Merge pull request #828 from bmancini55/reply_channel_range
authorMatt Corallo <649246+TheBlueMatt@users.noreply.github.com>
Wed, 17 Mar 2021 20:35:03 +0000 (20:35 +0000)
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>
Wed, 17 Mar 2021 20:35:03 +0000 (20:35 +0000)
Handle query_channel_range gossip queries

1  2 
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
lightning/src/ln/peer_handler.rs
lightning/src/util/mod.rs

index 9e4bb081c1a98ddc5bd17c4b818a835a37f10a65,7a992f64f1e29b65b0a8ba0d31024407a1b98954..13b2dbb1a1c6a7b9f54b996e03ab6acc6bdcbf11
@@@ -37,8 -37,10 +37,9 @@@ use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs
  use util::logger::Logger;
  use util::errors::APIError;
  use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
+ use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  
  use std;
 -use std::default::Default;
  use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  use std::ops::Deref;
  #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
@@@ -367,6 -369,9 +368,6 @@@ pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign
        /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
        funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
        short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 -      /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 -      /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 -      pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
        funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
  
        counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
@@@ -565,6 -570,7 +566,6 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> 
  
                        funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
                        short_channel_id: None,
 -                      last_block_connected: Default::default(),
                        funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
  
                        feerate_per_kw: feerate,
  
                        funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
                        short_channel_id: None,
 -                      last_block_connected: Default::default(),
                        funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
  
                        feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
                &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
        }
  
 -      pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
 +      pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
                if self.is_outbound() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
                }
                                                          &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
                                                          funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                                          obscure_factor,
 -                                                        holder_commitment_tx);
 +                                                        holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
  
                channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
  
  
        /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
        /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
 -      pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
 +      pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
                if !self.is_outbound() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
                }
                                                          &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
                                                          funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                                          obscure_factor,
 -                                                        holder_commitment_tx);
 +                                                        holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
  
                channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
  
                                _ => true
                        }
                });
 -              let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 -              if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
 -                      if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 -                              self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
 -                      }
 +
 +              if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 +                      self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
                }
 +
 +              let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
                if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
                                let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
-                                               if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
-                                                       panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
-                                               }
-                                               assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
                                                self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
-                                               self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
-                                                                            ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
-                                                                            ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
+                                               self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+                                                       Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
+                                                       Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
+                                               }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
 -              if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
 -                      self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
 -                      self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
 -                      if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 -                              if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
 -                                      let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
 -                                              self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
 -                                              true
 -                                      } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
 -                                              self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 -                                              self.update_time_counter += 1;
 -                                              true
 -                                      } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
 -                                              // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
 -                                              // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
 -                                              false
 -                                      } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
 -                                              panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
 +
 +              self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
 +              if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 +                      if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
 +                              let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
 +                                      self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
 +                                      true
 +                              } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
 +                                      self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 +                                      self.update_time_counter += 1;
 +                                      true
 +                              } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
 +                                      // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
 +                                      // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
 +                                      false
 +                              } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
 +                                      panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
 +                              } else {
 +                                      // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
 +                                      // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
 +                                      false
 +                              };
 +                              self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash());
 +
 +                              //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
 +                              //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
 +                              //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
 +                              //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
 +                              if need_commitment_update {
 +                                      if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
 +                                              let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
 +                                              return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
 +                                                      channel_id: self.channel_id,
 +                                                      next_per_commitment_point,
 +                                              }), timed_out_htlcs));
                                        } else {
 -                                              // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
 -                                              // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
 -                                              false
 -                                      };
 -                                      self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
 -
 -                                      //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
 -                                      //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
 -                                      //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
 -                                      //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
 -                                      if need_commitment_update {
 -                                              if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
 -                                                      let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
 -                                                      return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
 -                                                              channel_id: self.channel_id,
 -                                                              next_per_commitment_point,
 -                                                      }), timed_out_htlcs));
 -                                              } else {
 -                                                      self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
 -                                                      return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
 -                                              }
 +                                              self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
 +                                              return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                                return true;
                        }
                }
 -              self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
 -              if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
 +              if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
                        self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
                }
                false
        /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
        /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
        /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
 -      pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
 +      pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
 +              // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
 +              // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
 +              // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
 +              // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
                assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
  
                // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
                                _ => {}
                        }
                }
 -              let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
 +              let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
                        // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
                        // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
                        // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
                        // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
                        // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
                        if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
 -                              Some(funding_txo.clone())
 +                              self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
 +                              Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 +                                      update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
 +                                      updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
 +                              }))
                        } else { None }
                } else { None };
  
                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                self.update_time_counter += 1;
 -              self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
 -              (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 -                      update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
 -                      updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
 -              }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
 +              (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
        }
  }
  
@@@ -4426,6 -4429,8 +4424,6 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channe
  
                self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
                self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
 -
 -              self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
                self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
  
                self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
@@@ -4586,6 -4591,8 +4584,6 @@@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> Readab
  
                let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
 -
 -              let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
  
                let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
  
                        funding_tx_confirmed_in,
                        short_channel_id,
 -                      last_block_connected,
                        funding_tx_confirmations,
  
                        counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
@@@ -4910,8 -4918,6 +4908,8 @@@ mod tests 
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let seed = [42; 32];
                let network = Network::Testnet;
 +              let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
 +              let last_block_hash = chain_hash;
                let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
  
                // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
                let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
  
                // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
 -              let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
 +              let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
                let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
                let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
  
                }]};
                let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
                let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
 -              let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
 +              let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap();
  
                // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
 -              let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
 +              let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger);
  
                // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
                // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
index faae2c51726fb03dd0e3a3d93cfd0209fbb11925,3109b8529057661cdafa06383d967ead3ac923b4..970ad2d18a8542620daf54a7b6b24be1f9202cb2
@@@ -206,7 -206,7 +206,7 @@@ pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32])
  #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
  pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
  
 -type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
 +type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
  
  /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
  /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
@@@ -333,15 -333,6 +333,15 @@@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer
        pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
  }
  
 +/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
 +/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
 +/// quite some time lag.
 +enum BackgroundEvent {
 +      /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
 +      /// commitment transaction.
 +      ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
 +}
 +
  /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
  /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
  struct PeerState {
@@@ -389,7 -380,7 +389,7 @@@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b
  /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
  /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
  ///
 -/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Option<BlockHash>, ChannelManager), which
 +/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
  /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
  /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
  /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
@@@ -423,7 -414,7 +423,7 @@@ pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign
        pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
        #[cfg(not(test))]
        latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 -      last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
 +      last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
  
        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
        per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
  
        pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 +      pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
        /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
        /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
        /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
        logger: L,
  }
  
 +/// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
 +///
 +/// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
 +/// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
 +/// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
 +pub struct ChainParameters {
 +      /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
 +      pub network: Network,
 +
 +      /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
 +      pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
 +
 +      /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
 +      ///
 +      /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
 +      pub latest_height: usize,
 +}
 +
  /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
 -/// desirable to notify any listeners on `wait_timeout`/`wait` that new updates are available for
 -/// persistence. Therefore, this struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and,
 -/// upon going out of scope, sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released
 -/// indicates that the updates are ready for persistence).
 +/// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
 +/// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
 +/// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
 +/// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
 +/// updates are ready for persistence).
  struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
        persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
        // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
@@@ -508,12 -479,11 +508,12 @@@ impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGu
        }
  }
  
 -/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
 -/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
 +/// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
 +/// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
  pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
 -/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
 -pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
 +/// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
 +/// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
 +pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
  
  /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
  /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
@@@ -790,22 -760,24 +790,22 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, 
        ///
        /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
        ///
 -      /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
 -      /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
 -      ///
        /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
 -      /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
 -      pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
 +      /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
 +      /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
 +      pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
                let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
  
                ChannelManager {
                        default_configuration: config.clone(),
 -                      genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
 +                      genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
                        fee_estimator: fee_est,
                        chain_monitor,
                        tx_broadcaster,
  
 -                      latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
 -                      last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
 +                      latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
 +                      last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
                        secp_ctx,
  
                        channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
                        per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
  
                        pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 +                      pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
                        total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
                        persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
  
  
        #[inline]
        fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
 -              let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 +              let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
                log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                }
 -              if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
 +              if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
                        // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
                        // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
                        // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
                events.append(&mut new_events);
        }
  
 +      /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 +      ///
 +      /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
 +      /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 +      ///
 +      /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
 +      fn process_background_events(&self) {
 +              let mut background_events = Vec::new();
 +              mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
 +              for event in background_events.drain(..) {
 +                      match event {
 +                              BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
 +                                      // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
 +                                      // monitor updating completing.
 +                                      let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
 +                              },
 +                      }
 +              }
 +      }
 +
 +      #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
 +      pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
 +              self.process_background_events();
 +      }
 +
        /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
        /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
        /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
        ///
        /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
 +      ///
 +      /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
        pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 +              self.process_background_events();
 +
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
                //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
                //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
                //timer handling.
 +
 +              // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
 +              // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
 +              // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
                match source {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
  
        fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
 +                      let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
                                        }
 -                                      (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
 +                                      (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
                        }
                                        // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
                                        // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
                                        // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
 -                                      let (_funding_txo_option, _monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
 +                                      let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
                                        assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
                                },
  
        fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
 +                      let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
 -                                      let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
 +                                      let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
                                                Ok(update) => update,
                                                Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
                                        };
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
        }
 +
 +      /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
 +      /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
 +      /// Channel object.
 +      fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
 +              for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
 +                      // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
 +                      // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
 +                      // reorganized out of the main chain.
 +                      // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
 +                      // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
 +                      // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
 +                      // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
 +                      if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
 +                              assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
 +                              if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
 +                                      assert!(should_broadcast);
 +                              } else { unreachable!(); }
 +                              self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
 +                      }
 +                      self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
 +              }
 +      }
  }
  
  impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
@@@ -3254,17 -3167,9 +3254,17 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, 
  {
        /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
        pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
 -              let header_hash = header.block_hash();
 -              log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
 +              // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
 +              // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
 +              // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
 +              let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 +              log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
 +
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 +
 +              self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
 +              *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
 +
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
                {
                                                                if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                                }
 -                                                              // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
 -                                                              // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
 -                                                              // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
 +                                                              // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
                                                                failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
                                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
                                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
                        });
                }
 -              for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
 -                      self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
 -              }
 +
 +              self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
  
                for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
                }
 -              self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
 -              *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
 +
                loop {
                        // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
                        // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
        /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
        /// in the shutdown.
        pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
 +              // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
 +              // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
 +              // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 +
 +              self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
 +              *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
 +
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                }
                        });
                }
 -              for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
 -                      self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
 -              }
 -              self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
 -              *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
 +
 +              self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
        }
  
        /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
 -      /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on `wait_timeout` is
 -      /// guaranteed to be woken up.
 +      /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
 +      /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
 +      /// up.
        /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
 -      pub fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
 +      pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
                self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
        }
  
 -      /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on `wait` is
 -      /// guaranteed to be woken up.
 -      pub fn wait(&self) {
 +      /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
 +      /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
 +      /// up.
 +      pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
                self.persistence_notifier.wait()
        }
  
@@@ -3596,6 -3499,7 +3596,7 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Se
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
+                                       &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
                                }
                        });
                }
  }
  
  /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
 -/// disk/backups, through `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
 +/// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
  struct PersistenceNotifier {
        /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
        /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
@@@ -3963,7 -3867,7 +3964,7 @@@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, 
  
                self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
                (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
 -              self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
 +              self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
  
                let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
                        event.write(writer)?;
                }
  
 +              let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
 +              (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 +              for event in background_events.iter() {
 +                      match event {
 +                              BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
 +                                      0u8.write(writer)?;
 +                                      funding_txo.write(writer)?;
 +                                      monitor_update.write(writer)?;
 +                              },
 +                      }
 +              }
 +
                (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
  
                Ok(())
  /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
  /// is:
  /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
 -/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Option<BlockHash>,
 -///    ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
 +/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
 +///    <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
  ///    This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
  ///    ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
 -/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
 -///    ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
 +/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
 +///    way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
 +///    ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
  /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
 -/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
 -/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
 +/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
 +/// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
 +///
 +/// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
 +/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
 +///
 +/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
 +/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
 +/// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
 +/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
 +/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
 +/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
  pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
          T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
@@@ -4126,7 -4007,7 +4127,7 @@@ impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T
  // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
  // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
  impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
 -      ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (Option<BlockHash>, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
 +      ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
          T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
          K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
          L::Target: Logger,
  {
        fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 -              let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Option<BlockHash>, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
 +              let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
                Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
        }
  }
  
  impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
 -      ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (Option<BlockHash>, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
 +      ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
          T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
          K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
                let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
                for _ in 0..channel_count {
                        let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
 -                      if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
 -                              return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 -                      }
 -
                        let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
                        funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
                        if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
                                                channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
                                                channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
                                        // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
 -                                      let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
 +                                      let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
                                        failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
                                        monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
                                } else {
                        }
                }
  
 +              let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 +              let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
 +              for _ in 0..background_event_count {
 +                      match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 +                              0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
 +                              _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 +                      }
 +              }
 +
                let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
  
                let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                        tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
  
                        latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
 -                      last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
 +                      last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
                        secp_ctx,
  
                        channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
                        per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
  
                        pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
 +                      pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
                        total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
                        persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
  
                //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
                //connection or two.
  
 -              let last_seen_block_hash = if last_block_hash == Default::default() {
 -                      None
 -              } else {
 -                      Some(last_block_hash)
 -              };
 -              Ok((last_seen_block_hash, channel_manager))
 +              Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
        }
  }
  
index 03470588a0abff86a3e7488160a0fe81dd12994e,dacae671aaac028663ff5f2aa973f9ef81607faa..0e3f0ed4602a164a30189bc5ba0617f9be3451e1
@@@ -42,7 -42,7 +42,7 @@@ use bitcoin::hashes::{HashEngine, Hash}
  
  /// A dummy struct which implements `RoutingMessageHandler` without storing any routing information
  /// or doing any processing. You can provide one of these as the route_handler in a MessageHandler.
 -struct IgnoringMessageHandler{}
 +pub struct IgnoringMessageHandler{}
  impl MessageSendEventsProvider for IgnoringMessageHandler {
        fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> { Vec::new() }
  }
@@@ -67,7 -67,7 +67,7 @@@ impl Deref for IgnoringMessageHandler 
  
  /// A dummy struct which implements `ChannelMessageHandler` without having any channels.
  /// You can provide one of these as the route_handler in a MessageHandler.
 -struct ErroringMessageHandler {
 +pub struct ErroringMessageHandler {
        message_queue: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>
  }
  impl ErroringMessageHandler {
@@@ -1281,6 -1281,17 +1281,17 @@@ impl<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor, CM: 
                                                peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg)));
                                                self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
                                        }
+                                       MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+                                               log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendReplyChannelRange event in peer_handler for node {} with num_scids={} first_blocknum={} number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}",
+                                                       log_pubkey!(node_id),
+                                                       msg.short_channel_ids.len(),
+                                                       msg.first_blocknum,
+                                                       msg.number_of_blocks,
+                                                       msg.sync_complete);
+                                               let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {});
+                                               peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg)));
+                                               self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+                                       }
                                }
                        }
  
        /// It will send pings to each peer and disconnect those which did not respond to the last round of pings.
  
        /// Will most likely call send_data on all of the registered descriptors, thus, be very careful with reentrancy issues!
 -      pub fn timer_tick_occured(&self) {
 +      pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
                let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
                {
                        let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
@@@ -1518,11 -1529,11 +1529,11 @@@ mod tests 
                assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
  
                // peers[0] awaiting_pong is set to true, but the Peer is still connected
 -              peers[0].timer_tick_occured();
 +              peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
                assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
  
 -              // Since timer_tick_occured() is called again when awaiting_pong is true, all Peers are disconnected
 -              peers[0].timer_tick_occured();
 +              // Since timer_tick_occurred() is called again when awaiting_pong is true, all Peers are disconnected
 +              peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
                assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
        }
  
index a6609884773b85738267f14827058cdeb2e6920a,612bd9404b40b03591d9631b0304707597c24c10..04b77872c89011a4b6491019ed252da826e5d363
@@@ -22,13 -22,14 +22,14 @@@ pub(crate) mod chacha20
  pub(crate) mod poly1305;
  pub(crate) mod chacha20poly1305rfc;
  pub(crate) mod transaction_utils;
+ pub(crate) mod scid_utils;
  
  #[macro_use]
  pub(crate) mod ser_macros;
  
  /// Logging macro utilities.
  #[macro_use]
 -pub mod macro_logger;
 +pub(crate) mod macro_logger;
  
  // These have to come after macro_logger to build
  pub mod logger;