},
];
- let payment_paths = paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect();
+ let payment_paths = payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect();
let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash)?.build()
}
},
];
- let payment_paths = paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect();
+ let payment_paths = payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect();
let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
refund.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash, signing_pubkey)?.build()
}
self.event_notifier.notify();
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
use crate::events::EventsProvider;
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
///
/// Payments received on LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 will have this field unset.
onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
- /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for.
+ /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is claimable for. May be greater
+ /// than the invoice amount.
+ ///
+ /// May be less than the invoice amount if [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set
+ /// and the previous hop took an extra fee.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// If [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set and you claim without verifying this
+ /// field, you may lose money!
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The value, in thousands of a satoshi, that was skimmed off of this payment as an extra fee
+ /// taken by our channel counterparty.
+ ///
+ /// Will always be 0 unless [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: u64,
/// Information for claiming this received payment, based on whether the purpose of the
/// payment is to pay an invoice or to send a spontaneous payment.
purpose: PaymentPurpose,
/// The payment hash of the claimed payment. Note that LDK will not stop you from
/// registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound payments.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for.
+ /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for. May be greater than the
+ /// invoice amount.
amount_msat: u64,
/// The purpose of the claimed payment, i.e. whether the payment was for an invoice or a
/// spontaneous payment.
inbound_amount_msat: u64,
/// How many msats the payer intended to route to the next node. Depending on the reason you are
/// intercepting this payment, you might take a fee by forwarding less than this amount.
+ /// Forwarding less than this amount may break compatibility with LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
///
/// Note that LDK will NOT check that expected fees were factored into this value. You MUST
/// check that whatever fee you want has been included here or subtract it as required. Further,
// We never write out FundingGenerationReady events as, upon disconnection, peers
// drop any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_signed.
},
- &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, ref purpose,
- ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
+ &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
+ ref purpose, ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
ref claim_deadline, ref onion_fields
} => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
payment_preimage = Some(*preimage);
}
}
+ let skimmed_fee_opt = if counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None }
+ else { Some(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat) };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
(1, receiver_node_id, option),
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
(9, onion_fields, option),
+ (10, skimmed_fee_opt, option),
});
},
&Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_id, ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, ref fee_paid_msat } => {
let mut payment_preimage = None;
let mut payment_secret = None;
let mut amount_msat = 0;
+ let mut counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt = None;
let mut receiver_node_id = None;
let mut _user_payment_id = None::<u64>; // Used in 0.0.103 and earlier, no longer written in 0.0.116+.
let mut via_channel_id = None;
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
(9, onion_fields, option),
+ (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt, option),
});
let purpose = match payment_secret {
Some(secret) => PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
receiver_node_id,
payment_hash,
amount_msat,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt.unwrap_or(0),
purpose,
via_channel_id,
via_user_channel_id,
//! * `max_level_trace`
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), deny(missing_docs))]
-#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
+#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
// Prefix these with `rustdoc::` when we update our MSRV to be >= 1.52 to remove warnings.
#![deny(broken_intra_doc_links)]
extern crate core;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate regex;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate regex;
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] extern crate core2;
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
// handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
// to rebalance channels.
match &htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
+ onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
+ {
Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
match e {
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
});
}
}
/// commitment update.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
self
- .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
+ .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
.map_err(|err| {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
/// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
}
cltv_expiry,
source,
onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
});
return Ok(None);
}
cltv_expiry,
state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
});
let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
};
self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
///
/// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
/// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
+ onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
match send_res? {
Some(_) => {
}
let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
+ let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
reason.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
+ if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+ }
+ pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
+ } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
+ }
}
+ let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
match update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
+ } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
amount_msat.write(writer)?;
cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
source.write(writer)?;
onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
+
+ if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
+ if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+ }
+ holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
+ } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
(29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
(31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
(33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
+ (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
});
Ok(())
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
});
}
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
},
1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
+ let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
+
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, announcement_sigs, option),
(1, minimum_depth, option),
(29, temporary_channel_id, option),
(31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
(33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
+ (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
});
let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
+ if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
+ let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+ if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
+ let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
+ for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
+ *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ }
+ // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+
Ok(Channel {
context: ChannelContext {
user_id,
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
- }
+ },
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
});
// Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
/// may overshoot this in either case)
pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
+ /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
+ pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
total_value_received: Option<u64>,
/// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
total_msat: u64,
+ /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
}
}
- fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
- {
+ fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
return Err(ReceiveError {
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
+ if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
+ {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
+ ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
},
};
+ let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ }, ..
+ } => {
+ let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
+ msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
+ },
+ // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
+ // inbound channel's state.
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
+ } => {
+ return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
+ // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
+ if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
+ let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
+ // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
+ // phantom or an intercept.
+ if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ {
+ None
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ },
+ Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
+ };
+ let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ None => {
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
+ // have no consistency guarantees.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(chan) => chan
+ };
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
+ // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
+ // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ }
+ if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
+ break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ chan_update_opt
+ } else {
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
+ break Some((
+ "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
+ 0x2000 | 2, None,
+ ));
+ }
+ None
+ };
+
+ let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
+ // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ }
+ // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
+ // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
+ // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
+ // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
+ // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
+ // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
+ // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
+ // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+
+ break None;
+ }
+ {
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
+ if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ code = 0x2000 | 2;
+ }
+ return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
+ }
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
+ }
- let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
+ fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
+ allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match decoded_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
// OUR PAYMENT!
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
+ msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
+ {
Ok(info) => {
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
// message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
version: 0,
- public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
};
incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
})
}
- };
-
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
- // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
- // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
- // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
- if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
- let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
- // phantom or an intercept.
- if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
- {
- None
- } else {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- },
- Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
- };
- let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
- None => {
- // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
- // have no consistency guarantees.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- },
- Some(chan) => chan
- };
- if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
- // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
- // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
- // we don't have the channel here.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
- // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
- // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
- if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
- } else {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
- }
- }
- if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
- break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
- }
- chan_update_opt
- } else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
- // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
- // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
- // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
- break Some((
- "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x2000 | 2, None,
- ));
- }
- None
- };
-
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
- // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
- // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
- }
- // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
- // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
- // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
- // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
- // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
- // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
- // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
- // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
- if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
-
- break None;
- }
- {
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
- if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
- 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
- // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
- // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
- // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
- // instead.
- code = 0x2000 | 2;
- }
- return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
- }
- }
}
-
- pending_forward_info
}
/// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
/// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
///
/// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
- /// you from forwarding more than you received.
+ /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
+ /// than expected.
///
/// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
/// backwards.
///
/// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
},
_ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
};
+ let skimmed_fee_msat =
+ payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
+ skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
};
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
+ outgoing_cltv_value, ..
}
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
+ {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
});
if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, ..
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
};
let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
+ let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
+ .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
+ debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
purpose: $purpose,
amount_msat,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
+ };
let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
inflight_htlcs
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
(6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
(8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
(9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
+ (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
(5, self.total_value_received, option),
(6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
(8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
- let mut value = 0;
- let mut sender_intended_value = None;
- let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
- let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
- let mut total_value_received = None;
- let mut total_msat = None;
- let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
- (2, value, required),
+ (2, value_ser, required),
(3, sender_intended_value, option),
- (4, payment_data, option),
+ (4, payment_data_opt, option),
(5, total_value_received, option),
(6, cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option)
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
+ let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
+ let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
Some(p) => {
if payment_data.is_some() {
total_value_received,
total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
- cltv_expiry,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
}
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+ let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
+ let extra_fee_msat = 10;
+ let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
+ amt_to_forward: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ }
+ };
+ // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
+ // intended amount, we fail the payment.
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
+ node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
+ {
+ assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
+ let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_to_forward: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ }
+ };
+ assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
+ }
+
#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
match &events_2[0] {
Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat,
receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
- claim_deadline, onion_fields,
+ claim_deadline, onion_fields, ..
} => {
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
(our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, payment_id)
}
-pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> u64 {
+pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(
+ origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], skip_last: bool,
+ our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage
+) -> u64 {
+ let extra_fees = vec![0; expected_paths.len()];
+ do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees(origin_node, expected_paths,
+ &extra_fees[..], skip_last, our_payment_preimage)
+}
+
+pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees<'a, 'b, 'c>(
+ origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], expected_extra_fees:
+ &[u32], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage
+) -> u64 {
+ assert_eq!(expected_paths.len(), expected_extra_fees.len());
for path in expected_paths.iter() {
assert_eq!(path.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), expected_paths[0].last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id());
}
}
}
- for (expected_route, (path_msgs, next_hop)) in expected_paths.iter().zip(per_path_msgs.drain(..)) {
+ for (i, (expected_route, (path_msgs, next_hop))) in expected_paths.iter().zip(per_path_msgs.drain(..)).enumerate() {
let mut next_msgs = Some(path_msgs);
let mut expected_next_node = next_hop;
}
}
macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
+ ($idx: expr, $node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
{
$node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0);
- let fee = {
+ let mut fee = {
let per_peer_state = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id())
.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
channel.context.config().forwarding_fee_base_msat
}
};
+ if $idx == 1 { fee += expected_extra_fees[i]; }
expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false);
expected_total_fee_msat += fee as u64;
check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
} else {
next_node = expected_route[expected_route.len() - 1 - idx - 1];
}
- mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, next_node, update_next_msgs);
+ mid_update_fulfill_dance!(idx, node, prev_node, next_node, update_next_msgs);
} else {
assert!(!update_next_msgs);
assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
/// The expiry height of the HTLC
pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The extra fee skimmed by the sender of this message. See
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
+ pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
}
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet
-}, {});
+ onion_routing_packet,
+}, {
+ (65537, skimmed_fee_msat, option)
+});
impl Readable for OnionMessage {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
cltv_expiry: 821716,
- onion_routing_packet
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
}
}
+#[test]
+fn accept_underpaying_htlcs_config() {
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(1);
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(2);
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(3);
+}
+
+fn do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(num_mpp_parts: usize) {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut intercept_forwards_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ intercept_forwards_config.accept_intercept_htlcs = true;
+ let mut underpay_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ underpay_config.channel_config.accept_underpaying_htlcs = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(intercept_forwards_config), Some(underpay_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let mut chan_ids = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts {
+ let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 10_000, 0);
+ let channel_id = create_unannounced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 2_000_000, 0).0.channel_id;
+ chan_ids.push(channel_id);
+ }
+
+ // Send the initial payment.
+ let amt_msat = 900_000;
+ let skimmed_fee_msat = 20;
+ let mut route_hints = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts {
+ route_hints.push(RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: nodes[1].node.get_intercept_scid(),
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 1000,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: Some(amt_msat / num_mpp_parts as u64 + 5),
+ }]));
+ }
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_route_hints(route_hints).unwrap()
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params,
+ final_value_msat: amt_msat,
+ };
+ let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[2].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(amt_msat), 60 * 60, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], num_mpp_parts); // one monitor per path
+ let mut events: Vec<SendEvent> = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().into_iter().map(|e| SendEvent::from_event(e)).collect();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), num_mpp_parts);
+
+ // Forward the intercepted payments.
+ for (idx, ev) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &ev.msgs[0]);
+ do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &ev.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let (intercept_id, expected_outbound_amt_msat) = match events[0] {
+ crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
+ intercept_id, expected_outbound_amount_msat, payment_hash: pmt_hash, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(pmt_hash, payment_hash);
+ (intercept_id, expected_outbound_amount_msat)
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &chan_ids[idx],
+ nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amt_msat - skimmed_fee_msat).unwrap();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let payment_event = {
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+ if idx == num_mpp_parts - 1 {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Claim the payment and check that the skimmed fee is as expected.
+ let payment_preimage = nodes[2].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
+ ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, receiver_node_id, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt_msat - skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64, amount_msat);
+ assert_eq!(skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
+ match purpose {
+ crate::events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: ev_payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: ev_payment_secret, .. } =>
+ {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, ev_payment_preimage.unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_secret, *ev_payment_secret);
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let mut expected_paths_vecs = Vec::new();
+ let mut expected_paths = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts { expected_paths_vecs.push(vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])); }
+ for i in 0..num_mpp_parts { expected_paths.push(&expected_paths_vecs[i][..]); }
+ let total_fee_msat = do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees(
+ &nodes[0], &expected_paths[..], &vec![skimmed_fee_msat as u32; num_mpp_parts][..], false,
+ payment_preimage);
+ // The sender doesn't know that the penultimate hop took an extra fee.
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage,
+ Some(Some(total_fee_msat - skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64)), true);
+}
+
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum AutoRetry {
Success,
//! # use lightning::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
//! # use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
//! #
-//! # fn create_payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)> { unimplemented!() }
+//! # fn create_payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)> { unimplemented!() }
//! # fn create_payment_hash() -> PaymentHash { unimplemented!() }
//! #
//! # fn parse_invoice_request(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), lightning::offers::parse::ParseError> {
impl<'a> InvoiceBuilder<'a, ExplicitSigningPubkey> {
pub(super) fn for_offer(
- invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration, payment_hash: PaymentHash
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = Self::check_amount_msats(invoice_request)?;
}
pub(super) fn for_refund(
- refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, signing_pubkey: PublicKey
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
impl<'a> InvoiceBuilder<'a, DerivedSigningPubkey> {
pub(super) fn for_offer_using_keys(
- invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration, payment_hash: PaymentHash, keys: KeyPair
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = Self::check_amount_msats(invoice_request)?;
}
pub(super) fn for_refund_using_keys(
- refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, keys: KeyPair,
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
}
fn fields(
- payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, amount_msats: u64, signing_pubkey: PublicKey
) -> InvoiceFields {
InvoiceFields {
/// Invoice-specific fields for an `invoice` message.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
struct InvoiceFields {
- payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration,
relative_expiry: Option<Duration>,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
///
/// Blinded paths provide recipient privacy by obfuscating its node id. Note, however, that this
/// privacy is lost if a public node id is used for [`Invoice::signing_pubkey`].
- pub fn payment_paths(&self) -> &[(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)] {
+ pub fn payment_paths(&self) -> &[(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)] {
&self.contents.fields().payment_paths[..]
}
};
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(self.created_at.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: self.relative_expiry.map(|duration| duration.as_secs() as u32),
payment_hash: Some(&self.payment_hash),
});
type BlindedPathIter<'a> = core::iter::Map<
- core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
- for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)) -> &'r BlindedPath,
+ core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
+ for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)) -> &'r BlindedPath,
>;
type BlindedPayInfoIter<'a> = core::iter::Map<
- core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
- for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)) -> &'r BlindedPayInfo,
+ core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
+ for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)) -> &'r BlindedPayInfo,
>;
/// Information needed to route a payment across a [`BlindedPath`].
},
) = tlv_stream;
- let payment_paths = match (paths, blindedpay) {
- (None, _) => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
- (_, None) => return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo),
- (Some(paths), _) if paths.is_empty() => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
- (Some(paths), Some(blindedpay)) if paths.len() != blindedpay.len() => {
+ let payment_paths = match (blindedpay, paths) {
+ (_, None) => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
+ (None, _) => return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo),
+ (_, Some(paths)) if paths.is_empty() => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
+ (Some(blindedpay), Some(paths)) if paths.len() != blindedpay.len() => {
return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo);
},
- (Some(paths), Some(blindedpay)) => {
- paths.into_iter().zip(blindedpay.into_iter()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+ (Some(blindedpay), Some(paths)) => {
+ blindedpay.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
},
};
payer_note: None,
},
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(now.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: None,
payment_hash: Some(&payment_hash),
payer_note: None,
},
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(now.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: None,
payment_hash: Some(&payment_hash),
let empty_payment_paths = vec![];
let mut tlv_stream = invoice.as_tlv_stream();
- tlv_stream.3.paths = Some(Iterable(empty_payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path)));
+ tlv_stream.3.paths = Some(Iterable(empty_payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path)));
match Invoice::try_from(tlv_stream.to_bytes()) {
Ok(_) => panic!("expected error"),
let mut payment_paths = payment_paths();
payment_paths.pop();
let mut tlv_stream = invoice.as_tlv_stream();
- tlv_stream.3.blindedpay = Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo)));
+ tlv_stream.3.blindedpay = Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo)));
match Invoice::try_from(tlv_stream.to_bytes()) {
Ok(_) => panic!("expected error"),
/// [`Duration`]: core::time::Duration
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_with(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
///
/// [`Invoice::created_at`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice::created_at
pub fn respond_with_no_std(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn verify_and_respond_using_derived_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
///
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
pub fn verify_and_respond_using_derived_keys_no_std<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
/// [`Duration`]: core::time::Duration
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_with(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
signing_pubkey: PublicKey,
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
///
/// [`Invoice::created_at`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice::created_at
pub fn respond_with_no_std(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
signing_pubkey: PublicKey, created_at: Duration
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_using_derived_keys<ES: Deref>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, entropy_source: ES
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError>
where
///
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
pub fn respond_using_derived_keys_no_std<ES: Deref>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, entropy_source: ES
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError>
where
SecretKey::from_slice(&[byte; 32]).unwrap()
}
-pub(super) fn payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)> {
+pub(super) fn payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)> {
let paths = vec![
BlindedPath {
introduction_node_id: pubkey(40),
},
];
- paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect()
+ payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect()
}
pub(super) fn payment_hash() -> PaymentHash {
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
+use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Invoice as Bolt12Invoice};
use crate::routing::gossip::{DirectedChannelInfo, EffectiveCapacity, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, LockableScore, Score};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer};
// limits, but for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT: u8 = 10;
+const DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF: u8 = 2;
+
// The median hop CLTV expiry delta currently seen in the network.
const MEDIAN_HOP_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u32 = 40;
(2, features, (option: ReadableArgs, payee_pubkey.is_some())),
(3, max_path_count, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT)),
(4, route_hints, vec_type),
- (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, 2)),
+ (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF)),
(6, expiry_time, option),
(7, previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
(8, blinded_route_hints, optional_vec),
expiry_time: None,
max_total_cltv_expiry_delta: DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
max_path_count: DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT,
- max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: 2,
+ max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF,
previously_failed_channels: Vec::new(),
}
}
.expect("PaymentParameters::from_node_id should always initialize the payee as unblinded")
}
- /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were initialized with blinded payment
- /// paths.
+ /// Creates parameters for paying to a blinded payee from the provided invoice. Sets
+ /// [`Payee::Blinded::route_hints`], [`Payee::Blinded::features`], and
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::expiry_time`].
+ pub fn from_bolt12_invoice(invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Self {
+ Self::blinded(invoice.payment_paths().to_vec())
+ .with_bolt12_features(invoice.features().clone()).unwrap()
+ .with_expiry_time(invoice.created_at().as_secs().saturating_add(invoice.relative_expiry().as_secs()))
+ }
+
+ fn blinded(blinded_route_hints: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ payee: Payee::Blinded { route_hints: blinded_route_hints, features: None },
+ expiry_time: None,
+ max_total_cltv_expiry_delta: DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ max_path_count: DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT,
+ max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF,
+ previously_failed_channels: Vec::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were not initialized with
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
+ pub fn with_bolt12_features(self, features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures) -> Result<Self, ()> {
+ match self.payee {
+ Payee::Clear { .. } => Err(()),
+ Payee::Blinded { route_hints, .. } =>
+ Ok(Self { payee: Payee::Blinded { route_hints, features: Some(features) }, ..self })
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were initialized with
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_bolt11_features(self, features: InvoiceFeatures) -> Result<Self, ()> {
}
/// Includes hints for routing to the payee. Errors if the parameters were initialized with
- /// blinded payment paths.
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_route_hints(self, route_hints: Vec<RouteHint>) -> Result<Self, ()> {
Self { max_path_count, ..self }
}
- /// Includes a limit for the maximum number of payment paths that may be used.
+ /// Includes a limit for the maximum share of a channel's total capacity that can be sent over, as
+ /// a power of 1/2. See [`PaymentParameters::max_channel_saturation_power_of_half`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(self, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: u8) -> Self {
_ => None,
}
}
+ fn blinded_route_hints(&self) -> &[(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)] {
+ match self {
+ Self::Blinded { route_hints, .. } => &route_hints[..],
+ Self::Clear { .. } => &[]
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn unblinded_route_hints(&self) -> &[RouteHint] {
+ match self {
+ Self::Blinded { .. } => &[],
+ Self::Clear { route_hints, .. } => &route_hints[..]
+ }
+ }
}
enum FeaturesRef<'a> {
info: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
short_channel_id: u64,
},
- /// A hop to the payee found in the payment invoice, though not necessarily a direct channel.
+ /// A hop to the payee found in the BOLT 11 payment invoice, though not necessarily a direct
+ /// channel.
PrivateHop {
hint: &'a RouteHintHop,
- }
+ },
+ /// The payee's identity is concealed behind blinded paths provided in a BOLT 12 invoice.
+ Blinded {
+ hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ hint_idx: usize,
+ },
+ /// Similar to [`Self::Blinded`], but the path here has 1 blinded hop. `BlindedPayInfo` provided
+ /// for 1-hop blinded paths is ignored because it is meant to apply to the hops *between* the
+ /// introduction node and the destination. Useful for tracking that we need to include a blinded
+ /// path at the end of our [`Route`].
+ OneHopBlinded {
+ hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ hint_idx: usize,
+ },
}
impl<'a> CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
- fn short_channel_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ fn short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => *short_channel_id,
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.short_channel_id,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => Some(details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap()),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => Some(*short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => Some(hint.short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => None,
}
}
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.counterparty.features.to_context(),
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.channel().features.clone(),
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
}
}
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => 0,
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
}
}
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().htlc_minimum_msat,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.htlc_minimum_msat.unwrap_or(0),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
}
}
},
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().fees,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.fees,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => {
+ RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: hint.0.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: hint.0.fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
+ },
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } =>
+ RoutingFees { base_msat: 0, proportional_millionths: 0 },
}
}
EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: *max },
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: None, .. }} =>
EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: hint.0.htlc_maximum_msat },
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn id(&self, channel_direction: bool /* src_node_id < target_node_id */) -> CandidateHopId {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
+ _ => CandidateHopId::Clear((self.short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel_direction)),
}
}
+ fn blinded_path(&self) -> Option<&'a BlindedPath> {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ Some(&hint.1)
+ },
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd, PartialEq)]
+enum CandidateHopId {
+ /// Contains (scid, src_node_id < target_node_id)
+ Clear((u64, bool)),
+ /// Index of the blinded route hint in [`Payee::Blinded::route_hints`].
+ Blinded(usize),
}
#[inline]
}
}
+struct LoggedCandidateHop<'a>(&'a CandidateRouteHop<'a>);
+impl<'a> fmt::Display for LoggedCandidateHop<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self.0 {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ "blinded route hint with introduction node id ".fmt(f)?;
+ hint.1.introduction_node_id.fmt(f)?;
+ " and blinding point ".fmt(f)?;
+ hint.1.blinding_point.fmt(f)
+ },
+ _ => {
+ "SCID ".fmt(f)?;
+ self.0.short_channel_id().unwrap().fmt(f)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#[inline]
fn sort_first_hop_channels(
- channels: &mut Vec<&ChannelDetails>, used_channel_liquidities: &HashMap<(u64, bool), u64>,
+ channels: &mut Vec<&ChannelDetails>, used_liquidities: &HashMap<CandidateHopId, u64>,
recommended_value_msat: u64, our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey
) {
// Sort the first_hops channels to the same node(s) in priority order of which channel we'd
// Available outbound balances factor in liquidity already reserved for previously found paths.
channels.sort_unstable_by(|chan_a, chan_b| {
let chan_a_outbound_limit_msat = chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
- .saturating_sub(*used_channel_liquidities.get(&(chan_a.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
- our_node_pubkey < &chan_a.counterparty.node_id)).unwrap_or(&0));
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidities.get(&CandidateHopId::Clear((chan_a.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
+ our_node_pubkey < &chan_a.counterparty.node_id))).unwrap_or(&0));
let chan_b_outbound_limit_msat = chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
- .saturating_sub(*used_channel_liquidities.get(&(chan_b.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
- our_node_pubkey < &chan_b.counterparty.node_id)).unwrap_or(&0));
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidities.get(&CandidateHopId::Clear((chan_b.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
+ our_node_pubkey < &chan_b.counterparty.node_id))).unwrap_or(&0));
if chan_b_outbound_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat || chan_a_outbound_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat {
// Sort in descending order
chan_b_outbound_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_a_outbound_limit_msat)
// unblinded payee id as an option. We also need a non-optional "payee id" for path construction,
// so use a dummy id for this in the blinded case.
let payee_node_id_opt = payment_params.payee.node_id().map(|pk| NodeId::from_pubkey(&pk));
- const DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID: [u8; 33] = [42u8; 33];
+ const DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID: [u8; 33] = [2; 33];
let maybe_dummy_payee_pk = payment_params.payee.node_id().unwrap_or_else(|| PublicKey::from_slice(&DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID).unwrap());
let maybe_dummy_payee_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&maybe_dummy_payee_pk);
let our_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&our_node_pubkey);
}
}
},
- _ => return Err(LightningError{err: "Routing to blinded paths isn't supported yet".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
-
+ Payee::Blinded { route_hints, .. } => {
+ if route_hints.iter().all(|(_, path)| &path.introduction_node_id == our_node_pubkey) {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Cannot generate a route to blinded paths if we are the introduction node to all of them".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ for (_, blinded_path) in route_hints.iter() {
+ if blinded_path.blinded_hops.len() == 0 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "0-hop blinded path provided".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ } else if &blinded_path.introduction_node_id == our_node_pubkey {
+ log_info!(logger, "Got blinded path with ourselves as the introduction node, ignoring");
+ } else if blinded_path.blinded_hops.len() == 1 &&
+ route_hints.iter().any( |(_, p)| p.blinded_hops.len() == 1
+ && p.introduction_node_id != blinded_path.introduction_node_id)
+ {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("1-hop blinded paths must all have matching introduction node ids"), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
let final_cltv_expiry_delta = payment_params.payee.final_cltv_expiry_delta().unwrap_or(0);
if payment_params.max_total_cltv_expiry_delta <= final_cltv_expiry_delta {
// drop the requirement by setting this to 0.
let mut channel_saturation_pow_half = payment_params.max_channel_saturation_power_of_half;
- // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels. Used to determine
- // if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding decisions. It is
- // aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value is used. Hence,
- // liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite direction.
- let mut used_channel_liquidities: HashMap<(u64, bool), u64> =
+ // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels or blinded paths. Used to
+ // determine if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding
+ // decisions. It is aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value
+ // is used. Hence, liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite
+ // direction.
+ let mut used_liquidities: HashMap<CandidateHopId, u64> =
HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// Keeping track of how much value we already collected across other paths. Helps to decide
let mut already_collected_value_msat = 0;
for (_, channels) in first_hop_targets.iter_mut() {
- sort_first_hop_channels(channels, &used_channel_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
+ sort_first_hop_channels(channels, &used_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
our_node_pubkey);
}
// - for regular channels at channel announcement (TODO)
// - for first and last hops early in get_route
if $src_node_id != $dest_node_id {
- let short_channel_id = $candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let scid_opt = $candidate.short_channel_id();
let effective_capacity = $candidate.effective_capacity();
let htlc_maximum_msat = max_htlc_from_capacity(effective_capacity, channel_saturation_pow_half);
// if the amount being transferred over this path is lower.
// We do this for now, but this is a subject for removal.
if let Some(mut available_value_contribution_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .get(&(short_channel_id, $src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .get(&$candidate.id($src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
.map_or(0, |used_liquidity_msat| {
available_value_contribution_msat = available_value_contribution_msat
.saturating_sub(*used_liquidity_msat);
(amount_to_transfer_over_msat < $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat &&
recommended_value_msat > $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat));
- let payment_failed_on_this_channel =
- payment_params.previously_failed_channels.contains(&short_channel_id);
+ let payment_failed_on_this_channel = scid_opt.map_or(false,
+ |scid| payment_params.previously_failed_channels.contains(&scid));
// If HTLC minimum is larger than the amount we're going to transfer, we shouldn't
// bother considering this channel. If retrying with recommended_value_msat may
inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
effective_capacity,
};
- let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
- short_channel_id, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id, channel_usage, score_params
- );
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scid_opt.map_or(0,
+ |scid| scorer.channel_penalty_msat(scid, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id,
+ channel_usage, score_params));
let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat
.saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
// TODO: diversify by nodes (so that all paths aren't doomed if one node is offline).
'paths_collection: loop {
- // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_channel_liquidities, which
+ // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_liquidities, which
// helps to avoid reusing previously selected paths in future iterations.
targets.clear();
dist.clear();
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
let added = add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, payee, 0, path_value_msat,
0, 0u64, 0, 0).is_some();
- log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via SCID {}",
- if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, candidate.short_channel_id());
+ log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via {}",
+ if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, LoggedCandidateHop(&candidate));
}
}));
// If a caller provided us with last hops, add them to routing targets. Since this happens
// earlier than general path finding, they will be somewhat prioritized, although currently
// it matters only if the fees are exactly the same.
- let route_hints = match &payment_params.payee {
- Payee::Clear { route_hints, .. } => route_hints,
- _ => return Err(LightningError{err: "Routing to blinded paths isn't supported yet".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
- };
- for route in route_hints.iter().filter(|route| !route.0.is_empty()) {
+ for (hint_idx, hint) in payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().iter().enumerate() {
+ let intro_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hint.1.introduction_node_id);
+ let have_intro_node_in_graph =
+ // Only add the hops in this route to our candidate set if either
+ // we have a direct channel to the first hop or the first hop is
+ // in the regular network graph.
+ first_hop_targets.get(&intro_node_id).is_some() ||
+ network_nodes.get(&intro_node_id).is_some();
+ if !have_intro_node_in_graph { continue }
+ let candidate = if hint.1.blinded_hops.len() == 1 {
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, hint_idx }
+ } else { CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, hint_idx } };
+ let mut path_contribution_msat = path_value_msat;
+ if let Some(hop_used_msat) = add_entry!(candidate, intro_node_id, maybe_dummy_payee_node_id,
+ 0, path_contribution_msat, 0, 0_u64, 0, 0)
+ {
+ path_contribution_msat = hop_used_msat;
+ } else { continue }
+ if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hint.1.introduction_node_id)) {
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
+ our_node_pubkey);
+ for details in first_channels {
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
+ add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id, intro_node_id, 0, path_contribution_msat, 0,
+ 0_u64, 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for route in payment_params.payee.unblinded_route_hints().iter()
+ .filter(|route| !route.0.is_empty())
+ {
let first_hop_in_route = &(route.0)[0];
let have_hop_src_in_graph =
// Only add the hops in this route to our candidate set if either
hop_used = false;
}
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .get(&(hop.short_channel_id, source < target)).copied().unwrap_or(0);
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .get(&candidate.id(source < target)).copied()
+ .unwrap_or(0);
let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
amount_msat: final_value_msat + aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
// Searching for a direct channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id)) {
- sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_channel_liquidities,
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
// always assumes that the third argument is a node to which we have a
// path.
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id)) {
- sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_channel_liquidities,
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
let mut features_set = false;
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
- if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
- ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
- features_set = true;
- break;
+ if let Some(scid) = ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
+ if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == scid {
+ ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
+ features_set = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
}
.chain(payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(hop, _)| &hop.node_id));
for (prev_hop, (hop, _)) in prev_hop_iter.zip(payment_path.hops.iter()) {
let spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat + hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .entry((hop.candidate.short_channel_id(), *prev_hop < hop.node_id))
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .entry(hop.candidate.id(*prev_hop < hop.node_id))
.and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += spent_on_hop_msat)
.or_insert(spent_on_hop_msat);
let hop_capacity = hop.candidate.effective_capacity();
// If we weren't capped by hitting a liquidity limit on a channel in the path,
// we'll probably end up picking the same path again on the next iteration.
// Decrease the available liquidity of a hop in the middle of the path.
- let victim_scid = payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let victim_candidate = &payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate;
let exhausted = u64::max_value();
- log_trace!(logger, "Disabling channel {} for future path building iterations to avoid duplicates.", victim_scid);
- *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, false)).or_default() = exhausted;
- *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, true)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Disabling route candidate {} for future path building iterations to
+ avoid duplicates.", LoggedCandidateHop(victim_candidate));
+ *used_liquidities.entry(victim_candidate.id(false)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ *used_liquidities.entry(victim_candidate.id(true)).or_default() = exhausted;
}
// Track the total amount all our collected paths allow to send so that we know
// compare both SCIDs and NodeIds as individual nodes may use random aliases causing collisions
// across nodes.
selected_route.sort_unstable_by_key(|path| {
- let mut key = [0u64; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
+ let mut key = [CandidateHopId::Clear((42, true)) ; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
debug_assert!(path.hops.len() <= key.len());
- for (scid, key) in path.hops.iter().map(|h| h.0.candidate.short_channel_id()).zip(key.iter_mut()) {
+ for (scid, key) in path.hops.iter() .map(|h| h.0.candidate.id(true)).zip(key.iter_mut()) {
*key = scid;
}
key
});
for idx in 0..(selected_route.len() - 1) {
if idx + 1 >= selected_route.len() { break; }
- if iter_equal(selected_route[idx ].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.short_channel_id(), h.0.node_id)),
- selected_route[idx + 1].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.short_channel_id(), h.0.node_id))) {
+ if iter_equal(selected_route[idx ].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.id(true), h.0.node_id)),
+ selected_route[idx + 1].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.id(true), h.0.node_id))) {
let new_value = selected_route[idx].get_value_msat() + selected_route[idx + 1].get_value_msat();
selected_route[idx].update_value_and_recompute_fees(new_value);
selected_route.remove(idx + 1);
}
}
- let mut selected_paths = Vec::<Vec<Result<RouteHop, LightningError>>>::new();
+ let mut paths = Vec::new();
for payment_path in selected_route {
- let mut path = payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(payment_hop, node_features)| {
- Ok(RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(payment_hop.node_id.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{err: format!("Public key {:?} is invalid", &payment_hop.node_id), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})?,
+ let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(payment_path.hops.len());
+ for (hop, node_features) in payment_path.hops.iter()
+ .filter(|(h, _)| h.candidate.short_channel_id().is_some())
+ {
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(hop.node_id.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{err: format!("Public key {:?} is invalid", &hop.node_id), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})?,
node_features: node_features.clone(),
- short_channel_id: payment_hop.candidate.short_channel_id(),
- channel_features: payment_hop.candidate.features(),
- fee_msat: payment_hop.fee_msat,
- cltv_expiry_delta: payment_hop.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta(),
- })
- }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ short_channel_id: hop.candidate.short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ channel_features: hop.candidate.features(),
+ fee_msat: hop.fee_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: hop.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta(),
+ });
+ }
+ let mut final_cltv_delta = final_cltv_expiry_delta;
+ let blinded_tail = payment_path.hops.last().and_then(|(h, _)| {
+ if let Some(blinded_path) = h.candidate.blinded_path() {
+ final_cltv_delta = h.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta();
+ Some(BlindedTail {
+ hops: blinded_path.blinded_hops.clone(),
+ blinding_point: blinded_path.blinding_point,
+ excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ final_value_msat: h.fee_msat,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ });
// Propagate the cltv_expiry_delta one hop backwards since the delta from the current hop is
// applicable for the previous hop.
- path.iter_mut().rev().fold(final_cltv_expiry_delta, |prev_cltv_expiry_delta, hop| {
- core::mem::replace(&mut hop.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, prev_cltv_expiry_delta)
+ hops.iter_mut().rev().fold(final_cltv_delta, |prev_cltv_expiry_delta, hop| {
+ core::mem::replace(&mut hop.cltv_expiry_delta, prev_cltv_expiry_delta)
});
- selected_paths.push(path);
+
+ paths.push(Path { hops, blinded_tail });
}
// Make sure we would never create a route with more paths than we allow.
- debug_assert!(selected_paths.len() <= payment_params.max_path_count.into());
+ debug_assert!(paths.len() <= payment_params.max_path_count.into());
if let Some(node_features) = payment_params.payee.node_features() {
- for path in selected_paths.iter_mut() {
- if let Ok(route_hop) = path.last_mut().unwrap() {
- route_hop.node_features = node_features.clone();
- }
+ for path in paths.iter_mut() {
+ path.hops.last_mut().unwrap().node_features = node_features.clone();
}
}
- let mut paths: Vec<Path> = Vec::new();
- for results_vec in selected_paths {
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(results_vec.len());
- for res in results_vec { hops.push(res?); }
- paths.push(Path { hops, blinded_tail: None });
- }
- let route = Route {
- paths,
- payment_params: Some(payment_params.clone()),
- };
+ let route = Route { paths, payment_params: Some(payment_params.clone()) };
log_info!(logger, "Got route: {}", log_route!(route));
Ok(route)
}
use crate::routing::test_utils::{add_channel, add_or_update_node, build_graph, build_line_graph, id_to_feature_flags, get_nodes, update_channel};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
- use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use crate::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, LightningError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
+ use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::test_utils as ln_test_utils;
use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
#[test]
fn simple_mpp_route_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, _, _, _, _) = build_graph();
+ let (_, _, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let clear_payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2], 42)
+ .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(clear_payment_params);
+
+ // MPP to a 1-hop blinded path for nodes[2]
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo { // These fields are ignored for 1-hop blinded paths
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let one_hop_blinded_payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features.clone()).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(one_hop_blinded_payment_params.clone());
+
+ // MPP to 3 2-hop blinded paths
+ let mut blinded_path_node_0 = blinded_path.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_0.introduction_node_id = nodes[0];
+ blinded_path_node_0.blinded_hops.push(blinded_path.blinded_hops[0].clone());
+ let mut node_0_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_0_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 50_000;
+
+ let mut blinded_path_node_7 = blinded_path_node_0.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_7.introduction_node_id = nodes[7];
+ let mut node_7_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_7_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 60_000;
+
+ let mut blinded_path_node_1 = blinded_path_node_0.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_1.introduction_node_id = nodes[1];
+ let mut node_1_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_1_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 180_000;
+
+ let two_hop_blinded_payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(
+ vec![
+ (node_0_payinfo, blinded_path_node_0),
+ (node_7_payinfo, blinded_path_node_7),
+ (node_1_payinfo, blinded_path_node_1)
+ ])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(two_hop_blinded_payment_params);
+ }
+
+
+ fn do_simple_mpp_route_test(payment_params: PaymentParameters) {
let (secp_ctx, network_graph, gossip_sync, _, logger) = build_graph();
let (our_privkey, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let config = UserConfig::default();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2], 42)
- .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
// We need a route consisting of 3 paths:
// From our node to node2 via node0, node7, node1 (three paths one hop each).
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 3);
let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
for path in &route.paths {
- assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len() + if bt.hops.len() == 1 { 0 } else { 1 }, 2);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
}
assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 250_000);
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 3);
let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
for path in &route.paths {
- assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().len() != 0 {
+ assert!(path.blinded_tail.is_some()) } else { assert!(path.blinded_tail.is_none()) }
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len() + if bt.hops.len() == 1 { 0 } else { 1 }, 2);
+ if bt.hops.len() > 1 {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey,
+ payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().iter()
+ .find(|(p, _)| p.htlc_maximum_msat == path.final_value_msat())
+ .map(|(_, p)| p.introduction_node_id).unwrap());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
}
assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 290_000);
assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
+
+ // Make sure this works for blinded route hints.
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: intermed_node_id,
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42), encrypted_payload: vec![] },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(43), encrypted_payload: vec![] },
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: max_htlc_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 10,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_node_id, &payment_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].blinded_tail.as_ref().unwrap().excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, 40);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 40);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn simple_blinded_route_hints() {
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(1);
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(2);
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(3);
+ }
+
+ fn do_simple_blinded_route_hints(num_blinded_hops: usize) {
+ // Check that we can generate a route to a blinded path with the expected hops.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let mut blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: Vec::with_capacity(num_blinded_hops),
+ };
+ for i in 0..num_blinded_hops {
+ blinded_path.blinded_hops.push(
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 + i as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ );
+ }
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 500,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 100_000_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 15,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let final_amt_msat = 1001;
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())]);
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, final_amt_msat , Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0].hops.len(), 2);
+
+ let tail = route.paths[0].blinded_tail.as_ref().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(tail.hops, blinded_path.blinded_hops);
+ assert_eq!(tail.excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, 0);
+ assert_eq!(tail.final_value_msat, 1001);
+
+ let final_hop = route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.pubkey, blinded_path.introduction_node_id);
+ if tail.hops.len() > 1 {
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.fee_msat,
+ blinded_payinfo.fee_base_msat as u64 + blinded_payinfo.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * tail.final_value_msat / 1000000);
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, blinded_payinfo.cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn blinded_path_routing_errors() {
+ // Check that we can generate a route to a blinded path with the expected hops.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let mut invalid_blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(43), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 43] },
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 500,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 100_000_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 15,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let mut invalid_blinded_path_2 = invalid_blinded_path.clone();
+ invalid_blinded_path_2.introduction_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(45);
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path_2)]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "1-hop blinded paths must all have matching introduction node ids");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+
+ invalid_blinded_path.introduction_node_id = our_id;
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path.clone())]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot generate a route to blinded paths if we are the introduction node to all of them");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+
+ invalid_blinded_path.introduction_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(46);
+ invalid_blinded_path.blinded_hops.clear();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo, invalid_blinded_path)]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "0-hop blinded path provided");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn matching_intro_node_paths_provided() {
+ // Check that if multiple blinded paths with the same intro node are provided in payment
+ // parameters, we'll return the correct paths in the resulting MPP route.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let blinded_path_1 = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo_1 = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 30_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let mut blinded_path_2 = blinded_path_1.clone();
+ blinded_path_2.blinding_point = ln_test_utils::pubkey(43);
+ let mut blinded_payinfo_2 = blinded_payinfo_1.clone();
+ blinded_payinfo_2.htlc_maximum_msat = 70_000;
+
+ let blinded_hints = vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo_1.clone(), blinded_path_1.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo_2.clone(), blinded_path_2.clone()),
+ ];
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(blinded_hints.clone())
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features.clone()).unwrap();
+
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None,
+ 100_000, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
+ for path in route.paths.into_iter() {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(bt.blinding_point,
+ blinded_hints.iter().find(|(p, _)| p.htlc_maximum_msat == path.final_value_msat())
+ .map(|(_, bp)| bp.blinding_point).unwrap());
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
+ }
+ assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 100_000);
+ }
}
#[cfg(all(any(test, ldk_bench), not(feature = "no-std")))]
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
pub force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: u64,
+ /// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+ /// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+ ///
+ /// Usage:
+ /// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+ /// generated by this channel's counterparty.
+ /// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+ /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+ /// actual forward amounts is their fee.
+ // TODO: link to LSP JIT channel invoice generation spec when it's merged
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+ /// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+ /// counterparty.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+ /// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false.
+ ///
+ /// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+ /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
+ // TODO: link to bLIP when it's merged
+ pub accept_underpaying_htlcs: bool,
}
impl ChannelConfig {
cltv_expiry_delta: 6 * 12, // 6 blocks/hour * 12 hours
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: 5_000_000,
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: 1000,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs: false,
}
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelConfig, {
(0, forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
+ (1, accept_underpaying_htlcs, (default_value, false)),
(2, forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
(4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(6, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, required),
cltv_expiry_delta,
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
forwarding_fee_base_msat,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs: false,
},
announced_channel,
commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
pub mod logger;
pub mod config;
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub mod test_utils;
/// impls of traits that add exra enforcement on the way they're called. Useful for detecting state
/// machine errors and used in fuzz targets and tests.
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub mod enforcing_trait_impls;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
use regex;
use crate::io;
/// 1. belong to the specified module and
/// 2. match the given regex pattern.
/// Assert that the number of occurrences equals the given `count`
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn assert_log_regex(&self, module: &str, pattern: regex::Regex, count: usize) {
let log_entries = self.lines.lock().unwrap();
let l: usize = log_entries.iter().filter(|&(&(ref m, ref l), _c)| {
--- /dev/null
+## Backwards Compat
+
+* Forwarding less than the expected amount in `ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc` may break
+ compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116
+* Setting `ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs` may break compatibility with versions of LDK
+ prior to 0.0.116, and unsetting the feature between restarts may lead to payment failures.
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff