done
# check no-std compatibility across dependencies
cd no-std-check
- cargo check --verbose --color always
+ cargo check --verbose --color always --features lightning-transaction-sync
- name: Build no-std-check on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }} for ARM Embedded
if: "matrix.build-no-std && matrix.platform == 'ubuntu-latest'"
run: |
use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
-use lightning::routing::router::{find_route, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
+use lightning::routing::router::{find_route, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use lightning::routing::scoring::FixedPenaltyScorer;
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
fn do_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
let logger = test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out);
let network_graph = lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph::new(bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let _ = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(data);
}
use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
use lightning::routing::router::Router;
use lightning::routing::scoring::{Score, WriteableScore};
-use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, PathFailure};
+use lightning::util::events::{Event, PathFailure};
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use lightning::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::persist::Persister;
use lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::RapidGossipSync;
let params = ChainParameters { network, best_block };
let manager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_estimator.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), router.clone(), logger.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), UserConfig::default(), params));
let p2p_gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), Some(chain_source.clone()), logger.clone()));
- let rapid_gossip_sync = Arc::new(RapidGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone()));
+ let rapid_gossip_sync = Arc::new(RapidGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), logger.clone()));
let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new()), route_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new()), onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler{}};
let peer_manager = Arc::new(PeerManager::new(msg_handler, 0, &seed, logger.clone(), IgnoringMessageHandler{}, keys_manager.clone()));
let node = Node { node: manager, p2p_gossip_sync, rapid_gossip_sync, peer_manager, chain_monitor, persister, tx_broadcaster, network_graph, logger, best_block, scorer };
}
/// Converts the error into the underlying error.
+ ///
+ /// May contain an [`std::io::Error`] from the [`BlockSource`]. See implementations for further
+ /// details, if any.
pub fn into_inner(self) -> Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync> {
self.error
}
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::error::Error;
+use std::fmt;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+/// An error returned by the RPC server.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct RpcError {
+ /// The error code.
+ pub code: i64,
+ /// The error message.
+ pub message: String,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for RpcError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+ write!(f, "RPC error {}: {}", self.code, self.message)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Error for RpcError {}
+
/// A simple RPC client for calling methods using HTTP `POST`.
+///
+/// Implements [`BlockSource`] and may return an `Err` containing [`RpcError`]. See
+/// [`RpcClient::call_method`] for details.
pub struct RpcClient {
basic_auth: String,
endpoint: HttpEndpoint,
}
/// Calls a method with the response encoded in JSON format and interpreted as type `T`.
+ ///
+ /// When an `Err` is returned, [`std::io::Error::into_inner`] may contain an [`RpcError`] if
+ /// [`std::io::Error::kind`] is [`std::io::ErrorKind::Other`].
pub async fn call_method<T>(&self, method: &str, params: &[serde_json::Value]) -> std::io::Result<T>
where JsonResponse: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = std::io::Error> + TryInto<T, Error = std::io::Error> {
let host = format!("{}:{}", self.endpoint.host(), self.endpoint.port());
let error = &response["error"];
if !error.is_null() {
// TODO: Examine error code for a more precise std::io::ErrorKind.
- let message = error["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
- return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, message));
+ let rpc_error = RpcError {
+ code: error["code"].as_i64().unwrap_or(-1),
+ message: error["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error").to_string()
+ };
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, rpc_error));
}
let result = &mut response["result"];
match client.call_method::<u64>("getblock", &[invalid_block_hash]).await {
Err(e) => {
assert_eq!(e.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::Other);
- assert_eq!(e.get_ref().unwrap().to_string(), "invalid parameter");
+ let rpc_error: Box<RpcError> = e.into_inner().unwrap().downcast().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(rpc_error.code, -8);
+ assert_eq!(rpc_error.message, "invalid parameter");
},
Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
}
//! # let logger = FakeLogger {};
//!
//! let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
-//! let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+//! let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
//! let snapshot_contents: &[u8] = &[0; 0];
//! let new_last_sync_timestamp_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(snapshot_contents);
//! ```
pub struct RapidGossipSync<NG: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref>
where L::Target: Logger {
network_graph: NG,
+ logger: L,
is_initial_sync_complete: AtomicBool
}
impl<NG: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref> RapidGossipSync<NG, L> where L::Target: Logger {
/// Instantiate a new [`RapidGossipSync`] instance.
- pub fn new(network_graph: NG) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(network_graph: NG, logger: L) -> Self {
Self {
network_graph,
+ logger,
is_initial_sync_complete: AtomicBool::new(false)
}
}
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let sync_result = rapid_sync.sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&graph_sync_test_file);
if sync_result.is_err() {
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let sync_result = rapid_sync
.sync_network_graph_with_file_path("./res/full_graph.lngossip");
let logger = TestLogger::new();
b.iter(|| {
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let sync_result = rapid_sync.sync_network_graph_with_file_path("./res/full_graph.lngossip");
if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
};
use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use lightning::{log_warn, log_trace, log_given_level};
use lightning::util::ser::{BigSize, Readable};
use lightning::io;
&self,
read_cursor: &mut R,
) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
- #[allow(unused_mut)]
+ #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
let mut current_time_unix = None;
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test)))]
{
if let ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip = lightning_error.action {
// everything is fine, just a duplicate channel announcement
} else {
+ log_warn!(self.logger, "Failed to process channel announcement: {:?}", lightning_error);
return Err(lightning_error.into());
}
}
if (channel_flags & 0b_1000_0000) != 0 {
// incremental update, field flags will indicate mutated values
let read_only_network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
- if let Some(channel) = read_only_network_graph
- .channels()
- .get(&short_channel_id) {
-
- let directional_info = channel
- .get_directional_info(channel_flags)
- .ok_or(LightningError {
- err: "Couldn't find previous directional data for update".to_owned(),
- action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
- })?;
-
+ if let Some(directional_info) =
+ read_only_network_graph.channels().get(&short_channel_id)
+ .and_then(|channel| channel.get_directional_info(channel_flags))
+ {
synthetic_update.cltv_expiry_delta = directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta;
synthetic_update.htlc_minimum_msat = directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat;
synthetic_update.htlc_maximum_msat = directional_info.htlc_maximum_msat;
synthetic_update.fee_base_msat = directional_info.fees.base_msat;
synthetic_update.fee_proportional_millionths = directional_info.fees.proportional_millionths;
-
} else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Skipping application of channel update for chan {} with flags {} as original data is missing.",
+ short_channel_id, channel_flags);
skip_update_for_unknown_channel = true;
}
};
match network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) => {},
- Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(_), .. }) => {},
+ Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level), err }) => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Failed to apply channel update: {:?}", err);
+ },
Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError, .. }) => {},
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 24, 0,
0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0,
];
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&example_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_err());
if let Err(GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::ShortRead)) = update_result {
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&incremental_update_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
}
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
- let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&announced_update_input[..]);
- assert!(update_result.is_err());
- if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
- assert_eq!(
- lightning_error.err,
- "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
- );
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
- }
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
+ rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&announced_update_input[..]).unwrap();
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
if initialization_result.is_err() {
panic!(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
];
- let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..]);
- assert!(update_result.is_err());
- if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
- assert_eq!(
- lightning_error.err,
- "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
- );
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
- }
+ rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..]).unwrap();
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&VALID_RGS_BINARY);
if update_result.is_err() {
panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
// this is mostly for checking uint underflow issues before the fuzzer does
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(0));
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(latest_succeeding_time));
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(earliest_failing_time));
assert!(update_result.is_err());
if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&unknown_version_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_err());
async-interface = []
[dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.113", path = "../lightning" }
-bitcoin = "0.29.0"
+lightning = { version = "0.0.113", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.29.0", default-features = false }
bdk-macros = "0.6"
futures = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
esplora-client = { version = "0.3.0", default-features = false, optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
+lightning = { version = "0.0.113", path = "../lightning", features = ["std"] }
electrsd = { version = "0.22.0", features = ["legacy", "esplora_a33e97e1", "bitcoind_23_0"] }
electrum-client = "0.12.0"
once_cell = "1.16.0"
pub(crate) enum InternalError {
/// A transaction sync failed and needs to be retried eventually.
Failed,
- /// An inconsisteny was encounterd during transaction sync.
+ /// An inconsistency was encountered during transaction sync.
Inconsistency,
}
match *self {
Self::Failed => write!(f, "Failed to conduct transaction sync."),
Self::Inconsistency => {
- write!(f, "Encountered an inconsisteny during transaction sync.")
+ write!(f, "Encountered an inconsistency during transaction sync.")
}
}
}
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+ claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
},
LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_txid: Txid,
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_tx, required),
+ (1, claimed_htlcs, vec_type),
(2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
+
// We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
(13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
});
Ok(())
counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
&self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
}
/// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
/// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
/// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
///
- /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
- /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
- pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
+ /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
+ /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
+ pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
let mut res = HashMap::new();
// Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
// `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
+ res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
+ us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
}
}
}
res
}
- /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
+ /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
+ /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
+ ///
/// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
- pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ ///
+ /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
+ /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
+ pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
// We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
// actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
} else { false }
});
- if !htlc_update_confd {
- res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
+ let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
+ us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
+ if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
+ res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
}
}
}
}
}
if matched_htlc { continue; }
+ if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
+ continue;
+ }
$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
match entry.event {
// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
+ if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
+ let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
+ &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if let Some(source) = source_opt {
+ if !cur_claimables.iter()
+ .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
+ {
+ self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source_opt = None;
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
}
}
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
- // block for Rust 1.34 compat
- let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
- let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
- let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
- let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
- self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
- HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
- htlc_outputs,
- to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
- feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
- }
+ fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
+ let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
+ let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+ txid,
+ revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
+ htlc_outputs,
+ to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+ feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
};
self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
+ for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
+ &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
+ if let Some(source) = source_opt {
+ SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
+ } else { false }
+ }));
+ }
+ self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
+ }
if self.holder_tx_signed {
return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
}
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs) {
log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
ret = Err(());
let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
(13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
});
Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
current_holder_commitment_tx,
let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
{
HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
+
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+
// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
}
}
+
+ /// Gets the "node_id" secret key used to sign gossip announcements, decode onion data, etc.
+ pub fn get_node_secret_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.node_secret
+ }
+
/// Derive an old [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] containing per-channel secrets based on a key derivation parameters.
pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
let chan_id = u64::from_be_bytes(params[0..8].try_into().unwrap());
pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
self.inner.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, params)
}
+
+ /// Gets the "node_id" secret key used to sign gossip announcements, decode onion data, etc.
+ pub fn get_node_secret_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.inner.get_node_secret_key()
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the "node_id" secret key of the phantom node used to sign invoices, decode the
+ /// last-hop onion data, etc.
+ pub fn get_phantom_node_secret_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.phantom_secret
+ }
}
// Ensure that EcdsaChannelSigner can have a vtable
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
#[derive(Clone)]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
+ /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
Failure(HTLCFailReason),
}
// If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
// the current one.
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
+ } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
+ // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
+ // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
+ debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
+ self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
} else {
// If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
// their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
}
}
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
- }]
- };
-
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
Some(forward_info.clone())
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
+ if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
+ // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
+ // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
+ // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
+ // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
+ // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
+ // claim anyway.
+ claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
+ }
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
+ claimed_htlcs,
+ }]
+ };
+
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
-//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
+//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
-//!
-//! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
Ok(InterceptId(buf))
}
}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
+pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
+ PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
+ OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
+}
+impl SentHTLCId {
+ pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
+ Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
+ (0, PreviousHopData) => {
+ (0, short_channel_id, required),
+ (2, htlc_id, required),
+ },
+ (2, OutboundRoute) => {
+ (0, session_priv, required),
+ };
+);
+
+
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
}
- /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
- /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+ /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
+ /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
///
/// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
/// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
/// are.
- ///
- /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
/// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
/// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
}
/// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
/// reason for the failure.
///
/// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
}
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
- fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
+ fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
}
}
}
None => None
};
- let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
+ let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
|counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
)
probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
}
+ if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
+ pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
+ }
+
if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
} else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
}
pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
- } else {
+ }
+ let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
+ };
+
+ {
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
// (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
- for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
+ for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.is_empty() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
+
let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
+ match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
}
}
}
- for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
- if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
- let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
- info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
- info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
- };
- // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
- // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
- // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
- // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
- // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
- forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
- forwards.retain(|forward| {
- if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
- if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
- false
+ for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ match htlc_source {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
+ let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
+ info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
+ info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
+ };
+ // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
+ // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
+ // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
+ // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
+ // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
+ forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
+ forwards.retain(|forward| {
+ if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ false
+ } else { true }
} else { true }
+ });
+ !forwards.is_empty()
+ });
+ pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
+ if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
+ intercepted_id != ev_id
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ false
} else { true }
});
- !forwards.is_empty()
- });
- pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
- if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
- pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
- if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
- intercepted_id != ev_id
- } else { true }
- });
- false
- } else { true }
- });
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
+ if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
+ let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
+ // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
+ // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
+ // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
+ // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
+ // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
+ // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
+ // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
+ // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
+ pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
+ }
+ },
}
}
}
}
}
- let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
- retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
- };
if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
// If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
// `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
- pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
- }
-
let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_amount);
- nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&payment_hash, &failure_code);
+ nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&payment_hash, failure_code);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
/// it means the result of the first attempt is not known yet.
pub(crate) count: usize,
/// This field is only used when retry is `Retry::Timeout` which is only build with feature std
- first_attempted_at: T
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ first_attempted_at: T,
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ phantom: core::marker::PhantomData<T>,
+
}
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "no-std", test)))]
pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
PaymentAttemptsUsingTime {
count: 0,
- first_attempted_at: T::now()
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ first_attempted_at: T::now(),
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ phantom: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
}
}
}
+
+fn do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(persist_manager_with_payment: bool) {
+ // Test that if we reload in the middle of an HTLC claim commitment signed dance we'll still
+ // receive the PaymentSent event even if the ChannelManager had no idea about the payment when
+ // it was last persisted.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let (persister_a, persister_b, persister_c);
+ let (chain_monitor_a, chain_monitor_b, chain_monitor_c);
+ let (nodes_0_deserialized, nodes_0_deserialized_b, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
+
+ let mut nodes_0_serialized = Vec::new();
+ if !persist_manager_with_payment {
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ }
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ if persist_manager_with_payment {
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The ChannelMonitor should always be the latest version, as we're required to persist it
+ // during the commitment signed handling.
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_a, chain_monitor_a, nodes_0_deserialized);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); } else { panic!(); }
+ // Note that we don't get a PaymentPathSuccessful here as we leave the HTLC pending to avoid
+ // the double-claim that would otherwise appear at the end of this test.
+ let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);
+
+ // Ensure that, even after some time, if we restart we still include *something* in the current
+ // `ChannelManager` which prevents a `PaymentFailed` when we restart even if pending resolved
+ // payments have since been timed out thanks to `IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS`.
+ // A naive implementation of the fix here would wipe the pending payments set, causing a
+ // failure event when we restart.
+ for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_b, chain_monitor_b, nodes_0_deserialized_b);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that we don't generate any further events even after the channel-closing commitment
+ // transaction is confirmed on-chain.
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_broadcasted_txn[0]);
+ for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_c, chain_monitor_c, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload() {
+ do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(false);
+ do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(true);
+}
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
- if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_features: None,
- their_net_address: remote_network_address,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
-
- msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
- awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
- received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
-
- received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
- inbound_connection: false,
- })).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(res)
+ match peers.entry(descriptor) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ Err(PeerHandleError {})
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_features: None,
+ their_net_address: remote_network_address,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+
+ msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
+ awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
+ received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+
+ received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
+ inbound_connection: false,
+ }));
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+ }
}
/// Indicates a new inbound connection has been established to a node with an optional remote
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
- if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_features: None,
- their_net_address: remote_network_address,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
-
- msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
- awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
- received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
-
- received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
- inbound_connection: true,
- })).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(())
+ match peers.entry(descriptor) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ Err(PeerHandleError {})
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_features: None,
+ their_net_address: remote_network_address,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+
+ msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
+ awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
+ received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+
+ received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
+ inbound_connection: true,
+ }));
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
}
fn peer_should_read(&self, peer: &mut Peer) -> bool {
macro_rules! insert_node_id {
() => {
match self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap().0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap().0));
peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
+ // Check that the peers map is consistent with the
+ // node_id_to_descriptor map, as this has been broken
+ // before.
+ debug_assert!(peers.get(e.get()).is_some());
return Err(PeerHandleError { })
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut *peer, false);
}
self.do_disconnect(descriptor, &*peer, "DisconnectPeer HandleError");
- }
+ } else { debug_assert!(false, "Missing connection for peer"); }
}
}
}
},
Some(peer_lock) => {
let peer = peer_lock.lock().unwrap();
- if !peer.handshake_complete() { return; }
- debug_assert!(peer.their_node_id.is_some());
if let Some((node_id, _)) = peer.their_node_id {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling disconnection of peer {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ let removed = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ debug_assert!(removed.is_some(), "descriptor maps should be consistent");
+ if !peer.handshake_complete() { return; }
self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id);
self.message_handler.onion_message_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id);
}
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+ use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
#[derive(Clone)]
struct FileDescriptor {
fd: u16,
outbound_data: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
+ disconnect: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl PartialEq for FileDescriptor {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
data.len()
}
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) { self.disconnect.store(true, Ordering::Release); }
}
struct PeerManagerCfg {
fn establish_connection<'a>(peer_a: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor, &'a test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestLogger, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestNodeSigner>, peer_b: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor, &'a test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestLogger, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestNodeSigner>) -> (FileDescriptor, FileDescriptor) {
let id_a = peer_a.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_a = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1000};
let id_b = peer_b.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_b = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1001};
let initial_data = peer_b.new_outbound_connection(id_a, fd_b.clone(), Some(addr_a.clone())).unwrap();
peer_a.new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), Some(addr_b.clone())).unwrap();
(fd_a.clone(), fd_b.clone())
}
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ fn fuzz_threaded_connections() {
+ // Spawn two threads which repeatedly connect two peers together, leading to "got second
+ // connection with peer" disconnections and rapid reconnect. This previously found an issue
+ // with our internal map consistency, and is a generally good smoke test of disconnection.
+ let cfgs = Arc::new(create_peermgr_cfgs(2));
+ // Until we have std::thread::scoped we have to unsafe { turn off the borrow checker }.
+ let peers = Arc::new(create_network(2, unsafe { &*(&*cfgs as *const _) as &'static _ }));
+
+ let start_time = std::time::Instant::now();
+ macro_rules! spawn_thread { ($id: expr) => { {
+ let peers = Arc::clone(&peers);
+ let cfgs = Arc::clone(&cfgs);
+ std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ let mut ctr = 0;
+ while start_time.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_secs(1) {
+ let id_a = peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: $id + ctr * 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_a = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1000};
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: $id + ctr * 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_b = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1001};
+ let initial_data = peers[1].new_outbound_connection(id_a, fd_b.clone(), Some(addr_a.clone())).unwrap();
+ peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), Some(addr_b.clone())).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &initial_data).unwrap(), false);
+
+ while start_time.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_secs(1) {
+ peers[0].process_events();
+ if fd_a.disconnect.load(Ordering::Acquire) { break; }
+ let a_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if peers[1].read_event(&mut fd_b, &a_data).is_err() { break; }
+
+ peers[1].process_events();
+ if fd_b.disconnect.load(Ordering::Acquire) { break; }
+ let b_data = fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &b_data).is_err() { break; }
+
+ cfgs[0].chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap()
+ .push(crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: peers[1].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
+ msg: msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
+ },
+ });
+ cfgs[1].chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap()
+ .push(crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
+ msg: msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
+ },
+ });
+
+ peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
+ peers[1].timer_tick_occurred();
+ }
+
+ peers[0].socket_disconnected(&fd_a);
+ peers[1].socket_disconnected(&fd_b);
+ ctr += 1;
+ std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(1));
+ }
+ })
+ } } }
+ let thrd_a = spawn_thread!(1);
+ let thrd_b = spawn_thread!(2);
+
+ thrd_a.join().unwrap();
+ thrd_b.join().unwrap();
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_disconnect_peer() {
// Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
- let mut fd_dup = FileDescriptor { fd: 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_dup = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_dup = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1003};
let id_a = cfgs[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_dup.clone(), Some(addr_dup.clone())).unwrap();
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
let a_id = peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
- let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let initial_data = peers[1].new_outbound_connection(a_id, fd_b.clone(), None).unwrap();
peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 100_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+
+ as_channel_ready.short_channel_id_alias = Some(0xeadbeef);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
+ // Note that we always respond to a channel_ready with a channel_update. Not a lot of reason
+ // to bother updating that code, so just drop the message here.
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
// Now test that if a peer sends us a second channel_ready after the channel is operational we
// For each lock which is currently locked, check that no lock's locked-before
// set includes the lock we're about to lock, which would imply a lockorder
// inversion.
- for (locked_idx, locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
+ for (locked_idx, _locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
if *locked_idx == this.lock_idx {
// Note that with `feature = "backtrace"` set, we may be looking at different
// instances of the same lock. Still, doing so is quite risky, a total order
panic!("Tried to acquire a lock while it was held!");
}
}
- for (locked_idx, locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
+ for (_locked_idx, locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
for (locked_dep_idx, _locked_dep) in locked.locked_before.lock().unwrap().iter() {
if *locked_dep_idx == this.lock_idx && *locked_dep_idx != locked.lock_idx {
#[cfg(feature = "backtrace")]
inner: StdMutex<T>,
deps: Arc<LockMetadata>,
}
+impl<T: Sized> Mutex<T> {
+ pub(crate) fn into_inner(self) -> LockResult<T> {
+ self.inner.into_inner().map_err(|_| ())
+ }
+}
#[must_use = "if unused the Mutex will immediately unlock"]
pub struct MutexGuard<'a, T: Sized + 'a> {
self.lock.read()
}
+ #[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn try_write(&self) -> TryLockResult<RwLockWriteGuard<'_, T>> {
self.lock.try_write()
}
pub fn try_lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
}
+
+ pub fn into_inner(self) -> LockResult<T> {
+ Ok(self.inner.into_inner())
+ }
}
impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
use super::{LockHeldState, LockTestExt};
use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::thread;
#[test]
#[should_panic]
/// actually backed by a [`HashMap`], with some additional tracking to ensure we can iterate over
/// keys in the order defined by [`Ord`].
///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
+///
/// [`BTreeMap`]: alloc::collections::BTreeMap
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
pub struct IndexedMap<K: Hash + Ord, V> {
}
/// An iterator over a range of values in an [`IndexedMap`]
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct Range<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
inner_range: Iter<'a, K>,
map: &'a HashMap<K, V>,
}
/// An [`Entry`] for a key which currently has no value
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct VacantEntry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
underlying_entry: hash_map::VacantEntry<'a, K, V, hash_map::DefaultHashBuilder>,
}
/// An [`Entry`] for an existing key-value pair
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct OccupiedEntry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
underlying_entry: hash_map::OccupiedEntry<'a, K, V, hash_map::DefaultHashBuilder>,
/// A mutable reference to a position in the map. This can be used to reference, add, or update the
/// value at a fixed key.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub enum Entry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
/// A mutable reference to a position within the map where there is no value.
Vacant(VacantEntry<'a, K, V>),
($logger: expr, $lvl:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => (
match $lvl {
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Error => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Error => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Info => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Info => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug", feature = "max_level_trace")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug", feature = "max_level_trace"))]
_ => {
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_error {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_warn {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_info {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_debug {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_trace {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*)
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*)
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_gossip {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip, $($arg)*);
)
}
/// Writer that only tracks the amount of data written - useful if you need to calculate the length
/// of some data when serialized but don't yet need the full data.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct LengthCalculatingWriter(pub usize);
impl Writer for LengthCalculatingWriter {
#[inline]
/// Essentially [`std::io::Take`] but a bit simpler and with a method to walk the underlying stream
/// forward to ensure we always consume exactly the fixed length specified.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct FixedLengthReader<R: Read> {
read: R,
bytes_read: u64,
/// A [`Read`] implementation which tracks whether any bytes have been read at all. This allows us to distinguish
/// between "EOF reached before we started" and "EOF reached mid-read".
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct ReadTrackingReader<R: Read> {
read: R,
/// Returns whether we have read from this reader or not yet.
}
/// Wrapper to read a required (non-optional) TLV record.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct RequiredWrapper<T>(pub Option<T>);
impl<T: Readable> Readable for RequiredWrapper<T> {
#[inline]
/// Wrapper to read a required (non-optional) TLV record that may have been upgraded without
/// backwards compat.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct UpgradableRequired<T: MaybeReadable>(pub Option<T>);
impl<T: MaybeReadable> MaybeReadable for UpgradableRequired<T> {
#[inline]
/// A type for variable-length values within TLV record where the length is encoded as part of the record.
/// Used to prevent encoding the length twice.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct WithoutLength<T>(pub T);
impl Writeable for WithoutLength<&String> {
pub(crate) fn notify(&self) {
let mut lock = self.notify_pending.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(future_state) = &lock.1 {
- future_state.lock().unwrap().complete();
+ if future_state.lock().unwrap().complete() {
+ lock.1 = None;
+ return;
+ }
}
lock.0 = true;
mem::drop(lock);
}
impl FutureState {
- fn complete(&mut self) {
+ fn complete(&mut self) -> bool {
for (counts_as_call, callback) in self.callbacks.drain(..) {
callback.call();
self.callbacks_made |= counts_as_call;
}
self.complete = true;
+ self.callbacks_made
}
}
assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
assert!(!notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_poll_post_notify_completes() {
+ // Tests that if we have a future state that has completed, and we haven't yet requested a
+ // new future, if we get a notify prior to requesting that second future it is generated
+ // pre-completed.
+ let notifier = Notifier::new();
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_poll_post_notify_completes_initial_notified() {
+ // Identical to the previous test, but the first future completes via a wake rather than an
+ // immediate `Poll::Ready`.
+ let notifier = Notifier::new();
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ }
}
lightning-invoice = { path = "../lightning-invoice", default-features = false }
lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync", default-features = false }
lightning-background-processor = { path = "../lightning-background-processor", features = ["futures"], default-features = false }
+
+# Obviously lightning-transaction-sync doesn't support no-std, but it should build
+# even if lightning is built with no-std.
+lightning-transaction-sync = { path = "../lightning-transaction-sync", optional = true }
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff