//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
- use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
- use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
use routing::router::get_route;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
- expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
- expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
+ expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
+ // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
+ // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
+
+ let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
+ assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+ }
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
+ v.sort_unstable();
+ v
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
+ // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
+ // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ }
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
+ // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
+ let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
+ // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
+ let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
+ // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
+ // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
+ let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
+ let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
+ // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
+ let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
+ 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
+ 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
+ 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
+ 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
+ // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
+ chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
+ if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
+ channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }];
+ if !prev_commitment_tx {
+ a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
+ // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
+ let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
+
+ let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
+ }
+ // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
+ // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
+ // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
+ // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
+ // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ },
+ // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
+ // long.
+ Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
+ // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+ if !prev_commitment_tx {
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
+ a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
+ // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+
+ // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
+ // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
+ // balance entry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
+ // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
+ // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
+ let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
+ // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
+ // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
+ // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
+ // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
+ }