pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
///
/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
///
// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
+pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
/// this value.
-pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
+// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
+// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
+pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
+ /// our counterparty already.
+ ///
+ /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
+ /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
+ pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
+ pub is_outbound: bool,
+ /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
+ /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
+ /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
+ /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
+ pub is_funding_locked: bool,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
- pub is_live: bool,
-
+ /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
+ /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
+ ///
+ /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
+ pub is_usable: bool,
+ /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
+ pub is_public: bool,
/// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
/// payments to us through this channel.
pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- is_live: channel.is_live(),
+ is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
+ is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: channel.is_live(),
+ is_public: channel.should_announce(),
counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
});
}
/// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
/// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
///
- /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+ /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+ /// are.
pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
/// only Tor Onion addresses.
///
/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
- pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
+ pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
if addresses.len() > 500 {
panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
}
+ // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
+ // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
+ addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
+
let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
},
}
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
Ok(())
}
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff