without exception contributes patch proposals using "pull requests". This
facilitates social contribution, easy testing and peer review.
-To contribute a patch, the worflow is a as follows:
+To contribute a patch, the workflow is as follows:
1. Fork Repository
2. Create topic branch
be covered by functional tests.
When refactoring, structure your PR to make it easy to review and don't
-hestitate to split it into multiple small, focused PRs.
+hesitate to split it into multiple small, focused PRs.
The Minimum Supported Rust Version is 1.41.1 (enforced by our GitHub Actions).
[dependencies]
afl = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
lightning = { path = "../lightning", features = ["regex"] }
-bitcoin = { version = "0.27", features = ["fuzztarget", "secp-lowmemory"] }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", features = ["secp-lowmemory"] }
hex = "0.3"
honggfuzz = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
libfuzzer-sys = { git = "https://github.com/rust-fuzz/libfuzzer-sys.git", optional = true }
cargo install --force honggfuzz
```
+In some environments, you may want to pin the honggfuzz version to `0.5.52`:
+
+```shell
+cargo update -p honggfuzz --precise "0.5.52"
+cargo install --force honggfuzz --version "0.5.52"
+```
+
### Execution
To run the Hongg fuzzer, do
export HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="-n $CPU_COUNT --exit_upon_crash"
export TARGET="msg_ping_target" # replace with the target to be fuzzed
-cargo hfuzz run $TARGET
+cargo hfuzz run $TARGET
```
+(Or, for a prettier output, replace the last line with `cargo --color always hfuzz run $TARGET`.)
+
To see a list of available fuzzing targets, run:
```shell
cargo test
```
+Note that if the fuzz test failed locally, moving the offending run's trace
+to the `test_cases` folder should also do the trick; simply replace the `echo $HEX |` line above
+with (the trace file name is of course a bit longer than in the example):
+
+```shell
+mv hfuzz_workspace/fuzz_target/SIGABRT.PC.7ffff7e21ce1.STACK.[…].fuzz ./test_cases/$TARGET/
+```
+
This will reproduce the failing fuzz input and yield a usable stack trace.
+
+
+## How do I add a new fuzz test?
+
+1. The easiest approach is to take one of the files in `fuzz/src/`, such as
+`process_network_graph.rs`, and duplicate it, renaming the new file to something more
+suitable. For the sake of example, let's call the new fuzz target we're creating
+`my_fuzzy_experiment`.
+
+2. In the newly created file `fuzz/src/my_fuzzy_experiment.rs`, run a string substitution
+of `process_network_graph` to `my_fuzzy_experiment`, such that the three methods in the
+file are `do_test`, `my_fuzzy_experiment_test`, and `my_fuzzy_experiment_run`.
+
+3. Adjust the body (not the signature!) of `do_test` as necessary for the new fuzz test.
+
+4. In `fuzz/src/bin/gen_target.sh`, add a line reading `GEN_TEST my_fuzzy_experiment` to the
+first group of `GEN_TEST` lines (starting in line 9).
+
+5. If your test relies on a new local crate, add that crate as a dependency to `fuzz/Cargo.toml`.
+
+6. In `fuzz/src/lib.rs`, add the line `pub mod my_fuzzy_experiment`. Additionally, if
+you added a new crate dependency, add the `extern crate […]` import line.
+
+7. Run `fuzz/src/bin/gen_target.sh`.
+
+8. There is no step eight: happy fuzzing!
use utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use std::mem;
use utils::test_logger;
use utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use std::cell::RefCell;
use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use utils::test_logger;
use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, RoutingFees};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use utils::test_logger;
+use std::convert::TryInto;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
count => {
for _ in 0..count {
scid += 1;
- let rnid = node_pks.iter().skip(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2))as usize % node_pks.len()).next().unwrap();
+ let rnid = node_pks.iter().skip(u16::from_be_bytes(get_slice!(2).try_into().unwrap()) as usize % node_pks.len()).next().unwrap();
+ let capacity = u64::from_be_bytes(get_slice!(8).try_into().unwrap());
first_hops_vec.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
channel_type: None,
short_channel_id: Some(scid),
inbound_scid_alias: None,
- channel_value_satoshis: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
+ channel_value_satoshis: capacity,
user_channel_id: 0, inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
confirmations_required: None,
is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
is_usable: true, is_public: true,
balance_msat: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: capacity.saturating_mul(1000),
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: capacity.saturating_mul(1000),
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: None,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
});
rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"]
[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.27"
+bitcoin = "0.28.1"
lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning", features = ["std"] }
[dev-dependencies]
use lightning::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{CustomMessageHandler, PeerManager, SocketDescriptor};
use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NetGraphMsgHandler};
+use lightning::routing::scoring::WriteableScore;
use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::persist::Persister;
/// [`NetworkGraph`]: lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph
/// [`NetworkGraph::write`]: lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph#impl-Writeable
pub fn start<
+ 'a,
Signer: 'static + Sign,
CA: 'static + Deref + Send + Sync,
CF: 'static + Deref + Send + Sync,
NG: 'static + Deref<Target = NetGraphMsgHandler<G, CA, L>> + Send + Sync,
UMH: 'static + Deref + Send + Sync,
PM: 'static + Deref<Target = PeerManager<Descriptor, CMH, RMH, L, UMH>> + Send + Sync,
+ S: 'static + Deref<Target = SC> + Send + Sync,
+ SC: WriteableScore<'a>,
>(
persister: PS, event_handler: EH, chain_monitor: M, channel_manager: CM,
- net_graph_msg_handler: Option<NG>, peer_manager: PM, logger: L
+ net_graph_msg_handler: Option<NG>, peer_manager: PM, logger: L, scorer: Option<S>
) -> Self
where
CA::Target: 'static + chain::Access,
CMH::Target: 'static + ChannelMessageHandler,
RMH::Target: 'static + RoutingMessageHandler,
UMH::Target: 'static + CustomMessageHandler,
- PS::Target: 'static + Persister<Signer, CW, T, K, F, L>
+ PS::Target: 'static + Persister<'a, Signer, CW, T, K, F, L, SC>,
{
let stop_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let stop_thread_clone = stop_thread.clone();
let mut have_pruned = false;
loop {
- peer_manager.process_events(); // Note that this may block on ChannelManager's locking
channel_manager.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
chain_monitor.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
+ // Note that the PeerManager::process_events may block on ChannelManager's locks,
+ // hence it comes last here. When the ChannelManager finishes whatever it's doing,
+ // we want to ensure we get into `persist_manager` as quickly as we can, especially
+ // without running the normal event processing above and handing events to users.
+ //
+ // Specifically, on an *extremely* slow machine, we may see ChannelManager start
+ // processing a message effectively at any point during this loop. In order to
+ // minimize the time between such processing completing and persisting the updated
+ // ChannelManager, we want to minimize methods blocking on a ChannelManager
+ // generally, and as a fallback place such blocking only immediately before
+ // persistence.
+ peer_manager.process_events();
+
// We wait up to 100ms, but track how long it takes to detect being put to sleep,
// see `await_start`'s use below.
let await_start = Instant::now();
if let Err(e) = persister.persist_graph(handler.network_graph()) {
log_error!(logger, "Error: Failed to persist network graph, check your disk and permissions {}", e)
}
- last_prune_call = Instant::now();
- have_pruned = true;
}
+ if let Some(ref scorer) = scorer {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Persisting scorer");
+ if let Err(e) = persister.persist_scorer(&scorer) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Error: Failed to persist scorer, check your disk and permissions {}", e)
+ }
+ }
+
+ last_prune_call = Instant::now();
+ have_pruned = true;
}
}
// ChannelMonitor update(s) persisted without a corresponding ChannelManager update.
persister.persist_manager(&*channel_manager)?;
+ // Persist Scorer on exit
+ if let Some(ref scorer) = scorer {
+ persister.persist_scorer(&scorer)?;
+ }
+
// Persist NetworkGraph on exit
if let Some(ref handler) = net_graph_msg_handler {
persister.persist_graph(handler.network_graph())?;
}
+
Ok(())
});
Self { stop_thread: stop_thread_clone, thread_handle: Some(handle) }
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
- use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, chainmonitor, self};
+ use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, chainmonitor};
use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
- use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Sign};
+ use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeysInterface, KeysManager};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::get_event_msg;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, SimpleArcChannelManager};
use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NetGraphMsgHandler};
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
use lightning::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, MessageSendEvent};
- use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::ser::Writeable;
use lightning::util::test_utils;
use lightning::util::persist::KVStorePersister;
use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, RetryAttempts};
use lightning_invoice::utils::DefaultRouter;
use lightning_persister::FilesystemPersister;
- use std::fs::{self, File};
- use std::ops::Deref;
+ use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::Duration;
+ use lightning::routing::scoring::{FixedPenaltyScorer};
use super::{BackgroundProcessor, FRESHNESS_TIMER};
const EVENT_DEADLINE: u64 = 5 * FRESHNESS_TIMER;
network_graph: Arc<NetworkGraph>,
logger: Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
best_block: BestBlock,
+ scorer: Arc<Mutex<FixedPenaltyScorer>>,
}
impl Drop for Node {
}
struct Persister {
- data_dir: String,
graph_error: Option<(std::io::ErrorKind, &'static str)>,
manager_error: Option<(std::io::ErrorKind, &'static str)>,
+ scorer_error: Option<(std::io::ErrorKind, &'static str)>,
filesystem_persister: FilesystemPersister,
}
impl Persister {
fn new(data_dir: String) -> Self {
let filesystem_persister = FilesystemPersister::new(data_dir.clone());
- Self { data_dir, graph_error: None, manager_error: None, filesystem_persister }
+ Self { graph_error: None, manager_error: None, scorer_error: None, filesystem_persister }
}
fn with_graph_error(self, error: std::io::ErrorKind, message: &'static str) -> Self {
fn with_manager_error(self, error: std::io::ErrorKind, message: &'static str) -> Self {
Self { manager_error: Some((error, message)), ..self }
}
+
+ fn with_scorer_error(self, error: std::io::ErrorKind, message: &'static str) -> Self {
+ Self { scorer_error: Some((error, message)), ..self }
+ }
}
impl KVStorePersister for Persister {
}
}
+ if key == "scorer" {
+ if let Some((error, message)) = self.scorer_error {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(error, message))
+ }
+ }
+
self.filesystem_persister.persist(key, object)
}
}
let net_graph_msg_handler = Some(Arc::new(NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph.clone(), Some(chain_source.clone()), logger.clone())));
let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new()), route_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new() )};
let peer_manager = Arc::new(PeerManager::new(msg_handler, keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), &seed, logger.clone(), IgnoringMessageHandler{}));
- let node = Node { node: manager, net_graph_msg_handler, peer_manager, chain_monitor, persister, tx_broadcaster, network_graph, logger, best_block };
+ let scorer = Arc::new(Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0)));
+ let node = Node { node: manager, net_graph_msg_handler, peer_manager, chain_monitor, persister, tx_broadcaster, network_graph, logger, best_block, scorer };
nodes.push(node);
}
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir));
let event_handler = |_: &_| {};
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
macro_rules! check_persisted_data {
($node: expr, $filepath: expr) => {
check_persisted_data!(network_graph, filepath.clone());
}
+ // Check scorer is persisted
+ let filepath = get_full_filepath("test_background_processor_persister_0".to_string(), "scorer".to_string());
+ check_persisted_data!(nodes[0].scorer, filepath.clone());
+
assert!(bg_processor.stop().is_ok());
}
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir));
let event_handler = |_: &_| {};
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
loop {
let log_entries = nodes[0].logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
let desired_log = "Calling ChannelManager's timer_tick_occurred".to_string();
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir).with_manager_error(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "test"));
let event_handler = |_: &_| {};
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
match bg_processor.join() {
Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error persisting manager"),
Err(e) => {
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir).with_graph_error(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "test"));
let event_handler = |_: &_| {};
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
match bg_processor.stop() {
Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error persisting network graph"),
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_scorer_persist_error() {
+ // Test that if we encounter an error during scorer persistence, an error gets returned.
+ let nodes = create_nodes(2, "test_persist_scorer_error".to_string());
+ let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
+ let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir).with_scorer_error(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "test"));
+ let event_handler = |_: &_| {};
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
+
+ match bg_processor.stop() {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error persisting scorer"),
+ Err(e) => {
+ assert_eq!(e.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::Other);
+ assert_eq!(e.get_ref().unwrap().to_string(), "test");
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_background_event_handling() {
let mut nodes = create_nodes(2, "test_background_event_handling".to_string());
let event_handler = move |event: &Event| {
sender.send(handle_funding_generation_ready!(event, channel_value)).unwrap();
};
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
// Open a channel and check that the FundingGenerationReady event was handled.
begin_open_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_value);
let (sender, receiver) = std::sync::mpsc::sync_channel(1);
let event_handler = move |event: &Event| sender.send(event.clone()).unwrap();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir));
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
// Force close the channel and check that the SpendableOutputs event was handled.
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
// Initiate the background processors to watch each node.
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir));
- let scorer = Arc::new(Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0)));
let router = DefaultRouter::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].network_graph), Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), random_seed_bytes);
- let invoice_payer = Arc::new(InvoicePayer::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].node), router, scorer, Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), |_: &_| {}, RetryAttempts(2)));
+ let invoice_payer = Arc::new(InvoicePayer::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].node), router, Arc::clone(&nodes[0].scorer), Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), |_: &_| {}, RetryAttempts(2)));
let event_handler = Arc::clone(&invoice_payer);
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
assert!(bg_processor.stop().is_ok());
}
}
rpc-client = [ "serde", "serde_json", "chunked_transfer" ]
[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.27"
+bitcoin = "0.28.1"
lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning" }
futures = { version = "0.3" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "net", "time" ], optional = true }
use crate::{BlockSource, BlockSourceResult, Cache, ChainNotifier};
use crate::poll::{ChainPoller, Validate, ValidatedBlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
struct DynamicChainListener<'a, L: chain::Listen + ?Sized>(&'a L);
impl<'a, L: chain::Listen + ?Sized> chain::Listen for DynamicChainListener<'a, L> {
- fn block_connected(&self, _block: &Block, _height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, _txdata: &chain::transaction::TransactionData, _height: u32) {
unreachable!()
}
struct ChainListenerSet<'a, L: chain::Listen + ?Sized>(Vec<(u32, &'a L)>);
impl<'a, L: chain::Listen + ?Sized> chain::Listen for ChainListenerSet<'a, L> {
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &chain::transaction::TransactionData, height: u32) {
for (starting_height, chain_listener) in self.0.iter() {
if height > *starting_height {
- chain_listener.block_connected(block, height);
+ chain_listener.filtered_block_connected(header, txdata, height);
}
}
}
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::bitcoin_merkle_root;
+use bitcoin::Transaction;
use lightning::chain;
let prev_block = &self.blocks[i - 1];
let prev_blockhash = prev_block.block_hash();
let time = prev_block.header.time + height as u32;
+ // Must have at least one transaction, because the merkle root is not defined for an empty block
+ // and we would fail when we later checked, as of bitcoin crate 0.28.0.
+ // Note that elsewhere in tests we assume that the merkle root of an empty block is all zeros,
+ // but that's OK because those tests don't trigger the check.
+ let coinbase = Transaction {
+ version: 0,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![],
+ output: vec![]
+ };
+ let merkle_root = bitcoin_merkle_root(vec![coinbase.txid().as_hash()].into_iter()).unwrap();
self.blocks.push(Block {
header: BlockHeader {
version: 0,
prev_blockhash,
- merkle_root: Default::default(),
+ merkle_root: merkle_root.into(),
time,
bits,
nonce: 0,
},
- txdata: vec![],
+ txdata: vec![coinbase],
});
}
self
pub struct NullChainListener;
impl chain::Listen for NullChainListener {
- fn block_connected(&self, _block: &Block, _height: u32) {}
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, _txdata: &chain::transaction::TransactionData, _height: u32) {}
fn block_disconnected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {}
}
}
impl chain::Listen for MockChainListener {
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _txdata: &chain::transaction::TransactionData, height: u32) {
match self.expected_blocks_connected.borrow_mut().pop_front() {
None => {
- panic!("Unexpected block connected: {:?}", block.block_hash());
+ panic!("Unexpected block connected: {:?}", header.block_hash());
},
Some(expected_block) => {
- assert_eq!(block.block_hash(), expected_block.header.block_hash());
+ assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), expected_block.header.block_hash());
assert_eq!(height, expected_block.height);
},
}
[dependencies]
bech32 = { version = "0.8", default-features = false }
lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
-secp256k1 = { version = "0.20", default-features = false, features = ["recovery", "alloc"] }
+secp256k1 = { version = "0.22", default-features = false, features = ["recovery", "alloc"] }
num-traits = { version = "0.2.8", default-features = false }
bitcoin_hashes = { version = "0.10", default-features = false }
hashbrown = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
use num_traits::{CheckedAdd, CheckedMul};
use secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::recovery::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
+use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use super::{Invoice, Sha256, TaggedField, ExpiryTime, MinFinalCltvExpiry, Fallback, PayeePubKey, InvoiceSignature, PositiveTimestamp,
SemanticError, PrivateRoute, ParseError, ParseOrSemanticError, Description, RawTaggedField, Currency, RawHrp, SiPrefix, RawInvoice,
#[test]
fn test_payment_secret_and_features_de_and_ser() {
use lightning::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
- use secp256k1::recovery::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
+ use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
use TaggedField::*;
use {SiPrefix, SignedRawInvoice, InvoiceSignature, RawInvoice, RawHrp, RawDataPart,
Currency, Sha256, PositiveTimestamp};
#[test]
fn test_raw_signed_invoice_deserialization() {
use TaggedField::*;
- use secp256k1::recovery::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
+ use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
use {SignedRawInvoice, InvoiceSignature, RawInvoice, RawHrp, RawDataPart, Currency, Sha256,
PositiveTimestamp};
use lightning::routing::router::RouteHint;
use lightning::util::invoice::construct_invoice_preimage;
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use secp256k1::{Message, Secp256k1};
-use secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
+use secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
use core::fmt::{Display, Formatter, self};
use core::iter::FilterMap;
/// use bitcoin_hashes::sha256;
///
/// use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-/// use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
+/// use secp256k1::SecretKey;
///
/// use lightning::ln::PaymentSecret;
///
/// .current_timestamp()
/// .min_final_cltv_expiry(144)
/// .build_signed(|hash| {
-/// Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
+/// Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
/// })
/// .unwrap();
///
let hash = Message::from_slice(&self.hash[..])
.expect("Hash is 32 bytes long, same as MESSAGE_SIZE");
- Ok(PayeePubKey(Secp256k1::new().recover(
+ Ok(PayeePubKey(Secp256k1::new().recover_ecdsa(
&hash,
&self.signature
)?))
.expect("Hash is 32 bytes long, same as MESSAGE_SIZE");
let secp_context = Secp256k1::new();
- let verification_result = secp_context.verify(
+ let verification_result = secp_context.verify_ecdsa(
&hash,
&self.signature.to_standard(),
pub_key
fn test_check_signature() {
use TaggedField::*;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::recovery::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+ use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoveryId, RecoverableSignature};
+ use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use {SignedRawInvoice, InvoiceSignature, RawInvoice, RawHrp, RawDataPart, Currency, Sha256,
PositiveTimestamp};
let (raw_invoice, _, _) = invoice.into_parts();
let new_signed = raw_invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| {
- Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key))
+ Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key))
}).unwrap();
assert!(new_signed.check_signature());
use TaggedField::*;
use lightning::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
+ use secp256k1::SecretKey;
use {RawInvoice, RawHrp, RawDataPart, Currency, Sha256, PositiveTimestamp, Invoice,
SemanticError};
let invoice = {
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(PaymentSecret(payment_secret).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::InvalidFeatures));
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(PaymentSecret(payment_secret).into());
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(Features(InvoiceFeatures::empty()).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::InvalidFeatures));
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(PaymentSecret(payment_secret).into());
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(Features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice).is_ok());
// No payment secret or features
let invoice = {
let invoice = invoice_template.clone();
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::NoPaymentSecret));
let invoice = {
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(Features(InvoiceFeatures::empty()).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::NoPaymentSecret));
let invoice = {
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(Features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::NoPaymentSecret));
let mut invoice = invoice_template.clone();
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(PaymentSecret(payment_secret).into());
invoice.data.tagged_fields.push(PaymentSecret(payment_secret).into());
- invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
+ invoice.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| Ok(Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)))
}.unwrap();
assert_eq!(Invoice::from_signed(invoice), Err(SemanticError::MultiplePaymentSecrets));
}
use ::*;
use lightning::routing::router::RouteHintHop;
use std::iter::FromIterator;
- use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+ use secp256k1::PublicKey;
let builder = InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
.payment_hash(sha256::Hash::from_slice(&[0;32][..]).unwrap())
use ::*;
use lightning::routing::router::RouteHintHop;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+ use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use std::time::{UNIX_EPOCH, Duration};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
.basic_mpp();
let invoice = builder.clone().build_signed(|hash| {
- secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
+ secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
}).unwrap();
assert!(invoice.check_signature().is_ok());
fn test_default_values() {
use ::*;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
+ use secp256k1::SecretKey;
let signed_invoice = InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
.description("Test".into())
.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| {
let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- Ok(secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(hash, &privkey))
+ Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &privkey))
})
.unwrap();
let invoice = Invoice::from_signed(signed_invoice).unwrap();
fn test_expiration() {
use ::*;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
+ use secp256k1::SecretKey;
let signed_invoice = InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
.description("Test".into())
.sign::<_, ()>(|hash| {
let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- Ok(secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(hash, &privkey))
+ Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &privkey))
})
.unwrap();
let invoice = Invoice::from_signed(signed_invoice).unwrap();
//! # use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
//! # use lightning_invoice::Invoice;
//! # use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, Payer, RetryAttempts, Router};
-//! # use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+//! # use secp256k1::PublicKey;
//! # use std::cell::RefCell;
//! # use std::ops::Deref;
//! #
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::sync::Mutex;
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
.min_final_cltv_expiry(144)
.amount_milli_satoshis(128)
.build_signed(|hash| {
- Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
+ Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
})
.unwrap()
}
.duration_since_epoch(duration_since_epoch())
.min_final_cltv_expiry(144)
.build_signed(|hash| {
- Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
+ Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
})
.unwrap()
}
.min_final_cltv_expiry(144)
.amount_milli_satoshis(128)
.build_signed(|hash| {
- Secp256k1::new().sign_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
+ Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash, &private_key)
})
.unwrap()
}
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
- duration_since_epoch()).unwrap())
+ duration_since_epoch(), 3600).unwrap())
.is_ok());
let htlc_msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(htlc_msgs.len(), 2);
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
- duration_since_epoch()).unwrap())
+ duration_since_epoch(), 3600).unwrap())
.is_ok());
let htlc_msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(htlc_msgs.len(), 2);
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
- duration_since_epoch()).unwrap())
+ duration_since_epoch(), 3600).unwrap())
.is_ok());
let htlc_updates = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
//! Convenient utilities to create an invoice.
-use {CreationError, Currency, DEFAULT_EXPIRY_TIME, Invoice, InvoiceBuilder, SignOrCreationError};
+use {CreationError, Currency, Invoice, InvoiceBuilder, SignOrCreationError};
use payment::{Payer, Router};
use crate::{prelude::*, Description, InvoiceDescription, Sha256};
use lightning::routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, RoutingFees};
use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
+use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
use sync::Mutex;
.current_timestamp()
.payment_hash(Hash::from_slice(&payment_hash.0).unwrap())
.payment_secret(payment_secret)
- .min_final_cltv_expiry(MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY.into());
+ .min_final_cltv_expiry(MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY.into())
+ .expiry_time(Duration::from_secs(invoice_expiry_delta_secs.into()));
if let Some(amt) = amt_msat {
invoice = invoice.amount_milli_satoshis(amt);
}
/// method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user
/// doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify
/// that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid.
+///
+/// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+/// in excess of the current time.
pub fn create_invoice_from_channelmanager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channelmanager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>, keys_manager: K, network: Currency,
- amt_msat: Option<u64>, description: String
+ amt_msat: Option<u64>, description: String, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
) -> Result<Invoice, SignOrCreationError<()>>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
let duration = SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("for the foreseeable future this shouldn't happen");
create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
- channelmanager, keys_manager, network, amt_msat, description, duration
+ channelmanager, keys_manager, network, amt_msat, description, duration,
+ invoice_expiry_delta_secs
)
}
/// doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify
/// that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid.
/// Use this variant if you want to pass the `description_hash` to the invoice.
+///
+/// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+/// in excess of the current time.
pub fn create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channelmanager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>, keys_manager: K, network: Currency,
- amt_msat: Option<u64>, description_hash: Sha256,
+ amt_msat: Option<u64>, description_hash: Sha256, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
) -> Result<Invoice, SignOrCreationError<()>>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
.expect("for the foreseeable future this shouldn't happen");
create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(
- channelmanager, keys_manager, network, amt_msat, description_hash, duration,
+ channelmanager, keys_manager, network, amt_msat,
+ description_hash, duration, invoice_expiry_delta_secs
)
}
pub fn create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channelmanager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>, keys_manager: K, network: Currency,
amt_msat: Option<u64>, description_hash: Sha256, duration_since_epoch: Duration,
+ invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
) -> Result<Invoice, SignOrCreationError<()>>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
_create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
channelmanager, keys_manager, network, amt_msat,
InvoiceDescription::Hash(&description_hash),
- duration_since_epoch,
+ duration_since_epoch, invoice_expiry_delta_secs
)
}
pub fn create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channelmanager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>, keys_manager: K, network: Currency,
amt_msat: Option<u64>, description: String, duration_since_epoch: Duration,
+ invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
) -> Result<Invoice, SignOrCreationError<()>>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
InvoiceDescription::Direct(
&Description::new(description).map_err(SignOrCreationError::CreationError)?,
),
- duration_since_epoch,
+ duration_since_epoch, invoice_expiry_delta_secs
)
}
fn _create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channelmanager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>, keys_manager: K, network: Currency,
amt_msat: Option<u64>, description: InvoiceDescription, duration_since_epoch: Duration,
+ invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32
) -> Result<Invoice, SignOrCreationError<()>>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
// `create_inbound_payment` only returns an error if the amount is greater than the total bitcoin
// supply.
let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = channelmanager
- .create_inbound_payment(amt_msat, DEFAULT_EXPIRY_TIME.try_into().unwrap())
+ .create_inbound_payment(amt_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
.map_err(|()| SignOrCreationError::CreationError(CreationError::InvalidAmount))?;
let our_node_pubkey = channelmanager.get_our_node_id();
.payment_hash(Hash::from_slice(&payment_hash.0).unwrap())
.payment_secret(payment_secret)
.basic_mpp()
- .min_final_cltv_expiry(MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY.into());
+ .min_final_cltv_expiry(MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY.into())
+ .expiry_time(Duration::from_secs(invoice_expiry_delta_secs.into()));
if let Some(amt) = amt_msat {
invoice = invoice.amount_milli_satoshis(amt);
}
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_unannounced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let non_default_invoice_expiry_secs = 4200;
let invoice = create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet, Some(10_000), "test".to_string(),
- Duration::from_secs(1234567)).unwrap();
+ Duration::from_secs(1234567), non_default_invoice_expiry_secs).unwrap();
assert_eq!(invoice.amount_pico_btc(), Some(100_000));
assert_eq!(invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry(), MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY as u64);
assert_eq!(invoice.description(), InvoiceDescription::Direct(&Description("test".to_string())));
+ assert_eq!(invoice.expiry_time(), Duration::from_secs(non_default_invoice_expiry_secs.into()));
// Invoice SCIDs should always use inbound SCID aliases over the real channel ID, if one is
// available.
let description_hash = crate::Sha256(Hash::hash("Testing description_hash".as_bytes()));
let invoice = ::utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager_with_description_hash_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet, Some(10_000),
- description_hash, Duration::from_secs(1234567),
+ description_hash, Duration::from_secs(1234567), 3600
).unwrap();
assert_eq!(invoice.amount_pico_btc(), Some(100_000));
assert_eq!(invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry(), MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY as u64);
) {
let invoice = create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&invoice_node.node, invoice_node.keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet, invoice_amt, "test".to_string(),
- Duration::from_secs(1234567)).unwrap();
+ Duration::from_secs(1234567), 3600).unwrap();
let hints = invoice.private_routes();
for hint in hints {
} else {
None
};
+ let non_default_invoice_expiry_secs = 4200;
- let invoice = ::utils::create_phantom_invoice::<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface>(Some(payment_amt), payment_hash, "test".to_string(), 3600, route_hints, &nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet).unwrap();
+ let invoice =
+ ::utils::create_phantom_invoice::<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface>(
+ Some(payment_amt), payment_hash, "test".to_string(), non_default_invoice_expiry_secs,
+ route_hints, &nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet
+ ).unwrap();
let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = (PaymentHash(invoice.payment_hash().into_inner()), *invoice.payment_secret());
let payment_preimage = if user_generated_pmt_hash {
user_payment_preimage
assert_eq!(invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry(), MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY as u64);
assert_eq!(invoice.description(), InvoiceDescription::Direct(&Description("test".to_string())));
assert_eq!(invoice.route_hints().len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(invoice.expiry_time(), Duration::from_secs(non_default_invoice_expiry_secs.into()));
assert!(!invoice.features().unwrap().supports_basic_mpp());
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(invoice.recover_payee_pub_key())
];
let description_hash = crate::Sha256(Hash::hash("Description hash phantom invoice".as_bytes()));
- let invoice = ::utils::create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash::<EnforcingSigner,&test_utils::TestKeysInterface>(Some(payment_amt), None, 3600, description_hash, route_hints, &nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet).unwrap();
-
+ let non_default_invoice_expiry_secs = 4200;
+ let invoice = ::utils::create_phantom_invoice_with_description_hash::<
+ EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
+ >(
+ Some(payment_amt), None, non_default_invoice_expiry_secs, description_hash,
+ route_hints, &nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::BitcoinTestnet
+ )
+ .unwrap();
assert_eq!(invoice.amount_pico_btc(), Some(200_000));
assert_eq!(invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry(), MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY as u64);
+ assert_eq!(invoice.expiry_time(), Duration::from_secs(non_default_invoice_expiry_secs.into()));
assert_eq!(invoice.description(), InvoiceDescription::Hash(&crate::Sha256(Sha256::hash("Description hash phantom invoice".as_bytes()))));
}
use lightning::routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
use lightning_invoice::*;
use secp256k1::PublicKey;
-use secp256k1::recovery::{RecoverableSignature, RecoveryId};
+use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, RecoveryId};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::time::Duration;
use std::str::FromStr;
rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"]
[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.27"
+bitcoin = "0.28.1"
lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "macros", "rt", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
//! # Example
//! ```
//! use std::net::TcpStream;
-//! use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+//! use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
//! use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
//! use std::net::SocketAddr;
//! use std::sync::Arc;
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg))]
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::{io, time};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use std::task;
-use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::TcpStream as StdTcpStream;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
id: u64,
}
impl Connection {
+ async fn poll_event_process<CMH, RMH, L, UMH>(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor, Arc<CMH>, Arc<RMH>, Arc<L>, Arc<UMH>>>, mut event_receiver: mpsc::Receiver<()>) where
+ CMH: ChannelMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
+ RMH: RoutingMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
+ L: Logger + 'static + ?Sized + Send + Sync,
+ UMH: CustomMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync {
+ loop {
+ if event_receiver.recv().await.is_none() {
+ return;
+ }
+ peer_manager.process_events();
+ }
+ }
+
async fn schedule_read<CMH, RMH, L, UMH>(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor, Arc<CMH>, Arc<RMH>, Arc<L>, Arc<UMH>>>, us: Arc<Mutex<Self>>, mut reader: io::ReadHalf<TcpStream>, mut read_wake_receiver: mpsc::Receiver<()>, mut write_avail_receiver: mpsc::Receiver<()>) where
- CMH: ChannelMessageHandler + 'static,
- RMH: RoutingMessageHandler + 'static,
- L: Logger + 'static + ?Sized,
- UMH: CustomMessageHandler + 'static {
+ CMH: ChannelMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
+ RMH: RoutingMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
+ L: Logger + 'static + ?Sized + Send + Sync,
+ UMH: CustomMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync {
+ // Create a waker to wake up poll_event_process, above
+ let (event_waker, event_receiver) = mpsc::channel(1);
+ tokio::spawn(Self::poll_event_process(Arc::clone(&peer_manager), event_receiver));
+
// 8KB is nice and big but also should never cause any issues with stack overflowing.
let mut buf = [0; 8192];
Err(_) => break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected,
},
}
- peer_manager.process_events();
+ let _ = event_waker.try_send(());
+
+ // At this point we've processed a message or two, and reset the ping timer for this
+ // peer, at least in the "are we still receiving messages" context, if we don't give up
+ // our timeslice to another task we may just spin on this peer, starving other peers
+ // and eventually disconnecting them for ping timeouts. Instead, we explicitly yield
+ // here.
+ tokio::task::yield_now().await;
};
let writer_option = us.lock().unwrap().writer.take();
if let Some(mut writer) = writer_option {
}
}
+fn get_addr_from_stream(stream: &StdTcpStream) -> Option<NetAddress> {
+ match stream.peer_addr() {
+ Ok(SocketAddr::V4(sockaddr)) => Some(NetAddress::IPv4 {
+ addr: sockaddr.ip().octets(),
+ port: sockaddr.port(),
+ }),
+ Ok(SocketAddr::V6(sockaddr)) => Some(NetAddress::IPv6 {
+ addr: sockaddr.ip().octets(),
+ port: sockaddr.port(),
+ }),
+ Err(_) => None,
+ }
+}
+
/// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on the provided socket generated by
/// accepting an incoming connection.
///
RMH: RoutingMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
L: Logger + 'static + ?Sized + Send + Sync,
UMH: CustomMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync {
- let ip_addr = stream.peer_addr().unwrap();
+ let remote_addr = get_addr_from_stream(&stream);
let (reader, write_receiver, read_receiver, us) = Connection::new(stream);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
let last_us = Arc::clone(&us);
- let handle_opt = if let Ok(_) = peer_manager.new_inbound_connection(SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone()), match ip_addr.ip() {
- IpAddr::V4(ip) => Some(NetAddress::IPv4 {
- addr: ip.octets(),
- port: ip_addr.port(),
- }),
- IpAddr::V6(ip) => Some(NetAddress::IPv6 {
- addr: ip.octets(),
- port: ip_addr.port(),
- }),
- }) {
+ let handle_opt = if let Ok(_) = peer_manager.new_inbound_connection(SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone()), remote_addr) {
Some(tokio::spawn(Connection::schedule_read(peer_manager, us, reader, read_receiver, write_receiver)))
} else {
// Note that we will skip socket_disconnected here, in accordance with the PeerManager
RMH: RoutingMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync,
L: Logger + 'static + ?Sized + Send + Sync,
UMH: CustomMessageHandler + 'static + Send + Sync {
- let ip_addr = stream.peer_addr().unwrap();
+ let remote_addr = get_addr_from_stream(&stream);
let (reader, mut write_receiver, read_receiver, us) = Connection::new(stream);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
let last_us = Arc::clone(&us);
- let handle_opt = if let Ok(initial_send) = peer_manager.new_outbound_connection(their_node_id, SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone()), match ip_addr.ip() {
- IpAddr::V4(ip) => Some(NetAddress::IPv4 {
- addr: ip.octets(),
- port: ip_addr.port(),
- }),
- IpAddr::V6(ip) => Some(NetAddress::IPv6 {
- addr: ip.octets(),
- port: ip_addr.port(),
- }),
- }) {
+ let handle_opt = if let Ok(initial_send) = peer_manager.new_outbound_connection(their_node_id, SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone()), remote_addr) {
Some(tokio::spawn(async move {
// We should essentially always have enough room in a TCP socket buffer to send the
// initial 10s of bytes. However, tokio running in single-threaded mode will always
// pause read given we're now waiting on the remote end to ACK (and in
// accordance with the send_data() docs).
us.read_paused = true;
+ // Further, to avoid any current pending read causing a `read_event` call, wake
+ // up the read_waker and restart its loop.
+ let _ = us.read_waker.try_send(());
return written_len;
},
}
}
}
+ fn make_tcp_connection() -> (std::net::TcpStream, std::net::TcpStream) {
+ if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9735") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9735").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:19735") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:19735").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9997") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9997").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9998") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9998").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9999") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9999").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:46926") {
+ (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:46926").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
+ } else { panic!("Failed to bind to v4 localhost on common ports"); }
+ }
+
async fn do_basic_connection_test() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let a_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
// address. This may not always be the case in containers and the like, so if this test is
// failing for you check that you have a loopback interface and it is configured with
// 127.0.0.1.
- let (conn_a, conn_b) = if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9735") {
- (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9735").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
- } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:9999") {
- (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:9999").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
- } else if let Ok(listener) = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:46926") {
- (std::net::TcpStream::connect("127.0.0.1:46926").unwrap(), listener.accept().unwrap().0)
- } else { panic!("Failed to bind to v4 localhost on common ports"); };
+ let (conn_a, conn_b) = make_tcp_connection();
let fut_a = super::setup_outbound(Arc::clone(&a_manager), b_pub, conn_a);
let fut_b = super::setup_inbound(b_manager, conn_b);
async fn basic_threaded_connection_test() {
do_basic_connection_test().await;
}
+
#[tokio::test]
async fn basic_unthreaded_connection_test() {
do_basic_connection_test().await;
}
+
+ async fn race_disconnect_accept() {
+ // Previously, if we handed an already-disconnected socket to `setup_inbound` we'd panic.
+ // This attempts to find other similar races by opening connections and shutting them down
+ // while connecting. Sadly in testing this did *not* reproduce the previous issue.
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let a_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let b_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap();
+ let b_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &b_key);
+
+ let a_manager = Arc::new(PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
+ chan_handler: Arc::new(lightning::ln::peer_handler::ErroringMessageHandler::new()),
+ route_handler: Arc::new(lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler{}),
+ }, a_key, &[1; 32], Arc::new(TestLogger()), Arc::new(lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler{})));
+
+ // Make two connections, one for an inbound and one for an outbound connection
+ let conn_a = {
+ let (conn_a, _) = make_tcp_connection();
+ conn_a
+ };
+ let conn_b = {
+ let (_, conn_b) = make_tcp_connection();
+ conn_b
+ };
+
+ // Call connection setup inside new tokio tasks.
+ let manager_reference = Arc::clone(&a_manager);
+ tokio::spawn(async move {
+ super::setup_inbound(manager_reference, conn_a).await
+ });
+ tokio::spawn(async move {
+ super::setup_outbound(a_manager, b_pub, conn_b).await
+ });
+ }
+
+ #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+ async fn threaded_race_disconnect_accept() {
+ race_disconnect_accept().await;
+ }
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn unthreaded_race_disconnect_accept() {
+ race_disconnect_accept().await;
+ }
}
_bench_unstable = ["lightning/_bench_unstable"]
[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.27"
+bitcoin = "0.28.1"
lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning" }
libc = "0.2"
use super::{write_to_file};
use std::fs;
use std::io;
- use std::io::Write;
use std::path::PathBuf;
struct TestWriteable{}
default = ["std", "grind_signatures"]
[dependencies]
-bitcoin = { version = "0.27", default-features = false, features = ["secp-recovery"] }
-# TODO remove this once rust-bitcoin PR #637 is released
-secp256k1 = { version = "0.20.2", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", default-features = false, features = ["secp-recovery"] }
hashbrown = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
hex = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
hex = "0.4"
regex = "0.2.11"
-# TODO remove this once rust-bitcoin PR #637 is released
-secp256k1 = { version = "0.20.2", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
[dev-dependencies.bitcoin]
-version = "0.27"
+version = "0.28.1"
default-features = false
features = ["bitcoinconsensus", "secp-recovery"]
//! events. The remote server would make use of [`ChainMonitor`] for block processing and for
//! servicing [`ChannelMonitor`] updates from the client.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use chain;
L::Target: Logger,
P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let header = &block.header;
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
log_debug!(self.logger, "New best block {} at height {} provided via block_connected", header.block_hash(), height);
self.process_chain_data(header, Some(height), &txdata, |monitor, txdata| {
monitor.block_connected(
//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else { panic!(); }
fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let witness_items = input.witness.len();
+ let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
+ let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
+ || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+ let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
if accepted_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
}
macro_rules! log_claim {
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use hex;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use io;
+ use bitcoin::Witness;
use prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
};
let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- $sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+ let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
+ witness.push(ser_sig);
if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
+ witness.push(vec!(1));
} else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
} else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
+ witness.push(vec![0]);
} else {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
}
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
+ witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ let witness = witness.to_vec();
+ println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
}
}
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
}
//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
//! on-chain output which is theirs.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, EcdsaSighashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
use util::crypto::{hkdf_extract_expand_twice, sign};
if spend_tx.input[input_idx].previous_output != descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { return Err(()); }
let remotepubkey = self.pubkeys().payment_point;
- let witness_script = bitcoin::Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let witness_script = bitcoin::Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(spend_tx).segwit_signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
let remotesig = sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &self.payment_key);
- let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey();
+ let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: remotepubkey}, Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey();
if payment_script != descriptor.output.script_pubkey { return Err(()); }
let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(2);
witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ witness[0].push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
Ok(witness)
}
.expect("We constructed the payment_base_key, so we can only fail here if the RNG is busted.");
let delayed_payment_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &delayed_payment_key);
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&descriptor.revocation_pubkey, descriptor.to_self_delay, &delayed_payment_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(spend_tx).segwit_signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
let local_delayedsig = sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &delayed_payment_key);
let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&witness_script, Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey();
let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(3);
witness.push(local_delayedsig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ witness[0].push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
witness.push(vec!()); //MINIMALIF
witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
Ok(witness)
for htlc in commitment_tx.htlcs() {
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]);
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
let holder_htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
htlc_sigs.push(sign(secp_ctx, &htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
let counterparty_delayedpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
};
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
return Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &revocation_key))
}
let holder_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
};
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
return Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &revocation_key))
}
} else { return Err(()) }
} else { return Err(()) }
} else { return Err(()) };
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(htlc_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(htlc_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
return Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &htlc_key))
}
Err(())
// Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
- let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
+ let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key;
let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
Ok(destination_key) => {
- let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.to_bytes());
+ let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_priv(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).to_pub().to_bytes());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
.push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
.into_script()
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
};
let shutdown_pubkey = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(2).unwrap()) {
- Ok(shutdown_key) => ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &shutdown_key).public_key.key,
+ Ok(shutdown_key) => ExtendedPubKey::from_priv(&secp_ctx, &shutdown_key).public_key,
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
};
let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let inbound_payment_key: SecretKey = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
+ let inbound_payment_key: SecretKey = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key;
let mut inbound_pmt_key_bytes = [0; 32];
inbound_pmt_key_bytes.copy_from_slice(&inbound_payment_key[..]);
// entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
// starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(chan_id as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key[..]);
let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner();
previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor::MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH;
input_value += descriptor.output.value;
previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: descriptor.to_self_delay as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH;
input_value += descriptor.output.value;
previous_output: outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += 1 + 73 + 34;
input_value += output.value;
self.derive_channel_keys(descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id),
descriptor.channel_keys_id));
}
- spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_counterparty_payment_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?;
+ spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = Witness::from_vec(keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_counterparty_payment_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?);
},
SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
if keys_cache.is_none() || keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().1 != descriptor.channel_keys_id {
self.derive_channel_keys(descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id),
descriptor.channel_keys_id));
}
- spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?;
+ spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = Witness::from_vec(keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?);
},
SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref output, .. } => {
let derivation_idx = if output.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
}
};
- let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
+ let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_priv(&secp_ctx, &secret).to_pub();
if derivation_idx == 2 {
- assert_eq!(pubkey.key, self.shutdown_pubkey);
+ assert_eq!(pubkey.inner, self.shutdown_pubkey);
}
let witness_script = bitcoin::Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).expect("uncompressed key found").script_pubkey();
if payment_script != output.script_pubkey { return Err(()); };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let sig = sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
- spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&spend_tx).segwit_signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, output.value, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &secret.private_key);
+ let mut sig_ser = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(sig_ser);
+ spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(pubkey.inner.serialize().to_vec());
},
}
input_idx += 1;
}
- debug_assert!(expected_max_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
+ debug_assert!(expected_max_weight >= spend_tx.weight());
// Note that witnesses with a signature vary somewhat in size, so allow
// `expected_max_weight` to overshoot by up to 3 bytes per input.
- debug_assert!(expected_max_weight <= spend_tx.get_weight() + descriptors.len() * 3);
+ debug_assert!(expected_max_weight <= spend_tx.weight() + descriptors.len() * 3);
Ok(spend_tx)
}
let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key[..]);
sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt");
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
Recipient::Node => self.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node)?,
Recipient::PhantomNode => return Err(()),
};
- Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret))
+ Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret))
}
}
fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data);
let secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?;
- Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret))
+ Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret))
}
}
/// sourcing chain data using a block-oriented API should prefer this interface over [`Confirm`].
/// Such clients fetch the entire header chain whereas clients using [`Confirm`] only fetch headers
/// when needed.
+///
+/// By using [`Listen::filtered_block_connected`] this interface supports clients fetching the
+/// entire header chain and only blocks with matching transaction data using BIP 157 filters or
+/// other similar filtering.
pub trait Listen {
+ /// Notifies the listener that a block was added at the given height, with the transaction data
+ /// possibly filtered.
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32);
+
/// Notifies the listener that a block was added at the given height.
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32);
+ fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+ self.filtered_block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height);
+ }
/// Notifies the listener that a block was removed at the given height.
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32);
}
impl<T: Listen> Listen for core::ops::Deref<Target = T> {
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- (**self).block_connected(block, height);
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ (**self).filtered_block_connected(header, txdata, height);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
T::Target: Listen,
U::Target: Listen,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- self.0.block_connected(block, height);
- self.1.block_connected(block, height);
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ self.0.filtered_block_connected(header, txdata, height);
+ self.1.filtered_block_connected(header, txdata, height);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
let transaction = cached_request.finalize_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.get_weight());
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, transaction))
}
} else {
//! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use ln::PaymentPreimage;
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use core::cmp;
use core::mem;
use core::ops::Deref;
+use bitcoin::Witness;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
//TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
} else { return false; }
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
//TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
} else { return false; }
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
}
bumped_tx.lock_time = outp.htlc.cltv_expiry; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
// Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
previous_output: *outpoint,
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
let _a = a.write().unwrap();
}
}
+
+pub type FairRwLock<T> = RwLock<T>;
pub use debug_sync::*;
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ pub use crate::util::fairrwlock::FairRwLock;
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
use io;
use prelude::*;
previous_output: funding_outpoint,
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
ins
};
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 },
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
let weight = if htlc.offered {
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
if self.holder_sig_first {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
}
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
tx
///
/// This can be used to verify a signature.
pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
- let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
///
/// This can be used to verify a signature.
pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
- let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.inner.built).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
| ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
ins
};
///
/// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
///
- /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses SigHashType::All.
+ /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
let inner = self.inner;
let keys = &inner.keys;
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
Ok(ret)
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
+ let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(sighashtype as u8);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
+ let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
if this_htlc.offered {
// Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
// licenses.
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
-use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
+use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use io;
pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
}
+pub struct AvailableBalances {
+ /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
+ /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
+ pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
+ pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
+}
+
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
enum FeeUpdateState {
// Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
-/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
-/// it's 2^24.
-pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
+/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
+/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
+/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
+/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
+
+/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
+/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
+/// It's 2^24 - 1.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
+
+/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
+pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
}
impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
- // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
- fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
+ /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
+ /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
+ ///
+ /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
+ fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
+ let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
+ 1
+ } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
+ 100
+ } else {
+ config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
+ };
+ channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
}
/// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
- if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
+ if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
+ }
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
}
let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis),
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.own_channel_config),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
}
// Check sanity of message fields:
- if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ if msg.funding_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
}
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
}
- let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
+ let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
}
- let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
}
if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). Channel value is ({} - {}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
+ }
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis),
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.own_channel_config),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
}
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
+ msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
}
let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
// They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
}
stats
}
- /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
+ /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
/// Doesn't bother handling the
/// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
/// corner case properly.
- /// The channel reserve is subtracted from each balance.
- /// See also [`Channel::get_balance_msat`]
- pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
+ pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
// Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
- (
- cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
- - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
- - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
- - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
- 0) as u64,
- cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
- - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
- - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
- 0) as u64
- )
- }
+ let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- /// Get our total balance in msat.
- /// This is the amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
- /// See also [`Channel::get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat`]
- pub fn get_balance_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- // Include our local balance, plus any inbound HTLCs we know the preimage for, minus any
- // HTLCs sent or which will be sent after commitment signed's are exchanged.
let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
}
- balance_msat - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat
+ balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
+
+ let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
+ - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64;
+ AvailableBalances {
+ inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
+ - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
+ - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
+ - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
+ 0) as u64,
+ balance_msat,
+ }
}
pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
bitcoin_tx.txid
&keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]);
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
}
}
+ // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
+ // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
+ let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
+ return Err(
+ ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
+ );
+ }
+
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
+ let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
}
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
tx
if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+ if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
}
}
let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
},
};
// channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
- self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
);
}
}
// If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
- // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
+ // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
// close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
// the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
- if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
+ //
+ // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf channel,
+ // but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map being
+ // inconsistent, so we currently have to.
+ if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
&announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
}
- if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
&announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
- // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` and
- // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` values other than the defaults.
+ // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
+ // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
+ // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
+ // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
{ Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
+
+ let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().own_channel_config;
+ old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
- if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
+ if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
{ Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
- let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis));
+ let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().own_channel_config));
// Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
// only, so we default to that if none was written.
let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
use ln::PaymentHash;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
- use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::test_utils;
use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
- use core::num::NonZeroU8;
use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
use prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
}
#[test]
- fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
- assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
- "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
+ fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
+ assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
+ assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
+ "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
}
#[test]
fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
- ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
+ ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+ let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+
+ let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_2_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
+ let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_99_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
+ let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_0_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
+ let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_101_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
+
+ // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
+ // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
+ let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+
+ // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
+ let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+
+ let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+
+ // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
+ // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
+ let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+
+ // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
+ let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+
+ // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
+ let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+
+ // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
+ // than 100.
+ let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
+
+ // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
+ let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+
+ // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
+ // than 100.
+ let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn channel_update() {
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
#[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::SigHashType;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
- let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]).unwrap();
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
//!
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
+use ln::wire::Encode;
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
}
enum OnionPayload {
- /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
- /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
- /// are part of the same payment.
- Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
+ /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
+ Invoice {
+ /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
+ /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
+ _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
+ },
/// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
}
+/// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
struct ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
value: u64,
onion_payload: OnionPayload,
timer_ticks: u8,
+ /// The sum total of all MPP parts
+ total_msat: u64,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
+ /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
+ /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
+ /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
/// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
///
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
///
- /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- ///
/// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
/// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
/// from after `params.latest_hash`.
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
- let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
+ let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
+ balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
}
- let shared_secret = {
- let mut arr = [0; 32];
- arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
- arr
- };
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
//TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
break None;
}
{
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
};
let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: sig,
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
- let phantom_shared_secret = {
- let mut arr = [0; 32];
- arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
- arr
- };
+ let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
+ let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
+ },
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
},
value: amt_to_forward,
timer_ticks: 0,
+ total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
};
}
macro_rules! check_total_value {
- ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
let mut payment_received_generated = false;
let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
.or_insert(Vec::new());
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
total_value += htlc.value;
match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
- if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
+ if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
}
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
+ } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
payment_hash,
purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: $payment_secret,
+ payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
},
amt: total_value,
});
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
- let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
+ let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
+ let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
Err(()) => {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
continue
}
};
- let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
- let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
- check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
+ check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
- let payment_data =
- if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- data.clone()
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- continue
- };
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ };
+ let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
} else {
- let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
if payment_received_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
}
debug_assert!(false);
return false;
}
- if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
// Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
// In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
- if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
+ if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
return true;
} else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
- let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
+ let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
(desired_err_code, enc.0)
} else {
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
+ assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
"Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
"Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
}
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
- self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
+ self.best_block_updated(header, height);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
- if no_connection_possible {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
+ log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- false
+ return false;
} else {
- true
+ no_channels_remain = false;
}
- });
- } else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- return false;
- } else {
- no_channels_remain = false;
- }
- }
- true
- })
- }
+ }
+ true
+ });
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
(14, user_channel_id, required),
(16, balance_msat, required),
(18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
+ // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
+ (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
(20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
(22, confirmations_required, option),
(24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
_ => None,
};
let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
};
- write_tlv_fields!
- (writer,
- {
- (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
- (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option),
- });
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.prev_hop, required),
+ (1, self.total_msat, required),
+ (2, self.value, required),
+ (4, payment_data, option),
+ (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ });
Ok(())
}
}
let mut value = 0;
let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
+ let mut total_msat = None;
let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- read_tlv_fields!
- (reader,
- {
- (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
- (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option)
- });
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, prev_hop, required),
+ (1, total_msat, option),
+ (2, value, required),
+ (4, payment_data, option),
+ (6, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option)
+ });
let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
Some(p) => {
if payment_data.is_some() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
+ if total_msat.is_none() {
+ total_msat = Some(value);
+ }
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
},
None => {
if payment_data.is_none() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
- OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
+ if total_msat.is_none() {
+ total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
+ }
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
},
};
Ok(Self {
prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
timer_ticks: 0,
value,
+ total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
cltv_expiry,
})
// payment verification fails as expected.
let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
- match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
+ match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
Err(()) => {
nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
}
// Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
- assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
+ assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
}
}
// Byte 1
,
// Byte 2
- BasicMPP,
+ BasicMPP | Wumbo,
// Byte 3
ShutdownAnySegwit,
// Byte 4
// Byte 1
,
// Byte 2
- BasicMPP,
+ BasicMPP | Wumbo,
// Byte 3
ShutdownAnySegwit,
// Byte 4
define_feature!(17, BasicMPP, [InitContext, NodeContext, InvoiceContext],
"Feature flags for `basic_mpp`.", set_basic_mpp_optional, set_basic_mpp_required,
supports_basic_mpp, requires_basic_mpp);
+ define_feature!(19, Wumbo, [InitContext, NodeContext],
+ "Feature flags for `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels).", set_wumbo_optional, set_wumbo_required,
+ supports_wumbo, requires_wumbo);
define_feature!(27, ShutdownAnySegwit, [InitContext, NodeContext],
"Feature flags for `opt_shutdown_anysegwit`.", set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional,
set_shutdown_any_segwit_required, supports_shutdown_anysegwit, requires_shutdown_anysegwit);
self
}
}
+
+impl<T: sealed::Wumbo> Features<T> {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn clear_wumbo(mut self) -> Self {
+ <T as sealed::Wumbo>::clear_bits(&mut self.flags);
+ self
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! impl_feature_len_prefixed_write {
($features: ident) => {
impl Writeable for $features {
assert!(!InitFeatures::known().requires_scid_privacy());
assert!(!NodeFeatures::known().requires_scid_privacy());
+ assert!(InitFeatures::known().supports_wumbo());
+ assert!(NodeFeatures::known().supports_wumbo());
+ assert!(!InitFeatures::known().requires_wumbo());
+ assert!(!NodeFeatures::known().requires_wumbo());
+
let mut init_features = InitFeatures::known();
assert!(init_features.initial_routing_sync());
init_features.clear_initial_routing_sync();
// Check that the flags are as expected:
// - option_data_loss_protect
// - var_onion_optin (req) | static_remote_key (req) | payment_secret(req)
- // - basic_mpp
+ // - basic_mpp | wumbo
// - opt_shutdown_anysegwit
// -
// - option_channel_type | option_scid_alias
assert_eq!(node_features.flags.len(), 6);
assert_eq!(node_features.flags[0], 0b00000010);
assert_eq!(node_features.flags[1], 0b01010001);
- assert_eq!(node_features.flags[2], 0b00000010);
+ assert_eq!(node_features.flags[2], 0b00001010);
assert_eq!(node_features.flags[3], 0b00001000);
assert_eq!(node_features.flags[4], 0b00000000);
assert_eq!(node_features.flags[5], 0b10100000);
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use io;
use prelude::*;
for output in $tx.output.iter() {
total_value_out += output.value;
}
- let min_fee = ($tx.get_weight() as u64 + 3) / 4; // One sat per vbyte (ie per weight/4, rounded up)
+ let min_fee = ($tx.weight() as u64 + 3) / 4; // One sat per vbyte (ie per weight/4, rounded up)
// Input amount - output amount = fee, so check that out + min_fee is smaller than input
assert!(total_value_out + min_fee <= total_value_in);
$tx.verify(get_output).unwrap();
}
}
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! get_route {
+ ($send_node: expr, $payment_params: expr, $recv_value: expr, $cltv: expr) => {{
+ use $crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+ let scorer = $crate::util::test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let keys_manager = $crate::util::test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], bitcoin::network::constants::Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ $crate::routing::router::get_route(
+ &$send_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &$payment_params, &$send_node.network_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&$send_node.node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ $recv_value, $cltv, $send_node.logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ )
+ }}
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
$crate::get_route_and_payment_hash!($send_node, $recv_node, payment_params, $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
}};
($send_node: expr, $recv_node: expr, $payment_params: expr, $recv_value: expr, $cltv: expr) => {{
- use $crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = $crate::get_payment_preimage_hash!($recv_node, Some($recv_value));
- let scorer = $crate::util::test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
- let keys_manager = $crate::util::test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], bitcoin::network::constants::Network::Testnet);
- let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = $crate::routing::router::get_route(
- &$send_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &$payment_params, &$send_node.network_graph.read_only(),
- Some(&$send_node.node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- $recv_value, $cltv, $send_node.logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
- ).unwrap();
- (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
+ let route = $crate::get_route!($send_node, $payment_params, $recv_value, $cltv);
+ (route.unwrap(), payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
}}
}
pub fn route_payment<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_route: &[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id())
.with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
- let network_graph = origin_node.network_graph.read_only();
- let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
- let seed = [0u8; 32];
- let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
- let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = get_route(
- &origin_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &network_graph,
- Some(&origin_node.node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, origin_node.logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route!(origin_node, payment_params, recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), expected_route.len());
for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.paths[0].iter()) {
for tx in prev_txn {
if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
- assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
+ let mut iter = node_txn[0].input[0].witness.iter();
+ iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
+ iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
+ assert!(iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items").len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
found_prev = true;
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use regex;
#[test]
fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
// Stand up a network of 2 nodes
+ use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
+ let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
+ cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
} else { assert!(false); }
};
- use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
// Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
- insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
- insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
+ insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
}
+#[test]
+fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
+ // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
+ // them.
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
+ assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+}
+
fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
// A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
// but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
// One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
macro_rules! claim_funds {
// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
let node2_commitment_txid;
{
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
// Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
+ // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
+ // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
+ // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
+ let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
+ assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
+
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
+
+ // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
+ // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
+ // broadcasted.
+ {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
+ // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
// We check funding pubkey are unique
- let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
- let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
+ let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
+ let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
|| from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
|| from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
- tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
+ tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
}
// Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
+ // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
+ // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
- assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
+ assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
// Check A is able to claim to_remote output
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
+ assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
+ // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
+ let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
+
+ // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
+ // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
+ let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
+ let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
+ match action {
+ &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
+ err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event!");
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
node_txn.clear();
};
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
// Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
// Verify 25% bump heuristic
assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
node_txn.clear();
first = node_txn[4].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
- feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
node_txn.clear();
};
let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
+ // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
+ // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
+ // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
+ // 90% of the `channel_value`.
+ // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
+
+ let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
+ let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
+ let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
+ let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
+ config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
+ let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
+ let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
+ let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
+
+ let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+ assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
+ // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+ assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
+
+ // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
+ // `channel_value`.
+ assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
+ // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
+ // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
+ // `channel_value`.
+ assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
- // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
- // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
- // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
- // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
+fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
.with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
- let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
- let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let route = get_route(
- &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
- Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
{
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
// the first HTLC delivered above.
}
- // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ if test_for_second_fail_panic {
+ // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
+ nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ } else {
+ // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
+ // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
+ // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
+ // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
+ // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
+ do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
+ // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
+ // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
+ do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
+ // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
+ // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
+ .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
+ // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
+ if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
+ });
+ let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
+
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+ {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
+
+ // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
+ // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
+ // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
+ }
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
+
+ let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
- let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
- if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
- if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
}
#[test]
/// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
-pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
+pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data:
&msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
where L::Target: Logger
{
let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
//! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
//! track the network on the less-secure system.
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Signature;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
use io::Cursor;
($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
{
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
- $ctx.sign(&sighash, &$privkey)
+ $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
}
}
}
htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
};
let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
channel_type: None,
};
let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
channel_id: [2; 32],
scriptpubkey:
- if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
- else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
- else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
+ if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
+ else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
+ else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
};
let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate, OptionalField};
+use ln::wire::Encode;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use io;
use prelude::*;
impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
fn dummy(short_channel_id: u64) -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::Signature;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() }),
contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
// and tamper returning error message
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), NODE|2, &[0;0]);
}, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}), Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
// final node failure
// and tamper returning error message
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), NODE|2, &[0;0]);
}, ||{
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}), Some(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id));
}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}), Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
// final node failure
run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
}, ||{
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}), Some(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id));
}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
}, ||{
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}), Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
}, ||{
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.paths[0][1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}), Some(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id));
Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None, Some(short_channel_id));
let short_channel_id = channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_update = ChannelUpdate::dummy(short_channel_id);
+
+ let mut err_data = Vec::new();
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&(chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode());
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), UPDATE|7, &err_data);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: chan_update.clone()}), Some(short_channel_id));
+
+ // Check we can still handle onion failures that include channel updates without a type prefix
+ let err_data_without_type = chan_update.encode_with_len();
run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |msg| {
msg.amount_msat -= 1;
}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy(short_channel_id).encode_with_len()[..]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy(short_channel_id)}), Some(short_channel_id));
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), UPDATE|7, &err_data_without_type);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: chan_update}), Some(short_channel_id));
let short_channel_id = channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id;
run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |msg| {
}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|8, &[0;0]);
// short_channel_id from the processing node
}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}), Some(short_channel_id));
}, |msg| {
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), PERM|9, &[0;0]);
// short_channel_id from the processing node
}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}), Some(short_channel_id));
// Tamper returning error message
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], 23, &[0;0]);
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), 23, &[0;0]);
}, ||{
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, true, Some(23), None, None);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
- let mut error_data = channel.1.encode_with_len();
+ let mut err_data = Vec::new();
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&(channel.1.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&channel.1.encode());
+
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(channel.0.contents.short_channel_id)
.blamed_chan_closed(false)
- .expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000 | 7, &error_data);
+ .expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000 | 7, &err_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, fail_conditions);
}
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use ln::msgs;
+use ln::wire::Encode;
use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
({
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret);
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
},
{
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret);
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
})
}
pub(super) fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret);
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
pub(super) fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret);
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ sha.input(shared_secret.as_ref());
let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.len());
construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, path, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| {
- let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
res.push(OnionKeys {
#[cfg(test)]
let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
- let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path[route_hop_idx + 1] };
if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
- let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
- if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
+ // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
+ // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
+ // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
+ // support both here.
+ // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
+ // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
+ // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
+ // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
+ if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
+ update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
+ }
if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
// if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
// MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
// short channel id.
if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
}
network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
msg: chan_update,
let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
}
else {
- log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
}
} else {
// Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
use hex;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use super::OnionKeys;
// Legacy packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
// Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
- let onion_error = super::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
+ let onion_error = super::build_failure_packet(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.as_ref(), 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- let onion_packet_1 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
+ let onion_packet_1 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_error.encode()[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- let onion_packet_2 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
+ let onion_packet_2 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[3].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- let onion_packet_3 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
+ let onion_packet_3 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[2].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- let onion_packet_4 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
+ let onion_packet_4 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- let onion_packet_5 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
+ let onion_packet_5 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
}
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
#[inline]
fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
- let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, &ss[..]);
+ let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
state.ck = t1;
t2
}
mod tests {
use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use hex;
//! call into the provided message handlers (probably a ChannelManager and NetGraphmsgHandler) with messages
//! they should handle, and encoding/sending response messages.
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs;
use prelude::*;
use io;
use alloc::collections::LinkedList;
-use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, FairRwLock};
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, hash, fmt, mem};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::convert::Infallible;
/// descriptor.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PeerHandleError {
- /// Used to indicate that we probably can't make any future connections to this peer, implying
- /// we should go ahead and force-close any channels we have with it.
+ /// Used to indicate that we probably can't make any future connections to this peer (e.g.
+ /// because we required features that our peer was missing, or vice versa).
+ ///
+ /// While LDK's [`ChannelManager`] will not do it automatically, you likely wish to force-close
+ /// any channels with this peer or check for new versions of LDK.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
pub no_connection_possible: bool,
}
impl fmt::Debug for PeerHandleError {
msgs_sent_since_pong: usize,
awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: i8,
received_message_since_timer_tick: bool,
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: bool,
}
impl Peer {
/// announcements/updates for the given channel_id then we will send it when we get to that
/// point and we shouldn't send it yet to avoid sending duplicate updates. If we've already
/// sent the old versions, we should send the update, and so return true here.
- fn should_forward_channel_announcement(&self, channel_id: u64)->bool{
+ fn should_forward_channel_announcement(&self, channel_id: u64) -> bool {
+ if self.their_features.as_ref().unwrap().supports_gossip_queries() &&
+ !self.sent_gossip_timestamp_filter {
+ return false;
+ }
match self.sync_status {
InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => true,
InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(i) => i < channel_id,
/// Similar to the above, but for node announcements indexed by node_id.
fn should_forward_node_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
+ if self.their_features.as_ref().unwrap().supports_gossip_queries() &&
+ !self.sent_gossip_timestamp_filter {
+ return false;
+ }
match self.sync_status {
InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => true,
InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(_) => false,
}
}
-struct PeerHolder<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> {
- peers: HashMap<Descriptor, Peer>,
- /// Only add to this set when noise completes:
- node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>,
-}
-
/// SimpleArcPeerManager is useful when you need a PeerManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
L::Target: Logger,
CMH::Target: CustomMessageHandler {
message_handler: MessageHandler<CM, RM>,
- peers: Mutex<PeerHolder<Descriptor>>,
+ /// Connection state for each connected peer - we have an outer read-write lock which is taken
+ /// as read while we're doing processing for a peer and taken write when a peer is being added
+ /// or removed.
+ ///
+ /// The inner Peer lock is held for sending and receiving bytes, but note that we do *not* hold
+ /// it while we're processing a message. This is fine as [`PeerManager::read_event`] requires
+ /// that there be no parallel calls for a given peer, so mutual exclusion of messages handed to
+ /// the `MessageHandler`s for a given peer is already guaranteed.
+ peers: FairRwLock<HashMap<Descriptor, Mutex<Peer>>>,
+ /// Only add to this set when noise completes.
+ /// Locked *after* peers. When an item is removed, it must be removed with the `peers` write
+ /// lock held. Entries may be added with only the `peers` read lock held (though the
+ /// `Descriptor` value must already exist in `peers`).
+ node_id_to_descriptor: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>>,
+ /// We can only have one thread processing events at once, but we don't usually need the full
+ /// `peers` write lock to do so, so instead we block on this empty mutex when entering
+ /// `process_events`.
+ event_processing_lock: Mutex<()>,
+ /// Because event processing is global and always does all available work before returning,
+ /// there is no reason for us to have many event processors waiting on the lock at once.
+ /// Instead, we limit the total blocked event processors to always exactly one by setting this
+ /// when an event process call is waiting.
+ blocked_event_processors: AtomicBool,
our_node_secret: SecretKey,
ephemeral_key_midstate: Sha256Engine,
custom_message_handler: CMH,
PeerManager {
message_handler,
- peers: Mutex::new(PeerHolder {
- peers: HashMap::new(),
- node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap::new()
- }),
+ peers: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
+ node_id_to_descriptor: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ event_processing_lock: Mutex::new(()),
+ blocked_event_processors: AtomicBool::new(false),
our_node_secret,
ephemeral_key_midstate,
peer_counter: AtomicCounter::new(),
/// new_outbound_connection, however entries will only appear once the initial handshake has
/// completed and we are sure the remote peer has the private key for the given node_id.
pub fn get_peer_node_ids(&self) -> Vec<PublicKey> {
- let peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- peers.peers.values().filter_map(|p| {
+ let peers = self.peers.read().unwrap();
+ peers.values().filter_map(|peer_mutex| {
+ let p = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if !p.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || p.their_features.is_none() {
return None;
}
let res = peer_encryptor.get_act_one().to_vec();
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
+ let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
their_node_id: None,
their_features: None,
msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- }).is_some() {
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+ })).is_some() {
panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
};
Ok(res)
let peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&self.our_node_secret);
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
+ let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
their_node_id: None,
their_features: None,
msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- }).is_some() {
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+ })).is_some() {
panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
};
Ok(())
/// [`send_data`]: SocketDescriptor::send_data
/// [`write_buffer_space_avail`]: PeerManager::write_buffer_space_avail
pub fn write_buffer_space_avail(&self, descriptor: &mut Descriptor) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- match peers.peers.get_mut(descriptor) {
+ let peers = self.peers.read().unwrap();
+ match peers.get(descriptor) {
None => {
// This is most likely a simple race condition where the user found that the socket
// was writeable, then we told the user to `disconnect_socket()`, then they called
// this method. Return an error to make sure we get disconnected.
return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
},
- Some(peer) => {
+ Some(peer_mutex) => {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
peer.awaiting_write_event = false;
- self.do_attempt_write_data(descriptor, peer);
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(descriptor, &mut peer);
}
};
Ok(())
}
fn do_read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
- let pause_read = {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
- let mut msgs_to_forward = Vec::new();
- let mut peer_node_id = None;
- let pause_read = match peers.peers.get_mut(peer_descriptor) {
- None => {
- // This is most likely a simple race condition where the user read some bytes
- // from the socket, then we told the user to `disconnect_socket()`, then they
- // called this method. Return an error to make sure we get disconnected.
- return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
- },
- Some(peer) => {
+ let mut pause_read = false;
+ let peers = self.peers.read().unwrap();
+ let mut msgs_to_forward = Vec::new();
+ let mut peer_node_id = None;
+ match peers.get(peer_descriptor) {
+ None => {
+ // This is most likely a simple race condition where the user read some bytes
+ // from the socket, then we told the user to `disconnect_socket()`, then they
+ // called this method. Return an error to make sure we get disconnected.
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
+ },
+ Some(peer_mutex) => {
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ while read_pos < data.len() {
+ macro_rules! try_potential_handleerror {
+ ($peer: expr, $thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(x) => x,
+ Err(e) => {
+ match e.action {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: _ } => {
+ //TODO: Try to push msg
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; disconnecting peer with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level) => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Error handling message{}; ignoring: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ continue
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip => continue, // Don't even bother logging these
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; ignoring: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ continue;
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; sending error message with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ self.enqueue_message($peer, &msg);
+ continue;
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { msg, log_level } => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, log_level, "Error handling message{}; sending warning message with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ self.enqueue_message($peer, &msg);
+ continue;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut peer_lock = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer = &mut *peer_lock;
+ let mut msg_to_handle = None;
+ if peer_node_id.is_none() {
+ peer_node_id = peer.their_node_id.clone();
+ }
+
assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > 0);
assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > peer.pending_read_buffer_pos);
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- while read_pos < data.len() {
- {
- let data_to_copy = cmp::min(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() - peer.pending_read_buffer_pos, data.len() - read_pos);
- peer.pending_read_buffer[peer.pending_read_buffer_pos..peer.pending_read_buffer_pos + data_to_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[read_pos..read_pos + data_to_copy]);
- read_pos += data_to_copy;
- peer.pending_read_buffer_pos += data_to_copy;
+ {
+ let data_to_copy = cmp::min(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() - peer.pending_read_buffer_pos, data.len() - read_pos);
+ peer.pending_read_buffer[peer.pending_read_buffer_pos..peer.pending_read_buffer_pos + data_to_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[read_pos..read_pos + data_to_copy]);
+ read_pos += data_to_copy;
+ peer.pending_read_buffer_pos += data_to_copy;
+ }
+
+ if peer.pending_read_buffer_pos == peer.pending_read_buffer.len() {
+ peer.pending_read_buffer_pos = 0;
+
+ macro_rules! insert_node_id {
+ () => {
+ match self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false })
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Finished noise handshake for connection with {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ entry.insert(peer_descriptor.clone())
+ },
+ };
+ }
}
- if peer.pending_read_buffer_pos == peer.pending_read_buffer.len() {
- peer.pending_read_buffer_pos = 0;
+ let next_step = peer.channel_encryptor.get_noise_step();
+ match next_step {
+ NextNoiseStep::ActOne => {
+ let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
+ peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key())).to_vec();
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_two);
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 66].to_vec(); // act three is 66 bytes long
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::ActTwo => {
+ let (act_three, their_node_id) = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
+ peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_three.to_vec());
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
+
+ peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
+ insert_node_id!();
+ let features = InitFeatures::known();
+ let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
+ peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::ActThree => {
+ let their_node_id = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
+ peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_three(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
+ peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
+ insert_node_id!();
+ let features = InitFeatures::known();
+ let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
+ peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete => {
+ if peer.pending_read_is_header {
+ let msg_len = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
+ peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_length_header(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ if peer.pending_read_buffer.capacity() > 8192 { peer.pending_read_buffer = Vec::new(); }
+ peer.pending_read_buffer.resize(msg_len as usize + 16, 0);
+ if msg_len < 2 { // Need at least the message type tag
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = false;
+ } else {
+ let msg_data = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
+ peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_message(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ assert!(msg_data.len() >= 2);
+
+ // Reset read buffer
+ if peer.pending_read_buffer.capacity() > 8192 { peer.pending_read_buffer = Vec::new(); }
+ peer.pending_read_buffer.resize(18, 0);
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
- macro_rules! try_potential_handleerror {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
+ let mut reader = io::Cursor::new(&msg_data[..]);
+ let message_result = wire::read(&mut reader, &*self.custom_message_handler);
+ let message = match message_result {
Ok(x) => x,
Err(e) => {
- match e.action {
- msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: _ } => {
- //TODO: Try to push msg
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; disconnecting peer with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer.their_node_id), e.err);
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level) => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Error handling message{}; ignoring: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer.their_node_id), e.err);
- continue
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip => continue, // Don't even bother logging these
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; ignoring: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer.their_node_id), e.err);
+ match e {
+ // Note that to avoid recursion we never call
+ // `do_attempt_write_data` from here, causing
+ // the messages enqueued here to not actually
+ // be sent before the peer is disconnected.
+ (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, Some(ty)) if is_gossip_msg(ty) => {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Got a channel/node announcement with an unknown required feature flag, you may want to update!");
continue;
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; sending error message with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer.their_node_id), e.err);
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msg);
+ }
+ (msgs::DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression, _) => {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "We don't support zlib-compressed message fields, sending a warning and ignoring message");
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "Unsupported message compression: zlib".to_owned() });
continue;
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { msg, log_level } => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, log_level, "Error handling message{}; sending warning message with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer.their_node_id), e.err);
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msg);
+ }
+ (_, Some(ty)) if is_gossip_msg(ty) => {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Got an invalid value while deserializing a gossip message");
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "Unreadable/bogus gossip message".to_owned() });
continue;
- },
+ }
+ (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, ty) => {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Received a message with an unknown required feature flag or TLV, you may want to update!");
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: format!("Received an unknown required feature/TLV in message type {:?}", ty) });
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
+ (msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue, _) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got an invalid value while deserializing message");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ (msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead, _) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Deserialization failed due to shortness of message");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ (msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
+ (msgs::DecodeError::Io(_), _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
}
}
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! insert_node_id {
- () => {
- match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false })
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Finished noise handshake for connection with {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- entry.insert(peer_descriptor.clone())
- },
};
- }
- }
-
- let next_step = peer.channel_encryptor.get_noise_step();
- match next_step {
- NextNoiseStep::ActOne => {
- let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key())).to_vec();
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_two);
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 66].to_vec(); // act three is 66 bytes long
- },
- NextNoiseStep::ActTwo => {
- let (act_three, their_node_id) = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_three.to_vec());
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
- peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
- insert_node_id!();
- let features = InitFeatures::known();
- let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone())};
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
- peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
- },
- NextNoiseStep::ActThree => {
- let their_node_id = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_three(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
- peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
- insert_node_id!();
- let features = InitFeatures::known();
- let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone())};
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
- peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
- },
- NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete => {
- if peer.pending_read_is_header {
- let msg_len = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_length_header(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- peer.pending_read_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(msg_len as usize + 16);
- peer.pending_read_buffer.resize(msg_len as usize + 16, 0);
- if msg_len < 2 { // Need at least the message type tag
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- peer.pending_read_is_header = false;
- } else {
- let msg_data = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_message(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- assert!(msg_data.len() >= 2);
-
- // Reset read buffer
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec();
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
-
- let mut reader = io::Cursor::new(&msg_data[..]);
- let message_result = wire::read(&mut reader, &*self.custom_message_handler);
- let message = match message_result {
- Ok(x) => x,
- Err(e) => {
- match e {
- // Note that to avoid recursion we never call
- // `do_attempt_write_data` from here, causing
- // the messages enqueued here to not actually
- // be sent before the peer is disconnected.
- (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, Some(ty)) if is_gossip_msg(ty) => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Got a channel/node announcement with an unknown required feature flag, you may want to update!");
- continue;
- }
- (msgs::DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression, _) => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "We don't support zlib-compressed message fields, sending a warning and ignoring message");
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "Unsupported message compression: zlib".to_owned() });
- continue;
- }
- (_, Some(ty)) if is_gossip_msg(ty) => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Got an invalid value while deserializing a gossip message");
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "Unreadable/bogus gossip message".to_owned() });
- continue;
- }
- (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, ty) => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Received a message with an unknown required feature flag or TLV, you may want to update!");
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: format!("Received an unknown required feature/TLV in message type {:?}", ty) });
- return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
- (msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue, _) => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got an invalid value while deserializing message");
- return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- (msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead, _) => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Deserialization failed due to shortness of message");
- return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- (msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
- (msgs::DecodeError::Io(_), _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { no_connection_possible: false }),
- }
- }
- };
-
- match self.handle_message(peer, message) {
- Err(handling_error) => match handling_error {
- MessageHandlingError::PeerHandleError(e) => { return Err(e) },
- MessageHandlingError::LightningError(e) => {
- try_potential_handleerror!(Err(e));
- },
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => {
- peer_node_id = Some(peer.their_node_id.expect("After noise is complete, their_node_id is always set"));
- msgs_to_forward.push(msg);
- },
- Ok(None) => {},
- }
- }
+ msg_to_handle = Some(message);
}
}
}
}
-
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() > OUTBOUND_BUFFER_LIMIT_READ_PAUSE // pause_read
+ pause_read = peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() > OUTBOUND_BUFFER_LIMIT_READ_PAUSE;
+
+ if let Some(message) = msg_to_handle {
+ match self.handle_message(&peer_mutex, peer_lock, message) {
+ Err(handling_error) => match handling_error {
+ MessageHandlingError::PeerHandleError(e) => { return Err(e) },
+ MessageHandlingError::LightningError(e) => {
+ try_potential_handleerror!(&mut peer_mutex.lock().unwrap(), Err(e));
+ },
+ },
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => {
+ msgs_to_forward.push(msg);
+ },
+ Ok(None) => {},
+ }
+ }
}
- };
-
- for msg in msgs_to_forward.drain(..) {
- self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &msg, peer_node_id.as_ref());
}
+ }
- pause_read
- };
+ for msg in msgs_to_forward.drain(..) {
+ self.forward_broadcast_msg(&*peers, &msg, peer_node_id.as_ref());
+ }
Ok(pause_read)
}
/// Returns the message back if it needs to be broadcasted to all other peers.
fn handle_message(
&self,
- peer: &mut Peer,
+ peer_mutex: &Mutex<Peer>,
+ mut peer_lock: MutexGuard<Peer>,
message: wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>
) -> Result<Option<wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>>, MessageHandlingError> {
- if is_gossip_msg(message.type_id()) {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Received message {:?} from {}", message, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Received message {:?} from {}", message, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- }
-
- peer.received_message_since_timer_tick = true;
+ let their_node_id = peer_lock.their_node_id.clone().expect("We know the peer's public key by the time we receive messages");
+ peer_lock.received_message_since_timer_tick = true;
// Need an Init as first message
- if let wire::Message::Init(_) = message {
- } else if peer.their_features.is_none() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} sent non-Init first message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ if let wire::Message::Init(msg) = message {
+ if msg.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer features required unknown version bits");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true }.into());
+ }
+ if peer_lock.their_features.is_some() {
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }.into());
+ }
+
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received peer Init message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.features);
+
+ // For peers not supporting gossip queries start sync now, otherwise wait until we receive a filter.
+ if msg.features.initial_routing_sync() && !msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
+ peer_lock.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0);
+ }
+
+ if !msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true }.into());
+ }
+
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.peer_connected(&their_node_id, &msg);
+
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_connected(&their_node_id, &msg);
+ peer_lock.their_features = Some(msg.features);
+ return Ok(None);
+ } else if peer_lock.their_features.is_none() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} sent non-Init first message", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }.into());
}
- let mut should_forward = None;
-
- match message {
- // Setup and Control messages:
- wire::Message::Init(msg) => {
- if msg.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer features required unknown version bits");
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true }.into());
- }
- if peer.their_features.is_some() {
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }.into());
- }
+ if let wire::Message::GossipTimestampFilter(_msg) = message {
+ // When supporting gossip messages, start inital gossip sync only after we receive
+ // a GossipTimestampFilter
+ if peer_lock.their_features.as_ref().unwrap().supports_gossip_queries() &&
+ !peer_lock.sent_gossip_timestamp_filter {
+ peer_lock.sent_gossip_timestamp_filter = true;
+ peer_lock.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0);
+ }
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received peer Init message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()), msg.features);
+ let their_features = peer_lock.their_features.clone();
+ mem::drop(peer_lock);
- if msg.features.initial_routing_sync() {
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0);
- }
- if !msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true }.into());
- }
+ if is_gossip_msg(message.type_id()) {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Received message {:?} from {}", message, log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received message {:?} from {}", message, log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+ }
- self.message_handler.route_handler.peer_connected(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ let mut should_forward = None;
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_connected(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
- peer.their_features = Some(msg.features);
+ match message {
+ // Setup and Control messages:
+ wire::Message::Init(_) => {
+ // Handled above
+ },
+ wire::Message::GossipTimestampFilter(_) => {
+ // Handled above
},
wire::Message::Error(msg) => {
let mut data_is_printable = true;
}
if data_is_printable {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()), msg.data);
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.data);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
}
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&their_node_id, &msg);
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true }.into());
}
}
if data_is_printable {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()), msg.data);
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.data);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
}
},
wire::Message::Ping(msg) => {
if msg.ponglen < 65532 {
let resp = msgs::Pong { byteslen: msg.ponglen };
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer_mutex.lock().unwrap(), &resp);
}
},
wire::Message::Pong(_msg) => {
- peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
- peer.msgs_sent_since_pong = 0;
+ let mut peer_lock = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ peer_lock.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
+ peer_lock.msgs_sent_since_pong = 0;
},
// Channel messages:
wire::Message::OpenChannel(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_open_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_open_channel(&their_node_id, their_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg);
},
wire::Message::AcceptChannel(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_accept_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_accept_channel(&their_node_id, their_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg);
},
wire::Message::FundingCreated(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_created(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_created(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::FundingSigned(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_signed(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::FundingLocked(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_locked(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_locked(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::Shutdown(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_shutdown(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_features.as_ref().unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_shutdown(&their_node_id, their_features.as_ref().unwrap(), &msg);
},
wire::Message::ClosingSigned(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_closing_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_closing_signed(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
// Commitment messages:
wire::Message::UpdateAddHTLC(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_add_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_add_htlc(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::UpdateFulfillHTLC(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::UpdateFailHTLC(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_htlc(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::CommitmentSigned(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_commitment_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_commitment_signed(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::RevokeAndACK(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_revoke_and_ack(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_revoke_and_ack(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::UpdateFee(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fee(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fee(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::ChannelReestablish(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_reestablish(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_reestablish(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
// Routing messages:
wire::Message::AnnouncementSignatures(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_announcement_signatures(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_announcement_signatures(&their_node_id, &msg);
},
wire::Message::ChannelAnnouncement(msg) => {
if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&msg)
}
},
wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_update(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_update(&their_node_id, &msg);
if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg)
.map_err(|e| -> MessageHandlingError { e.into() })? {
should_forward = Some(wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg));
}
},
wire::Message::QueryShortChannelIds(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), msg)?;
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&their_node_id, msg)?;
},
wire::Message::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), msg)?;
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&their_node_id, msg)?;
},
wire::Message::QueryChannelRange(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_query_channel_range(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), msg)?;
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_query_channel_range(&their_node_id, msg)?;
},
wire::Message::ReplyChannelRange(msg) => {
- self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), msg)?;
- },
- wire::Message::GossipTimestampFilter(_msg) => {
- // TODO: handle message
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&their_node_id, msg)?;
},
// Unknown messages:
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received unknown odd message of type {}, ignoring", type_id);
},
wire::Message::Custom(custom) => {
- self.custom_message_handler.handle_custom_message(custom, &peer.their_node_id.unwrap())?;
+ self.custom_message_handler.handle_custom_message(custom, &their_node_id)?;
},
};
Ok(should_forward)
}
- fn forward_broadcast_msg(&self, peers: &mut PeerHolder<Descriptor>, msg: &wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>, except_node: Option<&PublicKey>) {
+ fn forward_broadcast_msg(&self, peers: &HashMap<Descriptor, Mutex<Peer>>, msg: &wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>, except_node: Option<&PublicKey>) {
match msg {
wire::Message::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Sending message to all peers except {:?} or the announced channel's counterparties: {:?}", except_node, msg);
let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg);
- for (_, peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_features.is_none() ||
!peer.should_forward_channel_announcement(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
continue
if except_node.is_some() && peer.their_node_id.as_ref() == except_node {
continue;
}
- self.enqueue_encoded_message(peer, &encoded_msg);
+ self.enqueue_encoded_message(&mut *peer, &encoded_msg);
}
},
wire::Message::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Sending message to all peers except {:?} or the announced node: {:?}", except_node, msg);
let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg);
- for (_, peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_features.is_none() ||
!peer.should_forward_node_announcement(msg.contents.node_id) {
continue
if except_node.is_some() && peer.their_node_id.as_ref() == except_node {
continue;
}
- self.enqueue_encoded_message(peer, &encoded_msg);
+ self.enqueue_encoded_message(&mut *peer, &encoded_msg);
}
},
wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Sending message to all peers except {:?}: {:?}", except_node, msg);
let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg);
- for (_, peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_features.is_none() ||
!peer.should_forward_channel_announcement(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
continue
if except_node.is_some() && peer.their_node_id.as_ref() == except_node {
continue;
}
- self.enqueue_encoded_message(peer, &encoded_msg);
+ self.enqueue_encoded_message(&mut *peer, &encoded_msg);
}
},
_ => debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't attempt to forward anything but gossip messages"),
/// You don't have to call this function explicitly if you are using [`lightning-net-tokio`]
/// or one of the other clients provided in our language bindings.
///
+ /// Note that if there are any other calls to this function waiting on lock(s) this may return
+ /// without doing any work. All available events that need handling will be handled before the
+ /// other calls return.
+ ///
/// [`send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
/// [`ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards
/// [`send_data`]: SocketDescriptor::send_data
pub fn process_events(&self) {
+ let mut _single_processor_lock = self.event_processing_lock.try_lock();
+ if _single_processor_lock.is_err() {
+ // While we could wake the older sleeper here with a CV and make more even waiting
+ // times, that would be a lot of overengineering for a simple "reduce total waiter
+ // count" goal.
+ match self.blocked_event_processors.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire) {
+ Err(val) => {
+ debug_assert!(val, "compare_exchange failed spuriously?");
+ return;
+ },
+ Ok(val) => {
+ debug_assert!(!val, "compare_exchange succeeded spuriously?");
+ // We're the only waiter, as the running process_events may have emptied the
+ // pending events "long" ago and there are new events for us to process, wait until
+ // its done and process any leftover events before returning.
+ _single_processor_lock = Ok(self.event_processing_lock.lock().unwrap());
+ self.blocked_event_processors.store(false, Ordering::Release);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut peers_to_disconnect = HashMap::new();
+ let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ events_generated.append(&mut self.message_handler.route_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
+
{
// TODO: There are some DoS attacks here where you can flood someone's outbound send
// buffer by doing things like announcing channels on another node. We should be willing to
// drop optional-ish messages when send buffers get full!
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- events_generated.append(&mut self.message_handler.route_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
- let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
+ let peers_lock = self.peers.read().unwrap();
+ let peers = &*peers_lock;
macro_rules! get_peer_for_forwarding {
($node_id: expr) => {
{
- match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.get($node_id) {
- Some(descriptor) => match peers.peers.get_mut(&descriptor) {
- Some(peer) => {
- if peer.their_features.is_none() {
+ if peers_to_disconnect.get($node_id).is_some() {
+ // If we've "disconnected" this peer, do not send to it.
+ continue;
+ }
+ let descriptor_opt = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().get($node_id).cloned();
+ match descriptor_opt {
+ Some(descriptor) => match peers.get(&descriptor) {
+ Some(peer_mutex) => {
+ let peer_lock = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if peer_lock.their_features.is_none() {
continue;
}
- peer
+ peer_lock
},
- None => panic!("Inconsistent peers set state!"),
+ None => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Inconsistent peers set state!");
+ continue;
+ }
},
None => {
continue;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
// TODO: If the peer is gone we should generate a DiscardFunding event
// indicating to the wallet that they should just throw away this funding transaction
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node {} with {} adds, {} fulfills, {} fails for channel {}",
update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
update_fail_htlcs.len(),
log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
- let peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
+ let mut peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
for msg in update_add_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(peer, msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
}
for msg in update_fulfill_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(peer, msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
}
for msg in update_fail_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(peer, msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
}
for msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(peer, msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
}
if let &Some(ref msg) = update_fee {
- self.enqueue_message(peer, msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
}
- self.enqueue_message(peer, commitment_signed);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, commitment_signed);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, update_msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- let peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg)));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, ref action } => {
match *action {
msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } => {
- if let Some(mut descriptor) = peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(node_id) {
- if let Some(mut peer) = peers.peers.remove(&descriptor) {
- if let Some(ref msg) = *msg {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut peer, msg);
- // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
- // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut peer);
- } else {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with no message", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- }
- }
- descriptor.disconnect_socket();
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
- }
+ // We do not have the peers write lock, so we just store that we're
+ // about to disconenct the peer and do it after we finish
+ // processing most messages.
+ peers_to_disconnect.insert(*node_id, msg.clone());
},
msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level) => {
log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Received a HandleError event to be ignored for node {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendErrorMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { ref msg, ref log_level } => {
log_given_level!(self.logger, *log_level, "Handling SendWarningMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
}
},
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Handling SendReplyChannelRange event in peer_handler for node {} with num_scids={} first_blocknum={} number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}",
msg.first_blocknum,
msg.number_of_blocks,
msg.sync_complete);
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
}
}
for (node_id, msg) in self.custom_message_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg() {
- self.enqueue_message(get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), &msg);
+ if peers_to_disconnect.get(&node_id).is_some() { continue; }
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), &msg);
}
- for (descriptor, peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), peer);
+ for (descriptor, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), &mut *peer_mutex.lock().unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ if !peers_to_disconnect.is_empty() {
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
+ for (node_id, msg) in peers_to_disconnect.drain() {
+ // Note that since we are holding the peers *write* lock we can
+ // remove from node_id_to_descriptor immediately (as no other
+ // thread can be holding the peer lock if we have the global write
+ // lock).
+
+ if let Some(mut descriptor) = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id) {
+ if let Some(peer_mutex) = peers.remove(&descriptor) {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.data);
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, &msg);
+ // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
+ // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut *peer);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with no message", log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ }
+ }
+ descriptor.disconnect_socket();
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
+ }
}
}
}
}
fn disconnect_event_internal(&self, descriptor: &Descriptor, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_option = peers.peers.remove(descriptor);
+ let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ let peer_option = peers.remove(descriptor);
match peer_option {
None => {
// This is most likely a simple race condition where the user found that the socket
// was disconnected, then we told the user to `disconnect_socket()`, then they
// called this method. Either way we're disconnected, return.
},
- Some(peer) => {
- match peer.their_node_id {
- Some(node_id) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger,
- "Handling disconnection of peer {}, with {}future connection to the peer possible.",
- log_pubkey!(node_id), if no_connection_possible { "no " } else { "" });
- peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id);
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, no_connection_possible);
- },
- None => {}
+ Some(peer_lock) => {
+ let peer = peer_lock.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(node_id) = peer.their_node_id {
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Handling disconnection of peer {}, with {}future connection to the peer possible.",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id), if no_connection_possible { "no " } else { "" });
+ self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, no_connection_possible);
}
}
};
///
/// [`disconnect_socket`]: SocketDescriptor::disconnect_socket
pub fn disconnect_by_node_id(&self, node_id: PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(mut descriptor) = peers_lock.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id) {
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ if let Some(mut descriptor) = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer with id {} due to client request", node_id);
- peers_lock.peers.remove(&descriptor);
+ peers_lock.remove(&descriptor);
self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, no_connection_possible);
descriptor.disconnect_socket();
}
/// an indication that TCP sockets have stalled even if we weren't around to time them out
/// using regular ping/pongs.
pub fn disconnect_all_peers(&self) {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().clear();
let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
- for (mut descriptor, peer) in peers.peers.drain() {
- if let Some(node_id) = peer.their_node_id {
+ for (mut descriptor, peer) in peers.drain() {
+ if let Some(node_id) = peer.lock().unwrap().their_node_id {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer with id {} due to client request to disconnect all peers", node_id);
- peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id);
self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
}
descriptor.disconnect_socket();
}
- debug_assert!(peers.node_id_to_descriptor.is_empty());
}
/// This is called when we're blocked on sending additional gossip messages until we receive a
///
/// [`send_data`]: SocketDescriptor::send_data
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut descriptors_needing_disconnect = Vec::new();
{
- let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
- let node_id_to_descriptor = &mut peers.node_id_to_descriptor;
- let peers = &mut peers.peers;
- let mut descriptors_needing_disconnect = Vec::new();
- let peer_count = peers.len();
+ let peers_lock = self.peers.read().unwrap();
- peers.retain(|descriptor, peer| {
- let mut do_disconnect_peer = false;
+ for (descriptor, peer_mutex) in peers_lock.iter() {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_node_id.is_none() {
// The peer needs to complete its handshake before we can exchange messages. We
// give peers one timer tick to complete handshake, reusing
// `awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals` to track number of timer ticks taken
// for handshake completion.
if peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals != 0 {
- do_disconnect_peer = true;
+ descriptors_needing_disconnect.push(descriptor.clone());
} else {
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 1;
- return true;
}
+ continue;
}
if peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals == -1 {
// Magic value set in `maybe_send_extra_ping`.
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 1;
peer.received_message_since_timer_tick = false;
- return true;
+ continue;
}
- if do_disconnect_peer
- || (peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals > 0 && !peer.received_message_since_timer_tick)
+ if (peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals > 0 && !peer.received_message_since_timer_tick)
|| peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals as u64 >
- MAX_BUFFER_DRAIN_TICK_INTERVALS_PER_PEER as u64 * peer_count as u64
+ MAX_BUFFER_DRAIN_TICK_INTERVALS_PER_PEER as u64 * peers_lock.len() as u64
{
descriptors_needing_disconnect.push(descriptor.clone());
- match peer.their_node_id {
- Some(node_id) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer with id {} due to ping timeout", node_id);
- node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id);
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
- }
- None => {},
- }
- return false;
+ continue;
}
peer.received_message_since_timer_tick = false;
if peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals > 0 {
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals += 1;
- return true;
+ continue;
}
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 1;
ponglen: 0,
byteslen: 64,
};
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &ping);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, &ping);
self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (descriptor.clone()), &mut *peer);
+ }
+ }
- true
- });
+ if !descriptors_needing_disconnect.is_empty() {
+ {
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ for descriptor in descriptors_needing_disconnect.iter() {
+ if let Some(peer) = peers_lock.remove(descriptor) {
+ if let Some(node_id) = peer.lock().unwrap().their_node_id {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer with id {} due to ping timeout", node_id);
+ self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
for mut descriptor in descriptors_needing_disconnect.drain(..) {
descriptor.disconnect_socket();
match type_id {
msgs::ChannelAnnouncement::TYPE |
msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE |
- msgs::NodeAnnouncement::TYPE => true,
+ msgs::NodeAnnouncement::TYPE |
+ msgs::QueryChannelRange::TYPE |
+ msgs::ReplyChannelRange::TYPE |
+ msgs::QueryShortChannelIds::TYPE |
+ msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd::TYPE => true,
_ => false
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor, IgnoringMessageHandler, filter_addresses};
- use ln::msgs;
+ use ln::{msgs, wire};
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use util::events;
use util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use prelude::*;
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
assert_eq!(peer_b.read_event(&mut fd_b, &fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)).unwrap(), false);
peer_b.process_events();
assert_eq!(peer_a.read_event(&mut fd_a, &fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)).unwrap(), false);
+ peer_a.process_events();
+ assert_eq!(peer_b.read_event(&mut fd_b, &fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)).unwrap(), false);
(fd_a.clone(), fd_b.clone())
}
let chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
let mut peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peers[1].our_node_secret);
peers[0].message_handler.chan_handler = &chan_handler;
peers[0].process_events();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_send_simple_msg() {
+ // Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
+ // push a message from one peer to another.
+ let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
+ let a_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
+ let b_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
+ let mut peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
+ let (fd_a, mut fd_b) = establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peers[1].our_node_secret);
+
+ let msg = msgs::Shutdown { channel_id: [42; 32], scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new() };
+ a_chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: their_id, msg: msg.clone()
+ });
+ peers[0].message_handler.chan_handler = &a_chan_handler;
+
+ b_chan_handler.expect_receive_msg(wire::Message::Shutdown(msg));
+ peers[1].message_handler.chan_handler = &b_chan_handler;
+
+ peers[0].process_events();
+
+ let a_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(peers[1].read_event(&mut fd_b, &a_data).unwrap(), false);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_disconnect_all_peer() {
+ // Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
+ // then calls disconnect_all_peers
+ let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
+ let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
+ establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
+
+ peers[0].disconnect_all_peers();
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
#[test]
let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
// peers[0] awaiting_pong is set to true, but the Peer is still connected
peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
peers[0].process_events();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
// Since timer_tick_occurred() is called again when awaiting_pong is true, all Peers are disconnected
peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
peers[0].process_events();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
#[test]
let (mut fd_a, mut fd_b) = establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
// Make each peer to read the messages that the other peer just wrote to them. Note that
- // due to the max-messagse-before-ping limits this may take a few iterations to complete.
+ // due to the max-message-before-ping limits this may take a few iterations to complete.
for _ in 0..150/super::BUFFER_DRAIN_MSGS_PER_TICK + 1 {
- peers[0].process_events();
- let b_read_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert!(!b_read_data.is_empty());
-
- peers[1].read_event(&mut fd_b, &b_read_data).unwrap();
peers[1].process_events();
-
let a_read_data = fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert!(!a_read_data.is_empty());
+
peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &a_read_data).unwrap();
+ peers[0].process_events();
- peers[1].process_events();
- assert_eq!(fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().len(), 0, "Until B receives data, it shouldn't send more messages");
+ let b_read_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert!(!b_read_data.is_empty());
+ peers[1].read_event(&mut fd_b, &b_read_data).unwrap();
+
+ peers[0].process_events();
+ assert_eq!(fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().len(), 0, "Until A receives data, it shouldn't send more messages");
}
// Check that each peer has received the expected number of channel updates and channel
peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), None).unwrap();
// If we get a single timer tick before completion, that's fine
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &initial_data).unwrap(), false);
peers[0].process_events();
// ...but if we get a second timer tick, we should disconnect the peer
peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
assert!(peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)).is_err());
}
use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteHint, RouteHintHop};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ChannelUpdate};
+use ln::wire::Encode;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::config::UserConfig;
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&contents.encode()[..]);
- let signature = Secp256k1::new().sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap());
+ let signature = Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap());
let msg = msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature, contents };
+ let mut err_data = Vec::new();
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&(msg.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&msg.encode());
+
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false,
PaymentFailedConditions::new().blamed_scid(last_hop[0].inbound_scid_alias.unwrap())
- .blamed_chan_closed(false).expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000|7, &msg.encode_with_len()));
+ .blamed_chan_closed(false).expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000|7, &err_data));
route.paths[0][1].fee_msat = 10_000; // Reset to the correct payment amount
route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0; // But set fee paid to the middle hop to 0
let mut err_data = Vec::new();
err_data.extend_from_slice(&10_000u64.to_be_bytes());
- err_data.extend_from_slice(&msg.encode_with_len());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&(msg.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes());
+ err_data.extend_from_slice(&msg.encode());
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false,
PaymentFailedConditions::new().blamed_scid(last_hop[0].inbound_scid_alias.unwrap())
.blamed_chan_closed(false).expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000|12, &err_data));
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(&relevant_txids[..], &[chan.3.txid()]);
nodes[0].node.transaction_unconfirmed(&relevant_txids[0]);
+ } else if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
} else {
disconnect_all_blocks(&nodes[0]);
}
- if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen && !use_funding_unconfirmed {
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 2 confs.");
- } else {
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- }
+ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(&relevant_txids[..], &[chan.3.txid()]);
nodes[0].node.transaction_unconfirmed(&relevant_txids[0]);
+ } else if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
} else {
disconnect_all_blocks(&nodes[0]);
}
- if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen && !use_funding_unconfirmed {
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 2 confs.");
- } else {
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- }
+ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
*nodes[0].chain_monitor.expect_channel_force_closed.lock().unwrap() = Some((chan.2, true));
nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events(); // Required to free the pending background monitor update
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let expected_err = if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen && !use_funding_unconfirmed {
- "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 2 confs."
- } else {
- "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs."
- };
+ let expected_err = "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.";
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err });
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_owned() });
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{WPubkeyHash, WScriptHash};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
use core::convert::TryFrom;
-use core::num::NonZeroU8;
use io;
/// A script pubkey for shutting down a channel as defined by [BOLT #2].
/// Generates a P2WPKH script pubkey from the given [`WPubkeyHash`].
pub fn new_p2wpkh(pubkey_hash: &WPubkeyHash) -> Self {
- Self(ShutdownScriptImpl::Bolt2(Script::new_v0_wpkh(pubkey_hash)))
+ Self(ShutdownScriptImpl::Bolt2(Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(pubkey_hash)))
}
/// Generates a P2WSH script pubkey from the given [`WScriptHash`].
pub fn new_p2wsh(script_hash: &WScriptHash) -> Self {
- Self(ShutdownScriptImpl::Bolt2(Script::new_v0_wsh(script_hash)))
+ Self(ShutdownScriptImpl::Bolt2(Script::new_v0_p2wsh(script_hash)))
}
/// Generates a witness script pubkey from the given segwit version and program.
/// # Errors
///
/// This function may return an error if `program` is invalid for the segwit `version`.
- pub fn new_witness_program(version: NonZeroU8, program: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InvalidShutdownScript> {
+ pub fn new_witness_program(version: WitnessVersion, program: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InvalidShutdownScript> {
let script = Builder::new()
- .push_int(version.get().into())
+ .push_int(version as i64)
.push_slice(&program)
.into_script();
Self::try_from(script)
fn into(self) -> Script {
match self.0 {
ShutdownScriptImpl::Legacy(pubkey) =>
- Script::new_v0_wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&pubkey.serialize())),
+ Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&pubkey.serialize())),
ShutdownScriptImpl::Bolt2(script_pubkey) => script_pubkey,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod shutdown_script_tests {
use super::ShutdownScript;
- use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use core::convert::TryFrom;
- use core::num::NonZeroU8;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
- fn pubkey() -> bitcoin::util::ecdsa::PublicKey {
+ fn pubkey() -> bitcoin::util::key::PublicKey {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
- bitcoin::util::ecdsa::PublicKey::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key))
+ bitcoin::util::key::PublicKey::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key))
}
fn redeem_script() -> Script {
fn generates_p2wpkh_from_pubkey() {
let pubkey = pubkey();
let pubkey_hash = pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap();
- let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
+ let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
- let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey.key);
+ let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey.inner);
assert!(shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known()));
assert!(shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit()));
assert_eq!(shutdown_script.into_inner(), p2wpkh_script);
#[test]
fn generates_p2wpkh_from_pubkey_hash() {
let pubkey_hash = pubkey().wpubkey_hash().unwrap();
- let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
+ let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
assert!(shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known()));
#[test]
fn generates_p2wsh_from_script_hash() {
let script_hash = redeem_script().wscript_hash();
- let p2wsh_script = Script::new_v0_wsh(&script_hash);
+ let p2wsh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&script_hash);
let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_p2wsh(&script_hash);
assert!(shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known()));
#[test]
fn generates_segwit_from_non_v0_witness_program() {
- let version = u5::try_from_u8(16).unwrap();
- let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(version, &[0; 40]);
-
- let version = NonZeroU8::new(version.to_u8()).unwrap();
- let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(version, &[0; 40]).unwrap();
+ let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0; 40]);
+ let shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0; 40]).unwrap();
assert!(shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known()));
assert!(!shutdown_script.is_compatible(&InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit()));
assert_eq!(shutdown_script.into_inner(), witness_program);
assert!(ShutdownScript::try_from(op_return).is_err());
}
- #[test]
- fn fails_from_invalid_segwit_version() {
- let version = NonZeroU8::new(17).unwrap();
- assert!(ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(version, &[0; 40]).is_err());
- }
-
#[test]
fn fails_from_invalid_segwit_v0_witness_program() {
- let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(u5::try_from_u8(0).unwrap(), &[0; 2]);
+ let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V0, &[0; 2]);
assert!(ShutdownScript::try_from(witness_program).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn fails_from_invalid_segwit_non_v0_witness_program() {
- let version = u5::try_from_u8(16).unwrap();
- let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(version, &[0; 42]);
+ let witness_program = Script::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0; 42]);
assert!(ShutdownScript::try_from(witness_program).is_err());
- let version = NonZeroU8::new(version.to_u8()).unwrap();
- assert!(ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(version, &[0; 42]).is_err());
+ assert!(ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0; 42]).is_err());
}
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
use regex;
use core::default::Default;
-use core::num::NonZeroU8;
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs::OptionalField::Present;
// Check that using an unsupported shutdown script fails and a supported one succeeds.
let supported_shutdown_script = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
let unsupported_shutdown_script =
- ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
+ ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager
.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey { returns: unsupported_shutdown_script.clone() })
.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey { returns: supported_shutdown_script });
fn read<R: io::Read>(&self, message_type: u16, buffer: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self::CustomMessage>, msgs::DecodeError>;
}
+// TestEq is a dummy trait which requires PartialEq when built in testing, and otherwise is
+// blanket-implemented for all types.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub trait TestEq : PartialEq {}
+#[cfg(test)]
+impl<T: PartialEq> TestEq for T {}
+
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+pub(crate) trait TestEq {}
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+impl<T> TestEq for T {}
+
+
/// A Lightning message returned by [`read()`] when decoding bytes received over the wire. Each
/// variant contains a message from [`msgs`] or otherwise the message type if unknown.
#[allow(missing_docs)]
#[derive(Debug)]
-pub(crate) enum Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type {
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+pub(crate) enum Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
Init(msgs::Init),
Error(msgs::ErrorMessage),
Warning(msgs::WarningMessage),
Custom(T),
}
-impl<T> Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type {
+impl<T> Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
/// Returns the type that was used to decode the message payload.
pub fn type_id(&self) -> u16 {
match self {
pub(crate) use self::encode::Encode;
+#[cfg(not(test))]
/// Defines a type identifier for sending messages over the wire.
///
/// Messages implementing this trait specify a type and must be [`Writeable`].
fn type_id(&self) -> u16;
}
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub trait Type: core::fmt::Debug + Writeable + PartialEq {
+ fn type_id(&self) -> u16;
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", fuzzing, test))]
+impl Type for () {
+ fn type_id(&self) -> u16 { unreachable!(); }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+impl<T: core::fmt::Debug + Writeable + PartialEq> Type for T where T: Encode {
+ fn type_id(&self) -> u16 { T::TYPE }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(test))]
impl<T: core::fmt::Debug + Writeable> Type for T where T: Encode {
- fn type_id(&self) -> u16 {
- T::TYPE
- }
+ fn type_id(&self) -> u16 { T::TYPE }
}
impl Encode for msgs::Init {
}
}
- impl Type for () {
- fn type_id(&self) -> u16 { unreachable!(); }
- }
-
#[test]
fn is_even_message_type() {
let message = Message::<()>::Unknown(42);
//! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
- match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
+ match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => {
return Err(LightningError {
/// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
/// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
- self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
+ self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
}
- fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let dest_node_id;
let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
let chan_was_enabled;
use hex;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
use io;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use prelude::*;
use sync::Arc;
f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
contents: unsigned_announcement
}
}
f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
+ bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
+ bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
contents: unsigned_announcement,
}
}
f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
contents: unsigned_channel_update
}
}
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
&NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
}) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
- invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
+ invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
//! You probably want to create a NetGraphMsgHandler and use that as your RoutingMessageHandler and then
//! interrogate it to get routes for your own payments.
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
match self {
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity {
- liquidity_msat: details.outbound_capacity_msat,
+ liquidity_msat: details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
},
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.effective_capacity(),
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
// We don't want multiple paths (as per MPP) share liquidity of the same channels.
// This map allows paths to be aware of the channel use by other paths in the same call.
// This would help to make a better path finding decisions and not "overbook" channels.
- // It is unaware of the directions (except for `outbound_capacity_msat` in `first_hops`).
+ // It is unaware of the directions (except for `next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat` in
+ // `first_hops`).
let mut bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat = HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// Keeping track of how much value we already collected across other paths. Helps to decide:
// sort channels above `recommended_value_msat` in ascending order, preferring channels
// which have enough, but not too much, capacity for the payment.
channels.sort_unstable_by(|chan_a, chan_b| {
- if chan_b.outbound_capacity_msat < recommended_value_msat || chan_a.outbound_capacity_msat < recommended_value_msat {
+ if chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat || chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat {
// Sort in descending order
- chan_b.outbound_capacity_msat.cmp(&chan_a.outbound_capacity_msat)
+ chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)
} else {
// Sort in ascending order
- chan_a.outbound_capacity_msat.cmp(&chan_b.outbound_capacity_msat)
+ chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)
}
});
}
use hex;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, All};
use prelude::*;
user_channel_id: 0,
balance_msat: 0,
outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: outbound_capacity_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: 42,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
confirmations_required: None,
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
+ bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
+ bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
};
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
) {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&update.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_privkey),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_privkey),
contents: update.clone()
};
};
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_privkey),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_privkey),
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
};
assert_eq!(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat, 250_000_000);
}
- // Check that setting outbound_capacity_msat in first_hops limits the channels.
+ // Check that setting next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat in first_hops limits the channels.
// Disable channel #1 and use another first hop.
update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- // Now, limit the first_hop by the outbound_capacity_msat of 200_000 sats.
+ // Now, limit the first_hop by the next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat of 200_000 sats.
let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[0].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 200_000_000)];
{
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst);
let amt = seed as u64 % 200_000_000;
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &graph);
- if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, 42, &test_utils::TestLogger::new(), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &graph, &logger);
+ if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, 42, &logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
continue 'load_endpoints;
}
}
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
let amt = seed as u64 % 200_000_000;
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &graph);
- if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, 42, &test_utils::TestLogger::new(), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &graph, &logger);
+ if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, 42, &logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
continue 'load_endpoints;
}
}
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use routing::scoring::{FixedPenaltyScorer, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringParameters, Scorer};
use util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use test::Bencher;
user_channel_id: 0,
balance_msat: 10_000_000,
outbound_capacity_msat: 10_000_000,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: 10_000_000,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
confirmations_required: None,
#[bench]
fn generate_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = read_network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, InvoiceFeatures::empty());
}
#[bench]
fn generate_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = read_network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, InvoiceFeatures::known());
}
//! # Example
//!
//! ```
-//! # extern crate secp256k1;
+//! # extern crate bitcoin;
//! #
//! # use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
//! # use lightning::routing::router::{RouteParameters, find_route};
//! # use lightning::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringParameters, Scorer, ScoringParameters};
//! # use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface};
//! # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
-//! # use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+//! # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
//! #
//! # struct FakeLogger {};
//! # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
//! #
//! // Use the default channel penalties.
//! let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
-//! let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+//! let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
//!
//! // Or use custom channel penalties.
//! let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
//! liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 2 * 1000,
//! ..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default()
//! };
-//! let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+//! let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
//! # let random_seed_bytes = [42u8; 32];
//!
//! let route = find_route(&payer, &route_params, &network_graph, None, &logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes);
use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::logger::Logger;
use prelude::*;
+use core::fmt;
use core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut};
use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use core::time::Duration;
fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked;
}
+/// Refers to a scorer that is accessible under lock and also writeable to disk
+///
+/// We need this trait to be able to pass in a scorer to `lightning-background-processor` that will enable us to
+/// use the Persister to persist it.
+pub trait WriteableScore<'a>: LockableScore<'a> + Writeable {}
+
+impl<'a, T> WriteableScore<'a> for T where T: LockableScore<'a> + Writeable {}
+
/// (C-not exported)
impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for Mutex<T> {
type Locked = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
/// behavior.
///
/// [1]: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.05322
-pub type ProbabilisticScorer<G> = ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime::<G, ConfiguredTime>;
+pub type ProbabilisticScorer<G, L> = ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime::<G, L, ConfiguredTime>;
/// Probabilistic [`Score`] implementation.
///
/// (C-not exported) generally all users should use the [`ProbabilisticScorer`] type alias.
-pub struct ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, T: Time> {
+pub struct ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> where L::Target: Logger {
params: ProbabilisticScoringParameters,
network_graph: G,
+ logger: L,
// TODO: Remove entries of closed channels.
channel_liquidities: HashMap<u64, ChannelLiquidity<T>>,
}
half_life: Duration,
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, T: Time> ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, T> {
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
/// Creates a new scorer using the given scoring parameters for sending payments from a node
/// through a network graph.
- pub fn new(params: ProbabilisticScoringParameters, network_graph: G) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(params: ProbabilisticScoringParameters, network_graph: G, logger: L) -> Self {
Self {
params,
network_graph,
+ logger,
channel_liquidities: HashMap::new(),
}
}
assert!(self.channel_liquidities.insert(short_channel_id, liquidity).is_none());
self
}
+
+ /// Dump the contents of this scorer into the configured logger.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this writes roughly one line per channel for which we have a liquidity estimate,
+ /// which may be a substantial amount of log output.
+ pub fn debug_log_liquidity_stats(&self) {
+ let graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
+ for (scid, liq) in self.channel_liquidities.iter() {
+ if let Some(chan_debug) = graph.channels().get(scid) {
+ let log_direction = |source, target| {
+ if let Some((directed_info, _)) = chan_debug.as_directed_to(target) {
+ let amt = directed_info.effective_capacity().as_msat();
+ let dir_liq = liq.as_directed(source, target, amt, self.params.liquidity_offset_half_life);
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Liquidity from {:?} to {:?} via {} is in the range ({}, {})",
+ source, target, scid, dir_liq.min_liquidity_msat(), dir_liq.max_liquidity_msat());
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "No amount known for SCID {} from {:?} to {:?}", scid, source, target);
+ }
+ };
+
+ log_direction(&chan_debug.node_one, &chan_debug.node_two);
+ log_direction(&chan_debug.node_two, &chan_debug.node_one);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "No network graph entry for SCID {}", scid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
impl ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
impl<L: DerefMut<Target = u64>, T: Time, U: DerefMut<Target = T>> DirectedChannelLiquidity<L, T, U> {
/// Adjusts the channel liquidity balance bounds when failing to route `amount_msat`.
- fn failed_at_channel(&mut self, amount_msat: u64) {
+ fn failed_at_channel<Log: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, chan_descr: fmt::Arguments, logger: &Log) where Log::Target: Logger {
if amount_msat < self.max_liquidity_msat() {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Setting max liquidity of {} to {}", chan_descr, amount_msat);
self.set_max_liquidity_msat(amount_msat);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Max liquidity of {} already more than {}", chan_descr, amount_msat);
}
}
/// Adjusts the channel liquidity balance bounds when failing to route `amount_msat` downstream.
- fn failed_downstream(&mut self, amount_msat: u64) {
+ fn failed_downstream<Log: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, chan_descr: fmt::Arguments, logger: &Log) where Log::Target: Logger {
if amount_msat > self.min_liquidity_msat() {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Setting min liquidity of {} to {}", chan_descr, amount_msat);
self.set_min_liquidity_msat(amount_msat);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Min liquidity of {} already less than {}", chan_descr, amount_msat);
}
}
/// Adjusts the channel liquidity balance bounds when successfully routing `amount_msat`.
- fn successful(&mut self, amount_msat: u64) {
+ fn successful<Log: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, chan_descr: fmt::Arguments, logger: &Log) where Log::Target: Logger {
let max_liquidity_msat = self.max_liquidity_msat().checked_sub(amount_msat).unwrap_or(0);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Subtracting {} from max liquidity of {} (setting it to {})", amount_msat, chan_descr, max_liquidity_msat);
self.set_max_liquidity_msat(max_liquidity_msat);
}
}
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, T: Time> Score for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, T> {
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> Score for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, amount_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId,
target: &NodeId
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop], short_channel_id: u64) {
let amount_msat = path.split_last().map(|(hop, _)| hop.fee_msat).unwrap_or(0);
let liquidity_offset_half_life = self.params.liquidity_offset_half_life;
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Scoring path through to SCID {} as having failed at {} msat", short_channel_id, amount_msat);
let network_graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
- for hop in path {
+ for (hop_idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
let target = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.pubkey);
let channel_directed_from_source = network_graph.channels()
.get(&hop.short_channel_id)
.and_then(|channel| channel.as_directed_to(&target));
+ if hop.short_channel_id == short_channel_id && hop_idx == 0 {
+ log_warn!(self.logger, "Payment failed at the first hop - we do not attempt to learn channel info in such cases as we can directly observe local state.\n\tBecause we know the local state, we should generally not see failures here - this may be an indication that your channel peer on channel {} is broken and you may wish to close the channel.", hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+
// Only score announced channels.
if let Some((channel, source)) = channel_directed_from_source {
let capacity_msat = channel.effective_capacity().as_msat();
.entry(hop.short_channel_id)
.or_insert_with(ChannelLiquidity::new)
.as_directed_mut(source, &target, capacity_msat, liquidity_offset_half_life)
- .failed_at_channel(amount_msat);
+ .failed_at_channel(amount_msat, format_args!("SCID {}, towards {:?}", hop.short_channel_id, target), &self.logger);
break;
}
.entry(hop.short_channel_id)
.or_insert_with(ChannelLiquidity::new)
.as_directed_mut(source, &target, capacity_msat, liquidity_offset_half_life)
- .failed_downstream(amount_msat);
+ .failed_downstream(amount_msat, format_args!("SCID {}, towards {:?}", hop.short_channel_id, target), &self.logger);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Not able to penalize channel with SCID {} as we do not have graph info for it (likely a route-hint last-hop).",
+ hop.short_channel_id);
}
}
}
fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop]) {
let amount_msat = path.split_last().map(|(hop, _)| hop.fee_msat).unwrap_or(0);
let liquidity_offset_half_life = self.params.liquidity_offset_half_life;
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Scoring path through SCID {} as having succeeded at {} msat.",
+ path.split_last().map(|(hop, _)| hop.short_channel_id).unwrap_or(0), amount_msat);
let network_graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
for hop in path {
let target = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.pubkey);
.entry(hop.short_channel_id)
.or_insert_with(ChannelLiquidity::new)
.as_directed_mut(source, &target, capacity_msat, liquidity_offset_half_life)
- .successful(amount_msat);
+ .successful(amount_msat, format_args!("SCID {}, towards {:?}", hop.short_channel_id, target), &self.logger);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Not able to learn for channel with SCID {} as we do not have graph info for it (likely a route-hint last-hop).",
+ hop.short_channel_id);
}
}
}
}
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, T: Time> Writeable for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, T> {
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> Writeable for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(w, {
}
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, T: Time>
-ReadableArgs<(ProbabilisticScoringParameters, G)> for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, T> {
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time>
+ReadableArgs<(ProbabilisticScoringParameters, G, L)> for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
#[inline]
fn read<R: Read>(
- r: &mut R, args: (ProbabilisticScoringParameters, G)
+ r: &mut R, args: (ProbabilisticScoringParameters, G, L)
) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (params, network_graph) = args;
+ let (params, network_graph, logger) = args;
let mut channel_liquidities = HashMap::new();
read_tlv_fields!(r, {
(0, channel_liquidities, required)
Ok(Self {
params,
network_graph,
+ logger,
channel_liquidities,
})
}
use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable};
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
// `ProbabilisticScorer` tests
/// A probabilistic scorer for testing with time that can be manually advanced.
- type ProbabilisticScorer<'a> = ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime::<&'a NetworkGraph, SinceEpoch>;
+ type ProbabilisticScorer<'a> = ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime::<&'a NetworkGraph, &'a TestLogger, SinceEpoch>;
fn sender_privkey() -> SecretKey {
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap()
};
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let signed_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &node_1_key),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &node_2_key),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &node_1_secret),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &node_2_secret),
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, &node_1_key),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, &node_2_key),
+ bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, &node_1_secret),
+ bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, &node_2_secret),
contents: unsigned_announcement,
};
let chain_source: Option<&::util::test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
};
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_update.encode()[..])[..]);
let signed_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &node_key),
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, &node_key),
contents: unsigned_update,
};
network_graph.update_channel(&signed_update, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
#[test]
fn liquidity_bounds_directed_from_lowest_node_id() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let last_updated = SinceEpoch::now();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph)
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger)
.with_channel(42,
ChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat: 700, max_liquidity_offset_msat: 100, last_updated
#[test]
fn resets_liquidity_upper_bound_when_crossed_by_lower_bound() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let last_updated = SinceEpoch::now();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph)
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger)
.with_channel(42,
ChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat: 200, max_liquidity_offset_msat: 400, last_updated
#[test]
fn resets_liquidity_lower_bound_when_crossed_by_upper_bound() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let last_updated = SinceEpoch::now();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph)
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger)
.with_channel(42,
ChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat: 200, max_liquidity_offset_msat: 400, last_updated
#[test]
fn increased_penalty_nearing_liquidity_upper_bound() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
#[test]
fn constant_penalty_outside_liquidity_bounds() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let last_updated = SinceEpoch::now();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph)
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger)
.with_channel(42,
ChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat: 40, max_liquidity_offset_msat: 40, last_updated
#[test]
fn does_not_further_penalize_own_channel() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let sender = sender_node_id();
let source = source_node_id();
let failed_path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
#[test]
fn sets_liquidity_lower_bound_on_downstream_failure() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
#[test]
fn sets_liquidity_upper_bound_on_failure() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
#[test]
fn reduces_liquidity_upper_bound_along_path_on_success() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let sender = sender_node_id();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
#[test]
fn decays_liquidity_bounds_over_time() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
liquidity_offset_half_life: Duration::from_secs(10),
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
#[test]
fn decays_liquidity_bounds_without_shift_overflow() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
liquidity_offset_half_life: Duration::from_secs(10),
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
#[test]
fn restricts_liquidity_bounds_after_decay() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
liquidity_offset_half_life: Duration::from_secs(10),
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
#[test]
fn restores_persisted_liquidity_bounds() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
liquidity_offset_half_life: Duration::from_secs(10),
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
- <ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph)).unwrap();
+ <ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
}
#[test]
fn decays_persisted_liquidity_bounds() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
liquidity_offset_half_life: Duration::from_secs(10),
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
- <ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph)).unwrap();
+ <ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 473);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(250).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
fn scores_realistic_payments() {
// Shows the scores of "realistic" sends of 100k sats over channels of 1-10m sats (with a
// 50k sat reserve).
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
#[test]
fn adds_base_penalty_to_liquidity_penalty() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 58);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
base_penalty_msat: 500, liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000, ..Default::default()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 558);
}
#[test]
fn adds_amount_penalty_to_liquidity_penalty() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
amount_penalty_multiplier_msat: 0,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 300);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
amount_penalty_multiplier_msat: 256,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 337);
}
#[test]
fn calculates_log10_without_overflowing_u64_max_value() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 40_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph);
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(
scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, u64::max_value(), u64::max_value(), &source, &target),
80_000,
Err(())
}
}
+
+pub type FairRwLock<T> = RwLock<T>;
//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
//! applies for you.
+use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
/// Configuration we set when applicable.
/// Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
/// by the protocol.
pub our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+ /// HTLCs to.
+ ///
+ /// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+ /// channel value in whole percentages.
+ ///
+ /// Note that:
+ /// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+ /// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+ /// `ChannelManager`.
+ ///
+ /// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+ /// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+ ///
+ /// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+ /// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+ /// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+ /// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+ /// for more information.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 10.
+ /// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+ /// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+ pub max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: u8,
/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
minimum_depth: 6,
our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+ max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: 10,
negotiate_scid_privacy: false,
}
}
/// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+ /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
/// Default value: 0.
pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
+ /// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
+ /// only applies to inbound channels.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+ pub max_funding_satoshis: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
///
fn default() -> Self {
ChannelHandshakeLimits {
min_funding_satoshis: 0,
+ max_funding_satoshis: MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO,
max_htlc_minimum_msat: <u64>::max_value(),
min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey, Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey, ecdsa::Signature, Signing};
macro_rules! hkdf_extract_expand {
($salt: expr, $ikm: expr) => {{
#[inline]
pub fn sign<C: Signing>(ctx: &Secp256k1<C>, msg: &Message, sk: &SecretKey) -> Signature {
#[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")]
- let sig = ctx.sign_low_r(msg, sk);
+ let sig = ctx.sign_ecdsa_low_r(msg, sk);
#[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
- let sig = ctx.sign(msg, sk);
+ let sig = ctx.sign_ecdsa(msg, sk);
sig
}
use sync::{Mutex, Arc};
#[cfg(test)] use sync::MutexGuard;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use io::Error;
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+ secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
}
Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use io;
use prelude::*;
use core::time::Duration;
/// A developer-readable error message which we generated.
err: String,
},
- /// The `PeerManager` informed us that we've disconnected from the peer. We close channels
- /// if the `PeerManager` informed us that it is unlikely we'll be able to connect to the
- /// peer again in the future or if the peer disconnected before we finished negotiating
- /// the channel open. The first case may be caused by incompatible features which our
- /// counterparty, or we, require.
- //TODO: split between PeerUnconnectable/PeerDisconnected ?
+ /// The peer disconnected prior to funding completing. In this case the spec mandates that we
+ /// forget the channel entirely - we can attempt again if the peer reconnects.
+ ///
+ /// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 this could also occur if we were unable to connect to the
+ /// peer because of mutual incompatibility between us and our channel counterparty.
DisconnectedPeer,
/// Closure generated from `ChannelManager::read` if the ChannelMonitor is newer than
/// the ChannelManager deserialized.
/// [`Route::get_total_fees`]: crate::routing::router::Route::get_total_fees
fee_paid_msat: Option<u64>,
},
+ /// Indicates an outbound payment failed. Individual [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] events
+ /// provide failure information for each MPP part in the payment.
+ ///
+ /// This event is provided once there are no further pending HTLCs for the payment and the
+ /// payment is no longer retryable, either due to a several-block timeout or because
+ /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] was previously called for the corresponding payment.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::abandon_payment
+ PaymentFailed {
+ /// The id returned by [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] and used with
+ /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
+ /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::retry_payment
+ /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::abandon_payment
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ /// The hash that was given to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ },
+ /// Indicates that a path for an outbound payment was successful.
+ ///
+ /// Always generated after [`Event::PaymentSent`] and thus useful for scoring channels. See
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] for obtaining the payment preimage.
+ PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ /// The id returned by [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] and used with
+ /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
+ /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::retry_payment
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ /// The hash that was given to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
+ payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
+ /// The payment path that was successful.
+ ///
+ /// May contain a closed channel if the HTLC sent along the path was fulfilled on chain.
+ path: Vec<RouteHop>,
+ },
/// Indicates an outbound HTLC we sent failed. Probably some intermediary node dropped
/// something. You may wish to retry with a different route.
///
#[cfg(test)]
error_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
},
- /// Indicates an outbound payment failed. Individual [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] events
- /// provide failure information for each MPP part in the payment.
- ///
- /// This event is provided once there are no further pending HTLCs for the payment and the
- /// payment is no longer retryable, either due to a several-block timeout or because
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] was previously called for the corresponding payment.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::abandon_payment
- PaymentFailed {
- /// The id returned by [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] and used with
- /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`].
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
- /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::retry_payment
- /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::abandon_payment
- payment_id: PaymentId,
- /// The hash that was given to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`].
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- },
/// Used to indicate that [`ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards`] should be called at
/// a time in the future.
///
/// The full transaction received from the user
transaction: Transaction
},
- /// Indicates that a path for an outbound payment was successful.
- ///
- /// Always generated after [`Event::PaymentSent`] and thus useful for scoring channels. See
- /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] for obtaining the payment preimage.
- PaymentPathSuccessful {
- /// The id returned by [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] and used with
- /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
- /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::retry_payment
- payment_id: PaymentId,
- /// The hash that was given to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`].
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
- payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
- /// The payment path that was successful.
- ///
- /// May contain a closed channel if the HTLC sent along the path was fulfilled on chain.
- path: Vec<RouteHop>,
- },
/// Indicates a request to open a new channel by a peer.
///
/// To accept the request, call [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. To reject the
--- /dev/null
+use std::sync::{LockResult, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+/// Rust libstd's RwLock does not provide any fairness guarantees (and, in fact, when used on
+/// Linux with pthreads under the hood, readers trivially and completely starve writers).
+/// Because we often hold read locks while doing message processing in multiple threads which
+/// can use significant CPU time, with write locks being time-sensitive but relatively small in
+/// CPU time, we can end up with starvation completely blocking incoming connections or pings,
+/// especially during initial graph sync.
+///
+/// Thus, we need to block readers when a writer is pending, which we do with a trivial RwLock
+/// wrapper here. Its not particularly optimized, but provides some reasonable fairness by
+/// blocking readers (by taking the write lock) if there are writers pending when we go to take
+/// a read lock.
+pub struct FairRwLock<T> {
+ lock: RwLock<T>,
+ waiting_writers: AtomicUsize,
+}
+
+impl<T> FairRwLock<T> {
+ pub fn new(t: T) -> Self {
+ Self { lock: RwLock::new(t), waiting_writers: AtomicUsize::new(0) }
+ }
+
+ // Note that all atomic accesses are relaxed, as we do not rely on the atomics here for any
+ // ordering at all, instead relying on the underlying RwLock to provide ordering of unrelated
+ // memory.
+ pub fn write(&self) -> LockResult<RwLockWriteGuard<T>> {
+ self.waiting_writers.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ let res = self.lock.write();
+ self.waiting_writers.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ res
+ }
+
+ pub fn read(&self) -> LockResult<RwLockReadGuard<T>> {
+ if self.waiting_writers.load(Ordering::Relaxed) != 0 {
+ let _write_queue_lock = self.lock.write();
+ }
+ // Note that we don't consider ensuring that an underlying RwLock allowing writers to
+ // starve readers doesn't exhibit the same behavior here. I'm not aware of any
+ // libstd-backing RwLock which exhibits this behavior, and as documented in the
+ // struct-level documentation, it shouldn't pose a significant issue for our current
+ // codebase.
+ self.lock.read()
+ }
+}
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use routing::router::Route;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCType;
use prelude::*;
use crate::util::zbase32;
use bitcoin::hashes::{sha256d, Hash};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::{RecoverableSignature, RecoveryId};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, RecoveryId};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Error, Message, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
static LN_MESSAGE_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"Lightning Signed Message:";
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let msg_hash = sha256d::Hash::hash(&[LN_MESSAGE_PREFIX, msg].concat());
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash)?, sk);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash)?, sk);
Ok(zbase32::encode(&sigrec_encode(sig)))
}
match zbase32::decode(&sig) {
Ok(sig_rec) => {
match sigrec_decode(sig_rec) {
- Ok(sig) => secp_ctx.recover(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash)?, &sig),
+ Ok(sig) => secp_ctx.recover_ecdsa(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash)?, &sig),
Err(e) => Err(e)
}
},
mod test {
use core::str::FromStr;
use util::message_signing::{sign, recover_pk, verify};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::ONE_KEY;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ONE_KEY;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1};
#[test]
pub(crate) mod atomic_counter;
pub(crate) mod byte_utils;
pub(crate) mod chacha20;
+#[cfg(all(not(test), feature = "std"))]
+pub(crate) mod fairrwlock;
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
pub mod zbase32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use io::{self};
+use routing::scoring::WriteableScore;
use crate::{chain::{keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface}, self, transaction::{OutPoint}, chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}, chainmonitor::{Persist, MonitorUpdateId}, channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate}}, ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager, routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph};
use super::{logger::Logger, ser::Writeable};
fn persist<W: Writeable>(&self, key: &str, object: &W) -> io::Result<()>;
}
-/// Trait that handles persisting a [`ChannelManager`] and [`NetworkGraph`] to disk.
-pub trait Persister<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+/// Trait that handles persisting a [`ChannelManager`], [`NetworkGraph`], and [`WriteableScore`] to disk.
+pub trait Persister<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, S>
where M::Target: 'static + chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: 'static + BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: 'static + KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: 'static + FeeEstimator,
L::Target: 'static + Logger,
+ S: WriteableScore<'a>,
{
/// Persist the given ['ChannelManager'] to disk, returning an error if persistence failed.
fn persist_manager(&self, channel_manager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<(), io::Error>;
/// Persist the given [`NetworkGraph`] to disk, returning an error if persistence failed.
fn persist_graph(&self, network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> Result<(), io::Error>;
+
+ /// Persist the given [`WriteableScore`] to disk, returning an error if persistence failed.
+ fn persist_scorer(&self, scorer: &S) -> Result<(), io::Error>;
}
-impl<A: KVStorePersister, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Persister<Signer, M, T, K, F, L> for A
+impl<'a, A: KVStorePersister, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, S> Persister<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L, S> for A
where M::Target: 'static + chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: 'static + BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: 'static + KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
F::Target: 'static + FeeEstimator,
L::Target: 'static + Logger,
+ S: WriteableScore<'a>,
{
- /// Persist the given ['ChannelManager'] to disk, returning an error if persistence failed.
+ /// Persist the given ['ChannelManager'] to disk with the name "manager", returning an error if persistence failed.
fn persist_manager(&self, channel_manager: &ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
self.persist("manager", channel_manager)
}
- /// Persist the given [`NetworkGraph`] to disk, returning an error if persistence failed.
+ /// Persist the given [`NetworkGraph`] to disk with the name "network_graph", returning an error if persistence failed.
fn persist_graph(&self, network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
self.persist("network_graph", network_graph)
}
+
+ /// Persist the given [`WriteableScore`] to disk with name "scorer", returning an error if persistence failed.
+ fn persist_scorer(&self, scorer: &S) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.persist("scorer", &scorer)
+ }
}
impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, K: KVStorePersister> Persist<ChannelSigner> for K {
use sync::Mutex;
use core::cmp;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Signature;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::{PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, SECRET_KEY_SIZE, COMPACT_SIGNATURE_SIZE};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint, Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::consensus;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
-use ln::msgs;
+use ln::{msgs, wire};
use ln::msgs::OptionalField;
use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use routing::scoring::FixedPenaltyScorer;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Secp256k1, Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
use regex;
use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial};
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
pub struct TestVecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
impl Writer for TestVecWriter {
fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
pub struct TestChannelMessageHandler {
pub pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
+ expected_recv_msgs: Mutex<Option<Vec<wire::Message<()>>>>,
}
impl TestChannelMessageHandler {
pub fn new() -> Self {
TestChannelMessageHandler {
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ expected_recv_msgs: Mutex::new(None),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn expect_receive_msg(&self, ev: wire::Message<()>) {
+ let mut expected_msgs = self.expected_recv_msgs.lock().unwrap();
+ if expected_msgs.is_none() { *expected_msgs = Some(Vec::new()); }
+ expected_msgs.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
+ }
+
+ fn received_msg(&self, _ev: wire::Message<()>) {
+ let mut msgs = self.expected_recv_msgs.lock().unwrap();
+ if msgs.is_none() { return; }
+ assert!(!msgs.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty(), "Received message when we weren't expecting one");
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ assert_eq!(msgs.as_ref().unwrap()[0], _ev);
+ msgs.as_mut().unwrap().remove(0);
+ }
+}
+
+impl Drop for TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ let l = self.expected_recv_msgs.lock().unwrap();
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ {
+ if !std::thread::panicking() {
+ assert!(l.is_none() || l.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty());
+ }
}
}
}
impl msgs::ChannelMessageHandler for TestChannelMessageHandler {
- fn handle_open_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: InitFeatures, _msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {}
- fn handle_accept_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: InitFeatures, _msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {}
- fn handle_funding_created(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {}
- fn handle_funding_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {}
- fn handle_funding_locked(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {}
- fn handle_shutdown(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: &InitFeatures, _msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {}
- fn handle_closing_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {}
- fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {}
- fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {}
- fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {}
- fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {}
- fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {}
- fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {}
- fn handle_update_fee(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {}
- fn handle_channel_update(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {}
- fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {}
- fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {}
+ fn handle_open_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::OpenChannel(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_accept_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::AcceptChannel(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_created(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::FundingCreated(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::FundingSigned(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_locked(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::FundingLocked(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_shutdown(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::Shutdown(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_closing_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::ClosingSigned(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::UpdateAddHTLC(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::UpdateFulfillHTLC(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::UpdateFailHTLC(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::CommitmentSigned(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::RevokeAndACK(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fee(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::UpdateFee(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_channel_update(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
+ // Don't call `received_msg` here as `TestRoutingMessageHandler` generates these sometimes
+ }
+ fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::AnnouncementSignatures(msg.clone()));
+ }
+ fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::ChannelReestablish(msg.clone()));
+ }
fn peer_disconnected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _no_connection_possible: bool) {}
- fn peer_connected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::Init) {}
- fn handle_error(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {}
+ fn peer_connected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::Init) {
+ // Don't bother with `received_msg` for Init as its auto-generated and we don't want to
+ // bother re-generating the expected Init message in all tests.
+ }
+ fn handle_error(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ self.received_msg(wire::Message::Error(msg.clone()));
+ }
}
impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for TestChannelMessageHandler {
pub struct TestRoutingMessageHandler {
pub chan_upds_recvd: AtomicUsize,
pub chan_anns_recvd: AtomicUsize,
+ pub pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
pub request_full_sync: AtomicBool,
}
TestRoutingMessageHandler {
chan_upds_recvd: AtomicUsize::new(0),
chan_anns_recvd: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
request_full_sync: AtomicBool::new(false),
}
}
Vec::new()
}
- fn peer_connected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _init_msg: &msgs::Init) {}
+ fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
+ if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
+ return ();
+ }
+
+ let should_request_full_sync = self.request_full_sync.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+
+ #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
+ let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ {
+ gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ if should_request_full_sync {
+ gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
+ } else {
+ gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32,
+ timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
+ },
+ });
+ }
fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: msgs::ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), msgs::LightningError> {
Ok(())
impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for TestRoutingMessageHandler {
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
- vec![]
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
+ ret
}
}
value: 0,
};
let change_len = change_output.consensus_encode(&mut sink()).unwrap();
- let starting_weight = tx.get_weight() + WITNESS_FLAG_BYTES as usize + witness_max_weight;
+ let starting_weight = tx.weight() + WITNESS_FLAG_BYTES as usize + witness_max_weight;
let mut weight_with_change: i64 = starting_weight as i64 + change_len as i64 * 4;
// Include any extra bytes required to push an extra output.
weight_with_change += (VarInt(tx.output.len() as u64 + 1).len() - VarInt(tx.output.len() as u64).len()) as i64 * 4;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::Witness;
use hex::decode;
let output_spk = Script::new_p2pkh(&PubkeyHash::hash(&[0; 0]));
assert_eq!(output_spk.dust_value().as_sat(), 546);
// 9 sats isn't enough to pay fee on a dummy transaction...
- assert_eq!(tx.get_weight() as u64, 40); // ie 10 vbytes
+ assert_eq!(tx.weight() as u64, 40); // ie 10 vbytes
assert!(maybe_add_change_output(&mut tx, 9, 0, 250, output_spk.clone()).is_err());
assert_eq!(tx.wtxid(), orig_wtxid); // Failure doesn't change the transaction
// but 10-564 is, just not enough to add a change output...
assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tx.output[0].value, 546);
assert_eq!(tx.output[0].script_pubkey, output_spk);
- assert_eq!(tx.get_weight() / 4, 590-546); // New weight is exactly the fee we wanted.
+ assert_eq!(tx.weight() / 4, 590-546); // New weight is exactly the fee we wanted.
tx.output.pop();
assert_eq!(tx.wtxid(), orig_wtxid); // The only change is the addition of one output.
fn test_tx_extra_outputs() {
// Check that we correctly handle existing outputs
let mut tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: vec![TxIn {
- previous_output: OutPoint::new(Txid::from_hash(Sha256dHash::default()), 0), script_sig: Script::new(), witness: Vec::new(), sequence: 0,
+ previous_output: OutPoint::new(Txid::from_hash(Sha256dHash::default()), 0), script_sig: Script::new(), witness: Witness::new(), sequence: 0,
}], output: vec![TxOut {
script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(1).into_script(), value: 1000
}] };
let orig_wtxid = tx.wtxid();
- let orig_weight = tx.get_weight();
+ let orig_weight = tx.weight();
assert_eq!(orig_weight / 4, 61);
assert_eq!(Builder::new().push_int(2).into_script().dust_value().as_sat(), 474);
assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(tx.output[1].value, 474);
assert_eq!(tx.output[1].script_pubkey, Builder::new().push_int(2).into_script());
- assert_eq!(tx.get_weight() - orig_weight, 40); // Weight difference matches what we had to add above
+ assert_eq!(tx.weight() - orig_weight, 40); // Weight difference matches what we had to add above
tx.output.pop();
assert_eq!(tx.wtxid(), orig_wtxid); // The only change is the addition of one output.
}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff