SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
channel_value_satoshis,
+ (0, 0),
))
}
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
channel_value_satoshis,
+ (0, 0),
)
} else {
InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
channel_value_satoshis,
+ (0, 0),
)
})
}
output: TxOut,
},
/// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after a CSV delay.
- /// The private key which should be used to sign the transaction is provided, as well as the
- /// full witness redeemScript which is hashed in the output script_pubkey.
+ ///
/// The witness in the spending input should be:
- /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <empty vector> (MINIMALIF standard rule)
- /// <witness_script as provided>
- /// Note that the nSequence field in the input must be set to_self_delay (which corresponds to
- /// the transaction not being broadcastable until at least to_self_delay blocks after the input
- /// confirms).
+ /// <BIP 143 signature> <empty vector> (MINIMALIF standard rule) <provided witnessScript>
+ ///
+ /// Note that the nSequence field in the spending input must be set to to_self_delay
+ /// (which means the transaction is not broadcastable until at least to_self_delay
+ /// blocks after the outpoint confirms).
+ ///
/// These are generally the result of a "revocable" output to us, spendable only by us unless
- /// it is an output from us having broadcast an old state (which should never happen).
+ /// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen).
+ ///
+ /// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the
+ /// local delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
+ /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
+ /// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key
+ /// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
+ /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().
+ ///
+ /// To derive the remote_revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
+ /// script generation), you must pass the remote revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
+ /// call to ChannelKeys::set_remote_channel_pubkeys) and the provided per_commitment point
+ /// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
+ ///
+ /// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
+ /// regenerated by passing the revocation_pubkey (derived as above), our delayed_payment pubkey
+ /// (derived as above), and the to_self_delay contained here to
+ /// chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript.
+ //
+ // TODO: we need to expose utility methods in KeyManager to do all the relevant derivation.
DynamicOutputP2WSH {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// The secret key which must be used to sign the spending transaction
- key: SecretKey,
- /// The witness redeemScript which is hashed to create the script_pubkey in the given output
- witness_script: Script,
+ /// Per commitment point to derive delayed_payment_key by key holder
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
/// The nSequence value which must be set in the spending input to satisfy the OP_CSV in
/// the witness_script.
to_self_delay: u16,
/// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
output: TxOut,
+ /// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
+ /// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
+ /// The remote_revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
+ remote_revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
},
- // TODO: Note that because key is now static and exactly what is provided by us, we should drop
- // this in favor of StaticOutput:
- /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by the given private key.
+ /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
+ /// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point).
/// The witness in the spending input, is, thus, simply:
- /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <public key derived from the given key>
+ /// <BIP 143 signature> <payment key>
+ ///
/// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state,
/// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately.
- DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ StaticOutputRemotePayment {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// The secret key which must be used to sign the spending transaction
- key: SecretKey,
/// The output which is reference by the given outpoint
output: TxOut,
+ /// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
+ /// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
}
}
outpoint.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref remote_revocation_pubkey } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
- witness_script.write(writer)?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
+ remote_revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
},
}
Ok(())
}),
1u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- key: Readable::read(reader)?,
- witness_script: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ per_commitment_point: Readable::read(reader)?,
to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
+ remote_revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
}),
- 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- key: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
}),
_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
fn commitment_seed<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a [u8; 32];
/// Gets the local channel public keys and basepoints
fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys;
+ /// Gets arbitrary identifiers describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ /// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. These should be sufficient to identify this
+ /// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64);
/// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
///
/// return value must contain a signature.
fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+ /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
+ /// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ ///
+ /// A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ /// It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ ///
+ /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ ///
+ /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _local_ secret key and does
+ /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our local revocation_secret to do
+ /// so).
+ ///
+ /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
+ /// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
+ /// signatures).
+ ///
+ /// on_remote_tx_csv is the relative lock-time that that our counterparty would have to set on
+ /// their transaction were they to spend the same output. It is included in the witness script
+ /// and thus committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a remote commitment
+ /// transaction, either offered or received.
+ ///
+ /// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ /// preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ /// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ /// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ ///
+ /// Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ /// outputs.
+ ///
+ /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ ///
+ /// Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ /// BIP 143 signature.
+ fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
pub(crate) remote_channel_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
/// The total value of this channel
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// Key derivation parameters
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
}
impl InMemoryChannelKeys {
delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
- channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64)) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
let local_channel_pubkeys =
InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
channel_value_satoshis,
local_channel_pubkeys,
remote_channel_pubkeys: None,
+ key_derivation_params,
}
}
htlc_basepoint: from_secret(&htlc_base_key),
}
}
+
+ fn remote_pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap() }
}
impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
fn htlc_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.htlc_base_key }
fn commitment_seed(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { &self.commitment_seed }
fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys }
+ fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.key_derivation_params }
fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
local_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, local_csv, secp_ctx)
}
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
+ Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
+ Ok(revocation_pubkey) => revocation_pubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let witness_script = if let &Some(ref htlc) = htlc {
+ let remote_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) => remote_htlcpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let local_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(local_htlcpubkey) => local_htlcpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ } else {
+ let remote_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) {
+ Ok(remote_delayedpubkey) => remote_delayedpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, on_remote_tx_csv, &remote_delayedpubkey)
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&justice_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]);
+ return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
+ let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
+ if let Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ if let Ok(local_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ } else { return Err(()) }
+ } else { return Err(()) }
+ } else { return Err(()) };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]);
+ return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key))
+ }
+ Err(())
+ }
+
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
self.commitment_seed.write(writer)?;
self.remote_channel_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ self.key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
+ let params_1 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let params_2 = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok(InMemoryChannelKeys {
funding_key,
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys
+ remote_channel_pubkeys,
+ key_derivation_params: (params_1, params_2),
})
}
}
channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- unique_start: Sha256State,
+ seed: [u8; 32],
+ starting_time_secs: u64,
+ starting_time_nanos: u32,
}
impl KeysManager {
let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
- unique_start.input(seed);
-
KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
node_secret,
channel_id_master_key,
channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- unique_start,
+ seed: *seed,
+ starting_time_secs,
+ starting_time_nanos,
}
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
}
}
-}
-
-impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
- type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
-
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
- self.node_secret.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- self.destination_script.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
+ fn derive_unique_start(&self) -> Sha256State {
+ let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_secs));
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos));
+ unique_start.input(&self.seed);
+ unique_start
}
+ /// Derive an old set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets based on a key derivation
+ /// parameters.
+ /// Key derivation parameters are accessible through a per-channel secrets
+ /// ChannelKeys::key_derivation_params and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of
+ /// onchain output detection for which a corresponding delayed_payment_key must be derived.
+ pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params_1: u64, params_2: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ let chan_id = ((params_1 & 0xFFFF_FFFF_0000_0000) >> 32) as u32;
+ let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(params_2));
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(params_1 as u32));
+ unique_start.input(&self.seed);
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
// We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure
// entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
// starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
-
- let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(chan_id).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- let seed = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner();
let commitment_seed = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
delayed_payment_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
- channel_value_satoshis
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ (params_1, params_2),
)
}
+}
+
+impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
+ type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
+
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.node_secret.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ self.destination_script.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let ix_and_nanos: u64 = (child_ix as u64) << 32 | (self.starting_time_nanos as u64);
+ self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, ix_and_nanos, self.starting_time_secs)
+ }
fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+ let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
}
fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+ let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
}
}
-/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
-/// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
+/// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
Ok(key)
}
-pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
+/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
+/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
base_point.combine(&hashkey)
}
-/// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
+///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
Ok(part_a)
}
-pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
+/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
+/// public key instead of private keys.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
- /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
- /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
- /// broadcast an old state.
+ /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
+ /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
+ /// states.
pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
/// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
/// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
}
}
-/// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
-/// the revocation key
-pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+/// A script either spendable by the revocation
+/// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
+/// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
+pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10_000_000,
+ (0, 0)
);
assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}
+/// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
+/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
+ per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
+}
+
+impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
+ self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
+ w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.write(w)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let remote_commitment_transaction = {
+ let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
+ let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
+ htlcs.push(htlc);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ remote_htlc_base_key,
+ on_remote_tx_csv,
+ per_htlc,
+ }
+ };
+ Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
+ }
+}
+
/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
Revoked {
- witness_script: Script,
- pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- key: SecretKey,
- is_htlc: bool,
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
+ input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
amount: u64,
+ htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
+ on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
},
RemoteHTLC {
- witness_script: Script,
- key: SecretKey,
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- locktime: u32,
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
},
LocalHTLC {
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
match self {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- witness_script.write(writer)?;
- pubkey.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
- is_htlc.write(writer)?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
+ input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
+ on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
+ &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- witness_script.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
},
&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
- let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
InputMaterial::Revoked {
- witness_script,
- pubkey,
- key,
- is_htlc,
- amount
+ per_commitment_point,
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ remote_htlc_base_key,
+ per_commitment_key,
+ input_descriptor,
+ amount,
+ htlc,
+ on_remote_tx_csv
}
},
1 => {
- let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
- witness_script,
- key,
+ per_commitment_point,
+ remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ remote_htlc_base_key,
preimage,
- amount,
- locktime
+ htlc
}
},
2 => {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
destination_script: Script,
- broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
+ broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
remote_payment_script: Script,
shutdown_script: Script,
current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
- our_to_self_delay: u16,
- their_to_self_delay: u16,
+ on_local_tx_csv: u16,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
- self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
- self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
- self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
+ self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
},
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
- our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
- their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
+ on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay);
+ let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
+
+ let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ remote_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay,
+ on_local_tx_csv,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
}
}
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
+ for htlc in htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+ htlcs.push(htlc.0);
+ }
+ }
+ self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
+ /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
if self.local_tx_signed {
return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
- let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
- let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
}
}
if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
- let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
- let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
+ self.remote_payment_script = {
+ // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
+ // script_pubkey version
+ let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.keys.payment_key()).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
+ };
// Then, try to find htlc outputs
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
+ let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
- Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
- } else { None };
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
- key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
- witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
- to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
+ per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
+ to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
output: outp.clone(),
+ key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
+ remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
});
break;
}
} else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
- key: self.keys.payment_key().clone(),
output: outp.clone(),
+ key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
});
break;
} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
+ Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
},
1 => { None },
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
};
- let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
current_remote_commitment_txid,
prev_remote_commitment_txid,
- their_htlc_base_key,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ remote_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points,
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay,
+ on_local_tx_csv,
commitment_secrets,
remote_claimable_outpoints,
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
+ (0, 0)
);
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
}
macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
- ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
+ ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr, $keysinterface: expr, $chan_value: expr) => {
{
let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let mut txn = Vec::new();
Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
for outp in outputs {
match *outp {
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
output: vec![outp],
};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
+ let keys = $keysinterface.derive_channel_keys($chan_value, key_derivation_params.0, key_derivation_params.1);
+ let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.payment_key());
let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &keys.payment_key());
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
txn.push(spend_tx);
},
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref remote_revocation_pubkey } => {
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
output: vec![outp],
};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ let keys = $keysinterface.derive_channel_keys($chan_value, key_derivation_params.0, key_derivation_params.1);
+ if let Ok(delayed_payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
+
+ let delayed_payment_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &delayed_payment_key);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(remote_revocation_pubkey, *to_self_delay, &delayed_payment_pubkey);
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let local_delayedsig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &delayed_payment_key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delayedsig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!()); //MINIMALIF
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ } else { panic!() }
txn.push(spend_tx);
},
SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote (*2), timeout_tx.output (*1)
check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0].clone());
}
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
// Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
// Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5); // Duplicated SpendableOutput due to block rescan after revoked htlc output tracking
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.bitcoin_hash());
// Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[2], htlc_timeout);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_key_derivation_params() {
+ // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
+ // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
+ // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+
+ // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ let mut seed = [0; 32];
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+ let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
+ let chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
+ let node = NodeCfg { chain_monitor: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_monitor, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chan_monitor, keys_manager, node_seed: seed };
+ let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ node_cfgs.remove(0);
+ node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
+ // for node 0
+ let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
+
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
+ let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
+ let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
+ assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
+
+ // We check funding pubkey are unique
+ let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
+ let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
+ if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
+ || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
+ || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
+ || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
+ panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
+ }
+
+ // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn_1[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let htlc_timeout = {
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
+ node_txn[0].clone()
+ };
+
+ let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.bitcoin_hash());
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
+
+ // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1, new_keys_manager, 100000);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[2], htlc_timeout);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
}
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 0);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
use ln::channelmanager::PaymentPreimage;
-use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCType, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
use util::logger::Logger;
}
}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub(super) enum InputDescriptors {
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Copy)]
+pub(crate) enum InputDescriptors {
RevokedOfferedHTLC,
RevokedReceivedHTLC,
OfferedHTLC,
RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
}
+impl Writeable for InputDescriptors {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ },
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ },
+ &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ },
+ &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
+ writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
+ }
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
+ writer.write_all(&[4; 1])?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for InputDescriptors {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let input_descriptor = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC
+ },
+ 4 => {
+ InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ Ok(input_descriptor)
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
($logger: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
{
local_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
prev_local_commitment: Option<LocalCommitmentTransaction>,
prev_local_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
- local_csv: u16,
+ on_local_tx_csv: u16,
key_storage: ChanSigner,
self.prev_local_commitment.write(writer)?;
self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
- self.local_csv.write(writer)?;
+ self.on_local_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
self.key_storage.write(writer)?;
let prev_local_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_local_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_local_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
let key_storage = Readable::read(reader)?;
local_htlc_sigs,
prev_local_commitment,
prev_local_htlc_sigs,
- local_csv,
+ on_local_tx_csv,
key_storage,
claimable_outpoints,
pending_claim_requests,
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
- pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, local_csv: u16) -> Self {
+ pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, on_local_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
let key_storage = keys;
local_htlc_sigs: None,
prev_local_commitment: None,
prev_local_htlc_sigs: None,
- local_csv,
+ on_local_tx_csv,
key_storage,
pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
let mut dynamic_fee = true;
for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
- inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref input_descriptor, ref amount, .. } => {
+ inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[*input_descriptor]);
amt += *amount;
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
+ &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref htlc, .. } => {
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
- amt += *amount;
+ amt += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
},
&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
dynamic_fee = false;
for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &witness_script, *amount)[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if *is_htlc {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv } => {
+ if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+
+ let witness_script = if let Some(ref htlc) = *htlc {
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &chan_keys.a_htlc_key, &chan_keys.b_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key)
+ } else {
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, *on_remote_tx_csv, &chan_keys.a_delayed_payment_key)
+ };
+
+ if let Ok(sig) = self.key_storage.sign_justice_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, *amount, &per_commitment_key, htlc, *on_remote_tx_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if htlc.is_some() {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ }
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ } else { return None; }
+ //TODO: panic ?
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { "to_local" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC { "offered" } else if *input_descriptor == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
}
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
},
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
- if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &witness_script, *amount)[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
- } else {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
+ &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc } => {
+ if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &self.key_storage.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &chan_keys.a_htlc_key, &chan_keys.b_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+
+ if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = htlc.cltv_expiry }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
+ if let Ok(sig) = self.key_storage.sign_remote_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &per_commitment_point, htlc, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
+ } else {
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
+ }
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
}
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- log_trace!(logger, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
},
_ => unreachable!()
}
fn sign_latest_local_htlcs(&mut self) {
if let Some(ref local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.on_local_tx_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
self.local_htlc_sigs = Some(Vec::new());
let ret = self.local_htlc_sigs.as_mut().unwrap();
for (htlc_idx, (local_sig, &(ref htlc, _))) in sigs.iter().zip(local_commitment.per_htlc.iter()).enumerate() {
}
fn sign_prev_local_htlcs(&mut self) {
if let Some(ref local_commitment) = self.prev_local_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment, self.on_local_tx_csv, &self.secp_ctx) {
self.prev_local_htlc_sigs = Some(Vec::new());
let ret = self.prev_local_htlc_sigs.as_mut().unwrap();
for (htlc_idx, (local_sig, &(ref htlc, _))) in sigs.iter().zip(local_commitment.per_htlc.iter()).enumerate() {
if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.local_htlc_sigs {
let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
htlc_tx = Some(self.local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap()
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.local_csv));
+ .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.on_local_tx_csv));
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_local_htlc_sigs {
let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
htlc_tx = Some(self.prev_local_commitment.as_ref().unwrap()
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.local_csv));
+ .get_signed_htlc_tx(*htlc_idx, htlc_sig, preimage, self.on_local_tx_csv));
}
}
}
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
use ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager};
-use util::ser::VecWriter;
+use util::ser::{VecWriter, Writeable};
use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NextNoiseStep};
use ln::wire;
use ln::wire::Encode;
}
}
+ /// Append a message to a peer's pending outbound/write buffer, and update the map of peers needing sends accordingly.
+ fn enqueue_message<M: Encode + Writeable>(&self, peers_needing_send: &mut HashSet<Descriptor>, peer: &mut Peer, descriptor: Descriptor, message: &M) {
+ let mut buffer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ wire::write(message, &mut buffer).unwrap(); // crash if the write failed
+ let encoded_message = buffer.0;
+
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Enqueueing message of type {} to {}", message.type_id(), log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_message[..]));
+ peers_needing_send.insert(descriptor);
+ }
+
fn do_read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
let pause_read = {
let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
if peer.pending_read_buffer_pos == peer.pending_read_buffer.len() {
peer.pending_read_buffer_pos = 0;
- macro_rules! encode_and_send_msg {
- ($msg: expr) => {
- {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Encoding and sending message of type {} to {}", $msg.type_id(), log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(&$msg)[..]));
- peers.peers_needing_send.insert(peer_descriptor.clone());
- }
- }
- }
-
macro_rules! try_potential_handleerror {
($thing: expr) => {
match $thing {
},
msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Got Err handling message, sending Error message because {}", e.err);
- encode_and_send_msg!(msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut peers.peers_needing_send, peer, peer_descriptor.clone(), &msg);
continue;
},
}
}
let resp = msgs::Init { features };
- encode_and_send_msg!(resp);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut peers.peers_needing_send, peer, peer_descriptor.clone(), &resp);
},
NextNoiseStep::ActThree => {
let their_node_id = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_three(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
}
let resp = msgs::Init { features };
- encode_and_send_msg!(resp);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut peers.peers_needing_send, peer, peer_descriptor.clone(), &resp);
}
self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_connected(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
wire::Message::Ping(msg) => {
if msg.ponglen < 65532 {
let resp = msgs::Pong { byteslen: msg.ponglen };
- encode_and_send_msg!(resp);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut peers.peers_needing_send, peer, peer_descriptor.clone(), &resp);
}
},
wire::Message::Pong(_msg) => {
fn htlc_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { self.inner.htlc_base_key() }
fn commitment_seed(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { self.inner.commitment_seed() }
fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
+ fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.inner.key_derivation_params() }
fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("lightning commitment transactions have a single input"); }
Ok(self.inner.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment_tx, local_csv, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_transaction(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, on_remote_tx_csv, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_remote_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
&SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, .. } => {
write!(f, "DynamicOutputP2WSH {}:{} marked for spending", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout)?;
}
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, .. } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { ref outpoint, .. } => {
write!(f, "DynamicOutputP2WPKH {}:{} marked for spending", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout)?;
}
}
override_channel_id_priv: Mutex::new(None),
}
}
+ pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id_1: u64, user_id_2: u64) -> EnforcingChannelKeys {
+ EnforcingChannelKeys::new(self.backing.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, user_id_1, user_id_2))
+ }
}
pub struct TestChainWatcher {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff