]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/commitdiff
Add test yielding anchor-related events
authorWilmer Paulino <wilmer.paulino@gmail.com>
Thu, 25 Aug 2022 20:39:46 +0000 (13:39 -0700)
committerWilmer Paulino <wilmer.paulino@gmail.com>
Wed, 18 Jan 2023 22:46:16 +0000 (14:46 -0800)
lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

index c19ef72f84fdd2263436981d81fe32a9bf839a33..088cf8661f8487b577a2a71e2a4b68f77236f7ea 100644 (file)
@@ -9,17 +9,29 @@
 
 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
 
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
 use crate::ln::channel;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent;
 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
 
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::{Amount, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime};
 use bitcoin::Transaction;
 
 use crate::prelude::*;
@@ -1666,3 +1678,141 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 }
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+#[test]
+fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
+       // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
+       // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
+       // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
+       // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
+       // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
+       // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
+       let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+       let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+       let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+       anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+       anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+       let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+               &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
+       ).2;
+       route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+       let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
+
+       assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+       check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
+       assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+       get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+               &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
+               &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
+       );
+
+       let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
+       let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
+               Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
+                       assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
+                       assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
+                       let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
+                               version: 2,
+                               lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+                               input: vec![
+                                       TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
+                                       TxIn { ..Default::default() },
+                               ],
+                               output: vec![TxOut {
+                                       value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+                                       script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+                               }],
+                       };
+                       let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+                               anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+                       );
+                       let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
+                       anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
+                               &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
+                       );
+                       (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
+               },
+               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+       };
+
+       mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+       let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+       // best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions.
+       match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
+               ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+                       assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+                       if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
+                       else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+               },
+               _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
+       };
+       let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+       for event in holder_events {
+               match event {
+                       Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => {
+                               assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
+                               let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
+                               let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+                                       htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+                               );
+                               let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+                               let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+                                       version: 2,
+                                       lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered {
+                                               PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry)
+                                       } else {
+                                               PackedLockTime::ZERO
+                                       },
+                                       input: vec![
+                                               htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
+                                               TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
+                                       ],
+                                       output: vec![
+                                               htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
+                                               TxOut { // Fee input change
+                                                       value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+                                                       script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+                                               }
+                                       ]
+                               };
+                               let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+                               let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+                               htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+                               htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+       }
+
+       mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+       assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
+
+       let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+       for event in holder_events {
+               match event {
+                       Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+       }
+
+       // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
+       nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+}