// In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
// we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
// (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
- // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
- // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
- // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
- // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
let mut existing_claim = false;
e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
+ }
+ }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
-/// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
-/// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-//TODO: We currently don't actually use this...we should
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
+/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
+/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
+/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
+/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
+/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
+/// accurate block height.
+/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
+/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
+pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
+/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
+/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
+/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
+/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
+pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum Storage {
RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
}
+/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
+/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
+/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum TxMaterial {
+ Revoked {
+ script: Script,
+ pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ is_htlc: bool,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ RemoteHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ LocalHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ sigs: (Signature, Signature),
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
+/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum OnchainEvent {
+ /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
+ /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
+ Claim {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
+ },
+ /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
+ /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
+ /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
+ HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
+ },
+}
+
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
destination_script: Script,
+ // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
+ // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
+ // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
+ // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
+ // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
+ // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
+
+ // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
+ // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
+ // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+
// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
}
macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
- ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
{
- let mut fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ let mut fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
- fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
- fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
$spent_txid, fee, $value);
self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
+ self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
{
false
} else {
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
destination_script: destination_script,
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
tx_weight
}
+ fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
+ if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
+ return current_height + 1
+ } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
+ return current_height + 3
+ }
+ current_height + 15
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
for i in 0..48 {
self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
+ match claim_tx_data.1 {
+ TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
+ if *is_htlc {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ key.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.0.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.1.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ }
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
Ok(())
}
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
/// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
};
}
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
} else { None };
let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
- let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
});
- htlc_idxs.push(None);
- values.push(outp.value);
+ inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
+ inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
total_value += outp.value;
- input_descriptors.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
} else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
macro_rules! sign_input {
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
{
- let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
};
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
} else {
$input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
}
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, revocation_key)
}
}
}
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
};
if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
inputs.push(input);
- htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
- values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
} else {
let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
}),
};
let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
- // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
- // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
- // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
}
// No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
input: inputs,
output: outputs,
};
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated);
+ let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
+
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
}
- let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
- let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
+ }
}
assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
- // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
- // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
}
}
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
}
let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
macro_rules! sign_input {
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
{
- let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
$input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, htlc_key)
}
}
}
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
let input = TxIn {
};
if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
inputs.push(input);
- values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
} else {
let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
}),
};
let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
}),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
+ //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ }
txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
}
}
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
input: inputs,
output: outputs,
};
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated);
+
+ let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
+
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
}
- let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
- let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
+ }
}
-
assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
}
}
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
return (None, None)
}
output: outputs,
};
let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
return (None, None);
}
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- let sig = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
}
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
+ }
(Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
} else { (None, None) }
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
}
}
- (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
+ (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the
- // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
- // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
+ let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
+ ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != $source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
+ ($updates: expr) => {
+ local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
+ for claim in $updates.3 {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
+ let mut is_local_tx = false;
+
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
}
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+ wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+ }
}
}
}
}
- (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
+
+ if is_local_tx {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
/// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
+ // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
},
_ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
};
}
};
if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
txn = remote_txn;
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
}
}
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
} else {
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, fee_estimator);
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
if let Some(tx) = tx {
txn.push(tx);
}
// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
if updated.len() > 0 {
htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
}
+ for inp in &tx.input {
+ if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ return outpoint != inp.previous_output
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
}
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
}
}
}
+ for claim in pending_claims {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
+ htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
+ fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
+ if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ //We may discard:
+ //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
+ //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
+ }
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ }
+
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
// * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
// corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
// least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
// inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
// The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
// with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
(!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
return true;
/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
/// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction
, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
} else {
- htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => true,
+ 1 => false,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::Revoked {
+ script,
+ pubkey,
+ key,
+ is_htlc,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
+ script,
+ key,
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
+ script,
+ sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
+ }
+
+ let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::Claim {
+ outpoint
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ events.push(ev);
+ }
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
+ }
+
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
payment_preimages,
destination_script,
+
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+
last_block_hash,
secp_ctx,
logger,
use chain::keysinterface;
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
+ for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+ for i in 12..22 {
+ if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
+ }
+
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
}
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
headers.push(header.clone());
}
+ let mut height = 99;
while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
+ height -= 1;
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
} else {
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
}
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
// to "time out" the HTLC.
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
}
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
}, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
}, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+ // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+ // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+ let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+ let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+ // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut first_failed = false;
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+ assert!(!first_failed);
+ first_failed = true;
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
+ // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Rebalance a bit
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
+
+ // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: 10000,
+ };
+
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp]
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+ // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2);
+}
+
+fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
+ // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
+ if revoked {
+ let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+ }
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
+ if local {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if !revoked {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
+ // commitment tx
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let first;
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
+ else { first = false; }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
+ else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff