- RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code" cargo build --verbose
- rm -f target/debug/lightning-* # Make sure we drop old test binaries
- RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code" cargo test --verbose
- - if [ "$(rustup show | grep default | grep 1.34.2)" != "" ]; then cd fuzz && cargo test --verbose && ./travis-fuzz.sh; fi
- - if [ "$(rustup show | grep default | grep stable)" != "" ]; then cd net-tokio && cargo build --verbose && cd ..; fi
+ - if [ "$(rustup show | grep default | grep 1.34.2)" != "" ]; then cd lightning/fuzz && cargo test --verbose && ./travis-fuzz.sh; fi
+ - if [ "$(rustup show | grep default | grep stable)" != "" ]; then cd lightning-net-tokio && cargo build --verbose && cd ..; fi
- if [ "$(rustup show | grep default | grep stable)" != "" ]; then
wget https://github.com/SimonKagstrom/kcov/archive/master.tar.gz &&
tar xzf master.tar.gz &&
-[package]
-name = "lightning"
-version = "0.0.9"
-authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
-license = "Apache-2.0"
-repository = "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning/"
-description = """
-A Bitcoin Lightning library in Rust.
-Does most of the hard work, without implying a specific runtime, requiring clients implement basic network logic, chain interactions and disk storage.
-Still missing tons of error-handling. See GitHub issues for suggested projects if you want to contribute. Don't have to bother telling you not to use this for anything serious, because you'd have to build a client around it to even try.
-"""
+[workspace]
-[features]
-# Supports tracking channels with a non-bitcoin chain hashes. Currently enables all kinds of fun DoS attacks.
-non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing = []
-fuzztarget = ["secp256k1/fuzztarget", "bitcoin/fuzztarget", "bitcoin_hashes/fuzztarget"]
-# Unlog messages superior at targeted level.
-max_level_off = []
-max_level_error = []
-max_level_warn = []
-max_level_info = []
-max_level_debug = []
-
-[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.20"
-bitcoin_hashes = "0.7"
-secp256k1 = "0.15"
-
-[dev-dependencies.bitcoin]
-version = "0.20"
-features = ["bitcoinconsensus"]
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-hex = "0.3"
-rand = "0.4"
-
-[profile.dev]
-opt-level = 1
+members = [
+ "lightning",
+ "lightning-net-tokio",
+]
+++ /dev/null
-hfuzz_target
-target
-hfuzz_workspace
+++ /dev/null
-[package]
-name = "lightning-fuzz"
-version = "0.0.1"
-authors = ["Automatically generated"]
-publish = false
-# Because the function is unused it gets dropped before we link lightning, so
-# we have to duplicate build.rs here. Note that this is only required for
-# fuzztarget mode.
-
-[package.metadata]
-cargo-fuzz = true
-
-[features]
-afl_fuzz = ["afl"]
-honggfuzz_fuzz = ["honggfuzz"]
-libfuzzer_fuzz = ["libfuzzer-sys"]
-
-[dependencies]
-afl = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
-lightning = { path = "..", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
-bitcoin = { version = "0.20", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
-bitcoin_hashes = { version = "0.7", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
-hex = "0.3"
-honggfuzz = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
-secp256k1 = { version = "0.15", features=["fuzztarget"] }
-libfuzzer-sys = { git = "https://github.com/rust-fuzz/libfuzzer-sys.git", optional = true }
-
-[build-dependencies]
-cc = "1.0"
-
-# Prevent this from interfering with workspaces
-[workspace]
-members = ["."]
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = true
-codegen-units = 1
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "peer_crypt_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/peer_crypt_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "full_stack_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/full_stack_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "chanmon_fail_consistency"
-path = "fuzz_targets/chanmon_fail_consistency.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "router_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/router_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "chanmon_deser_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/chanmon_deser_target.rs"
-
-# message fuzz targets
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_ping_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_ping_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_pong_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_pong_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_error_message_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_error_message_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_update_add_htlc_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_add_htlc_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_accept_channel_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_accept_channel_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_closing_signed_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_closing_signed_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_commitment_signed_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_commitment_signed_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_funding_created_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_created_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_funding_locked_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_locked_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_funding_signed_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_signed_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_open_channel_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_open_channel_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_revoke_and_ack_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_revoke_and_ack_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_shutdown_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_shutdown_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_update_fail_malformed_htlc_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fail_malformed_htlc_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_update_fee_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fee_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_update_fulfill_htlc_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fulfill_htlc_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_update_fail_htlc_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fail_htlc_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_channel_reestablish_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_reestablish_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_announcement_signatures_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_announcement_signatures_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_channel_announcement_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_announcement_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_channel_update_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_update_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_decoded_onion_error_packet_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_decoded_onion_error_packet_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_init_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_init_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_node_announcement_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_node_announcement_target.rs"
-
-[[bin]]
-name = "msg_onion_hop_data_target"
-path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_onion_hop_data_target.rs"
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate bitcoin;
-extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer};
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::test_logger;
-
-use std::io::Cursor;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- let logger = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- if let Ok((latest_block_hash, monitor)) = <(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(data), logger.clone()) {
- let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
- let deserialized_copy = <(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&w.0), logger.clone()).unwrap();
- assert!(latest_block_hash == deserialized_copy.0);
- assert!(monitor == deserialized_copy.1);
- w.0.clear();
- monitor.write_for_watchtower(&mut w).unwrap();
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
-//! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
-//! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
-//! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
-//! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
-//! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
-//! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
-//! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
-//! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
-//! channel being force-closed.
-
-//Uncomment this for libfuzzer builds:
-//#![no_main]
-
-extern crate bitcoin;
-extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
-extern crate lightning;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-
-use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
-
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface;
-use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
-use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLCUpdate};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
-use lightning::ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
-use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, HandleError, UpdateAddHTLC, LocalFeatures};
-use lightning::util::events;
-use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
-use lightning::util::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
-use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::test_logger;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-
-use std::mem;
-use std::cmp::Ordering;
-use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
-use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::sync::atomic;
-use std::io::Cursor;
-
-struct FuzzEstimator {}
-impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
- fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
- 253
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
-impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
-}
-
-pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-static mut IN_RESTORE: bool = false;
-pub struct TestChannelMonitor {
- pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
- pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
- pub latest_good_update: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, Vec<u8>>>,
- pub latest_update_good: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
- pub latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
- pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
-}
-impl TestChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<chaininterface::FeeEstimator>) -> Self {
- Self {
- simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, feeest),
- update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
- latest_good_update: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- latest_update_good: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
- }
- }
-}
-impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- let ret = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone();
- if let Ok(()) = ret {
- let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write_for_disk(&mut ser).unwrap();
- self.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, ser.0);
- match self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().entry(funding_txo) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(mut e) => { e.insert(true); },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- if !e.get() && unsafe { IN_RESTORE } {
- // Technically we can't consider an update to be "good" unless we're doing
- // it in response to a test_restore_channel_monitor as the channel may
- // still be waiting on such a call, so only set us to good if we're in the
- // middle of a restore call.
- e.insert(true);
- }
- },
- }
- self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- } else {
- self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, false);
- }
- assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
- ret
- }
-
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- return self.simple_monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated();
- }
-}
-
-struct KeyProvider {
- node_id: u8,
- session_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
- channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
-}
-impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
- }
- }
-
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
- let id = self.session_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 10, self.node_id]).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let id = self.channel_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 11, self.node_id]
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator{});
- let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
-
- macro_rules! make_node {
- ($node_id: expr) => { {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
-
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
- let mut config = UserConfig::new();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
- config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
- (ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap(),
- monitor)
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! reload_node {
- ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr) => { {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
-
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
- let mut config = UserConfig::new();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
- config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
-
- let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
- let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap();
- for (outpoint, monitor_ser) in old_monitors.drain() {
- monitors.insert(outpoint, <(Sha256d, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), Arc::clone(&logger)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
- monitor.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, monitor_ser);
- }
- let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
- for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter() {
- monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
- }
-
- let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: fee_est.clone(),
- monitor: monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: watch,
- tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
- logger,
- default_config: config,
- channel_monitors: &monitor_refs,
- };
-
- let res = (<(Sha256d, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, monitor);
- for (_, was_good) in $old_monitors.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap().iter() {
- if !was_good {
- // If the last time we updated a monitor we didn't successfully update (and we
- // have sense updated our serialized copy of the ChannelManager) we may
- // force-close the channel on our counterparty cause we know we're missing
- // something. Thus, we just return here since we can't continue to test.
- return;
- }
- }
- res
- } }
- }
-
-
- let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
- macro_rules! make_channel {
- ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
- $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 10000000, 42, 0).unwrap();
- let open_channel = {
- let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
- msg.clone()
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- };
-
- $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel).unwrap();
- let accept_channel = {
- let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
- msg.clone()
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- };
-
- $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel).unwrap();
- {
- let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
- let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
- }]};
- let funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
- $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
- channel_txn.push(tx);
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- }
-
- let funding_created = {
- let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
- msg.clone()
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- };
- $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created).unwrap();
-
- let funding_signed = {
- let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
- msg.clone()
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- };
- $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
-
- {
- let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { .. } = events[0] {
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- }
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! confirm_txn {
- ($node: expr) => { {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
- let mut posn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
- for i in 0..channel_txn.len() {
- txn.push(&channel_txn[i]);
- posn.push(i as u32 + 1);
- }
- $node.block_connected(&header, 1, &txn, &posn);
- for i in 2..100 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- $node.block_connected(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
- }
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! lock_fundings {
- ($nodes: expr) => { {
- let mut node_events = Vec::new();
- for node in $nodes.iter() {
- node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
- }
- for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
- for event in node_event {
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
- for node in $nodes.iter() {
- if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
- node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
- }
- }
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- }
- }
-
- for node in $nodes.iter() {
- let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- for event in events {
- if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- }
- }
- } }
- }
-
- // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
- // forwarding.
- let (mut node_a, mut monitor_a) = make_node!(0);
- let (mut node_b, mut monitor_b) = make_node!(1);
- let (mut node_c, mut monitor_c) = make_node!(2);
-
- let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
-
- make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
- make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
-
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- confirm_txn!(node);
- }
-
- lock_fundings!(nodes);
-
- let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
- let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
-
- let mut payment_id = 0;
-
- let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
- let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
- let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
- let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
-
- let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
- let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
- let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
-
- macro_rules! test_err {
- ($res: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(()) => {},
- Err(HandleError { action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError), .. }) => { },
- _ => { $res.unwrap() },
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_return {
- () => { {
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
- return;
- } }
- }
-
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- macro_rules! get_slice {
- ($len: expr) => {
- {
- let slice_len = $len as usize;
- if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
- test_return!();
- }
- read_pos += slice_len;
- &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
- }
- }
- }
-
- loop {
- macro_rules! send_payment {
- ($source: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
- let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
- payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
- if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
- hops: vec![RouteHop {
- pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: $dest.1,
- fee_msat: 5000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
- }],
- }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
- // Probably ran out of funds
- test_return!();
- }
- } };
- ($source: expr, $middle: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
- let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
- payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
- if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
- hops: vec![RouteHop {
- pubkey: $middle.0.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: $middle.1,
- fee_msat: 50000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
- },RouteHop {
- pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: $dest.1,
- fee_msat: 5000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
- }],
- }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
- // Probably ran out of funds
- test_return!();
- }
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! process_msg_events {
- ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr) => { {
- let events = if $node == 1 {
- let mut new_events = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
- new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
- bc_events.clear();
- new_events
- } else { Vec::new() };
- for event in events.iter().chain(nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter()) {
- match event {
- events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- for dest in nodes.iter() {
- if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- for update_add in update_add_htlcs {
- if !$corrupt_forward {
- test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_add));
- } else {
- // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
- // check will fail and we generate a
- // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
- // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
- let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
- msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
- let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
- test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg));
- }
- }
- for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs {
- test_err!(dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill));
- }
- for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs {
- test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail));
- }
- for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
- test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_malformed));
- }
- test_err!(dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed));
- }
- }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- for dest in nodes.iter() {
- if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
- test_err!(dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
- }
- }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- for dest in nodes.iter() {
- if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
- test_err!(dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
- }
- }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
- // Can be generated as a reestablish response
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
- // Can be generated due to a payment forward being rejected due to a
- // channel having previously failed a monitor update
- },
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
- }
- }
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
- ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
- if $counterparty_id == 0 {
- for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- match event {
- events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
- }
- }
- ba_events.clear();
- } else {
- for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- match event {
- events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
- }
- }
- bc_events.clear();
- }
- let mut events = nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let drop_node_id = if $counterparty_id == 0 { nodes[0].get_our_node_id() } else { nodes[2].get_our_node_id() };
- let msg_sink = if $counterparty_id == 0 { &mut bc_events } else { &mut ba_events };
- for event in events.drain(..) {
- let push = match event {
- events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
- if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
- if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
- if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
- },
- events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => false,
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => false,
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
- };
- if push { msg_sink.push(event); }
- }
- } }
- }
-
- macro_rules! process_events {
- ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
- // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
- // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
- // deduplicate the calls here.
- let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
- let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
- // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
- // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
- // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
- // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
- // our claim_set deduplication).
- events.sort_by(|a, b| {
- if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
- if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
- Ordering::Less
- } else { Ordering::Equal }
- } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
- if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
- Ordering::Greater
- } else { Ordering::Equal }
- } else { Ordering::Equal }
- });
- for event in events.drain(..) {
- match event {
- events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
- if $fail {
- assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
- } else {
- assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0)));
- }
- }
- },
- events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
- events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
- events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
- nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- },
- _ => panic!("Unhandled event"),
- }
- }
- } }
- }
-
- match get_slice!(1)[0] {
- 0x00 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
- 0x01 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
- 0x02 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
- 0x03 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
- 0x04 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
- 0x05 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
- 0x06 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[0].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
- 0x07 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[1].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
- 0x08 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[2].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
- 0x09 => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a)),
- 0x0a => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
- 0x0b => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
- 0x0c => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b)),
- 0x0d => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a), (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
- 0x0e => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b), (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
- 0x0f => {
- if !chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_a_disconnected = true;
- drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
- }
- },
- 0x10 => {
- if !chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_b_disconnected = true;
- drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
- }
- },
- 0x11 => {
- if chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
- chan_a_disconnected = false;
- }
- },
- 0x12 => {
- if chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
- chan_b_disconnected = false;
- }
- },
- 0x13 => process_msg_events!(0, true),
- 0x14 => process_msg_events!(0, false),
- 0x15 => process_events!(0, true),
- 0x16 => process_events!(0, false),
- 0x17 => process_msg_events!(1, true),
- 0x18 => process_msg_events!(1, false),
- 0x19 => process_events!(1, true),
- 0x1a => process_events!(1, false),
- 0x1b => process_msg_events!(2, true),
- 0x1c => process_msg_events!(2, false),
- 0x1d => process_events!(2, true),
- 0x1e => process_events!(2, false),
- 0x1f => {
- if !chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_a_disconnected = true;
- drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
- }
- let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a);
- node_a = Arc::new(new_node_a);
- nodes[0] = node_a.clone();
- monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
- },
- 0x20 => {
- if !chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_a_disconnected = true;
- nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- ba_events.clear();
- }
- if !chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_b_disconnected = true;
- nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- bc_events.clear();
- }
- let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b);
- node_b = Arc::new(new_node_b);
- nodes[1] = node_b.clone();
- monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
- },
- 0x21 => {
- if !chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
- chan_b_disconnected = true;
- drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
- }
- let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c);
- node_c = Arc::new(new_node_c);
- nodes[2] = node_c.clone();
- monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
- },
- _ => test_return!(),
- }
-
- if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
- node_a_ser.0.clear();
- nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
- monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- *monitor_a.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_a.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
- }
- if monitor_b.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
- node_b_ser.0.clear();
- nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
- monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- *monitor_b.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_b.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
- }
- if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
- node_c_ser.0.clear();
- nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
- monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- *monitor_c.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_c.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
-#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
- do_test(data);
-});
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
-//! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
-//! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
-//! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
-//! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
-
-//Uncomment this for libfuzzer builds:
-//#![no_main]
-
-extern crate bitcoin;
-extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
-extern crate lightning;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
-use bitcoin_hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
-use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor};
-use lightning::ln::router::Router;
-use lightning::util::events::{EventsProvider,Event};
-use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
-
-mod utils;
-
-use utils::test_logger;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-
-use std::cell::RefCell;
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
-use std::cmp;
-use std::hash::Hash;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
- ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
- ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
- ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
- ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
- ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
- ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
- ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
- ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
- ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
- let mut v = [0; 8];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-
-struct InputData {
- data: Vec<u8>,
- read_pos: AtomicUsize,
-}
-impl InputData {
- fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
- let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
- if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
- return None;
- }
- Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
- }
-}
-
-struct FuzzEstimator {
- input: Arc<InputData>,
-}
-impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
- fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
- //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
- match self.input.get_slice(2) {
- Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u64, 253),
- None => 0
- }
- }
-}
-
-struct TestBroadcaster {}
-impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) {}
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone)]
-struct Peer<'a> {
- id: u8,
- peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
-}
-impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
- fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
- data.len()
- }
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
- assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
- self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
- }
-}
-impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- self.id == other.id
- }
-}
-impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
-impl<'a> Hash for Peer<'a> {
- fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
- self.id.hash(h)
- }
-}
-
-struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
- manager: Arc<ChannelManager>,
- monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
- handler: PeerManager<Peer<'a>>,
-
- peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
- funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
- txids_confirmed: HashMap<Sha256dHash, usize>,
- header_hashes: Vec<Sha256dHash>,
- height: usize,
- max_height: usize,
- blocks_connected: u32,
-}
-impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
- pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>, manager: Arc<ChannelManager>, monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>, handler: PeerManager<Peer<'a>>) -> Self {
- MoneyLossDetector {
- manager,
- monitor,
- handler,
-
- peers,
- funding_txn: Vec::new(),
- txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
- header_hashes: vec![Default::default()],
- height: 0,
- max_height: 0,
- blocks_connected: 0,
- }
- }
-
- fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
- let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
- let mut txn_idxs = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
- for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
- let txid = tx.txid();
- match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(self.height);
- txn.push(tx);
- txn_idxs.push(idx as u32 + 1);
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- }
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- self.height += 1;
- self.blocks_connected += 1;
- self.manager.block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
- (*self.monitor).block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
- if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
- self.header_hashes[self.height] = header.bitcoin_hash();
- } else {
- assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
- self.header_hashes.push(header.bitcoin_hash());
- }
- self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
- }
-
- fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
- if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
- self.height -= 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
- self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
- let removal_height = self.height;
- self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
- removal_height != *height
- });
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
- fn drop(&mut self) {
- if !::std::thread::panicking() {
- // Disconnect all peers
- for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
- if *peer {
- self.handler.disconnect_event(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
- }
- }
-
- // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
- self.manager.force_close_all_channels();
- }
- }
-}
-
-struct KeyProvider {
- node_secret: SecretKey,
- counter: AtomicU64,
-}
-impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
- self.node_secret.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = <Hash160 as bitcoin_hashes::Hash>::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
- let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
- if inbound {
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
- }
- } else {
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
- let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, ctr]).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<Logger>) {
- let input = Arc::new(InputData {
- data: data.to_vec(),
- read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- });
- let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
- input: input.clone(),
- });
-
- macro_rules! get_slice {
- ($len: expr) => {
- match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
- Some(slice) => slice,
- None => return,
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! get_pubkey {
- () => {
- match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- }
- }
-
- let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
-
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
- let monitor = channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone());
-
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
- let mut config = UserConfig::new();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
- config.channel_options.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
- config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
- let channelmanager = ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
- let router = Arc::new(Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), watch.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)));
-
- let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
- let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
- chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
- route_handler: router.clone(),
- }, our_network_key, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger)));
-
- let mut should_forward = false;
- let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
- let mut payments_sent = 0;
- let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
- let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
- let mut pending_funding_relay = Vec::new();
-
- loop {
- match get_slice!(1)[0] {
- 0 => {
- let mut new_id = 0;
- for i in 1..256 {
- if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
- new_id = i;
- break;
- }
- }
- if new_id == 0 { return; }
- loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
- peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
- },
- 1 => {
- let mut new_id = 0;
- for i in 1..256 {
- if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
- new_id = i;
- break;
- }
- }
- if new_id == 0 { return; }
- loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
- peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
- },
- 2 => {
- let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
- if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
- loss_detector.handler.disconnect_event(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
- peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
- },
- 3 => {
- let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
- if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
- match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0]).to_vec()) {
- Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
- Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
- }
- },
- 4 => {
- let value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
- let route = match router.get_route(&get_pubkey!(), None, &Vec::new(), value, 42) {
- Ok(route) => route,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
- let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
- payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- payments_sent += 1;
- match channelmanager.send_payment(route, payment_hash) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- },
- 5 => {
- let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
- if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
- let their_key = get_pubkey!();
- let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
- let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
- if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0).is_err() { return; }
- },
- 6 => {
- let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
- let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
- if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
- channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
- if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).is_err() { return; }
- },
- 7 => {
- if should_forward {
- channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- should_forward = false;
- }
- },
- 8 => {
- for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
- // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
- // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
- // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
- // place that anywhere in our preimage.
- if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
- channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
- } else {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
- channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- }
- }
- },
- 9 => {
- for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
- channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
- }
- },
- 10 => {
- 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
- let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: funding_generation.1, script_pubkey: funding_generation.2,
- }] };
- let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
- let funding_txid = tx.txid();
- if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
- let outpoint = OutPoint::new(funding_txid, 0);
- for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
- if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
- tx.version += 1;
- continue 'search_loop;
- }
- }
- break outpoint;
- }
- tx.version += 1;
- if tx.version > 0xff {
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- };
- channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, funding_output.clone());
- pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
- }
- },
- 11 => {
- if !pending_funding_relay.is_empty() {
- loss_detector.connect_block(&pending_funding_relay[..]);
- for _ in 2..100 {
- loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
- }
- }
- for tx in pending_funding_relay.drain(..) {
- loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
- }
- },
- 12 => {
- let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
- if txlen == 0 {
- loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
- } else {
- let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
- if let Ok(tx) = txres {
- loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
- } else {
- return;
- }
- }
- },
- 13 => {
- loss_detector.disconnect_block();
- },
- 14 => {
- let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
- let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
- if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
- channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
- channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id);
- },
- _ => return,
- }
- loss_detector.handler.process_events();
- for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
- match event {
- Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
- pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
- },
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { funding_txo, .. } => {
- pending_funding_relay.push(pending_funding_signatures.remove(&funding_txo).unwrap());
- },
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
- payments_received.push(payment_hash);
- },
- Event::PaymentSent {..} => {},
- Event::PaymentFailed {..} => {},
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
- should_forward = true;
- },
- Event::SpendableOutputs {..} => {},
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- do_test(data, &logger);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- do_test(data, &logger);
- });
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
-#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
-fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- do_test(data, &logger);
-});
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use utils::test_logger;
- use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
- use std::collections::HashMap;
- use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap(), &logger);
- }
-
- struct TrackingLogger {
- /// (module, message) -> count
- pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
- }
- impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
- fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
- *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
- println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
- // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
- // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
- // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
- // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
- // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
-
- // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
- // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
-
- // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
- // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
- // of the Lightning message
- // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
- // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
-
- // 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
- // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
- // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
- //
- // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
- // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - peer's pubkey
- // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
- // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 6
- // 030016 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 22
- // 0010 00000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message with no features (type 16) and mac
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
- // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
- // 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000222 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
- // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
- // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
- //
- // 00fd00fd00fd - Three feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
- // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
- // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 5c000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
- // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
- //
- // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
- // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 3: SendFundingLocked to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
- // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
- // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
- //
- // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
- // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
- // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
- // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
- // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0006 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 6
- // 030116 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 22
- // 0010 00000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message with no features (type 16)
- //
- // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
- // 00fd00fd00fd - Three feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
- // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
- // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e02 000000000000001a 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 03000000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
- // 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
- // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
- //
- // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
- // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
- // 0023 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
- //
- // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
- // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 4: SendFundingLocked to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
- // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
- // 0024 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
- //
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
- // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 4d000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
- // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
- // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
- //
- // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
- // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 f1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
- // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
- // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
- // 0082 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
- // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
- // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fd000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
- // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
- //
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
- // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
- // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
- // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 be000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
- // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
- // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
- // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
- // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fc000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
- // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
- // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
- // 0083 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
- // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fb000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- //
- // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
- // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
- // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
- // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
- // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
- // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
- // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
- // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 4f000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e0000010000000000000003e800000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
- // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
- // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
- //
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
- // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
- // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 07000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0001 c8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007f00000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
- // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
- //
- // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
- // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
- // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
- // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
- //
- // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
- // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
- //
- // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
- // 0200000001390000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008002000100000000000022002090000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cc10000000000001600145c0000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
- // 0200000001fd00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014f00000000000000220020f60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
- //
- // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
- // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
-
- let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<Logger>));
-
- let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending remote commitment tx (00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fd:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000044 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-#!/bin/sh
-
-GEN_TEST() {
- tn=$(echo $1 | sed 's/\([a-z0-9]\)\([A-Z]\)/\1_\2/g')
- fn=msg_$(echo $tn | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')_target.rs
- cat msg_target_template.txt | sed s/MSG_TARGET/$1/ | sed "s/TEST_MSG/$2/" | sed "s/EXTRA_ARGS/$3/" > $fn
-}
-
-GEN_TEST AcceptChannel test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST AnnouncementSignatures test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST ChannelReestablish test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST ClosingSigned test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST CommitmentSigned test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST DecodedOnionErrorPacket test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST FundingCreated test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST FundingLocked test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST FundingSigned test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST Init test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST OpenChannel test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST RevokeAndACK test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST Shutdown test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST UpdateFailHTLC test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST UpdateFailMalformedHTLC test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST UpdateFee test_msg ""
-GEN_TEST UpdateFulfillHTLC test_msg ""
-
-GEN_TEST ChannelAnnouncement test_msg_exact ""
-GEN_TEST ChannelUpdate test_msg_exact ""
-GEN_TEST NodeAnnouncement test_msg_exact ""
-
-GEN_TEST UpdateAddHTLC test_msg_hole ", 85, 33"
-GEN_TEST ErrorMessage test_msg_hole ", 32, 2"
-GEN_TEST OnionHopData test_msg_hole ", 1+8+8+4, 12"
-
-GEN_TEST Ping test_msg_simple ""
-GEN_TEST Pong test_msg_simple ""
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::AcceptChannel, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_exact!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::ChannelReestablish, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_exact!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::ClosingSigned, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::CommitmentSigned, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_hole!(msgs::ErrorMessage, data, 32, 2);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::FundingCreated, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::FundingLocked, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::FundingSigned, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::Init, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_exact!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_hole!(msgs::OnionHopData, data, 1+8+8+4, 12);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::OpenChannel, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_simple!(msgs::Ping, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_simple!(msgs::Pong, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::RevokeAndACK, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::Shutdown, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- TEST_MSG!(msgs::MSG_TARGET, dataEXTRA_ARGS);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg_hole!(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, data, 85, 33);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFee, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
-// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
-
-extern crate lightning;
-
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-
-mod utils;
-use utils::VecWriter;
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, data);
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-#![macro_use]
-
-use lightning::util::ser::Writer;
-pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- assert!(self.0.capacity() >= self.0.len() + buf.len());
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! test_msg {
- ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
- {
- use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
- let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
- if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
- let p = r.position() as usize;
- let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(w.0.len(), p);
- assert_eq!(&r.into_inner()[..p], &w.0[..p]);
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! test_msg_simple {
- ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
- {
- use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
- let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
- if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
- let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! test_msg_exact {
- ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
- {
- use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
- let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
- if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
- let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(&r.into_inner()[..], &w.0[..]);
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! test_msg_hole {
- ($MsgType: path, $data: ident, $hole: expr, $hole_len: expr) => {
- {
- use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
- let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
- if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
- let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let p = w.0.len() as usize;
-
- assert_eq!(w.0.len(), p);
- assert_eq!(&r.get_ref()[..$hole], &w.0[..$hole]);
- assert_eq!(&r.get_ref()[$hole+$hole_len..p], &w.0[$hole+$hole_len..]);
- }
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-extern crate lightning;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-
-use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-
-#[inline]
-fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
- ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
- ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- macro_rules! get_slice {
- ($len: expr) => {
- {
- let slice_len = $len as usize;
- if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
- return;
- }
- read_pos += slice_len;
- &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
- }
- }
- }
-
- let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
- let ephemeral_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
-
- let mut crypter = if get_slice!(1)[0] != 0 {
- let their_pubkey = match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
- let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_pubkey, ephemeral_key);
- crypter.get_act_one();
- match crypter.process_act_two(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- assert!(crypter.is_ready_for_encryption());
- crypter
- } else {
- let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_network_key);
- match crypter.process_act_one_with_keys(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key, ephemeral_key) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- match crypter.process_act_three(get_slice!(66)) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- assert!(crypter.is_ready_for_encryption());
- crypter
- };
- loop {
- if get_slice!(1)[0] == 0 {
- crypter.encrypt_message(get_slice!(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2))));
- } else {
- let len = match crypter.decrypt_length_header(get_slice!(16+2)) {
- Ok(len) => len,
- Err(_) => return,
- };
- match crypter.decrypt_message(get_slice!(len as usize + 16)) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("01").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-extern crate bitcoin;
-extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
-extern crate lightning;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{ChainError,ChainWatchInterface, ChainListener};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
-use lightning::ln::msgs;
-use lightning::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler};
-use lightning::ln::router::{Router, RouteHint};
-use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use lightning::util::ser::Readable;
-
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-
-mod utils;
-
-use utils::test_logger;
-
-use std::sync::{Weak, Arc};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
- ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
- ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
- ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
- ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
- ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
- ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
- ((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
- ((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
- ((v[2] as u64) << 8*5) |
- ((v[3] as u64) << 8*4) |
- ((v[4] as u64) << 8*3) |
- ((v[5] as u64) << 8*2) |
- ((v[6] as u64) << 8*1) |
- ((v[7] as u64) << 8*0)
-}
-
-
-struct InputData {
- data: Vec<u8>,
- read_pos: AtomicUsize,
-}
-impl InputData {
- fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
- let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
- if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
- return None;
- }
- Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
- }
- fn get_slice_nonadvancing(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
- let old_pos = self.read_pos.load(Ordering::Acquire);
- if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
- return None;
- }
- Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
- }
-}
-
-struct DummyChainWatcher {
- input: Arc<InputData>,
-}
-
-impl ChainWatchInterface for DummyChainWatcher {
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, _txid: &Sha256dHash, _script_pub_key: &Script) { }
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, _outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), _out_script: &Script) { }
- fn watch_all_txn(&self) { }
- fn register_listener(&self, _listener: Weak<ChainListener>) { }
-
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
- match self.input.get_slice(2) {
- Some(&[0, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotSupported),
- Some(&[1, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotWatched),
- Some(&[2, _]) => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
- Some(&[_, x]) => Ok((Builder::new().push_int(x as i64).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh(), 0)),
- None => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
- let input = Arc::new(InputData {
- data: data.to_vec(),
- read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- });
- macro_rules! get_slice_nonadvancing {
- ($len: expr) => {
- match input.get_slice_nonadvancing($len as usize) {
- Some(slice) => slice,
- None => return,
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! get_slice {
- ($len: expr) => {
- match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
- Some(slice) => slice,
- None => return,
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! decode_msg {
- ($MsgType: path, $len: expr) => {{
- let mut reader = ::std::io::Cursor::new(get_slice!($len));
- match <($MsgType)>::read(&mut reader) {
- Ok(msg) => msg,
- Err(e) => match e {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => return,
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => return,
- msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue => return,
- msgs::DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => return,
- msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => return,
- msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => panic!("We picked the length..."),
- msgs::DecodeError::Io(e) => panic!(format!("{}", e)),
- }
- }
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! decode_msg_with_len16 {
- ($MsgType: path, $begin_len: expr, $excess: expr) => {
- {
- let extra_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!($begin_len as usize + 2)[$begin_len..$begin_len + 2]);
- decode_msg!($MsgType, $begin_len as usize + 2 + (extra_len as usize) + $excess)
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! get_pubkey {
- () => {
- match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return,
- }
- }
- }
-
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(DummyChainWatcher {
- input: Arc::clone(&input),
- });
-
- let our_pubkey = get_pubkey!();
- let router = Router::new(our_pubkey.clone(), chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
-
- loop {
- match get_slice!(1)[0] {
- 0 => {
- let start_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!(64 + 2)[64..64 + 2]) as usize;
- let addr_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!(64+start_len+2 + 74)[64+start_len+2 + 72..64+start_len+2 + 74]);
- if addr_len > (37+1)*4 {
- return;
- }
- let _ = router.handle_node_announcement(&decode_msg_with_len16!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement, 64, 288));
- },
- 1 => {
- let _ = router.handle_channel_announcement(&decode_msg_with_len16!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, 64*4, 32+8+33*4));
- },
- 2 => {
- let _ = router.handle_channel_update(&decode_msg!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, 128));
- },
- 3 => {
- match get_slice!(1)[0] {
- 0 => {
- router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {msg: decode_msg!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, 128)});
- },
- 1 => {
- let short_channel_id = slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8));
- router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {short_channel_id, is_permanent: false});
- },
- _ => return,
- }
- },
- 4 => {
- let target = get_pubkey!();
- let mut first_hops_vec = Vec::new();
- let first_hops = match get_slice!(1)[0] {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- let count = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
- for _ in 0..count {
- first_hops_vec.push(ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- short_channel_id: Some(slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8))),
- remote_network_id: get_pubkey!(),
- channel_value_satoshis: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
- user_id: 0,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_live: true,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- });
- }
- Some(&first_hops_vec[..])
- },
- _ => return,
- };
- let mut last_hops_vec = Vec::new();
- let last_hops = {
- let count = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
- for _ in 0..count {
- last_hops_vec.push(RouteHint {
- src_node_id: get_pubkey!(),
- short_channel_id: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
- fee_base_msat: slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)),
- fee_proportional_millionths: slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)),
- cltv_expiry_delta: slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2)),
- htlc_minimum_msat: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
- });
- }
- &last_hops_vec[..]
- };
- let _ = router.get_route(&target, first_hops, last_hops, slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)), slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)));
- },
- _ => return,
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
-#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
-fn main() {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
-#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
-fn main() {
- loop {
- fuzz!(|data| {
- do_test(data);
- });
- }
-}
-
-extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_crash() {
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-pub(crate) mod test_logger;
+++ /dev/null
-use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
-pub struct TestLogger {
- #[cfg(test)]
- id: String,
-}
-
-impl TestLogger {
- pub fn new(_id: String) -> TestLogger {
- TestLogger {
- #[cfg(test)]
- id: _id
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Logger for TestLogger {
- fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
- #[cfg(test)]
- println!("{:<5} {} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), self.id, record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- let _ = format!("{}", record.args);
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-#!/bin/bash
-set -e
-
-pushd fuzz_targets/msg_targets
-rm *_target.rs
-./gen_target.sh
-[ "$(git diff)" != "" ] && exit 1
-popd
-
-cargo install --force honggfuzz
-for TARGET in fuzz_targets/*.rs fuzz_targets/msg_targets/*_target.rs; do
- FILENAME=$(basename $TARGET)
- FILE="${FILENAME%.*}"
- HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="--exit_upon_crash -v -n2"
- if [ "$FILE" = "chanmon_fail_consistency" ]; then
- HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="$HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS -F 64 -N100000"
- else
- HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="$HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS -N1000000"
- fi
- export HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS
- HFUZZ_BUILD_ARGS="--features honggfuzz_fuzz" cargo hfuzz run $FILE
- if [ -f hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/HONGGFUZZ.REPORT.TXT ]; then
- cat hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/HONGGFUZZ.REPORT.TXT
- for CASE in hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/SIG*; do
- cat $CASE | xxd -p
- done
- exit 1
- fi
-done
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning-net-tokio"
+version = "0.0.1"
+authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
+license = "Apache-2.0"
+description = """
+Implementation of the rust-lightning network stack using Tokio.
+For Rust-Lightning clients which wish to make direct connections to Lightning P2P nodes, this is a simple alternative to implementing the nerequired network stack, especially for those already using Tokio.
+"""
+
+[dependencies]
+bitcoin = "0.20"
+bitcoin_hashes = "0.7"
+lightning = { version = "0.0.9", path = "../lightning" }
+secp256k1 = "0.15"
+tokio-codec = "0.1"
+futures = "0.1"
+tokio = "0.1"
+bytes = "0.4"
--- /dev/null
+extern crate bytes;
+extern crate tokio;
+extern crate tokio_codec;
+extern crate futures;
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+
+use bytes::BufMut;
+
+use futures::future;
+use futures::future::Future;
+use futures::{AsyncSink, Stream, Sink};
+use futures::sync::mpsc;
+
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+
+use tokio::timer::Delay;
+use tokio::net::TcpStream;
+
+use lightning::ln::peer_handler;
+use lightning::ln::peer_handler::SocketDescriptor as LnSocketTrait;
+
+use std::mem;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use std::vec::Vec;
+use std::hash::Hash;
+
+static ID_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
+
+/// A connection to a remote peer. Can be constructed either as a remote connection using
+/// Connection::setup_outbound o
+pub struct Connection {
+ writer: Option<mpsc::Sender<bytes::Bytes>>,
+ event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>,
+ pending_read: Vec<u8>,
+ read_blocker: Option<futures::sync::oneshot::Sender<Result<(), ()>>>,
+ read_paused: bool,
+ need_disconnect: bool,
+ id: u64,
+}
+impl Connection {
+ fn schedule_read(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, us: Arc<Mutex<Self>>, reader: futures::stream::SplitStream<tokio_codec::Framed<TcpStream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec>>) {
+ let us_ref = us.clone();
+ let us_close_ref = us.clone();
+ let peer_manager_ref = peer_manager.clone();
+ tokio::spawn(reader.for_each(move |b| {
+ let pending_read = b.to_vec();
+ {
+ let mut lock = us_ref.lock().unwrap();
+ assert!(lock.pending_read.is_empty());
+ if lock.read_paused {
+ lock.pending_read = pending_read;
+ let (sender, blocker) = futures::sync::oneshot::channel();
+ lock.read_blocker = Some(sender);
+ return future::Either::A(blocker.then(|_| { Ok(()) }));
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: There's a race where we don't meet the requirements of disconnect_socket if its
+ //called right here, after we release the us_ref lock in the scope above, but before we
+ //call read_event!
+ match peer_manager.read_event(&mut SocketDescriptor::new(us_ref.clone(), peer_manager.clone()), pending_read) {
+ Ok(pause_read) => {
+ if pause_read {
+ let mut lock = us_ref.lock().unwrap();
+ lock.read_paused = true;
+ }
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ us_ref.lock().unwrap().need_disconnect = false;
+ return future::Either::B(future::result(Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Err(e) = us_ref.lock().unwrap().event_notify.try_send(()) {
+ // Ignore full errors as we just need them to poll after this point, so if the user
+ // hasn't received the last send yet, it doesn't matter.
+ assert!(e.is_full());
+ }
+
+ future::Either::B(future::result(Ok(())))
+ }).then(move |_| {
+ if us_close_ref.lock().unwrap().need_disconnect {
+ peer_manager_ref.disconnect_event(&SocketDescriptor::new(us_close_ref, peer_manager_ref.clone()));
+ println!("Peer disconnected!");
+ } else {
+ println!("We disconnected peer!");
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }));
+ }
+
+ fn new(event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, stream: TcpStream) -> (futures::stream::SplitStream<tokio_codec::Framed<TcpStream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec>>, Arc<Mutex<Self>>) {
+ let (writer, reader) = tokio_codec::Framed::new(stream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec::new()).split();
+ let (send_sink, send_stream) = mpsc::channel(3);
+ tokio::spawn(writer.send_all(send_stream.map_err(|_| -> std::io::Error {
+ unreachable!();
+ })).then(|_| {
+ future::result(Ok(()))
+ }));
+ let us = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Self { writer: Some(send_sink), event_notify, pending_read: Vec::new(), read_blocker: None, read_paused: false, need_disconnect: true, id: ID_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) }));
+
+ (reader, us)
+ }
+
+ /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on the provided socket generated by
+ /// accepting an incoming connection (by scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
+ ///
+ /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
+ /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
+ pub fn setup_inbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, stream: TcpStream) {
+ let (reader, us) = Self::new(event_notify, stream);
+
+ if let Ok(_) = peer_manager.new_inbound_connection(SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone())) {
+ Self::schedule_read(peer_manager, us, reader);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on the provided socket generated by
+ /// making an outbound connection which is expected to be accepted by a peer with the given
+ /// public key (by scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
+ ///
+ /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
+ /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
+ pub fn setup_outbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, their_node_id: PublicKey, stream: TcpStream) {
+ let (reader, us) = Self::new(event_notify, stream);
+
+ if let Ok(initial_send) = peer_manager.new_outbound_connection(their_node_id, SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone())) {
+ if SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone()).send_data(&initial_send, true) == initial_send.len() {
+ Self::schedule_read(peer_manager, us, reader);
+ } else {
+ println!("Failed to write first full message to socket!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on a new connection made to the given
+ /// socket address which is expected to be accepted by a peer with the given public key (by
+ /// scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
+ ///
+ /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
+ /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
+ pub fn connect_outbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, their_node_id: PublicKey, addr: SocketAddr) {
+ let connect_timeout = Delay::new(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10)).then(|_| {
+ future::err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut, "timeout reached"))
+ });
+ tokio::spawn(TcpStream::connect(&addr).select(connect_timeout)
+ .and_then(move |stream| {
+ Connection::setup_outbound(peer_manager, event_notify, their_node_id, stream.0);
+ future::ok(())
+ }).or_else(|_| {
+ //TODO: return errors somehow
+ future::ok(())
+ }));
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct SocketDescriptor {
+ conn: Arc<Mutex<Connection>>,
+ id: u64,
+ peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>,
+}
+impl SocketDescriptor {
+ fn new(conn: Arc<Mutex<Connection>>, peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>) -> Self {
+ let id = conn.lock().unwrap().id;
+ Self { conn, id, peer_manager }
+ }
+}
+impl peer_handler::SocketDescriptor for SocketDescriptor {
+ fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], resume_read: bool) -> usize {
+ macro_rules! schedule_read {
+ ($us_ref: expr) => {
+ tokio::spawn(future::lazy(move || -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut read_data = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut us = $us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
+ mem::swap(&mut read_data, &mut us.pending_read);
+ }
+ if !read_data.is_empty() {
+ let mut us_clone = $us_ref.clone();
+ match $us_ref.peer_manager.read_event(&mut us_clone, read_data) {
+ Ok(pause_read) => {
+ if pause_read { return Ok(()); }
+ },
+ Err(_) => {
+ //TODO: Not actually sure how to do this
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut us = $us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(sender) = us.read_blocker.take() {
+ sender.send(Ok(())).unwrap();
+ }
+ us.read_paused = false;
+ if let Err(e) = us.event_notify.try_send(()) {
+ // Ignore full errors as we just need them to poll after this point, so if the user
+ // hasn't received the last send yet, it doesn't matter.
+ assert!(e.is_full());
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut us = self.conn.lock().unwrap();
+ if resume_read {
+ let us_ref = self.clone();
+ schedule_read!(us_ref);
+ }
+ if data.is_empty() { return 0; }
+ if us.writer.is_none() {
+ us.read_paused = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ let mut bytes = bytes::BytesMut::with_capacity(data.len());
+ bytes.put(data);
+ let write_res = us.writer.as_mut().unwrap().start_send(bytes.freeze());
+ match write_res {
+ Ok(res) => {
+ match res {
+ AsyncSink::Ready => {
+ data.len()
+ },
+ AsyncSink::NotReady(_) => {
+ us.read_paused = true;
+ let us_ref = self.clone();
+ tokio::spawn(us.writer.take().unwrap().flush().then(move |writer_res| -> Result<(), ()> {
+ if let Ok(writer) = writer_res {
+ {
+ let mut us = us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
+ us.writer = Some(writer);
+ }
+ schedule_read!(us_ref);
+ } // we'll fire the disconnect event on the socket reader end
+ Ok(())
+ }));
+ 0
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ Err(_) => {
+ // We'll fire the disconnected event on the socket reader end
+ 0
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
+ let mut us = self.conn.lock().unwrap();
+ us.need_disconnect = true;
+ us.read_paused = true;
+ }
+}
+impl Eq for SocketDescriptor {}
+impl PartialEq for SocketDescriptor {
+ fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.id == o.id
+ }
+}
+impl Hash for SocketDescriptor {
+ fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
+ self.id.hash(state);
+ }
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning"
+version = "0.0.9"
+authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
+license = "Apache-2.0"
+repository = "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning/"
+description = """
+A Bitcoin Lightning library in Rust.
+Does most of the hard work, without implying a specific runtime, requiring clients implement basic network logic, chain interactions and disk storage.
+Still missing tons of error-handling. See GitHub issues for suggested projects if you want to contribute. Don't have to bother telling you not to use this for anything serious, because you'd have to build a client around it to even try.
+"""
+
+[features]
+# Supports tracking channels with a non-bitcoin chain hashes. Currently enables all kinds of fun DoS attacks.
+non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing = []
+fuzztarget = ["secp256k1/fuzztarget", "bitcoin/fuzztarget", "bitcoin_hashes/fuzztarget"]
+# Unlog messages superior at targeted level.
+max_level_off = []
+max_level_error = []
+max_level_warn = []
+max_level_info = []
+max_level_debug = []
+
+[dependencies]
+bitcoin = "0.20"
+bitcoin_hashes = "0.7"
+secp256k1 = "0.15"
+
+[dev-dependencies.bitcoin]
+version = "0.20"
+features = ["bitcoinconsensus"]
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+hex = "0.3"
+rand = "0.4"
+
+[profile.dev]
+opt-level = 1
--- /dev/null
+hfuzz_target
+target
+hfuzz_workspace
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning-fuzz"
+version = "0.0.1"
+authors = ["Automatically generated"]
+publish = false
+# Because the function is unused it gets dropped before we link lightning, so
+# we have to duplicate build.rs here. Note that this is only required for
+# fuzztarget mode.
+
+[package.metadata]
+cargo-fuzz = true
+
+[features]
+afl_fuzz = ["afl"]
+honggfuzz_fuzz = ["honggfuzz"]
+libfuzzer_fuzz = ["libfuzzer-sys"]
+
+[dependencies]
+afl = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
+lightning = { path = "..", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.20", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
+bitcoin_hashes = { version = "0.7", features = ["fuzztarget"] }
+hex = "0.3"
+honggfuzz = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
+secp256k1 = { version = "0.15", features=["fuzztarget"] }
+libfuzzer-sys = { git = "https://github.com/rust-fuzz/libfuzzer-sys.git", optional = true }
+
+[build-dependencies]
+cc = "1.0"
+
+# Prevent this from interfering with workspaces
+[workspace]
+members = ["."]
+
+[profile.release]
+lto = true
+codegen-units = 1
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "peer_crypt_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/peer_crypt_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "full_stack_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/full_stack_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "chanmon_fail_consistency"
+path = "fuzz_targets/chanmon_fail_consistency.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "router_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/router_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "chanmon_deser_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/chanmon_deser_target.rs"
+
+# message fuzz targets
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_ping_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_ping_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_pong_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_pong_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_error_message_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_error_message_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_update_add_htlc_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_add_htlc_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_accept_channel_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_accept_channel_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_closing_signed_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_closing_signed_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_commitment_signed_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_commitment_signed_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_funding_created_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_created_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_funding_locked_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_locked_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_funding_signed_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_funding_signed_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_open_channel_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_open_channel_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_revoke_and_ack_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_revoke_and_ack_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_shutdown_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_shutdown_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_update_fail_malformed_htlc_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fail_malformed_htlc_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_update_fee_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fee_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_update_fulfill_htlc_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fulfill_htlc_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_update_fail_htlc_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_update_fail_htlc_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_channel_reestablish_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_reestablish_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_announcement_signatures_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_announcement_signatures_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_channel_announcement_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_announcement_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_channel_update_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_channel_update_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_decoded_onion_error_packet_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_decoded_onion_error_packet_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_init_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_init_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_node_announcement_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_node_announcement_target.rs"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "msg_onion_hop_data_target"
+path = "fuzz_targets/msg_targets/msg_onion_hop_data_target.rs"
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate bitcoin;
+extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
+use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer};
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let logger = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ if let Ok((latest_block_hash, monitor)) = <(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(data), logger.clone()) {
+ let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
+ let deserialized_copy = <(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&w.0), logger.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert!(latest_block_hash == deserialized_copy.0);
+ assert!(monitor == deserialized_copy.1);
+ w.0.clear();
+ monitor.write_for_watchtower(&mut w).unwrap();
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
+//! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
+//! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
+//! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
+//! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
+//! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
+//! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
+//! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
+//! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
+//! channel being force-closed.
+
+//Uncomment this for libfuzzer builds:
+//#![no_main]
+
+extern crate bitcoin;
+extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+
+use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
+
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface;
+use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
+use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
+use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLCUpdate};
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
+use lightning::ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, HandleError, UpdateAddHTLC, LocalFeatures};
+use lightning::util::events;
+use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
+use lightning::util::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
+use std::mem;
+use std::cmp::Ordering;
+use std::collections::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
+use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
+use std::sync::atomic;
+use std::io::Cursor;
+
+struct FuzzEstimator {}
+impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ 253
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
+impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
+ fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
+}
+
+pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+static mut IN_RESTORE: bool = false;
+pub struct TestChannelMonitor {
+ pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
+ pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
+ pub latest_good_update: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, Vec<u8>>>,
+ pub latest_update_good: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
+ pub latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, bool>>,
+ pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
+}
+impl TestChannelMonitor {
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<chaininterface::FeeEstimator>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, feeest),
+ update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
+ latest_good_update: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ latest_update_good: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ latest_updates_good_at_last_ser: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool::new(false),
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ let ret = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ if let Ok(()) = ret {
+ let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.write_for_disk(&mut ser).unwrap();
+ self.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, ser.0);
+ match self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().entry(funding_txo) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(mut e) => { e.insert(true); },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ if !e.get() && unsafe { IN_RESTORE } {
+ // Technically we can't consider an update to be "good" unless we're doing
+ // it in response to a test_restore_channel_monitor as the channel may
+ // still be waiting on such a call, so only set us to good if we're in the
+ // middle of a restore call.
+ e.insert(true);
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ } else {
+ self.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, false);
+ }
+ assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
+ ret
+ }
+
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ return self.simple_monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated();
+ }
+}
+
+struct KeyProvider {
+ node_id: u8,
+ session_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
+ channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8,
+}
+impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_id]).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_id]).unwrap();
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_id]).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
+ ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_id]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_id],
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ let id = self.session_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 10, self.node_id]).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let id = self.channel_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, id, 11, self.node_id]
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator{});
+ let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
+
+ macro_rules! make_node {
+ ($node_id: expr) => { {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
+ let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
+
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
+ (ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap(),
+ monitor)
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! reload_node {
+ ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr) => { {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string()));
+ let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
+
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, session_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), channel_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
+
+ let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
+ let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap();
+ for (outpoint, monitor_ser) in old_monitors.drain() {
+ monitors.insert(outpoint, <(Sha256d, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), Arc::clone(&logger)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
+ monitor.latest_good_update.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, monitor_ser);
+ }
+ let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
+ for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter() {
+ monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
+ }
+
+ let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: fee_est.clone(),
+ monitor: monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: watch,
+ tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
+ logger,
+ default_config: config,
+ channel_monitors: &monitor_refs,
+ };
+
+ let res = (<(Sha256d, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, monitor);
+ for (_, was_good) in $old_monitors.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ if !was_good {
+ // If the last time we updated a monitor we didn't successfully update (and we
+ // have sense updated our serialized copy of the ChannelManager) we may
+ // force-close the channel on our counterparty cause we know we're missing
+ // something. Thus, we just return here since we can't continue to test.
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ } }
+ }
+
+
+ let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
+ macro_rules! make_channel {
+ ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
+ $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 10000000, 42, 0).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = {
+ let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
+ msg.clone()
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ };
+
+ $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel).unwrap();
+ let accept_channel = {
+ let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
+ msg.clone()
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ };
+
+ $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel).unwrap();
+ {
+ let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
+ $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ channel_txn.push(tx);
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ }
+
+ let funding_created = {
+ let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
+ msg.clone()
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ };
+ $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created).unwrap();
+
+ let funding_signed = {
+ let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
+ msg.clone()
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ };
+ $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
+
+ {
+ let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { .. } = events[0] {
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! confirm_txn {
+ ($node: expr) => { {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
+ let mut posn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
+ for i in 0..channel_txn.len() {
+ txn.push(&channel_txn[i]);
+ posn.push(i as u32 + 1);
+ }
+ $node.block_connected(&header, 1, &txn, &posn);
+ for i in 2..100 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ $node.block_connected(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! lock_fundings {
+ ($nodes: expr) => { {
+ let mut node_events = Vec::new();
+ for node in $nodes.iter() {
+ node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
+ }
+ for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
+ for event in node_event {
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
+ for node in $nodes.iter() {
+ if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
+ node.handle_funding_locked(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for node in $nodes.iter() {
+ let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ for event in events {
+ if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
+ } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
+ }
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
+ // forwarding.
+ let (mut node_a, mut monitor_a) = make_node!(0);
+ let (mut node_b, mut monitor_b) = make_node!(1);
+ let (mut node_c, mut monitor_c) = make_node!(2);
+
+ let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
+
+ make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 0);
+ make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1);
+
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ confirm_txn!(node);
+ }
+
+ lock_fundings!(nodes);
+
+ let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
+ let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
+
+ let mut payment_id = 0;
+
+ let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
+ let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
+ let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
+ let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
+
+ macro_rules! test_err {
+ ($res: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(()) => {},
+ Err(HandleError { action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError), .. }) => { },
+ _ => { $res.unwrap() },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! test_return {
+ () => { {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
+ return;
+ } }
+ }
+
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ macro_rules! get_slice {
+ ($len: expr) => {
+ {
+ let slice_len = $len as usize;
+ if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
+ test_return!();
+ }
+ read_pos += slice_len;
+ &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ loop {
+ macro_rules! send_payment {
+ ($source: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
+ let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
+ payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
+ if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
+ hops: vec![RouteHop {
+ pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: $dest.1,
+ fee_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
+ }],
+ }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
+ // Probably ran out of funds
+ test_return!();
+ }
+ } };
+ ($source: expr, $middle: expr, $dest: expr) => { {
+ let payment_hash = Sha256::hash(&[payment_id; 1]);
+ payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
+ if let Err(_) = $source.send_payment(Route {
+ hops: vec![RouteHop {
+ pubkey: $middle.0.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: $middle.1,
+ fee_msat: 50000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
+ },RouteHop {
+ pubkey: $dest.0.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: $dest.1,
+ fee_msat: 5000000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
+ }],
+ }, PaymentHash(payment_hash.into_inner())) {
+ // Probably ran out of funds
+ test_return!();
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! process_msg_events {
+ ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr) => { {
+ let events = if $node == 1 {
+ let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
+ new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
+ bc_events.clear();
+ new_events
+ } else { Vec::new() };
+ for event in events.iter().chain(nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter()) {
+ match event {
+ events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ for dest in nodes.iter() {
+ if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ for update_add in update_add_htlcs {
+ if !$corrupt_forward {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_add));
+ } else {
+ // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
+ // check will fail and we generate a
+ // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
+ // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
+ let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
+ msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
+ let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
+ test_err!(dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg));
+ }
+ }
+ for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill));
+ }
+ for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail));
+ }
+ for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_malformed));
+ }
+ test_err!(dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed));
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ for dest in nodes.iter() {
+ if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ for dest in nodes.iter() {
+ if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
+ test_err!(dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg));
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {
+ // Can be generated as a reestablish response
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {
+ // Can be generated due to a payment forward being rejected due to a
+ // channel having previously failed a monitor update
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ }
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
+ ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
+ if $counterparty_id == 0 {
+ for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ match event {
+ events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ }
+ }
+ ba_events.clear();
+ } else {
+ for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ match event {
+ events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ }
+ }
+ bc_events.clear();
+ }
+ let mut events = nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ let drop_node_id = if $counterparty_id == 0 { nodes[0].get_our_node_id() } else { nodes[2].get_our_node_id() };
+ let msg_sink = if $counterparty_id == 0 { &mut bc_events } else { &mut ba_events };
+ for event in events.drain(..) {
+ let push = match event {
+ events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
+ if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
+ if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
+ if *node_id != drop_node_id { true } else { false }
+ },
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => false,
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => false,
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ };
+ if push { msg_sink.push(event); }
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! process_events {
+ ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
+ // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
+ // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
+ // deduplicate the calls here.
+ let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
+ let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
+ // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
+ // PaymentReceived, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
+ // PaymentReceived event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
+ // our claim_set deduplication).
+ events.sort_by(|a, b| {
+ if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = a {
+ if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
+ Ordering::Less
+ } else { Ordering::Equal }
+ } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
+ if let events::Event::PaymentReceived { .. } = b {
+ Ordering::Greater
+ } else { Ordering::Equal }
+ } else { Ordering::Equal }
+ });
+ for event in events.drain(..) {
+ match event {
+ events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
+ if $fail {
+ assert!(nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ assert!(nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0)));
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
+ events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
+ nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled event"),
+ }
+ }
+ } }
+ }
+
+ match get_slice!(1)[0] {
+ 0x00 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
+ 0x01 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
+ 0x02 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure),
+ 0x03 => *monitor_a.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
+ 0x04 => *monitor_b.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
+ 0x05 => *monitor_c.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()),
+ 0x06 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[0].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
+ 0x07 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[1].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
+ 0x08 => { unsafe { IN_RESTORE = true }; nodes[2].test_restore_channel_monitor(); unsafe { IN_RESTORE = false }; },
+ 0x09 => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a)),
+ 0x0a => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
+ 0x0b => send_payment!(nodes[1], (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
+ 0x0c => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b)),
+ 0x0d => send_payment!(nodes[0], (&nodes[1], chan_a), (&nodes[2], chan_b)),
+ 0x0e => send_payment!(nodes[2], (&nodes[1], chan_b), (&nodes[0], chan_a)),
+ 0x0f => {
+ if !chan_a_disconnected {
+ nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_a_disconnected = true;
+ drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
+ }
+ },
+ 0x10 => {
+ if !chan_b_disconnected {
+ nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_b_disconnected = true;
+ drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
+ }
+ },
+ 0x11 => {
+ if chan_a_disconnected {
+ nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
+ chan_a_disconnected = false;
+ }
+ },
+ 0x12 => {
+ if chan_b_disconnected {
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
+ chan_b_disconnected = false;
+ }
+ },
+ 0x13 => process_msg_events!(0, true),
+ 0x14 => process_msg_events!(0, false),
+ 0x15 => process_events!(0, true),
+ 0x16 => process_events!(0, false),
+ 0x17 => process_msg_events!(1, true),
+ 0x18 => process_msg_events!(1, false),
+ 0x19 => process_events!(1, true),
+ 0x1a => process_events!(1, false),
+ 0x1b => process_msg_events!(2, true),
+ 0x1c => process_msg_events!(2, false),
+ 0x1d => process_events!(2, true),
+ 0x1e => process_events!(2, false),
+ 0x1f => {
+ if !chan_a_disconnected {
+ nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_a_disconnected = true;
+ drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
+ }
+ let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a);
+ node_a = Arc::new(new_node_a);
+ nodes[0] = node_a.clone();
+ monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
+ },
+ 0x20 => {
+ if !chan_a_disconnected {
+ nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_a_disconnected = true;
+ nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ ba_events.clear();
+ }
+ if !chan_b_disconnected {
+ nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_b_disconnected = true;
+ nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ bc_events.clear();
+ }
+ let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b);
+ node_b = Arc::new(new_node_b);
+ nodes[1] = node_b.clone();
+ monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
+ },
+ 0x21 => {
+ if !chan_b_disconnected {
+ nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), false);
+ chan_b_disconnected = true;
+ drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
+ }
+ let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c);
+ node_c = Arc::new(new_node_c);
+ nodes[2] = node_c.clone();
+ monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
+ },
+ _ => test_return!(),
+ }
+
+ if monitor_a.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
+ node_a_ser.0.clear();
+ nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
+ monitor_a.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ *monitor_a.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_a.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ }
+ if monitor_b.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
+ node_b_ser.0.clear();
+ nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
+ monitor_b.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ *monitor_b.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_b.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ }
+ if monitor_c.should_update_manager.load(atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) {
+ node_c_ser.0.clear();
+ nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
+ monitor_c.should_update_manager.store(false, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+ *monitor_c.latest_updates_good_at_last_ser.lock().unwrap() = monitor_c.latest_update_good.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+ do_test(data);
+});
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
+//! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
+//! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
+//! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
+//! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
+
+//Uncomment this for libfuzzer builds:
+//#![no_main]
+
+extern crate bitcoin;
+extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
+use bitcoin_hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
+use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor};
+use lightning::ln::router::Router;
+use lightning::util::events::{EventsProvider,Event};
+use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
+
+mod utils;
+
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
+use std::cell::RefCell;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+use std::cmp;
+use std::hash::Hash;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
+ ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+ ((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+ ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
+ let mut v = [0; 8];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+
+struct InputData {
+ data: Vec<u8>,
+ read_pos: AtomicUsize,
+}
+impl InputData {
+ fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
+ let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
+ return None;
+ }
+ Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
+ }
+}
+
+struct FuzzEstimator {
+ input: Arc<InputData>,
+}
+impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ //TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
+ match self.input.get_slice(2) {
+ Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u64, 253),
+ None => 0
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct TestBroadcaster {}
+impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
+ fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) {}
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct Peer<'a> {
+ id: u8,
+ peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
+}
+impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
+ fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
+ data.len()
+ }
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
+ assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
+ self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
+ }
+}
+impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.id == other.id
+ }
+}
+impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
+impl<'a> Hash for Peer<'a> {
+ fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
+ self.id.hash(h)
+ }
+}
+
+struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
+ manager: Arc<ChannelManager>,
+ monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
+ handler: PeerManager<Peer<'a>>,
+
+ peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
+ funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+ txids_confirmed: HashMap<Sha256dHash, usize>,
+ header_hashes: Vec<Sha256dHash>,
+ height: usize,
+ max_height: usize,
+ blocks_connected: u32,
+}
+impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
+ pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>, manager: Arc<ChannelManager>, monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>, handler: PeerManager<Peer<'a>>) -> Self {
+ MoneyLossDetector {
+ manager,
+ monitor,
+ handler,
+
+ peers,
+ funding_txn: Vec::new(),
+ txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
+ header_hashes: vec![Default::default()],
+ height: 0,
+ max_height: 0,
+ blocks_connected: 0,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
+ let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
+ let mut txn_idxs = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
+ for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
+ let txid = tx.txid();
+ match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(self.height);
+ txn.push(tx);
+ txn_idxs.push(idx as u32 + 1);
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ self.height += 1;
+ self.blocks_connected += 1;
+ self.manager.block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
+ (*self.monitor).block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
+ if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
+ self.header_hashes[self.height] = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
+ self.header_hashes.push(header.bitcoin_hash());
+ }
+ self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
+ }
+
+ fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
+ if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
+ self.height -= 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
+ self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
+ let removal_height = self.height;
+ self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
+ removal_height != *height
+ });
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ if !::std::thread::panicking() {
+ // Disconnect all peers
+ for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
+ if *peer {
+ self.handler.disconnect_event(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
+ self.manager.force_close_all_channels();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct KeyProvider {
+ node_secret: SecretKey,
+ counter: AtomicU64,
+}
+impl KeysInterface for KeyProvider {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.node_secret.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = <Hash160 as bitcoin_hashes::Hash>::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
+ let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
+ if inbound {
+ ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
+ }
+ } else {
+ ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, ctr]).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ (ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<Logger>) {
+ let input = Arc::new(InputData {
+ data: data.to_vec(),
+ read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ });
+ let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
+ input: input.clone(),
+ });
+
+ macro_rules! get_slice {
+ ($len: expr) => {
+ match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
+ Some(slice) => slice,
+ None => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! get_pubkey {
+ () => {
+ match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+
+ let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
+ let monitor = channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone());
+
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
+ let channelmanager = ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
+ let router = Arc::new(Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), watch.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)));
+
+ let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
+ let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
+ chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
+ route_handler: router.clone(),
+ }, our_network_key, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger)));
+
+ let mut should_forward = false;
+ let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
+ let mut payments_sent = 0;
+ let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
+ let mut pending_funding_relay = Vec::new();
+
+ loop {
+ match get_slice!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ let mut new_id = 0;
+ for i in 1..256 {
+ if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
+ new_id = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if new_id == 0 { return; }
+ loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
+ peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let mut new_id = 0;
+ for i in 1..256 {
+ if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
+ new_id = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if new_id == 0 { return; }
+ loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}).unwrap();
+ peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
+ if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
+ loss_detector.handler.disconnect_event(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
+ peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
+ if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
+ match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0]).to_vec()) {
+ Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
+ Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
+ }
+ },
+ 4 => {
+ let value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
+ let route = match router.get_route(&get_pubkey!(), None, &Vec::new(), value, 42) {
+ Ok(route) => route,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+ payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
+ payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ payments_sent += 1;
+ match channelmanager.send_payment(route, payment_hash) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ },
+ 5 => {
+ let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
+ if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
+ let their_key = get_pubkey!();
+ let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
+ let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
+ if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0).is_err() { return; }
+ },
+ 6 => {
+ let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
+ let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
+ if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
+ channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
+ if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).is_err() { return; }
+ },
+ 7 => {
+ if should_forward {
+ channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ should_forward = false;
+ }
+ },
+ 8 => {
+ for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
+ // SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
+ // for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
+ // fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
+ // place that anywhere in our preimage.
+ if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
+ channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
+ } else {
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
+ channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ 9 => {
+ for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
+ channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
+ }
+ },
+ 10 => {
+ 'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
+ let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: funding_generation.1, script_pubkey: funding_generation.2,
+ }] };
+ let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
+ let funding_txid = tx.txid();
+ if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
+ let outpoint = OutPoint::new(funding_txid, 0);
+ for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
+ if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
+ tx.version += 1;
+ continue 'search_loop;
+ }
+ }
+ break outpoint;
+ }
+ tx.version += 1;
+ if tx.version > 0xff {
+ continue 'outer_loop;
+ }
+ };
+ channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, funding_output.clone());
+ pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
+ }
+ },
+ 11 => {
+ if !pending_funding_relay.is_empty() {
+ loss_detector.connect_block(&pending_funding_relay[..]);
+ for _ in 2..100 {
+ loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
+ }
+ }
+ for tx in pending_funding_relay.drain(..) {
+ loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
+ }
+ },
+ 12 => {
+ let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
+ if txlen == 0 {
+ loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
+ } else {
+ let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
+ if let Ok(tx) = txres {
+ loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ 13 => {
+ loss_detector.disconnect_block();
+ },
+ 14 => {
+ let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
+ let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
+ if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
+ channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
+ channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => return,
+ }
+ loss_detector.handler.process_events();
+ for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
+ match event {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
+ pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
+ },
+ Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { funding_txo, .. } => {
+ pending_funding_relay.push(pending_funding_signatures.remove(&funding_txo).unwrap());
+ },
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ payments_received.push(payment_hash);
+ },
+ Event::PaymentSent {..} => {},
+ Event::PaymentFailed {..} => {},
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
+ should_forward = true;
+ },
+ Event::SpendableOutputs {..} => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ do_test(data, &logger);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ do_test(data, &logger);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ do_test(data, &logger);
+});
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use utils::test_logger;
+ use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+ use std::collections::HashMap;
+ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap(), &logger);
+ }
+
+ struct TrackingLogger {
+ /// (module, message) -> count
+ pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
+ }
+ impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
+ fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
+ *self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
+ println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
+ // To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
+ // changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
+ // step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
+ // so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
+ // If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
+
+ // What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
+ // one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
+
+ // Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
+ // 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
+ // of the Lightning message
+ // I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
+ // Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
+
+ // 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
+ // 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
+ // 01 - announce_channels_publicly
+ //
+ // 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
+ // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - peer's pubkey
+ // 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
+ // 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 6
+ // 030016 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 22
+ // 0010 00000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message with no features (type 16) and mac
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
+ // 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
+ // 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000222 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
+ // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
+ // 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
+ //
+ // 00fd00fd00fd - Three feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ // - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
+ // 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
+ // 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 5c000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
+ // - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
+ //
+ // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
+ // 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 3: SendFundingLocked to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
+ // 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
+ // 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
+ //
+ // 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
+ // 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
+ // 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
+ // 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
+ // 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0006 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 6
+ // 030116 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 22
+ // 0010 00000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message with no features (type 16)
+ //
+ // 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
+ // 00fd00fd00fd - Three feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
+ // 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
+ // 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e02 000000000000001a 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 03000000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
+ // 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
+ // 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
+ //
+ // 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
+ // 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
+ // 0023 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
+ //
+ // 0b - broadcast funding transaction
+ // - by now client should have sent a funding_locked (CHECK 4: SendFundingLocked to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
+ // 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
+ // 0024 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_locked and mac
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
+ //
+ // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
+ // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 4d000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
+ // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
+ // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
+ //
+ // - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
+ // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 f1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
+ // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
+ // 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
+ // 0082 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
+ // - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
+ // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fd000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
+ // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e000001000000000000000003e8000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
+ //
+ // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
+ // - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
+ // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
+ // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 be000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
+ // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
+ // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
+ // - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
+ // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fc000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
+ // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
+ // 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
+ // 0083 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
+ // 0084 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 fb000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ //
+ // 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
+ // 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
+ // 0085 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
+ // - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
+ // - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
+ // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
+ // 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
+ // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 4f000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000121 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 0000000e0000010000000000000003e800000000010000000000000000000000000a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ // 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
+ // ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ef00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
+ //
+ // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
+ // 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
+ // 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 07000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 0001 c8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007f00000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
+ // - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
+ //
+ // 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
+ // 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
+ // 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
+ // 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 030600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
+ //
+ // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
+ // - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
+ //
+ // 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
+ // 0200000001390000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008002000100000000000022002090000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cc10000000000001600145c0000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+ // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ // 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
+ // 0200000001fd00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014f00000000000000220020f60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ // 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
+ //
+ // 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
+ // - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
+
+ let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0300ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0300ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0300ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0300c1ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffef000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000000fd03001200a4030000000000000000000000000000000300b400843d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000070000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010001c8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007f000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003001200630300000000000000000000000000000003007300853d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003060000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000070c007d0200000001390000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008002000100000000000022002090000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cc10000000000001600145c000000000000000000000000000000000000000500002000fd00fd0c005e0200000001fd00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014f00000000000000220020f600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c00000c00000c00000c00000c000007").unwrap(), &(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<Logger>));
+
+ let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending remote commitment tx (00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fd:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000044 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+
+GEN_TEST() {
+ tn=$(echo $1 | sed 's/\([a-z0-9]\)\([A-Z]\)/\1_\2/g')
+ fn=msg_$(echo $tn | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')_target.rs
+ cat msg_target_template.txt | sed s/MSG_TARGET/$1/ | sed "s/TEST_MSG/$2/" | sed "s/EXTRA_ARGS/$3/" > $fn
+}
+
+GEN_TEST AcceptChannel test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST AnnouncementSignatures test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST ChannelReestablish test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST ClosingSigned test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST CommitmentSigned test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST DecodedOnionErrorPacket test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST FundingCreated test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST FundingLocked test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST FundingSigned test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST Init test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST OpenChannel test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST RevokeAndACK test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST Shutdown test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST UpdateFailHTLC test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST UpdateFailMalformedHTLC test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST UpdateFee test_msg ""
+GEN_TEST UpdateFulfillHTLC test_msg ""
+
+GEN_TEST ChannelAnnouncement test_msg_exact ""
+GEN_TEST ChannelUpdate test_msg_exact ""
+GEN_TEST NodeAnnouncement test_msg_exact ""
+
+GEN_TEST UpdateAddHTLC test_msg_hole ", 85, 33"
+GEN_TEST ErrorMessage test_msg_hole ", 32, 2"
+GEN_TEST OnionHopData test_msg_hole ", 1+8+8+4, 12"
+
+GEN_TEST Ping test_msg_simple ""
+GEN_TEST Pong test_msg_simple ""
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::AcceptChannel, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_exact!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::ChannelReestablish, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_exact!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::ClosingSigned, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::CommitmentSigned, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_hole!(msgs::ErrorMessage, data, 32, 2);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::FundingCreated, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::FundingLocked, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::FundingSigned, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::Init, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_exact!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_hole!(msgs::OnionHopData, data, 1+8+8+4, 12);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::OpenChannel, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_simple!(msgs::Ping, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_simple!(msgs::Pong, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::RevokeAndACK, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::Shutdown, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ TEST_MSG!(msgs::MSG_TARGET, dataEXTRA_ARGS);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg_hole!(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, data, 85, 33);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFee, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+extern crate lightning;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+
+mod utils;
+use utils::VecWriter;
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ test_msg!(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, data);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#![macro_use]
+
+use lightning::util::ser::Writer;
+pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ assert!(self.0.capacity() >= self.0.len() + buf.len());
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! test_msg {
+ ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
+ {
+ use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+ let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
+ if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
+ let p = r.position() as usize;
+ let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+
+ assert_eq!(w.0.len(), p);
+ assert_eq!(&r.into_inner()[..p], &w.0[..p]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! test_msg_simple {
+ ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
+ {
+ use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+ let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
+ if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
+ let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! test_msg_exact {
+ ($MsgType: path, $data: ident) => {
+ {
+ use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+ let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
+ if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
+ let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+
+ assert_eq!(&r.into_inner()[..], &w.0[..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! test_msg_hole {
+ ($MsgType: path, $data: ident, $hole: expr, $hole_len: expr) => {
+ {
+ use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+ let mut r = ::std::io::Cursor::new($data);
+ if let Ok(msg) = <$MsgType as Readable<::std::io::Cursor<&[u8]>>>::read(&mut r) {
+ let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ msg.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+ let p = w.0.len() as usize;
+
+ assert_eq!(w.0.len(), p);
+ assert_eq!(&r.get_ref()[..$hole], &w.0[..$hole]);
+ assert_eq!(&r.get_ref()[$hole+$hole_len..p], &w.0[$hole+$hole_len..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+
+use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+
+#[inline]
+fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
+ ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ macro_rules! get_slice {
+ ($len: expr) => {
+ {
+ let slice_len = $len as usize;
+ if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
+ return;
+ }
+ read_pos += slice_len;
+ &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ let ephemeral_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+
+ let mut crypter = if get_slice!(1)[0] != 0 {
+ let their_pubkey = match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_pubkey, ephemeral_key);
+ crypter.get_act_one();
+ match crypter.process_act_two(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ assert!(crypter.is_ready_for_encryption());
+ crypter
+ } else {
+ let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_network_key);
+ match crypter.process_act_one_with_keys(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key, ephemeral_key) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ match crypter.process_act_three(get_slice!(66)) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ assert!(crypter.is_ready_for_encryption());
+ crypter
+ };
+ loop {
+ if get_slice!(1)[0] == 0 {
+ crypter.encrypt_message(get_slice!(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2))));
+ } else {
+ let len = match crypter.decrypt_length_header(get_slice!(16+2)) {
+ Ok(len) => len,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ match crypter.decrypt_message(get_slice!(len as usize + 16)) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("01").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+extern crate bitcoin;
+extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{ChainError,ChainWatchInterface, ChainListener};
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
+use lightning::ln::msgs;
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler};
+use lightning::ln::router::{Router, RouteHint};
+use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use lightning::util::ser::Readable;
+
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+
+mod utils;
+
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+use std::sync::{Weak, Arc};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
+ ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+ ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
+ ((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
+ ((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
+ ((v[2] as u64) << 8*5) |
+ ((v[3] as u64) << 8*4) |
+ ((v[4] as u64) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[5] as u64) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[6] as u64) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[7] as u64) << 8*0)
+}
+
+
+struct InputData {
+ data: Vec<u8>,
+ read_pos: AtomicUsize,
+}
+impl InputData {
+ fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
+ let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
+ return None;
+ }
+ Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
+ }
+ fn get_slice_nonadvancing(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
+ let old_pos = self.read_pos.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
+ return None;
+ }
+ Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
+ }
+}
+
+struct DummyChainWatcher {
+ input: Arc<InputData>,
+}
+
+impl ChainWatchInterface for DummyChainWatcher {
+ fn install_watch_tx(&self, _txid: &Sha256dHash, _script_pub_key: &Script) { }
+ fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, _outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), _out_script: &Script) { }
+ fn watch_all_txn(&self) { }
+ fn register_listener(&self, _listener: Weak<ChainListener>) { }
+
+ fn get_chain_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
+ match self.input.get_slice(2) {
+ Some(&[0, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotSupported),
+ Some(&[1, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotWatched),
+ Some(&[2, _]) => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
+ Some(&[_, x]) => Ok((Builder::new().push_int(x as i64).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh(), 0)),
+ None => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let input = Arc::new(InputData {
+ data: data.to_vec(),
+ read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ });
+ macro_rules! get_slice_nonadvancing {
+ ($len: expr) => {
+ match input.get_slice_nonadvancing($len as usize) {
+ Some(slice) => slice,
+ None => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! get_slice {
+ ($len: expr) => {
+ match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
+ Some(slice) => slice,
+ None => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! decode_msg {
+ ($MsgType: path, $len: expr) => {{
+ let mut reader = ::std::io::Cursor::new(get_slice!($len));
+ match <($MsgType)>::read(&mut reader) {
+ Ok(msg) => msg,
+ Err(e) => match e {
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => panic!("We picked the length..."),
+ msgs::DecodeError::Io(e) => panic!(format!("{}", e)),
+ }
+ }
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! decode_msg_with_len16 {
+ ($MsgType: path, $begin_len: expr, $excess: expr) => {
+ {
+ let extra_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!($begin_len as usize + 2)[$begin_len..$begin_len + 2]);
+ decode_msg!($MsgType, $begin_len as usize + 2 + (extra_len as usize) + $excess)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! get_pubkey {
+ () => {
+ match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned()));
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(DummyChainWatcher {
+ input: Arc::clone(&input),
+ });
+
+ let our_pubkey = get_pubkey!();
+ let router = Router::new(our_pubkey.clone(), chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+
+ loop {
+ match get_slice!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ let start_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!(64 + 2)[64..64 + 2]) as usize;
+ let addr_len = slice_to_be16(&get_slice_nonadvancing!(64+start_len+2 + 74)[64+start_len+2 + 72..64+start_len+2 + 74]);
+ if addr_len > (37+1)*4 {
+ return;
+ }
+ let _ = router.handle_node_announcement(&decode_msg_with_len16!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement, 64, 288));
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let _ = router.handle_channel_announcement(&decode_msg_with_len16!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, 64*4, 32+8+33*4));
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let _ = router.handle_channel_update(&decode_msg!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, 128));
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ match get_slice!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {msg: decode_msg!(msgs::ChannelUpdate, 128)});
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let short_channel_id = slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8));
+ router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {short_channel_id, is_permanent: false});
+ },
+ _ => return,
+ }
+ },
+ 4 => {
+ let target = get_pubkey!();
+ let mut first_hops_vec = Vec::new();
+ let first_hops = match get_slice!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ let count = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
+ for _ in 0..count {
+ first_hops_vec.push(ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ short_channel_id: Some(slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8))),
+ remote_network_id: get_pubkey!(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
+ user_id: 0,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ is_live: true,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ });
+ }
+ Some(&first_hops_vec[..])
+ },
+ _ => return,
+ };
+ let mut last_hops_vec = Vec::new();
+ let last_hops = {
+ let count = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
+ for _ in 0..count {
+ last_hops_vec.push(RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: get_pubkey!(),
+ short_channel_id: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
+ fee_base_msat: slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2)),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
+ });
+ }
+ &last_hops_vec[..]
+ };
+ let _ = router.get_route(&target, first_hops, last_hops, slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)), slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4)));
+ },
+ _ => return,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ do_test(data);
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+extern crate hex;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ #[test]
+ fn duplicate_crash() {
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+pub(crate) mod test_logger;
--- /dev/null
+use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+pub struct TestLogger {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ id: String,
+}
+
+impl TestLogger {
+ pub fn new(_id: String) -> TestLogger {
+ TestLogger {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ id: _id
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Logger for TestLogger {
+ fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ println!("{:<5} {} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), self.id, record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ let _ = format!("{}", record.args);
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/bash
+set -e
+
+pushd fuzz_targets/msg_targets
+rm *_target.rs
+./gen_target.sh
+[ "$(git diff)" != "" ] && exit 1
+popd
+
+cargo install --force honggfuzz
+for TARGET in fuzz_targets/*.rs fuzz_targets/msg_targets/*_target.rs; do
+ FILENAME=$(basename $TARGET)
+ FILE="${FILENAME%.*}"
+ HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="--exit_upon_crash -v -n2"
+ if [ "$FILE" = "chanmon_fail_consistency" ]; then
+ HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="$HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS -F 64 -N100000"
+ else
+ HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS="$HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS -N1000000"
+ fi
+ export HFUZZ_RUN_ARGS
+ HFUZZ_BUILD_ARGS="--features honggfuzz_fuzz" cargo hfuzz run $FILE
+ if [ -f hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/HONGGFUZZ.REPORT.TXT ]; then
+ cat hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/HONGGFUZZ.REPORT.TXT
+ for CASE in hfuzz_workspace/$FILE/SIG*; do
+ cat $CASE | xxd -p
+ done
+ exit 1
+ fi
+done
--- /dev/null
+//! Traits and utility impls which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the
+//! blockchain.
+//!
+//! Includes traits for monitoring and receiving notifications of new blocks and block
+//! disconnections, transaction broadcasting, and feerate information requests.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+use util::logger::Logger;
+
+use std::sync::{Mutex,Weak,MutexGuard,Arc};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+/// Used to give chain error details upstream
+pub enum ChainError {
+ /// Client doesn't support UTXO lookup (but the chain hash matches our genesis block hash)
+ NotSupported,
+ /// Chain isn't the one watched
+ NotWatched,
+ /// Tx doesn't exist or is unconfirmed
+ UnknownTx,
+}
+
+/// An interface to request notification of certain scripts as they appear the
+/// chain.
+///
+/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
+/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
+/// events).
+pub trait ChainWatchInterface: Sync + Send {
+ /// Provides a txid/random-scriptPubKey-in-the-tx which much be watched for.
+ fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script);
+
+ /// Provides an outpoint which must be watched for, providing any transactions which spend the
+ /// given outpoint.
+ fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), out_script: &Script);
+
+ /// Indicates that a listener needs to see all transactions.
+ fn watch_all_txn(&self);
+
+ /// Register the given listener to receive events. Only a weak pointer is provided and the
+ /// registration should be freed once that pointer expires.
+ fn register_listener(&self, listener: Weak<ChainListener>);
+ //TODO: unregister
+
+ /// Gets the script and value in satoshis for a given unspent transaction output given a
+ /// short_channel_id (aka unspent_tx_output_identier). For BTC/tBTC channels the top three
+ /// bytes are the block height, the next 3 the transaction index within the block, and the
+ /// final two the output within the transaction.
+ fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError>;
+}
+
+/// An interface to send a transaction to the Bitcoin network.
+pub trait BroadcasterInterface: Sync + Send {
+ /// Sends a transaction out to (hopefully) be mined.
+ fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction);
+}
+
+/// A trait indicating a desire to listen for events from the chain
+pub trait ChainListener: Sync + Send {
+ /// Notifies a listener that a block was connected.
+ /// Note that if a new transaction/outpoint is watched during a block_connected call, the block
+ /// *must* be re-scanned with the new transaction/outpoints and block_connected should be
+ /// called again with the same header and (at least) the new transactions.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if non-new transaction/outpoints may be registered during a call, a second call
+ /// *must not* happen.
+ ///
+ /// This also means those counting confirmations using block_connected callbacks should watch
+ /// for duplicate headers and not count them towards confirmations!
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]);
+ /// Notifies a listener that a block was disconnected.
+ /// Unlike block_connected, this *must* never be called twice for the same disconnect event.
+ /// Height must be the one of the block which was disconnected (not new height of the best chain)
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32);
+}
+
+/// An enum that represents the speed at which we want a transaction to confirm used for feerate
+/// estimation.
+pub enum ConfirmationTarget {
+ /// We are happy with this transaction confirming slowly when feerate drops some.
+ Background,
+ /// We'd like this transaction to confirm without major delay, but 12-18 blocks is fine.
+ Normal,
+ /// We'd like this transaction to confirm in the next few blocks.
+ HighPriority,
+}
+
+/// A trait which should be implemented to provide feerate information on a number of time
+/// horizons.
+///
+/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
+/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
+/// events).
+pub trait FeeEstimator: Sync + Send {
+ /// Gets estimated satoshis of fee required per 1000 Weight-Units.
+ ///
+ /// Must be no smaller than 253 (ie 1 satoshi-per-byte rounded up to ensure later round-downs
+ /// don't put us below 1 satoshi-per-byte).
+ ///
+ /// This translates to:
+ /// * satoshis-per-byte * 250
+ /// * ceil(satoshis-per-kbyte / 4)
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64;
+}
+
+/// Utility for tracking registered txn/outpoints and checking for matches
+pub struct ChainWatchedUtil {
+ watch_all: bool,
+
+ // We are more conservative in matching during testing to ensure everything matches *exactly*,
+ // even though during normal runtime we take more optimized match approaches...
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ watched_txn: HashSet<(Sha256dHash, Script)>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ watched_txn: HashSet<Script>,
+
+ watched_outpoints: HashSet<(Sha256dHash, u32)>,
+}
+
+impl ChainWatchedUtil {
+ /// Constructs an empty (watches nothing) ChainWatchedUtil
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ Self {
+ watch_all: false,
+ watched_txn: HashSet::new(),
+ watched_outpoints: HashSet::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Registers a tx for monitoring, returning true if it was a new tx and false if we'd already
+ /// been watching for it.
+ pub fn register_tx(&mut self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
+ if self.watch_all { return false; }
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ {
+ self.watched_txn.insert((txid.clone(), script_pub_key.clone()))
+ }
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ {
+ let _tx_unused = txid; // It's used in cfg(test), though
+ self.watched_txn.insert(script_pub_key.clone())
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Registers an outpoint for monitoring, returning true if it was a new outpoint and false if
+ /// we'd already been watching for it
+ pub fn register_outpoint(&mut self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), _script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
+ if self.watch_all { return false; }
+ self.watched_outpoints.insert(outpoint)
+ }
+
+ /// Sets us to match all transactions, returning true if this is a new setting and false if
+ /// we'd already been set to match everything.
+ pub fn watch_all(&mut self) -> bool {
+ if self.watch_all { return false; }
+ self.watch_all = true;
+ true
+ }
+
+ /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
+ pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
+ if self.watch_all {
+ return true;
+ }
+ for out in tx.output.iter() {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ for &(ref txid, ref script) in self.watched_txn.iter() {
+ if *script == out.script_pubkey {
+ if tx.txid() == *txid {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ for script in self.watched_txn.iter() {
+ if *script == out.script_pubkey {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ for outpoint in self.watched_outpoints.iter() {
+ let &(outpoint_hash, outpoint_index) = outpoint;
+ if outpoint_hash == input.previous_output.txid && outpoint_index == input.previous_output.vout {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ false
+ }
+}
+
+/// Utility to capture some common parts of ChainWatchInterface implementors.
+///
+/// Keeping a local copy of this in a ChainWatchInterface implementor is likely useful.
+pub struct ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
+ network: Network,
+ watched: Mutex<ChainWatchedUtil>,
+ listeners: Mutex<Vec<Weak<ChainListener>>>,
+ reentered: AtomicUsize,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+/// Register listener
+impl ChainWatchInterface for ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
+ fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script) {
+ let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
+ if watched.register_tx(txid, script_pub_key) {
+ self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), out_script: &Script) {
+ let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
+ if watched.register_outpoint(outpoint, out_script) {
+ self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn watch_all_txn(&self) {
+ let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
+ if watched.watch_all() {
+ self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn register_listener(&self, listener: Weak<ChainListener>) {
+ let mut vec = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
+ vec.push(listener);
+ }
+
+ fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
+ if genesis_hash != genesis_block(self.network).header.bitcoin_hash() {
+ return Err(ChainError::NotWatched);
+ }
+ Err(ChainError::NotSupported)
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
+ /// Creates a new ChainWatchInterfaceUtil for the given network
+ pub fn new(network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
+ ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
+ network: network,
+ watched: Mutex::new(ChainWatchedUtil::new()),
+ listeners: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ reentered: AtomicUsize::new(1),
+ logger: logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Notify listeners that a block was connected given a full, unfiltered block.
+ ///
+ /// Handles re-scanning the block and calling block_connected again if listeners register new
+ /// watch data during the callbacks for you (see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
+ pub fn block_connected_with_filtering(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ let mut reentered = true;
+ while reentered {
+ let mut matched = Vec::new();
+ let mut matched_index = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
+ for (index, transaction) in block.txdata.iter().enumerate() {
+ if self.does_match_tx_unguarded(transaction, &watched) {
+ matched.push(transaction);
+ matched_index.push(index as u32);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ reentered = self.block_connected_checked(&block.header, height, matched.as_slice(), matched_index.as_slice());
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Notify listeners that a block was disconnected.
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ for listener in listeners.iter() {
+ match listener.upgrade() {
+ Some(arc) => arc.block_disconnected(&header, disconnected_height),
+ None => ()
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Notify listeners that a block was connected, given pre-filtered list of transactions in the
+ /// block which matched the filter (probably using does_match_tx).
+ ///
+ /// Returns true if notified listeners registered additional watch data (implying that the
+ /// block must be re-scanned and this function called again prior to further block_connected
+ /// calls, see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
+ pub fn block_connected_checked(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> bool {
+ let last_seen = self.reentered.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
+
+ let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ for listener in listeners.iter() {
+ match listener.upgrade() {
+ Some(arc) => arc.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched),
+ None => ()
+ }
+ }
+ return last_seen != self.reentered.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
+ }
+
+ /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
+ pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
+ let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
+ self.does_match_tx_unguarded (tx, &watched)
+ }
+
+ fn does_match_tx_unguarded(&self, tx: &Transaction, watched: &MutexGuard<ChainWatchedUtil>) -> bool {
+ watched.does_match_tx(tx)
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
+//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
+//! on-chain output which is theirs.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use util::byte_utils;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+/// When on-chain outputs are created by rust-lightning an event is generated which informs the
+/// user thereof. This enum describes the format of the output and provides the OutPoint.
+pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
+ /// Outpoint with an output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface, thus you should
+ /// have stored somewhere how to spend script_pubkey!
+ /// Outputs from a justice tx, claim tx or preimage tx
+ StaticOutput {
+ /// The outpoint spendable by user wallet
+ outpoint: OutPoint,
+ /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
+ output: TxOut,
+ },
+ /// Outpoint commits to a P2WSH
+ /// P2WSH should be spend by the following witness :
+ /// <local_delayedsig> 0 <witnessScript>
+ /// With input nSequence set to_self_delay.
+ /// Outputs from a HTLC-Success/Timeout tx/commitment tx
+ DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ /// Outpoint spendable by user wallet
+ outpoint: OutPoint,
+ /// local_delayedkey = delayed_payment_basepoint_secret + SHA256(per_commitment_point || delayed_payment_basepoint) OR
+ key: SecretKey,
+ /// witness redeemScript encumbering output.
+ witness_script: Script,
+ /// nSequence input must commit to self_delay to satisfy script's OP_CSV
+ to_self_delay: u16,
+ /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
+ output: TxOut,
+ },
+ /// Outpoint commits to a P2WPKH
+ /// P2WPKH should be spend by the following witness :
+ /// <local_sig> <local_pubkey>
+ /// Outputs to_remote from a commitment tx
+ DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ /// Outpoint spendable by user wallet
+ outpoint: OutPoint,
+ /// localkey = payment_basepoint_secret + SHA256(per_commitment_point || payment_basepoint
+ key: SecretKey,
+ /// The output which is reference by the given outpoint
+ output: TxOut,
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
+pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
+ /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
+ /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
+ /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
+ /// restarted with some stale data!
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys;
+ /// Get a secret for construting an onion packet
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey;
+ /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding
+ /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding
+ /// transaction.
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
+}
+
+/// Set of lightning keys needed to operate a channel as described in BOLT 3
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ChannelKeys {
+ /// Private key of anchor tx
+ pub funding_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
+ pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Local secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
+ pub payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Local secret key used in HTLC tx
+ pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
+ pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Commitment seed
+ pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(ChannelKeys, 0, {
+ funding_key,
+ revocation_base_key,
+ payment_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key,
+ commitment_seed
+});
+
+/// Simple KeysInterface implementor that takes a 32-byte seed for use as a BIP 32 extended key
+/// and derives keys from that.
+///
+/// Your node_id is seed/0'
+/// ChannelMonitor closes may use seed/1'
+/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'
+/// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds!
+pub struct KeysManager {
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
+ node_secret: SecretKey,
+ destination_script: Script,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ session_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+
+ unique_start: Sha256State,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+impl KeysManager {
+ /// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
+ /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
+ /// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
+ /// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
+ /// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
+ /// simply use the current time (with very high precision).
+ ///
+ /// The seed MUST be backed up safely prior to use so that the keys can be re-created, however,
+ /// obviously, starting_time should be unique every time you reload the library - it is only
+ /// used to generate new ephemeral key data (which will be stored by the individual channel if
+ /// necessary).
+ ///
+ /// Note that the seed is required to recover certain on-chain funds independent of
+ /// ChannelMonitor data, though a current copy of ChannelMonitor data is also required for any
+ /// channel, and some on-chain during-closing funds.
+ ///
+ /// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between
+ /// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
+ /// detailed description of the guarantee.
+ pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> KeysManager {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(network.clone(), seed) {
+ Ok(master_key) => {
+ let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
+ let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
+ Ok(destination_key) => {
+ let pubkey_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.key.serialize()[..]);
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
+ .push_slice(&pubkey_hash160.into_inner())
+ .into_script()
+ },
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
+ };
+ let shutdown_pubkey = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(2).unwrap()) {
+ Ok(shutdown_key) => ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &shutdown_key).public_key.key,
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
+ };
+ let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+
+ let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
+ unique_start.input(seed);
+
+ KeysManager {
+ secp_ctx,
+ node_secret,
+ destination_script,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
+ channel_master_key,
+ channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ session_master_key,
+ session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ channel_id_master_key,
+ channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+
+ unique_start,
+ logger,
+ }
+ },
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.node_secret.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ self.destination_script.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
+ // We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure
+ // entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
+ // starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
+ let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+
+ let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+
+ let seed = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let commitment_seed = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&seed);
+ sha.input(&b"commitment seed"[..]);
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+ macro_rules! key_step {
+ ($info: expr, $prev_key: expr) => {{
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&seed);
+ sha.input(&$prev_key[..]);
+ sha.input(&$info[..]);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is busted")
+ }}
+ }
+ let funding_key = key_step!(b"funding key", commitment_seed);
+ let revocation_base_key = key_step!(b"revocation base key", funding_key);
+ let payment_base_key = key_step!(b"payment base key", revocation_base_key);
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_base_key);
+ let htlc_base_key = key_step!(b"HTLC base key", delayed_payment_base_key);
+
+ ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key,
+ revocation_base_key,
+ payment_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key,
+ commitment_seed,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+
+ let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted")
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+
+ let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+
+ (Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner())
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Structs and traits which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the blockchain.
+
+pub mod chaininterface;
+pub mod transaction;
+pub mod keysinterface;
--- /dev/null
+//! Contains simple structs describing parts of transactions on the chain.
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+
+/// A reference to a transaction output.
+///
+/// Differs from bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as the index is a u16 instead of u32
+/// due to LN's restrictions on index values. Should reduce (possibly) unsafe conversions this way.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
+pub struct OutPoint {
+ /// The referenced transaction's txid.
+ pub txid: Sha256dHash,
+ /// The index of the referenced output in its transaction's vout.
+ pub index: u16,
+}
+
+impl OutPoint {
+ /// Creates a new `OutPoint` from the txid and the index.
+ pub fn new(txid: Sha256dHash, index: u16) -> OutPoint {
+ OutPoint { txid, index }
+ }
+
+ /// Convert an `OutPoint` to a lightning channel id.
+ pub fn to_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut res = [0; 32];
+ res[..].copy_from_slice(&self.txid[..]);
+ res[30] ^= ((self.index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
+ res[31] ^= ((self.index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Converts this OutPoint into the OutPoint field as used by rust-bitcoin
+ pub fn into_bitcoin_outpoint(self) -> BitcoinOutPoint {
+ BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: self.txid,
+ vout: self.index as u32,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
+
+ use hex;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_calculation() {
+ let tx: Transaction = encode::deserialize(&hex::decode("020000000001010e0adef48412e4361325ac1c6e36411299ab09d4f083b9d8ddb55fbc06e1b0c00000000000feffffff0220a1070000000000220020f81d95e040bd0a493e38bae27bff52fe2bb58b93b293eb579c01c31b05c5af1dc072cfee54a3000016001434b1d6211af5551905dc2642d05f5b04d25a8fe80247304402207f570e3f0de50546aad25a872e3df059d277e776dda4269fa0d2cc8c2ee6ec9a022054e7fae5ca94d47534c86705857c24ceea3ad51c69dd6051c5850304880fc43a012103cb11a1bacc223d98d91f1946c6752e358a5eb1a1c983b3e6fb15378f453b76bd00000000").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ index: 0
+ }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25e").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ index: 1
+ }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25f").unwrap()[..]);
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#![crate_name = "lightning"]
+
+//! Rust-Lightning, not Rusty's Lightning!
+//!
+//! A full-featured but also flexible lightning implementation, in library form. This allows the
+//! user (you) to decide how they wish to use it instead of being a fully self-contained daemon.
+//! This means there is no built-in threading/execution environment and it's up to the user to
+//! figure out how best to make networking happen/timers fire/things get written to disk/keys get
+//! generated/etc. This makes it a good candidate for tight integration into an existing wallet
+//! instead of having a rather-separate lightning appendage to a wallet.
+
+#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "fuzztarget"), deny(missing_docs))]
+#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
+
+// In general, rust is absolutely horrid at supporting users doing things like,
+// for example, compiling Rust code for real environments. Disable useless lints
+// that don't do anything but annoy us and cant actually ever be resolved.
+#![allow(bare_trait_objects)]
+#![allow(ellipsis_inclusive_range_patterns)]
+
+extern crate bitcoin;
+extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
+extern crate secp256k1;
+#[cfg(test)] extern crate rand;
+#[cfg(test)] extern crate hex;
+
+#[macro_use]
+pub mod util;
+pub mod chain;
+pub mod ln;
--- /dev/null
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1;
+
+pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
+pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
+
+// Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
+// used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
+
+pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: [u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed;
+ for i in 0..48 {
+ let bitpos = 47 - i;
+ if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
+ res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+ }
+ }
+ res
+}
+
+pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let mut key = base_secret.clone();
+ key.add_assign(&res)?;
+ Ok(key)
+}
+
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
+ base_point.combine(&hashkey)
+}
+
+/// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+
+ let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+ let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+
+ let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
+ part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
+ let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
+ part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
+ Ok(part_a)
+}
+
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+ let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+
+ let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
+ part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
+ let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
+ part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ part_a.combine(&part_b)
+}
+
+pub struct TxCreationKeys {
+ pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
+ pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ pub b_payment_key: PublicKey,
+}
+
+impl TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
+ Ok(TxCreationKeys {
+ per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
+ revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
+ a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
+ b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
+ a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
+ b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+/// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
+/// the revocation key
+pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
+ .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
+ .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
+ .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .into_script()
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ pub offered: bool,
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+ pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+ let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
+ if htlc.offered {
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
+ .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
+ .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
+ .push_int(32)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
+ .push_int(2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
+ .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_int(2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
+ .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .into_script()
+ } else {
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
+ .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
+ .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
+ .push_int(32)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
+ .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
+ .push_int(2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
+ .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_int(2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
+ .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .into_script()
+ }
+}
+
+/// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
+/// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
+ get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+}
+
+/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+ let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ txins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: OutPoint {
+ txid: prev_hash.clone(),
+ vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+
+ let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
+ feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
+ } else {
+ feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
+ };
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ txouts.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
+ });
+
+ Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
+ input: txins,
+ output: txouts,
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Functional tests which test the correct handling of ChannelMonitorUpdateErr returns from
+//! monitor updates.
+//! There are a bunch of these as their handling is relatively error-prone so they are split out
+//! here. See also the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
+
+use ln::channelmanager::{RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr;
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, LocalFeatures, RoutingMessageHandler};
+use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::errors::APIError;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+
+use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
+ // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ match events_1[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
+ // PaymentFailed event
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
+ // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
+ // a disconnect in between
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ if disconnect {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ // Now set it to failed again...
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ if disconnect {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
+ // PaymentFailed event
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
+ do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
+ do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
+ let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
+
+ // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
+ // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
+ // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
+ // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
+ // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
+ // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
+ // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
+ // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
+ // immediately, otherwise we wait disconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
+ // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
+ // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
+ // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
+ // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
+ // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
+ // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
+ // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
+ // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
+ // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ }
+
+ (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }
+
+ // Now fix monitor updating...
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
+ } } }
+
+ let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ } else {
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
+ bs_resp.2 = None;
+ }
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
+ let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
+ assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
+ }
+ assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
+ assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
+ }
+
+ (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
+ } else {
+ let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
+ (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ })
+ };
+
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ }
+
+ let as_commitment_update;
+ let bs_second_commitment_update;
+
+ macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ } }
+
+ macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ } }
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
+ handle_bs_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ }
+
+ handle_initial_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+ }
+ } else {
+ handle_initial_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ }
+
+ handle_bs_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
+ // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
+
+ match responses[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match responses[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_fail_no_rebroadcast() {
+ // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when no message rebroadcasting on
+ // test_restore_channel_monitor() is required. Backported from
+ // chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_raa_while_paused() {
+ // Tests handling of an RAA while monitor updating has already been marked failed.
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as this used to be broken.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 5000000);
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let send_event_1 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, our_payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let send_event_2 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_update_raa = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash_1, 1000000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
+ // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
+
+ // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+
+ // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+
+ // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
+ // holding cell.
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Now fail monitor updating.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
+ // for forwarding.
+
+ let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2.remove(0) {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
+ };
+
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
+ } else { (None, None) };
+
+ // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
+ // update_add update.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
+ }
+
+ // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
+ // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
+ let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
+ };
+ let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ match events_3.remove(1) {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { None };
+ let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now deliver the new messages...
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ } else {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
+ }
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+
+ let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
+ match events_6[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
+ match events_9[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
+ do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
+ do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
+ // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
+ // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
+ // HTLCs).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
+
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn raa_no_response_awaiting_raa_state() {
+ // This is a rather convoluted test which ensures that if handling of an RAA does not happen
+ // due to a previous monitor update failure, we still set AwaitingRemoteRevoke on the channel
+ // in question (assuming it intends to respond with a CS after monitor updating is restored).
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as this used to be broken.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ // Queue up two payments - one will be delivered right away, one immediately goes into the
+ // holding cell as nodes[0] is AwaitingRAA. Ultimately this allows us to deliver an RAA
+ // immediately after a CS. By setting failing the monitor update failure from the CS (which
+ // requires only an RAA response due to AwaitingRAA) we can deliver the RAA and require the CS
+ // generation during RAA while in monitor-update-failed state.
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now we have a CS queued up which adds a new HTLC (which will need a RAA/CS response from
+ // nodes[1]) followed by an RAA. Fail the monitor updating prior to the CS, deliver the RAA,
+ // then restore channel monitor updates.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ // nodes[1] should be AwaitingRAA here!
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
+
+ // We send a third payment here, which is somewhat of a redundant test, but the
+ // chanmon_fail_consistency test required it to actually find the bug (by seeing out-of-sync
+ // commitment transaction states) whereas here we can explicitly check for it.
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Finally deliver the RAA to nodes[1] which results in a CS response to the last update
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+ let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 1000000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn claim_while_disconnected_monitor_update_fail() {
+ // Test for claiming a payment while disconnected and then having the resulting
+ // channel-update-generated monitor update fail. This kind of thing isn't a particularly
+ // contrived case for nodes with network instability.
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as an unmerged version of the handling
+ // code introduced a regression in this test (specifically, this caught a removal of the
+ // channel_reestablish handling ensuring the order was sensical given the messages used).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Forward a payment for B to claim
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let as_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Now deliver a's reestablish, freeing the claim from the holding cell, but fail the monitor
+ // update.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Send a second payment from A to B, resulting in a commitment update that gets swallowed with
+ // the monitor still failed
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ // Note that nodes[1] not updating monitor here is OK - it wont take action on the new HTLC
+ // until we've test_restore_channel_monitor'd and updated for the new commitment transaction.
+
+ // Now un-fail the monitor, which will result in B sending its original commitment update,
+ // receiving the commitment update from A, and the resulting commitment dances.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_msgs = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_msgs.len(), 2);
+
+ match bs_msgs[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ match bs_msgs[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let as_commitment = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let bs_commitment = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn monitor_failed_no_reestablish_response() {
+ // Test for receiving a channel_reestablish after a monitor update failure resulted in no
+ // response to a commitment_signed.
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as it caught a long-standing
+ // debug_assert!() failure in channel_reestablish handling.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Route the payment and deliver the initial commitment_signed (with a monitor update failure
+ // on receipt).
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Now disconnect and immediately reconnect, delivering the channel_reestablish while nodes[1]
+ // is still failing to update monitors.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let as_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect).unwrap();
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn first_message_on_recv_ordering() {
+ // Test that if the initial generator of a monitor-update-frozen state doesn't generate
+ // messages, we're willing to flip the order of response messages if neccessary in resposne to
+ // a commitment_signed which needs to send an RAA first.
+ // At a high level, our goal is to fail monitor updating in response to an RAA which needs no
+ // response and then handle a CS while in the failed state, requiring an RAA followed by a CS
+ // response. To do this, we start routing two payments, with the final RAA for the first being
+ // delivered while B is in AwaitingRAA, hence when we deliver the CS for the second B will
+ // have no pending response but will want to send a RAA/CS (with the updates for the second
+ // payment applied).
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as it caught a bug here.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Route the first payment outbound, holding the last RAA for B until we are set up so that we
+ // can deliver it and fail the monitor update.
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Route the second payment, generating an update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+
+ // Deliver the final RAA for the first payment, which does not require a response. RAAs
+ // generally require a commitment_signed, so the fact that we're expecting an opposite response
+ // to the next message also tests resetting the delivery order.
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Now deliver the update_add_htlc/commitment_signed for the second payment, which does need an
+ // RAA/CS response, which should be generated when we call test_restore_channel_monitor (with
+ // the appropriate HTLC acceptance).
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
+
+ let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_fail_claim() {
+ // Basic test for monitor update failures when processing claim_funds calls.
+ // We set up a simple 3-node network, sending a payment from A to B and failing B's monitor
+ // update to claim the payment. We then send a payment C->B->A, making the forward of this
+ // payment from B to A fail due to the paused channel. Finally, we restore the channel monitor
+ // updating and claim the payment on B.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 3 to 2.
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ // Successfully update the monitor on the 1<->2 channel, but the 0<->1 channel should still be
+ // paused, so forward shouldn't succeed until we call test_restore_channel_monitor().
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+
+ let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let bs_fail_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_update.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], bs_fail_update.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+
+ // Now restore monitor updating on the 0<->1 channel and claim the funds on B.
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_fulfill_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fulfill_update.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fulfill_update.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_update_on_pending_forwards() {
+ // Basic test for monitor update failures when processing pending HTLC fail/add forwards.
+ // We do this with a simple 3-node network, sending a payment from A to C and one from C to A.
+ // The payment from A to C will be failed by C and pending a back-fail to A, while the payment
+ // from C to A will be pending a forward to A.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 3 to 1.
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
+
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let cs_fail_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_fail_update.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], cs_fail_update.commitment_signed, true, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn monitor_update_claim_fail_no_response() {
+ // Test for claim_funds resulting in both a monitor update failure and no message response (due
+ // to channel being AwaitingRAA).
+ // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as an unmerged version of the handling
+ // code was broken.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Forward a payment for B to claim
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Now start forwarding a second payment, skipping the last RAA so B is in AwaitingRAA
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ let as_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
+
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+// Note that restore_between_fails with !fail_on_generate is useless
+// Also note that !fail_on_generate && !fail_on_signed is useless
+// Finally, note that !fail_on_signed is not possible with fail_on_generate && !restore_between_fails
+// confirm_a_first and restore_b_before_conf are wholly unrelated to earlier bools and
+// restore_b_before_conf has no meaning if !confirm_a_first
+fn do_during_funding_monitor_fail(fail_on_generate: bool, restore_between_fails: bool, fail_on_signed: bool, confirm_a_first: bool, restore_b_before_conf: bool) {
+ // Test that if the monitor update generated by funding_transaction_generated fails we continue
+ // the channel setup happily after the update is restored.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 43);
+
+ if fail_on_generate {
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if restore_between_fails {
+ assert!(fail_on_generate);
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ }
+
+ if fail_on_signed {
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ } else {
+ assert!(restore_between_fails || !fail_on_generate); // We can't switch to good now (there's no monitor update)
+ assert!(fail_on_generate); // Somebody has to fail
+ }
+ let funding_signed_res = nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ if fail_on_signed || !restore_between_fails {
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = funding_signed_res.unwrap_err() {
+ if fail_on_generate && !restore_between_fails {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast");
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ } else {
+ funding_signed_res.unwrap();
+ }
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 43);
+ assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if confirm_a_first {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ assert!(!restore_b_before_conf);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ }
+
+ // Make sure nodes[1] isn't stupid enough to re-send the FundingLocked on reconnect
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, confirm_a_first), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ if !restore_b_before_conf {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ }
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let (channel_id, (announcement, as_update, bs_update)) = if !confirm_a_first {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
+ (channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked))
+ } else {
+ if restore_b_before_conf {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ }
+ let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ (channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &funding_locked))
+ };
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_id, funding_tx, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn during_funding_monitor_fail() {
+ do_during_funding_monitor_fail(false, false, true, true, true);
+ do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, false, true, false, false);
+ do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, true, true, true, false);
+ do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, true, false, false, false);
+}
--- /dev/null
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
+use secp256k1;
+
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures, DataLossProtect};
+use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use util::transaction_utils;
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
+use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
+
+use std;
+use std::default::Default;
+use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use std::sync::{Arc};
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub struct ChannelValueStat {
+ pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
+ pub channel_value_msat: u64,
+ pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
+ pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
+}
+
+enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
+ FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
+ Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
+}
+
+enum InboundHTLCState {
+ /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
+ RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
+ /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack.
+ AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ Committed,
+ /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we'll drop it.
+ /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
+ /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
+ /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
+ /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
+ /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
+ /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
+}
+
+struct InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ state: InboundHTLCState,
+}
+
+enum OutboundHTLCState {
+ /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
+ /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
+ /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
+ /// money back (though we won't), and,
+ /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
+ /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
+ /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
+ /// we'll never get out of sync).
+ /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
+ /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
+ LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
+ Committed,
+ /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
+ /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
+ RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
+ /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
+ AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+}
+
+struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState,
+ source: HTLCSource,
+}
+
+/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
+enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
+ AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
+ // always outbound
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ },
+ ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+}
+
+/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
+/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
+/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
+/// move on to ChannelFunded.
+/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
+/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
+/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
+enum ChannelState {
+ /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
+ OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
+ /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
+ TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
+ /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
+ /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
+ /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
+ FundingCreated = 4,
+ /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
+ /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
+ /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
+ FundingSent = 8,
+ /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
+ /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
+ TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
+ /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
+ /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
+ OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
+ ChannelFunded = 64,
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
+ /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
+ /// dance.
+ PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
+ /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
+ /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
+ MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
+ /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
+ /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
+ /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
+ /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
+ /// later.
+ /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
+ /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
+ /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
+ RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
+ /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
+ /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
+ /// us their shutdown.
+ LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
+ /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
+ ShutdownComplete = 4096,
+}
+const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
+const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
+// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
+// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
+// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
+// inbound channel.
+pub(super) struct Channel {
+ config: ChannelConfig,
+
+ user_id: u64,
+
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_state: u32,
+ channel_outbound: bool,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+
+ local_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+
+ // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
+ // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
+ // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
+
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
+
+ /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
+ /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
+ /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
+ /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
+ /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
+ /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
+ /// send it first.
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
+
+ // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
+ // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
+ // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
+ //
+ // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
+ // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
+ // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
+ // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
+ // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
+ // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
+ // commitment_signed.
+ pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
+ // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
+ // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
+ // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
+ // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
+ next_local_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
+ channel_update_count: u32,
+ feerate_per_kw: u64,
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
+ pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
+
+ /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
+ /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
+ /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
+ /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
+ /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
+ pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
+ funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
+
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
+ /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ their_to_self_delay: u16,
+ our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ minimum_depth: u32,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_node_id: PublicKey,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+
+ channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
+/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
+/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
+/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
+const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
+/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
+const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
+/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
+/// it's 2^24.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+
+/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
+/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
+/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+ Ignore(&'static str),
+ Close(&'static str),
+ CloseDelayBroadcast {
+ msg: &'static str,
+ update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
+ },
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+ ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(thing) => thing,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+impl Channel {
+ // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
+ fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
+ ///
+ /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
+ pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
+ }
+
+ fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
+ cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
+ }
+
+ fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
+ 1000 // TODO
+ }
+
+ // Constructors:
+ pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
+
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
+ }
+
+ if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
+ }
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
+ }
+
+
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+ return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+ }
+
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+
+ Ok(Channel {
+ user_id: user_id,
+ config: config.channel_options.clone(),
+
+ channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
+ channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
+ channel_outbound: true,
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_local_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ last_block_connected: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate,
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
+ their_to_self_delay: 0,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: None,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+ their_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: None,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ their_node_id: their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+
+ channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
+ }
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
+ /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
+ let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
+
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
+ }
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
+ }
+ if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
+ }
+ Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+
+ // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
+
+ let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+ if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
+ }
+ }
+ // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
+ local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
+
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+
+ let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+ let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
+ }
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
+ }
+
+ // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+ // for full fee payment
+ let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+ if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+ }
+
+ let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
+ let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
+ if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+ }
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+ channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ let mut chan = Channel {
+ user_id: user_id,
+ config: local_config,
+
+ channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
+ channel_outbound: false,
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+
+ local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_local_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ last_block_connected: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
+ channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
+ their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+ their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ their_node_id: their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+
+ channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ };
+
+ let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
+ chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
+
+ Ok(chan)
+ }
+
+ // Utilities to derive keys:
+
+ fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
+ let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ // Utilities to build transactions:
+
+ fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ } else {
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ }
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
+ ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
+ ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
+ ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
+ ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
+ ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
+ }
+
+ /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
+ /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
+ /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
+ /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
+ /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
+ /// an HTLC to a).
+ /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
+ /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
+ /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
+ /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
+ /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
+ /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
+ /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
+ /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
+ /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
+ /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
+ let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
+
+ let txins = {
+ let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ ins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ ins
+ };
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
+
+ let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
+ let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
+ let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+
+ macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: $offered,
+ amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
+ cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
+ transaction_output_index: None
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
+ ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
+ if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
+ }
+ } else {
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
+ remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if generated_by_local {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
+ local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ },
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
+ if !generated_by_local {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
+ // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
+ // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
+ // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
+ // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
+ let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
+ self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
+ } else {
+ self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
+ };
+ debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
+ max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
+ debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
+ max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
+ }
+
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+ (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
+ } else {
+ (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
+ };
+
+ let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
+ let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
+
+ if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
+ if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
+ &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: value_to_a as u64
+ }, None));
+ }
+
+ if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
+ .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
+ .into_script(),
+ value: value_to_b as u64
+ }, None));
+ }
+
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
+ if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
+ if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
+ a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
+ // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
+ // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
+ // may fail)!
+ .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
+ // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
+ // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ });
+
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+ let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
+ for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ outputs.push(out.0);
+ if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
+ htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
+ htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
+ }
+ }
+ let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+ htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
+
+ (Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
+ input: txins,
+ output: outputs,
+ }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
+ (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
+ let txins = {
+ let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ ins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xffffffff,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ ins
+ };
+
+ assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
+ let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+
+ if value_to_self < 0 {
+ assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
+ } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
+ assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
+ }
+
+ if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
+ value: value_to_remote as u64
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ value: value_to_self as u64
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
+
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ for out in txouts.drain(..) {
+ outputs.push(out.0);
+ }
+
+ (Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: txins,
+ output: outputs,
+ }, total_fee_satoshis)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
+ /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
+ /// our counterparty!)
+ /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
+ /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
+ fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
+ /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
+ //may see payments to it!
+ let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+ let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
+ /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+ /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
+ if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
+ builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
+ } else {
+ builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
+ }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+ if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
+ panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
+ }
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
+ if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ }
+ tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ our_sig
+ }
+
+ /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
+ /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
+ /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
+ fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ }
+
+ fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
+ }
+
+ /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
+ /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
+ fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+ if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
+ panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
+ }
+
+ let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ if local_tx { // b, then a
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ }
+ tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ if htlc.offered {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
+ }
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ Ok(our_sig)
+ }
+
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
+ // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
+ // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
+ // either.
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
+
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+ // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ });
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
+ }
+
+ Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
+ }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
+ let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
+ },
+ (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+ (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ return Ok(None);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ err_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ }
+
+ Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ reason: err_packet
+ }))
+ }
+
+ // Message handlers:
+
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
+ }
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
+ }
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+
+ self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
+ self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
+ self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
+ self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
+ self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
+ self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+ self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+ self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+
+ let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
+
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+
+ // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+ // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+ // channel.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
+
+ let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ return Err(e);
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ signature: our_signature
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
+ /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ } else {
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+
+ if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
+ // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
+ // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
+ (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
+ if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
+ }
+ // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
+ return Ok(());
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
+ }
+
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+ fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
+ let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
+ /// holding cell.
+ fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
+ let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+
+ let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
+ htlc_outbound_count += 1;
+ htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+
+ (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
+ }
+
+ /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
+ /// Doesn't bother handling the
+ /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
+ /// corner case properly.
+ pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
+ // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
+ (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
+ cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
+ }
+
+ let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
+ if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
+ }
+ // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
+ }
+ // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
+ // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
+ // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
+ // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
+ // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
+ // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
+ // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
+ // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
+ // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
+ // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
+ // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
+ // transaction).
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
+ }
+ if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
+ }
+
+ //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
+
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
+ panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
+ #[inline]
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
+ match check_preimage {
+ None => {},
+ Some(payment_hash) =>
+ if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
+ }
+ };
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
+ },
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
+ }
+ return Ok(&htlc.source);
+ }
+ }
+ Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+ }
+
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+
+ let mut update_fee = false;
+ let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ update_fee = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
+ } else {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
+ };
+
+ let mut local_commitment_tx = {
+ let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ };
+ let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+
+ //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
+ if update_fee {
+ let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+
+ if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
+ }
+
+ let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
+
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
+ let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
+ htlc_sig
+ } else {
+ self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+ };
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
+ } else {
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
+
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ let mut need_our_commitment = false;
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
+ // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
+ // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
+ // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(forward_info.clone())
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
+ // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
+ // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
+ // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
+ // includes the right HTLCs.
+ // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
+ // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
+ // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ }
+ // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
+ // re-send the message on restoration)
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
+ }
+
+ let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
+ // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
+ // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
+ let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ (Some(msg), monitor, None)
+ } else if !need_our_commitment {
+ (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
+ } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
+
+ Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
+ }
+
+ /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
+ /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+
+ let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut err = None;
+ for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
+ // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
+ // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
+ // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
+ // to rebalance channels.
+ if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ } else {
+ match &htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ match e {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ }
+ err = Some(e);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
+ Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ if err.is_some() {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
+ // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
+ // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
+ err = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
+ //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
+ match err {
+ None => {
+ if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
+ // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
+ // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
+ // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
+ self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
+ Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
+ })
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs,
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: update_fee,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ Some(e) => Err(e)
+ }
+ } else {
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
+ /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
+ /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
+ /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
+ /// revoke_and_ack message.
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+ }
+
+ if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
+ }
+ }
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
+
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
+ // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
+ // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
+ let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
+ let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut require_commitment = false;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
+
+ {
+ // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
+ let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
+ let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
+
+ // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
+ pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
+ revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
+ } else {
+ // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
+ value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ true
+ } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ true
+ } else { false };
+ if swap {
+ let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
+
+ if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
+ require_commitment = true;
+ } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
+ match forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ require_commitment = true;
+ match fail_msg {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
+ require_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
+ self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
+ // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
+ // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
+ // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
+ // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
+ if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ require_commitment = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
+ // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
+ // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
+ if require_commitment {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
+ // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
+ // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ }
+ self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+ self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
+ }
+
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
+ Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
+ },
+ None => {
+ if require_commitment {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed
+ }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
+ } else {
+ Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
+ /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
+ }
+ if !self.is_usable() {
+ panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
+ }
+ if !self.is_live() {
+ panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+ self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+
+ Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
+ Some(update_fee) => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
+ /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
+ /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
+ /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+ /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
+ /// completed.
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
+ let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
+
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ return outbound_drops;
+ }
+ // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
+ // will be retransmitted.
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
+
+ let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
+ // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
+ // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
+ // this HTLC accordingly
+ inbound_drop_count += 1;
+ false
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
+ // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
+ // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
+ // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
+ true
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
+ // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
+ // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
+ // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
+ true
+ },
+ }
+ });
+ self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
+ // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
+ // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
+ // the update upon reconnection.
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
+ }
+ });
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ outbound_drops
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
+ /// updates are partially paused.
+ /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
+ /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
+ /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
+ /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
+ /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
+ /// to the remote side.
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+ let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+
+ // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
+ // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
+ // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
+ // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
+ // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
+ // monitor was persisted.
+ let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
+ assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ let mut forwards = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ let mut failures = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
+ }
+
+ let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ } else { None };
+ let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ let order = self.resend_order.clone();
+ log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
+ if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
+ match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
+ update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+ match reason {
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ reason: err_packet.clone()
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
+ failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
+ update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
+ /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
+ // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
+ // just close here instead of trying to recover.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
+ match msg.data_loss_protect {
+ OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
+ if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
+ }
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
+ return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ OptionalField::Absent => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
+ // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+
+ let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
+ self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
+ }
+ // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
+ return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ // We have OurFundingLocked set!
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
+ // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
+ None
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
+ };
+
+ // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
+ // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
+ // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
+ let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+
+ let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
+ // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
+ // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
+ // now!
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ }
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+ self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
+ proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ }
+ let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
+
+ let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
+ Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
+ signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
+ // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
+ // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
+ // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
+ if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
+ }
+
+ //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
+ if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
+ }
+
+ if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
+ if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
+ }
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
+ // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
+ // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
+ // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
+ // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
+
+ let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ })
+ };
+
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
+ }
+ if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
+ }
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
+ if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
+ }
+ let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
+ // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
+ closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
+ sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ },
+ };
+
+ if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
+ ($new_feerate: expr) => {
+ let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
+ sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
+ return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ }), None))
+ }
+ }
+
+ let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
+ }
+ }
+ propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
+ }
+ } else {
+ let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
+ }
+ }
+ propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ }), Some(closing_tx)))
+ }
+
+ // Public utilities:
+
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ self.channel_id
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
+ /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
+ pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.user_id
+ }
+
+ /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
+ pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
+ }
+ self.channel_monitor.clone()
+ }
+
+ /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
+ /// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
+ /// get_outbound_funding_created.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+ self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.their_node_id
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.channel_value_satoshis
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+ &self.local_keys
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
+ ChannelValueStat {
+ value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
+ channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
+ let mut res = 0;
+ for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match h {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
+ res += amount_msat;
+ }
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.channel_update_count
+ }
+
+ pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
+ self.config.announced_channel
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_outbound
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
+ // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
+ // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
+
+ // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
+ let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
+ res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
+ }
+
+ // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
+ res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
+
+ res as u32
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+ pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
+ let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
+ (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
+ /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
+ /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
+ /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
+ pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
+ assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ }
+
+ /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
+ /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
+ /// the channel_monitor.
+ /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
+ /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
+ /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
+ //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
+ //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
+ //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
+ if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
+ let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+
+ /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
+ /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
+ /// unconfirmation/reorg.
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
+ }
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ false
+ }
+
+ // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
+ // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
+
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
+ }
+
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+
+ msgs::OpenChannel {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
+ channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
+ }
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
+ /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
+ /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
+ /// or if called on an inbound channel.
+ /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
+
+ let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
+ self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ return Err(e);
+ }
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
+ funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
+ signature: our_signature
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
+ /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
+ /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
+ /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
+ /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+ /// closing).
+ /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+ /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
+ pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
+ if !self.config.announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
+ }
+
+ let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
+ let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ Ok((msg, sig))
+ }
+
+ /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
+ /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
+ pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+ let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ let remote_last_secret = self.channel_monitor.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
+ })
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
+ })
+ };
+ msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
+ // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
+ // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
+ // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
+ // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
+ // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
+
+ // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
+ // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
+ // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
+ // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
+ // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
+ // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
+ // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
+ // overflow here.
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+ data_loss_protect,
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ // Send stuff to our remote peers:
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
+ /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
+ /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
+ /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
+ /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
+ pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
+ }
+
+ if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
+ }
+ if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+ // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+ // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+ // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+ // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+ // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
+ }
+
+ let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
+ if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
+ }
+ // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
+ }
+
+ // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
+ // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
+ if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
+ }
+
+ //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ source,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
+ source,
+ });
+
+ let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
+ };
+ self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
+
+ Ok(Some(res))
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
+ /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+ /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
+ /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+ }
+ let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ have_updates = true;
+ }
+ if have_updates { break; }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
+ have_updates = true;
+ }
+ if have_updates { break; }
+ }
+ if !have_updates {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
+ }
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
+ }
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
+ // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
+ // is acceptable.
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(state) = new_state {
+ htlc.state = state;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
+ }
+ }
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+
+ let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+ Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
+ },
+ Err(e) => return Err(e),
+ };
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
+ /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
+ let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+ log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
+
+ let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
+ log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
+ }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
+ /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
+ /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
+ /// more info.
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
+ Some(update_add_htlc) => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
+ /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
+ pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
+ }
+ else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
+ }
+
+ let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ } else {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ }
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
+ // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+
+ Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
+ }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
+ //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
+ //which correspond)
+ }
+
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
+ (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ error_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ onion_hash.write(writer)?;
+ err_code.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Channel {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
+ // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
+
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ self.user_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.config.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
+ self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
+
+ let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ 3u8.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
+ 4u8.write(writer)?;
+ removal_reason.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match &$thing {
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ &Some(ref v) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ v.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.source.write(writer)?;
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 3u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 4u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ source.write(writer)?;
+ onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ err_packet.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.resend_order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
+
+ (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
+ pending_forward.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
+ htlc_source.write(writer)?;
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ fail_reason.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
+ write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
+
+ self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
+ self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+
+ (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
+ if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ Some((feerate, fee)) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ feerate.write(writer)?;
+ fee.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+
+ write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
+ write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
+
+ self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+ self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
+ write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
+
+ write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
+ self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+
+ self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
+ pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
+ pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
+ for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ });
+ }
+
+ let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+ 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
+ monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
+ monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
+ for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
+ last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ });
+ }
+
+ let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
+ // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
+ // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
+ if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ Ok(Channel {
+ user_id,
+
+ config,
+ channel_id,
+ channel_state,
+ channel_outbound,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ local_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
+
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+ value_to_self_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates,
+
+ resend_order,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
+ monitor_pending_forwards,
+ monitor_pending_failures,
+
+ pending_update_fee,
+ holding_cell_update_fee,
+ next_local_htlc_id,
+ next_remote_htlc_id,
+ channel_update_count,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn,
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ short_channel_id,
+ last_block_connected,
+ funding_tx_confirmations,
+
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey,
+ their_revocation_basepoint,
+ their_payment_basepoint,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ their_htlc_basepoint,
+ their_cur_commitment_point,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point,
+ their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+
+ channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use hex;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::chan_utils;
+ use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+ use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use util::config::UserConfig;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
+ use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use std::sync::Arc;
+
+ struct TestFeeEstimator {
+ fee_est: u64
+ }
+ impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ self.fee_est
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
+ assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
+ "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
+ }
+
+ struct Keys {
+ chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ }
+ impl KeysInterface for Keys {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn outbound_commitment_test() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+
+ // These aren't set in the test vectors:
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
+ };
+ assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
+
+ let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
+ chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+
+ let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
+ chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
+
+ chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+
+ // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
+ // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
+ // build_commitment_transaction.
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
+
+ macro_rules! test_commitment {
+ ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
+ unsigned_tx = {
+ let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
+ .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
+ .collect();
+ (res.0, htlcs)
+ };
+ let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
+
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ };
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
+ ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
+ let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
+
+ let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ for i in 0..5 {
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
+ if out == htlc.payment_hash {
+ preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(preimage.is_some());
+ }
+
+ chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ };
+ }
+
+ {
+ // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
+ "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 1000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 500,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 501,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 2,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 502,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 3,
+ amount_msat: 3000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 503,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 4,
+ amount_msat: 4000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 504,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
+ "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
+ "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
+ "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
+ "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
+ "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(4,
+ "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
+ "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
+ "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
+ "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
+ "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab3437400147304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
+ "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
+ "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
+ "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(4,
+ "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
+ "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
+ "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb604000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f00147304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
+ "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
+ "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
+ "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
+ "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
+ "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
+ "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
+ "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
+ "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
+ "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
+ "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
+ "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
+ "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
+ "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
+ "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
+ "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
+ "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
+ "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
+ "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
+ "02000000000101fb824d4e4dafc0f567789dee3a6bce8d411fe80f5563d8cdfdcc7d7e4447d43a020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a01483045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
+ "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
+ "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
+ "020000000001014e16c488fa158431c1a82e8f661240ec0a71ba0ce92f2721a6538c510226ad5c0000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc01483045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc70439001008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
+ "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
+ "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
+ "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
+ "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
+
+ test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
+ "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
+ "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
+ "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
+ "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
+ "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
+ "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
+ "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
+ "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431100400473044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b101473044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
+ "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
+
+ let mut seed = [0; 32];
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
+ hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
+ hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
+ hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
+ hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
+ hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_key_derivation() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
+//!
+//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
+//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
+//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
+//!
+//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
+//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
+//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::router::Route;
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
+use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
+use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+use util::config::UserConfig;
+use util::{byte_utils, events};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::errors::APIError;
+
+use std::{cmp, mem};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
+use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
+//
+// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
+// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
+// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
+//
+// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
+// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
+// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
+// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
+// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
+// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
+/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
+ incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
+ pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
+ Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
+}
+
+/// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
+ Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
+ Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
+}
+
+/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
+ PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
+ OutboundRoute {
+ route: Route,
+ session_priv: SecretKey,
+ /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
+ /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
+ },
+}
+#[cfg(test)]
+impl HTLCSource {
+ pub fn dummy() -> Self {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
+ ErrorPacket {
+ err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+ Reason {
+ failure_code: u16,
+ data: Vec<u8>,
+ }
+}
+
+/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
+/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
+
+type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
+
+/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
+/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
+/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
+/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
+/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
+
+struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
+ err: msgs::HandleError,
+ shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
+}
+impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
+ #[inline]
+ fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: HandleError {
+ err,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: err.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: None,
+ }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: HandleError {
+ err,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: None,
+ }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
+ Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: HandleError {
+ err,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: err.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
+ }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: match err {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
+/// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
+/// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
+/// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
+const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
+
+pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
+ AddHTLC {
+ prev_short_channel_id: u64,
+ prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+}
+
+/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
+/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
+/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
+/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
+ /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
+ CommitmentFirst,
+ /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
+ RevokeAndACKFirst,
+}
+
+// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
+pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
+ pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
+ pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
+ /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
+ /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
+ /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
+ /// can be failed/claimed by the user
+ /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
+ /// go to read them!
+ pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
+ /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
+ /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
+ pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
+}
+pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
+ pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
+ pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
+ pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
+}
+impl ChannelHolder {
+ pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
+ MutChannelHolder {
+ by_id: &mut self.by_id,
+ short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
+ forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
+ claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
+const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
+
+/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
+/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
+///
+/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
+/// to individual Channels.
+///
+/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
+/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
+/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
+/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
+///
+/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
+/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
+/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
+/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
+/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
+/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+///
+/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
+/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
+/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
+/// object!
+pub struct ChannelManager {
+ default_configuration: UserConfig,
+ genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
+ monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
+ chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
+ last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
+ our_network_key: SecretKey,
+
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
+ /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
+ /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
+
+ keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
+/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
+pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
+/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
+pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
+
+/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
+/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
+/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
+/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
+/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
+const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
+pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
+
+// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
+// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
+// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
+// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
+// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
+// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
+#[deny(const_err)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
+#[deny(const_err)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+
+macro_rules! secp_call {
+ ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return Err($err),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
+pub struct ChannelDetails {
+ /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
+ /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
+ /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
+ /// lifetime of the channel.
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
+ /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
+ pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
+ pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
+ pub user_id: u64,
+ /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
+ /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
+ /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
+ /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
+ /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
+ /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
+ pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
+ /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
+ pub is_live: bool,
+}
+
+macro_rules! handle_error {
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
+ match $internal {
+ Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
+ $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ if let Some(update) = update_option {
+ let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Err(err)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
+ log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ if let Some(update) = update {
+ if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
+ match e {
+ // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
+ // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
+ // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
+ // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
+ if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
+ log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
+ }
+ shutdown_res.0.clear();
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ match $err {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
+ // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
+ // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
+ // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
+ // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
+ // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
+ // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
+ // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
+ // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
+ res
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
+ log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
+ if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
+ match $action_type {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
+ }
+ } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
+ else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
+ else { "nothing" },
+ (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
+ (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
+ if !$resend_commitment {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
+ }
+ if !$resend_raa {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
+ }
+ $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ }
+}
+
+// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
+macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
+ (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
+ break e;
+ },
+ (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChannelManager {
+ /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
+ ///
+ /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
+ /// ChannelMessageHandler.
+ ///
+ /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
+ ///
+ /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
+ pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
+ default_configuration: config.clone(),
+ genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
+ monitor: monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster,
+
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
+ last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
+ secp_ctx,
+
+ channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
+ by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
+ forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
+ claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+
+ keys_manager,
+
+ logger,
+ });
+ let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
+ res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
+ ///
+ /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
+ /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
+ /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
+ /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
+ ///
+ /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
+ /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ ///
+ /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
+ /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
+ }
+
+ let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
+ let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
+ } else {
+ panic!("RNG is bad???");
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
+ node_id: their_network_key,
+ msg: res,
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
+ /// more information.
+ pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
+ for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ res.push(ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
+ inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ is_live: channel.is_live(),
+ });
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
+ /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+ ///
+ /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
+ /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
+ pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
+ for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
+ // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
+ // really wanted anyway.
+ if channel.is_live() {
+ let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ res.push(ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
+ inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ is_live: true,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ ///
+ /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: shutdown_msg
+ });
+ if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
+ channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
+ }
+ };
+ for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ Some(update)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
+
+ if let Some(update) = chan_update {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
+ let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
+ for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ for tx in local_txn {
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
+ /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
+ pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let mut chan = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ chan
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+ };
+ log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+ /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+ pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+
+ const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
+ macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
+ failure_code: $err_code,
+ })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
+ return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
+ }
+
+ let shared_secret = {
+ let mut arr = [0; 32];
+ arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
+ arr
+ };
+ let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
+ }
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
+ }
+
+ let mut channel_state = None;
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ if channel_state.is_none() {
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ })), channel_state.unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
+ let next_hop_data = {
+ let mut decoded = [0; 65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
+ match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
+ Err(err) => {
+ let error_code = match err {
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
+ _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
+ };
+ return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(msg) => msg
+ }
+ };
+
+ let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
+ // OUR PAYMENT!
+ // final_expiry_too_soon
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
+ }
+ // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
+ if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
+ return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
+ return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+
+ // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
+ // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
+ // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
+ // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: None,
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ } else {
+ let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
+ chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
+
+ let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
+
+ let blinding_factor = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(&shared_secret);
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
+
+ let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
+ Err(e)
+ } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
+
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key,
+ hop_data: new_packet_data,
+ hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
+ };
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ };
+
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
+ if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
+ let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
+ let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
+ return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+ if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
+ break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ }
+ break None;
+ }
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
+ }
+ res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }
+ return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
+ }
+
+ /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
+ /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
+ fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
+ let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
+ Some(id) => id,
+ };
+
+ let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
+
+ let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
+ short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
+ flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
+ fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
+
+ Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: sig,
+ contents: unsigned
+ })
+ }
+
+ /// Sends a payment along a given route.
+ ///
+ /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
+ /// fields for more info.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
+ /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
+ /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
+ /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
+ /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
+ /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
+ ///
+ /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
+ /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
+ /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
+ /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// relevant updates.
+ ///
+ /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
+ /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
+ /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
+ /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
+ /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
+ }
+ let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
+ if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
+ }
+ }
+
+ let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
+
+ let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+
+ let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
+ APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
+ match {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
+ }
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: route.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
+ } {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
+ // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
+ // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
+ // something else in case we will resend later!
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
+
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ },
+ None => {},
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+ ///
+ /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
+ /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
+ ///
+ /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ ///
+ /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
+ /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
+ let (res, chan) = {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(mut chan) => {
+ (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
+ .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
+ } else { unreachable!(); })
+ , chan)
+ },
+ None => return
+ }
+ };
+ match handle_error!(self, res) {
+ Ok(funding_msg) => {
+ (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ return;
+ },
+ }
+ };
+ // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
+ // lock before add_update_monitor
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ match e {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ return;
+ },
+ Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
+ // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
+ // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
+ // in fact, safe).
+ chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: msg,
+ });
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(chan);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
+ if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
+
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
+ };
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
+
+ Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
+ channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_signature: our_node_sig,
+ bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
+ })
+ }
+
+ /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+ ///
+ /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+ /// Will likely generate further events.
+ pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
+ if short_chan_id != 0 {
+ let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
+ Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ });
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
+ // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
+ // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
+ // problem, not ours.
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
+ let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ });
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(update_add) => {
+ match update_add {
+ Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ None => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
+ // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
+ // commitment_signed messages when we can.
+ // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
+ // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
+ // this channel currently :/.
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ Ok(None) => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
+ // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
+ // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
+ // messages when we can.
+ // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
+ // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
+ // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
+ let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
+ }
+ //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
+ continue;
+ },
+ };
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
+ continue;
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ unreachable!();
+ }
+ } else {
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ };
+ match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
+ };
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
+ amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
+ });
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match update {
+ None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
+ Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
+ };
+ }
+
+ for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ if new_events.is_empty() { return }
+ let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ events.append(&mut new_events);
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+ /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
+ /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
+ /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
+ /// HTLC backwards has been started.
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
+ if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
+ for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
+ if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
+ }
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ }
+
+ /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
+ /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
+ /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
+ /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
+ /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
+ /// still-available channels.
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
+ //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
+ //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
+ //timer handling.
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ match &onion_error {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(update) = channel_update {
+ self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
+ update,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code
+ }
+ );
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref failure_code,
+ .. } => {
+ // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
+ // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
+ // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
+ // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
+ // ChannelDetails.
+ // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
+ // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
+ let err_packet = match onion_error {
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
+ let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ },
+ HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
+ }
+ };
+
+ let mut forward_event = None;
+ if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
+ }
+ match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
+ }
+ }
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ if let Some(time) = forward_event {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: time
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
+ /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
+ /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ ///
+ /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
+ if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
+ // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
+ // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
+ // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
+ for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
+ if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
+ }
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ }
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_preimage
+ });
+ },
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
+ //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
+ Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
+ // why it's missing.
+ return
+ }
+ };
+
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
+ Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
+ if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ if was_frozen_for_monitor {
+ assert!(msgs.is_none());
+ } else {
+ break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
+ //TODO: Do something with e?
+ return
+ },
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ },
+ }
+ return;
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
+ pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
+ }
+
+ /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
+ /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
+ /// operation.
+ pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
+ let mut close_results = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
+ if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ match e {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
+ // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
+ // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
+ // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
+ // on-chain confirmations.
+ // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
+ // should be written.
+ if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ false
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
+ }
+ } else {
+ let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
+ if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
+ htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
+ }
+ htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
+
+ macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
+ if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: update,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
+ if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ handle_cs!();
+ handle_raa!();
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ handle_raa!();
+ handle_cs!();
+ },
+ }
+ if needs_broadcast_safe {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
+ }
+ true
+ }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ }
+
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
+
+ for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
+ }
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
+
+ for res in close_results.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
+ });
+ entry.insert(channel);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
+ (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ },
+ //TODO: same as above
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: value,
+ output_script: output_script,
+ user_channel_id: user_id,
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
+ // lock before add_update_monitor
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ match e {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
+ // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
+ // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
+ // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
+ // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
+ // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
+ // until we have persisted our monitor.
+ chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: funding_msg,
+ });
+ e.insert(chan);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
+ }
+ (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
+ funding_txo: funding_txo,
+ user_channel_id: user_id,
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
+ channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (tx, chan_option) = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
+ if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if tx.is_some() {
+ // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
+ // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
+ // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
+ // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
+ // watch for old state broadcasts)!
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
+ channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (tx, None) }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
+ //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
+ //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
+ //
+ //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
+ //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
+ //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
+ //but we should prevent it anyway.
+
+ let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
+ // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
+ // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
+ // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
+ // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
+ // allowed.
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ res
+ }[..])
+ } else {
+ // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
+ // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
+ // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
+ // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
+ // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
+ },
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let htlc_source = {
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
+ //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
+ });
+ if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: msg,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
+ for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
+ let mut forward_event = None;
+ if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
+ }
+ for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match forward_event {
+ Some(time) => {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: time
+ });
+ }
+ None => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ if was_frozen_for_monitor {
+ assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
+ } else {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
+ }
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
+ }
+
+ let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
+
+ let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
+ self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
+ }
+
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
+
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
+ node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
+ bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: announcement,
+ },
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
+ });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
+ // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
+ // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
+ if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ }
+ if commitment_update.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+ }
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
+ //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg
+ });
+ }
+ macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
+ if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
+ if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ send_raa!();
+ send_cu!();
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ send_cu!();
+ send_raa!();
+ },
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
+ /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
+ /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ /// Note: This API is likely to change!
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let their_node_id;
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
+ }
+ if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
+ }
+ their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
+ if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
+ {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ return Ok(())
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
+impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
+ let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: funding_locked,
+ });
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
+ } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
+ });
+ return false;
+ }
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
+ for tx in txn_matched {
+ for inp in tx.input.iter() {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
+ // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
+ // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
+ // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
+ // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
+ failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ true
+ });
+ }
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
+ }
+
+ /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
+ if v.block_disconnected(header) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
+ //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
+ fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
+ }
+
+ fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ if no_connection_possible {
+ log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ });
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
+ let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
+ if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
+ failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
+ }
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ true
+ })
+ }
+ pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
+ match msg {
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
+ for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
+ log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
+ if !chan.have_received_message() {
+ // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
+ // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
+ // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
+ // drop it.
+ false
+ } else {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
+ });
+ true
+ }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
+ }
+
+ fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
+ self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
+ self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ forward_info.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
+ short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret
+});
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ hop_data.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ route.write(writer)?;
+ session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ err.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ failure_code.write(writer)?;
+ data.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ data: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ forward_info.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ err_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
+ prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
+
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
+ (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
+
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
+ short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for forward in pending_forwards {
+ forward.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
+ recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
+ previous_hop.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
+///
+/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
+/// is:
+/// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
+/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
+/// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
+/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
+/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
+/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
+/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
+/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
+/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
+/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
+/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
+/// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
+pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
+ /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
+ /// deserialization.
+ pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
+
+ /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
+ pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
+ /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
+ /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
+ /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
+ pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
+ /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
+ /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
+ /// force-closed during deserialization.
+ pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
+ /// deserialization.
+ pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
+ /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
+ /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
+ pub default_config: UserConfig,
+
+ /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
+ /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
+ ///
+ /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
+ /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
+ /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
+ /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
+ ///
+ /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
+ /// this struct.
+ pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
+}
+
+impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
+
+ let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..channel_count {
+ let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
+ if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
+ if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
+ if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
+ channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
+ let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
+ force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
+ closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
+ }
+ by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
+ if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
+ closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
+ let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
+ pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
+ }
+
+ let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
+ let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
+ for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
+ previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+ claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
+ }
+
+ let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
+ genesis_hash,
+ fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
+ monitor: args.monitor,
+ chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
+
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
+ last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+
+ channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
+ by_id,
+ short_to_id,
+ forward_htlcs,
+ claimable_htlcs,
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+ keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
+ logger: args.logger,
+ default_configuration: args.default_config,
+ };
+
+ for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
+ channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
+ //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
+ //connection or two.
+ }
+
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
+//! here.
+//!
+//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
+//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
+//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
+//!
+//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
+//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
+//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
+//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
+//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
+use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use secp256k1;
+
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
+use util::{byte_utils, events};
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
+use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
+
+/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
+ /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
+ /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
+ ///
+ /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
+ /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
+ /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
+ /// the channel to an operational state.
+ ///
+ /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
+ /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
+ /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
+ ///
+ /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
+ /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
+ /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
+ /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
+ /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
+ /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
+ /// been "frozen".
+ ///
+ /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
+ /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
+ /// channel operation.
+ ///
+ /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
+ /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
+ /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
+ TemporaryFailure,
+ /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
+ /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
+ /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
+ ///
+ /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
+ PermanentFailure,
+}
+
+/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
+/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
+/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
+/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+
+/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
+/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
+pub struct HTLCUpdate {
+ pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ pub(super) source: HTLCSource
+}
+
+/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
+/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
+/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
+/// server(s).
+///
+/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
+/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
+/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
+/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
+pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
+ /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
+ /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
+ /// any spends of it.
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
+ /// with success or failure backward
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
+}
+
+/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
+/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
+///
+/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
+///
+/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
+/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
+/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
+///
+/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
+/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
+pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
+ pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+ fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
+}
+
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
+ let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
+ if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
+ outputs: spendable_outputs,
+ });
+ }
+
+ for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
+ }
+ }
+ htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
+ let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
+ match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
+ // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
+ // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
+ let mut existing_claim = false;
+ e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
+ if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
+ if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
+ existing_claim = true;
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ if !existing_claim {
+ e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
+ }
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
+ }
+
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
+ /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
+ let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
+ monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ chain_monitor,
+ broadcaster,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ logger,
+ fee_estimator: feeest,
+ });
+ let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
+ res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
+ pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
+ Some(orig_monitor) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
+ return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
+ },
+ None => {}
+ };
+ match monitor.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ match funding_info {
+ &None => {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
+ },
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
+ }
+ }
+ monitors.insert(key, monitor);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
+ Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
+ for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
+ for htlc_data in v {
+ pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ payment_hash: k,
+ payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
+ source: htlc_data.0,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ pending_htlcs_updated
+ }
+}
+
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
+/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
+const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
+/// HTLC-Success transaction.
+/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
+/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
+pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
+/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
+/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
+/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
+/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
+/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
+/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
+/// accurate block height.
+/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
+/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
+pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
+/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
+/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
+/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
+/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
+pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum Storage {
+ Local {
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ },
+ Watchtower {
+ revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
+ htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+struct LocalSignedTx {
+ /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
+ txid: Sha256dHash,
+ tx: Transaction,
+ revocation_key: PublicKey,
+ a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ feerate_per_kw: u64,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+enum InputDescriptors {
+ RevokedOfferedHTLC,
+ RevokedReceivedHTLC,
+ OfferedHTLC,
+ ReceivedHTLC,
+ RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
+}
+
+/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
+/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
+/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum TxMaterial {
+ Revoked {
+ script: Script,
+ pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ is_htlc: bool,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ RemoteHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ LocalHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ sigs: (Signature, Signature),
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
+/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum OnchainEvent {
+ /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
+ /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
+ Claim {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
+ },
+ /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
+ /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
+ /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
+ HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
+ },
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
+/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
+///
+/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
+/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ChannelMonitor {
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
+
+ key_storage: Storage,
+ their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
+ their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+
+ our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
+
+ old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
+ /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
+ /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
+ /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
+ /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
+ /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
+ /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
+ /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
+ /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
+ /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
+ remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
+
+ // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
+ // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
+ // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
+ // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+
+ // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
+ // deserialization
+ current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
+
+ destination_script: Script,
+ // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
+ // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
+ // scan every commitment transaction for that
+ to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
+
+ // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
+ // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
+ // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
+ // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
+ // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
+ // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
+
+ // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
+ // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
+ // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+
+ // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
+ // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
+ // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
+ // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
+ // the full block_connected).
+ pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
+ ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
+ {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, fee, $value);
+ false
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+ self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+ self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
+ self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
+ self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ true
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChannelMonitor {
+ pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ ChannelMonitor {
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
+
+ key_storage: Storage::Local {
+ revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
+ htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
+ shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: None,
+ funding_info: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+ },
+ their_htlc_base_key: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
+ their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+
+ our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay: None,
+
+ old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+ destination_script: destination_script,
+ to_remote_rescue: None,
+
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
+ last_block_hash: Default::default(),
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
+ let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ for inp in inputs {
+ // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
+ tx_weight += match inp {
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
+ },
+ };
+ }
+ tx_weight
+ }
+
+ fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
+ if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
+ return current_height + 1
+ } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
+ return current_height + 3
+ }
+ current_height + 15
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
+ for i in 0..48 {
+ if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
+ return i
+ }
+ }
+ 48
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
+ for i in 0..bits {
+ let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
+ if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
+ res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
+ /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
+ /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
+ for i in 0..pos {
+ let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
+ if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+ }
+ }
+ if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
+
+ // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+ // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
+ // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
+ let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
+ let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
+
+ self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if k == htlc.payment_hash {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if k == htlc.payment_hash {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
+ if *cn < min_idx {
+ return true
+ }
+ true
+ } else { false };
+ if contains {
+ remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
+ }
+ false
+ });
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
+ /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
+ /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
+ /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
+ // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
+ // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
+ // timeouts)
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
+ }
+
+ let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
+ *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
+ }
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
+ //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
+ let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
+ .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
+ .into_script();
+ if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
+ self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
+ /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
+ /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
+ /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
+ /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
+ /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
+ /// case of onchain HTLC tx
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
+ assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
+ tx: signed_commitment_tx,
+ revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs,
+ });
+
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
+ /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
+ pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+ }
+
+ /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
+ /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
+ /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
+ let our_funding_info = funding_info;
+ if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
+ if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
+ // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
+ // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
+ if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
+ unimplemented!();
+ } else {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
+ let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
+ if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
+ self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
+ self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
+ // local transactions to decide how to merge
+ if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
+ for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
+ }
+ if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
+ }
+ self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
+ self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
+ }
+
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
+ pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
+ assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
+ }
+
+ /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
+ /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
+ /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
+ /// provides slightly better privacy.
+ /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
+ /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
+ pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
+ *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
+ pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
+ self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
+ self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
+ *funding_info = None;
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ match funding_info {
+ &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
+ &None => None
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
+ /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
+ /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
+ /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+ pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+ for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+ //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ &Some(ref t) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ t.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ match funding_info {
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
+ },
+ }
+ current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ },
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
+
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(secret)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+ (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in txouts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ }
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
+ }
+
+ self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
+ local_key.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
+ match claim_tx_data.1 {
+ TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
+ if *is_htlc {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ key.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.0.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.1.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ }
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, true)
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, false)
+ }
+
+ /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
+ pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
+ if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
+ return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
+ None
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ //TODO This can be optimized?
+ let mut min = 1 << 48;
+ for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ if idx < min {
+ min = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ min
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
+ } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
+ /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
+ /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
+ /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
+ /// revoked remote commitment tx
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
+ // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
+ let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+ let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
+
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
+ let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
+ Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
+ None)
+ },
+ };
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
+ let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
+ };
+
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+
+ let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
+ // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
+ // script_pubkey version.
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
+ } else { None };
+
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
+
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: idx as u32,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
+ inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
+ total_value += outp.value;
+ } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
+ {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
+ };
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
+ let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
+ $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
+ } else {
+ $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ }
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, revocation_key)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
+
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
+ }
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: total_value,
+ });
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+
+ let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
+
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
+ }
+
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
+
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+ } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
+ // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
+ // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
+ // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
+ // insert it here.
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ let revocation_point_option =
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
+ },
+ };
+ let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
+ };
+
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_key,
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
+ }
+ break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+ {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
+ let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ $input.witness.push($preimage);
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, htlc_key)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
+ //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: total_value
+ });
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+
+ let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
+
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
+ }
+
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_key.clone(),
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
+ return (None, None)
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (None, None)
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
+ },
+ };
+ let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
+ None => return (None, None),
+ Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
+ };
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut amount = 0;
+
+ if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: htlc_txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ amount = tx.output[0].value;
+ }
+
+ if !inputs.is_empty() {
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: amount
+ });
+
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (None, None);
+ }
+
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
+ let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
+ }
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
+ let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
+ let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
+ }
+ (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
+ } else { (None, None) }
+ }
+
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+
+ macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
+ ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
+ if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
+ key: local_delayedkey,
+ witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
+
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
+ res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
+
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
+ res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+ } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
+ /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
+ /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
+ ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != $source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
+ ($updates: expr) => {
+ local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
+ for claim in $updates.3 {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
+ let mut is_local_tx = false;
+
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+ wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if is_local_tx {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ }
+
+ /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
+ fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+ if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
+ return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
+ output: output.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
+ // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
+ /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
+ /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
+ /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
+ /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
+ /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
+ /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
+ /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
+ /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
+ pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
+ // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
+ };
+ res
+ } else {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
+ for tx in txn_matched {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 {
+ // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
+ // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
+ // filters.
+ let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
+ let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
+ let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ funding_info.clone()
+ }
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
+ if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
+ txn = remote_txn;
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ if txn.is_empty() {
+ let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ txn = local_txn;
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
+ if let Some(tx) = tx {
+ txn.push(tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for tx in txn.iter() {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ }
+ }
+ // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
+ // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
+ // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
+ for inp in &tx.input {
+ if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ return outpoint != inp.previous_output
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for claim in pending_claims {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
+ htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+ }
+
+ fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
+ if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ //We may discard:
+ //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
+ //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
+ }
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
+ // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
+ // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
+ // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
+ // broadcast if we go on-chain.
+ // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
+ // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
+ // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
+ // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for ref htlc in $htlcs {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
+ // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
+ let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
+ if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
+ }
+
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ false
+ }
+
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
+ /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
+
+ 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
+ let mut payment_data = None;
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+ || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+
+ macro_rules! log_claim {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
+ // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
+ // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
+ // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ } else {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
+ ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
+ if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
+ for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
+ log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
+ payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
+ if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
+ payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ } else if !$local_tx {
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
+ continue 'outer_loop;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our latest local commitment tx", true);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our previous local commitment tx", true);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
+ "remote commitment tx", false);
+ }
+
+ // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
+ // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
+ if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ htlc_updated
+ }
+}
+
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let outpoint = OutPoint {
+ txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ index: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ };
+ let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ Storage::Local {
+ revocation_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ payment_base_key,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
+ latest_per_commitment_point,
+ funding_info,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid,
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(e) => match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ };
+
+ if tx.input.is_empty() {
+ // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
+ let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => true,
+ 1 => false,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::Revoked {
+ script,
+ pubkey,
+ key,
+ is_htlc,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
+ script,
+ key,
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
+ script,
+ sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
+ }
+
+ let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::Claim {
+ outpoint
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ events.push(ev);
+ }
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
+ }
+
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ key_storage,
+ their_htlc_base_key,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ remote_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_remote_commitment_number,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+
+ destination_script,
+ to_remote_rescue,
+
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+
+ last_block_hash,
+ secp_ctx,
+ logger,
+ }))
+ }
+
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use hex;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
+ use ln::chan_utils;
+ use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+ use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
+ use std::sync::Arc;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
+ let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
+ let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
+
+ macro_rules! test_secrets {
+ () => {
+ let mut idx = 281474976710655;
+ for secret in secrets.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
+ idx -= 1;
+ }
+ assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
+ assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
+ };
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret correct sequence
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #1 incorrect
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #3 incorrect
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #5 incorrect
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #7 incorrect
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #8 incorrect
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
+ "Previous secret did not match new one");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_prune_preimages() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
+
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ macro_rules! dummy_keys {
+ () => {
+ {
+ TxCreationKeys {
+ per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
+ revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+
+ let mut preimages = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ for _ in 0..20 {
+ let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ preimages.push((preimage, hash));
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: true,
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
+ transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
+ }, None));
+ }
+ res
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
+ res
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
+ for preimage in $preimages_slice {
+ assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
+ // old state.
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
+
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
+ for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
+ }
+
+ // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
+ let mut secret = [0; 32];
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
+ // previous commitment tx's preimages too
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
+
+ // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
+ // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
+ // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+ let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
+ transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
+ };
+ let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
+ if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
+ $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
+ $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
+ $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
+ } else {
+ $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ }
+ $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
+ }
+ }
+
+ let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ }
+
+ // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! A bunch of useful utilities for building networks of nodes and exchanging messages between
+//! nodes for functional tests.
+
+use chain::chaininterface;
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::router::{Route, Router};
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler, LocalFeatures};
+use util::test_utils;
+use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::config::UserConfig;
+
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+
+use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
+
+use std::cell::RefCell;
+use std::rc::Rc;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::mem;
+
+pub const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 100;
+pub fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
+ assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
+ for i in 2..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn connect_blocks(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, depth: u32, height: u32, parent: bool, prev_blockhash: Sha256d) -> Sha256d {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000000, prev_blockhash: if parent { prev_blockhash } else { Default::default() }, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ chain.block_connected_checked(&header, height + 1, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ for i in 2..depth + 1 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ chain.block_connected_checked(&header, height + i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ }
+ header.bitcoin_hash()
+}
+
+pub struct Node {
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
+ pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
+ pub chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
+ pub keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
+ pub node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
+ pub router: Router,
+ pub node_seed: [u8; 32],
+ pub network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
+ pub network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
+}
+impl Drop for Node {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ if !::std::thread::panicking() {
+ // Check that we processed all pending events
+ assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001, a_flags, b_flags)
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+ let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
+ (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
+ ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ (match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }, match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ updates.commitment_signed.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ })
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_event_msg {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
+ ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
+ (*updates).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn create_funding_transaction(node: &Node, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u64) -> ([u8; 32], Transaction, OutPoint) {
+ let chan_id = *node.network_chan_count.borrow();
+
+ let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, expected_chan_value);
+ assert_eq!(user_channel_id, expected_user_chan_id);
+
+ let tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
+ (*temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_outpoint)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> Transaction {
+ node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
+ node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, channel_value, 42);
+
+ {
+ node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+
+ node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+
+ node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+
+ let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+ assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ tx
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_recv: &Node, node_conf: &Node, tx: &Transaction) {
+ confirm_transaction(&node_conf.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ node_recv.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_conf.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_conf, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_recv: &Node, node_conf: &Node) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
+ let channel_id;
+ let events_6 = node_conf.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
+ ((match events_6[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }, match events_6[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }), channel_id)
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_a, node_b, tx);
+ confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_b, node_a)
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
+ let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
+ (msgs, chan_id, tx)
+}
+
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
+ node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
+ let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
+
+ let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
+ let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ (msg, update_msg)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
+ let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
+ let as_update = match events_8[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ assert!(*announcement == *msg);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
+ update_msg
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
+
+ ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
+}
+
+pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001, a_flags, b_flags)
+}
+
+pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+ let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
+ for node in nodes {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
+ }
+ (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
+}
+
+macro_rules! check_spends {
+ ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
+ {
+ $tx.verify(|out_point| {
+ if out_point.txid == $spends_tx.txid() {
+ $spends_tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
+ ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
+ (match events[events.len() - 1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }, if events.len() == 2 {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { None })
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! check_closed_broadcast {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }}
+}
+
+pub fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
+ let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
+ let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
+ let (tx_a, tx_b);
+
+ node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
+ node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+
+ let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
+ let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(match events_1[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ })
+ };
+
+ node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
+ let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
+ assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
+ let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
+
+ node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(none_b.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
+ (as_update, bs_update)
+ } else {
+ let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
+
+ node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
+ let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
+
+ node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(none_a.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
+ (as_update, bs_update)
+ };
+ assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
+ check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
+
+ (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
+}
+
+pub struct SendEvent {
+ pub node_id: PublicKey,
+ pub msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
+ pub commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
+}
+impl SendEvent {
+ pub fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
+ }
+
+ pub fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
+ let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
+ ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
+ {
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+ commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
+ {
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
+ assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
+ $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
+ let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert!(events.len() <= 2);
+ (match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
+ };
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
+ if $fail_backwards {
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ }
+ (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
+ {
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+ let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
+ assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
+ bs_revoke_and_ack
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
+ {
+ let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
+ $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+ extra_msg_option
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
+ {
+ assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
+ {
+ commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
+ if $fail_backwards {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node_a);
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+
+ let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
+ assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ } else {
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
+ ($node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
+ *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ }}
+}
+
+macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
+ ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! expect_payment_sent {
+ ($node: expr, $expected_payment_preimage: expr) => {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!($expected_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
+
+ let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ let mut prev_node = origin_node;
+
+ for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
+ assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
+
+ node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
+
+ if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
+ let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+ }
+
+ prev_node = node;
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
+ send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value, our_payment_hash);
+ (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
+}
+
+pub fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
+
+ let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
+ let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
+ macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
+ ($node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
+ Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
+ assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
+ {
+ $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
+ let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
+ get_next_msgs!($node)
+ } else {
+ assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ None
+ };
+ commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
+ next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
+ for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
+ assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
+ if next_msgs.is_some() {
+ mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
+ } else if update_next_msgs {
+ next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
+ } else {
+ assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ }
+ if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
+ assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
+ prev_node = node;
+ }
+
+ if !skip_last {
+ last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
+ expect_payment_sent!(origin_node, our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
+}
+
+pub const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
+
+pub fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
+ let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
+ for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
+ assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
+ send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
+}
+
+pub fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
+ let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
+ for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
+ assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
+
+ let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
+ match err {
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
+ _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
+ };
+}
+
+pub fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
+ let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
+ claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
+}
+
+pub fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
+ assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(expected_route.last().unwrap());
+ check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
+
+ let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
+ macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
+ if skip_last && $last_node {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
+ let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
+ for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
+ assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ if next_msgs.is_some() {
+ // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
+ // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
+ // second-to-last node!
+ update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
+ }
+
+ let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
+ next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+ }
+ if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
+ assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
+ prev_node = node;
+ }
+
+ if !skip_last {
+ update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
+
+ let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
+ fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
+}
+
+pub fn create_network(node_count: usize, node_config: &[Option<UserConfig>]) -> Vec<Node> {
+ let mut nodes = Vec::new();
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
+ let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
+
+ for i in 0..node_count {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
+ let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
+ let mut seed = [0; 32];
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
+ let mut default_config = UserConfig::new();
+ default_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ default_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { default_config }).unwrap();
+ let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
+ nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
+ network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
+ network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+
+ nodes
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
+/// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
+///
+/// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
+/// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
+/// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
+///
+/// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
+/// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
+///
+/// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
+/// also fail.
+pub fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
+
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
+ if commitment_tx.is_none() {
+ res.push(tx.clone());
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
+ res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
+
+ if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
+ check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
+ if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
+ assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
+ } else {
+ assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
+ }
+ res.push(tx.clone());
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
+ if res.len() == 3 {
+ assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
+ res
+}
+
+/// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
+/// HTLC transaction.
+pub fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
+ let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
+}
+
+pub fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+
+ assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ let mut found_prev = false;
+
+ for tx in prev_txn {
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
+ assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
+
+ found_prev = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(found_prev);
+
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
+ res
+}
+
+pub fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
+ let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ let as_update = match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ for node in nodes {
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
+ ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_value_stat()
+ }}
+}
+
+macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
+ ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ res.push(msg.clone());
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event")
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
+ ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ let mut idx = 0;
+ let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
+ idx += 1;
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+
+ let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
+ let mut commitment_update = None;
+ let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
+ idx += 1;
+ match ev {
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
+ },
+ &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+ };
+
+ if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
+ match ev {
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
+ revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ },
+ &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
+ commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
+/// for claims/fails they are separated out.
+pub fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
+ node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
+ node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
+
+ if send_funding_locked.0 {
+ // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
+ // from b
+ for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if send_funding_locked.1 {
+ // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
+ // from a
+ for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
+ // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
+ // next_local_commitment_number to 1
+ for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
+ }
+ for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
+ for msg in reestablish_1 {
+ node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
+ }
+ if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
+ }
+
+ let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
+ for msg in reestablish_2 {
+ node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
+ }
+ if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
+ }
+
+ // We don't yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
+ assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
+ (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
+
+ for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
+ if send_funding_locked.0 {
+ node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
+ assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
+ //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_raa.0 {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
+ let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
+ } else {
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ }
+ }
+
+ for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
+ if send_funding_locked.1 {
+ node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
+ assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
+ //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_raa.1 {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
+ let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
+//! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
+//! claim outputs on-chain.
+
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor, KeysManager};
+use chain::keysinterface;
+use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
+use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, Channel, ChannelError};
+use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, LocalFeatures, ErrorAction};
+use util::test_utils;
+use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
+use util::config::UserConfig;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
+use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+
+use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+
+use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
+use std::default::Default;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+use std::mem;
+
+use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
+
+use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
+ // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
+ // funding satoshis
+ let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
+ let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
+ let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+
+ // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
+ // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
+ let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
+ match nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone())) {
+ Err(msgs::HandleError{ err: error_str, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) => {
+ assert_eq!(error_str, expected_error_str, "unexpected HandleError string (expected `{}`, actual `{}`)", expected_error_str, error_str)
+ },
+ Err(msgs::HandleError{..}) => {panic!("unexpected HandleError action")},
+ _ => panic!("insane OpenChannel message was somehow Ok"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
+
+ // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
+ insane_open_helper("funding value > 2^24", |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("push_msat larger than funding value", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Minimum htlc value is full channel value", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("max_accpted_htlcs > 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // A B
+ // update_fee ->
+ // send (1) commitment_signed -.
+ // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
+ // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
+ // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
+ // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
+ // (2) RAA is delivered ->
+ // .- send (4) commitment_signed
+ // <- (3) RAA is delivered
+ // send (5) commitment_signed -.
+ // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
+ // send (6) RAA -.
+ // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
+ // <- RAA
+ // (6) RAA is delivered ->
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // deliver(1), generate (3):
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
+ let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
+ let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
+ let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
+ let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
+ // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
+ // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
+ update_fee.as_ref()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
+ let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ // A B
+ // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
+ // update_fee (never committed) ->
+ // (3) update_fee ->
+ // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
+ // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
+ // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
+ // <- (1) RAA delivered
+ // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
+ // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
+ // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
+ // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+ // B should send no response here
+ // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
+ // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
+ let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
+ // transaction:
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
+ let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
+ feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
+
+ update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
+ // Deliver (3)
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
+
+ // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
+ assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
+
+ // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Delever (4)
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
+ let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let channel_value = 1888;
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ let feerate = 260;
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
+ //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
+ {
+ let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+
+ //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
+ let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
+ actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
+ assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
+ } //drop the mutex
+
+ //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
+ //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
+ //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
+ //Should produce and error.
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
+
+ assert!(match err.err {
+ "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
+ _ => false,
+ });
+
+ //clear the message we could not handle
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
+
+ // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // node[1] has nothing to do
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
+
+ let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fee() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ // A B
+ // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
+ // .- send (3) commitment_signed
+ // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
+ // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
+ // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
+ // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
+ // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
+ // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
+ // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+
+ // Create and deliver (1)...
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // Generate (2) and (3):
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (2):
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Create and deliver (4)...
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // ... creating (5)
+ let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+
+ // Handle (3), creating (6):
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+
+ // Deliver (5):
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (6), creating (7):
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
+ let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (7)
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
+ // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
+ // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
+ else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
+ else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
+ // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
+
+ let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
+ // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
+ // messages delivered prior to disconnect
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if recv_count > 0 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if recv_count > 1 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
+ let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
+ let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
+ let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
+ node_0_2nd_shutdown
+ } else {
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if recv_count > 0 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if recv_count == 0 {
+ // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
+ let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
+ let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
+ let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
+ let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
+ } else {
+ // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
+ // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
+ // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
+ // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
+ // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
+ // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
+ // transaction.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
+ assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
+ } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
+
+ // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
+ // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
+ // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
+ do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
+ do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
+ do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn fake_network_test() {
+ // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
+ // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // Send some more payments
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
+
+ // Test failure packets
+ let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
+
+ // Add a new channel that skips 3
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
+ let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ });
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ });
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 1000000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ });
+ hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
+ hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
+ let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
+
+ let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ });
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
+ });
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: 1000000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ });
+ hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
+ hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
+ let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
+
+ // Claim the rebalances...
+ fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Send some payments across both channels
+ let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
+
+ //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
+
+ // Close down the channels...
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
+ close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
+ close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
+ // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
+ // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
+ // commitment dance rounds.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let mut payments = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
+ payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
+ // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
+ // another HTLC.
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+
+ // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
+ // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update).unwrap();
+ }
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
+ for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
+ match event {
+ &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+
+ for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
+ }
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
+ // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
+ // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
+ let mut nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
+
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
+
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
+ fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
+}
+
+fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
+ use ln::msgs::HandleError;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
+ let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+
+ let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
+ let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
+
+ macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
+ ($recv_value: expr) => {{
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
+ }}
+ };
+
+ macro_rules! expect_forward {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
+ payment_event
+ }}
+ }
+
+ let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
+ let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
+
+ let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
+
+ // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ {
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
+ assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
+ match err {
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
+ _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut htlc_id = 0;
+ // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
+ // nodes[0]'s wealth
+ loop {
+ let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
+ if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
+ break;
+ }
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
+ htlc_id += 1;
+
+ let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
+ get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
+ get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
+ get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
+ get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
+ );
+
+ assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
+ assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
+ assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
+ assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
+ stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
+ }
+
+ {
+ let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
+ // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
+ match err {
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
+ _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // adding pending output
+ let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
+ let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
+
+ let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
+ let payment_event_1 = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
+ let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
+ {
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
+ match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
+ _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
+
+ // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
+ let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ session_key
+ }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+ let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: chan_1.2,
+ htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ };
+
+ if test_recv {
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
+ match err {
+ HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
+ }
+ // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // split the rest to test holding cell
+ let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
+ let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
+ {
+ let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
+ assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
+ }
+
+ // now see if they go through on both sides
+ let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
+ // but this will stuck in the holding cell
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+
+ // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
+ {
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
+ match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
+ _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
+ // this will also stuck in the holding cell
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // flush the pending htlc
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
+
+ // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
+
+ let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
+ let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
+ assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
+ assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
+
+ let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
+ assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn channel_reserve_test() {
+ do_channel_reserve_test(false);
+ do_channel_reserve_test(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
+ // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
+ // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
+ // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
+ // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
+ // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
+ // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
+ // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
+ // To test this we:
+ // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
+ // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
+ // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
+ // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
+ // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
+ // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
+ // * deliver the first fulfill from B
+ // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
+ // claim,
+ // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
+ // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
+ // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
+ // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
+ // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+ // Route the first two HTLCs.
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
+
+ // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
+ let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let send_1 = {
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
+ // initial fulfill/CS.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
+ // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
+ // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
+ // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
+ // on-chain as necessary).
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 100000);
+
+ // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
+ // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
+ // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
+ let send_2 = {
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, 10000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
+ // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
+ // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
+ let nodes = create_network(5, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ macro_rules! claim_funds {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+ {
+ assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
+
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
+ // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ {
+ let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
+
+ // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
+ claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
+ // One pending HTLC to time out:
+ let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
+ // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
+ // buffer space).
+
+ {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+
+ let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
+
+ // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
+ claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
+
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
+
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
+
+ check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_justice_tx() {
+ // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
+
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::new();
+ alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::new();
+ bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
+ // Create some new channels:
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
+ let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+
+ {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ node_txn.swap_remove(0);
+ }
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+
+ // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
+ // Create some new channels:
+ let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
+ let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
+ {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ node_txn.swap_remove(0);
+ }
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn revoked_output_claim() {
+ // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
+ // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
+ // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
+
+ // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
+ // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some new channel:
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
+ check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ //Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ {
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
+
+ let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
+ // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
+ // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ //Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ {
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+
+ for i in 12..22 {
+ if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+
+ fn get_txout(out_point: &BitcoinOutPoint, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<TxOut> {
+ if out_point.txid == tx.txid() {
+ tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+ node_txn[0].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[1].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[2].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+
+ let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
+ let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
+ // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
+ // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
+ // commitment transaction was broadcast.
+ // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
+ // towards B.
+ // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
+ // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
+ // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
+ // PaymentSent event).
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 4 (2*2 * HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
+
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
+ ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
+ // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx.clone());
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
+ if $htlc_offered {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ }
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], $chan_tx.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[3].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert!(node_txn[4].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[3].lock_time, 0);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[4].lock_time, 0);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ } }
+ }
+ // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
+ // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
+ // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
+ check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
+ // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
+ // we already checked the same situation with A.
+
+ // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut first_claimed = false;
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage {
+ assert!(!first_claimed);
+ first_claimed = true;
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
+ // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
+ // \ \
+ // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some intial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+
+ // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ let timeout_tx;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
+ // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
+ // and fail backward accordingly.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
+ // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
+ // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
+ // commitment transaction anymore.
+ // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
+ // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
+ // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
+ // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
+ // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
+ // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
+ // transactions:
+ // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
+ // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
+ // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
+ // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
+ // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ let value = if use_dust {
+ // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
+ // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
+ nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
+ } else { 3000000 };
+
+ let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
+ // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
+ // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
+ // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
+ // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
+ }
+
+ let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ if !deliver_bs_raa {
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
+ // that we should update our routing table for.
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[2] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
+ // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
+ // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
+ // registering new transactions
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
+ // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
+ // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
+ // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
+
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+ let tx = {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
+ // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
+ // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ node_txn.remove(0)
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+
+ // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
+ {
+ let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), 0)).unwrap()
+ .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_unconf_chan() {
+ // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+
+ let mut headers = Vec::new();
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ headers.push(header.clone());
+ for _i in 2..100 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ headers.push(header.clone());
+ }
+ let mut height = 99;
+ while !headers.is_empty() {
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
+ height -= 1;
+ }
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
+ // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+ let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
+ fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
+ {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
+}
+
+fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
+ // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ if messages_delivered == 0 {
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
+ } else {
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ }
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
+
+ if messages_delivered < 2 {
+ // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
+ } else {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if messages_delivered >= 3 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 4 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 5 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 6 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ if messages_delivered < 3 {
+ // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
+ // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
+ // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
+ // Everything was delivered...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 1 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
+
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 2 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 3 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 4 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 5 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ if messages_delivered < 2 {
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
+ //if messages_delivered < 1 {
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ //}
+ } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
+ // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
+ // Everything was delivered...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // Channel should still work fine...
+ let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
+ // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events_2[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
+ // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
+ // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
+ // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
+ //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+ let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+
+ let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+
+ let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+
+ let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
+
+ let mut chan_announcement;
+
+ macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
+ () => {
+ msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! sign_msg {
+ ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
+ let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
+ let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
+ let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
+ chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
+ node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: $unsigned_msg
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+
+ // Configured with Network::Testnet
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let config = UserConfig::new();
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: config,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
+ // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
+ let mut nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
+ // nodes[3])
+ let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
+ for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
+ node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
+ for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
+ let mut read = &serialized[..];
+ let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(read.is_empty());
+ node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
+ }
+
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+
+ { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
+ }
+
+ for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+
+ // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //... and we can even still claim the payment!
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+
+ nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
+ assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
+}
+
+macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
+ ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let mut txn = Vec::new();
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
+ for outp in outputs {
+ match *outp {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp.clone()],
+ };
+ let secret = {
+ match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
+ Ok(master_key) => {
+ match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
+ }
+ }
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
+ }
+ };
+ let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+ txn
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+
+ // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
+ // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
+ // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
+ // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
+ // channel.
+ // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
+ // gets broadcast.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+
+ let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+
+ // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
+ {
+ let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ b_txn.clear();
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
+ // Topology : A --> B --> C
+ // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
+
+ let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let htlc_timeout_tx;
+ { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
+ htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
+ },
+ _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
+}
+
+fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
+ // unrevoked commitment transaction.
+ // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
+ // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
+ // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
+ // use the same payment hashes.
+ // Thus, we use a six-node network:
+ //
+ // A \ / E
+ // - C - D -
+ // B / \ F
+ // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
+ let nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance and check output sanity...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
+
+ let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ // 0th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 1st HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // 2nd HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 3rd HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 4th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_3) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ // 5th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_4) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // 6th HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_3);
+ // 7th HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_4);
+
+ // 8th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_5) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ // 9th HTLC:
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+
+ // 10th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_6) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 11th HTLC:
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_6);
+
+ // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
+ // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
+ // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 8);
+
+ // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
+ // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
+
+ let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
+ assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
+
+ let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let ds_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
+ let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]).unwrap();
+ if deliver_last_raa {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ }
+
+ // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
+ // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
+ // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
+ // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
+ //
+ // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
+ // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
+ // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
+ //
+ // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
+ // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
+ let ds_last_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+
+ let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
+ let mut a_done = false;
+ for msg in cs_msgs {
+ match msg {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
+ // should be failed-backwards here.
+ let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
+ for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
+ assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
+ assert!(!a_done);
+ a_done = true;
+ &nodes[0]
+ } else {
+ // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
+ for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
+ assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
+ &nodes[1]
+ };
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ if announce_latest {
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+ commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
+ let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
+ for event in as_events.iter() {
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
+ assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
+ } else {
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ }
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ if announce_latest {
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+ }
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
+
+ let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
+ let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
+ for event in bs_events.iter() {
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
+ assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
+ } else {
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ }
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ if announce_latest {
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
+ }
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+
+ // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
+ // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due
+ // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
+ // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2
+ // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates.
+ let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
+ let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
+ for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) {
+ match event {
+ &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
+ // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
+ // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
+}
+
+fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
+
+ // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
+ // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ }
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
+ // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
+ // to "time out" the HTLC.
+
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ }
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
+ // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
+ // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
+ // actually revoked.
+ let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ if check_revoke_no_close {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ }
+ if !check_revoke_no_close {
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ } else {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
+// There are only a few cases to test here:
+// * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
+// broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
+// * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
+// * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
+// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
+// non-dust HTLCs.
+// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
+// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
+// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
+#[test]
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
+ do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
+ do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
+
+ do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
+ do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
+}
+
+fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: FnMut(),
+{
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
+}
+
+// test_case
+// 0: node1 fails backward
+// 1: final node fails backward
+// 2: payment completed but the user rejects the payment
+// 3: final node fails backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
+// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returning fail_htlc
+// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returning fail_htlc
+fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ F3: FnMut(),
+{
+
+ // reset block height
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
+ nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_event {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ $event_type { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
+ $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // temper update_add (0 => 1)
+ let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let update_1_0 = match test_case {
+ 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // forwarding on 1
+ if test_case != 200 {
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
+
+ let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
+ let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
+ }
+
+ // 1 => 2
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
+ expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
+ callback_node();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ }
+
+ let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
+ }
+ assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+
+ let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 200 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+
+ // 2 => 1
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true);
+
+ // backward fail on 1
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+
+ // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
+ if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
+ let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 100 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ };
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
+ assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Uexpected event");
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
+ panic!("channel_update not found!");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+}
+
+impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
+ use secp256k1::Signature;
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
+ contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: Sha256dHash::hash(&vec![0u8][..]),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_onion_failure() {
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
+ use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
+ use secp256k1;
+
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap());
+ }
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new()), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new())];
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // positve case
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
+ // receiving simulated fail messages
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // trigger error
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returning error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returning error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
+
+ let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
+ bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
+ run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
+ //invalid channel_update cases.
+ run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
+ msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
+ forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(18), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
+ forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(19), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let mut route = route.clone();
+ let height = 1;
+ route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
+}
+
+#[test]
+#[should_panic]
+fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ //Force duplicate channel ids
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
+ }
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
+ let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
+
+ //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
+ let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
+ let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
+ // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
+ assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
+ let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+}
+
+// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
+// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
+//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ route.hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
+ //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::RouteError{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Channel CLTV overflowed?!");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+
+ for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100000);
+ }
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let channel_value = 100000;
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], max_in_flight+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
+}
+
+// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
+ {
+ let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat();
+ }
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat;
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 5000000-their_channel_reserve, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 5000000-their_channel_reserve+1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
+ let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ session_key
+ }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+ let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 1000,
+ payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+ };
+
+ for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
+ msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ }
+ msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
+ //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
+ //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
+ // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
+ // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ //Disconnect and Reconnect
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ //Resend HTLC
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote skipped HTLC ID");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
+ };
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
+ };
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
+ failure_code: 0x8000,
+ };
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+ update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
+ // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ //First hop
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ //Second Hop
+ payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
+ match events_3[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0).unwrap();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+
+ //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
+ match events_4[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+}
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+ // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+ // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+ let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+ let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+ // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut first_failed = false;
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+ assert!(!first_failed);
+ first_failed = true;
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
+ // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance a bit
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
+
+ // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: 10000,
+ };
+
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp]
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+ // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2);
+}
+
+fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
+ // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
+ if revoked {
+ let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+ }
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
+ if local {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if !revoked {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
+ // commitment tx
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let first;
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
+ else { first = false; }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
+ else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ // BOLT 2 : Option upfront shutdown script, if peer commit its closing_script at channel opening
+ // enforce it at shutdown message
+
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = false;
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, Some(config), None]);
+
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it changes at closing, we refuse to sign
+ let flags = LocalFeatures::new();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ // Test we enforce upfront_scriptpbukey if by providing a diffrent one at closing that we disconnect peer
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {
+ if let Some(error) = error.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it doesn't change at closing, we sign
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it oesn't change at closing, we sign
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that if case of peer non-signaling we don't enforce committed script at channel opening
+ let mut flags_no = LocalFeatures::new();
+ flags_no.unset_upfront_shutdown_script();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags_no, flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_1_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ // channel smoothly, opt-out is from channel initiator here
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 0, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ //// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ //// channel smoothly
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
+ // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
+
+ let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
+ let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None]);
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
+ let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), 10, 20));
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false) }
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel) {
+ if let Some(error) = error.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &high_their_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_data_loss_protect() {
+ // We want to be sure that :
+ // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
+ // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
+ // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to remote my_current_per_commitment_point
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Cache node A state before any channel update
+ let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut previous_chan_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut previous_chan_monitor_state).unwrap();
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ // Restore node A from previous state
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0)));
+ let chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
+ let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &chan_monitor);
+ let node_state_0 = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ keys_manager: Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger), 42, 21)),
+ fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
+ monitor: monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::clone(&logger),
+ tx_broadcaster,
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors
+ }).unwrap().1;
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(node_state_0);
+ monitor.add_update_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_monitor.clone()).is_ok();
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = monitor;
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = chain_monitor;
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ // Check we update monitor following learning of per_commitment_point from B
+ if let Err(err) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]) {
+ if let Some(error) = err.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ {
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
+ } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event")
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
+ if let Err(err) = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]) {
+ if let Some(error) = err.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! High level lightning structs and impls live here.
+//!
+//! You probably want to create a channelmanager::ChannelManager, and a router::Router first.
+//! Then, you probably want to pass them both on to a peer_handler::PeerManager and use that to
+//! create/manage connections and call get_and_clear_pending_events after each action, handling
+//! them appropriately.
+//!
+//! When you want to open/close a channel or send a payment, call into your ChannelManager and when
+//! you want to learn things about the network topology (eg get a route for sending a payment),
+//! call into your Router.
+
+pub mod channelmanager;
+pub mod channelmonitor;
+pub mod msgs;
+pub mod router;
+pub mod peer_handler;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+pub mod peer_channel_encryptor;
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+pub(crate) mod peer_channel_encryptor;
+
+mod channel;
+mod chan_utils;
+mod onion_utils;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[macro_use] mod functional_test_utils;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod functional_tests;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod chanmon_update_fail_tests;
--- /dev/null
+//! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
+//!
+//! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
+//! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
+//! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
+//! ChannelMessageHandler yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
+//! daemons/servers.
+//!
+//! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
+//! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
+//! source node_id of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
+//! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
+//! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
+//! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
+//! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
+//! track the network on the less-secure system.
+
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use secp256k1::Signature;
+use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+
+use std::error::Error;
+use std::{cmp, fmt};
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::result::Result;
+
+use util::events;
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+
+use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+
+/// An error in decoding a message or struct.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum DecodeError {
+ /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
+ /// Includes unknown realm byte in an OnionHopData packet
+ UnknownVersion,
+ /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message
+ UnknownRequiredFeature,
+ /// Value was invalid, eg a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
+ /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, etc
+ InvalidValue,
+ /// Buffer too short
+ ShortRead,
+ /// node_announcement included more than one address of a given type!
+ ExtraAddressesPerType,
+ /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly
+ BadLengthDescriptor,
+ /// Error from std::io
+ Io(::std::io::Error),
+}
+
+/// Tracks localfeatures which are only in init messages
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct LocalFeatures {
+ flags: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl LocalFeatures {
+ /// Create a blank LocalFeatures flags (visibility extended for fuzz tests)
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> LocalFeatures {
+ LocalFeatures {
+ flags: vec![2 | 1 << 5],
+ }
+ }
+ #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+ pub fn new() -> LocalFeatures {
+ LocalFeatures {
+ flags: vec![2 | 1 << 5],
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn supports_data_loss_protect(&self) -> bool {
+ self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & 3) != 0
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn initial_routing_sync(&self) -> bool {
+ self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & (1 << 3)) != 0
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn set_initial_routing_sync(&mut self) {
+ if self.flags.len() == 0 {
+ self.flags.resize(1, 1 << 3);
+ } else {
+ self.flags[0] |= 1 << 3;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn supports_upfront_shutdown_script(&self) -> bool {
+ self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & (3 << 4)) != 0
+ }
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn unset_upfront_shutdown_script(&mut self) {
+ self.flags[0] ^= 1 << 5;
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn requires_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
+ self.flags.iter().enumerate().any(|(idx, &byte)| {
+ ( idx != 0 && (byte & 0x55) != 0 ) || ( idx == 0 && (byte & 0x14) != 0 )
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn supports_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
+ self.flags.iter().enumerate().any(|(idx, &byte)| {
+ ( idx != 0 && byte != 0 ) || ( idx == 0 && (byte & 0xc4) != 0 )
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+/// Tracks globalfeatures which are in init messages and routing announcements
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub struct GlobalFeatures {
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ flags: Vec<u8>,
+ // Used to test encoding of diverse msgs
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub flags: Vec<u8>
+}
+
+impl GlobalFeatures {
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> GlobalFeatures {
+ GlobalFeatures {
+ flags: Vec::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn requires_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
+ for &byte in self.flags.iter() {
+ if (byte & 0x55) != 0 {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn supports_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
+ for &byte in self.flags.iter() {
+ if byte != 0 {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+/// An init message to be sent or received from a peer
+pub struct Init {
+ pub(crate) global_features: GlobalFeatures,
+ pub(crate) local_features: LocalFeatures,
+}
+
+/// An error message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct ErrorMessage {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) data: String,
+}
+
+/// A ping message to be sent or received from a peer
+pub struct Ping {
+ pub(crate) ponglen: u16,
+ pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
+}
+
+/// A pong message to be sent or received from a peer
+pub struct Pong {
+ pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
+}
+
+/// An open_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct OpenChannel {
+ pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) funding_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) push_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
+ pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) channel_flags: u8,
+ pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
+}
+
+/// An accept_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct AcceptChannel {
+ pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) minimum_depth: u32,
+ pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
+ pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>
+}
+
+/// A funding_created message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct FundingCreated {
+ pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) funding_txid: Sha256dHash,
+ pub(crate) funding_output_index: u16,
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+}
+
+/// A funding_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct FundingSigned {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+}
+
+/// A funding_locked message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct FundingLocked {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+}
+
+/// A shutdown message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct Shutdown {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) scriptpubkey: Script,
+}
+
+/// A closing_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ClosingSigned {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) fee_satoshis: u64,
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+}
+
+/// An update_add_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) amount_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub(crate) cltv_expiry: u32,
+ pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
+}
+
+/// An update_fulfill_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+}
+
+/// An update_fail_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
+}
+
+/// An update_fail_malformed_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) failure_code: u16,
+}
+
+/// A commitment_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CommitmentSigned {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ pub(crate) htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
+}
+
+/// A revoke_and_ack message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct RevokeAndACK {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+}
+
+/// An update_fee message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+pub struct UpdateFee {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct DataLossProtect {
+ pub(crate) your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+}
+
+/// A channel_reestablish message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+pub struct ChannelReestablish {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) next_local_commitment_number: u64,
+ pub(crate) next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+ pub(crate) data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
+}
+
+/// An announcement_signatures message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
+ pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) node_signature: Signature,
+ pub(crate) bitcoin_signature: Signature,
+}
+
+/// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
+pub enum NetAddress {
+ /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
+ IPv4 {
+ /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
+ addr: [u8; 4],
+ /// The port on which the node is listening
+ port: u16,
+ },
+ /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
+ IPv6 {
+ /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
+ addr: [u8; 16],
+ /// The port on which the node is listening
+ port: u16,
+ },
+ /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
+ OnionV2 {
+ /// The bytes (usually encoded in base32 with ".onion" appended)
+ addr: [u8; 10],
+ /// The port on which the node is listening
+ port: u16,
+ },
+ /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
+ /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate ed25519_pubkey, checksum, and version,
+ /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
+ OnionV3 {
+ /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
+ ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
+ /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
+ checksum: u16,
+ /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
+ version: u8,
+ /// The port on which the node is listening
+ port: u16,
+ },
+}
+impl NetAddress {
+ fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
+ match self {
+ &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
+ &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV2 {..} => { 3 },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
+ fn len(&self) -> u16 {
+ match self {
+ &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
+ &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV2 { .. } => { 12 },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for NetAddress {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ addr.write(writer)?;
+ port.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ addr.write(writer)?;
+ port.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV2 { ref addr, ref port } => {
+ 3u8.write(writer)?;
+ addr.write(writer)?;
+ port.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
+ 4u8.write(writer)?;
+ ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ checksum.write(writer)?;
+ version.write(writer)?;
+ port.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
+ let byte = <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
+ match byte {
+ 1 => {
+ Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
+ addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ port: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
+ addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ port: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2 {
+ addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ port: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ 4 => {
+ Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
+ ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ version: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ port: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// Only exposed as broadcast of node_announcement should be filtered by node_id
+/// The unsigned part of a node_announcement
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ pub(crate) features: GlobalFeatures,
+ pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
+ /// The node_id this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the node_announcement back
+ /// to this node).
+ pub node_id: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) rgb: [u8; 3],
+ pub(crate) alias: [u8; 32],
+ /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable. Note that you may only have up to one
+ /// address of each type, if you have more, they may be silently discarded or we may panic!
+ pub(crate) addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
+ pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
+ pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+/// A node_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
+pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ pub(crate) contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
+}
+
+// Only exposed as broadcast of channel_announcement should be filtered by node_id
+/// The unsigned part of a channel_announcement
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ pub(crate) features: GlobalFeatures,
+ pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// One of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
+ pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
+ /// The other of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
+ pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
+ pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+/// A channel_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
+ pub(crate) node_signature_1: Signature,
+ pub(crate) node_signature_2: Signature,
+ pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
+ pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
+ pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
+ pub(crate) flags: u16,
+ pub(crate) cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+ pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ pub(crate) fee_base_msat: u32,
+ pub(crate) fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChannelUpdate {
+ pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
+}
+
+/// Used to put an error message in a HandleError
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum ErrorAction {
+ /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
+ DisconnectPeer {
+ /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
+ msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
+ },
+ /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
+ IgnoreError,
+ /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
+ SendErrorMessage {
+ /// The message to send.
+ msg: ErrorMessage
+ },
+}
+
+/// An Err type for failure to process messages.
+pub struct HandleError { //TODO: rename me
+ /// A human-readable message describing the error
+ pub err: &'static str,
+ /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
+ pub action: Option<ErrorAction>, //TODO: Make this required
+}
+
+/// Struct used to return values from revoke_and_ack messages, containing a bunch of commitment
+/// transaction updates if they were pending.
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
+ /// update_add_htlc messages which should be sent
+ pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
+ /// update_fulfill_htlc messages which should be sent
+ pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
+ /// update_fail_htlc messages which should be sent
+ pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
+ /// update_fail_malformed_htlc messages which should be sent
+ pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
+ /// An update_fee message which should be sent
+ pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
+ /// Finally, the commitment_signed message which should be sent
+ pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
+}
+
+/// The information we received from a peer along the route of a payment we originated. This is
+/// returned by ChannelMessageHandler::handle_update_fail_htlc to be passed into
+/// RoutingMessageHandler::handle_htlc_fail_channel_update to update our network map.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum HTLCFailChannelUpdate {
+ /// We received an error which included a full ChannelUpdate message.
+ ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ /// The unwrapped message we received
+ msg: ChannelUpdate,
+ },
+ /// We received an error which indicated only that a channel has been closed
+ ChannelClosed {
+ /// The short_channel_id which has now closed.
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// when this true, this channel should be permanently removed from the
+ /// consideration. Otherwise, this channel can be restored as new channel_update is received
+ is_permanent: bool,
+ },
+ /// We received an error which indicated only that a node has failed
+ NodeFailure {
+ /// The node_id that has failed.
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// when this true, node should be permanently removed from the
+ /// consideration. Otherwise, the channels connected to this node can be
+ /// restored as new channel_update is received
+ is_permanent: bool,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
+/// As we wish to serialize these differently from Option<T>s (Options get a tag byte, but
+/// OptionalFeild simply gets Present if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
+/// separate enum type for them.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub enum OptionalField<T> {
+ /// Optional field is included in message
+ Present(T),
+ /// Optional field is absent in message
+ Absent
+}
+
+/// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
+///
+/// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different their_node_ids, however
+/// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same their_node_id.
+pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : events::MessageSendEventsProvider + Send + Sync {
+ //Channel init:
+ /// Handle an incoming open_channel message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming accept_channel message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming funding_created message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming funding_signed message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming funding_locked message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ // Channl close:
+ /// Handle an incoming shutdown message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming closing_signed message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ // HTLC handling:
+ /// Handle an incoming update_add_htlc message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming update_fulfill_htlc message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming update_fail_htlc message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming update_fail_malformed_htlc message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming commitment_signed message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming revoke_and_ack message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ /// Handle an incoming update_fee message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ // Channel-to-announce:
+ /// Handle an incoming announcement_signatures message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ // Connection loss/reestablish:
+ /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. If no connection
+ /// is believed to be possible in the future (eg they're sending us messages we don't
+ /// understand or indicate they require unknown feature bits), no_connection_possible is set
+ /// and any outstanding channels should be failed.
+ fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
+
+ /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating channel_reestablish message(s).
+ fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
+ /// Handle an incoming channel_reestablish message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+
+ // Error:
+ /// Handle an incoming error message from the given peer.
+ fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
+}
+
+/// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
+pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : Send + Sync {
+ /// Handle an incoming node_announcement message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
+ /// false or returning an Err otherwise.
+ fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
+ /// Handle a channel_announcement message, returning true if it should be forwarded on, false
+ /// or returning an Err otherwise.
+ fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
+ /// Handle an incoming channel_update message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
+ /// false or returning an Err otherwise.
+ fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
+ /// Handle some updates to the route graph that we learned due to an outbound failed payment.
+ fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &HTLCFailChannelUpdate);
+ /// Gets a subset of the channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table
+ /// to a remote node, starting at the short_channel_id indicated by starting_point and
+ /// including batch_amount entries.
+ fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate)>;
+ /// Gets a subset of the node announcements required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
+ /// starting at the node *after* the provided publickey and including batch_amount entries.
+ /// If None is provided for starting_point, we start at the first node.
+ fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement>;
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct OnionRealm0HopData {
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
+ pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
+ pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ // 12 bytes of 0-padding
+}
+
+mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
+ // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
+ // them from untrusted input):
+
+ use super::OnionRealm0HopData;
+ pub struct OnionHopData {
+ pub(crate) realm: u8,
+ pub(crate) data: OnionRealm0HopData,
+ pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
+ }
+
+ pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
+ pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
+ pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
+ pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
+ pub(crate) version: u8,
+ /// In order to ensure we always return an error on Onion decode in compliance with BOLT 4, we
+ /// have to deserialize OnionPackets contained in UpdateAddHTLCs even if the ephemeral public
+ /// key (here) is bogus, so we hold a Result instead of a PublicKey as we'd like.
+ pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
+ pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
+ pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
+ for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
+ if i != j { return false; }
+ }
+ self.version == other.version &&
+ self.public_key == other.public_key &&
+ self.hmac == other.hmac
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
+ // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
+ // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
+ pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl Error for DecodeError {
+ fn description(&self) -> &str {
+ match *self {
+ DecodeError::UnknownVersion => "Unknown realm byte in Onion packet",
+ DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => "Unknown required feature preventing decode",
+ DecodeError::InvalidValue => "Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as",
+ DecodeError::ShortRead => "Packet extended beyond the provided bytes",
+ DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => "More than one address of a single type",
+ DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => "A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly",
+ DecodeError::Io(ref e) => e.description(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ f.write_str(self.description())
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for HandleError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ f.write_str(self.err)
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<::std::io::Error> for DecodeError {
+ fn from(e: ::std::io::Error) -> Self {
+ if e.kind() == ::std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
+ DecodeError::ShortRead
+ } else {
+ DecodeError::Io(e)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match *self {
+ OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
+ script.write(w)?;
+ },
+ OptionalField::Absent => {}
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OptionalField<Script> {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ match <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r) {
+ Ok(len) => {
+ let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
+ r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
+ },
+ Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
+ Err(e) => Err(e)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(AcceptChannel, {
+ {AcceptChannel{ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(ref script), .. }, 270 + 2 + script.len()},
+ {_, 270}
+ }, {
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat,
+ minimum_depth,
+ to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(AnnouncementSignatures, 32+8+64*2, {
+ channel_id,
+ short_channel_id,
+ node_signature,
+ bitcoin_signature
+});
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(if let OptionalField::Present(..) = self.data_loss_protect { 32+2*8+33+32 } else { 32+2*8 });
+ self.channel_id.write(w)?;
+ self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
+ self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
+ match self.data_loss_protect {
+ OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
+ (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
+ (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
+ },
+ OptionalField::Absent => {}
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for ChannelReestablish{
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
+ next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
+ data_loss_protect: {
+ match <[u8; 32] as Readable<R>>::read(r) {
+ Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret,
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
+ }),
+ Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
+ Err(e) => return Err(e)
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(ClosingSigned, 32+8+64, {
+ channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis,
+ signature
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(CommitmentSigned, {
+ { CommitmentSigned { ref htlc_signatures, .. }, 32+64+2+htlc_signatures.len()*64 }
+ }, {
+ channel_id,
+ signature,
+ htlc_signatures
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
+ { DecodedOnionErrorPacket { ref failuremsg, ref pad, .. }, 32 + 4 + failuremsg.len() + pad.len() }
+ }, {
+ hmac,
+ failuremsg,
+ pad
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(FundingCreated, 32+32+2+64, {
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_txid,
+ funding_output_index,
+ signature
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(FundingSigned, 32+64, {
+ channel_id,
+ signature
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(FundingLocked, 32+33, {
+ channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(GlobalFeatures, {
+ { GlobalFeatures { ref flags }, flags.len() + 2 }
+ }, {
+ flags
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(LocalFeatures, {
+ { LocalFeatures { ref flags }, flags.len() + 2 }
+ }, {
+ flags
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(Init, {
+ { Init { ref global_features, ref local_features }, global_features.flags.len() + local_features.flags.len() + 4 }
+ }, {
+ global_features,
+ local_features
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(OpenChannel, {
+ { OpenChannel { shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(ref script), .. }, 319 + 2 + script.len() },
+ { _, 319 }
+ }, {
+ chain_hash,
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ channel_flags,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(RevokeAndACK, 32+32+33, {
+ channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(Shutdown, {
+ { Shutdown { ref scriptpubkey, .. }, 32 + 2 + scriptpubkey.len() }
+ }, {
+ channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
+ { UpdateFailHTLC { ref reason, .. }, 32 + 10 + reason.data.len() }
+ }, {
+ channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ reason
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, 32+8+32+2, {
+ channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion,
+ failure_code
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(UpdateFee, 32+4, {
+ channel_id,
+ feerate_per_kw
+});
+
+impl_writeable!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, 32+8+32, {
+ channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ payment_preimage
+});
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(OnionErrorPacket, {
+ { OnionErrorPacket { ref data, .. }, 2 + data.len() }
+ }, {
+ data
+});
+
+impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(1 + 33 + 20*65 + 32);
+ self.version.write(w)?;
+ match self.public_key {
+ Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
+ Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
+ }
+ w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
+ self.hmac.write(w)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionPacket {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(OnionPacket {
+ version: Readable::read(r)?,
+ public_key: {
+ let mut buf = [0u8;33];
+ r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
+ },
+ hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
+ hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(UpdateAddHTLC, 32+8+8+32+4+1366, {
+ channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet
+});
+
+impl Writeable for OnionRealm0HopData {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(32);
+ self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
+ self.amt_to_forward.write(w)?;
+ self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&[0;12])?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionRealm0HopData {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
+ amt_to_forward: Readable::read(r)?,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: {
+ let v: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ r.read_exact(&mut [0; 12])?;
+ v
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(65);
+ self.realm.write(w)?;
+ self.data.write(w)?;
+ self.hmac.write(w)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionHopData {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(OnionHopData {
+ realm: {
+ let r: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ if r != 0 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+ r
+ },
+ data: Readable::read(r)?,
+ hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Ping {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(self.byteslen as usize + 4);
+ self.ponglen.write(w)?;
+ vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Ping {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Ping {
+ ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
+ byteslen: {
+ let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
+ r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
+ byteslen
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Pong {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(self.byteslen as usize + 2);
+ vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Pong {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Pong {
+ byteslen: {
+ let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
+ r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
+ byteslen
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(2 + 2*32 + 4*33 + self.features.flags.len() + self.excess_data.len());
+ self.features.write(w)?;
+ self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
+ self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
+ self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
+ self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
+ self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
+ self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ features: {
+ let f: GlobalFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
+ if f.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
+ }
+ f
+ },
+ chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
+ node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
+ node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
+ bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
+ bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
+ excess_data: {
+ let mut excess_data = vec![];
+ r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
+ excess_data
+ },
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
+ { ChannelAnnouncement { contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {ref features, ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
+ 2 + 2*32 + 4*33 + features.flags.len() + excess_data.len() + 4*64 }
+ }, {
+ node_signature_1,
+ node_signature_2,
+ bitcoin_signature_1,
+ bitcoin_signature_2,
+ contents
+});
+
+impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(64 + self.excess_data.len());
+ self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
+ self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
+ self.timestamp.write(w)?;
+ self.flags.write(w)?;
+ self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
+ self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
+ self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
+ self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
+ timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
+ flags: Readable::read(r)?,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
+ fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
+ excess_data: {
+ let mut excess_data = vec![];
+ r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
+ excess_data
+ },
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(ChannelUpdate, {
+ { ChannelUpdate { contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
+ 64 + excess_data.len() + 64 }
+ }, {
+ signature,
+ contents
+});
+
+impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(32 + 2 + self.data.len());
+ self.channel_id.write(w)?;
+ (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for ErrorMessage {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
+ data: {
+ let mut sz: usize = <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? as usize;
+ let mut data = vec![];
+ let data_len = r.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
+ sz = cmp::min(data_len, sz);
+ match String::from_utf8(data[..sz as usize].to_vec()) {
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(64 + 76 + self.features.flags.len() + self.addresses.len()*38 + self.excess_address_data.len() + self.excess_data.len());
+ self.features.write(w)?;
+ self.timestamp.write(w)?;
+ self.node_id.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
+ self.alias.write(w)?;
+
+ let mut addrs_to_encode = self.addresses.clone();
+ addrs_to_encode.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| { a.get_id().cmp(&b.get_id()) });
+ addrs_to_encode.dedup_by(|a, b| { a.get_id() == b.get_id() });
+ let mut addr_len = 0;
+ for addr in &addrs_to_encode {
+ addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
+ }
+ (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ for addr in addrs_to_encode {
+ addr.write(w)?;
+ }
+ w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
+ w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let features: GlobalFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
+ if features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
+ }
+ let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let node_id: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut rgb = [0; 3];
+ r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
+ let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+
+ let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::with_capacity(4);
+ let mut addr_readpos = 0;
+ let mut excess = false;
+ let mut excess_byte = 0;
+ loop {
+ if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
+ match Readable::read(r) {
+ Ok(Ok(addr)) => {
+ match addr {
+ NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => {
+ if addresses.len() > 0 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
+ }
+ },
+ NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => {
+ if addresses.len() > 1 || (addresses.len() == 1 && addresses[0].get_id() != 1) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
+ }
+ },
+ NetAddress::OnionV2 { .. } => {
+ if addresses.len() > 2 || (addresses.len() > 0 && addresses.last().unwrap().get_id() > 2) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
+ }
+ },
+ NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => {
+ if addresses.len() > 3 || (addresses.len() > 0 && addresses.last().unwrap().get_id() > 3) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
+ }
+ addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
+ addresses.push(addr);
+ },
+ Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
+ excess = true;
+ excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
+ break;
+ },
+ Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
+ Err(e) => return Err(e),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut excess_data = vec![];
+ let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
+ let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
+ r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
+ if excess {
+ excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
+ }
+ excess_address_data
+ } else {
+ if excess {
+ excess_data.push(excess_byte);
+ }
+ Vec::new()
+ };
+ r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
+ Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ features,
+ timestamp,
+ node_id,
+ rgb,
+ alias,
+ addresses,
+ excess_address_data,
+ excess_data,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_len_match!(NodeAnnouncement, {
+ { NodeAnnouncement { contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { ref features, ref addresses, ref excess_address_data, ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
+ 64 + 76 + features.flags.len() + addresses.len()*38 + excess_address_data.len() + excess_data.len() }
+ }, {
+ signature,
+ contents
+});
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use hex;
+ use ln::msgs;
+ use ln::msgs::{GlobalFeatures, LocalFeatures, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use util::ser::Writeable;
+
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
+ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+
+ use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
+ let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ next_local_commitment_number: 3,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
+ data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
+ };
+
+ let encoded_value = cr.encode();
+ assert_eq!(
+ encoded_value,
+ vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
+ );
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
+ let public_key = {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ };
+
+ let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ next_local_commitment_number: 3,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
+ data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
+ };
+
+ let encoded_value = cr.encode();
+ assert_eq!(
+ encoded_value,
+ vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
+ );
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! get_keys_from {
+ ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
+ {
+ let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
+ (privkey, pubkey)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! get_sig_on {
+ ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
+ {
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
+ $ctx.sign(&sighash, &$privkey)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
+ let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
+ channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
+ node_signature: sig_1,
+ bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
+ };
+
+ let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, excess_data: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let mut features = GlobalFeatures::new();
+ if unknown_features_bits {
+ features.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
+ }
+ let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features,
+ chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
+ short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
+ node_id_1: pubkey_1,
+ node_id_2: pubkey_2,
+ bitcoin_key_1: pubkey_3,
+ bitcoin_key_2: pubkey_4,
+ excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
+ };
+ let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: sig_1,
+ node_signature_2: sig_2,
+ bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
+ bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
+ contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
+ if unknown_features_bits {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
+ }
+ if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
+ if excess_data {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true, true);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true, true);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false, true);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false, true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let mut features = GlobalFeatures::new();
+ if unknown_features_bits {
+ features.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
+ }
+ let mut addresses = Vec::new();
+ if ipv4 {
+ addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
+ addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
+ port: 9735
+ });
+ }
+ if ipv6 {
+ addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
+ addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
+ port: 9735
+ });
+ }
+ if onionv2 {
+ addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2 {
+ addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246],
+ port: 9735
+ });
+ }
+ if onionv3 {
+ addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
+ ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
+ checksum: 32,
+ version: 16,
+ port: 9735
+ });
+ }
+ let mut addr_len = 0;
+ for addr in &addresses {
+ addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
+ }
+ let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ features,
+ timestamp: 20190119,
+ node_id: pubkey_1,
+ rgb: [32; 3],
+ alias: [16;32],
+ addresses,
+ excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
+ excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
+ };
+ addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
+ let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
+ signature: sig_1,
+ contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ if unknown_features_bits {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
+ target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
+ if ipv4 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
+ }
+ if ipv6 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
+ }
+ if onionv2 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
+ }
+ if onionv3 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
+ }
+ if excess_address_data {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
+ }
+ if excess_data {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_node_announcement() {
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, true, false);
+ do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_channel_update(non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, direction: bool, disable: bool, htlc_maximum_msat: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
+ short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
+ timestamp: 20190119,
+ flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 } | if htlc_maximum_msat { 1 << 8 } else { 0 },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
+ fee_base_msat: 10000,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
+ excess_data: if htlc_maximum_msat { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
+ };
+ let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: sig_1,
+ contents: unsigned_channel_update
+ };
+ let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
+ if htlc_maximum_msat {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ if direction {
+ let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
+ *flag = 1;
+ }
+ if disable {
+ let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
+ *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
+ if htlc_maximum_msat {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_channel_update() {
+ do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true, false);
+ do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false, true);
+ do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true, true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_open_channel(non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
+ let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
+ chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
+ temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
+ push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
+ feerate_per_kw: 821716,
+ to_self_delay: 49340,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
+ funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
+ revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
+ payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
+ htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
+ first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
+ channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent }
+ };
+ let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
+ let mut target_value = Vec::new();
+ if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
+ }
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+ if random_bit {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
+ }
+ if shutdown {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_open_channel() {
+ do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
+ do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
+ do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
+ do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
+ do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
+ let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
+ let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
+ minimum_depth: 821716,
+ to_self_delay: 49340,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
+ funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
+ revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
+ payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
+ htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
+ first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent }
+ };
+ let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020212345678901234562334032891223698321446687011447600083a840000034d000c89d4c0bcc0bc031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f703f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap();
+ if shutdown {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_accept_channel() {
+ do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
+ do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_funding_created() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ funding_txid: Sha256dHash::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
+ funding_output_index: 255,
+ signature: sig_1,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_funding_signed() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ signature: sig_1,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_funding_locked() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let funding_locked = msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = funding_locked.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
+ let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ scriptpubkey: if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
+ };
+ let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
+ if script_type == 1 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
+ } else if script_type == 2 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
+ } else if script_type == 3 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
+ } else if script_type == 4 {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_shutdown() {
+ do_encoding_shutdown(1);
+ do_encoding_shutdown(2);
+ do_encoding_shutdown(3);
+ do_encoding_shutdown(4);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_closing_signed() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
+ signature: sig_1,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 255,
+ public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
+ hop_data: [1; 20*65],
+ hmac: [2; 32]
+ };
+ let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
+ amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
+ cltv_expiry: 821716,
+ onion_routing_packet
+ };
+ let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
+ let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
+ };
+ let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
+ let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
+ data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
+ };
+ let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
+ reason
+ };
+ let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
+ let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
+ sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
+ failure_code: 255
+ };
+ let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
+ let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
+ let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
+ let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ signature: sig_1,
+ htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
+ };
+ let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
+ let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
+ if htlcs {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
+ do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
+ do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
+ let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
+ next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = raa.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_update_fee() {
+ let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ fn do_encoding_init(unknown_global_bits: bool, initial_routing_sync: bool) {
+ let mut global = GlobalFeatures::new();
+ if unknown_global_bits {
+ global.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
+ }
+ let mut local = LocalFeatures::new();
+ if initial_routing_sync {
+ local.set_initial_routing_sync();
+ }
+ let init = msgs::Init {
+ global_features: global,
+ local_features: local,
+ };
+ let encoded_value = init.encode();
+ let mut target_value = Vec::new();
+ if unknown_global_bits {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
+ }
+ if initial_routing_sync {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00012a").unwrap());
+ } else {
+ target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_init() {
+ do_encoding_init(false, false);
+ do_encoding_init(true, false);
+ do_encoding_init(false, true);
+ do_encoding_init(true, true);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_error() {
+ let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: [2; 32],
+ data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
+ };
+ let encoded_value = error.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_ping() {
+ let ping = msgs::Ping {
+ ponglen: 64,
+ byteslen: 64
+ };
+ let encoded_value = ping.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn encoding_pong() {
+ let pong = msgs::Pong {
+ byteslen: 64
+ };
+ let encoded_value = pong.encode();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, HTLCSource};
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
+use util::byte_utils;
+use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+use util::errors::{self, APIError};
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
+use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+pub(super) struct OnionKeys {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) shared_secret: SharedSecret,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ pub(super) rho: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) mu: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
+ ({
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
+ },
+ {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
+ })
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+ assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+ assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
+ hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
+}
+
+// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
+ let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
+ let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
+
+ for hop in route.hops.iter() {
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
+
+ blinded_priv.mul_assign(&blinding_factor)?;
+ blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
+
+ callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
+
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
+ let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+
+ res.push(OnionKeys {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ shared_secret,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
+ ephemeral_pubkey,
+ rho,
+ mu,
+ });
+ })?;
+
+ Ok(res)
+}
+
+/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
+pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
+ let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
+ let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
+ let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
+ let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
+
+ for hop in route.hops.iter().rev() {
+ // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
+ // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
+ // the intended recipient).
+ let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
+ let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
+ res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
+ amt_to_forward: value_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ });
+ cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
+ if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
+ }
+ cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
+ if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
+ }
+ last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
+ }
+ Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
+ for i in (65..20*65).rev() {
+ arr[i] = arr[i-65];
+ }
+ for i in 0..65 {
+ arr[i] = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
+ assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
+
+ for i in 0..dst.len() {
+ dst[i] ^= src[i];
+ }
+}
+
+const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
+ let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
+ buf.resize(21*65, 0);
+
+ let filler = {
+ let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
+ let end_len = iters * 65;
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
+ res.resize(end_len, 0);
+
+ for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
+ if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
+ xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
+ }
+ res
+ };
+
+ let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
+ let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
+
+ for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
+ shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
+ payload.hmac = hmac_res;
+ packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
+ packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
+
+ if i == 0 {
+ packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
+ }
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
+ hmac.input(&packet_data);
+ hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
+ hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ }
+
+ msgs::OnionPacket{
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
+ hop_data: packet_data,
+ hmac: hmac_res,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
+/// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
+pub(super) fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
+ let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+
+ let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
+ packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
+ msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
+ data: packet_crypted,
+ }
+}
+
+pub(super) fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
+ assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
+ assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
+
+ let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+
+ let failuremsg = {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
+ res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
+ res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
+ res
+ };
+ let pad = {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
+ res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
+ res
+ };
+ let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ failuremsg: failuremsg,
+ pad: pad,
+ };
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
+ hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
+ packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+
+ packet
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
+ let failure_packet = build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
+ encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
+}
+
+/// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
+/// OutboundRoute).
+/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, and the error code.
+pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &Arc<Logger>, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
+ if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
+ let mut res = None;
+ let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
+ let mut error_code_ret = None;
+ let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
+ let mut is_from_final_node = false;
+
+ // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
+ next_route_hop_ix += 1;
+ if res.is_some() { return; }
+
+ let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
+ htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
+
+ let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+
+ let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
+ decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
+ packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
+
+ is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
+
+ if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
+ let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
+ hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
+
+ if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
+ if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
+ error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
+
+ let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
+
+ // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
+ // update Route object
+ let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
+ 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
+ _ => false,
+ } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
+ || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
+
+ let mut fail_channel_update = None;
+
+ if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
+ }
+ else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+ fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })};
+ }
+ else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+ if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
+ let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
+ if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
+ // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
+ // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
+ let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 7 => false,
+ 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ 12 => {
+ let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
+ new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
+ }
+ 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
+ 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
+ _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
+ };
+ fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
+ // to the node in question corrupted something.
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })
+ } else {
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: chan_update,
+ })
+ };
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
+ // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
+ // trying to relay through them anymore.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if !payment_failed {
+ // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
+ // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
+ // really not worth trying any further.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
+ // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
+ // to decode the onion.
+ res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
+
+ let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
+ if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
+ let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
+ log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ }
+ else {
+ let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
+ log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
+ // definitely came from the peer in question
+ res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ }), !is_from_final_node));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
+ if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
+ (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
+ } else {
+ // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
+ // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
+ (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
+ use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+ use ln::msgs;
+ use util::ser::Writeable;
+
+ use hex;
+
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+
+ use super::OnionKeys;
+
+ fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
+ // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let route = Route {
+ hops: vec!(
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
+ },
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
+ },
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
+ },
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
+ },
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
+ },
+ ),
+ };
+
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
+ onion_keys
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn onion_vectors() {
+ // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
+ let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
+ let payloads = vec!(
+ msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ amt_to_forward: 0,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
+ amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
+ amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
+ amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopData {
+ realm: 0,
+ data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
+ short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
+ amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
+ },
+ hmac: [0; 32],
+ },
+ );
+
+ let packet = super::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
+ // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
+ // anyway...
+ assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
+ // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
+
+ let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
+ let onion_error = super::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+
+ let onion_packet_1 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+
+ let onion_packet_2 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+
+ let onion_packet_3 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+
+ let onion_packet_4 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+
+ let onion_packet_5 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use ln::msgs::HandleError;
+use ln::msgs;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine, Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
+use util::byte_utils;
+
+// Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
+const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
+// Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
+const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
+
+pub enum NextNoiseStep {
+ ActOne,
+ ActTwo,
+ ActThree,
+ NoiseComplete,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+enum NoiseStep {
+ PreActOne,
+ PostActOne,
+ PostActTwo,
+ // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
+}
+
+struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
+ h: [u8; 32],
+ ck: [u8; 32],
+}
+enum DirectionalNoiseState {
+ Outbound {
+ ie: SecretKey,
+ },
+ Inbound {
+ ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
+ re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
+ temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
+ }
+}
+enum NoiseState {
+ InProgress {
+ state: NoiseStep,
+ directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
+ bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
+ },
+ Finished {
+ sk: [u8; 32],
+ sn: u64,
+ sck: [u8; 32],
+ rk: [u8; 32],
+ rn: u64,
+ rck: [u8; 32],
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
+ their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
+
+ noise_state: NoiseState,
+}
+
+impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&NOISE_H);
+ sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
+ let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
+ state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
+ directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
+ ie: ephemeral_key,
+ },
+ bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
+ h: h,
+ ck: NOISE_CK,
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn new_inbound(our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&NOISE_H);
+ let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
+ sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
+ let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ their_node_id: None,
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
+ state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
+ directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
+ ie: None,
+ re: None,
+ temp_k2: None,
+ },
+ bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
+ h: h,
+ ck: NOISE_CK,
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
+ let mut nonce = [0; 12];
+ nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
+ let mut tag = [0; 16];
+ chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
+ res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let mut nonce = [0; 12];
+ nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
+ if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Bad MAC", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
+ hmac.input(ikm);
+ let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&[1; 1]);
+ let t1 = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
+ hmac.input(&t1);
+ hmac.input(&[2; 1]);
+ (t1, Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner())
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let (t1, t2) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&state.ck, &ss[..]);
+ state.ck = t1;
+ t2
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
+ let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&state.h);
+ sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
+ state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
+ let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
+
+ let mut res = [0; 50];
+ res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&state.h);
+ sha.input(&res[34..]);
+ state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ (res, temp_k)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn inbound_noise_act(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], our_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
+
+ if act[0] != 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown handshake version number", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ }
+
+ let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
+ Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Invalid public key", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })}),
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ };
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&state.h);
+ sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
+ state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, &our_key);
+ let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
+
+ let mut dec = [0; 0];
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&state.h);
+ sha.input(&act[34..]);
+ state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_act_one(&mut self) -> [u8; 50] {
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
+ match directional_state {
+ &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
+ if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
+ panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
+ }
+
+ let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
+ *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
+ res
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn process_act_one_with_keys(&mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey) -> Result<[u8; 50], HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
+
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
+ match directional_state {
+ &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
+ if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
+ panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
+ }
+
+ let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, &our_node_secret)?;
+ ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
+
+ re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
+
+ let (res, temp_k) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
+ *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
+ *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
+ Ok(res)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn process_act_two(&mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
+
+ let final_hkdf;
+ let ck;
+ let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
+ match directional_state {
+ &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
+ if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
+ panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
+ }
+
+ let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
+
+ let mut res = [0; 66];
+ let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
+
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
+ sha.input(&res[1..50]);
+ bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let ss = SharedSecret::new(&re, our_node_secret);
+ let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
+
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
+ final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
+ ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
+ res
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
+ };
+
+ let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
+ self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
+ sk: sk,
+ sn: 0,
+ sck: ck.clone(),
+ rk: rk,
+ rn: 0,
+ rck: ck,
+ };
+
+ Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
+ }
+
+ pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
+
+ let final_hkdf;
+ let ck;
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
+ match directional_state {
+ &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
+ if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
+ panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
+ }
+ if act_three[0] != 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown handshake version number", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ }
+
+ let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
+ self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Bad node_id from peer", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })}),
+ });
+
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
+ sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
+ bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
+ let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
+
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
+ final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
+ ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
+ }
+
+ let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
+ self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
+ sk: sk,
+ sn: 0,
+ sck: ck.clone(),
+ rk: rk,
+ rn: 0,
+ rck: ck,
+ };
+
+ Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
+ }
+
+ /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version
+ /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
+ pub fn encrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+ if msg.len() > 65535 {
+ panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
+ }
+
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
+ res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
+
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
+ if *sn >= 1000 {
+ let (new_sck, new_sk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(sck, sk);
+ *sck = new_sck;
+ *sk = new_sk;
+ *sn = 0;
+ }
+
+ Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &byte_utils::be16_to_array(msg.len() as u16));
+ *sn += 1;
+
+ Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
+ *sn += 1;
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
+ }
+
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
+ /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
+ pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
+
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
+ if *rn >= 1000 {
+ let (new_rck, new_rk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(rck, rk);
+ *rck = new_rck;
+ *rk = new_rk;
+ *rn = 0;
+ }
+
+ let mut res = [0; 2];
+ Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
+ *rn += 1;
+ Ok(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&res))
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Decrypts the given message.
+ /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
+ pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandleError> {
+ if msg.len() > 65535 + 16 {
+ panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
+ }
+
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
+ res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
+ Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
+ *rn += 1;
+
+ Ok(res)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
+ match state {
+ &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
+ &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
+ &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
+ }
+ },
+ NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
+ match self.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
+ NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+
+ use hex;
+
+ use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
+
+ fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
+ let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one()[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
+ outbound_peer
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
+ let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ {
+ // transport-initiator successful handshake
+ let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+
+ let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ match outbound_peer.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
+ assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(sn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-initiator act2 short read test
+ // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
+ let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+
+ let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
+ let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+
+ let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
+ let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+
+ let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
+ let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ {
+ // transport-responder successful handshake
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
+ // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
+ // from transport-initiator successful handshake
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ match inbound_peer.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
+ assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(sn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act1 short read test
+ // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act1 bad version test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act3 bad version test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act3 short read test
+ // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
+ }
+ {
+ // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ #[test]
+ fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
+ // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
+ // here and use them to encrypt.
+ let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+
+ {
+ let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ match outbound_peer.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
+ assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(sn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut inbound_peer;
+
+ {
+ // transport-responder successful handshake
+ let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+
+ let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
+ // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
+ // from transport-initiator successful handshake
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ match inbound_peer.noise_state {
+ NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
+ assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(sn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(rn, 0);
+ assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+ }
+
+ for i in 0..1005 {
+ let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
+ let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
+ assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
+
+ let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
+
+ if i == 0 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
+ } else if i == 1 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
+ } else if i == 500 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
+ } else if i == 501 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
+ } else if i == 1000 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
+ } else if i == 1001 {
+ assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Top level peer message handling and socket handling logic lives here.
+//!
+//! Instead of actually servicing sockets ourselves we require that you implement the
+//! SocketDescriptor interface and use that to receive actions which you should perform on the
+//! socket, and call into PeerManager with bytes read from the socket. The PeerManager will then
+//! call into the provided message handlers (probably a ChannelManager and Router) with messages
+//! they should handle, and encoding/sending response messages.
+
+use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+
+use ln::msgs;
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
+use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NextNoiseStep};
+use util::byte_utils;
+use util::events::{MessageSendEvent};
+use util::logger::Logger;
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap,hash_map,HashSet,LinkedList};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::{cmp,error,hash,fmt};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256Engine;
+use bitcoin_hashes::{HashEngine, Hash};
+
+/// Provides references to trait impls which handle different types of messages.
+pub struct MessageHandler {
+ /// A message handler which handles messages specific to channels. Usually this is just a
+ /// ChannelManager object.
+ pub chan_handler: Arc<msgs::ChannelMessageHandler>,
+ /// A message handler which handles messages updating our knowledge of the network channel
+ /// graph. Usually this is just a Router object.
+ pub route_handler: Arc<msgs::RoutingMessageHandler>,
+}
+
+/// Provides an object which can be used to send data to and which uniquely identifies a connection
+/// to a remote host. You will need to be able to generate multiple of these which meet Eq and
+/// implement Hash to meet the PeerManager API.
+///
+/// For efficiency, Clone should be relatively cheap for this type.
+///
+/// You probably want to just extend an int and put a file descriptor in a struct and implement
+/// send_data. Note that if you are using a higher-level net library that may close() itself, be
+/// careful to ensure you don't have races whereby you might register a new connection with an fd
+/// the same as a yet-to-be-disconnect_event()-ed.
+pub trait SocketDescriptor : cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + Clone {
+ /// Attempts to send some data from the given slice to the peer.
+ ///
+ /// Returns the amount of data which was sent, possibly 0 if the socket has since disconnected.
+ /// Note that in the disconnected case, a disconnect_event must still fire and further write
+ /// attempts may occur until that time.
+ ///
+ /// If the returned size is smaller than data.len(), a write_available event must
+ /// trigger the next time more data can be written. Additionally, until the a send_data event
+ /// completes fully, no further read_events should trigger on the same peer!
+ ///
+ /// If a read_event on this descriptor had previously returned true (indicating that read
+ /// events should be paused to prevent DoS in the send buffer), resume_read may be set
+ /// indicating that read events on this descriptor should resume. A resume_read of false does
+ /// *not* imply that further read events should be paused.
+ fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], resume_read: bool) -> usize;
+ /// Disconnect the socket pointed to by this SocketDescriptor. Once this function returns, no
+ /// more calls to write_event, read_event or disconnect_event may be made with this descriptor.
+ /// No disconnect_event should be generated as a result of this call, though obviously races
+ /// may occur whereby disconnect_socket is called after a call to disconnect_event but prior to
+ /// that event completing.
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self);
+}
+
+/// Error for PeerManager errors. If you get one of these, you must disconnect the socket and
+/// generate no further read/write_events for the descriptor, only triggering a single
+/// disconnect_event (unless it was provided in response to a new_*_connection event, in which case
+/// no such disconnect_event must be generated and the socket be silently disconencted).
+pub struct PeerHandleError {
+ /// Used to indicate that we probably can't make any future connections to this peer, implying
+ /// we should go ahead and force-close any channels we have with it.
+ no_connection_possible: bool,
+}
+impl fmt::Debug for PeerHandleError {
+ fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ formatter.write_str("Peer Sent Invalid Data")
+ }
+}
+impl fmt::Display for PeerHandleError {
+ fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ formatter.write_str("Peer Sent Invalid Data")
+ }
+}
+impl error::Error for PeerHandleError {
+ fn description(&self) -> &str {
+ "Peer Sent Invalid Data"
+ }
+}
+
+enum InitSyncTracker{
+ NoSyncRequested,
+ ChannelsSyncing(u64),
+ NodesSyncing(PublicKey),
+}
+
+struct Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: PeerChannelEncryptor,
+ outbound: bool,
+ their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_global_features: Option<msgs::GlobalFeatures>,
+ their_local_features: Option<msgs::LocalFeatures>,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList<Vec<u8>>,
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: usize,
+ awaiting_write_event: bool,
+
+ pending_read_buffer: Vec<u8>,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: usize,
+ pending_read_is_header: bool,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker,
+}
+
+impl Peer {
+ /// Returns true if the channel announcements/updates for the given channel should be
+ /// forwarded to this peer.
+ /// If we are sending our routing table to this peer and we have not yet sent channel
+ /// announcements/updates for the given channel_id then we will send it when we get to that
+ /// point and we shouldn't send it yet to avoid sending duplicate updates. If we've already
+ /// sent the old versions, we should send the update, and so return true here.
+ fn should_forward_channel(&self, channel_id: u64)->bool{
+ match self.sync_status {
+ InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => true,
+ InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(i) => i < channel_id,
+ InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(_) => true,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct PeerHolder<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> {
+ peers: HashMap<Descriptor, Peer>,
+ /// Added to by do_read_event for cases where we pushed a message onto the send buffer but
+ /// didn't call do_attempt_write_data to avoid reentrancy. Cleared in process_events()
+ peers_needing_send: HashSet<Descriptor>,
+ /// Only add to this set when noise completes:
+ node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>,
+}
+struct MutPeerHolder<'a, Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + 'a> {
+ peers: &'a mut HashMap<Descriptor, Peer>,
+ peers_needing_send: &'a mut HashSet<Descriptor>,
+ node_id_to_descriptor: &'a mut HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>,
+}
+impl<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> PeerHolder<Descriptor> {
+ fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutPeerHolder<Descriptor> {
+ MutPeerHolder {
+ peers: &mut self.peers,
+ peers_needing_send: &mut self.peers_needing_send,
+ node_id_to_descriptor: &mut self.node_id_to_descriptor,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
+fn _check_usize_is_32_or_64() {
+ // See below, less than 32 bit pointers may be unsafe here!
+ unsafe { mem::transmute::<*const usize, [u8; 4]>(panic!()); }
+}
+
+/// A PeerManager manages a set of peers, described by their SocketDescriptor and marshalls socket
+/// events into messages which it passes on to its MessageHandlers.
+pub struct PeerManager<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> {
+ message_handler: MessageHandler,
+ peers: Mutex<PeerHolder<Descriptor>>,
+ our_node_secret: SecretKey,
+ ephemeral_key_midstate: Sha256Engine,
+
+ // Usize needs to be at least 32 bits to avoid overflowing both low and high. If usize is 64
+ // bits we will never realistically count into high:
+ peer_counter_low: AtomicUsize,
+ peer_counter_high: AtomicUsize,
+
+ initial_syncs_sent: AtomicUsize,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! encode_msg {
+ ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {{
+ let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ ($msg_code as u16).write(&mut msg).unwrap();
+ $msg.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
+ msg.0
+ }}
+}
+
+//TODO: Really should do something smarter for this
+const INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND: usize = 5;
+
+/// Manages and reacts to connection events. You probably want to use file descriptors as PeerIds.
+/// PeerIds may repeat, but only after disconnect_event() has been called.
+impl<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> PeerManager<Descriptor> {
+ /// Constructs a new PeerManager with the given message handlers and node_id secret key
+ /// ephemeral_random_data is used to derive per-connection ephemeral keys and must be
+ /// cryptographically secure random bytes.
+ pub fn new(message_handler: MessageHandler, our_node_secret: SecretKey, ephemeral_random_data: &[u8; 32], logger: Arc<Logger>) -> PeerManager<Descriptor> {
+ let mut ephemeral_key_midstate = Sha256::engine();
+ ephemeral_key_midstate.input(ephemeral_random_data);
+
+ PeerManager {
+ message_handler: message_handler,
+ peers: Mutex::new(PeerHolder {
+ peers: HashMap::new(),
+ peers_needing_send: HashSet::new(),
+ node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap::new()
+ }),
+ our_node_secret: our_node_secret,
+ ephemeral_key_midstate,
+ peer_counter_low: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ peer_counter_high: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ initial_syncs_sent: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Get the list of node ids for peers which have completed the initial handshake.
+ ///
+ /// For outbound connections, this will be the same as the their_node_id parameter passed in to
+ /// new_outbound_connection, however entries will only appear once the initial handshake has
+ /// completed and we are sure the remote peer has the private key for the given node_id.
+ pub fn get_peer_node_ids(&self) -> Vec<PublicKey> {
+ let peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ peers.peers.values().filter_map(|p| {
+ if !p.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || p.their_global_features.is_none() {
+ return None;
+ }
+ p.their_node_id
+ }).collect()
+ }
+
+ fn get_ephemeral_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ let mut ephemeral_hash = self.ephemeral_key_midstate.clone();
+ let low = self.peer_counter_low.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let high = if low == 0 {
+ self.peer_counter_high.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel)
+ } else {
+ self.peer_counter_high.load(Ordering::Acquire)
+ };
+ ephemeral_hash.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(low as u64));
+ ephemeral_hash.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(high as u64));
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(ephemeral_hash).into_inner()).expect("You broke SHA-256!")
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates a new outbound connection has been established to a node with the given node_id.
+ /// Note that if an Err is returned here you MUST NOT call disconnect_event for the new
+ /// descriptor but must disconnect the connection immediately.
+ ///
+ /// Returns a small number of bytes to send to the remote node (currently always 50).
+ ///
+ /// Panics if descriptor is duplicative with some other descriptor which has not yet has a
+ /// disconnect_event.
+ pub fn new_outbound_connection(&self, their_node_id: PublicKey, descriptor: Descriptor) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PeerHandleError> {
+ let mut peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id.clone(), self.get_ephemeral_key());
+ let res = peer_encryptor.get_act_one().to_vec();
+ let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
+
+ let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ outbound: true,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_global_features: None,
+ their_local_features: None,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer: pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+ }).is_some() {
+ panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ };
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates a new inbound connection has been established.
+ ///
+ /// May refuse the connection by returning an Err, but will never write bytes to the remote end
+ /// (outbound connector always speaks first). Note that if an Err is returned here you MUST NOT
+ /// call disconnect_event for the new descriptor but must disconnect the connection
+ /// immediately.
+ ///
+ /// Panics if descriptor is duplicative with some other descriptor which has not yet has a
+ /// disconnect_event.
+ pub fn new_inbound_connection(&self, descriptor: Descriptor) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
+ let peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&self.our_node_secret);
+ let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
+
+ let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ outbound: false,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_global_features: None,
+ their_local_features: None,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer: pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+ }).is_some() {
+ panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ };
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn do_attempt_write_data(&self, descriptor: &mut Descriptor, peer: &mut Peer) {
+ macro_rules! encode_and_send_msg {
+ ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_trace!(self, "Encoding and sending sync update message of type {} to {}", $msg_code, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!($msg, $msg_code)[..]));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ const MSG_BUFF_SIZE: usize = 10;
+ while !peer.awaiting_write_event {
+ if peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() < MSG_BUFF_SIZE {
+ match peer.sync_status {
+ InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => {},
+ InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(c) if c < 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff => {
+ let steps = ((MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() + 2) / 3) as u8;
+ let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, steps);
+ for &(ref announce, ref update_a, ref update_b) in all_messages.iter() {
+ encode_and_send_msg!(announce, 256);
+ encode_and_send_msg!(update_a, 258);
+ encode_and_send_msg!(update_b, 258);
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(announce.contents.short_channel_id + 1);
+ }
+ if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff);
+ }
+ },
+ InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(c) if c == 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff => {
+ let steps = (MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len()) as u8;
+ let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, steps);
+ for msg in all_messages.iter() {
+ encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 256);
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(msg.contents.node_id);
+ }
+ if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested;
+ }
+ },
+ InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(_) => unreachable!(),
+ InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(key) => {
+ let steps = (MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len()) as u8;
+ let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&key), steps);
+ for msg in all_messages.iter() {
+ encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 256);
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(msg.contents.node_id);
+ }
+ if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested;
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ if {
+ let next_buff = match peer.pending_outbound_buffer.front() {
+ None => return,
+ Some(buff) => buff,
+ };
+
+ let should_be_reading = peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() < MSG_BUFF_SIZE;
+ let pending = &next_buff[peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset..];
+ let data_sent = descriptor.send_data(pending, should_be_reading);
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset += data_sent;
+ if peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset == next_buff.len() { true } else { false }
+ } {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset = 0;
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.pop_front();
+ } else {
+ peer.awaiting_write_event = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that there is room to write data to the given socket descriptor.
+ ///
+ /// May return an Err to indicate that the connection should be closed.
+ ///
+ /// Will most likely call send_data on the descriptor passed in (or the descriptor handed into
+ /// new_*\_connection) before returning. Thus, be very careful with reentrancy issues! The
+ /// invariants around calling write_event in case a write did not fully complete must still
+ /// hold - be ready to call write_event again if a write call generated here isn't sufficient!
+ /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a new_\*_connection event.
+ pub fn write_event(&self, descriptor: &mut Descriptor) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
+ let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ match peers.peers.get_mut(descriptor) {
+ None => panic!("Descriptor for write_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
+ Some(peer) => {
+ peer.awaiting_write_event = false;
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(descriptor, peer);
+ }
+ };
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that data was read from the given socket descriptor.
+ ///
+ /// May return an Err to indicate that the connection should be closed.
+ ///
+ /// Will *not* call back into send_data on any descriptors to avoid reentrancy complexity.
+ /// Thus, however, you almost certainly want to call process_events() after any read_event to
+ /// generate send_data calls to handle responses.
+ ///
+ /// If Ok(true) is returned, further read_events should not be triggered until a write_event on
+ /// this file descriptor has resume_read set (preventing DoS issues in the send buffer).
+ ///
+ /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a new_*_connection event.
+ pub fn read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
+ match self.do_read_event(peer_descriptor, data) {
+ Ok(res) => Ok(res),
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.disconnect_event_internal(peer_descriptor, e.no_connection_possible);
+ Err(e)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn do_read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
+ let pause_read = {
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ let peers = peers_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let pause_read = match peers.peers.get_mut(peer_descriptor) {
+ None => panic!("Descriptor for read_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
+ Some(peer) => {
+ assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > 0);
+ assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > peer.pending_read_buffer_pos);
+
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ while read_pos < data.len() {
+ {
+ let data_to_copy = cmp::min(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() - peer.pending_read_buffer_pos, data.len() - read_pos);
+ peer.pending_read_buffer[peer.pending_read_buffer_pos..peer.pending_read_buffer_pos + data_to_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[read_pos..read_pos + data_to_copy]);
+ read_pos += data_to_copy;
+ peer.pending_read_buffer_pos += data_to_copy;
+ }
+
+ if peer.pending_read_buffer_pos == peer.pending_read_buffer.len() {
+ peer.pending_read_buffer_pos = 0;
+
+ macro_rules! encode_and_send_msg {
+ ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_trace!(self, "Encoding and sending message of type {} to {}", $msg_code, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!($msg, $msg_code)[..]));
+ peers.peers_needing_send.insert(peer_descriptor.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! try_potential_handleerror {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(x) => x,
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(action) = e.action {
+ match action {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: _ } => {
+ //TODO: Try to push msg
+ log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, disconnecting peer because {}", e.err);
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, ignoring because {}", e.err);
+ continue;
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, sending Error message because {}", e.err);
+ encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 17);
+ continue;
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Got Err handling message, action not yet filled in: {}", e.err);
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! try_potential_decodeerror {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(x) => x,
+ Err(e) => {
+ match e {
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => {
+ log_debug!(self, "Got a channel/node announcement with an known required feature flag, you may want to update!");
+ continue;
+ },
+ msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue => {
+ log_debug!(self, "Got an invalid value while deserializing message");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ },
+ msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => {
+ log_debug!(self, "Deserialization failed due to shortness of message");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ },
+ msgs::DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => {
+ log_debug!(self, "Error decoding message, ignoring due to lnd spec incompatibility. See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/1407");
+ continue;
+ },
+ msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
+ msgs::DecodeError::Io(_) => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! insert_node_id {
+ () => {
+ match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false })
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Finished noise handshake for connection with {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ entry.insert(peer_descriptor.clone())
+ },
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ let next_step = peer.channel_encryptor.get_noise_step();
+ match next_step {
+ NextNoiseStep::ActOne => {
+ let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key())).to_vec();
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_two);
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 66].to_vec(); // act three is 66 bytes long
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::ActTwo => {
+ let (act_three, their_node_id) = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_three.to_vec());
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
+
+ peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
+ insert_node_id!();
+ let mut local_features = msgs::LocalFeatures::new();
+ if self.initial_syncs_sent.load(Ordering::Acquire) < INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND {
+ self.initial_syncs_sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ local_features.set_initial_routing_sync();
+ }
+ encode_and_send_msg!(msgs::Init {
+ global_features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ local_features,
+ }, 16);
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::ActThree => {
+ let their_node_id = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_three(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
+ peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
+ insert_node_id!();
+ },
+ NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete => {
+ if peer.pending_read_is_header {
+ let msg_len = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_length_header(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(msg_len as usize + 16);
+ peer.pending_read_buffer.resize(msg_len as usize + 16, 0);
+ if msg_len < 2 { // Need at least the message type tag
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = false;
+ } else {
+ let msg_data = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_message(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
+ assert!(msg_data.len() >= 2);
+
+ // Reset read buffer
+ peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec();
+ peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
+
+ let msg_type = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&msg_data[0..2]);
+ log_trace!(self, "Received message of type {} from {}", msg_type, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ if msg_type != 16 && peer.their_global_features.is_none() {
+ // Need an init message as first message
+ log_trace!(self, "Peer {} sent non-Init first message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+ let mut reader = ::std::io::Cursor::new(&msg_data[2..]);
+ match msg_type {
+ // Connection control:
+ 16 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Init::read(&mut reader));
+ if msg.global_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ log_info!(self, "Peer global features required unknown version bits");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
+ }
+ if msg.local_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ log_info!(self, "Peer local features required unknown version bits");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
+ }
+ if peer.their_global_features.is_some() {
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
+ }
+
+ log_info!(self, "Received peer Init message: data_loss_protect: {}, initial_routing_sync: {}, upfront_shutdown_script: {}, unkown local flags: {}, unknown global flags: {}",
+ if msg.local_features.supports_data_loss_protect() { "supported" } else { "not supported"},
+ if msg.local_features.initial_routing_sync() { "requested" } else { "not requested" },
+ if msg.local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { "supported" } else { "not supported"},
+ if msg.local_features.supports_unknown_bits() { "present" } else { "none" },
+ if msg.global_features.supports_unknown_bits() { "present" } else { "none" });
+
+ if msg.local_features.initial_routing_sync() {
+ peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0);
+ peers.peers_needing_send.insert(peer_descriptor.clone());
+ }
+ peer.their_global_features = Some(msg.global_features);
+ peer.their_local_features = Some(msg.local_features);
+
+ if !peer.outbound {
+ let mut local_features = msgs::LocalFeatures::new();
+ if self.initial_syncs_sent.load(Ordering::Acquire) < INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND {
+ self.initial_syncs_sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ local_features.set_initial_routing_sync();
+ }
+
+ encode_and_send_msg!(msgs::Init {
+ global_features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ local_features,
+ }, 16);
+ }
+
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_connected(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap());
+ },
+ 17 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ErrorMessage::read(&mut reader));
+ let mut data_is_printable = true;
+ for b in msg.data.bytes() {
+ if b < 32 || b > 126 {
+ data_is_printable = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if data_is_printable {
+ log_debug!(self, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()), msg.data);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Got Err message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
+ }
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
+ if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
+ }
+ },
+
+ 18 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Ping::read(&mut reader));
+ if msg.ponglen < 65532 {
+ let resp = msgs::Pong { byteslen: msg.ponglen };
+ encode_and_send_msg!(resp, 19);
+ }
+ },
+ 19 => {
+ try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Pong::read(&mut reader));
+ },
+
+ // Channel control:
+ 32 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::OpenChannel::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_open_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_local_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 33 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::AcceptChannel::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_accept_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_local_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+
+ 34 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingCreated::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_created(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 35 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingSigned::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 36 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingLocked::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_locked(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+
+ 38 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Shutdown::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_shutdown(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 39 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_closing_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+
+ 128 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_add_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 130 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 131 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 135 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+
+ 132 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::CommitmentSigned::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_commitment_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 133 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::RevokeAndACK::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_revoke_and_ack(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 134 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFee::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fee(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 136 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelReestablish::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_reestablish(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+
+ // Routing control:
+ 259 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures::read(&mut reader));
+ try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_announcement_signatures(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
+ },
+ 256 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement::read(&mut reader));
+ let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&msg));
+
+ if should_forward {
+ // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
+ }
+ },
+ 257 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut reader));
+ let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_node_announcement(&msg));
+
+ if should_forward {
+ // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
+ }
+ },
+ 258 => {
+ let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut reader));
+ let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg));
+
+ if should_forward {
+ // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ if (msg_type & 1) == 0 {
+ return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(peer_descriptor, peer);
+
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() > 10 // pause_read
+ }
+ };
+
+ pause_read
+ };
+
+ Ok(pause_read)
+ }
+
+ /// Checks for any events generated by our handlers and processes them. Includes sending most
+ /// response messages as well as messages generated by calls to handler functions directly (eg
+ /// functions like ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forward or send_payment).
+ pub fn process_events(&self) {
+ {
+ // TODO: There are some DoS attacks here where you can flood someone's outbound send
+ // buffer by doing things like announcing channels on another node. We should be willing to
+ // drop optional-ish messages when send buffers get full!
+
+ let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ let peers = peers_lock.borrow_parts();
+ for event in events_generated.drain(..) {
+ macro_rules! get_peer_for_forwarding {
+ ($node_id: expr, $handle_no_such_peer: block) => {
+ {
+ let descriptor = match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.get($node_id) {
+ Some(descriptor) => descriptor.clone(),
+ None => {
+ $handle_no_such_peer;
+ continue;
+ },
+ };
+ match peers.peers.get_mut(&descriptor) {
+ Some(peer) => {
+ if peer.their_global_features.is_none() {
+ $handle_no_such_peer;
+ continue;
+ }
+ (descriptor, peer)
+ },
+ None => panic!("Inconsistent peers set state!"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Drop the pending channel? (or just let it timeout, but that sucks)
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 33)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Drop the pending channel? (or just let it timeout, but that sucks)
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 32)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id),
+ log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
+ //they should just throw away this funding transaction
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 34)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
+ //they should just throw away this funding transaction
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 35)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 36)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
+ //they should just throw away this funding transaction
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 259)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node {} with {} adds, {} fulfills, {} fails for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ update_add_htlcs.len(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
+ update_fail_htlcs.len(),
+ log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ for msg in update_add_htlcs {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 128)));
+ }
+ for msg in update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 130)));
+ }
+ for msg in update_fail_htlcs {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 131)));
+ }
+ for msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 135)));
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref msg) = update_fee {
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 134)));
+ }
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(commitment_signed, 132)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 133)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 39)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 38)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 136)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling BroadcastChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(msg).is_ok() && self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(update_msg).is_ok() {
+ let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg, 256);
+ let encoded_update_msg = encode_msg!(update_msg, 258);
+
+ for (ref descriptor, ref mut peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
+ if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_global_features.is_none() ||
+ !peer.should_forward_channel(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ continue
+ }
+ match peer.their_node_id {
+ None => continue,
+ Some(their_node_id) => {
+ if their_node_id == msg.contents.node_id_1 || their_node_id == msg.contents.node_id_2 {
+ continue
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_msg[..]));
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_update_msg[..]));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), peer);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(msg).is_ok() {
+ let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg, 258);
+
+ for (ref descriptor, ref mut peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
+ if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_global_features.is_none() ||
+ !peer.should_forward_channel(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ continue
+ }
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_msg[..]));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), peer);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
+ self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(update);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, ref action } => {
+ if let Some(ref action) = *action {
+ match *action {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } => {
+ if let Some(mut descriptor) = peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(node_id) {
+ peers.peers_needing_send.remove(&descriptor);
+ if let Some(mut peer) = peers.peers.remove(&descriptor) {
+ if let Some(ref msg) = *msg {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.data);
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 17)));
+ // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
+ // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut peer);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with no message", log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ }
+ }
+ descriptor.disconnect_socket();
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
+ }
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Handling SendErrorMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.data);
+ let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
+ //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
+ });
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 17)));
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got no-action HandleError Event in peer_handler for node {}, no such events should ever be generated!", log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for mut descriptor in peers.peers_needing_send.drain() {
+ match peers.peers.get_mut(&descriptor) {
+ Some(peer) => self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer),
+ None => panic!("Inconsistent peers set state!"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the given socket descriptor's connection is now closed.
+ ///
+ /// This must be called even if a PeerHandleError was given for a read_event or write_event,
+ /// but must NOT be called if a PeerHandleError was provided out of a new_\*\_connection event!
+ ///
+ /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a successful new_*_connection event.
+ pub fn disconnect_event(&self, descriptor: &Descriptor) {
+ self.disconnect_event_internal(descriptor, false);
+ }
+
+ fn disconnect_event_internal(&self, descriptor: &Descriptor, no_connection_possible: bool) {
+ let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
+ peers.peers_needing_send.remove(descriptor);
+ let peer_option = peers.peers.remove(descriptor);
+ match peer_option {
+ None => panic!("Descriptor for disconnect_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
+ Some(peer) => {
+ match peer.their_node_id {
+ Some(node_id) => {
+ peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id);
+ self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, no_connection_possible);
+ },
+ None => {}
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor};
+ use ln::msgs;
+ use util::events;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+
+ use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
+
+ use std::sync::{Arc};
+
+ #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Hash)]
+ struct FileDescriptor {
+ fd: u16,
+ }
+
+ impl SocketDescriptor for FileDescriptor {
+ fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
+ data.len()
+ }
+
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
+ }
+
+ fn create_network(peer_count: usize) -> Vec<PeerManager<FileDescriptor>> {
+ let mut peers = Vec::new();
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let mut ephemeral_bytes = [0; 32];
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut ephemeral_bytes);
+
+ for _ in 0..peer_count {
+ let chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
+ let router = test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new();
+ let node_id = {
+ let mut key_slice = [0;32];
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&key_slice).unwrap()
+ };
+ let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(chan_handler), route_handler: Arc::new(router) };
+ let peer = PeerManager::new(msg_handler, node_id, &ephemeral_bytes, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ peers.push(peer);
+ }
+
+ peers
+ }
+
+ fn establish_connection(peer_a: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor>, peer_b: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor>) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peer_b.our_node_secret);
+ let fd = FileDescriptor { fd: 1};
+ peer_a.new_inbound_connection(fd.clone()).unwrap();
+ peer_a.peers.lock().unwrap().node_id_to_descriptor.insert(their_id, fd.clone());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_disconnect_peer() {
+ // Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
+ // push a DisconnectPeer event to remove the node flagged by id
+ let mut peers = create_network(2);
+ establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peers[1].our_node_secret);
+
+ let chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
+ chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_id,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }),
+ });
+ assert_eq!(chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ peers[0].message_handler.chan_handler = Arc::new(chan_handler);
+
+ peers[0].process_events();
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! The top-level routing/network map tracking logic lives here.
+//!
+//! You probably want to create a Router and use that as your RoutingMessageHandler and then
+//! interrogate it to get routes for your own payments.
+
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
+use ln::channelmanager;
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError,ErrorAction,HandleError,RoutingMessageHandler,NetAddress,GlobalFeatures};
+use ln::msgs;
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
+use util::logger::Logger;
+
+use std::cmp;
+use std::sync::{RwLock,Arc};
+use std::collections::{HashMap,BinaryHeap,BTreeMap};
+use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
+use std;
+
+/// A hop in a route
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct RouteHop {
+ /// The node_id of the node at this hop.
+ pub pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// The channel that should be used from the previous hop to reach this node.
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// The fee taken on this hop. For the last hop, this should be the full value of the payment.
+ pub fee_msat: u64,
+ /// The CLTV delta added for this hop. For the last hop, this should be the full CLTV value
+ /// expected at the destination, in excess of the current block height.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+}
+
+/// A route from us through the network to a destination
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct Route {
+ /// The list of hops, NOT INCLUDING our own, where the last hop is the destination. Thus, this
+ /// must always be at least length one. By protocol rules, this may not currently exceed 20 in
+ /// length.
+ pub hops: Vec<RouteHop>,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Route {
+ fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.hops.len() as u8).write(writer)?;
+ for hop in self.hops.iter() {
+ hop.pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ hop.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ hop.fee_msat.write(writer)?;
+ hop.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for Route {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Route, DecodeError> {
+ let hops_count: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(hops_count as usize);
+ for _ in 0..hops_count {
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ fee_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(Route {
+ hops
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: PublicKey,
+ last_update: u32,
+ enabled: bool,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ fee_base_msat: u32,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ last_update_message: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ write!(f, "src_node_id {}, last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fee_base_msat {}, fee_proportional_millionths {}", log_pubkey!(self.src_node_id), self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fee_base_msat, self.fee_proportional_millionths)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
+ src_node_id,
+ last_update,
+ enabled,
+ cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat,
+ fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths,
+ last_update_message
+});
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures,
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo,
+ two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo,
+ //this is cached here so we can send out it later if required by route_init_sync
+ //keep an eye on this to see if the extra memory is a problem
+ announcement_message: Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ write!(f, "features: {}, one_to_two: {}, two_to_one: {}", log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), self.one_to_two, self.two_to_one)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
+ features,
+ one_to_two,
+ two_to_one,
+ announcement_message
+});
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct NodeInfo {
+ #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
+ channels: Vec<(u64, Sha256dHash)>,
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
+ channels: Vec<u64>,
+
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+
+ features: GlobalFeatures,
+ last_update: u32,
+ rgb: [u8; 3],
+ alias: [u8; 32],
+ addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
+ //this is cached here so we can send out it later if required by route_init_sync
+ //keep an eye on this to see if the extra memory is a problem
+ announcement_message: Option<msgs::NodeAnnouncement>,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ write!(f, "features: {}, last_update: {}, lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: {}, lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: {}, channels: {:?}", log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), self.last_update, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, &self.channels[..])?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
+ chan.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
+ self.features.write(writer)?;
+ self.last_update.write(writer)?;
+ self.rgb.write(writer)?;
+ self.alias.write(writer)?;
+ (self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for ref addr in &self.addresses {
+ addr.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for NodeInfo {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
+ let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
+ for _ in 0..channels_count {
+ channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ let lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
+ for _ in 0..addresses_count {
+ match Readable::read(reader) {
+ Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
+ Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ }
+ let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ Ok(NodeInfo {
+ channels,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths,
+ features,
+ last_update,
+ rgb,
+ alias,
+ addresses,
+ announcement_message
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct NetworkMap {
+ #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
+ channels: BTreeMap<(u64, Sha256dHash), ChannelInfo>,
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
+ channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
+
+ our_node_id: PublicKey,
+ nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for NetworkMap {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
+ (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
+ chan_info.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ self.our_node_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
+ node_id.write(writer)?;
+ node_info.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for NetworkMap {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkMap, DecodeError> {
+ let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
+ for _ in 0..channels_count {
+ let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
+ }
+ let our_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
+ for _ in 0..nodes_count {
+ let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
+ }
+ Ok(NetworkMap {
+ channels,
+ our_node_id,
+ nodes,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+struct MutNetworkMap<'a> {
+ #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
+ channels: &'a mut BTreeMap<(u64, Sha256dHash), ChannelInfo>,
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
+ channels: &'a mut BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
+ nodes: &'a mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
+}
+impl NetworkMap {
+ fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutNetworkMap {
+ MutNetworkMap {
+ channels: &mut self.channels,
+ nodes: &mut self.nodes,
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkMap {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ write!(f, "Node id {} network map\n[Channels]\n", log_pubkey!(self.our_node_id))?;
+ for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
+ write!(f, " {}: {}\n", key, val)?;
+ }
+ write!(f, "[Nodes]\n")?;
+ for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
+ write!(f, " {}: {}\n", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl NetworkMap {
+ #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_key(short_channel_id: u64, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> (u64, Sha256dHash) {
+ (short_channel_id, chain_hash)
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_key(short_channel_id: u64, _: Sha256dHash) -> u64 {
+ short_channel_id
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_short_id(id: &(u64, Sha256dHash)) -> &u64 {
+ &id.0
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_short_id(id: &u64) -> &u64 {
+ id
+ }
+}
+
+/// A channel descriptor which provides a last-hop route to get_route
+pub struct RouteHint {
+ /// The node_id of the non-target end of the route
+ pub src_node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The short_channel_id of this channel
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// The static msat-denominated fee which must be paid to use this channel
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// The dynamic proportional fee which must be paid to use this channel, denominated in
+ /// millionths of the value being forwarded to the next hop.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The difference in CLTV values between this node and the next node.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+ /// The minimum value, in msat, which must be relayed to the next hop.
+ pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+}
+
+/// Tracks a view of the network, receiving updates from peers and generating Routes to
+/// payment destinations.
+pub struct Router {
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
+ network_map: RwLock<NetworkMap>,
+ chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for Router {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
+ network.write(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Arguments for the creation of a Router that are not deserialized.
+/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a Router and resuming normal operation is:
+/// 1) Deserialize the Router by filling in this struct and calling <Router>::read(reaser, args).
+/// 2) Register the new Router with your ChainWatchInterface
+pub struct RouterReadArgs {
+ /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the Router in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
+ /// deserialization.
+ pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, RouterReadArgs> for Router {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, args: RouterReadArgs) -> Result<Router, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+ let network_map = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ Ok(Router {
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
+ network_map: RwLock::new(network_map),
+ chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
+ logger: args.logger,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
+ ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
+ match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node", action: None}),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router {
+ fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
+
+ if msg.contents.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ panic!("Unknown-required-features NodeAnnouncements should never deserialize!");
+ }
+
+ let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
+ match network.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
+ None => Err(HandleError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}),
+ Some(node) => {
+ if node.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+
+ node.features = msg.contents.features.clone();
+ node.last_update = msg.contents.timestamp;
+ node.rgb = msg.contents.rgb;
+ node.alias = msg.contents.alias;
+ node.addresses = msg.contents.addresses.clone();
+
+ let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty() && !msg.contents.features.supports_unknown_bits();
+ node.announcement_message = if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None };
+ Ok(should_relay)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+
+ if msg.contents.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ panic!("Unknown-required-features ChannelAnnouncements should never deserialize!");
+ }
+
+ let checked_utxo = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ Ok((script_pubkey, _value)) => {
+ let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ if script_pubkey != expected_script {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announcement keys didn't match on-chain script", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+ //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
+ //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
+ true
+ },
+ Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
+ // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
+ false
+ },
+ Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced on an unknown chain", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ },
+ Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ },
+ };
+
+ let mut network_lock = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
+ let network = network_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && !msg.contents.features.supports_unknown_bits();
+
+ let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
+ features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: false,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(),
+ fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: false,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(),
+ fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ };
+
+ match network.channels.entry(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
+ //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
+ //exactly how...
+ if checked_utxo {
+ // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
+ // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
+ // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
+ // do that because
+ // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
+ // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
+ // get reorg'd out.
+ // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(network.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
+ } else {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})
+ }
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(chan_info);
+ }
+ };
+
+ macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
+ ( $node_id: expr ) => {
+ match network.nodes.entry($node_id) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash));
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
+
+ Ok(should_relay)
+ }
+
+ fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
+ match update {
+ &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
+ let _ = self.handle_channel_update(msg);
+ },
+ &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
+ if *is_permanent {
+ if let Some(chan) = network.channels.remove(short_channel_id) {
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut network.nodes, &chan, *short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(chan) = network.channels.get_mut(short_channel_id) {
+ chan.one_to_two.enabled = false;
+ chan.two_to_one.enabled = false;
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if *is_permanent {
+ //TODO: Wholly remove the node
+ } else {
+ self.mark_node_bad(node_id, false);
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
+ let dest_node_id;
+ let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
+ let chan_was_enabled;
+
+ match network.channels.get_mut(&NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) {
+ None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}),
+ Some(channel) => {
+ macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
+ ( $target: expr) => {
+ if $target.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+ chan_was_enabled = $target.enabled;
+ $target.last_update = msg.contents.timestamp;
+ $target.enabled = chan_enabled;
+ $target.cltv_expiry_delta = msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta;
+ $target.htlc_minimum_msat = msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ $target.fee_base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
+ $target.fee_proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
+ $target.last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ }
+ }
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
+ dest_node_id = channel.one_to_two.src_node_id.clone();
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.two_to_one.src_node_id);
+ maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one);
+ } else {
+ dest_node_id = channel.two_to_one.src_node_id.clone();
+ secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.one_to_two.src_node_id);
+ maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if chan_enabled {
+ let node = network.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
+ node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, msg.contents.fee_base_msat);
+ node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths);
+ } else if chan_was_enabled {
+ let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = u32::max_value();
+ let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = u32::max_value();
+
+ {
+ let node = network.nodes.get(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
+
+ for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
+ let chan = network.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
+ if chan.one_to_two.src_node_id == dest_node_id {
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, chan.two_to_one.fee_base_msat);
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, chan.two_to_one.fee_proportional_millionths);
+ } else {
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, chan.one_to_two.fee_base_msat);
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, chan.one_to_two.fee_proportional_millionths);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ //TODO: satisfy the borrow-checker without a double-map-lookup :(
+ let mut_node = network.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
+ mut_node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat;
+ mut_node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ }
+
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
+ }
+
+
+ fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate,msgs::ChannelUpdate)> {
+ let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
+ let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
+ let mut iter = network.channels.range(starting_point..);
+ while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
+ if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
+ if chan.announcement_message.is_some() &&
+ chan.one_to_two.last_update_message.is_some() &&
+ chan.two_to_one.last_update_message.is_some() {
+ result.push((chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap(),
+ chan.one_to_two.last_update_message.clone().unwrap(),
+ chan.two_to_one.last_update_message.clone().unwrap()));
+ } else {
+ // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
+ // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
+ }
+ } else {
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ result
+ }
+
+ fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
+ let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
+ let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
+ let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
+ let mut iter = network.nodes.range((*pubkey)..);
+ iter.next();
+ iter
+ } else {
+ network.nodes.range(..)
+ };
+ while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
+ if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
+ if node.announcement_message.is_some() {
+ result.push(node.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
+ }
+ } else {
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ result
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Eq, PartialEq)]
+struct RouteGraphNode {
+ pubkey: PublicKey,
+ lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: u64,
+ lowest_fee_to_node: u64,
+}
+
+impl cmp::Ord for RouteGraphNode {
+ fn cmp(&self, other: &RouteGraphNode) -> cmp::Ordering {
+ other.lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node.cmp(&self.lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node)
+ .then_with(|| other.pubkey.serialize().cmp(&self.pubkey.serialize()))
+ }
+}
+
+impl cmp::PartialOrd for RouteGraphNode {
+ fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &RouteGraphNode) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
+ Some(self.cmp(other))
+ }
+}
+
+struct DummyDirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: PublicKey,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ fee_base_msat: u32,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+}
+
+impl Router {
+ /// Creates a new router with the given node_id to be used as the source for get_route()
+ pub fn new(our_pubkey: PublicKey, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Router {
+ let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
+ nodes.insert(our_pubkey.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: Vec::new(),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ Router {
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
+ network_map: RwLock::new(NetworkMap {
+ channels: BTreeMap::new(),
+ our_node_id: our_pubkey,
+ nodes: nodes,
+ }),
+ chain_monitor,
+ logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Dumps the entire network view of this Router to the logger provided in the constructor at
+ /// level Trace
+ pub fn trace_state(&self) {
+ log_trace!(self, "{}", self.network_map.read().unwrap());
+ }
+
+ /// Get network addresses by node id
+ pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
+ let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
+ network.nodes.get(pubkey).map(|n| n.addresses.clone())
+ }
+
+ /// Marks a node as having failed a route. This will avoid re-using the node in routes for now,
+ /// with an exponential decay in node "badness". Note that there is deliberately no
+ /// mark_channel_bad as a node may simply lie and suggest that an upstream channel from it is
+ /// what failed the route and not the node itself. Instead, setting the blamed_upstream_node
+ /// boolean will reduce the penalty, returning the node to usability faster. If the node is
+ /// behaving correctly, it will disable the failing channel and we will use it again next time.
+ pub fn mark_node_bad(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, _blamed_upstream_node: bool) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+
+ fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
+ macro_rules! remove_from_node {
+ ($node_id: expr) => {
+ if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
+ entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
+ short_channel_id != *NetworkMap::get_short_id(chan_id)
+ });
+ if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
+ entry.remove_entry();
+ }
+ } else {
+ panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ remove_from_node!(chan.one_to_two.src_node_id);
+ remove_from_node!(chan.two_to_one.src_node_id);
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a route from us to the given target node.
+ ///
+ /// Extra routing hops between known nodes and the target will be used if they are included in
+ /// last_hops.
+ ///
+ /// If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in a first_hops with the
+ /// results from a local ChannelManager::list_usable_channels() call. If it is filled in, our
+ /// (this Router's) view of our local channels will be ignored, and only those in first_hops
+ /// will be used.
+ ///
+ /// Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids
+ /// (ChannelManager::list_usable_channels will never include such channels).
+ ///
+ /// The fees on channels from us to next-hops are ignored (as they are assumed to all be
+ /// equal), however the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the htlc_minimum_msat
+ /// *is* checked as they may change based on the receiving node.
+ pub fn get_route(&self, target: &PublicKey, first_hops: Option<&[channelmanager::ChannelDetails]>, last_hops: &[RouteHint], final_value_msat: u64, final_cltv: u32) -> Result<Route, HandleError> {
+ // TODO: Obviously *only* using total fee cost sucks. We should consider weighting by
+ // uptime/success in using a node in the past.
+ let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
+
+ if *target == network.our_node_id {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate a route to ourselves", action: None});
+ }
+
+ if final_value_msat > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 * 1000 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate a route of more value than all existing satoshis", action: None});
+ }
+
+ // We do a dest-to-source Dijkstra's sorting by each node's distance from the destination
+ // plus the minimum per-HTLC fee to get from it to another node (aka "shitty A*").
+ // TODO: There are a few tweaks we could do, including possibly pre-calculating more stuff
+ // to use as the A* heuristic beyond just the cost to get one node further than the current
+ // one.
+
+ let dummy_directional_info = DummyDirectionalChannelInfo { // used for first_hops routes
+ src_node_id: network.our_node_id.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ };
+
+ let mut targets = BinaryHeap::new(); //TODO: Do we care about switching to eg Fibbonaci heap?
+ let mut dist = HashMap::with_capacity(network.nodes.len());
+
+ let mut first_hop_targets = HashMap::with_capacity(if first_hops.is_some() { first_hops.as_ref().unwrap().len() } else { 0 });
+ if let Some(hops) = first_hops {
+ for chan in hops {
+ let short_channel_id = chan.short_channel_id.expect("first_hops should be filled in with usable channels, not pending ones");
+ if chan.remote_network_id == *target {
+ return Ok(Route {
+ hops: vec![RouteHop {
+ pubkey: chan.remote_network_id,
+ short_channel_id,
+ fee_msat: final_value_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: final_cltv,
+ }],
+ });
+ }
+ first_hop_targets.insert(chan.remote_network_id, short_channel_id);
+ }
+ if first_hop_targets.is_empty() {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot route when there are no outbound routes away from us", action: None});
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! add_entry {
+ // Adds entry which goes from the node pointed to by $directional_info to
+ // $dest_node_id over the channel with id $chan_id with fees described in
+ // $directional_info.
+ ( $chan_id: expr, $dest_node_id: expr, $directional_info: expr, $starting_fee_msat: expr ) => {
+ //TODO: Explore simply adding fee to hit htlc_minimum_msat
+ if $starting_fee_msat as u64 + final_value_msat >= $directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat {
+ let proportional_fee_millions = ($starting_fee_msat + final_value_msat).checked_mul($directional_info.fee_proportional_millionths as u64);
+ if let Some(new_fee) = proportional_fee_millions.and_then(|part| {
+ ($directional_info.fee_base_msat as u64).checked_add(part / 1000000) })
+ {
+ let mut total_fee = $starting_fee_msat as u64;
+ let hm_entry = dist.entry(&$directional_info.src_node_id);
+ let old_entry = hm_entry.or_insert_with(|| {
+ let node = network.nodes.get(&$directional_info.src_node_id).unwrap();
+ (u64::max_value(),
+ node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat,
+ node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths,
+ RouteHop {
+ pubkey: $dest_node_id.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ fee_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ })
+ });
+ if $directional_info.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
+ // Ignore new_fee for channel-from-us as we assume all channels-from-us
+ // will have the same effective-fee
+ total_fee += new_fee;
+ if let Some(fee_inc) = final_value_msat.checked_add(total_fee).and_then(|inc| { (old_entry.2 as u64).checked_mul(inc) }) {
+ total_fee += fee_inc / 1000000 + (old_entry.1 as u64);
+ } else {
+ // max_value means we'll always fail the old_entry.0 > total_fee check
+ total_fee = u64::max_value();
+ }
+ }
+ let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
+ pubkey: $directional_info.src_node_id,
+ lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: total_fee,
+ lowest_fee_to_node: $starting_fee_msat as u64 + new_fee,
+ };
+ if old_entry.0 > total_fee {
+ targets.push(new_graph_node);
+ old_entry.0 = total_fee;
+ old_entry.3 = RouteHop {
+ pubkey: $dest_node_id.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: $chan_id.clone(),
+ fee_msat: new_fee, // This field is ignored on the last-hop anyway
+ cltv_expiry_delta: $directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node {
+ ( $node: expr, $node_id: expr, $fee_to_target_msat: expr ) => {
+ if first_hops.is_some() {
+ if let Some(first_hop) = first_hop_targets.get(&$node_id) {
+ add_entry!(first_hop, $node_id, dummy_directional_info, $fee_to_target_msat);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for chan_id in $node.channels.iter() {
+ let chan = network.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
+ if chan.one_to_two.src_node_id == *$node_id {
+ // ie $node is one, ie next hop in A* is two, via the two_to_one channel
+ if first_hops.is_none() || chan.two_to_one.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
+ if chan.two_to_one.enabled {
+ add_entry!(chan_id, chan.one_to_two.src_node_id, chan.two_to_one, $fee_to_target_msat);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if first_hops.is_none() || chan.one_to_two.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
+ if chan.one_to_two.enabled {
+ add_entry!(chan_id, chan.two_to_one.src_node_id, chan.one_to_two, $fee_to_target_msat);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ match network.nodes.get(target) {
+ None => {},
+ Some(node) => {
+ add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, target, 0);
+ },
+ }
+
+ for hop in last_hops.iter() {
+ if first_hops.is_none() || hop.src_node_id != network.our_node_id { // first_hop overrules last_hops
+ if network.nodes.get(&hop.src_node_id).is_some() {
+ if first_hops.is_some() {
+ if let Some(first_hop) = first_hop_targets.get(&hop.src_node_id) {
+ add_entry!(first_hop, hop.src_node_id, dummy_directional_info, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ add_entry!(hop.short_channel_id, target, hop, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ while let Some(RouteGraphNode { pubkey, lowest_fee_to_node, .. }) = targets.pop() {
+ if pubkey == network.our_node_id {
+ let mut res = vec!(dist.remove(&network.our_node_id).unwrap().3);
+ while res.last().unwrap().pubkey != *target {
+ let new_entry = match dist.remove(&res.last().unwrap().pubkey) {
+ Some(hop) => hop.3,
+ None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find a non-fee-overflowing path to the given destination", action: None}),
+ };
+ res.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = new_entry.fee_msat;
+ res.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = new_entry.cltv_expiry_delta;
+ res.push(new_entry);
+ }
+ res.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = final_value_msat;
+ res.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = final_cltv;
+ let route = Route { hops: res };
+ log_trace!(self, "Got route: {}", log_route!(route));
+ return Ok(route);
+ }
+
+ match network.nodes.get(&pubkey) {
+ None => {},
+ Some(node) => {
+ add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, &pubkey, lowest_fee_to_node);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find a path to the given destination", action: None})
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use chain::chaininterface;
+ use ln::channelmanager;
+ use ln::router::{Router,NodeInfo,NetworkMap,ChannelInfo,DirectionalChannelInfo,RouteHint};
+ use ln::msgs::GlobalFeatures;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::test_utils::TestVecWriter;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+ use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+ use hex;
+
+ use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
+ use std::sync::Arc;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn route_test() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let router = Router::new(our_id, chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+
+ // Build network from our_id to node8:
+ //
+ // -1(1)2- node1 -1(3)2-
+ // / \
+ // our_id -1(12)2- node8 -1(13)2--- node3
+ // \ /
+ // -1(2)2- node2 -1(4)2-
+ //
+ //
+ // chan1 1-to-2: disabled
+ // chan1 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan2 1-to-2: enabled, ignored fee
+ // chan2 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan3 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
+ // chan3 2-to-1: enabled, 100 msat fee
+ //
+ // chan4 1-to-2: enabled, 100% fee
+ // chan4 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan12 1-to-2: enabled, ignored fee
+ // chan12 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan13 1-to-2: enabled, 200% fee
+ // chan13 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ //
+ // -1(5)2- node4 -1(8)2--
+ // | 2 |
+ // | (11) |
+ // / 1 \
+ // node3--1(6)2- node5 -1(9)2--- node7 (not in global route map)
+ // \ /
+ // -1(7)2- node6 -1(10)2-
+ //
+ // chan5 1-to-2: enabled, 100 msat fee
+ // chan5 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan6 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
+ // chan6 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan7 1-to-2: enabled, 100% fee
+ // chan7 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan8 1-to-2: enabled, variable fee (0 then 1000 msat)
+ // chan8 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan9 1-to-2: enabled, 1001 msat fee
+ // chan9 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan10 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
+ // chan10 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+ //
+ // chan11 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
+ // chan11 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
+
+ let node1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node3 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node4 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node5 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node6 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node7 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ let node8 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+
+ let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
+
+ {
+ let mut network = router.network_map.write().unwrap();
+
+ network.nodes.insert(node1.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(1, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 100,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(1, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: false,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node1.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node2.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(2, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(2, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node2.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node8.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(12, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(12, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node8.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node3.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(
+ NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone()),
+ NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone()),
+ NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone()),
+ NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()),
+ NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()),
+ NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node1.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (3 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (3 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node2.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (4 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (4 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node8.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (13 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 2000000,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (13 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node4.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (5 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node4.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (5 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node5.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (6 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node5.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (6 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node5.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (11 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node4.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (11 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.nodes.insert(node6.clone(), NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone())),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ last_update: 1,
+ rgb: [0; 3],
+ alias: [0; 32],
+ addresses: Vec::new(),
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
+ features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node3.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (7 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ src_node_id: node6.clone(),
+ last_update: 0,
+ enabled: true,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (7 << 8) | 2,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ last_update_message: None,
+ },
+ announcement_message: None,
+ });
+ }
+
+ { // Simple route to 3 via 2
+ let route = router.get_route(&node3, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ { // Route to 1 via 2 and 3 because our channel to 1 is disabled
+ let route = router.get_route(&node1, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 3);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (3 << 8) | 2);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node1);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ { // If we specify a channel to node8, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
+ let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ short_channel_id: Some(42),
+ remote_network_id: node8.clone(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: 0,
+ user_id: 0,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ is_live: true,
+ }];
+ let route = router.get_route(&node3, Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node8);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 42);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (13 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 13);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ let mut last_hops = vec!(RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: node4.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 8,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (8 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ }, RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: node5.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 9,
+ fee_base_msat: 1001,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (9 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ }, RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: node6.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 10,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (10 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ });
+
+ { // Simple test across 2, 3, 5, and 4 via a last_hop channel
+ let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 5);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node5);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 6);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 11);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].short_channel_id, 8);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ { // Simple test with outbound channel to 4 to test that last_hops and first_hops connect
+ let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ short_channel_id: Some(42),
+ remote_network_id: node4.clone(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: 0,
+ user_id: 0,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ is_live: true,
+ }];
+ let route = router.get_route(&node7, Some(&our_chans), &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 42);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 8);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ last_hops[0].fee_base_msat = 1000;
+
+ { // Revert to via 6 as the fee on 8 goes up
+ let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 4);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200); // fee increased as its % of value transferred across node
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (7 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node6);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 7);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (10 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 10);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 100);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ { // ...but still use 8 for larger payments as 6 has a variable feerate
+ let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 2000, 42).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 5);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 3000);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node5);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 6);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 11);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 1000);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].short_channel_id, 8);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].fee_msat, 2000);
+ assert_eq!(route.hops[4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
+ }
+
+ { // Test Router serialization/deserialization
+ let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let network = router.network_map.read().unwrap();
+ assert!(!network.channels.is_empty());
+ assert!(!network.nodes.is_empty());
+ network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+ assert!(<NetworkMap>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
+ ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+ ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
+}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] // Used only by poly1305
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_le32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+ ((v[0] as u32) << 8*0) |
+ ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[2] as u32) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[3] as u32) << 8*3)
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be48(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
+ ((v[0] as u64) << 8*5) |
+ ((v[1] as u64) << 8*4) |
+ ((v[2] as u64) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[3] as u64) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[4] as u64) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[5] as u64) << 8*0)
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
+ ((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
+ ((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
+ ((v[2] as u64) << 8*5) |
+ ((v[3] as u64) << 8*4) |
+ ((v[4] as u64) << 8*3) |
+ ((v[5] as u64) << 8*2) |
+ ((v[6] as u64) << 8*1) |
+ ((v[7] as u64) << 8*0)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn be16_to_array(u: u16) -> [u8; 2] {
+ let mut v = [0; 2];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn be32_to_array(u: u32) -> [u8; 4] {
+ let mut v = [0; 4];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] // Used only by poly1305
+#[inline]
+pub fn le32_to_array(u: u32) -> [u8; 4] {
+ let mut v = [0; 4];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn be48_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 6] {
+ assert!(u & 0xffff_0000_0000_0000 == 0);
+ let mut v = [0; 6];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[4] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[5] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+#[inline]
+pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
+ let mut v = [0; 8];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub fn le64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
+ let mut v = [0; 8];
+ v[0] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[1] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[2] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[3] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[4] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[5] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[6] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v[7] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
+ v
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file was stolen from rust-crypto.
+// Copyright 2012-2013 The Rust Project Developers. See the COPYRIGHT
+// file at the top-level directory of this distribution and at
+// http://rust-lang.org/COPYRIGHT.
+
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
+// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
+// except according to those terms.
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+mod real_chacha {
+ use std::cmp;
+ use util::byte_utils::{slice_to_le32, le32_to_array};
+
+ #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+ #[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+ struct u32x4(pub u32, pub u32, pub u32, pub u32);
+ impl ::std::ops::Add for u32x4 {
+ type Output = u32x4;
+ fn add(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
+ u32x4(self.0.wrapping_add(rhs.0),
+ self.1.wrapping_add(rhs.1),
+ self.2.wrapping_add(rhs.2),
+ self.3.wrapping_add(rhs.3))
+ }
+ }
+ impl ::std::ops::Sub for u32x4 {
+ type Output = u32x4;
+ fn sub(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
+ u32x4(self.0.wrapping_sub(rhs.0),
+ self.1.wrapping_sub(rhs.1),
+ self.2.wrapping_sub(rhs.2),
+ self.3.wrapping_sub(rhs.3))
+ }
+ }
+ impl ::std::ops::BitXor for u32x4 {
+ type Output = u32x4;
+ fn bitxor(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
+ u32x4(self.0 ^ rhs.0, self.1 ^ rhs.1, self.2 ^ rhs.2, self.3 ^ rhs.3)
+ }
+ }
+ impl ::std::ops::Shr<u32x4> for u32x4 {
+ type Output = u32x4;
+ fn shr(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
+ u32x4(self.0 >> rhs.0, self.1 >> rhs.1, self.2 >> rhs.2, self.3 >> rhs.3)
+ }
+ }
+ impl ::std::ops::Shl<u32x4> for u32x4 {
+ type Output = u32x4;
+ fn shl(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
+ u32x4(self.0 << rhs.0, self.1 << rhs.1, self.2 << rhs.2, self.3 << rhs.3)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[derive(Clone,Copy)]
+ struct ChaChaState {
+ a: u32x4,
+ b: u32x4,
+ c: u32x4,
+ d: u32x4
+ }
+
+ #[derive(Copy)]
+ pub struct ChaCha20 {
+ state : ChaChaState,
+ output : [u8; 64],
+ offset : usize,
+ }
+
+ impl Clone for ChaCha20 { fn clone(&self) -> ChaCha20 { *self } }
+
+ macro_rules! swizzle {
+ ($b: expr, $c: expr, $d: expr) => {{
+ let u32x4(b10, b11, b12, b13) = $b;
+ $b = u32x4(b11, b12, b13, b10);
+ let u32x4(c10, c11, c12, c13) = $c;
+ $c = u32x4(c12, c13,c10, c11);
+ let u32x4(d10, d11, d12, d13) = $d;
+ $d = u32x4(d13, d10, d11, d12);
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! state_to_buffer {
+ ($state: expr, $output: expr) => {{
+ let u32x4(a1, a2, a3, a4) = $state.a;
+ let u32x4(b1, b2, b3, b4) = $state.b;
+ let u32x4(c1, c2, c3, c4) = $state.c;
+ let u32x4(d1, d2, d3, d4) = $state.d;
+ let lens = [
+ a1,a2,a3,a4,
+ b1,b2,b3,b4,
+ c1,c2,c3,c4,
+ d1,d2,d3,d4
+ ];
+ for i in 0..lens.len() {
+ $output[i*4..(i+1)*4].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(lens[i]));
+ }
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! round{
+ ($state: expr) => {{
+ $state.a = $state.a + $state.b;
+ rotate!($state.d, $state.a, S16);
+ $state.c = $state.c + $state.d;
+ rotate!($state.b, $state.c, S12);
+ $state.a = $state.a + $state.b;
+ rotate!($state.d, $state.a, S8);
+ $state.c = $state.c + $state.d;
+ rotate!($state.b, $state.c, S7);
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! rotate {
+ ($a: expr, $b: expr, $c:expr) => {{
+ let v = $a ^ $b;
+ let r = S32 - $c;
+ let right = v >> r;
+ $a = (v << $c) ^ right
+ }}
+ }
+
+ const S32:u32x4 = u32x4(32, 32, 32, 32);
+ const S16:u32x4 = u32x4(16, 16, 16, 16);
+ const S12:u32x4 = u32x4(12, 12, 12, 12);
+ const S8:u32x4 = u32x4(8, 8, 8, 8);
+ const S7:u32x4 = u32x4(7, 7, 7, 7);
+
+ impl ChaCha20 {
+ pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20 {
+ assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
+ assert!(nonce.len() == 8 || nonce.len() == 12);
+
+ ChaCha20{ state: ChaCha20::expand(key, nonce), output: [0u8; 64], offset: 64 }
+ }
+
+ fn expand(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaChaState {
+ let constant = match key.len() {
+ 16 => b"expand 16-byte k",
+ 32 => b"expand 32-byte k",
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+ ChaChaState {
+ a: u32x4(
+ slice_to_le32(&constant[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&constant[4..8]),
+ slice_to_le32(&constant[8..12]),
+ slice_to_le32(&constant[12..16])
+ ),
+ b: u32x4(
+ slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[4..8]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[8..12]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[12..16])
+ ),
+ c: if key.len() == 16 {
+ u32x4(
+ slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[4..8]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[8..12]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[12..16])
+ )
+ } else {
+ u32x4(
+ slice_to_le32(&key[16..20]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[20..24]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[24..28]),
+ slice_to_le32(&key[28..32])
+ )
+ },
+ d: if nonce.len() == 16 {
+ u32x4(
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[8..12]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[12..16])
+ )
+ } else if nonce.len() == 12 {
+ u32x4(
+ 0,
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[8..12])
+ )
+ } else {
+ u32x4(
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
+ slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8])
+ )
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // put the the next 64 keystream bytes into self.output
+ fn update(&mut self) {
+ let mut state = self.state;
+
+ for _ in 0..10 {
+ round!(state);
+ swizzle!(state.b, state.c, state.d);
+ round!(state);
+ swizzle!(state.d, state.c, state.b);
+ }
+ state.a = state.a + self.state.a;
+ state.b = state.b + self.state.b;
+ state.c = state.c + self.state.c;
+ state.d = state.d + self.state.d;
+
+ state_to_buffer!(state, self.output);
+
+ self.state.d = self.state.d + u32x4(1, 0, 0, 0);
+ let u32x4(c12, _, _, _) = self.state.d;
+ if c12 == 0 {
+ // we could increment the other counter word with an 8 byte nonce
+ // but other implementations like boringssl have this same
+ // limitation
+ panic!("counter is exhausted");
+ }
+
+ self.offset = 0;
+ }
+
+ pub fn process(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) {
+ assert!(input.len() == output.len());
+ let len = input.len();
+ let mut i = 0;
+ while i < len {
+ // If there is no keystream available in the output buffer,
+ // generate the next block.
+ if self.offset == 64 {
+ self.update();
+ }
+
+ // Process the min(available keystream, remaining input length).
+ let count = cmp::min(64 - self.offset, len - i);
+ // explicitly assert lengths to avoid bounds checks:
+ assert!(output.len() >= i + count);
+ assert!(input.len() >= i + count);
+ assert!(self.output.len() >= self.offset + count);
+ for j in 0..count {
+ output[i + j] = input[i + j] ^ self.output[self.offset + j];
+ }
+ i += count;
+ self.offset += count;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+pub use self::real_chacha::ChaCha20;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+mod fuzzy_chacha {
+ pub struct ChaCha20 {}
+
+ impl ChaCha20 {
+ pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20 {
+ assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
+ assert!(nonce.len() == 8 || nonce.len() == 12);
+ Self {}
+ }
+
+ pub fn process(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) {
+ output.copy_from_slice(input);
+ }
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+pub use self::fuzzy_chacha::ChaCha20;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+ use std::iter::repeat;
+
+ use super::ChaCha20;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_chacha20_256_tls_vectors() {
+ struct TestVector {
+ key: [u8; 32],
+ nonce: [u8; 8],
+ keystream: Vec<u8>,
+ };
+ // taken from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
+ let test_vectors = vec!(
+ TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90,
+ 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28,
+ 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a,
+ 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7,
+ 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d,
+ 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37,
+ 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c,
+ 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96,
+ 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96,
+ 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60,
+ 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41,
+ 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2,
+ 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c,
+ 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81,
+ 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xde, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf5,
+ 0xe7, 0x86, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x65, 0x3a,
+ 0x0b, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x15, 0xad, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x13,
+ 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0x37, 0x82, 0x10, 0x31,
+ 0xe8, 0x5a, 0x05, 0x02, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x45,
+ 0x27, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xef, 0xc7, 0xfa, 0x5b,
+ 0x52, 0x77, 0x06, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xa0, 0x43, 0x3e,
+ 0x44, 0x5f, 0x41, 0xe3,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xef, 0x3f, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0x15, 0x78, 0xfb,
+ 0xf5, 0xcf, 0x35, 0xbd, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x3b, 0x80,
+ 0x09, 0x63, 0x16, 0x34, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xac,
+ 0x33, 0x96, 0x0b, 0xd1, 0x38, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x32,
+ 0x11, 0x1e, 0x4c, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x3c,
+ 0xa8, 0xad, 0x64, 0x26, 0x19, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x54,
+ 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0x46, 0x6e, 0x7d,
+ 0x6b, 0xbd, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x6b,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xf7, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x89, 0xf1, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x69,
+ 0x82, 0x10, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x75,
+ 0x7f, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x93,
+ 0xec, 0x01, 0xac, 0x56, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xc1,
+ 0x34, 0xa4, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x41,
+ 0x30, 0x42, 0xc9, 0x44, 0x00, 0x49, 0x17, 0x69,
+ 0x05, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x59, 0xea, 0x1c, 0x53, 0xf1,
+ 0x59, 0x16, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x1a,
+ 0x38, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x35, 0x94,
+ 0x1e, 0x24, 0x44, 0x17, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xde, 0x66,
+ 0x89, 0xde, 0x95, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0xd9, 0x58,
+ 0x89, 0xfb, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xbd,
+ 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0xc1, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x56,
+ 0x3e, 0xb9, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x2e,
+ 0x09, 0xa7, 0xe7, 0x78, 0x49, 0x2b, 0x56, 0x2e,
+ 0xf7, 0x13, 0x0e, 0x88, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xc7,
+ 0x9d, 0xb9, 0xd4, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0xa8, 0x99, 0x15,
+ 0x1b, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x50, 0x32, 0xb6, 0x3f, 0xc3,
+ 0x85, 0x24, 0x5f, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xe3, 0xdd, 0x5a,
+ 0x97, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x76, 0xfe, 0x06, 0x40, 0x25,
+ 0xd3, 0xce, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xb2, 0xc5,
+ 0x07, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xdb, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0x69,
+ 0x59, 0x66, 0x09, 0x96, 0x54, 0x6c, 0xc9, 0xc4,
+ 0xa6, 0xea, 0xfd, 0xc7, 0x77, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xd7,
+ 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xad, 0x39, 0x79,
+ 0xe5, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x33, 0x17, 0x16, 0x6a,
+ 0x1c, 0x89, 0x4c, 0x94, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x87, 0x6a,
+ 0x94, 0xdf, 0x76, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4e, 0xaa, 0xf2,
+ 0xcc, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xe0, 0xad, 0x7a,
+ 0xd0, 0xf9, 0xd4, 0xb6, 0xad, 0x3b, 0x54, 0x09,
+ 0x87, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x38, 0x40, 0x7a,
+ 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x3a, 0xb7, 0x8f, 0xab, 0x78, 0xc9,
+ ),
+ },
+ );
+
+ for tv in test_vectors.iter() {
+ let mut c = ChaCha20::new(&tv.key, &tv.nonce);
+ let input: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(tv.keystream.len()).collect();
+ let mut output: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(input.len()).collect();
+ c.process(&input[..], &mut output[..]);
+ assert_eq!(output, tv.keystream);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_chacha20_256_tls_vectors_96_nonce() {
+ struct TestVector {
+ key: [u8; 32],
+ nonce: [u8; 12],
+ keystream: Vec<u8>,
+ };
+ // taken from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
+ let test_vectors = vec!(
+ TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90,
+ 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28,
+ 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a,
+ 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7,
+ 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d,
+ 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37,
+ 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c,
+ 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96,
+ 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96,
+ 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60,
+ 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41,
+ 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2,
+ 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c,
+ 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81,
+ 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xde, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf5,
+ 0xe7, 0x86, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x65, 0x3a,
+ 0x0b, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x15, 0xad, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x13,
+ 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0x37, 0x82, 0x10, 0x31,
+ 0xe8, 0x5a, 0x05, 0x02, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x45,
+ 0x27, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xef, 0xc7, 0xfa, 0x5b,
+ 0x52, 0x77, 0x06, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xa0, 0x43, 0x3e,
+ 0x44, 0x5f, 0x41, 0xe3,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ],
+ nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xef, 0x3f, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0x15, 0x78, 0xfb,
+ 0xf5, 0xcf, 0x35, 0xbd, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x3b, 0x80,
+ 0x09, 0x63, 0x16, 0x34, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xac,
+ 0x33, 0x96, 0x0b, 0xd1, 0x38, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x32,
+ 0x11, 0x1e, 0x4c, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x3c,
+ 0xa8, 0xad, 0x64, 0x26, 0x19, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x54,
+ 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0x46, 0x6e, 0x7d,
+ 0x6b, 0xbd, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x6b,
+ ),
+ }, TestVector{
+ key: [
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
+ ],
+ nonce: [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 ],
+ keystream: vec!(
+ 0xf7, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x89, 0xf1, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x69,
+ 0x82, 0x10, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x75,
+ 0x7f, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x93,
+ 0xec, 0x01, 0xac, 0x56, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xc1,
+ 0x34, 0xa4, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x41,
+ 0x30, 0x42, 0xc9, 0x44, 0x00, 0x49, 0x17, 0x69,
+ 0x05, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x59, 0xea, 0x1c, 0x53, 0xf1,
+ 0x59, 0x16, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x1a,
+ 0x38, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x35, 0x94,
+ 0x1e, 0x24, 0x44, 0x17, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xde, 0x66,
+ 0x89, 0xde, 0x95, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0xd9, 0x58,
+ 0x89, 0xfb, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xbd,
+ 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0xc1, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x56,
+ 0x3e, 0xb9, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x2e,
+ 0x09, 0xa7, 0xe7, 0x78, 0x49, 0x2b, 0x56, 0x2e,
+ 0xf7, 0x13, 0x0e, 0x88, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xc7,
+ 0x9d, 0xb9, 0xd4, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0xa8, 0x99, 0x15,
+ 0x1b, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x50, 0x32, 0xb6, 0x3f, 0xc3,
+ 0x85, 0x24, 0x5f, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xe3, 0xdd, 0x5a,
+ 0x97, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x76, 0xfe, 0x06, 0x40, 0x25,
+ 0xd3, 0xce, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xb2, 0xc5,
+ 0x07, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xdb, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0x69,
+ 0x59, 0x66, 0x09, 0x96, 0x54, 0x6c, 0xc9, 0xc4,
+ 0xa6, 0xea, 0xfd, 0xc7, 0x77, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xd7,
+ 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xad, 0x39, 0x79,
+ 0xe5, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x33, 0x17, 0x16, 0x6a,
+ 0x1c, 0x89, 0x4c, 0x94, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x87, 0x6a,
+ 0x94, 0xdf, 0x76, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4e, 0xaa, 0xf2,
+ 0xcc, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xe0, 0xad, 0x7a,
+ 0xd0, 0xf9, 0xd4, 0xb6, 0xad, 0x3b, 0x54, 0x09,
+ 0x87, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x38, 0x40, 0x7a,
+ 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x3a, 0xb7, 0x8f, 0xab, 0x78, 0xc9,
+ ),
+ },
+ );
+
+ for tv in test_vectors.iter() {
+ let mut c = ChaCha20::new(&tv.key, &tv.nonce);
+ let input: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(tv.keystream.len()).collect();
+ let mut output: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(input.len()).collect();
+ c.process(&input[..], &mut output[..]);
+ assert_eq!(output, tv.keystream);
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// ring has a garbage API so its use is avoided, but rust-crypto doesn't have RFC-variant poly1305
+// Instead, we steal rust-crypto's implementation and tweak it to match the RFC.
+
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
+// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
+// except according to those terms.
+
+// This is a port of Andrew Moons poly1305-donna
+// https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+mod real_chachapoly {
+ use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+ use util::poly1305::Poly1305;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+
+ use util::byte_utils;
+
+ #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+ pub struct ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ cipher: ChaCha20,
+ mac: Poly1305,
+ finished: bool,
+ data_len: usize,
+ aad_len: u64,
+ }
+
+ impl ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ #[inline]
+ fn pad_mac_16(mac: &mut Poly1305, len: usize) {
+ if len % 16 != 0 {
+ mac.input(&[0; 16][0..16 - (len % 16)]);
+ }
+ }
+ pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
+ assert!(nonce.len() == 12);
+
+ // Ehh, I'm too lazy to *also* tweak ChaCha20 to make it RFC-compliant
+ assert!(nonce[0] == 0 && nonce[1] == 0 && nonce[2] == 0 && nonce[3] == 0);
+
+ let mut cipher = ChaCha20::new(key, &nonce[4..]);
+ let mut mac_key = [0u8; 64];
+ let zero_key = [0u8; 64];
+ cipher.process(&zero_key, &mut mac_key);
+
+ let mut mac = Poly1305::new(&mac_key[..32]);
+ mac.input(aad);
+ ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut mac, aad.len());
+
+ ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ cipher: cipher,
+ mac: mac,
+ finished: false,
+ data_len: 0,
+ aad_len: aad.len() as u64,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn encrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], out_tag: &mut [u8]) {
+ assert!(input.len() == output.len());
+ assert!(self.finished == false);
+ self.cipher.process(input, output);
+ self.data_len += input.len();
+ self.mac.input(output);
+ ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut self.mac, self.data_len);
+ self.finished = true;
+ self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.aad_len));
+ self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.data_len as u64));
+ self.mac.raw_result(out_tag);
+ }
+
+ pub fn decrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], tag: &[u8]) -> bool {
+ assert!(input.len() == output.len());
+ assert!(self.finished == false);
+
+ self.finished = true;
+
+ self.mac.input(input);
+
+ self.data_len += input.len();
+ ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut self.mac, self.data_len);
+ self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.aad_len));
+ self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.data_len as u64));
+
+ let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 16];
+ self.mac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
+ if fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, tag) {
+ self.cipher.process(input, output);
+ true
+ } else {
+ false
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+pub use self::real_chachapoly::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+mod fuzzy_chachapoly {
+ #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+ pub struct ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ tag: [u8; 16],
+ finished: bool,
+ }
+ impl ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8], _aad: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
+ assert!(nonce.len() == 12);
+
+ // Ehh, I'm too lazy to *also* tweak ChaCha20 to make it RFC-compliant
+ assert!(nonce[0] == 0 && nonce[1] == 0 && nonce[2] == 0 && nonce[3] == 0);
+
+ let mut tag = [0; 16];
+ tag.copy_from_slice(&key[0..16]);
+
+ ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
+ tag,
+ finished: false,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn encrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], out_tag: &mut [u8]) {
+ assert!(input.len() == output.len());
+ assert!(self.finished == false);
+
+ output.copy_from_slice(&input);
+ out_tag.copy_from_slice(&self.tag);
+ self.finished = true;
+ }
+
+ pub fn decrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], tag: &[u8]) -> bool {
+ assert!(input.len() == output.len());
+ assert!(self.finished == false);
+
+ if tag[..] != self.tag[..] { return false; }
+ output.copy_from_slice(input);
+ self.finished = true;
+ true
+ }
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+pub use self::fuzzy_chachapoly::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
--- /dev/null
+//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
+//! applies for you.
+
+use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+
+/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct UserConfig {
+ /// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
+ pub own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig,
+ /// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
+ pub peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
+ /// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
+ pub channel_options: ChannelConfig,
+}
+
+impl UserConfig {
+ /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with 0 relay fees!)
+ pub fn new() -> Self{
+ UserConfig {
+ own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::new(),
+ peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits::new(),
+ channel_options: ChannelConfig::new(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Configuration we set when applicable.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ /// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
+ /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+ /// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+ pub minimum_depth: u32,
+ /// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+ ///
+ /// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+ /// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
+ /// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+ /// Default is BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you can
+ /// tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ ///
+ /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
+ /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
+ /// our channel.
+ pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
+}
+
+impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ /// Provides sane defaults for `ChannelHandshakeConfig`
+ pub fn new() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ minimum_depth: 6,
+ our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation.
+///
+/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
+///
+/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+ /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+ /// only applies to inbound channels.
+ pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
+ /// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
+ pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
+ /// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
+ pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ /// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
+ /// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
+ /// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
+ pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
+ /// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
+ pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ /// Outputs below a certain value will not be added to on-chain transactions. The dust value is
+ /// required to always be higher than this value so this only applies to HTLC outputs (and
+ /// potentially to-self outputs before any payments have been made).
+ /// Thus, HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
+ /// This setting allows you to set a minimum dust limit for their commitment transactions,
+ /// reflecting the reality that tiny outputs are not considered standard transactions and will
+ /// not propagate through the Bitcoin network.
+ /// Defaults to 546, or the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
+ pub min_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ /// Maximum allowed threshold above which outputs will not be generated in their commitment
+ /// transactions.
+ /// HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
+ pub max_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ /// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
+ /// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
+ /// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
+ /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. Defaults to
+ /// 144 blocks or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
+ pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
+ /// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
+ /// ChannelConfig.
+ /// Defaults to true to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
+ /// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
+ pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
+ /// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
+ ///
+ /// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
+ /// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
+ /// Default is MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, which we also enforce as a maximum value
+ /// so you can tweak config to reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
+ pub their_to_self_delay: u16
+}
+
+impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+ /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
+ ///
+ /// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
+ /// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
+ /// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+ min_funding_satoshis: 0,
+ max_htlc_minimum_msat: <u64>::max_value(),
+ min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
+ min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ min_dust_limit_satoshis: 546,
+ max_dust_limit_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
+ max_minimum_depth: 144,
+ force_announced_channel_preference: true,
+ their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
+/// with our counterparty.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ChannelConfig {
+ /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+ /// channel.
+ ///
+ /// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+ ///
+ /// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+ /// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
+ ///
+ /// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ pub announced_channel: bool,
+ /// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+ /// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+ /// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+ ///
+ /// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+ /// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+ /// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+ ///
+ /// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool
+}
+
+impl ChannelConfig {
+ /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with zero relay fees!).
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ ChannelConfig {
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ announced_channel: false,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+//Add write and readable traits to channelconfig
+impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 8+1+1, {
+ fee_proportional_millionths,
+ announced_channel,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey
+});
--- /dev/null
+//! Error types live here.
+
+use std::fmt;
+
+/// Indicates an error on the client's part (usually some variant of attempting to use too-low or
+/// too-high values)
+pub enum APIError {
+ /// Indicates the API was wholly misused (see err for more). Cases where these can be returned
+ /// are documented, but generally indicates some precondition of a function was violated.
+ APIMisuseError {
+ /// A human-readable error message
+ err: &'static str
+ },
+ /// Due to a high feerate, we were unable to complete the request.
+ /// For example, this may be returned if the feerate implies we cannot open a channel at the
+ /// requested value, but opening a larger channel would succeed.
+ FeeRateTooHigh {
+ /// A human-readable error message
+ err: String,
+ /// The feerate which was too high.
+ feerate: u64
+ },
+ /// A malformed Route was provided (eg overflowed value, node id mismatch, overly-looped route,
+ /// too-many-hops, etc).
+ RouteError {
+ /// A human-readable error message
+ err: &'static str
+ },
+ /// We were unable to complete the request as the Channel required to do so is unable to
+ /// complete the request (or was not found). This can take many forms, including disconnected
+ /// peer, channel at capacity, channel shutting down, etc.
+ ChannelUnavailable {
+ /// A human-readable error message
+ err: &'static str
+ },
+ /// An attempt to call add_update_monitor returned an Err (ie you did this!), causing the
+ /// attempted action to fail.
+ MonitorUpdateFailed,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for APIError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match *self {
+ APIError::APIMisuseError {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
+ APIError::FeeRateTooHigh {ref err, ref feerate} => write!(f, "{} feerate: {}", err, feerate),
+ APIError::RouteError {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
+ APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => f.write_str("Client indicated a channel monitor update failed"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(crate) fn get_onion_debug_field(error_code: u16) -> (&'static str, usize) {
+ match error_code & 0xff {
+ 4|5|6 => ("sha256_of_onion", 32),
+ 11|12 => ("htlc_msat", 8),
+ 13|18 => ("cltv_expiry", 4),
+ 19 => ("incoming_htlc_msat", 8),
+ 20 => ("flags", 2),
+ _ => ("", 0),
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+pub(crate) fn get_onion_error_description(error_code: u16) -> (&'static str, &'static str) {
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+ match error_code {
+ _c if _c == PERM|1 => ("The realm byte was not understood by the processing node", "invalid_realm"),
+ _c if _c == NODE|2 => ("Node indicated temporary node failure", "temporary_node_failure"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|NODE|2 => ("Node indicated permanent node failure", "permanent_node_failure"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|NODE|3 => ("Node indicated the required node feature is missing in the onion", "required_node_feature_missing"),
+ _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|4 => ("Node indicated the version by is not understood", "invalid_onion_version"),
+ _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|5 => ("Node indicated the HMAC of the onion is incorrect", "invalid_onion_hmac"),
+ _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|6 => ("Node indicated the ephemeral public keys is not parseable", "invalid_onion_key"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|7 => ("Node indicated the outgoing channel is unable to handle the HTLC temporarily", "temporary_channel_failure"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|8 => ("Node indicated the outgoing channel is unable to handle the HTLC peramanently", "permanent_channel_failure"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|9 => ("Node indicated the required feature for the outgoing channel is not satisfied", "required_channel_feature_missing"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|10 => ("Node indicated the outbound channel is not found for the specified short_channel_id in the onion packet", "unknown_next_peer"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|11 => ("Node indicated the HTLC amount was below the required minmum for the outbound channel", "amount_below_minimum"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|12 => ("Node indicated the fee amount does not meet the required level", "fee_insufficient"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|13 => ("Node indicated the cltv_expiry does not comply with the cltv_expiry_delta required by the outgoing channel", "incorrect_cltv_expiry"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|14 => ("Node indicated the CLTV expiry too close to the current block height for safe handling", "expiry_too_soon"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|15 => ("The final node indicated the payment hash is unknown or amount is incorrect", "incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details"),
+ _c if _c == PERM|16 => ("The final node indicated the payment amount is incorrect", "incorrect_payment_amount"),
+ _c if _c == 17 => ("The final node indicated the CLTV expiry is too close to the current block height for safe handling", "final_expiry_too_soon"),
+ _c if _c == 18 => ("The final node indicated the CLTV expiry in the HTLC does not match the value in the onion", "final_incorrect_cltv_expiry"),
+ _c if _c == 19 => ("The final node indicated the amount in the HTLC does not match the value in the onion", "final_incorrect_htlc_amount"),
+ _c if _c == UPDATE|20 => ("Node indicated the outbound channel has been disabled", "channel_disabled"),
+ _c if _c == 21 => ("Node indicated the CLTV expiry in the HTLC is too far in the future", "expiry_too_far"),
+ _ => ("Unknown", ""),
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Events are returned from various bits in the library which indicate some action must be taken
+//! by the client.
+//!
+//! Because we don't have a built-in runtime, it's up to the client to call events at a time in the
+//! future, as well as generate and broadcast funding transactions handle payment preimages and a
+//! few other things.
+//!
+//! Note that many events are handled for you by PeerHandler, so in the common design of having a
+//! PeerManager which marshalls messages to ChannelManager and Router you only need to call
+//! process_events on the PeerHandler and then get_and_clear_pending_events and handle the events
+//! that bubble up to the surface. If, however, you do not have a PeerHandler managing a
+//! ChannelManager you need to handle all of the events which may be generated.
+//TODO: We need better separation of event types ^
+
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+/// An Event which you should probably take some action in response to.
+pub enum Event {
+ /// Used to indicate that the client should generate a funding transaction with the given
+ /// parameters and then call ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated.
+ /// Generated in ChannelManager message handling.
+ /// Note that *all inputs* in the funding transaction must spend SegWit outputs or your
+ /// counterparty can steal your funds!
+ FundingGenerationReady {
+ /// The random channel_id we picked which you'll need to pass into
+ /// ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated.
+ temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The value, in satoshis, that the output should have.
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The script which should be used in the transaction output.
+ output_script: Script,
+ /// The value passed in to ChannelManager::create_channel
+ user_channel_id: u64,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that the client may now broadcast the funding transaction it created for a
+ /// channel. Broadcasting such a transaction prior to this event may lead to our counterparty
+ /// trivially stealing all funds in the funding transaction!
+ FundingBroadcastSafe {
+ /// The output, which was passed to ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated, which is
+ /// now safe to broadcast.
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ /// The value passed in to ChannelManager::create_channel
+ user_channel_id: u64,
+ },
+ /// Indicates we've received money! Just gotta dig out that payment preimage and feed it to
+ /// ChannelManager::claim_funds to get it....
+ /// Note that if the preimage is not known or the amount paid is incorrect, you must call
+ /// ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards to free up resources for this HTLC.
+ /// The amount paid should be considered 'incorrect' when it is less than or more than twice
+ /// the amount expected.
+ PaymentReceived {
+ /// The hash for which the preimage should be handed to the ChannelManager.
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for. Note that you must
+ /// compare this to the expected value before accepting the payment (as otherwise you are
+ /// providing proof-of-payment for less than the value you expected!).
+ amt: u64,
+ },
+ /// Indicates an outbound payment we made succeeded (ie it made it all the way to its target
+ /// and we got back the payment preimage for it).
+ /// Note that duplicative PaymentSent Events may be generated - it is your responsibility to
+ /// deduplicate them by payment_preimage (which MUST be unique)!
+ PaymentSent {
+ /// The preimage to the hash given to ChannelManager::send_payment.
+ /// Note that this serves as a payment receipt, if you wish to have such a thing, you must
+ /// store it somehow!
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ },
+ /// Indicates an outbound payment we made failed. Probably some intermediary node dropped
+ /// something. You may wish to retry with a different route.
+ /// Note that duplicative PaymentFailed Events may be generated - it is your responsibility to
+ /// deduplicate them by payment_hash (which MUST be unique)!
+ PaymentFailed {
+ /// The hash which was given to ChannelManager::send_payment.
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// Indicates the payment was rejected for some reason by the recipient. This implies that
+ /// the payment has failed, not just the route in question. If this is not set, you may
+ /// retry the payment via a different route.
+ rejected_by_dest: bool,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: Option<u16>,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards should be called at a
+ /// time in the future.
+ PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ /// The minimum amount of time that should be waited prior to calling
+ /// process_pending_htlc_forwards. To increase the effort required to correlate payments,
+ /// you should wait a random amount of time in roughly the range (now + time_forwardable,
+ /// now + 5*time_forwardable).
+ time_forwardable: Duration,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that an output was generated on-chain which you should know how to spend.
+ /// Such an output will *not* ever be spent by rust-lightning, so you need to store them
+ /// somewhere and spend them when you create on-chain spends.
+ SpendableOutputs {
+ /// The outputs which you should store as spendable by you.
+ outputs: Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>,
+ },
+}
+
+/// An event generated by ChannelManager which indicates a message should be sent to a peer (or
+/// broadcast to most peers).
+/// These events are handled by PeerManager::process_events if you are using a PeerManager.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum MessageSendEvent {
+ /// Used to indicate that we've accepted a channel open and should send the accept_channel
+ /// message provided to the given peer.
+ SendAcceptChannel {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::AcceptChannel,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that we've initiated a channel open and should send the open_channel
+ /// message provided to the given peer.
+ SendOpenChannel {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a funding_created message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendFundingCreated {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::FundingCreated,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a funding_signed message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendFundingSigned {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::FundingSigned,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a funding_locked message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendFundingLocked {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The funding_locked message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::FundingLocked,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that an announcement_signatures message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The announcement_signatures message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::AnnouncementSignatures,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a series of HTLC update messages, as well as a commitment_signed
+ /// message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ UpdateHTLCs {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The update messages which should be sent. ALL messages in the struct should be sent!
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a revoke_and_ack message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendRevokeAndACK {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::RevokeAndACK,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a closing_signed message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendClosingSigned {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::ClosingSigned,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a shutdown message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendShutdown {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::Shutdown,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a channel_reestablish message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
+ SendChannelReestablish {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The message which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a channel_announcement and channel_update should be broadcast to all
+ /// peers (except the peer with node_id either msg.contents.node_id_1 or msg.contents.node_id_2).
+ BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ /// The channel_announcement which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement,
+ /// The followup channel_update which should be sent.
+ update_msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that a channel_update should be broadcast to all peers.
+ BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ /// The channel_update which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
+ },
+ /// Broadcast an error downstream to be handled
+ HandleError {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The action which should be taken.
+ action: Option<msgs::ErrorAction>
+ },
+ /// When a payment fails we may receive updates back from the hop where it failed. In such
+ /// cases this event is generated so that we can inform the router of this information.
+ PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
+ /// The channel/node update which should be sent to router
+ update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trait indicating an object may generate message send events
+pub trait MessageSendEventsProvider {
+ /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
+ /// in the process.
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent>;
+}
+
+/// A trait indicating an object may generate events
+pub trait EventsProvider {
+ /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
+ /// in the process.
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event>;
+}
--- /dev/null
+macro_rules! hash_to_message {
+ ($slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ {
+ ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice($slice).unwrap()
+ }
+ #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
+ {
+ match ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice($slice) {
+ Ok(msg) => msg,
+ Err(_) => ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap()
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// Pruned copy of crate rust log, without global logger
+// https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/log #7a60286
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
+// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
+// except according to those terms.
+
+//! Log traits live here, which are called throughout the library to provide useful information for
+//! debugging purposes.
+//!
+//! There is currently 2 ways to filter log messages. First one, by using compilation features, e.g "max_level_off".
+//! The second one, client-side by implementing check against Record Level field.
+//! Each module may have its own Logger or share one.
+
+use std::cmp;
+use std::fmt;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+static LOG_LEVEL_NAMES: [&'static str; 6] = ["OFF", "ERROR", "WARN", "INFO", "DEBUG", "TRACE"];
+
+/// An enum representing the available verbosity levels of the logger.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash)]
+pub enum Level {
+ ///Designates logger being silent
+ Off,
+ /// Designates very serious errors
+ Error,
+ /// Designates hazardous situations
+ Warn,
+ /// Designates useful information
+ Info,
+ /// Designates lower priority information
+ Debug,
+ /// Designates very low priority, often extremely verbose, information
+ Trace,
+}
+
+impl PartialOrd for Level {
+ #[inline]
+ fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Level) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
+ Some(self.cmp(other))
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn lt(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
+ (*self as usize) < *other as usize
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn le(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
+ *self as usize <= *other as usize
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn gt(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
+ *self as usize > *other as usize
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn ge(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
+ *self as usize >= *other as usize
+ }
+}
+
+impl Ord for Level {
+ #[inline]
+ fn cmp(&self, other: &Level) -> cmp::Ordering {
+ (*self as usize).cmp(&(*other as usize))
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for Level {
+ fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ fmt.pad(LOG_LEVEL_NAMES[*self as usize])
+ }
+}
+
+impl Level {
+ /// Returns the most verbose logging level.
+ #[inline]
+ pub fn max() -> Level {
+ Level::Trace
+ }
+}
+
+/// A Record, unit of logging output with Metadata to enable filtering
+/// Module_path, file, line to inform on log's source
+#[derive(Clone,Debug)]
+pub struct Record<'a> {
+ /// The verbosity level of the message.
+ pub level: Level,
+ /// The message body.
+ pub args: fmt::Arguments<'a>,
+ /// The module path of the message.
+ pub module_path: &'a str,
+ /// The source file containing the message.
+ pub file: &'a str,
+ /// The line containing the message.
+ pub line: u32,
+}
+
+impl<'a> Record<'a> {
+ /// Returns a new Record.
+ #[inline]
+ pub fn new(level: Level, args: fmt::Arguments<'a>, module_path: &'a str, file: &'a str, line: u32) -> Record<'a> {
+ Record {
+ level,
+ args,
+ module_path,
+ file,
+ line
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trait encapsulating the operations required of a logger
+pub trait Logger: Sync + Send {
+ /// Logs the `Record`
+ fn log(&self, record: &Record);
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct LogHolder<'a> { pub(crate) logger: &'a Arc<Logger> }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+ use std::sync::{Arc};
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_level_show() {
+ assert_eq!("INFO", Level::Info.to_string());
+ assert_eq!("ERROR", Level::Error.to_string());
+ assert_ne!("WARN", Level::Error.to_string());
+ }
+
+ struct WrapperLog {
+ logger: Arc<Logger>
+ }
+
+ impl WrapperLog {
+ fn new(logger: Arc<Logger>) -> WrapperLog {
+ WrapperLog {
+ logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn call_macros(&self) {
+ log_error!(self, "This is an error");
+ log_warn!(self, "This is a warning");
+ log_info!(self, "This is an info");
+ log_debug!(self, "This is a debug");
+ log_trace!(self, "This is a trace");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_logging_macros() {
+ let mut logger = TestLogger::new();
+ logger.enable(Level::Trace);
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(logger);
+ let wrapper = WrapperLog::new(Arc::clone(&logger));
+ wrapper.call_macros();
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
+
+use ln::router::Route;
+
+use std;
+
+pub(crate) struct DebugPubKey<'a>(pub &'a PublicKey);
+impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugPubKey<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ for i in self.0.serialize().iter() {
+ write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! log_pubkey {
+ ($obj: expr) => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugPubKey(&$obj)
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct DebugBytes<'a>(pub &'a [u8]);
+impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugBytes<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ for i in self.0 {
+ write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! log_bytes {
+ ($obj: expr) => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugBytes(&$obj)
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct DebugFundingChannelId<'a>(pub &'a Sha256dHash, pub u16);
+impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugFundingChannelId<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ for i in OutPoint::new(self.0.clone(), self.1).to_channel_id().iter() {
+ write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! log_funding_channel_id {
+ ($funding_txid: expr, $funding_txo: expr) => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingChannelId(&$funding_txid, $funding_txo)
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct DebugFundingInfo<'a, T: 'a>(pub &'a Option<(OutPoint, T)>);
+impl<'a, T> std::fmt::Display for DebugFundingInfo<'a, T> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ match self.0.as_ref() {
+ Some(&(ref funding_output, _)) => DebugBytes(&funding_output.to_channel_id()[..]).fmt(f),
+ None => write!(f, "without funding output set"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! log_funding_info {
+ ($key_storage: expr) => {
+ match $key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&funding_info)
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&None)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct DebugRoute<'a>(pub &'a Route);
+impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugRoute<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
+ for h in self.0.hops.iter() {
+ write!(f, "node_id: {}, short_channel_id: {}, fee_msat: {}, cltv_expiry_delta: {}\n", log_pubkey!(h.pubkey), h.short_channel_id, h.fee_msat, h.cltv_expiry_delta)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! log_route {
+ ($obj: expr) => {
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugRoute(&$obj)
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_internal {
+ ($self: ident, $lvl:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => (
+ &$self.logger.log(&::util::logger::Record::new($lvl, format_args!($($arg)+), module_path!(), file!(), line!()));
+ );
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_error {
+ ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
+ #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off")))]
+ log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
+ )
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_warn {
+ ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
+ #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error")))]
+ log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
+ )
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_info {
+ ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
+ #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn")))]
+ log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
+ )
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_debug {
+ ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
+ #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info")))]
+ log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
+ )
+}
+
+macro_rules! log_trace {
+ ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
+ #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug")))]
+ log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*);
+ )
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! Some utility modules live here. See individual sub-modules for more info.
+
+pub mod events;
+pub mod errors;
+pub mod ser;
+
+pub(crate) mod byte_utils;
+pub(crate) mod chacha20;
+#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+pub(crate) mod poly1305;
+pub(crate) mod chacha20poly1305rfc;
+pub(crate) mod transaction_utils;
+
+#[macro_use]
+pub(crate) mod ser_macros;
+#[macro_use]
+pub(crate) mod macro_logger;
+
+// These have to come after macro_logger to build
+pub mod logger;
+pub mod config;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) mod test_utils;
+
+#[macro_use]
+pub(crate) mod fuzz_wrappers;
--- /dev/null
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
+// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
+// except according to those terms.
+
+// This is a port of Andrew Moons poly1305-donna
+// https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+
+use std::cmp::min;
+use util::byte_utils::{slice_to_le32, le32_to_array};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct Poly1305 {
+ r : [u32; 5],
+ h : [u32; 5],
+ pad : [u32; 4],
+ leftover : usize,
+ buffer : [u8; 16],
+ finalized : bool,
+}
+
+impl Poly1305 {
+ pub fn new(key: &[u8]) -> Poly1305 {
+ assert!(key.len() == 32);
+ let mut poly = Poly1305{ r: [0u32; 5], h: [0u32; 5], pad: [0u32; 4], leftover: 0, buffer: [0u8; 16], finalized: false };
+
+ // r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff
+ poly.r[0] = (slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]) ) & 0x3ffffff;
+ poly.r[1] = (slice_to_le32(&key[3..7]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03;
+ poly.r[2] = (slice_to_le32(&key[6..10]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff;
+ poly.r[3] = (slice_to_le32(&key[9..13]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff;
+ poly.r[4] = (slice_to_le32(&key[12..16]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff;
+
+ poly.pad[0] = slice_to_le32(&key[16..20]);
+ poly.pad[1] = slice_to_le32(&key[20..24]);
+ poly.pad[2] = slice_to_le32(&key[24..28]);
+ poly.pad[3] = slice_to_le32(&key[28..32]);
+
+ poly
+ }
+
+ fn block(&mut self, m: &[u8]) {
+ let hibit : u32 = if self.finalized { 0 } else { 1 << 24 };
+
+ let r0 = self.r[0];
+ let r1 = self.r[1];
+ let r2 = self.r[2];
+ let r3 = self.r[3];
+ let r4 = self.r[4];
+
+ let s1 = r1 * 5;
+ let s2 = r2 * 5;
+ let s3 = r3 * 5;
+ let s4 = r4 * 5;
+
+ let mut h0 = self.h[0];
+ let mut h1 = self.h[1];
+ let mut h2 = self.h[2];
+ let mut h3 = self.h[3];
+ let mut h4 = self.h[4];
+
+ // h += m
+ h0 += (slice_to_le32(&m[0..4]) ) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h1 += (slice_to_le32(&m[3..7]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h2 += (slice_to_le32(&m[6..10]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h3 += (slice_to_le32(&m[9..13]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff;
+ h4 += (slice_to_le32(&m[12..16]) >> 8) | hibit;
+
+ // h *= r
+ let d0 = (h0 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * s3 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s2 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s1 as u64);
+ let mut d1 = (h0 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s3 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s2 as u64);
+ let mut d2 = (h0 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s3 as u64);
+ let mut d3 = (h0 as u64 * r3 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s4 as u64);
+ let mut d4 = (h0 as u64 * r4 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r3 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * r0 as u64);
+
+ // (partial) h %= p
+ let mut c : u32;
+ c = (d0 >> 26) as u32; h0 = d0 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
+ d1 += c as u64; c = (d1 >> 26) as u32; h1 = d1 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
+ d2 += c as u64; c = (d2 >> 26) as u32; h2 = d2 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
+ d3 += c as u64; c = (d3 >> 26) as u32; h3 = d3 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
+ d4 += c as u64; c = (d4 >> 26) as u32; h4 = d4 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h0 += c * 5; c = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h1 += c;
+
+ self.h[0] = h0;
+ self.h[1] = h1;
+ self.h[2] = h2;
+ self.h[3] = h3;
+ self.h[4] = h4;
+ }
+
+ pub fn finish(&mut self) {
+ if self.leftover > 0 {
+ self.buffer[self.leftover] = 1;
+ for i in self.leftover+1..16 {
+ self.buffer[i] = 0;
+ }
+ self.finalized = true;
+ let tmp = self.buffer;
+ self.block(&tmp);
+ }
+
+ // fully carry h
+ let mut h0 = self.h[0];
+ let mut h1 = self.h[1];
+ let mut h2 = self.h[2];
+ let mut h3 = self.h[3];
+ let mut h4 = self.h[4];
+
+ let mut c : u32;
+ c = h1 >> 26; h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h2 += c; c = h2 >> 26; h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h3 += c; c = h3 >> 26; h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h4 += c; c = h4 >> 26; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h0 += c * 5; c = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+ h1 += c;
+
+ // compute h + -p
+ let mut g0 = h0.wrapping_add(5); c = g0 >> 26; g0 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ let mut g1 = h1.wrapping_add(c); c = g1 >> 26; g1 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ let mut g2 = h2.wrapping_add(c); c = g2 >> 26; g2 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ let mut g3 = h3.wrapping_add(c); c = g3 >> 26; g3 &= 0x3ffffff;
+ let mut g4 = h4.wrapping_add(c).wrapping_sub(1 << 26);
+
+ // select h if h < p, or h + -p if h >= p
+ let mut mask = (g4 >> (32 - 1)).wrapping_sub(1);
+ g0 &= mask;
+ g1 &= mask;
+ g2 &= mask;
+ g3 &= mask;
+ g4 &= mask;
+ mask = !mask;
+ h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
+ h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
+ h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2;
+ h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3;
+ h4 = (h4 & mask) | g4;
+
+ // h = h % (2^128)
+ h0 = ((h0 ) | (h1 << 26)) & 0xffffffff;
+ h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) & 0xffffffff;
+ h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) & 0xffffffff;
+ h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) & 0xffffffff;
+
+ // h = mac = (h + pad) % (2^128)
+ let mut f : u64;
+ f = h0 as u64 + self.pad[0] as u64 ; h0 = f as u32;
+ f = h1 as u64 + self.pad[1] as u64 + (f >> 32); h1 = f as u32;
+ f = h2 as u64 + self.pad[2] as u64 + (f >> 32); h2 = f as u32;
+ f = h3 as u64 + self.pad[3] as u64 + (f >> 32); h3 = f as u32;
+
+ self.h[0] = h0;
+ self.h[1] = h1;
+ self.h[2] = h2;
+ self.h[3] = h3;
+ }
+
+ pub fn input(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
+ assert!(!self.finalized);
+ let mut m = data;
+
+ if self.leftover > 0 {
+ let want = min(16 - self.leftover, m.len());
+ for i in 0..want {
+ self.buffer[self.leftover+i] = m[i];
+ }
+ m = &m[want..];
+ self.leftover += want;
+
+ if self.leftover < 16 {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // self.block(self.buffer[..]);
+ let tmp = self.buffer;
+ self.block(&tmp);
+
+ self.leftover = 0;
+ }
+
+ while m.len() >= 16 {
+ self.block(&m[0..16]);
+ m = &m[16..];
+ }
+
+ for i in 0..m.len() {
+ self.buffer[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ self.leftover = m.len();
+ }
+
+ pub fn raw_result(&mut self, output: &mut [u8]) {
+ assert!(output.len() >= 16);
+ if !self.finalized{
+ self.finish();
+ }
+ output[0..4].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[0]));
+ output[4..8].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[1]));
+ output[8..12].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[2]));
+ output[12..16].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[3]));
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+ use std::iter::repeat;
+
+ use util::poly1305::Poly1305;
+
+ fn poly1305(key: &[u8], msg: &[u8], mac: &mut [u8]) {
+ let mut poly = Poly1305::new(key);
+ poly.input(msg);
+ poly.raw_result(mac);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_nacl_vector() {
+ let key = [
+ 0xee,0xa6,0xa7,0x25,0x1c,0x1e,0x72,0x91,
+ 0x6d,0x11,0xc2,0xcb,0x21,0x4d,0x3c,0x25,
+ 0x25,0x39,0x12,0x1d,0x8e,0x23,0x4e,0x65,
+ 0x2d,0x65,0x1f,0xa4,0xc8,0xcf,0xf8,0x80,
+ ];
+
+ let msg = [
+ 0x8e,0x99,0x3b,0x9f,0x48,0x68,0x12,0x73,
+ 0xc2,0x96,0x50,0xba,0x32,0xfc,0x76,0xce,
+ 0x48,0x33,0x2e,0xa7,0x16,0x4d,0x96,0xa4,
+ 0x47,0x6f,0xb8,0xc5,0x31,0xa1,0x18,0x6a,
+ 0xc0,0xdf,0xc1,0x7c,0x98,0xdc,0xe8,0x7b,
+ 0x4d,0xa7,0xf0,0x11,0xec,0x48,0xc9,0x72,
+ 0x71,0xd2,0xc2,0x0f,0x9b,0x92,0x8f,0xe2,
+ 0x27,0x0d,0x6f,0xb8,0x63,0xd5,0x17,0x38,
+ 0xb4,0x8e,0xee,0xe3,0x14,0xa7,0xcc,0x8a,
+ 0xb9,0x32,0x16,0x45,0x48,0xe5,0x26,0xae,
+ 0x90,0x22,0x43,0x68,0x51,0x7a,0xcf,0xea,
+ 0xbd,0x6b,0xb3,0x73,0x2b,0xc0,0xe9,0xda,
+ 0x99,0x83,0x2b,0x61,0xca,0x01,0xb6,0xde,
+ 0x56,0x24,0x4a,0x9e,0x88,0xd5,0xf9,0xb3,
+ 0x79,0x73,0xf6,0x22,0xa4,0x3d,0x14,0xa6,
+ 0x59,0x9b,0x1f,0x65,0x4c,0xb4,0x5a,0x74,
+ 0xe3,0x55,0xa5,
+ ];
+
+ let expected = [
+ 0xf3,0xff,0xc7,0x70,0x3f,0x94,0x00,0xe5,
+ 0x2a,0x7d,0xfb,0x4b,0x3d,0x33,0x05,0xd9,
+ ];
+
+ let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
+ poly1305(&key, &msg, &mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
+
+ let mut poly = Poly1305::new(&key);
+ poly.input(&msg[0..32]);
+ poly.input(&msg[32..96]);
+ poly.input(&msg[96..112]);
+ poly.input(&msg[112..120]);
+ poly.input(&msg[120..124]);
+ poly.input(&msg[124..126]);
+ poly.input(&msg[126..127]);
+ poly.input(&msg[127..128]);
+ poly.input(&msg[128..129]);
+ poly.input(&msg[129..130]);
+ poly.input(&msg[130..131]);
+ poly.raw_result(&mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn donna_self_test() {
+ let wrap_key = [
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ];
+
+ let wrap_msg = [
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ ];
+
+ let wrap_mac = [
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ];
+
+ let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
+ poly1305(&wrap_key, &wrap_msg, &mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &wrap_mac[..]);
+
+ let total_key = [
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0xff,
+ 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ ];
+
+ let total_mac = [
+ 0x64, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0xe8, 0xd6, 0xad, 0x7b, 0xbd,
+ 0xd2, 0x87, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x44, 0x62, 0x3d, 0x39,
+ ];
+
+ let mut tpoly = Poly1305::new(&total_key);
+ for i in 0..256 {
+ let key: Vec<u8> = repeat(i as u8).take(32).collect();
+ let msg: Vec<u8> = repeat(i as u8).take(256).collect();
+ let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
+ poly1305(&key[..], &msg[0..i], &mut mac);
+ tpoly.input(&mac);
+ }
+ tpoly.raw_result(&mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &total_mac[..]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_tls_vectors() {
+ // from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
+ let key = b"this is 32-byte key for Poly1305";
+ let msg = [0u8; 32];
+ let expected = [
+ 0x49, 0xec, 0x78, 0x09, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x1e, 0xc6,
+ 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x33, 0xb9, 0x1c, 0xcc, 0x03, 0x07,
+ ];
+ let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
+ poly1305(key, &msg, &mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
+
+ let msg = b"Hello world!";
+ let expected= [
+ 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x45, 0x00, 0x8f, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x16,
+ 0xa2, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x74, 0xee, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0xf0,
+ ];
+ poly1305(key, msg, &mut mac);
+ assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+//! A very simple serialization framework which is used to serialize/deserialize messages as well
+//! as ChannelsManagers and ChannelMonitors.
+
+use std::result::Result;
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::hash::Hash;
+
+use secp256k1::Signature;
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use std::marker::Sized;
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use util::byte_utils;
+
+use util::byte_utils::{be64_to_array, be48_to_array, be32_to_array, be16_to_array, slice_to_be16, slice_to_be32, slice_to_be48, slice_to_be64};
+
+const MAX_BUF_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
+
+/// A trait that is similar to std::io::Write but has one extra function which can be used to size
+/// buffers being written into.
+/// An impl is provided for any type that also impls std::io::Write which simply ignores size
+/// hints.
+pub trait Writer {
+ /// Writes the given buf out. See std::io::Write::write_all for more
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error>;
+ /// Hints that data of the given size is about the be written. This may not always be called
+ /// prior to data being written and may be safely ignored.
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize);
+}
+
+impl<W: Write> Writer for W {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ <Self as ::std::io::Write>::write_all(self, buf)
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, _size: usize) { }
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct WriterWriteAdaptor<'a, W: Writer + 'a>(pub &'a mut W);
+impl<'a, W: Writer + 'a> Write for WriterWriteAdaptor<'a, W> {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.write_all(buf)
+ }
+ fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.write_all(buf)?;
+ Ok(buf.len())
+ }
+ fn flush(&mut self) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trait that various rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be written out to a Writer
+pub trait Writeable {
+ /// Writes self out to the given Writer
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error>;
+
+ /// Writes self out to a Vec<u8>
+ fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
+ msg.0
+ }
+
+ /// Writes self out to a Vec<u8>
+ fn encode_with_len(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ 0u16.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
+ self.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
+ let len = msg.0.len();
+ msg.0[..2].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(len as u16 - 2));
+ msg.0
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trait that various rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be read in from a Read
+pub trait Readable<R>
+ where Self: Sized,
+ R: Read
+{
+ /// Reads a Self in from the given Read
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError>;
+}
+
+/// A trait that various higher-level rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be read in
+/// from a Read given some additional set of arguments which is required to deserialize.
+pub trait ReadableArgs<R, P>
+ where Self: Sized,
+ R: Read
+{
+ /// Reads a Self in from the given Read
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, params: P) -> Result<Self, DecodeError>;
+}
+
+pub(crate) struct U48(pub u64);
+impl Writeable for U48 {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&be48_to_array(self.0))
+ }
+}
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for U48 {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<U48, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0; 6];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(U48(slice_to_be48(&buf)))
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! impl_writeable_primitive {
+ ($val_type:ty, $meth_write:ident, $len: expr, $meth_read:ident) => {
+ impl Writeable for $val_type {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&$meth_write(*self))
+ }
+ }
+ impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for $val_type {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<$val_type, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0; $len];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok($meth_read(&buf))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_primitive!(u64, be64_to_array, 8, slice_to_be64);
+impl_writeable_primitive!(u32, be32_to_array, 4, slice_to_be32);
+impl_writeable_primitive!(u16, be16_to_array, 2, slice_to_be16);
+
+impl Writeable for u8 {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&[*self])
+ }
+}
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for u8 {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<u8, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0; 1];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(buf[0])
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for bool {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&[if *self {1} else {0}])
+ }
+}
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for bool {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0; 1];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ if buf[0] != 0 && buf[0] != 1 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ Ok(buf[0] == 1)
+ }
+}
+
+// u8 arrays
+macro_rules! impl_array {
+ ( $size:expr ) => (
+ impl Writeable for [u8; $size]
+ {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.write_all(self)
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for [u8; $size]
+ {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0u8; $size];
+ r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(buf)
+ }
+ }
+ );
+}
+
+//TODO: performance issue with [u8; size] with impl_array!()
+impl_array!(3); // for rgb
+impl_array!(4); // for IPv4
+impl_array!(10); // for OnionV2
+impl_array!(16); // for IPv6
+impl_array!(32); // for channel id & hmac
+impl_array!(33); // for PublicKey
+impl_array!(64); // for Signature
+impl_array!(1300); // for OnionPacket.hop_data
+
+// HashMap
+impl<K, V> Writeable for HashMap<K, V>
+ where K: Writeable + Eq + Hash,
+ V: Writeable
+{
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ for (key, value) in self.iter() {
+ key.write(w)?;
+ value.write(w)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R, K, V> Readable<R> for HashMap<K, V>
+ where R: Read,
+ K: Readable<R> + Eq + Hash,
+ V: Readable<R>
+{
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut ret = HashMap::with_capacity(len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..len {
+ ret.insert(K::read(r)?, V::read(r)?);
+ }
+ Ok(ret)
+ }
+}
+
+// Vectors
+impl Writeable for Vec<u8> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&self)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Vec<u8> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
+ ret.resize(len as usize, 0);
+ r.read_exact(&mut ret)?;
+ Ok(ret)
+ }
+}
+impl Writeable for Vec<Signature> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ for e in self.iter() {
+ e.write(w)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Vec<Signature> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let byte_size = (len as usize)
+ .checked_mul(33)
+ .ok_or(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor)?;
+ if byte_size > MAX_BUF_SIZE {
+ return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
+ }
+ let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..len { ret.push(Signature::read(r)?); }
+ Ok(ret)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Script {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(self.as_bytes())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Script {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let len = <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? as usize;
+ let mut buf = vec![0; len];
+ r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(Script::from(buf))
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PublicKey {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.serialize().write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PublicKey {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ match PublicKey::from_slice(&buf) {
+ Ok(key) => Ok(key),
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for SecretKey {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ let mut ser = [0; 32];
+ ser.copy_from_slice(&self[..]);
+ ser.write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for SecretKey {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ match SecretKey::from_slice(&buf) {
+ Ok(key) => Ok(key),
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Sha256dHash {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.write_all(&self[..])
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Sha256dHash {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&buf[..]).unwrap())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Signature {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.serialize_compact().write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Signature {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 64] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ match Signature::from_compact(&buf) {
+ Ok(sig) => Ok(sig),
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PaymentPreimage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PaymentPreimage {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(PaymentPreimage(buf))
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PaymentHash {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PaymentHash {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(PaymentHash(buf))
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: Writeable> Writeable for Option<T> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match *self {
+ None => 0u8.write(w)?,
+ Some(ref data) => {
+ 1u8.write(w)?;
+ data.write(w)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R, T> Readable<R> for Option<T>
+ where R: Read,
+ T: Readable<R>
+{
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? {
+ 0 => Ok(None),
+ 1 => Ok(Some(Readable::read(r)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OutPoint {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.txid.write(w)?;
+ self.vout.write(w)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OutPoint {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let txid = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let vout = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(OutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout,
+ })
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+macro_rules! impl_writeable {
+ ($st:ident, $len: expr, {$($field:ident),*}) => {
+ impl ::util::ser::Writeable for $st {
+ fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ if $len != 0 {
+ w.size_hint($len);
+ }
+ $( self.$field.write(w)?; )*
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ::util::ser::Readable<R> for $st {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ $($field: ::util::ser::Readable::read(r)?),*
+ })
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! impl_writeable_len_match {
+ ($st:ident, {$({$m: pat, $l: expr}),*}, {$($field:ident),*}) => {
+ impl Writeable for $st {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ w.size_hint(match *self {
+ $($m => $l,)*
+ });
+ $( self.$field.write(w)?; )*
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for $st {
+ fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self {
+ $($field: Readable::read(r)?),*
+ })
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use chain::chaininterface;
+use chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface;
+use ln::channelmonitor;
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
+use ln::msgs::{HandleError};
+use ln::channelmonitor::HTLCUpdate;
+use util::events;
+use util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer};
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+
+use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
+use std::{mem};
+
+pub struct TestVecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
+impl Writer for TestVecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestFeeEstimator {
+ pub sat_per_kw: u64,
+}
+impl chaininterface::FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ self.sat_per_kw
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestChannelMonitor {
+ pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>>,
+ pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
+ pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
+}
+impl TestChannelMonitor {
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, fee_estimator: Arc<chaininterface::FeeEstimator>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ added_monitors: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, fee_estimator),
+ update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ // At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
+ // to a watchtower and disk...
+ let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
+ assert!(<(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(
+ &mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0), Arc::new(TestLogger::new())).unwrap().1 == monitor);
+ w.0.clear();
+ monitor.write_for_watchtower(&mut w).unwrap(); // This at least shouldn't crash...
+ self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, monitor.clone()));
+ assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
+ self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
+ }
+
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ return self.simple_monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated();
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestBroadcaster {
+ pub txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
+}
+impl chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
+ fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
+ self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ pub pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
+}
+
+impl TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl msgs::ChannelMessageHandler for TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ fn handle_open_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_local_features: LocalFeatures, _msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_accept_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_local_features: LocalFeatures, _msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_created(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_funding_locked(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_shutdown(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_closing_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_update_fee(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn peer_disconnected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _no_connection_possible: bool) {}
+ fn peer_connected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) {}
+ fn handle_error(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {}
+}
+
+impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for TestChannelMessageHandler {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestRoutingMessageHandler {}
+
+impl TestRoutingMessageHandler {
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ TestRoutingMessageHandler {}
+ }
+}
+impl msgs::RoutingMessageHandler for TestRoutingMessageHandler {
+ fn handle_node_announcement(&self, _msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, _msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_channel_update(&self, _msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
+ Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
+ }
+ fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, _update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {}
+ fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, _starting_point: u64, _batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate,msgs::ChannelUpdate)> {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+ fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, _starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, _batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestLogger {
+ level: Level,
+ id: String,
+}
+
+impl TestLogger {
+ pub fn new() -> TestLogger {
+ Self::with_id("".to_owned())
+ }
+ pub fn with_id(id: String) -> TestLogger {
+ TestLogger {
+ level: Level::Trace,
+ id,
+ }
+ }
+ pub fn enable(&mut self, level: Level) {
+ self.level = level;
+ }
+}
+
+impl Logger for TestLogger {
+ fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
+ if self.level >= record.level {
+ println!("{:<5} {} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), self.id, record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct TestKeysInterface {
+ backing: keysinterface::KeysManager,
+ pub override_session_priv: Mutex<Option<SecretKey>>,
+ pub override_channel_id_priv: Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>,
+}
+
+impl keysinterface::KeysInterface for TestKeysInterface {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { self.backing.get_node_secret() }
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { self.backing.get_destination_script() }
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey { self.backing.get_shutdown_pubkey() }
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> keysinterface::ChannelKeys { self.backing.get_channel_keys(inbound) }
+
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ match *self.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() {
+ Some(key) => key.clone(),
+ None => self.backing.get_session_key()
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ match *self.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() {
+ Some(key) => key.clone(),
+ None => self.backing.get_channel_id()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl TestKeysInterface {
+ pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Self {
+ let now = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time went backwards");
+ Self {
+ backing: keysinterface::KeysManager::new(seed, network, logger, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_nanos()),
+ override_session_priv: Mutex::new(None),
+ override_channel_id_priv: Mutex::new(None),
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
+
+use std::cmp::Ordering;
+
+pub fn sort_outputs<T, C : Fn(&T, &T) -> Ordering>(outputs: &mut Vec<(TxOut, T)>, tie_breaker: C) {
+ outputs.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| {
+ a.0.value.cmp(&b.0.value).then_with(|| {
+ a.0.script_pubkey[..].cmp(&b.0.script_pubkey[..]).then_with(|| {
+ tie_breaker(&a.1, &b.1)
+ })
+ })
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::*;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
+
+ use hex::decode;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn sort_output_by_value() {
+ let txout1 = TxOut {
+ value: 100,
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(0).into_script()
+ };
+ let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
+
+ let txout2 = TxOut {
+ value: 99,
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(0).into_script()
+ };
+ let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
+
+ let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
+ sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ &outputs,
+ &vec![(txout2_, "ignore"), (txout1_, "ignore")]
+ );
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn sort_output_by_script_pubkey() {
+ let txout1 = TxOut {
+ value: 100,
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(3).into_script(),
+ };
+ let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
+
+ let txout2 = TxOut {
+ value: 100,
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(1).push_int(2).into_script()
+ };
+ let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
+
+ let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
+ sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ &outputs,
+ &vec![(txout2_, "ignore"), (txout1_, "ignore")]
+ );
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn sort_output_by_bip_test() {
+ let txout1 = TxOut {
+ value: 100000000,
+ script_pubkey: script_from_hex("41046a0765b5865641ce08dd39690aade26dfbf5511430ca428a3089261361cef170e3929a68aee3d8d4848b0c5111b0a37b82b86ad559fd2a745b44d8e8d9dfdc0cac")
+ };
+ let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
+
+ // doesn't deserialize cleanly:
+ let txout2 = TxOut {
+ value: 2400000000,
+ script_pubkey: script_from_hex("41044a656f065871a353f216ca26cef8dde2f03e8c16202d2e8ad769f02032cb86a5eb5e56842e92e19141d60a01928f8dd2c875a390f67c1f6c94cfc617c0ea45afac")
+ };
+ let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
+
+ let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
+ sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
+
+ assert_eq!(&outputs, &vec![(txout1_, "ignore"), (txout2_, "ignore")]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn sort_output_tie_breaker_test() {
+ let txout1 = TxOut {
+ value: 100,
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(1).push_int(2).into_script()
+ };
+ let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
+
+ let txout2 = txout1.clone();
+ let txout2_ = txout1.clone();
+
+ let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, 420), (txout2, 69)];
+ sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |a, b| { a.cmp(b) });
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ &outputs,
+ &vec![(txout2_, 69), (txout1_, 420)]
+ );
+ }
+
+ fn script_from_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Script {
+ Script::from(decode(hex_str).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! bip_txout_tests {
+ ($($name:ident: $value:expr,)*) => {
+ $(
+ #[test]
+ fn $name() {
+ let expected_raw: Vec<(u64, &str)> = $value;
+ let expected: Vec<(TxOut, &str)> = expected_raw.iter()
+ .map(|txout_raw| TxOut {
+ value: txout_raw.0,
+ script_pubkey: script_from_hex(txout_raw.1)
+ }).map(|txout| (txout, "ignore"))
+ .collect();
+
+ let mut outputs = expected.clone();
+ outputs.reverse(); // prep it
+
+ // actually do the work!
+ sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
+
+ assert_eq!(outputs, expected);
+ }
+ )*
+ }
+ }
+
+ const TXOUT1: [(u64, &str); 2] = [
+ (400057456, "76a9144a5fba237213a062f6f57978f796390bdcf8d01588ac"),
+ (40000000000, "76a9145be32612930b8323add2212a4ec03c1562084f8488ac"),
+ ];
+ const TXOUT2: [(u64, &str); 2] = [
+ (100000000, "41046a0765b5865641ce08dd39690aade26dfbf5511430ca428a3089261361cef170e3929a68aee3d8d4848b0c5111b0a37b82b86ad559fd2a745b44d8e8d9dfdc0cac"),
+ (2400000000, "41044a656f065871a353f216ca26cef8dde2f03e8c16202d2e8ad769f02032cb86a5eb5e56842e92e19141d60a01928f8dd2c875a390f67c1f6c94cfc617c0ea45afac"),
+ ];
+ bip_txout_tests! {
+ bip69_txout_test_1: TXOUT1.to_vec(),
+ bip69_txout_test_2: TXOUT2.to_vec(),
+ }
+}
+++ /dev/null
-[package]
-name = "lightning-net-tokio"
-version = "0.0.1"
-authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
-license = "Apache-2.0"
-description = """
-Implementation of the rust-lightning network stack using Tokio.
-For Rust-Lightning clients which wish to make direct connections to Lightning P2P nodes, this is a simple alternative to implementing the nerequired network stack, especially for those already using Tokio.
-"""
-
-[dependencies]
-bitcoin = "0.20"
-bitcoin_hashes = "0.7"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.9", path = "../" }
-secp256k1 = "0.15"
-tokio-codec = "0.1"
-futures = "0.1"
-tokio = "0.1"
-bytes = "0.4"
+++ /dev/null
-extern crate bytes;
-extern crate tokio;
-extern crate tokio_codec;
-extern crate futures;
-extern crate lightning;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-
-use bytes::BufMut;
-
-use futures::future;
-use futures::future::Future;
-use futures::{AsyncSink, Stream, Sink};
-use futures::sync::mpsc;
-
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-
-use tokio::timer::Delay;
-use tokio::net::TcpStream;
-
-use lightning::ln::peer_handler;
-use lightning::ln::peer_handler::SocketDescriptor as LnSocketTrait;
-
-use std::mem;
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
-use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
-use std::vec::Vec;
-use std::hash::Hash;
-
-static ID_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
-
-/// A connection to a remote peer. Can be constructed either as a remote connection using
-/// Connection::setup_outbound o
-pub struct Connection {
- writer: Option<mpsc::Sender<bytes::Bytes>>,
- event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>,
- pending_read: Vec<u8>,
- read_blocker: Option<futures::sync::oneshot::Sender<Result<(), ()>>>,
- read_paused: bool,
- need_disconnect: bool,
- id: u64,
-}
-impl Connection {
- fn schedule_read(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, us: Arc<Mutex<Self>>, reader: futures::stream::SplitStream<tokio_codec::Framed<TcpStream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec>>) {
- let us_ref = us.clone();
- let us_close_ref = us.clone();
- let peer_manager_ref = peer_manager.clone();
- tokio::spawn(reader.for_each(move |b| {
- let pending_read = b.to_vec();
- {
- let mut lock = us_ref.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(lock.pending_read.is_empty());
- if lock.read_paused {
- lock.pending_read = pending_read;
- let (sender, blocker) = futures::sync::oneshot::channel();
- lock.read_blocker = Some(sender);
- return future::Either::A(blocker.then(|_| { Ok(()) }));
- }
- }
- //TODO: There's a race where we don't meet the requirements of disconnect_socket if its
- //called right here, after we release the us_ref lock in the scope above, but before we
- //call read_event!
- match peer_manager.read_event(&mut SocketDescriptor::new(us_ref.clone(), peer_manager.clone()), pending_read) {
- Ok(pause_read) => {
- if pause_read {
- let mut lock = us_ref.lock().unwrap();
- lock.read_paused = true;
- }
- },
- Err(e) => {
- us_ref.lock().unwrap().need_disconnect = false;
- return future::Either::B(future::result(Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))));
- }
- }
-
- if let Err(e) = us_ref.lock().unwrap().event_notify.try_send(()) {
- // Ignore full errors as we just need them to poll after this point, so if the user
- // hasn't received the last send yet, it doesn't matter.
- assert!(e.is_full());
- }
-
- future::Either::B(future::result(Ok(())))
- }).then(move |_| {
- if us_close_ref.lock().unwrap().need_disconnect {
- peer_manager_ref.disconnect_event(&SocketDescriptor::new(us_close_ref, peer_manager_ref.clone()));
- println!("Peer disconnected!");
- } else {
- println!("We disconnected peer!");
- }
- Ok(())
- }));
- }
-
- fn new(event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, stream: TcpStream) -> (futures::stream::SplitStream<tokio_codec::Framed<TcpStream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec>>, Arc<Mutex<Self>>) {
- let (writer, reader) = tokio_codec::Framed::new(stream, tokio_codec::BytesCodec::new()).split();
- let (send_sink, send_stream) = mpsc::channel(3);
- tokio::spawn(writer.send_all(send_stream.map_err(|_| -> std::io::Error {
- unreachable!();
- })).then(|_| {
- future::result(Ok(()))
- }));
- let us = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Self { writer: Some(send_sink), event_notify, pending_read: Vec::new(), read_blocker: None, read_paused: false, need_disconnect: true, id: ID_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) }));
-
- (reader, us)
- }
-
- /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on the provided socket generated by
- /// accepting an incoming connection (by scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
- ///
- /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
- /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
- pub fn setup_inbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, stream: TcpStream) {
- let (reader, us) = Self::new(event_notify, stream);
-
- if let Ok(_) = peer_manager.new_inbound_connection(SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone())) {
- Self::schedule_read(peer_manager, us, reader);
- }
- }
-
- /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on the provided socket generated by
- /// making an outbound connection which is expected to be accepted by a peer with the given
- /// public key (by scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
- ///
- /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
- /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
- pub fn setup_outbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, their_node_id: PublicKey, stream: TcpStream) {
- let (reader, us) = Self::new(event_notify, stream);
-
- if let Ok(initial_send) = peer_manager.new_outbound_connection(their_node_id, SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone())) {
- if SocketDescriptor::new(us.clone(), peer_manager.clone()).send_data(&initial_send, true) == initial_send.len() {
- Self::schedule_read(peer_manager, us, reader);
- } else {
- println!("Failed to write first full message to socket!");
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Process incoming messages and feed outgoing messages on a new connection made to the given
- /// socket address which is expected to be accepted by a peer with the given public key (by
- /// scheduling futures with tokio::spawn).
- ///
- /// You should poll the Receive end of event_notify and call get_and_clear_pending_events() on
- /// ChannelManager and ChannelMonitor objects.
- pub fn connect_outbound(peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>, event_notify: mpsc::Sender<()>, their_node_id: PublicKey, addr: SocketAddr) {
- let connect_timeout = Delay::new(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10)).then(|_| {
- future::err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut, "timeout reached"))
- });
- tokio::spawn(TcpStream::connect(&addr).select(connect_timeout)
- .and_then(move |stream| {
- Connection::setup_outbound(peer_manager, event_notify, their_node_id, stream.0);
- future::ok(())
- }).or_else(|_| {
- //TODO: return errors somehow
- future::ok(())
- }));
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct SocketDescriptor {
- conn: Arc<Mutex<Connection>>,
- id: u64,
- peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>,
-}
-impl SocketDescriptor {
- fn new(conn: Arc<Mutex<Connection>>, peer_manager: Arc<peer_handler::PeerManager<SocketDescriptor>>) -> Self {
- let id = conn.lock().unwrap().id;
- Self { conn, id, peer_manager }
- }
-}
-impl peer_handler::SocketDescriptor for SocketDescriptor {
- fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], resume_read: bool) -> usize {
- macro_rules! schedule_read {
- ($us_ref: expr) => {
- tokio::spawn(future::lazy(move || -> Result<(), ()> {
- let mut read_data = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut us = $us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
- mem::swap(&mut read_data, &mut us.pending_read);
- }
- if !read_data.is_empty() {
- let mut us_clone = $us_ref.clone();
- match $us_ref.peer_manager.read_event(&mut us_clone, read_data) {
- Ok(pause_read) => {
- if pause_read { return Ok(()); }
- },
- Err(_) => {
- //TODO: Not actually sure how to do this
- return Ok(());
- }
- }
- }
- let mut us = $us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(sender) = us.read_blocker.take() {
- sender.send(Ok(())).unwrap();
- }
- us.read_paused = false;
- if let Err(e) = us.event_notify.try_send(()) {
- // Ignore full errors as we just need them to poll after this point, so if the user
- // hasn't received the last send yet, it doesn't matter.
- assert!(e.is_full());
- }
- Ok(())
- }));
- }
- }
-
- let mut us = self.conn.lock().unwrap();
- if resume_read {
- let us_ref = self.clone();
- schedule_read!(us_ref);
- }
- if data.is_empty() { return 0; }
- if us.writer.is_none() {
- us.read_paused = true;
- return 0;
- }
-
- let mut bytes = bytes::BytesMut::with_capacity(data.len());
- bytes.put(data);
- let write_res = us.writer.as_mut().unwrap().start_send(bytes.freeze());
- match write_res {
- Ok(res) => {
- match res {
- AsyncSink::Ready => {
- data.len()
- },
- AsyncSink::NotReady(_) => {
- us.read_paused = true;
- let us_ref = self.clone();
- tokio::spawn(us.writer.take().unwrap().flush().then(move |writer_res| -> Result<(), ()> {
- if let Ok(writer) = writer_res {
- {
- let mut us = us_ref.conn.lock().unwrap();
- us.writer = Some(writer);
- }
- schedule_read!(us_ref);
- } // we'll fire the disconnect event on the socket reader end
- Ok(())
- }));
- 0
- }
- }
- },
- Err(_) => {
- // We'll fire the disconnected event on the socket reader end
- 0
- },
- }
- }
-
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
- let mut us = self.conn.lock().unwrap();
- us.need_disconnect = true;
- us.read_paused = true;
- }
-}
-impl Eq for SocketDescriptor {}
-impl PartialEq for SocketDescriptor {
- fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
- self.id == o.id
- }
-}
-impl Hash for SocketDescriptor {
- fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
- self.id.hash(state);
- }
-}
-
+++ /dev/null
-//! Traits and utility impls which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the
-//! blockchain.
-//!
-//! Includes traits for monitoring and receiving notifications of new blocks and block
-//! disconnections, transaction broadcasting, and feerate information requests.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
-use util::logger::Logger;
-
-use std::sync::{Mutex,Weak,MutexGuard,Arc};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-
-/// Used to give chain error details upstream
-pub enum ChainError {
- /// Client doesn't support UTXO lookup (but the chain hash matches our genesis block hash)
- NotSupported,
- /// Chain isn't the one watched
- NotWatched,
- /// Tx doesn't exist or is unconfirmed
- UnknownTx,
-}
-
-/// An interface to request notification of certain scripts as they appear the
-/// chain.
-///
-/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
-/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
-/// events).
-pub trait ChainWatchInterface: Sync + Send {
- /// Provides a txid/random-scriptPubKey-in-the-tx which much be watched for.
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script);
-
- /// Provides an outpoint which must be watched for, providing any transactions which spend the
- /// given outpoint.
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), out_script: &Script);
-
- /// Indicates that a listener needs to see all transactions.
- fn watch_all_txn(&self);
-
- /// Register the given listener to receive events. Only a weak pointer is provided and the
- /// registration should be freed once that pointer expires.
- fn register_listener(&self, listener: Weak<ChainListener>);
- //TODO: unregister
-
- /// Gets the script and value in satoshis for a given unspent transaction output given a
- /// short_channel_id (aka unspent_tx_output_identier). For BTC/tBTC channels the top three
- /// bytes are the block height, the next 3 the transaction index within the block, and the
- /// final two the output within the transaction.
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError>;
-}
-
-/// An interface to send a transaction to the Bitcoin network.
-pub trait BroadcasterInterface: Sync + Send {
- /// Sends a transaction out to (hopefully) be mined.
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction);
-}
-
-/// A trait indicating a desire to listen for events from the chain
-pub trait ChainListener: Sync + Send {
- /// Notifies a listener that a block was connected.
- /// Note that if a new transaction/outpoint is watched during a block_connected call, the block
- /// *must* be re-scanned with the new transaction/outpoints and block_connected should be
- /// called again with the same header and (at least) the new transactions.
- ///
- /// Note that if non-new transaction/outpoints may be registered during a call, a second call
- /// *must not* happen.
- ///
- /// This also means those counting confirmations using block_connected callbacks should watch
- /// for duplicate headers and not count them towards confirmations!
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]);
- /// Notifies a listener that a block was disconnected.
- /// Unlike block_connected, this *must* never be called twice for the same disconnect event.
- /// Height must be the one of the block which was disconnected (not new height of the best chain)
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32);
-}
-
-/// An enum that represents the speed at which we want a transaction to confirm used for feerate
-/// estimation.
-pub enum ConfirmationTarget {
- /// We are happy with this transaction confirming slowly when feerate drops some.
- Background,
- /// We'd like this transaction to confirm without major delay, but 12-18 blocks is fine.
- Normal,
- /// We'd like this transaction to confirm in the next few blocks.
- HighPriority,
-}
-
-/// A trait which should be implemented to provide feerate information on a number of time
-/// horizons.
-///
-/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
-/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
-/// events).
-pub trait FeeEstimator: Sync + Send {
- /// Gets estimated satoshis of fee required per 1000 Weight-Units.
- ///
- /// Must be no smaller than 253 (ie 1 satoshi-per-byte rounded up to ensure later round-downs
- /// don't put us below 1 satoshi-per-byte).
- ///
- /// This translates to:
- /// * satoshis-per-byte * 250
- /// * ceil(satoshis-per-kbyte / 4)
- fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64;
-}
-
-/// Utility for tracking registered txn/outpoints and checking for matches
-pub struct ChainWatchedUtil {
- watch_all: bool,
-
- // We are more conservative in matching during testing to ensure everything matches *exactly*,
- // even though during normal runtime we take more optimized match approaches...
- #[cfg(test)]
- watched_txn: HashSet<(Sha256dHash, Script)>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- watched_txn: HashSet<Script>,
-
- watched_outpoints: HashSet<(Sha256dHash, u32)>,
-}
-
-impl ChainWatchedUtil {
- /// Constructs an empty (watches nothing) ChainWatchedUtil
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- Self {
- watch_all: false,
- watched_txn: HashSet::new(),
- watched_outpoints: HashSet::new(),
- }
- }
-
- /// Registers a tx for monitoring, returning true if it was a new tx and false if we'd already
- /// been watching for it.
- pub fn register_tx(&mut self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- #[cfg(test)]
- {
- self.watched_txn.insert((txid.clone(), script_pub_key.clone()))
- }
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- {
- let _tx_unused = txid; // It's used in cfg(test), though
- self.watched_txn.insert(script_pub_key.clone())
- }
- }
-
- /// Registers an outpoint for monitoring, returning true if it was a new outpoint and false if
- /// we'd already been watching for it
- pub fn register_outpoint(&mut self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), _script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- self.watched_outpoints.insert(outpoint)
- }
-
- /// Sets us to match all transactions, returning true if this is a new setting and false if
- /// we'd already been set to match everything.
- pub fn watch_all(&mut self) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- self.watch_all = true;
- true
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
- pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all {
- return true;
- }
- for out in tx.output.iter() {
- #[cfg(test)]
- for &(ref txid, ref script) in self.watched_txn.iter() {
- if *script == out.script_pubkey {
- if tx.txid() == *txid {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- for script in self.watched_txn.iter() {
- if *script == out.script_pubkey {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- for outpoint in self.watched_outpoints.iter() {
- let &(outpoint_hash, outpoint_index) = outpoint;
- if outpoint_hash == input.previous_output.txid && outpoint_index == input.previous_output.vout {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- false
- }
-}
-
-/// Utility to capture some common parts of ChainWatchInterface implementors.
-///
-/// Keeping a local copy of this in a ChainWatchInterface implementor is likely useful.
-pub struct ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- network: Network,
- watched: Mutex<ChainWatchedUtil>,
- listeners: Mutex<Vec<Weak<ChainListener>>>,
- reentered: AtomicUsize,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-/// Register listener
-impl ChainWatchInterface for ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Sha256dHash, script_pub_key: &Script) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.register_tx(txid, script_pub_key) {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Sha256dHash, u32), out_script: &Script) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.register_outpoint(outpoint, out_script) {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn watch_all_txn(&self) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.watch_all() {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn register_listener(&self, listener: Weak<ChainListener>) {
- let mut vec = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- vec.push(listener);
- }
-
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
- if genesis_hash != genesis_block(self.network).header.bitcoin_hash() {
- return Err(ChainError::NotWatched);
- }
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported)
- }
-}
-
-impl ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- /// Creates a new ChainWatchInterfaceUtil for the given network
- pub fn new(network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- network: network,
- watched: Mutex::new(ChainWatchedUtil::new()),
- listeners: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- reentered: AtomicUsize::new(1),
- logger: logger,
- }
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was connected given a full, unfiltered block.
- ///
- /// Handles re-scanning the block and calling block_connected again if listeners register new
- /// watch data during the callbacks for you (see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
- pub fn block_connected_with_filtering(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let mut reentered = true;
- while reentered {
- let mut matched = Vec::new();
- let mut matched_index = Vec::new();
- {
- let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- for (index, transaction) in block.txdata.iter().enumerate() {
- if self.does_match_tx_unguarded(transaction, &watched) {
- matched.push(transaction);
- matched_index.push(index as u32);
- }
- }
- }
- reentered = self.block_connected_checked(&block.header, height, matched.as_slice(), matched_index.as_slice());
- }
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was disconnected.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap().clone();
- for listener in listeners.iter() {
- match listener.upgrade() {
- Some(arc) => arc.block_disconnected(&header, disconnected_height),
- None => ()
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was connected, given pre-filtered list of transactions in the
- /// block which matched the filter (probably using does_match_tx).
- ///
- /// Returns true if notified listeners registered additional watch data (implying that the
- /// block must be re-scanned and this function called again prior to further block_connected
- /// calls, see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
- pub fn block_connected_checked(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> bool {
- let last_seen = self.reentered.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
-
- let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap().clone();
- for listener in listeners.iter() {
- match listener.upgrade() {
- Some(arc) => arc.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched),
- None => ()
- }
- }
- return last_seen != self.reentered.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
- pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- self.does_match_tx_unguarded (tx, &watched)
- }
-
- fn does_match_tx_unguarded(&self, tx: &Transaction, watched: &MutexGuard<ChainWatchedUtil>) -> bool {
- watched.does_match_tx(tx)
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
-//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
-//! on-chain output which is theirs.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint, TxOut};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1;
-
-use util::byte_utils;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-
-/// When on-chain outputs are created by rust-lightning an event is generated which informs the
-/// user thereof. This enum describes the format of the output and provides the OutPoint.
-pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
- /// Outpoint with an output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface, thus you should
- /// have stored somewhere how to spend script_pubkey!
- /// Outputs from a justice tx, claim tx or preimage tx
- StaticOutput {
- /// The outpoint spendable by user wallet
- outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
- output: TxOut,
- },
- /// Outpoint commits to a P2WSH
- /// P2WSH should be spend by the following witness :
- /// <local_delayedsig> 0 <witnessScript>
- /// With input nSequence set to_self_delay.
- /// Outputs from a HTLC-Success/Timeout tx/commitment tx
- DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- /// Outpoint spendable by user wallet
- outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// local_delayedkey = delayed_payment_basepoint_secret + SHA256(per_commitment_point || delayed_payment_basepoint) OR
- key: SecretKey,
- /// witness redeemScript encumbering output.
- witness_script: Script,
- /// nSequence input must commit to self_delay to satisfy script's OP_CSV
- to_self_delay: u16,
- /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
- output: TxOut,
- },
- /// Outpoint commits to a P2WPKH
- /// P2WPKH should be spend by the following witness :
- /// <local_sig> <local_pubkey>
- /// Outputs to_remote from a commitment tx
- DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- /// Outpoint spendable by user wallet
- outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// localkey = payment_basepoint_secret + SHA256(per_commitment_point || payment_basepoint
- key: SecretKey,
- /// The output which is reference by the given outpoint
- output: TxOut,
- }
-}
-
-/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
-pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
- /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
- /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
- /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
- /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
- /// restarted with some stale data!
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys;
- /// Get a secret for construting an onion packet
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey;
- /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding
- /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding
- /// transaction.
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
-}
-
-/// Set of lightning keys needed to operate a channel as described in BOLT 3
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelKeys {
- /// Private key of anchor tx
- pub funding_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
- pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- pub payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used in HTLC tx
- pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Commitment seed
- pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(ChannelKeys, 0, {
- funding_key,
- revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key,
- htlc_base_key,
- commitment_seed
-});
-
-/// Simple KeysInterface implementor that takes a 32-byte seed for use as a BIP 32 extended key
-/// and derives keys from that.
-///
-/// Your node_id is seed/0'
-/// ChannelMonitor closes may use seed/1'
-/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'
-/// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds!
-pub struct KeysManager {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
- node_secret: SecretKey,
- destination_script: Script,
- shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
- channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
-
- unique_start: Sha256State,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-impl KeysManager {
- /// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
- /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
- /// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
- /// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
- /// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
- /// simply use the current time (with very high precision).
- ///
- /// The seed MUST be backed up safely prior to use so that the keys can be re-created, however,
- /// obviously, starting_time should be unique every time you reload the library - it is only
- /// used to generate new ephemeral key data (which will be stored by the individual channel if
- /// necessary).
- ///
- /// Note that the seed is required to recover certain on-chain funds independent of
- /// ChannelMonitor data, though a current copy of ChannelMonitor data is also required for any
- /// channel, and some on-chain during-closing funds.
- ///
- /// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between
- /// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
- /// detailed description of the guarantee.
- pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> KeysManager {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(network.clone(), seed) {
- Ok(master_key) => {
- let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
- let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
- Ok(destination_key) => {
- let pubkey_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.key.serialize()[..]);
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&pubkey_hash160.into_inner())
- .into_script()
- },
- Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
- };
- let shutdown_pubkey = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(2).unwrap()) {
- Ok(shutdown_key) => ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &shutdown_key).public_key.key,
- Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
- };
- let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
-
- let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
- unique_start.input(seed);
-
- KeysManager {
- secp_ctx,
- node_secret,
- destination_script,
- shutdown_pubkey,
- channel_master_key,
- channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- session_master_key,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- channel_id_master_key,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
-
- unique_start,
- logger,
- }
- },
- Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
- self.node_secret.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- self.destination_script.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys {
- // We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure
- // entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
- // starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
-
- let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
-
- let seed = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let commitment_seed = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&seed);
- sha.input(&b"commitment seed"[..]);
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
- macro_rules! key_step {
- ($info: expr, $prev_key: expr) => {{
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&seed);
- sha.input(&$prev_key[..]);
- sha.input(&$info[..]);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is busted")
- }}
- }
- let funding_key = key_step!(b"funding key", commitment_seed);
- let revocation_base_key = key_step!(b"revocation base key", funding_key);
- let payment_base_key = key_step!(b"payment base key", revocation_base_key);
- let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_base_key);
- let htlc_base_key = key_step!(b"HTLC base key", delayed_payment_base_key);
-
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key,
- revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key,
- htlc_base_key,
- commitment_seed,
- }
- }
-
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
-
- let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted")
- }
-
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
-
- let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
-
- (Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner())
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Structs and traits which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the blockchain.
-
-pub mod chaininterface;
-pub mod transaction;
-pub mod keysinterface;
+++ /dev/null
-//! Contains simple structs describing parts of transactions on the chain.
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-
-/// A reference to a transaction output.
-///
-/// Differs from bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as the index is a u16 instead of u32
-/// due to LN's restrictions on index values. Should reduce (possibly) unsafe conversions this way.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Debug, Hash)]
-pub struct OutPoint {
- /// The referenced transaction's txid.
- pub txid: Sha256dHash,
- /// The index of the referenced output in its transaction's vout.
- pub index: u16,
-}
-
-impl OutPoint {
- /// Creates a new `OutPoint` from the txid and the index.
- pub fn new(txid: Sha256dHash, index: u16) -> OutPoint {
- OutPoint { txid, index }
- }
-
- /// Convert an `OutPoint` to a lightning channel id.
- pub fn to_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- res[..].copy_from_slice(&self.txid[..]);
- res[30] ^= ((self.index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
- res[31] ^= ((self.index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
- res
- }
-
- /// Converts this OutPoint into the OutPoint field as used by rust-bitcoin
- pub fn into_bitcoin_outpoint(self) -> BitcoinOutPoint {
- BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: self.txid,
- vout: self.index as u32,
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-
- use hex;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_channel_id_calculation() {
- let tx: Transaction = encode::deserialize(&hex::decode("020000000001010e0adef48412e4361325ac1c6e36411299ab09d4f083b9d8ddb55fbc06e1b0c00000000000feffffff0220a1070000000000220020f81d95e040bd0a493e38bae27bff52fe2bb58b93b293eb579c01c31b05c5af1dc072cfee54a3000016001434b1d6211af5551905dc2642d05f5b04d25a8fe80247304402207f570e3f0de50546aad25a872e3df059d277e776dda4269fa0d2cc8c2ee6ec9a022054e7fae5ca94d47534c86705857c24ceea3ad51c69dd6051c5850304880fc43a012103cb11a1bacc223d98d91f1946c6752e358a5eb1a1c983b3e6fb15378f453b76bd00000000").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- index: 0
- }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25e").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- index: 1
- }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25f").unwrap()[..]);
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-#![crate_name = "lightning"]
-
-//! Rust-Lightning, not Rusty's Lightning!
-//!
-//! A full-featured but also flexible lightning implementation, in library form. This allows the
-//! user (you) to decide how they wish to use it instead of being a fully self-contained daemon.
-//! This means there is no built-in threading/execution environment and it's up to the user to
-//! figure out how best to make networking happen/timers fire/things get written to disk/keys get
-//! generated/etc. This makes it a good candidate for tight integration into an existing wallet
-//! instead of having a rather-separate lightning appendage to a wallet.
-
-#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "fuzztarget"), deny(missing_docs))]
-#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
-
-// In general, rust is absolutely horrid at supporting users doing things like,
-// for example, compiling Rust code for real environments. Disable useless lints
-// that don't do anything but annoy us and cant actually ever be resolved.
-#![allow(bare_trait_objects)]
-#![allow(ellipsis_inclusive_range_patterns)]
-
-extern crate bitcoin;
-extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
-extern crate secp256k1;
-#[cfg(test)] extern crate rand;
-#[cfg(test)] extern crate hex;
-
-#[macro_use]
-pub mod util;
-pub mod chain;
-pub mod ln;
+++ /dev/null
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction};
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1;
-
-pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
-pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
-
-// Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
-// used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
-
-pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: [u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed;
- for i in 0..48 {
- let bitpos = 47 - i;
- if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
- res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
- }
- }
- res
-}
-
-pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let mut key = base_secret.clone();
- key.add_assign(&res)?;
- Ok(key)
-}
-
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
- base_point.combine(&hashkey)
-}
-
-/// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
- let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
-
- let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
- let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
-
- let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
- part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
- part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
- Ok(part_a)
-}
-
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
- let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
- let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
-
- let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
- part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
- part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- part_a.combine(&part_b)
-}
-
-pub struct TxCreationKeys {
- pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
- pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- pub b_payment_key: PublicKey,
-}
-
-impl TxCreationKeys {
- pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
- Ok(TxCreationKeys {
- per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
- a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
- b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
- a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
- b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
- })
- }
-}
-
-/// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
-/// the revocation key
-pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
- .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .into_script()
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- pub offered: bool,
- pub amount_msat: u64,
- pub cltv_expiry: u32,
- pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
- if htlc.offered {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
- .push_int(32)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_int(2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
- .push_int(2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .into_script()
- } else {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
- .push_int(32)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
- .push_int(2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
- .push_int(2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .into_script()
- }
-}
-
-/// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
-/// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
-#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
- get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
-}
-
-/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
- let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- txins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: OutPoint {
- txid: prev_hash.clone(),
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
-
- let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
- feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- } else {
- feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- };
-
- let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- txouts.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
- });
-
- Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
- input: txins,
- output: txouts,
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Functional tests which test the correct handling of ChannelMonitorUpdateErr returns from
-//! monitor updates.
-//! There are a bunch of these as their handling is relatively error-prone so they are split out
-//! here. See also the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
-
-use ln::channelmanager::{RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr;
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, LocalFeatures, RoutingMessageHandler};
-use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
-use util::errors::APIError;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-
-use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
-
-#[test]
-fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
- // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- match events_1[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
- // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
- // a disconnect in between
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
-
- // Now set it to failed again...
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
-}
-
-fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
- let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
-
- // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
- // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
- // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
- // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
- // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
- // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
- // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
- // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
- // immediately, otherwise we wait disconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
- // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
- // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
- // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
- // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
- // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
- // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
- // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
- // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
- // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
-
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- }
-
- (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- }
-
- // Now fix monitor updating...
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
-
- (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
- } } }
-
- let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
-
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- } else {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
- bs_resp.2 = None;
- }
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
- let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
- assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
- }
- assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
- assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
- }
-
- (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
- } else {
- let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
- (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- })
- };
-
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
- }
-
- let as_commitment_update;
- let bs_second_commitment_update;
-
- macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- } }
-
- macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- } }
-
- if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
- handle_bs_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
-
- handle_initial_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
- } else {
- handle_initial_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
-
- assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
-
- handle_bs_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
-
- match responses[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match responses[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_no_rebroadcast() {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when no message rebroadcasting on
- // test_restore_channel_monitor() is required. Backported from
- // chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_raa_while_paused() {
- // Tests handling of an RAA while monitor updating has already been marked failed.
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as this used to be broken.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 5000000);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let send_event_1 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
-
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, our_payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let send_event_2 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_update_raa = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash_1, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
-
- // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
-
- // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
-
- // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
- // holding cell.
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // Now fail monitor updating.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
- // for forwarding.
-
- let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
- send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2.remove(0) {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
- match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- };
-
- let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
- // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
- let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
- } else { (None, None) };
-
- // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
- // update_add update.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
- }
-
- // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
- // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
- let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- };
- let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
- match events_3.remove(1) {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- Some(msg.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { None };
- let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Now deliver the new messages...
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- } else {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
- }
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
-
- let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
- match events_6[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
-
- let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
- match events_9[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
- do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
- do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
- // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
- // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
- // HTLCs).
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
-
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
-
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
- assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn raa_no_response_awaiting_raa_state() {
- // This is a rather convoluted test which ensures that if handling of an RAA does not happen
- // due to a previous monitor update failure, we still set AwaitingRemoteRevoke on the channel
- // in question (assuming it intends to respond with a CS after monitor updating is restored).
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as this used to be broken.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- // Queue up two payments - one will be delivered right away, one immediately goes into the
- // holding cell as nodes[0] is AwaitingRAA. Ultimately this allows us to deliver an RAA
- // immediately after a CS. By setting failing the monitor update failure from the CS (which
- // requires only an RAA response due to AwaitingRAA) we can deliver the RAA and require the CS
- // generation during RAA while in monitor-update-failed state.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Now we have a CS queued up which adds a new HTLC (which will need a RAA/CS response from
- // nodes[1]) followed by an RAA. Fail the monitor updating prior to the CS, deliver the RAA,
- // then restore channel monitor updates.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- // nodes[1] should be AwaitingRAA here!
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
-
- // We send a third payment here, which is somewhat of a redundant test, but the
- // chanmon_fail_consistency test required it to actually find the bug (by seeing out-of-sync
- // commitment transaction states) whereas here we can explicitly check for it.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_3).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Finally deliver the RAA to nodes[1] which results in a CS response to the last update
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
- let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn claim_while_disconnected_monitor_update_fail() {
- // Test for claiming a payment while disconnected and then having the resulting
- // channel-update-generated monitor update fail. This kind of thing isn't a particularly
- // contrived case for nodes with network instability.
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as an unmerged version of the handling
- // code introduced a regression in this test (specifically, this caught a removal of the
- // channel_reestablish handling ensuring the order was sensical given the messages used).
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Forward a payment for B to claim
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let as_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // Now deliver a's reestablish, freeing the claim from the holding cell, but fail the monitor
- // update.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
-
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // Send a second payment from A to B, resulting in a commitment update that gets swallowed with
- // the monitor still failed
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- // Note that nodes[1] not updating monitor here is OK - it wont take action on the new HTLC
- // until we've test_restore_channel_monitor'd and updated for the new commitment transaction.
-
- // Now un-fail the monitor, which will result in B sending its original commitment update,
- // receiving the commitment update from A, and the resulting commitment dances.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_msgs = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(bs_msgs.len(), 2);
-
- match bs_msgs[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- match bs_msgs[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let as_commitment = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let bs_commitment = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn monitor_failed_no_reestablish_response() {
- // Test for receiving a channel_reestablish after a monitor update failure resulted in no
- // response to a commitment_signed.
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as it caught a long-standing
- // debug_assert!() failure in channel_reestablish handling.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Route the payment and deliver the initial commitment_signed (with a monitor update failure
- // on receipt).
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Now disconnect and immediately reconnect, delivering the channel_reestablish while nodes[1]
- // is still failing to update monitors.
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let as_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect).unwrap();
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn first_message_on_recv_ordering() {
- // Test that if the initial generator of a monitor-update-frozen state doesn't generate
- // messages, we're willing to flip the order of response messages if neccessary in resposne to
- // a commitment_signed which needs to send an RAA first.
- // At a high level, our goal is to fail monitor updating in response to an RAA which needs no
- // response and then handle a CS while in the failed state, requiring an RAA followed by a CS
- // response. To do this, we start routing two payments, with the final RAA for the first being
- // delivered while B is in AwaitingRAA, hence when we deliver the CS for the second B will
- // have no pending response but will want to send a RAA/CS (with the updates for the second
- // payment applied).
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as it caught a bug here.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Route the first payment outbound, holding the last RAA for B until we are set up so that we
- // can deliver it and fail the monitor update.
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Route the second payment, generating an update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
-
- // Deliver the final RAA for the first payment, which does not require a response. RAAs
- // generally require a commitment_signed, so the fact that we're expecting an opposite response
- // to the next message also tests resetting the delivery order.
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Now deliver the update_add_htlc/commitment_signed for the second payment, which does need an
- // RAA/CS response, which should be generated when we call test_restore_channel_monitor (with
- // the appropriate HTLC acceptance).
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1000000);
-
- let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_responses.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_claim() {
- // Basic test for monitor update failures when processing claim_funds calls.
- // We set up a simple 3-node network, sending a payment from A to B and failing B's monitor
- // update to claim the payment. We then send a payment C->B->A, making the forward of this
- // payment from B to A fail due to the paused channel. Finally, we restore the channel monitor
- // updating and claim the payment on B.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 3 to 2.
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
-
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- // Successfully update the monitor on the 1<->2 channel, but the 0<->1 channel should still be
- // paused, so forward shouldn't succeed until we call test_restore_channel_monitor().
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
-
- let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
-
- let bs_fail_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_update.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], bs_fail_update.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let msg_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
- match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
-
- // Now restore monitor updating on the 0<->1 channel and claim the funds on B.
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_fulfill_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fulfill_update.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fulfill_update.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_on_pending_forwards() {
- // Basic test for monitor update failures when processing pending HTLC fail/add forwards.
- // We do this with a simple 3-node network, sending a payment from A to C and one from C to A.
- // The payment from A to C will be failed by C and pending a back-fail to A, while the payment
- // from C to A will be pending a forward to A.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 3 to 1.
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
-
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let cs_fail_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_fail_update.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], cs_fail_update.commitment_signed, true, true);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn monitor_update_claim_fail_no_response() {
- // Test for claim_funds resulting in both a monitor update failure and no message response (due
- // to channel being AwaitingRAA).
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as an unmerged version of the handling
- // code was broken.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Forward a payment for B to claim
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Now start forwarding a second payment, skipping the last RAA so B is in AwaitingRAA
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- let as_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-// Note that restore_between_fails with !fail_on_generate is useless
-// Also note that !fail_on_generate && !fail_on_signed is useless
-// Finally, note that !fail_on_signed is not possible with fail_on_generate && !restore_between_fails
-// confirm_a_first and restore_b_before_conf are wholly unrelated to earlier bools and
-// restore_b_before_conf has no meaning if !confirm_a_first
-fn do_during_funding_monitor_fail(fail_on_generate: bool, restore_between_fails: bool, fail_on_signed: bool, confirm_a_first: bool, restore_b_before_conf: bool) {
- // Test that if the monitor update generated by funding_transaction_generated fails we continue
- // the channel setup happily after the update is restored.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
-
- let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 43);
-
- if fail_on_generate {
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- }
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- if restore_between_fails {
- assert!(fail_on_generate);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- }
-
- if fail_on_signed {
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- } else {
- assert!(restore_between_fails || !fail_on_generate); // We can't switch to good now (there's no monitor update)
- assert!(fail_on_generate); // Somebody has to fail
- }
- let funding_signed_res = nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- if fail_on_signed || !restore_between_fails {
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = funding_signed_res.unwrap_err() {
- if fail_on_generate && !restore_between_fails {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
- } else { panic!(); }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- } else {
- funding_signed_res.unwrap();
- }
-
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 43);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- if confirm_a_first {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
- nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- } else {
- assert!(!restore_b_before_conf);
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- }
-
- // Make sure nodes[1] isn't stupid enough to re-send the FundingLocked on reconnect
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, confirm_a_first), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- if !restore_b_before_conf {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- }
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let (channel_id, (announcement, as_update, bs_update)) = if !confirm_a_first {
- nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
-
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
- let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
- (channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked))
- } else {
- if restore_b_before_conf {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
- }
- let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- (channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &funding_locked))
- };
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
- }
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
- close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_id, funding_tx, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn during_funding_monitor_fail() {
- do_during_funding_monitor_fail(false, false, true, true, true);
- do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, false, true, false, false);
- do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, true, true, true, false);
- do_during_funding_monitor_fail(true, true, false, false, false);
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
-use util::transaction_utils;
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
-use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
-use util::errors::APIError;
-use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
-
-use std;
-use std::default::Default;
-use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
-use std::sync::{Arc};
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub struct ChannelValueStat {
- pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
- pub channel_value_msat: u64,
- pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
- pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
- pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
- pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
- pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
-}
-
-enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
- FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
- FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
- Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
-}
-
-enum InboundHTLCState {
- /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
- RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
- /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
- /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
- /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
- /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
- /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
- /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
- /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
- /// revoke_and_ack.
- AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
- Committed,
- /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
- /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
- /// we'll drop it.
- /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
- /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
- /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
- /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
- /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
- /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
- /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
- LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
-}
-
-struct InboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: u64,
- amount_msat: u64,
- cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- state: InboundHTLCState,
-}
-
-enum OutboundHTLCState {
- /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
- /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
- /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
- /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
- /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
- /// money back (though we won't), and,
- /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
- /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
- /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
- /// we'll never get out of sync).
- /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
- /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
- LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
- Committed,
- /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
- /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
- RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
- /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
- /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
- /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
- /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
- /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
- /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
- /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
- /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
- AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
-}
-
-struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: u64,
- amount_msat: u64,
- cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- state: OutboundHTLCState,
- source: HTLCSource,
-}
-
-/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
-enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
- AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
- // always outbound
- amount_msat: u64,
- cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
- },
- ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- htlc_id: u64,
- },
- FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: u64,
- err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
-}
-
-/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
-/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
-/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
-/// move on to ChannelFunded.
-/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
-/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
-/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
-enum ChannelState {
- /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
- OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
- /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
- TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
- /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
- /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
- /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
- FundingCreated = 4,
- /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
- /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
- /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
- FundingSent = 8,
- /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
- /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
- TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
- /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
- /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
- OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
- ChannelFunded = 64,
- /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
- /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
- /// dance.
- PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
- /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
- /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
- /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
- MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
- /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
- /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
- /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
- /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
- /// later.
- /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
- AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
- /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
- /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
- /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
- RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
- /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
- /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
- /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
- /// us their shutdown.
- LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
- /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
- ShutdownComplete = 4096,
-}
-const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
-const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
-
-const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
-
-// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
-// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
-// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
-// inbound channel.
-pub(super) struct Channel {
- config: ChannelConfig,
-
- user_id: u64,
-
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
- channel_state: u32,
- channel_outbound: bool,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
- channel_value_satoshis: u64,
-
- local_keys: ChannelKeys,
- shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
-
- // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
- // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
- // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
-
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
- value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
-
- /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
- /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
- /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
- /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
- /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
- /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
- /// send it first.
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
-
- monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
-
- // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
- // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
- // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
- //
- // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
- // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
- // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
- // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
- // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
- // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
- // commitment_signed.
- pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
- // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
- // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
- // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
- // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
- next_local_htlc_id: u64,
- next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
- channel_update_count: u32,
- feerate_per_kw: u64,
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
- pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
-
- /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
- /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
- /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
- /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
- short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
- /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
- pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
- funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
-
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
- /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
- their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- their_to_self_delay: u16,
- our_to_self_delay: u16,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- minimum_depth: u32,
-
- their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
-
- their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_node_id: PublicKey,
-
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
-
- channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
-
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
-/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
-/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
-/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
-const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
-/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
-const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
-const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
-/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
-/// it's 2^24.
-pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
-#[cfg(not(test))]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
-pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
-
-/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
-/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
-/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
-pub(super) enum ChannelError {
- Ignore(&'static str),
- Close(&'static str),
- CloseDelayBroadcast {
- msg: &'static str,
- update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
- },
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- match self {
- &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! secp_check {
- ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(thing) => thing,
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
- }
- };
-}
-
-impl Channel {
- // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
- fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
- }
-
- /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
- ///
- /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
- pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
- }
-
- fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
- cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
- }
-
- fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
- 1000 // TODO
- }
-
- // Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
-
- if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
- }
-
- if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
- }
- if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
- }
-
-
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
- return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
- }
-
- let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
-
- Ok(Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
- config: config.channel_options.clone(),
-
- channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
- channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- channel_outbound: true,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
-
- local_keys: chan_keys,
- shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_local_htlc_id: 0,
- next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
-
- last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- short_channel_id: None,
- last_block_connected: Default::default(),
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
-
- feerate_per_kw: feerate,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
- their_to_self_delay: 0,
- our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
-
- their_funding_pubkey: None,
- their_revocation_basepoint: None,
- their_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_htlc_basepoint: None,
- their_cur_commitment_point: None,
-
- their_prev_commitment_point: None,
- their_node_id: their_node_id,
-
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
-
- channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
-
- logger,
- })
- }
-
- fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
- }
- if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
- /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
- let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
-
- if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
- }
-
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
- }
- if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
- }
- Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
-
- if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
- }
-
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
- }
-
- // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
-
- let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
- if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
- if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
- }
- }
- // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
- local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
-
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
-
- let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
- let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
- if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
- }
- if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
- }
-
- // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
- // for full fee payment
- let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
- if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
- }
-
- let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
- let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
- if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
- }
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
- channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
- channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
-
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
- }
- },
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &OptionalField::Absent => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
- }
- }
- } else { None };
-
- let mut chan = Channel {
- user_id: user_id,
- config: local_config,
-
- channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
- channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- channel_outbound: false,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
-
- local_keys: chan_keys,
- shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_local_htlc_id: 0,
- next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
-
- last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- short_channel_id: None,
- last_block_connected: Default::default(),
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
-
- feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
- channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
- their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
-
- their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
- their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
- their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
- their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
- their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
-
- their_prev_commitment_point: None,
- their_node_id: their_node_id,
-
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
-
- channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
-
- logger,
- };
-
- let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
- chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
-
- Ok(chan)
- }
-
- // Utilities to derive keys:
-
- fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
- let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
- }
-
- // Utilities to build transactions:
-
- fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
-
- if self.channel_outbound {
- sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
- } else {
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
- sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- }
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
- ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
- ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
- ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
- ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
- ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
- }
-
- /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
- /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
- /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
- /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
- /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
- /// an HTLC to a).
- /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
- /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
- /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
- /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
- /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
- /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
- /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
- /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
- /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
- /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
- /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
- #[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
-
- let txins = {
- let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- ins
- };
-
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
- let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
-
- let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
- let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
- let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
- let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
-
- log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
-
- macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: $offered,
- amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
- cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
- payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
- transaction_output_index: None
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
- ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
- if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
- let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
- if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
- }
- } else {
- let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
- if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
- included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
- InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
- InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
- };
-
- if include {
- add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
- remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
- match &htlc.state {
- &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if generated_by_local {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
- }
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
-
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
- };
-
- if include {
- add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
- local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
- value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- },
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
- if !generated_by_local {
- value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
-
- let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
- assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
- // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
- // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
- // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
- // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
- let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
- assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- {
- // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
- // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
- let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
- self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
- } else {
- self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
- };
- debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
- max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
- debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
- max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
- }
-
- let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
- (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
- } else {
- (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
- };
-
- let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
- let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
-
- if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
- &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: value_to_a as u64
- }, None));
- }
-
- if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
- log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script(),
- value: value_to_b as u64
- }, None));
- }
-
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
- if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
- if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
- a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
- // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
- // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
- // may fail)!
- .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
- // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
- // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
- });
-
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
- for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
- outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
- htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
- htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
- }
- }
- let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
- htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
-
- (Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
- input: txins,
- output: outputs,
- }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
- (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
- let txins = {
- let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xffffffff,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- ins
- };
-
- assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
-
- let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
-
- if value_to_self < 0 {
- assert!(self.channel_outbound);
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
- } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
- }
-
- if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
- value: value_to_remote as u64
- }, ()));
- }
-
- if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- value: value_to_self as u64
- }, ()));
- }
-
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
-
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- for out in txouts.drain(..) {
- outputs.push(out.0);
- }
-
- (Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: txins,
- output: outputs,
- }, total_fee_satoshis)
- }
-
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
- /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
- /// our counterparty!)
- /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
- /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
-
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
- }
-
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
- /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
- //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
- //may see payments to it!
- let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
- let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
-
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
- }
-
- /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
- /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
- /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
- if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
- builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
- } else {
- builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
- }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
- }
-
- fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 {
- panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
- }
- if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
- panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
- }
-
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
-
- tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
- if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- } else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- }
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
-
- our_sig
- }
-
- /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
- /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
- /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
- fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
- }
-
- fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 {
- panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
- }
-
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
-
- let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
- Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
- }
-
- /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
- /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
- fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 {
- panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
- }
- if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
- panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
- }
-
- let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
-
- tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- if local_tx { // b, then a
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- } else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- }
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- if htlc.offered {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- } else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
- }
-
- tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
-
- Ok(our_sig)
- }
-
- /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
- /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
- /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
- // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
- // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
- // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
- // either.
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
-
- let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
-
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
-
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- } else {
- log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- }
- return Ok((None, None));
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
- }
- }
- pending_idx = idx;
- break;
- }
- }
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
- }
-
- // Now update local state:
- //
- // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
- // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
- self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- return Ok((None, None));
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
- // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- });
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
- }
-
- {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
- }
- log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
- }
-
- Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
- }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
- }
-
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
- (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
- let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
- },
- (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
- (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
- }
- }
-
- /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
- /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
- /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
-
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
-
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
- return Ok(None);
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
- }
- }
- pending_idx = idx;
- }
- }
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
- }
-
- // Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- err_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
- }
-
- {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
- }
-
- Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- reason: err_packet
- }))
- }
-
- // Message handlers:
-
- pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
- }
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
- }
- if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
- }
-
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
- }
- if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
- }
-
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
- if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- Some(script.clone())
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- } else if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
- }
- },
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &OptionalField::Absent => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
- }
- }
- } else { None };
-
- self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
-
- self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
- self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
- self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
- self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
- self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
- self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
- self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
- self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
- self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
- self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
- self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
-
- let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
- self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
- self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
-
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
-
- // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
- self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
-
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
- }
-
- pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
- // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
- // channel.
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
- }
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
- let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
-
- let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
- return Err(e);
- }
- };
-
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
-
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
- self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature: our_signature
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
- }
-
- /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
- /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
- }
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
-
- self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
- self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
- } else {
- Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
- }
- }
-
- pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
-
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
-
- if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
- // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
- // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
- (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
- if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
- }
- // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
- return Ok(());
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
- }
-
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
- fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
- let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
- }
-
- /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
- /// holding cell.
- fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
- let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
-
- let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
- htlc_outbound_count += 1;
- htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
- }
- }
-
- (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
- }
-
- /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
- /// Doesn't bother handling the
- /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
- /// corner case properly.
- pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
- // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
- (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
- cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
- }
-
- pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
- }
- if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
- }
-
- let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
- if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
- }
- // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
- }
- // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
- // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
- // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
- // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
- // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
- // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
- // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
- // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
- // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
- // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
- // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
- // transaction).
- let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
- removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
- removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- }
- if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
- }
- if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
- }
-
- //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
-
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
- if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
- panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
- }
- }
-
- // Now update local state:
- self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
- state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
- });
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
- #[inline]
- fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
- match check_preimage {
- None => {},
- Some(payment_hash) =>
- if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
- }
- };
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
- },
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
- }
- return Ok(&htlc.source);
- }
- }
- Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
- }
-
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
-
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
- }
-
- pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
-
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
-
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
- }
-
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
-
- let mut update_fee = false;
- let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
- update_fee = true;
- self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
- } else {
- self.feerate_per_kw
- };
-
- let mut local_commitment_tx = {
- let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
- (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
- };
- let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
-
- //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
- if update_fee {
- let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
- let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
-
- if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
- }
- }
-
- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
- }
-
- let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
- self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
- new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
-
- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
- for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
- if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
- log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
- let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
- let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
- new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
- htlc_sig
- } else {
- self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
- };
- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
- } else {
- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
- }
- }
-
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
- let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
-
- // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- let mut need_our_commitment = false;
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
- self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
- // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
- // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
- // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
- need_our_commitment = true;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
-
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
- Some(forward_info.clone())
- } else { None };
- if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
- need_our_commitment = true;
- }
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
- Some(fail_reason.take())
- } else { None } {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
- need_our_commitment = true;
- }
- }
-
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
- // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
- // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
-
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
- // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
- // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
- // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
- // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
- // includes the right HTLCs.
- // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
- // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
- // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- }
- // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
- // re-send the message on restoration)
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
- }
-
- let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
- // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
- // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
- // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
- let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- (Some(msg), monitor, None)
- } else if !need_our_commitment {
- (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
- } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
-
- Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
- }
-
- /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
- /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
- if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
- log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
-
- let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
- let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
- let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
- let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
- let mut err = None;
- for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
- // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
- // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
- // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
- // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
- // to rebalance channels.
- if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
- } else {
- match &htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
- Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
- Err(e) => {
- match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- },
- _ => {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- },
- }
- err = Some(e);
- }
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
- Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
- else {
- panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
- }
- }
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
- Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
- else {
- panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
- }
- }
- }
- },
- }
- if err.is_some() {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
- if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
- // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
- // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
- err = None;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
- //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
- match err {
- None => {
- if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
- // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
- // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
- // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
- return Ok(None);
- }
- let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
- self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
- Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
- })
- } else {
- None
- };
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs,
- update_fail_htlcs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: update_fee,
- commitment_signed,
- }, monitor_update)))
- },
- Some(e) => Err(e)
- }
- } else {
- Ok(None)
- }
- }
-
- /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
- /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
- /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
- /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
- /// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
- }
-
- if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
- }
- }
- self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
- .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
-
- // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
- // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
- // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
- let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
- let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut require_commitment = false;
- let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
-
- {
- // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
- let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
- let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
- let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
-
- // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
- pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
- revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
- } else {
- // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
- value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- true
- } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- true
- } else { false };
- if swap {
- let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
- mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
-
- if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
- require_commitment = true;
- } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
- match forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
- require_commitment = true;
- match fail_msg {
- HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
- update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
- },
- HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
- },
- }
- },
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
- to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
- }
- if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
- Some(fail_reason.take())
- } else { None } {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
- require_commitment = true;
- }
- }
- }
- self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
-
- if self.channel_outbound {
- if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
- // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
- // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
- // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
- // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
- // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
- if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
- require_commitment = true;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
- // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
- // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
- if require_commitment {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
- // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
- // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
- self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- }
- self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
- self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
- return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
- }
-
- match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
- Some(mut commitment_update) => {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
- for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
- }
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
- for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
- }
- Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
- },
- None => {
- if require_commitment {
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed
- }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
- } else {
- Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
- }
- }
- }
-
- }
-
- /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
- /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
- /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
- fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
- }
- if !self.is_usable() {
- panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
- }
- if !self.is_live() {
- panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
- }
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
- return None;
- }
-
- debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
- self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
-
- Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
- })
- }
-
- pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
- match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
- Some(update_fee) => {
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
- },
- None => Ok(None)
- }
- }
-
- /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
- /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
- /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
- /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
- /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
- /// completed.
- pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
- let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
-
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- return outbound_drops;
- }
- // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
- // will be retransmitted.
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
-
- let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
- // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
- // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
- // this HTLC accordingly
- inbound_drop_count += 1;
- false
- },
- InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
- // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
- // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
- // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
- true
- },
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
- // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
- // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
- // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
- // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
- true
- },
- }
- });
- self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
-
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
- // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
- // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
- // the update upon reconnection.
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
- }
- }
-
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
- }
- });
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- outbound_drops
- }
-
- /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
- /// updates are partially paused.
- /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
- /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
- /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
- /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
- pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
- assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
- mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
- assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
- mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
- }
-
- /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
- /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
- /// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
-
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
-
- // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
- // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
- // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
- // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
- // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
- // monitor was persisted.
- let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- })
- } else { None };
-
- let mut forwards = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
- let mut failures = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
-
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
- }
-
- let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
- Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
- } else { None };
- let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
- Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
- } else { None };
-
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- let order = self.resend_order.clone();
- log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
- if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
- if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
- match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
- (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
- }
-
- pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
- self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
- let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
- msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- }
- }
-
- fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
-
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
- update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
- amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
- payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
- });
- }
- }
-
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
- match reason {
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
- update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
- reason: err_packet.clone()
- });
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
- failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
- });
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
- update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
- });
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
- msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
- }
- }
-
- /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
- /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
- // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
- // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
- // just close here instead of trying to recover.
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
- }
-
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
- }
-
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
- match msg.data_loss_protect {
- OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
- if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
- }
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
- return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
- });
- }
- },
- OptionalField::Absent => {}
- }
- }
-
- // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
- // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
-
- let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
- Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- })
- } else { None };
-
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
- self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
- }
- // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
- return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
- }
-
- // We have OurFundingLocked set!
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
- }
-
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
- // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
- None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- None
- } else {
- Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
- }
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
- };
-
- // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
- // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
- // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
- // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
- let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
-
- let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
- // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- })
- } else { None };
-
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
- if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- }
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
- // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
- // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
- // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
- // now!
- match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
- Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
- Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
- Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
- Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
- }
- } else {
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
- }
- } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
- if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- }
-
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
- }
-
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
- }
- }
-
- fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
- if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
- self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
- self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
- return None;
- }
-
- let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
- proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
- }
- let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
-
- let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
- Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
- signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
- })
- }
-
- pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
- // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
- // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
-
- // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
- // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
- if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
- }
-
- //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
- if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
- }
-
- if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
- if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
- }
-
- // From here on out, we may not fail!
-
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
-
- // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
- // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
- // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
- // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
- // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
-
- let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
- None
- } else {
- Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- })
- };
-
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
- }
-
- pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
- }
- if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
- }
- if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
- }
-
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
- if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
- }
- let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_e) => {
- // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
- // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
- closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
- sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
- },
- };
-
- if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
- self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
- ($new_feerate: expr) => {
- let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
- sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
- return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
- signature: our_sig,
- }), None))
- }
- }
-
- let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
- if self.channel_outbound {
- let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
- if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
- }
- }
- propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
- }
- } else {
- let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
- if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
- }
- }
- propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
- }
- }
-
- let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
-
- Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
- signature: our_sig,
- }), Some(closing_tx)))
- }
-
- // Public utilities:
-
- pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- self.channel_id
- }
-
- /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
- /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
- pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.user_id
- }
-
- /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
- pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
- }
- self.channel_monitor.clone()
- }
-
- /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
- /// is_usable() returns true).
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id
- }
-
- /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
- /// get_outbound_funding_created.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.their_node_id
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
- }
-
- pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
- self.channel_value_satoshis
- }
-
- pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
- self.feerate_per_kw
- }
-
- pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
- }
-
- pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
- }
-
- pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
- &self.local_keys
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
- ChannelValueStat {
- value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
- channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
- channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
- pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
- pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
- holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
- let mut res = 0;
- for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match h {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
- res += amount_msat;
- }
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- res
- },
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- }
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
- self.channel_update_count
- }
-
- pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
- self.config.announced_channel
- }
-
- pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_outbound
- }
-
- /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
- // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
- // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
-
- // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
- let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
-
- if self.channel_outbound {
- // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
- res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
- }
-
- // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
- res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
-
- res as u32
- }
-
- /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
- pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
- let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
- (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
- /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
- }
-
- /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
- pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
- /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
- /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
- pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
- assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
- true
- } else { false }
- }
-
- /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
- /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
- /// the channel_monitor.
- /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
- /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
- /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok(None);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
- if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
- let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
- // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
- // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
- // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
- // channel and move on.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
- });
- } else {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if input.witness.is_empty() {
- // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
- // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- }
- }
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- Ok(None)
- }
-
- /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
- /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
- /// unconfirmation/reorg.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
- return true;
- }
- }
- if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
- }
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
- false
- }
-
- // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
- // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
-
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
- }
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
- }
-
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
-
- let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
-
- msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
- push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
- channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
- }
- }
-
- pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
- }
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
-
- let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
-
- msgs::AcceptChannel {
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
- }
- }
-
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
-
- // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
- }
-
- /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
- /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
- /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
- /// or if called on an inbound channel.
- /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
- /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- if !self.channel_outbound {
- panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
- }
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
-
- let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
- return Err(e);
- }
- };
-
- let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
-
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
-
- Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature: our_signature
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
- }
-
- /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
- /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
- /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
- /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
- /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
- /// closing).
- /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
- /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
- pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
- if !self.config.announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
- }
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
- }
-
- let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
- let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
-
- let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- chain_hash: chain_hash,
- short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
-
- Ok((msg, sig))
- }
-
- /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
- /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
- pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
- let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- let remote_last_secret = self.channel_monitor.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
- OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
- your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
- my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
- })
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
- OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
- your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
- my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
- })
- };
- msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
- // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
- // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
- // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
- // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
- // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
-
- // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
- // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
- next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
- // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
- // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
- // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
- // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
- // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
- // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
- // overflow here.
- next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
- data_loss_protect,
- }
- }
-
-
- // Send stuff to our remote peers:
-
- /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
- /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
- /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
- /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
- /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
- /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
- /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
- pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
- }
-
- if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
- }
- if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
- }
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
- // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
- // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
- // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
- // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
- // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
- // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
- }
-
- let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
- if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
- }
- // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
- }
-
- // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
- // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
- if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
- }
-
- //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
-
- // Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
- amount_msat: amount_msat,
- payment_hash: payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
- source,
- onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
- }
-
- self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
- amount_msat: amount_msat,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
- state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
- source,
- });
-
- let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
- amount_msat: amount_msat,
- payment_hash: payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
- };
- self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
-
- Ok(Some(res))
- }
-
- /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
- /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
- /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
- /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
- pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
- }
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
- panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
- }
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
- panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
- }
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
- panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
- }
- let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- have_updates = true;
- }
- if have_updates { break; }
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
- have_updates = true;
- }
- if have_updates { break; }
- }
- if !have_updates {
- panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
- }
- self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
- }
- /// Only fails in case of bad keys
- fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
- // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
- // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
- // is acceptable.
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
- Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
- } else { None };
- if let Some(state) = new_state {
- htlc.state = state;
- }
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
- Some(fail_reason.take())
- } else { None } {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
- }
- }
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
-
- let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
- Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
- // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
- (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
- },
- Err(e) => return Err(e),
- };
-
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
- }
-
- /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
- /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
- if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- }
- }
-
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
- let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
- log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
-
- let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
- for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
- if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
- htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
- log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
- }
- }
-
- Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature: our_sig,
- htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
- }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
- }
-
- /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
- /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
- /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
- /// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
- Some(update_add_htlc) => {
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
- },
- None => Ok(None)
- }
- }
-
- /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
- /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
- }
- }
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
- }
- else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
- }
-
- let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
-
- // From here on out, we may not fail!
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- } else {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- }
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
-
- // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
- // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
-
- Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
- }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
- }
-
- /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
- /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
- /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
- /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
- /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
- assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
-
- // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
- // return them to fail the payment.
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
- match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
-
- for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
- //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
- //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
- //which correspond)
- }
-
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
- (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
- }
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- error_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- onion_hash.write(writer)?;
- err_code.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Channel {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
- // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
-
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- self.user_id.write(writer)?;
- self.config.write(writer)?;
-
- self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
-
- self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
- self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
-
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
-
- let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
- }
- }
- (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
- htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
- htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- match &htlc.state {
- &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
- &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_state.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_state.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
- 3u8.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
- 4u8.write(writer)?;
- removal_reason.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! write_option {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match &$thing {
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- &Some(ref v) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- v.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
- htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
- htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- htlc.source.write(writer)?;
- match &htlc.state {
- &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- onion_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- },
- &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
- },
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
- 3u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
- },
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
- 4u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
- },
- }
- }
-
- (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- amount_msat.write(writer)?;
- cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
- payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- source.write(writer)?;
- onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
- htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- err_packet.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
-
- match self.resend_order {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
- }
-
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
-
- (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
- pending_forward.write(writer)?;
- htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
- htlc_source.write(writer)?;
- payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- fail_reason.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
- write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
-
- self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
- self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
-
- (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
- if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
- match e {
- encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
- _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
- }
- }
- }
-
- match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
- Some((feerate, fee)) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- feerate.write(writer)?;
- fee.write(writer)?;
- },
- None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
-
- write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
- write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
-
- self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
-
- self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
- self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
- self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
-
- write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
- write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
-
- write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
- self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
-
- write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
-
- self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
- for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
- pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
- cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
- payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
- 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- },
- });
- }
-
- let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
- for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
- pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
- cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
- payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- source: Readable::read(reader)?,
- state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
- 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- },
- });
- }
-
- let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
- for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
- holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
- amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
- cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
- payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- source: Readable::read(reader)?,
- onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
- },
- 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
- htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- },
- 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- });
- }
-
- let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
- 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
- for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
- monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
- for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
- monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
- for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
- last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
- Ok(tx) => tx,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- });
- }
-
- let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
- // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
- // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
- if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
-
- Ok(Channel {
- user_id,
-
- config,
- channel_id,
- channel_state,
- channel_outbound,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- channel_value_satoshis,
-
- local_keys,
- shutdown_pubkey,
-
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
- value_to_self_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs,
- pending_outbound_htlcs,
- holding_cell_htlc_updates,
-
- resend_order,
-
- monitor_pending_funding_locked,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
- monitor_pending_forwards,
- monitor_pending_failures,
-
- pending_update_fee,
- holding_cell_update_fee,
- next_local_htlc_id,
- next_remote_htlc_id,
- channel_update_count,
- feerate_per_kw,
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
-
- last_local_commitment_txn,
-
- last_sent_closing_fee,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in,
- short_channel_id,
- last_block_connected,
- funding_tx_confirmations,
-
- their_dust_limit_satoshis,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis,
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- their_htlc_minimum_msat,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- their_to_self_delay,
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth,
-
- their_funding_pubkey,
- their_revocation_basepoint,
- their_payment_basepoint,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
- their_htlc_basepoint,
- their_cur_commitment_point,
-
- their_prev_commitment_point,
- their_node_id,
-
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
-
- channel_monitor,
-
- logger,
- })
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
- use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::test_utils;
- use util::logger::Logger;
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
- use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
- use std::sync::Arc;
-
- struct TestFeeEstimator {
- fee_est: u64
- }
- impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
- fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
- self.fee_est
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
- assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
- "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
- }
-
- struct Keys {
- chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
- }
- impl KeysInterface for Keys {
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
- }
-
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn outbound_commitment_test() {
- // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
- let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
- let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-
- let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-
- // These aren't set in the test vectors:
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
- };
- assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
-
- let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut config = UserConfig::new();
- config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
- chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
-
- let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
- chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
-
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
-
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
-
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
-
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
-
- // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
- // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
- // build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
-
- macro_rules! test_commitment {
- ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
- unsigned_tx = {
- let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
- let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
- .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
- .collect();
- (res.0, htlcs)
- };
- let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
-
- assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
- hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
- };
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
- ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
-
- let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- if !htlc.offered {
- for i in 0..5 {
- let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
- if out == htlc.payment_hash {
- preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
- }
- }
-
- assert!(preimage.is_some());
- }
-
- chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
- hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
- };
- }
-
- {
- // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
-
- test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
- "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
- "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");
- }
-
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
- htlc_id: 0,
- amount_msat: 1000000,
- cltv_expiry: 500,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
- };
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
- out
- });
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
- htlc_id: 1,
- amount_msat: 2000000,
- cltv_expiry: 501,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
- };
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
- out
- });
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
- htlc_id: 2,
- amount_msat: 2000000,
- cltv_expiry: 502,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
- source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- };
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
- out
- });
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
- htlc_id: 3,
- amount_msat: 3000000,
- cltv_expiry: 503,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
- source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- };
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
- out
- });
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
- htlc_id: 4,
- amount_msat: 4000000,
- cltv_expiry: 504,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
- };
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
- out
- });
-
- {
- // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
-
- test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
- "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
- "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
- "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
- "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(3,
- "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
- "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(4,
- "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
- "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
-
- test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
- "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
- "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
- "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
- "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b00147304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
- "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
- "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb6020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d83301483045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
-
- test_htlc_output!(3,
- "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
- "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(4,
- "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
- "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
-
- test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
- "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
- "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
- "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
- "02000000000101579c183eca9e8236a5d7f5dcd79cfec32c497fdc0ec61533cde99ecd436cadd10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d40147304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
- "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(3,
- "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
- "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
-
- test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
- "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
- "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
- "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
- "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(3,
- "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
- "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
-
- test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
- "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
- "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
- "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
- "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
-
- test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
- "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
- "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
- "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(2,
- "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
- "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
-
- test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
- "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
- "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de843110b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a54290147304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb792429801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
- "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
- "020000000001014e16c488fa158431c1a82e8f661240ec0a71ba0ce92f2721a6538c510226ad5c0000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc01483045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc70439001008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
- "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
-
- test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
- "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
- "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431106f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b001483045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c101475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
- "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
- "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");
-
- test_htlc_output!(1,
- "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
- "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
-
- test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
- "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
- "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
-
- test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
- "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
-
- test_htlc_output!(0,
- "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
- "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
- "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");
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
-
- test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
- "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
-
- test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
- "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
-
- test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
- "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
- }
-
- {
- // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
-
- test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
- "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
- "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");
-
- assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
- // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
-
- let mut seed = [0; 32];
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
-
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
- hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
- hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
-
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
- hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_key_derivation() {
- // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-
- let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
- assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
-//!
-//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
-//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
-//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
-//!
-//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
-//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
-//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
-
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
-use ln::router::Route;
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
-use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
-use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
-use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
-use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::errors::APIError;
-
-use std::{cmp, mem};
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
-use std::io::Cursor;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
-//
-// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
-// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
-// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
-//
-// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
-// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
-// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
-// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
-// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
-// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
-/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
- incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
- pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
- Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
- Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
-}
-
-/// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
- Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
- Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
-}
-
-/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: u64,
- htlc_id: u64,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
-}
-
-/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
- PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
- OutboundRoute {
- route: Route,
- session_priv: SecretKey,
- /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
- /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
- first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
- },
-}
-#[cfg(test)]
-impl HTLCSource {
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
- session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
- ErrorPacket {
- err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
- Reason {
- failure_code: u16,
- data: Vec<u8>,
- }
-}
-
-/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
-/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
-
-type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
-
-/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
-/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
-/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
-/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
-/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
-
-struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
- err: msgs::HandleError,
- shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
-}
-impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
- #[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: HandleError {
- err,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: err.to_string()
- },
- }),
- },
- shutdown_finish: None,
- }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: HandleError {
- err,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
- },
- shutdown_finish: None,
- }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
- Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: HandleError {
- err,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: err.to_string()
- },
- }),
- },
- shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
- }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: match err {
- ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
- err: msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
- },
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
- err: msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: msg.to_string()
- },
- }),
- },
- ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => HandleError {
- err: msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: msg.to_string()
- },
- }),
- },
- },
- shutdown_finish: None,
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
-/// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
-/// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
-/// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
-const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
-
-pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
- AddHTLC {
- prev_short_channel_id: u64,
- prev_htlc_id: u64,
- forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
- },
- FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: u64,
- err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
-}
-
-/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
-/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
-/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
-/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
- /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
- CommitmentFirst,
- /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
- RevokeAndACKFirst,
-}
-
-// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
-pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
- pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
- pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
- /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
- /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
- pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
- /// can be failed/claimed by the user
- /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
- /// go to read them!
- pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
- /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
- /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
- pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
-}
-pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
- pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
- pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
- pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
-}
-impl ChannelHolder {
- pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
- MutChannelHolder {
- by_id: &mut self.by_id,
- short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
- forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
- claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
- pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
-const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
-
-/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
-/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
-///
-/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
-/// to individual Channels.
-///
-/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
-/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
-/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
-/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
-///
-/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
-/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
-/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
-/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
-/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
-/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
-///
-/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
-/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
-/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
-/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
-/// object!
-pub struct ChannelManager {
- default_configuration: UserConfig,
- genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
- fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
- monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
- chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
- last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
- our_network_key: SecretKey,
-
- pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
- /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
- /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
- /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
- total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
-
- keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
-
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
-/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
-pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
-/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
-pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
-
-/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
-/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
-/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
-/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
-pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
-
-// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
-// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
-// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
-// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
-// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
-// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
-#[deny(const_err)]
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-
-// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
-// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
-#[deny(const_err)]
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
-
-macro_rules! secp_call {
- ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return Err($err),
- }
- };
-}
-
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
-pub struct ChannelDetails {
- /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
- /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
- /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
- /// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
- /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
- /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
- pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
- /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
- pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
- pub user_id: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
- /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
- /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
- /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
- pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
- pub is_live: bool,
-}
-
-macro_rules! handle_error {
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
- match $internal {
- Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
- if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
- $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
- if let Some(update) = update_option {
- let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- }
- Err(err)
- },
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
- },
- Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
- log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
- let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
- },
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
- },
- Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
- log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
- let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
- },
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
- log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
- let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- if let Some(update) = update {
- if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
- match e {
- // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
- // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
- // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
- // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
- }
- }
- }
- let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
- if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
- log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
- }
- shutdown_res.0.clear();
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
- };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- match $err {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
- let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
- // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
- // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
- // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
- // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
- // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
- // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
- // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
- // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
- res
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
- log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
- if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
- match $action_type {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
- }
- } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
- else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
- else { "nothing" },
- (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
- (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
- if !$resend_commitment {
- debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
- }
- if !$resend_raa {
- debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
- }
- $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
- },
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
- };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
- }
-}
-
-// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
-macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
- (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
- break e;
- },
- (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl ChannelManager {
- /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
- ///
- /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
- /// ChannelMessageHandler.
- ///
- /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
- ///
- /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-
- let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
- default_configuration: config.clone(),
- genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
- monitor: monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor,
- tx_broadcaster,
-
- latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
- last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
- secp_ctx,
-
- channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
- by_id: HashMap::new(),
- short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
- forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
- pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
- }),
- our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
-
- pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
-
- keys_manager,
-
- logger,
- });
- let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
- res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
- Ok(res)
- }
-
- /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
- ///
- /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
- /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
- /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
- /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
- ///
- /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
- /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
- ///
- /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
- /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
- }
-
- let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
- let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
-
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
- } else {
- panic!("RNG is bad???");
- }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
- node_id: their_network_key,
- msg: res,
- });
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
- /// more information.
- pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
- for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
- res.push(ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
- short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
- inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
- user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- is_live: channel.is_live(),
- });
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
- /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
- ///
- /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
- /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
- pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
- for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
- // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
- // really wanted anyway.
- if channel.is_live() {
- let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
- res.push(ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
- short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
- inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
- user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- is_live: true,
- });
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
- /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
- /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
- ///
- /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
- msg: shutdown_msg
- });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
- }
- };
- for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- Some(update)
- } else { None }
- } else { None };
-
- if let Some(update) = chan_update {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
- let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
- log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
- for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- for tx in local_txn {
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- }
-
- /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
- /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
- pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let mut chan = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- chan
- } else {
- return;
- }
- };
- log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- }
-
- /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
- /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
- pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
- for chan in self.list_channels() {
- self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
- }
- }
-
- const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
- macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
- {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
- failure_code: $err_code,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
- return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
- }
-
- let shared_secret = {
- let mut arr = [0; 32];
- arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
- arr
- };
- let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
- }
-
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
- if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
- }
-
- let mut channel_state = None;
- macro_rules! return_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
- {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- if channel_state.is_none() {
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- }
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
- })), channel_state.unwrap());
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- let next_hop_data = {
- let mut decoded = [0; 65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
- match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
- Err(err) => {
- let error_code = match err {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
- _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
- };
- return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(msg) => msg
- }
- };
-
- let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
- // OUR PAYMENT!
- // final_expiry_too_soon
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
- }
- // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
- if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
- return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
- return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
-
- // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
- // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
- // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
- // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: None,
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- })
- } else {
- let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
-
- let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
-
- let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret);
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
-
- let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
- Err(e)
- } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
-
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key,
- hop_data: new_packet_data,
- hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- })
- };
-
- channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
- if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
- let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
- let forwarding_id = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
- },
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
- if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
- if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
- break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
- }
- break None;
- }
- {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
- }
- res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
- }
- return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
- }
- }
- }
-
- (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
- }
-
- /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
- /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
- let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
- Some(id) => id,
- };
-
- let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
-
- let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
- short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
- timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
- flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
- cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
- htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
- fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
- fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
-
- Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- signature: sig,
- contents: unsigned
- })
- }
-
- /// Sends a payment along a given route.
- ///
- /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
- /// fields for more info.
- ///
- /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
- /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
- /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
- /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
- /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
- /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
- ///
- /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
- ///
- /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
- /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
- /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
- /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
- /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
- /// relevant updates.
- ///
- /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
- /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
- /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
- /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
- /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
- }
- let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
- if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
- }
- }
-
- let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
-
- let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
-
- let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
- APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
-
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
-
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
- match {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
- }
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
- }
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: route.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
- } {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
- // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
- // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
- // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
- // something else in case we will resend later!
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
- }
-
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- },
- None => {},
- }
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- return Ok(());
- };
-
- match handle_error!(self, err) {
- Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
- Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
- } else {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- action: e.action,
- });
- }
- Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
- },
- }
- }
-
- /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
- ///
- /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
- /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
- ///
- /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
- ///
- /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
- /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
- let (res, chan) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
- .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
- } else { unreachable!(); })
- , chan)
- },
- None => return
- }
- };
- match handle_error!(self, res) {
- Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
- },
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
- });
- return;
- },
- }
- };
- // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_update_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
- });
- return;
- },
- Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
- }
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
- // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
- // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
- // in fact, safe).
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- },
- }
- }
-
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: msg,
- });
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(chan);
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
- if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
-
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_signature: our_node_sig,
- bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
- })
- }
-
- /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
- ///
- /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
- /// Will likely generate further events.
- pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let mut new_events = Vec::new();
- let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
- if short_chan_id != 0 {
- let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
- failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
- // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
- // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
- // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
- // problem, not ours.
- }
- }
- }
- continue;
- }
- };
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
- continue;
- },
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
- }
- }
- }
- }
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- Ok(None) => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
- // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
- // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
- // messages when we can.
- // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
- // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
- // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
- }
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
- continue;
- },
- };
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
- }
- } else {
- unreachable!();
- }
- } else {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
- let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- };
- match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
- };
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
- amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
- });
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
- match update {
- None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
- Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
- };
- }
-
- for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- match handle_error!(self, err) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
- } else {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: their_node_id,
- action: e.action,
- });
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- if new_events.is_empty() { return }
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.append(&mut new_events);
- }
-
- /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
- /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
- /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
- /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
- /// HTLC backwards has been started.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
- if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
- }
- true
- } else { false }
- }
-
- /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
- /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
- /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
- /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
- /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
- /// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
- //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
- //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
- //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
- //timer handling.
- match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- match &onion_error {
- &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
-#[cfg(test)]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
-#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
- // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
- // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
- // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- if let Some(update) = channel_update {
- self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
- update,
- }
- );
- }
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code
- }
- );
- },
- &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
-#[cfg(test)]
- ref failure_code,
- .. } => {
- // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
- // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
- // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
- // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
- // ChannelDetails.
- // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
- // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
- }
- );
- }
- }
- },
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
- let err_packet = match onion_error {
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
- let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
- },
- HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
- }
- };
-
- let mut forward_event = None;
- if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
- forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
- }
- match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
- }
- }
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if let Some(time) = forward_event {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable: time
- });
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
- ///
- /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
-
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
- if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
- // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
- // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
- for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
- if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
- }
- true
- } else { false }
- }
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
- let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
- match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
- },
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
- //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
- Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
- // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
- // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
- // why it's missing.
- return
- }
- };
-
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
- Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
- if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(msgs.is_none());
- } else {
- break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- }
- });
- }
- },
- Err(_e) => {
- // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
- // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
- //TODO: Do something with e?
- return
- },
- }
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- },
- }
- return;
- };
-
- match handle_error!(self, err) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
- } else {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: their_node_id,
- action: e.action,
- });
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
- pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
- }
-
- /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
- /// operation.
- pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
- let mut close_results = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
- let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
- let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
- let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
- // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
- // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
- // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
- // on-chain confirmations.
- // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
- // should be written.
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- false
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
- }
- } else {
- let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
- if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
- }
- htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
-
- macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
- if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- updates: update,
- });
- }
- } }
- macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
- if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: revoke_and_ack,
- });
- }
- } }
- match order {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
- handle_cs!();
- handle_raa!();
- },
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
- handle_raa!();
- handle_cs!();
- },
- }
- if needs_broadcast_safe {
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- }
- true
- }
- } else { true }
- });
- }
-
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
-
- for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
- }
- self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
-
- for res in close_results.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
- }
- }
-
- fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
-
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
- });
- entry.insert(channel);
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
- (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
- },
- //TODO: same as above
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
- }
- };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
- channel_value_satoshis: value,
- output_script: output_script,
- user_channel_id: user_id,
- });
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
- }
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
- }
- };
- // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_update_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
- // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
- // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
- // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
- // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
- // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
- // until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- },
- }
- }
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: funding_msg,
- });
- e.insert(chan);
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
- }
- (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo: funding_txo,
- user_channel_id: user_id,
- });
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- }
-
- fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (tx, chan_option) = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- if tx.is_some() {
- // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
- // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
- // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
- // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
- // watch for old state broadcasts)!
- if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (tx, None) }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
- }
- if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
- //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
- //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
- //
- //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
- //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
- //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
- //but we should prevent it anyway.
-
- let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- if !chan.get().is_usable() {
- // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
- // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
- // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
- pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
- // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
- // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
- // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
- // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
- // allowed.
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
- res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
- res
- }[..])
- } else {
- // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
- // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
- // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
- // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
- // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
- },
- }));
- }
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let htlc_source = {
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- }
-
- fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
- //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: revoke_and_ack,
- });
- if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: msg,
- },
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
- for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
- let mut forward_event = None;
- if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
- forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
- }
- for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- match forward_event {
- Some(time) => {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable: time
- });
- }
- None => {},
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
- } else {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
- }
- }
- if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- updates,
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
- }
- self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- if !chan.get().is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
- }
-
- let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
-
- let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
- self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
- }
-
- let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
- node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
- bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
- bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
- contents: announcement,
- },
- update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
- });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
- if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
- // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
- // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
- if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
- order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
- }
- if commitment_update.is_none() {
- order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- }
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
- //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
- }
- }
- if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg
- });
- }
- macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
- if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg
- });
- }
- } }
- macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
- if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- updates
- });
- }
- } }
- match order {
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
- send_raa!();
- send_cu!();
- },
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
- send_cu!();
- send_raa!();
- },
- }
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- Ok(())
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- }
-
- /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
- /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
- /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
- /// Note: This API is likely to change!
- #[doc(hidden)]
- pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let their_node_id;
- let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
- }
- if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
- }
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
- }
- their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
- if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
- {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- }
- },
- }
- return Ok(())
- };
-
- match handle_error!(self, err) {
- Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
- Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
- } else {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: their_node_id,
- action: e.action,
- });
- }
- Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
- },
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
- fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
- // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
- // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
- // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
- {
- //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
- ret
- }
-}
-
-impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
- // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
- // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
- // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
- {
- //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
- ret
- }
-}
-
-impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
- let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
- if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
- });
- return false;
- }
- if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
- for tx in txn_matched {
- for inp in tx.input.iter() {
- if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
- log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
- // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
- // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- return false;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
- // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
- // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
- // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
- failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- return false;
- }
- true
- });
- }
- for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
- }
- self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
- *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
- }
-
- /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
- let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
- if v.block_disconnected(header) {
- if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
- });
- }
- for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
- }
- self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
-}
-
-impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
- //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
- fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
- }
-
- fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
- let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
- let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if no_connection_possible {
- log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
- });
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
- //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
- let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
- if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
- failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
- }
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- return false;
- }
- }
- true
- })
- }
- pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
- match msg {
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
- }
- });
- }
- for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
- }
- for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
- for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
- log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
-
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
- if !chan.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
- });
- true
- }
- } else { true }
- });
- //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
- }
-
- fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- for chan in self.list_channels() {
- if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
- self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
- }
- }
- } else {
- self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
- }
- }
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
- self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
- self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
- self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
- Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
- incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
- payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
- outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- fail_msg.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- fail_msg.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- forward_info.write(writer)?;
- },
- &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- fail_msg.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
- short_channel_id,
- htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret
-});
-
-impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- hop_data.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- route.write(writer)?;
- session_priv.write(writer)?;
- first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: Readable::read(reader)?,
- session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
- first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- err.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- failure_code.write(writer)?;
- data.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
- 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
- data: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- forward_info.write(writer)?;
- },
- &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- err_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
- prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }),
- 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
-
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
- (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
-
- let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
- }
- }
- ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
- short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for forward in pending_forwards {
- forward.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
- payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
- recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
- previous_hop.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
-///
-/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
-/// is:
-/// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
-/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
-/// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
-/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
-/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
-/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
-/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
-/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
-/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
-/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
-/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
-/// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
-pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
- /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
- /// deserialization.
- pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
-
- /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
- ///
- /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
- pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
- /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
- ///
- /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
- /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
- /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
- pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
- /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
- ///
- /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
- pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
- /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
- /// force-closed during deserialization.
- pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
- /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
- /// deserialization.
- pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
- /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
- /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
- pub default_config: UserConfig,
-
- /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
- /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
- ///
- /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
- /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
- /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
- /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
- ///
- /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
- /// this struct.
- pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
-}
-
-impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
-
- let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
- if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
-
- let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
- funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
- if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
- if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
- channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
- channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
- let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
- force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
- closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
- } else {
- if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
- }
- by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
- }
- } else {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
- }
- }
-
- let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
- for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
- let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
- for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
- pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
- }
-
- let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
- for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
- let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
- for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
- previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
- claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
- }
-
- let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
- genesis_hash,
- fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
- monitor: args.monitor,
- chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
- tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
-
- latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
- last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
-
- channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
- by_id,
- short_to_id,
- forward_htlcs,
- claimable_htlcs,
- pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
- }),
- our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
-
- pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
- logger: args.logger,
- default_configuration: args.default_config,
- };
-
- for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
- channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
- //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
- //connection or two.
- }
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
-//! here.
-//!
-//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
-//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
-//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
-//!
-//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
-//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
-//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
-//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
-//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
-use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
-use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
-
-/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
- /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
- ///
- /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
- /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
- /// the channel to an operational state.
- ///
- /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
- /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
- /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
- ///
- /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
- /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
- /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
- /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
- /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
- /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
- /// been "frozen".
- ///
- /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
- /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
- /// channel operation.
- ///
- /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
- /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
- /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
- TemporaryFailure,
- /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
- /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
- ///
- /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
- PermanentFailure,
-}
-
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
-/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
-/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
-/// Contains a human-readable error message.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
-/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
-/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
-pub struct HTLCUpdate {
- pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- pub(super) source: HTLCSource
-}
-
-/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
-/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
-/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
-/// server(s).
-///
-/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
-/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
-/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
-/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
- /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
- /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
- /// any spends of it.
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
- /// with success or failure backward
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
-}
-
-/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
-/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
-///
-/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
-///
-/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
-/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
-/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
-///
-/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
-/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
-pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
- pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
- chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
- pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
- pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
- fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
- let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
- if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
- new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
- outputs: spendable_outputs,
- });
- }
-
- for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
- }
- }
- htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
- }
- }
- {
- // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
- let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
- for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
- match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
- // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
- // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
- let mut existing_claim = false;
- e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
- if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
- if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
- existing_claim = true;
- true
- } else { false }
- } else { true }
- });
- if !existing_claim {
- e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
- }
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
- /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
- let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
- monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- chain_monitor,
- broadcaster,
- pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- logger,
- fee_estimator: feeest,
- });
- let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
- res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
- res
- }
-
- /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
- return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
- },
- None => {}
- };
- match monitor.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- match funding_info {
- &None => {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
- },
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
- },
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
- }
- }
- monitors.insert(key, monitor);
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
- }
-
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
- for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
- for htlc_data in v {
- pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
- payment_hash: k,
- payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
- source: htlc_data.0,
- });
- }
- }
- pending_htlcs_updated
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
- ret
- }
-}
-
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
-/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
-const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
-/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
-/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
-pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
-/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
-/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
-/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
-/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
-/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
-/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
-/// accurate block height.
-/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
-/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
-/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
-pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
-/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
-/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
-/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
-/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
-pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum Storage {
- Local {
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
- current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
- },
- Watchtower {
- revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
- htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct LocalSignedTx {
- /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
- txid: Sha256dHash,
- tx: Transaction,
- revocation_key: PublicKey,
- a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u64,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum InputDescriptors {
- RevokedOfferedHTLC,
- RevokedReceivedHTLC,
- OfferedHTLC,
- ReceivedHTLC,
- RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
-}
-
-/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
-/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
-/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum TxMaterial {
- Revoked {
- script: Script,
- pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- key: SecretKey,
- is_htlc: bool,
- amount: u64,
- },
- RemoteHTLC {
- script: Script,
- key: SecretKey,
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- },
- LocalHTLC {
- script: Script,
- sigs: (Signature, Signature),
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- }
-}
-
-/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
-/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum OnchainEvent {
- /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
- /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
- Claim {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
- },
- /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
- /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
- /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
- HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
- },
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
-/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
-///
-/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
-/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
-
- key_storage: Storage,
- their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
-
- our_to_self_delay: u16,
- their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
-
- old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
- /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
- /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
- /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
- /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
- /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
- /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
- /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
- /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
- /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
-
- // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
- // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
- // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
- // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
-
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
-
- destination_script: Script,
- // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
- // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
- // scan every commitment transaction for that
- to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
-
- // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
- // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
- // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
- // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
- // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
- // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
-
- // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
- // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
- // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
-
- // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
- // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
- // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
- // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
- // the full block_connected).
- pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
- ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
- {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
- let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, fee, $value);
- false
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
-impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
- self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
- self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
- self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
- self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
- {
- false
- } else {
- for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
- if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
- return false
- }
- }
- true
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
- ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
-
- key_storage: Storage::Local {
- revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
- htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
- payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
- shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
- latest_per_commitment_point: None,
- funding_info: None,
- current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- },
- their_htlc_base_key: None,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
-
- our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay: None,
-
- old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- destination_script: destination_script,
- to_remote_rescue: None,
-
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
-
- last_block_hash: Default::default(),
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- logger,
- }
- }
-
- fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
- let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- for inp in inputs {
- // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
- tx_weight += match inp {
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
- },
- };
- }
- tx_weight
- }
-
- fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
- if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
- return current_height + 1
- } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
- return current_height + 3
- }
- current_height + 15
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
- for i in 0..48 {
- if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
- return i
- }
- }
- 48
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
- for i in 0..bits {
- let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
- if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
- res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
- /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
- /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
- for i in 0..pos {
- let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
- if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
- }
- }
- if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
- return Ok(());
- }
- self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
-
- // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
- // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
- // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
- let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
- let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
-
- self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- }
- let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
- if *cn < min_idx {
- return true
- }
- true
- } else { false };
- if contains {
- remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
- }
- false
- });
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
- /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
- /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
- /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
- // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
- // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
- // timeouts)
- for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
- }
-
- let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
- *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- }
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
- self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- }
- }
-
- pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
- let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script();
- if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
- self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
- }
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
- }
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
- /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
- /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
- /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
- /// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
- assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
- txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
- tx: signed_commitment_tx,
- revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
- feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs,
- });
-
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
- *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
- } else {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- }
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
- /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
- self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
- /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
- /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
- let our_funding_info = funding_info;
- if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
- if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
- // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
- // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
- if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
- }
- } else {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
- unimplemented!();
- } else {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
- }
- },
- }
- let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
- let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
- self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
- }
- if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
- self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
- }
- }
- }
- // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
- // local transactions to decide how to merge
- if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
- for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
- }
- if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
- }
- if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
- }
- self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
- self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
- }
-
- self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
- pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
- assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
- }
-
- /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
- /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
- /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
- /// provides slightly better privacy.
- /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
- /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
- pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
- *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
- pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
- self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
- self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
- }
-
- pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
- self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
- }
-
- pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
- *funding_info = None;
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- },
- }
- }
-
- /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- match funding_info {
- &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
- &None => None
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- return None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
- /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
- /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
- /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
- pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
- //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
- macro_rules! write_option {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
- &Some(ref t) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- t.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
- }
- }
-
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- match funding_info {
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
- },
- }
- current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
-
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
- writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
- match second_option {
- Some(second_pubkey) => {
- writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
- },
- }
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- },
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
-
- for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- writer.write_all(secret)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc_output: expr) => {
- writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
- (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in txouts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
- }
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
- match e {
- encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
- _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- } else {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- }
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
- for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
- }
-
- self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
- local_key.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
- match claim_tx_data.1 {
- TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- pubkey.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
- if *is_htlc {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- sigs.0.write(writer)?;
- sigs.1.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- }
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
- for ev in events.iter() {
- match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, true)
- }
-
- /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, false)
- }
-
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
- if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
- }
- }
- assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
- None
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
- //TODO This can be optimized?
- let mut min = 1 << 48;
- for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- if idx < min {
- min = idx;
- }
- }
- min
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_remote_commitment_number
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
- } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
- /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
- // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
- // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
- let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
- Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
- None)
- },
- };
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
- let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
- Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
- };
-
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version.
- let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
- Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
- } else { None };
-
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
-
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: idx as u32,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
- inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
- total_value += outp.value;
- } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
- };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
- } else {
- $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- }
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, revocation_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
- }
- }
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
- }
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value,
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
- }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
-
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
- continue $id;
- }
- }
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
- },
- };
- let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
- Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
- };
-
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_key,
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
- }
- break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
- }
- }
-
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- $input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, htlc_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
- //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
- }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
- }
- }
- } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_key.clone(),
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
-
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
- return (None, None)
- }
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (None, None)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
- },
- };
- let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
- None => return (None, None),
- Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
- };
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
-
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut amount = 0;
-
- if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: htlc_txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- amount = tx.output[0].value;
- }
-
- if !inputs.is_empty() {
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: amount
- });
-
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (None, None);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
-
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
- let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
- }
- (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
- } else { (None, None) }
- }
-
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
- ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
- if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
- if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
- key: local_delayedkey,
- witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
-
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
- if htlc.offered {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
-
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
- res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
- } else {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
- let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
-
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
- res.push(htlc_success_tx);
- }
- }
- watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
- } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
- }
- }
-
- (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
- /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
- ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != $source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
- local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
- for claim in $updates.3 {
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_local_tx = false;
-
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source {
- wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if is_local_tx {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
- }
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
- }
- }
-
- (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
- fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
- if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
- return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
- output: output.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
- // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
- }
- }
- }
- None
- }
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
- /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
- /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
- /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- },
- _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
- };
- res
- } else {
- Vec::new()
- }
- }
-
- fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
- for tx in txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 {
- // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
- let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
- let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- funding_info.clone()
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
- txn = remote_txn;
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- if txn.is_empty() {
- let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- txn = local_txn;
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- }
- }
- if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
- if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
- spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
- }
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
- if let Some(tx) = tx {
- txn.push(tx);
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
- }
- }
- }
- for tx in txn.iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
- for inp in &tx.input {
- if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
- return outpoint != inp.previous_output
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- for tx in txs {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- for tx in txs {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- for claim in pending_claims {
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
- }
- }
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
- },
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
- log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
- },
- }
- }
- }
- //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
- if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
- //We may discard:
- //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
- }
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- }
-
- pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
- // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
- // broadcast if we go on-chain.
- // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
- // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
- // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
- // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
- // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
- for ref htlc in $htlcs {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
- // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
- }
-
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
- /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
-
- 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
- let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
-
- macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
- log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
- } else {
- log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
- ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
- if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
- if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
- payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
- for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
- if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$local_tx {
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest local commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous local commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "remote commitment tx", false);
- }
-
- // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
- // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
- if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else {
- log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- htlc_updated
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Storage::Local {
- revocation_base_key,
- htlc_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
- shutdown_pubkey,
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
- latest_per_commitment_point,
- funding_info,
- current_remote_commitment_txid,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid,
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
- let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
-
- let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
- for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
- *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
- *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_local_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
- Ok(tx) => tx,
- Err(e) => match e {
- encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- },
- };
-
- if tx.input.is_empty() {
- // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
-
- let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
- let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- LocalSignedTx {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => true,
- 1 => false,
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::Revoked {
- script,
- pubkey,
- key,
- is_htlc,
- amount
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
- script,
- key,
- preimage,
- amount
- }
- },
- 2 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
- script,
- sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
- preimage,
- amount
- }
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
- }
-
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::Claim {
- outpoint
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- events.push(ev);
- }
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
- }
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- key_storage,
- their_htlc_base_key,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay,
-
- old_secrets,
- remote_claimable_outpoints,
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- remote_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_remote_commitment_number,
-
- payment_preimages,
-
- destination_script,
- to_remote_rescue,
-
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
-
- last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx,
- logger,
- }))
- }
-
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
- use std::sync::Arc;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
- // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
- let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
- let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- macro_rules! test_secrets {
- () => {
- let mut idx = 281474976710655;
- for secret in secrets.iter() {
- assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
- idx -= 1;
- }
- assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
- assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
- };
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- macro_rules! dummy_keys {
- () => {
- {
- TxCreationKeys {
- per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
- revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-
- let mut preimages = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- for _ in 0..20 {
- let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- preimages.push((preimage, hash));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: true,
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 0,
- payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
- }
- res
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
- ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
- for preimage in $preimages_slice {
- assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
- // old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
-
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
- for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
- }
-
- // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
- let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
-
- // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
-
- // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
- // previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
-
- // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
- // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
- // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
- let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
- };
- let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
- if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
- } else {
- $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
- }
- $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
- }
- }
-
- let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
-
- // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
- }
-
- // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! A bunch of useful utilities for building networks of nodes and exchanging messages between
-//! nodes for functional tests.
-
-use chain::chaininterface;
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
-use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::router::{Route, Router};
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler, LocalFeatures};
-use util::test_utils;
-use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
-use util::errors::APIError;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::config::UserConfig;
-
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-
-use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
-
-use std::cell::RefCell;
-use std::rc::Rc;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-use std::mem;
-
-pub const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 100;
-pub fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
- assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
- for i in 2..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
- }
-}
-
-pub fn connect_blocks(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, depth: u32, height: u32, parent: bool, prev_blockhash: Sha256d) -> Sha256d {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000000, prev_blockhash: if parent { prev_blockhash } else { Default::default() }, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, height + 1, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- for i in 2..depth + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, height + i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- }
- header.bitcoin_hash()
-}
-
-pub struct Node {
- pub chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
- pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
- pub chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
- pub keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
- pub node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
- pub router: Router,
- pub node_seed: [u8; 32],
- pub network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
- pub network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
-}
-impl Drop for Node {
- fn drop(&mut self) {
- if !::std::thread::panicking() {
- // Check that we processed all pending events
- assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001, a_flags, b_flags)
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
- let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
- (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
- ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- (match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
- (*msg).clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }, match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- updates.commitment_signed.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- })
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_event_msg {
- ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
- (*msg).clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
- ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
- (*updates).clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
- {
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub fn create_funding_transaction(node: &Node, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u64) -> ([u8; 32], Transaction, OutPoint) {
- let chan_id = *node.network_chan_count.borrow();
-
- let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, expected_chan_value);
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, expected_user_chan_id);
-
- let tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
- }]};
- let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
- (*temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_outpoint)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> Transaction {
- node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
- node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
-
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, channel_value, 42);
-
- {
- node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- tx
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_recv: &Node, node_conf: &Node, tx: &Transaction) {
- confirm_transaction(&node_conf.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- node_recv.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_conf.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_conf, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_recv: &Node, node_conf: &Node) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
- let channel_id;
- let events_6 = node_conf.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
- ((match events_6[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }, match events_6[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }), channel_id)
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_a, node_b, tx);
- confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_b, node_a)
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
- let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
- (msgs, chan_id, tx)
-}
-
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
- node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
- let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
-
- let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
- let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- (msg, update_msg)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
- let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
- let as_update = match events_8[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- assert!(*announcement == *msg);
- assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
- assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
- update_msg
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
-
- ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
-}
-
-pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001, a_flags, b_flags)
-}
-
-pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64, a_flags: LocalFeatures, b_flags: LocalFeatures) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat, a_flags, b_flags);
- for node in nodes {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
- }
- (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
-}
-
-macro_rules! check_spends {
- ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
- {
- $tx.verify(|out_point| {
- if out_point.txid == $spends_tx.txid() {
- $spends_tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
- } else {
- None
- }
- }).unwrap();
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
- ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
- (match events[events.len() - 1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }, if events.len() == 2 {
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
- Some(msg.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { None })
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! check_closed_broadcast {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }}
-}
-
-pub fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
- let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
- let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
- let (tx_a, tx_b);
-
- node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
- node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
-
- let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
- let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- None
- } else {
- Some(match events_1[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- })
- };
-
- node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
- let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
- assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
-
- node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(none_b.is_none());
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- (as_update, bs_update)
- } else {
- let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
-
- node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
-
- node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(none_a.is_none());
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- (as_update, bs_update)
- };
- assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
- check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
-
- (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
-}
-
-pub struct SendEvent {
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- pub msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
- pub commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
-}
-impl SendEvent {
- pub fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
- }
-
- pub fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
- match event {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
- let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
- ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
- {
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
- commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
- }
- };
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
- {
- let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
- assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
- $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
- let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert!(events.len() <= 2);
- (match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- (*msg).clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
- };
- check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
- if $fail_backwards {
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- }
- (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
- }
- };
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
- {
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
- let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
- assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
- bs_revoke_and_ack
- }
- };
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
- {
- let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
- $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
- extra_msg_option
- }
- };
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
- {
- assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
- }
- };
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
- {
- commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
- if $fail_backwards {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node_a);
- check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
-
- let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
- assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- } else {
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
- ($node: expr) => {
- {
- let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
- *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- }}
-}
-
-macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
- ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! expect_payment_sent {
- ($node: expr, $expected_payment_preimage: expr) => {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!($expected_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub fn send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
- let mut payment_event = {
- origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
-
- let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- let mut prev_node = origin_node;
-
- for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
-
- node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
-
- if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
- }
-}
-
-pub fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
- send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value, our_payment_hash);
- (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
-}
-
-pub fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
-
- let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
- let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
- macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
- ($node: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
- {
- $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
- assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
- {
- $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
- let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
- get_next_msgs!($node)
- } else {
- assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- None
- };
- commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
- next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
- for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
- if next_msgs.is_some() {
- mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
- } else if update_next_msgs {
- next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
- } else {
- assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- }
- if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
- }
-
- if !skip_last {
- last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
- expect_payment_sent!(origin_node, our_payment_preimage);
- }
-}
-
-pub fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
- claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
-}
-
-pub const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
-
-pub fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
- let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
- for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
- assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
-}
-
-pub fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
- let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
- for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
- assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
-
- let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- };
-}
-
-pub fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
- let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
- claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
-}
-
-pub fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(expected_route.last().unwrap());
- check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
-
- let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
- macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
- {
- $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
- if skip_last && $last_node {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
- let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
- for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- if next_msgs.is_some() {
- // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
- // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
- // second-to-last node!
- update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
- }
-
- let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- assert!(events.is_empty());
- }
- if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
- }
-
- if !skip_last {
- update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
-
- let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
- fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
-}
-
-pub fn create_network(node_count: usize, node_config: &[Option<UserConfig>]) -> Vec<Node> {
- let mut nodes = Vec::new();
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-
- let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
- let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
-
- for i in 0..node_count {
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
- let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
- let mut seed = [0; 32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
- let mut default_config = UserConfig::new();
- default_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- default_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { default_config }).unwrap();
- let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
- nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
- network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
- network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
- });
- }
-
- nodes
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
-/// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
-///
-/// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
-/// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
-/// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
-///
-/// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
-/// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
-///
-/// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
-/// also fail.
-pub fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
-
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
- check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
- if commitment_tx.is_none() {
- res.push(tx.clone());
- }
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
- res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
- }
-
- assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
-
- if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
- check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
- if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
- assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
- } else {
- assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
- }
- res.push(tx.clone());
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
- if res.len() == 3 {
- assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
- }
- }
-
- assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
- res
-}
-
-/// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
-/// HTLC transaction.
-pub fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
- check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
-}
-
-pub fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-
- assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- let mut found_prev = false;
-
- for tx in prev_txn {
- if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
- assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
- assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
-
- found_prev = true;
- break;
- }
- }
- assert!(found_prev);
-
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
- res
-}
-
-pub fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
- let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- let as_update = match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- for node in nodes {
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
- ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_value_stat()
- }}
-}
-
-macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
- ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
- for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- res.push(msg.clone());
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected event")
- }
- }
- res
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
- ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
- {
- let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let mut idx = 0;
- let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
- idx += 1;
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
-
- let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
- let mut commitment_update = None;
- let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
- idx += 1;
- match ev {
- &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
- },
- &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
- };
-
- if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
- match ev {
- &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
- revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
- },
- &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
- commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-
- (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
-/// for claims/fails they are separated out.
-pub fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
- node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
- node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
-
- if send_funding_locked.0 {
- // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
- // from b
- for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
- assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
- }
- }
- if send_funding_locked.1 {
- // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
- // from a
- for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
- assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
- }
- }
- if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
- // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
- // next_local_commitment_number to 1
- for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
- assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
- }
- for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
- assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
- }
- }
-
- let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_1 {
- node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
- }
- if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- } else {
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
- }
-
- let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_2 {
- node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
- }
- if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- } else {
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
- }
-
- // We don't yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
- assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
- (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
-
- for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
- if send_funding_locked.0 {
- node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
- assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
- }
- if pending_raa.0 {
- assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
- }
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
- } else {
- assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- }
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
- }
-
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
- }
- }
-
- for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
- if send_funding_locked.1 {
- node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
- assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
- }
- if pending_raa.1 {
- assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
- }
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
- }
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
- }
-
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
-//! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
-//! claim outputs on-chain.
-
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor, KeysManager};
-use chain::keysinterface;
-use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
-use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, LocalFeatures, ErrorAction};
-use util::test_utils;
-use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
-use util::errors::APIError;
-use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
-use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
-use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-
-use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
-use std::default::Default;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-use std::mem;
-
-use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
-
-use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
-
-#[test]
-fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
- // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
- // funding satoshis
- let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
- let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
- let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
-
- // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
-
- // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
- let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
- // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
- let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
- match nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone())) {
- Err(msgs::HandleError{ err: error_str, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) => {
- assert_eq!(error_str, expected_error_str, "unexpected HandleError string (expected `{}`, actual `{}`)", expected_error_str, error_str)
- },
- Err(msgs::HandleError{..}) => {panic!("unexpected HandleError action")},
- _ => panic!("insane OpenChannel message was somehow Ok"),
- }
- };
-
- use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
- use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
-
- // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
- insane_open_helper("funding value > 2^24", |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("push_msat larger than funding value", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("Minimum htlc value is full channel value", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
-
- insane_open_helper("max_accpted_htlcs > 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- // balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
-
- // A B
- // update_fee ->
- // send (1) commitment_signed -.
- // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
- // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
- // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
- // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
- // (2) RAA is delivered ->
- // .- send (4) commitment_signed
- // <- (3) RAA is delivered
- // send (5) commitment_signed -.
- // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
- // send (6) RAA -.
- // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
- // <- RAA
- // (6) RAA is delivered ->
-
- // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let payment_event = {
- let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
- };
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
- // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- // deliver(1), generate (3):
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
- let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
- assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
- assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
- assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
- assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
- let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
- assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
- assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
- assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
- assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
- let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
- let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
- // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
- // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- // balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
-
- // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
- update_fee.as_ref()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let payment_event = {
- let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
- };
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
- // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
- let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- // A B
- // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
- // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
- // update_fee (never committed) ->
- // (3) update_fee ->
- // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
- // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
- // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
- // <- (1) RAA delivered
- // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
- // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
- // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
- // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
- // revoke_and_ack ->
- // B should send no response here
- // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
- // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
- // revoke_and_ack ->
-
- // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
- let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
- // transaction:
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
- let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
- feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
-
- update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
- // Deliver (3)
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
-
- // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
- let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
- assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
- assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
-
- // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Delever (4)
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
- let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let channel_value = 1888;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- let feerate = 260;
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
-
- //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
- //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
- {
- let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
-
- //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
- let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
- let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
- actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
- assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
- } //drop the mutex
-
- //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
- //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
- //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
- //Should produce and error.
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
-
- assert!(match err.err {
- "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
- _ => false,
- });
-
- //clear the message we could not handle
- nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- // balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
-
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
-
- // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- // node[1] has nothing to do
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
-
- let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
-
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
- close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let channel_id = chan.2;
-
- // A B
- // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
- // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
- // .- send (3) commitment_signed
- // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
- // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
- // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
- // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
- // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
- // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
- // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
- // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
- // revoke_and_ack ->
-
- // Create and deliver (1)...
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
-
- // Generate (2) and (3):
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Deliver (2):
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- // Create and deliver (4)...
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
- let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // ... creating (5)
- let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
-
- // Handle (3), creating (6):
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
-
- // Deliver (5):
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- // Deliver (6), creating (7):
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
- let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Deliver (7)
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
- assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
- close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
- // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
-
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
-
- let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
- // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
-
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
- else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
- else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
- // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
- let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
-
- let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
- let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- (*msg).clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- match msg_events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-}
-
-fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
- // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
- // messages delivered prior to disconnect
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
-
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
- let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- if recv_count > 0 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- if recv_count > 1 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
- }
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
- let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
- let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
- let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
- node_0_2nd_shutdown
- } else {
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
- get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- if recv_count > 0 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- if recv_count == 0 {
- // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
- let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
- let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
- let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
- } else {
- // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
- // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
- // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
- // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
- // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
- // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
- // transaction.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
- nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
- let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
- assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
- } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
-
- // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
- // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
- // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
- do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
- do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
- do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn fake_network_test() {
- // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
- // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
- let nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Send some more payments
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
-
- // Test failure packets
- let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
-
- // Add a new channel that skips 3
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 1000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
- });
- hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
-
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 1000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
- });
- hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
-
- // Claim the rebalances...
- fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Send some payments across both channels
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
-
- //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
-
- // Close down the channels...
- close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
- close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
- // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
- // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
- // commitment dance rounds.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let mut payments = Vec::new();
- for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
- payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
- }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
- // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
- // another HTLC.
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
-
- // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
- // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update).unwrap();
- }
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
-
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
- for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
- match event {
- &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
-
- for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
- }
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
- // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
- // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
- let mut nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
-
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
-
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
- fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
-}
-
-fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
- use ln::msgs::HandleError;
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
- let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
-
- let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
- let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
-
- macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
- ($recv_value: expr) => {{
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
- }}
- };
-
- macro_rules! expect_forward {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
- payment_event
- }}
- }
-
- let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
- let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
-
- let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
-
- // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- {
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
- assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- }
- }
-
- let mut htlc_id = 0;
- // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
- // nodes[0]'s wealth
- loop {
- let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
- if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
- break;
- }
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
- htlc_id += 1;
-
- let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
- get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
- get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
- get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
- get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
- );
-
- assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
- assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
- assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
- assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
- stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
- }
-
- {
- let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
- // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- }
- }
-
- // adding pending output
- let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
- let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
-
- let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
- let payment_event_1 = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
-
- // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
- let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
- {
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
- match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- }
- }
-
- {
- // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
-
- // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
- let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
- session_key
- }).expect("RNG is bad!");
-
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
- let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: chan_1.2,
- htlc_id,
- amount_msat: htlc_msat,
- payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
- onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
- };
-
- if test_recv {
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
- }
- // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- // split the rest to test holding cell
- let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
- let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
- {
- let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
- assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
- }
-
- // now see if they go through on both sides
- let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
- // but this will stuck in the holding cell
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
-
- // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
- {
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
- match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- }
- }
-
- let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
- // this will also stuck in the holding cell
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // flush the pending htlc
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
-
- // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
- assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
-
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
-
- let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
- let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
- assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
- assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
-
- let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
- assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn channel_reserve_test() {
- do_channel_reserve_test(false);
- do_channel_reserve_test(true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
- // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
- // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
- // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
- // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
- // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
- // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
- // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
- // To test this we:
- // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
- // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
- // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
- // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
- // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
- // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
- // * deliver the first fulfill from B
- // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
- // claim,
- // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
- // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
- // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
- // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
- // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
- // Route the first two HTLCs.
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
- let (payment_preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
-
- // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
- let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let send_1 = {
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
-
- // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
- // initial fulfill/CS.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
- // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
- // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
- // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
- // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
- // on-chain as necessary).
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 100000);
-
- // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
- // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
- // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
- let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
- let send_2 = {
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, 10000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
- // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
- // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
- let nodes = create_network(5, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- macro_rules! claim_funds {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
- {
- assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
- check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
-
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
- }
- }
-
- // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
- // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
-
- // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
-
- check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
- }
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
- // One pending HTLC to time out:
- let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
- // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
- // buffer space).
-
- {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
-
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
-
- // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
-
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
-
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
-
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
-
- check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_justice_tx() {
- // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
-
- let mut alice_config = UserConfig::new();
- alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
- let mut bob_config = UserConfig::new();
- bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
- // Create some new channels:
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
- // Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
-
- {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn.swap_remove(0);
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
-
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-
- // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
- // Create some new channels:
- let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
- // Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
- {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn.swap_remove(0);
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn revoked_output_claim() {
- // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
- // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
- // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
- // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
-
- // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
- // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some new channel:
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
-
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
- check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- //Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- {
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
-
- let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
-
- // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
- // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
- // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
-
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- //Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- {
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
-
- for i in 12..22 {
- if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
- }
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
-
- fn get_txout(out_point: &BitcoinOutPoint, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<TxOut> {
- if out_point.txid == tx.txid() {
- tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
- } else {
- None
- }
- }
- node_txn[0].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
- node_txn[1].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
- node_txn[2].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
-
- let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
- let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
- // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
- // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
- // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
- // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
- // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
- // commitment transaction was broadcast.
- // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
- // towards B.
- // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
- // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
- // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
- // PaymentSent event).
-
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
- let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
-
- // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
- // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
- let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 4 (2*2 * HTLC-Success tx)
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
-
- // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
- ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
- // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
- let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx.clone());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
- if $htlc_offered {
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- } else {
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- }
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], $chan_tx.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(node_txn[3].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert!(node_txn[4].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_ne!(node_txn[3].lock_time, 0);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].lock_time, 0);
- node_txn.clear();
- } }
- }
- // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
- // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
- // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
- check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
-
- // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
- // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
- let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
- assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
- // we already checked the same situation with A.
-
- // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let mut first_claimed = false;
- for event in events {
- match event {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage {
- assert!(!first_claimed);
- first_claimed = true;
- } else {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
- // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
- // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
- // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
- // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
- // \ \
- // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
-
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some intial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
-
- let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
-
- // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
- let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
-
- // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
- // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
- let timeout_tx;
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
- node_txn.clear();
- }
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
-
- // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
- let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
- // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
- // and fail backward accordingly.
-
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- // Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
-
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
- // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
- // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
- // commitment transaction anymore.
- // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
- // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
- // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
- // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
- // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
- // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
- // transactions:
- // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
- // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
- // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
- // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
- // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
- // Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
-
- let value = if use_dust {
- // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
- // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
- nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
- } else { 3000000 };
-
- let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
- let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
- let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
- // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
- // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
- // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
-
- if deliver_bs_raa {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
- // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
- // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
- }
-
- let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- if !deliver_bs_raa {
- match events[1] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
- match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- if deliver_bs_raa {
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
- // that we should update our routing table for.
- assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
- for event in events {
- match event {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[2] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
- assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
- assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
- // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
- // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
- // registering new transactions
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
- // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
- // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
- // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
-
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- let tx = {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
- // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
- // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- node_txn.remove(0)
- };
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
-
- // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
- {
- let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), 0)).unwrap()
- .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
- }
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_unconf_chan() {
- // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
- mem::drop(channel_state);
-
- let mut headers = Vec::new();
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- for _i in 2..100 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- }
- let mut height = 99;
- while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
- height -= 1;
- }
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
- // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
- fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
-
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
-}
-
-fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
- // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- if messages_delivered == 0 {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
- } else {
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- }
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- let payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
-
- if messages_delivered < 2 {
- // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
- } else {
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if messages_delivered >= 3 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- if messages_delivered >= 4 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- if messages_delivered >= 5 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- if messages_delivered >= 6 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if messages_delivered < 3 {
- // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
- // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
- // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
- } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
- // Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
-
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- if messages_delivered >= 1 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
-
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- if messages_delivered >= 2 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- if messages_delivered >= 3 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- if messages_delivered >= 4 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- if messages_delivered >= 5 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if messages_delivered < 2 {
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
- //if messages_delivered < 1 {
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- //}
- } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
- } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
- // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
- // Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- // Channel should still work fine...
- let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
- // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
- match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events_2[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
- // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
- // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
- // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
-
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
-
- assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
- let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
- //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
- let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
-
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
-
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
-
- let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
-
- let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
-
- let mut chan_announcement;
-
- macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
- () => {
- msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! sign_msg {
- ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
- let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
- chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
- node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
- bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
- bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
- contents: $unsigned_msg
- }
- }
- }
-
- let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
-
- // Configured with Network::Testnet
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
-
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
-
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
-
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let config = UserConfig::new();
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: config,
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
-
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
- let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
- }
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
-
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
-
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
-
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
- // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
- let mut nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
-
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
- // nodes[3])
- let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
- for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
- let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
- node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
- }
-
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
- let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
- for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
- let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(read.is_empty());
- node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
- }
-
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
- }).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
-
- { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
- let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
- }
-
- for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
-
- // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- //... and we can even still claim the payment!
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
-
- nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
- assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
-}
-
-macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
- ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let mut txn = Vec::new();
- for event in events {
- match event {
- Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
- for outp in outputs {
- match *outp {
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp],
- };
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
- let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp],
- };
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp.clone()],
- };
- let secret = {
- match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
- Ok(master_key) => {
- match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
- }
- }
- Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
- }
- };
- let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
- let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- }
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
- txn
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
- // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
- // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
-
- // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
- check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
- // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
- // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
- // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
- // channel.
- // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
- // gets broadcast.
-
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
-
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
-
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
-
- let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
- assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
- assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
-
- // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
- {
- let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
- check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
- check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
- b_txn.clear();
- }
- let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match msg_events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
- let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
- check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
- check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
-
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
- // Topology : A --> B --> C
- // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
-
- let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let htlc_timeout_tx;
- { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
- htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
- }
-
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
- let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
- },
- _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- }
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
- }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
- }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
- let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
-}
-
-fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
- // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
- // unrevoked commitment transaction.
- // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
- // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
- // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
- // use the same payment hashes.
- // Thus, we use a six-node network:
- //
- // A \ / E
- // - C - D -
- // B / \ F
- // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
- let nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance and check output sanity...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
-
- let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
- // 0th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 1st HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // 2nd HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 3rd HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 4th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_3) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- // 5th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_4) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // 6th HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_3);
- // 7th HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_4);
-
- // 8th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_5) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- // 9th HTLC:
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
-
- // 10th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_6) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 11th HTLC:
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_6);
-
- // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
- // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
- // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 8);
-
- // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
- // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
-
- let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
-
- // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
- assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
- assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
-
- let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let ds_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
- let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]).unwrap();
- if deliver_last_raa {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
- }
-
- // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
- // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
- // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
- // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
- //
- // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
- // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
- // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
- //
- // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
- // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
- let ds_last_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- if announce_latest {
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- } else {
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- }
- connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
-
- let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
- let mut a_done = false;
- for msg in cs_msgs {
- match msg {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
- // should be failed-backwards here.
- let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
- // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
- for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
- assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
- }
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
- assert!(!a_done);
- a_done = true;
- &nodes[0]
- } else {
- // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
- for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
- assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
- }
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
- &nodes[1]
- };
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- if announce_latest {
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
- }
- }
- commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-
- let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
- let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
- for event in as_events.iter() {
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
- assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
- if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
- } else {
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- }
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
- if announce_latest {
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
- }
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
-
- let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
- let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
- for event in bs_events.iter() {
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
- assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
- if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
- } else {
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- }
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
- if announce_latest {
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
- }
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
-
- // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
- // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due
- // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
- // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2
- // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates.
- let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
- let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
- for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) {
- match event {
- &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
- // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
- // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
- let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
-}
-
-fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
-
- // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
- // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
- // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
- // to "time out" the HTLC.
-
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
- // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
- // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
- // actually revoked.
- let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- if check_revoke_no_close {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
-
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- if !check_revoke_no_close {
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- } else {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
-// There are only a few cases to test here:
-// * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
-// broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
-// * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
-// * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
-// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
-// non-dust HTLCs.
-// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
-// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
-// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
-#[test]
-fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
- do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
- do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
-
- do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
- do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
-}
-
-fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
- where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
- F2: FnMut(),
-{
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
-}
-
-// test_case
-// 0: node1 fails backward
-// 1: final node fails backward
-// 2: payment completed but the user rejects the payment
-// 3: final node fails backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
-// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returning fail_htlc
-// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returning fail_htlc
-fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
- where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
- F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
- F3: FnMut(),
-{
-
- // reset block height
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
- nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
-
- macro_rules! expect_event {
- ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- $event_type { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
- $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- }}
- }
-
- // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // temper update_add (0 => 1)
- let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
- callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
- callback_node();
- }
- // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let update_1_0 = match test_case {
- 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
- let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
- update_1_0
- },
- 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- // forwarding on 1
- if test_case != 200 {
- callback_node();
- }
- expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
-
- let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
- let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
- callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
- }
-
- // 1 => 2
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
- expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
- expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
- callback_node();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- }
-
- let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
- check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
- }
- assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
-
- let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 200 {
- callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
- }
-
- // 2 => 1
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true);
-
- // backward fail on 1
- let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
- update_1_0
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- };
-
- // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
- if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
- let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 100 {
- callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
- }
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
- } else {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- };
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
- assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
- } else {
- panic!("Uexpected event");
- }
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
- match update {
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
- panic!("channel_update not found!");
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
- assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
- assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected message event");
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
- assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
- assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected message event");
- }
- },
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
- }
- } else {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
- }
-}
-
-impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
- use secp256k1::Signature;
- msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
- contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: Sha256dHash::hash(&vec![0u8][..]),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- timestamp: 0,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- excess_data: vec![],
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_onion_failure() {
- use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
- use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
- use secp256k1;
-
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap());
- }
- let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new()), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new())];
- let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // positve case
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
-
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
-
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-
- // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
- // receiving simulated fail messages
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- // trigger error
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- // and tamper returning error message
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
-
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- // and tamper returning error message
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
-
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
-
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
-
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
-
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
- // short_channel_id from the processing node
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
- // short_channel_id from the processing node
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-
- let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
- bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
- run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
-
- let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
- let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
- let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
- bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
- run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
-
- //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
- //invalid channel_update cases.
- run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
- msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
- }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
-
- run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
- }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
- match f {
- &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
- forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- }, true, Some(18), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
- match f {
- &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
- forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- }, true, Some(19), None);
-
- run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
- run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let mut route = route.clone();
- let height = 1;
- route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
- }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
-}
-
-#[test]
-#[should_panic]
-fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- //Force duplicate channel ids
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
- }
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
- let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
-
- //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
- let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
- let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
- let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
- // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
- assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
- let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
- assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
-}
-
-// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
-// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
-//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
- //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- route.hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
-
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
- //It is enforced when constructing a route.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
-
- if let Err(APIError::RouteError{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Channel CLTV overflowed?!");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
-
- for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100000);
- }
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
-
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let channel_value = 100000;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], max_in_flight+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
-
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
-}
-
-// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
- {
- let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
- htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat();
- }
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat;
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 5000000-their_channel_reserve, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 5000000-their_channel_reserve+1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
- let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
- session_key
- }).expect("RNG is bad!");
-
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
-
- let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: chan.2,
- htlc_id: 0,
- amount_msat: 1000,
- payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
- onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
- };
-
- for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
- msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- }
- msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
- //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
- //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
- // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
- // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- //Disconnect and Reconnect
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- //Resend HTLC
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote skipped HTLC ID");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
- channel_id: chan.2,
- htlc_id: 0,
- payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
- };
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
- channel_id: chan.2,
- htlc_id: 0,
- reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
- };
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
- channel_id: chan.2,
- htlc_id: 0,
- sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
- failure_code: 0x8000,
- };
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
-
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
-
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- };
-
- update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
-
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- };
-
- update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
-
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
-
- let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- };
- update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
- let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
- // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
-
- let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- //First hop
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
- //Second Hop
- payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
-
- let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
- match events_3[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0).unwrap();
-
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
-
- //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
- match events_4[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-}
-
-fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
- // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
- // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
- // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
-
- // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
- let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
- assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
- let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
- // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- if announce_latest {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- } else {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- }
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let mut first_failed = false;
- for event in events {
- match event {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
- assert!(!first_failed);
- first_failed = true;
- } else {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
- }
- }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
- do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
- do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
- // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
- // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
-
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Rebalance a bit
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
-
- let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
-
- // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
- let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
-
- // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: 10000,
- };
-
- let dummy_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp]
- };
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
- // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2);
-}
-
-fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
- // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
- // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
- // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
- // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
- // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
- // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
-
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
-
- let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
- let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
- if revoked {
- let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
- }
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
- if local {
- // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
- let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
- let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
- let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
- let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- if !revoked {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
- // commitment tx
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let first;
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
- else { first = false; }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
- if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
- else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
- do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
- do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
- do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- // BOLT 2 : Option upfront shutdown script, if peer commit its closing_script at channel opening
- // enforce it at shutdown message
-
- let mut config = UserConfig::new();
- config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = false;
- let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, Some(config), None]);
-
- // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it changes at closing, we refuse to sign
- let flags = LocalFeatures::new();
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
- // Test we enforce upfront_scriptpbukey if by providing a diffrent one at closing that we disconnect peer
- if let Err(error) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {
- if let Some(error) = error.action {
- match error {
- ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.data,"Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey");
- },
- _ => { assert!(false); }
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it doesn't change at closing, we sign
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it oesn't change at closing, we sign
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
- else { assert!(false) }
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // We test that if case of peer non-signaling we don't enforce committed script at channel opening
- let mut flags_no = LocalFeatures::new();
- flags_no.unset_upfront_shutdown_script();
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags_no, flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- node_1_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown) {}
- else { assert!(false) }
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
- // channel smoothly, opt-out is from channel initiator here
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 0, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
- else { assert!(false) }
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- //// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
- //// channel smoothly
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
- else { assert!(false) }
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
- // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
-
- let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
- low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
- let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
- high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
- let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None]);
-
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
- let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), 10, 20));
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
- match error {
- APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { assert!(false) }
-
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
- let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
- match error {
- ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
-
- // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
- let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel) {
- if let Some(error) = error.action {
- match error {
- ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.data,"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
- },
- _ => { assert!(false); }
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- } else { assert!(false); }
-
- // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
- nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
- let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &high_their_to_self_config) {
- match error {
- ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_data_loss_protect() {
- // We want to be sure that :
- // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
- // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
- // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to remote my_current_per_commitment_point
- let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-
- // Cache node A state before any channel update
- let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut previous_chan_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut previous_chan_monitor_state).unwrap();
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- // Restore node A from previous state
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0)));
- let chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
- let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
- let monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &chan_monitor);
- let node_state_0 = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- keys_manager: Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger), 42, 21)),
- fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
- monitor: monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
- logger: Arc::clone(&logger),
- tx_broadcaster,
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors
- }).unwrap().1;
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(node_state_0);
- monitor.add_update_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_monitor.clone()).is_ok();
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = monitor;
- nodes[0].chain_monitor = chain_monitor;
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- // Check we update monitor following learning of per_commitment_point from B
- if let Err(err) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]) {
- if let Some(error) = err.action {
- match error {
- ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- {
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
- }
-
- let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
- for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
- } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected event")
- }
- }
-
- // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
- if let Err(err) = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]) {
- if let Some(error) = err.action {
- match error {
- ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- assert_eq!(msg.data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
- }
- } else { assert!(false); }
- } else { assert!(false); }
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 1);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! High level lightning structs and impls live here.
-//!
-//! You probably want to create a channelmanager::ChannelManager, and a router::Router first.
-//! Then, you probably want to pass them both on to a peer_handler::PeerManager and use that to
-//! create/manage connections and call get_and_clear_pending_events after each action, handling
-//! them appropriately.
-//!
-//! When you want to open/close a channel or send a payment, call into your ChannelManager and when
-//! you want to learn things about the network topology (eg get a route for sending a payment),
-//! call into your Router.
-
-pub mod channelmanager;
-pub mod channelmonitor;
-pub mod msgs;
-pub mod router;
-pub mod peer_handler;
-
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-pub mod peer_channel_encryptor;
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub(crate) mod peer_channel_encryptor;
-
-mod channel;
-mod chan_utils;
-mod onion_utils;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-#[macro_use] mod functional_test_utils;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod functional_tests;
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod chanmon_update_fail_tests;
+++ /dev/null
-//! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
-//!
-//! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
-//! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
-//! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
-//! ChannelMessageHandler yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
-//! daemons/servers.
-//!
-//! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
-//! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
-//! source node_id of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
-//! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
-//! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
-//! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
-//! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
-//! track the network on the less-secure system.
-
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-use secp256k1::Signature;
-use secp256k1;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-
-use std::error::Error;
-use std::{cmp, fmt};
-use std::io::Read;
-use std::result::Result;
-
-use util::events;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-
-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-
-/// An error in decoding a message or struct.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub enum DecodeError {
- /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
- /// Includes unknown realm byte in an OnionHopData packet
- UnknownVersion,
- /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message
- UnknownRequiredFeature,
- /// Value was invalid, eg a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
- /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, etc
- InvalidValue,
- /// Buffer too short
- ShortRead,
- /// node_announcement included more than one address of a given type!
- ExtraAddressesPerType,
- /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly
- BadLengthDescriptor,
- /// Error from std::io
- Io(::std::io::Error),
-}
-
-/// Tracks localfeatures which are only in init messages
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct LocalFeatures {
- flags: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl LocalFeatures {
- /// Create a blank LocalFeatures flags (visibility extended for fuzz tests)
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- pub(crate) fn new() -> LocalFeatures {
- LocalFeatures {
- flags: vec![2 | 1 << 5],
- }
- }
- #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- pub fn new() -> LocalFeatures {
- LocalFeatures {
- flags: vec![2 | 1 << 5],
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn supports_data_loss_protect(&self) -> bool {
- self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & 3) != 0
- }
- pub(crate) fn initial_routing_sync(&self) -> bool {
- self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & (1 << 3)) != 0
- }
- pub(crate) fn set_initial_routing_sync(&mut self) {
- if self.flags.len() == 0 {
- self.flags.resize(1, 1 << 3);
- } else {
- self.flags[0] |= 1 << 3;
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn supports_upfront_shutdown_script(&self) -> bool {
- self.flags.len() > 0 && (self.flags[0] & (3 << 4)) != 0
- }
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn unset_upfront_shutdown_script(&mut self) {
- self.flags[0] ^= 1 << 5;
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn requires_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
- self.flags.iter().enumerate().any(|(idx, &byte)| {
- ( idx != 0 && (byte & 0x55) != 0 ) || ( idx == 0 && (byte & 0x14) != 0 )
- })
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn supports_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
- self.flags.iter().enumerate().any(|(idx, &byte)| {
- ( idx != 0 && byte != 0 ) || ( idx == 0 && (byte & 0xc4) != 0 )
- })
- }
-}
-
-/// Tracks globalfeatures which are in init messages and routing announcements
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
-pub struct GlobalFeatures {
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- flags: Vec<u8>,
- // Used to test encoding of diverse msgs
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub flags: Vec<u8>
-}
-
-impl GlobalFeatures {
- pub(crate) fn new() -> GlobalFeatures {
- GlobalFeatures {
- flags: Vec::new(),
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn requires_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
- for &byte in self.flags.iter() {
- if (byte & 0x55) != 0 {
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn supports_unknown_bits(&self) -> bool {
- for &byte in self.flags.iter() {
- if byte != 0 {
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
- }
-}
-
-/// An init message to be sent or received from a peer
-pub struct Init {
- pub(crate) global_features: GlobalFeatures,
- pub(crate) local_features: LocalFeatures,
-}
-
-/// An error message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ErrorMessage {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) data: String,
-}
-
-/// A ping message to be sent or received from a peer
-pub struct Ping {
- pub(crate) ponglen: u16,
- pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
-}
-
-/// A pong message to be sent or received from a peer
-pub struct Pong {
- pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
-}
-
-/// An open_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct OpenChannel {
- pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) funding_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) push_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
- pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
- pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) channel_flags: u8,
- pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
-}
-
-/// An accept_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct AcceptChannel {
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) minimum_depth: u32,
- pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
- pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>
-}
-
-/// A funding_created message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct FundingCreated {
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) funding_txid: Sha256dHash,
- pub(crate) funding_output_index: u16,
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
-}
-
-/// A funding_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct FundingSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
-}
-
-/// A funding_locked message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct FundingLocked {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
-}
-
-/// A shutdown message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct Shutdown {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) scriptpubkey: Script,
-}
-
-/// A closing_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ClosingSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) fee_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
-}
-
-/// An update_add_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) amount_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(crate) cltv_expiry: u32,
- pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
-}
-
-/// An update_fulfill_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
-}
-
-/// An update_fail_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
-}
-
-/// An update_fail_malformed_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) failure_code: u16,
-}
-
-/// A commitment_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct CommitmentSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
-}
-
-/// A revoke_and_ack message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct RevokeAndACK {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
-}
-
-/// An update_fee message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub struct UpdateFee {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct DataLossProtect {
- pub(crate) your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
-}
-
-/// A channel_reestablish message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelReestablish {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) next_local_commitment_number: u64,
- pub(crate) next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
- pub(crate) data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
-}
-
-/// An announcement_signatures message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(crate) node_signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature: Signature,
-}
-
-/// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
-pub enum NetAddress {
- /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
- IPv4 {
- /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
- addr: [u8; 4],
- /// The port on which the node is listening
- port: u16,
- },
- /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
- IPv6 {
- /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
- addr: [u8; 16],
- /// The port on which the node is listening
- port: u16,
- },
- /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
- OnionV2 {
- /// The bytes (usually encoded in base32 with ".onion" appended)
- addr: [u8; 10],
- /// The port on which the node is listening
- port: u16,
- },
- /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
- /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate ed25519_pubkey, checksum, and version,
- /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
- OnionV3 {
- /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
- ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
- /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
- checksum: u16,
- /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
- version: u8,
- /// The port on which the node is listening
- port: u16,
- },
-}
-impl NetAddress {
- fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
- match self {
- &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
- &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
- &NetAddress::OnionV2 {..} => { 3 },
- &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
- }
- }
-
- /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
- fn len(&self) -> u16 {
- match self {
- &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
- &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
- &NetAddress::OnionV2 { .. } => { 12 },
- &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for NetAddress {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- addr.write(writer)?;
- port.write(writer)?;
- },
- &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- addr.write(writer)?;
- port.write(writer)?;
- },
- &NetAddress::OnionV2 { ref addr, ref port } => {
- 3u8.write(writer)?;
- addr.write(writer)?;
- port.write(writer)?;
- },
- &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
- 4u8.write(writer)?;
- ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
- checksum.write(writer)?;
- version.write(writer)?;
- port.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
- let byte = <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
- match byte {
- 1 => {
- Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
- addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
- port: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }))
- },
- 2 => {
- Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
- addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
- port: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }))
- },
- 3 => {
- Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2 {
- addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
- port: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }))
- },
- 4 => {
- Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
- ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
- checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
- version: Readable::read(reader)?,
- port: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }))
- },
- _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
- }
- }
-}
-
-// Only exposed as broadcast of node_announcement should be filtered by node_id
-/// The unsigned part of a node_announcement
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) features: GlobalFeatures,
- pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
- /// The node_id this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the node_announcement back
- /// to this node).
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) rgb: [u8; 3],
- pub(crate) alias: [u8; 32],
- /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable. Note that you may only have up to one
- /// address of each type, if you have more, they may be silently discarded or we may panic!
- pub(crate) addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
- pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
-}
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-/// A node_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
-pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
-}
-
-// Only exposed as broadcast of channel_announcement should be filtered by node_id
-/// The unsigned part of a channel_announcement
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) features: GlobalFeatures,
- pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- /// One of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
- pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
- /// The other of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
- pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
-}
-/// A channel_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) node_signature_1: Signature,
- pub(crate) node_signature_2: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub(crate) struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- pub(crate) chain_hash: Sha256dHash,
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
- pub(crate) flags: u16,
- pub(crate) cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) fee_base_msat: u32,
- pub(crate) fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
-}
-/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelUpdate {
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
-}
-
-/// Used to put an error message in a HandleError
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ErrorAction {
- /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
- DisconnectPeer {
- /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
- msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
- },
- /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
- IgnoreError,
- /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
- SendErrorMessage {
- /// The message to send.
- msg: ErrorMessage
- },
-}
-
-/// An Err type for failure to process messages.
-pub struct HandleError { //TODO: rename me
- /// A human-readable message describing the error
- pub err: &'static str,
- /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
- pub action: Option<ErrorAction>, //TODO: Make this required
-}
-
-/// Struct used to return values from revoke_and_ack messages, containing a bunch of commitment
-/// transaction updates if they were pending.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
- /// update_add_htlc messages which should be sent
- pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
- /// update_fulfill_htlc messages which should be sent
- pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
- /// update_fail_htlc messages which should be sent
- pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
- /// update_fail_malformed_htlc messages which should be sent
- pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
- /// An update_fee message which should be sent
- pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
- /// Finally, the commitment_signed message which should be sent
- pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
-}
-
-/// The information we received from a peer along the route of a payment we originated. This is
-/// returned by ChannelMessageHandler::handle_update_fail_htlc to be passed into
-/// RoutingMessageHandler::handle_htlc_fail_channel_update to update our network map.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum HTLCFailChannelUpdate {
- /// We received an error which included a full ChannelUpdate message.
- ChannelUpdateMessage {
- /// The unwrapped message we received
- msg: ChannelUpdate,
- },
- /// We received an error which indicated only that a channel has been closed
- ChannelClosed {
- /// The short_channel_id which has now closed.
- short_channel_id: u64,
- /// when this true, this channel should be permanently removed from the
- /// consideration. Otherwise, this channel can be restored as new channel_update is received
- is_permanent: bool,
- },
- /// We received an error which indicated only that a node has failed
- NodeFailure {
- /// The node_id that has failed.
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// when this true, node should be permanently removed from the
- /// consideration. Otherwise, the channels connected to this node can be
- /// restored as new channel_update is received
- is_permanent: bool,
- }
-}
-
-/// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
-/// As we wish to serialize these differently from Option<T>s (Options get a tag byte, but
-/// OptionalFeild simply gets Present if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
-/// separate enum type for them.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub enum OptionalField<T> {
- /// Optional field is included in message
- Present(T),
- /// Optional field is absent in message
- Absent
-}
-
-/// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
-///
-/// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different their_node_ids, however
-/// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same their_node_id.
-pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : events::MessageSendEventsProvider + Send + Sync {
- //Channel init:
- /// Handle an incoming open_channel message from the given peer.
- fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming accept_channel message from the given peer.
- fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming funding_created message from the given peer.
- fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming funding_signed message from the given peer.
- fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming funding_locked message from the given peer.
- fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- // Channl close:
- /// Handle an incoming shutdown message from the given peer.
- fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming closing_signed message from the given peer.
- fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- // HTLC handling:
- /// Handle an incoming update_add_htlc message from the given peer.
- fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming update_fulfill_htlc message from the given peer.
- fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming update_fail_htlc message from the given peer.
- fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming update_fail_malformed_htlc message from the given peer.
- fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming commitment_signed message from the given peer.
- fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming revoke_and_ack message from the given peer.
- fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- /// Handle an incoming update_fee message from the given peer.
- fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- // Channel-to-announce:
- /// Handle an incoming announcement_signatures message from the given peer.
- fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- // Connection loss/reestablish:
- /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. If no connection
- /// is believed to be possible in the future (eg they're sending us messages we don't
- /// understand or indicate they require unknown feature bits), no_connection_possible is set
- /// and any outstanding channels should be failed.
- fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
-
- /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating channel_reestablish message(s).
- fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
- /// Handle an incoming channel_reestablish message from the given peer.
- fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
-
- // Error:
- /// Handle an incoming error message from the given peer.
- fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
-}
-
-/// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
-pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : Send + Sync {
- /// Handle an incoming node_announcement message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
- /// false or returning an Err otherwise.
- fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
- /// Handle a channel_announcement message, returning true if it should be forwarded on, false
- /// or returning an Err otherwise.
- fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
- /// Handle an incoming channel_update message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
- /// false or returning an Err otherwise.
- fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError>;
- /// Handle some updates to the route graph that we learned due to an outbound failed payment.
- fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &HTLCFailChannelUpdate);
- /// Gets a subset of the channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table
- /// to a remote node, starting at the short_channel_id indicated by starting_point and
- /// including batch_amount entries.
- fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate)>;
- /// Gets a subset of the node announcements required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
- /// starting at the node *after* the provided publickey and including batch_amount entries.
- /// If None is provided for starting_point, we start at the first node.
- fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement>;
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct OnionRealm0HopData {
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
- pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
- // 12 bytes of 0-padding
-}
-
-mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
- // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
- // them from untrusted input):
-
- use super::OnionRealm0HopData;
- pub struct OnionHopData {
- pub(crate) realm: u8,
- pub(crate) data: OnionRealm0HopData,
- pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
- }
-
- pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
- pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
- pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
- }
-}
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
-
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
- pub(crate) version: u8,
- /// In order to ensure we always return an error on Onion decode in compliance with BOLT 4, we
- /// have to deserialize OnionPackets contained in UpdateAddHTLCs even if the ephemeral public
- /// key (here) is bogus, so we hold a Result instead of a PublicKey as we'd like.
- pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
- pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
- pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
-}
-
-impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
- fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
- for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
- if i != j { return false; }
- }
- self.version == other.version &&
- self.public_key == other.public_key &&
- self.hmac == other.hmac
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
- // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
- // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
- pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl Error for DecodeError {
- fn description(&self) -> &str {
- match *self {
- DecodeError::UnknownVersion => "Unknown realm byte in Onion packet",
- DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => "Unknown required feature preventing decode",
- DecodeError::InvalidValue => "Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as",
- DecodeError::ShortRead => "Packet extended beyond the provided bytes",
- DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => "More than one address of a single type",
- DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => "A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly",
- DecodeError::Io(ref e) => e.description(),
- }
- }
-}
-impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- f.write_str(self.description())
- }
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for HandleError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- f.write_str(self.err)
- }
-}
-
-impl From<::std::io::Error> for DecodeError {
- fn from(e: ::std::io::Error) -> Self {
- if e.kind() == ::std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
- DecodeError::ShortRead
- } else {
- DecodeError::Io(e)
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match *self {
- OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
- // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
- script.write(w)?;
- },
- OptionalField::Absent => {}
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OptionalField<Script> {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r) {
- Ok(len) => {
- let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
- r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
- },
- Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
- Err(e) => Err(e)
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(AcceptChannel, {
- {AcceptChannel{ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(ref script), .. }, 270 + 2 + script.len()},
- {_, 270}
- }, {
- temporary_channel_id,
- dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay,
- max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint,
- payment_basepoint,
- delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(AnnouncementSignatures, 32+8+64*2, {
- channel_id,
- short_channel_id,
- node_signature,
- bitcoin_signature
-});
-
-impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(if let OptionalField::Present(..) = self.data_loss_protect { 32+2*8+33+32 } else { 32+2*8 });
- self.channel_id.write(w)?;
- self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
- self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
- match self.data_loss_protect {
- OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
- (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
- (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
- },
- OptionalField::Absent => {}
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for ChannelReestablish{
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
- next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
- next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
- data_loss_protect: {
- match <[u8; 32] as Readable<R>>::read(r) {
- Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
- OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
- your_last_per_commitment_secret,
- my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
- }),
- Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
- Err(e) => return Err(e)
- }
- }
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(ClosingSigned, 32+8+64, {
- channel_id,
- fee_satoshis,
- signature
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(CommitmentSigned, {
- { CommitmentSigned { ref htlc_signatures, .. }, 32+64+2+htlc_signatures.len()*64 }
- }, {
- channel_id,
- signature,
- htlc_signatures
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
- { DecodedOnionErrorPacket { ref failuremsg, ref pad, .. }, 32 + 4 + failuremsg.len() + pad.len() }
- }, {
- hmac,
- failuremsg,
- pad
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(FundingCreated, 32+32+2+64, {
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid,
- funding_output_index,
- signature
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(FundingSigned, 32+64, {
- channel_id,
- signature
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(FundingLocked, 32+33, {
- channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(GlobalFeatures, {
- { GlobalFeatures { ref flags }, flags.len() + 2 }
- }, {
- flags
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(LocalFeatures, {
- { LocalFeatures { ref flags }, flags.len() + 2 }
- }, {
- flags
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(Init, {
- { Init { ref global_features, ref local_features }, global_features.flags.len() + local_features.flags.len() + 4 }
- }, {
- global_features,
- local_features
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(OpenChannel, {
- { OpenChannel { shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(ref script), .. }, 319 + 2 + script.len() },
- { _, 319 }
- }, {
- chain_hash,
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_satoshis,
- push_msat,
- dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat,
- feerate_per_kw,
- to_self_delay,
- max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint,
- payment_basepoint,
- delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- channel_flags,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(RevokeAndACK, 32+32+33, {
- channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(Shutdown, {
- { Shutdown { ref scriptpubkey, .. }, 32 + 2 + scriptpubkey.len() }
- }, {
- channel_id,
- scriptpubkey
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
- { UpdateFailHTLC { ref reason, .. }, 32 + 10 + reason.data.len() }
- }, {
- channel_id,
- htlc_id,
- reason
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, 32+8+32+2, {
- channel_id,
- htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion,
- failure_code
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(UpdateFee, 32+4, {
- channel_id,
- feerate_per_kw
-});
-
-impl_writeable!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, 32+8+32, {
- channel_id,
- htlc_id,
- payment_preimage
-});
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(OnionErrorPacket, {
- { OnionErrorPacket { ref data, .. }, 2 + data.len() }
- }, {
- data
-});
-
-impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(1 + 33 + 20*65 + 32);
- self.version.write(w)?;
- match self.public_key {
- Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
- Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
- }
- w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
- self.hmac.write(w)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionPacket {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(OnionPacket {
- version: Readable::read(r)?,
- public_key: {
- let mut buf = [0u8;33];
- r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
- },
- hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
- hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(UpdateAddHTLC, 32+8+8+32+4+1366, {
- channel_id,
- htlc_id,
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet
-});
-
-impl Writeable for OnionRealm0HopData {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(32);
- self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
- self.amt_to_forward.write(w)?;
- self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&[0;12])?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionRealm0HopData {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
- amt_to_forward: Readable::read(r)?,
- outgoing_cltv_value: {
- let v: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
- r.read_exact(&mut [0; 12])?;
- v
- }
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(65);
- self.realm.write(w)?;
- self.data.write(w)?;
- self.hmac.write(w)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OnionHopData {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(OnionHopData {
- realm: {
- let r: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
- if r != 0 {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
- r
- },
- data: Readable::read(r)?,
- hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Ping {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(self.byteslen as usize + 4);
- self.ponglen.write(w)?;
- vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Ping {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Ping {
- ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
- byteslen: {
- let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
- r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
- byteslen
- }
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Pong {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(self.byteslen as usize + 2);
- vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Pong {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Pong {
- byteslen: {
- let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
- r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
- byteslen
- }
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(2 + 2*32 + 4*33 + self.features.flags.len() + self.excess_data.len());
- self.features.write(w)?;
- self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
- self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
- self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
- self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
- self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- features: {
- let f: GlobalFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
- if f.requires_unknown_bits() {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
- }
- f
- },
- chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
- node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
- node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
- bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
- bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
- excess_data: {
- let mut excess_data = vec![];
- r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
- excess_data
- },
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
- { ChannelAnnouncement { contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {ref features, ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
- 2 + 2*32 + 4*33 + features.flags.len() + excess_data.len() + 4*64 }
- }, {
- node_signature_1,
- node_signature_2,
- bitcoin_signature_1,
- bitcoin_signature_2,
- contents
-});
-
-impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(64 + self.excess_data.len());
- self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
- self.timestamp.write(w)?;
- self.flags.write(w)?;
- self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
- self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
- self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
- self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
- timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
- flags: Readable::read(r)?,
- cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
- htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
- fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
- fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
- excess_data: {
- let mut excess_data = vec![];
- r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
- excess_data
- },
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(ChannelUpdate, {
- { ChannelUpdate { contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
- 64 + excess_data.len() + 64 }
- }, {
- signature,
- contents
-});
-
-impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(32 + 2 + self.data.len());
- self.channel_id.write(w)?;
- (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for ErrorMessage {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
- data: {
- let mut sz: usize = <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? as usize;
- let mut data = vec![];
- let data_len = r.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
- sz = cmp::min(data_len, sz);
- match String::from_utf8(data[..sz as usize].to_vec()) {
- Ok(s) => s,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(64 + 76 + self.features.flags.len() + self.addresses.len()*38 + self.excess_address_data.len() + self.excess_data.len());
- self.features.write(w)?;
- self.timestamp.write(w)?;
- self.node_id.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
- self.alias.write(w)?;
-
- let mut addrs_to_encode = self.addresses.clone();
- addrs_to_encode.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| { a.get_id().cmp(&b.get_id()) });
- addrs_to_encode.dedup_by(|a, b| { a.get_id() == b.get_id() });
- let mut addr_len = 0;
- for addr in &addrs_to_encode {
- addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
- }
- (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- for addr in addrs_to_encode {
- addr.write(w)?;
- }
- w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
- w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let features: GlobalFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
- if features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
- }
- let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let node_id: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut rgb = [0; 3];
- r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
- let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
-
- let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::with_capacity(4);
- let mut addr_readpos = 0;
- let mut excess = false;
- let mut excess_byte = 0;
- loop {
- if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
- match Readable::read(r) {
- Ok(Ok(addr)) => {
- match addr {
- NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => {
- if addresses.len() > 0 {
- return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
- }
- },
- NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => {
- if addresses.len() > 1 || (addresses.len() == 1 && addresses[0].get_id() != 1) {
- return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
- }
- },
- NetAddress::OnionV2 { .. } => {
- if addresses.len() > 2 || (addresses.len() > 0 && addresses.last().unwrap().get_id() > 2) {
- return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
- }
- },
- NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => {
- if addresses.len() > 3 || (addresses.len() > 0 && addresses.last().unwrap().get_id() > 3) {
- return Err(DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType);
- }
- },
- }
- if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
- return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
- }
- addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
- addresses.push(addr);
- },
- Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
- excess = true;
- excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
- break;
- },
- Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
- Err(e) => return Err(e),
- }
- }
-
- let mut excess_data = vec![];
- let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
- let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
- r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
- if excess {
- excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
- }
- excess_address_data
- } else {
- if excess {
- excess_data.push(excess_byte);
- }
- Vec::new()
- };
- r.read_to_end(&mut excess_data)?;
- Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features,
- timestamp,
- node_id,
- rgb,
- alias,
- addresses,
- excess_address_data,
- excess_data,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_len_match!(NodeAnnouncement, {
- { NodeAnnouncement { contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { ref features, ref addresses, ref excess_address_data, ref excess_data, ..}, .. },
- 64 + 76 + features.flags.len() + addresses.len()*38 + excess_address_data.len() + excess_data.len() }
- }, {
- signature,
- contents
-});
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use hex;
- use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::{GlobalFeatures, LocalFeatures, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket};
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use util::ser::Writeable;
-
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
- use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
- let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
- next_local_commitment_number: 3,
- next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
- data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
- };
-
- let encoded_value = cr.encode();
- assert_eq!(
- encoded_value,
- vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
- );
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
- let public_key = {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
- };
-
- let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
- next_local_commitment_number: 3,
- next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
- data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
- };
-
- let encoded_value = cr.encode();
- assert_eq!(
- encoded_value,
- vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
- );
- }
-
- macro_rules! get_keys_from {
- ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
- {
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
- (privkey, pubkey)
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! get_sig_on {
- ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
- {
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
- $ctx.sign(&sighash, &$privkey)
- }
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
- let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
- short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
- node_signature: sig_1,
- bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
- };
-
- let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, excess_data: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let mut features = GlobalFeatures::new();
- if unknown_features_bits {
- features.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
- }
- let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features,
- chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
- short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
- node_id_1: pubkey_1,
- node_id_2: pubkey_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: pubkey_3,
- bitcoin_key_2: pubkey_4,
- excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
- };
- let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: sig_1,
- node_signature_2: sig_2,
- bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
- bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
- contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
- };
- let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
- if unknown_features_bits {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
- }
- if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
- if excess_data {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false, false);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false, false);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true, false);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true, true);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true, true);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false, true);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true, false);
- do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false, true);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let mut features = GlobalFeatures::new();
- if unknown_features_bits {
- features.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
- }
- let mut addresses = Vec::new();
- if ipv4 {
- addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
- addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
- port: 9735
- });
- }
- if ipv6 {
- addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
- addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
- port: 9735
- });
- }
- if onionv2 {
- addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2 {
- addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246],
- port: 9735
- });
- }
- if onionv3 {
- addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
- ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
- checksum: 32,
- version: 16,
- port: 9735
- });
- }
- let mut addr_len = 0;
- for addr in &addresses {
- addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
- }
- let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features,
- timestamp: 20190119,
- node_id: pubkey_1,
- rgb: [32; 3],
- alias: [16;32],
- addresses,
- excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
- excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
- };
- addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
- let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: sig_1,
- contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
- };
- let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- if unknown_features_bits {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
- target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
- if ipv4 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
- }
- if ipv6 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
- }
- if onionv2 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
- }
- if onionv3 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
- }
- if excess_address_data {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
- }
- if excess_data {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_node_announcement() {
- do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, true, false);
- do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_channel_update(non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, direction: bool, disable: bool, htlc_maximum_msat: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
- short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
- timestamp: 20190119,
- flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 } | if htlc_maximum_msat { 1 << 8 } else { 0 },
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: if htlc_maximum_msat { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
- };
- let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- signature: sig_1,
- contents: unsigned_channel_update
- };
- let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
- if htlc_maximum_msat {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- if direction {
- let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
- *flag = 1;
- }
- if disable {
- let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
- *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
- if htlc_maximum_msat {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_channel_update() {
- do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false, false);
- do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false, false);
- do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true, false);
- do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false, true);
- do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true, true);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_open_channel(non_bitcoin_chain_hash: bool, random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
- let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash: if !non_bitcoin_chain_hash { Sha256dHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap() } else { Sha256dHash::from_hex("000000000933ea01ad0ee984209779baaec3ced90fa3f408719526f8d77f4943").unwrap() },
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
- funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
- push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
- dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
- feerate_per_kw: 821716,
- to_self_delay: 49340,
- max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
- funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
- revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
- payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
- htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
- first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
- channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent }
- };
- let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
- let mut target_value = Vec::new();
- if non_bitcoin_chain_hash {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("43497fd7f826957108f4a30fd9cec3aeba79972084e90ead01ea330900000000").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
- }
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- if random_bit {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
- }
- if shutdown {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_open_channel() {
- do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
- do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
- do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
- do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
- do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
- let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
- let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
- dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
- minimum_depth: 821716,
- to_self_delay: 49340,
- max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
- funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
- revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
- payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
- htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
- first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent }
- };
- let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
- if shutdown {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_accept_channel() {
- do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
- do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_funding_created() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
- funding_txid: Sha256dHash::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
- funding_output_index: 255,
- signature: sig_1,
- };
- let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_funding_signed() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- signature: sig_1,
- };
- let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_funding_locked() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let funding_locked = msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
- };
- let encoded_value = funding_locked.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
- let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- scriptpubkey: if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() } else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
- };
- let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
- if script_type == 1 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
- } else if script_type == 2 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
- } else if script_type == 3 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
- } else if script_type == 4 {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_shutdown() {
- do_encoding_shutdown(1);
- do_encoding_shutdown(2);
- do_encoding_shutdown(3);
- do_encoding_shutdown(4);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_closing_signed() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
- signature: sig_1,
- };
- let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 255,
- public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
- hop_data: [1; 20*65],
- hmac: [2; 32]
- };
- let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
- amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- cltv_expiry: 821716,
- onion_routing_packet
- };
- let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
- let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
- payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
- };
- let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
- let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
- data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
- };
- let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
- reason
- };
- let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
- let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
- sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
- failure_code: 255
- };
- let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
- let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
- let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
- let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- signature: sig_1,
- htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
- };
- let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
- let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
- if htlcs {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
- do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
- do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
- let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
- next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
- };
- let encoded_value = raa.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_update_fee() {
- let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
- };
- let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- fn do_encoding_init(unknown_global_bits: bool, initial_routing_sync: bool) {
- let mut global = GlobalFeatures::new();
- if unknown_global_bits {
- global.flags = vec![0xFF, 0xFF];
- }
- let mut local = LocalFeatures::new();
- if initial_routing_sync {
- local.set_initial_routing_sync();
- }
- let init = msgs::Init {
- global_features: global,
- local_features: local,
- };
- let encoded_value = init.encode();
- let mut target_value = Vec::new();
- if unknown_global_bits {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
- }
- if initial_routing_sync {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00012a").unwrap());
- } else {
- target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
- }
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_init() {
- do_encoding_init(false, false);
- do_encoding_init(true, false);
- do_encoding_init(false, true);
- do_encoding_init(true, true);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_error() {
- let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
- data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
- };
- let encoded_value = error.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_ping() {
- let ping = msgs::Ping {
- ponglen: 64,
- byteslen: 64
- };
- let encoded_value = ping.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn encoding_pong() {
- let pong = msgs::Pong {
- byteslen: 64
- };
- let encoded_value = pong.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
- assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, HTLCSource};
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
-use util::byte_utils;
-use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
-use util::errors::{self, APIError};
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
-use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
-
-use std::io::Cursor;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-pub(super) struct OnionKeys {
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) shared_secret: SharedSecret,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
- pub(super) ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
- pub(super) rho: [u8; 32],
- pub(super) mu: [u8; 32],
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(super) fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- ({
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
- },
- {
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
- })
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(super) fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
- assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(super) fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
- assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
-}
-
-// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
-#[inline]
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
- let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
-
- for hop in route.hops.iter() {
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
-
- blinded_priv.mul_assign(&blinding_factor)?;
- blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
-
- callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
- }
-
- Ok(())
-}
-
-// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
-
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
- let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
-
- res.push(OnionKeys {
- #[cfg(test)]
- shared_secret,
- #[cfg(test)]
- blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
- ephemeral_pubkey,
- rho,
- mu,
- });
- })?;
-
- Ok(res)
-}
-
-/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
-pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
- let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
- let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
- let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
- let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
-
- for hop in route.hops.iter().rev() {
- // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
- // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
- // the intended recipient).
- let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
- let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
- res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
- amt_to_forward: value_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- });
- cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
- if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
- }
- cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
- if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
- }
- last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
- }
- Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
-}
-
-#[inline]
-fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
- for i in (65..20*65).rev() {
- arr[i] = arr[i-65];
- }
- for i in 0..65 {
- arr[i] = 0;
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
- assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
-
- for i in 0..dst.len() {
- dst[i] ^= src[i];
- }
-}
-
-const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
- let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
- buf.resize(21*65, 0);
-
- let filler = {
- let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
- let end_len = iters * 65;
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
- res.resize(end_len, 0);
-
- for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
- if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
- xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
- }
- res
- };
-
- let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
-
- for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
- shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
- payload.hmac = hmac_res;
- packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
- packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
-
- if i == 0 {
- packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
- }
-
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
- hmac.input(&packet_data);
- hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
- hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
- }
-
- msgs::OnionPacket{
- version: 0,
- public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
- hop_data: packet_data,
- hmac: hmac_res,
- }
-}
-
-/// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
-/// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
-pub(super) fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
- packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
- msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- data: packet_crypted,
- }
-}
-
-pub(super) fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
- assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
-
- let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let failuremsg = {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
- res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
- res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
- res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
- res
- };
- let pad = {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
- res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
- res
- };
- let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
- hmac: [0; 32],
- failuremsg: failuremsg,
- pad: pad,
- };
-
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
- hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
- packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
-
- packet
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(super) fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- let failure_packet = build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
- encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
-}
-
-/// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
-/// OutboundRoute).
-/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, and the error code.
-pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &Arc<Logger>, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
- if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
- let mut res = None;
- let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
- let mut error_code_ret = None;
- let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
- let mut is_from_final_node = false;
-
- // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
- next_route_hop_ix += 1;
- if res.is_some() { return; }
-
- let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
- htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
-
- let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
-
- let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
- decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
- packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
-
- is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
-
- if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
- let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
- hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
-
- if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
- if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
-
- let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
- error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
-
- let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
-
- // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
- // update Route object
- let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
- 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
- _ => false,
- } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
- || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
-
- let mut fail_channel_update = None;
-
- if error_code & NODE == NODE {
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
- }
- else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
- fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- })};
- }
- else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
- if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
- let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
- if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
- if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
- // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
- // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
- let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
- 7 => false,
- 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- 12 => {
- let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
- new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
- }
- 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
- 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
- _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
- };
- fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
- // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
- // to the node in question corrupted something.
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- })
- } else {
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- })
- };
- }
- }
- }
- if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
- // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
- // trying to relay through them anymore.
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- }
- } else if !payment_failed {
- // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
- // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
- // really not worth trying any further.
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- }
-
- // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
- // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
- // to decode the onion.
- res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
-
- let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
- if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
- log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
- }
- else {
- let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
- log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
- }
- } else {
- // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
- // definitely came from the peer in question
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), !is_from_final_node));
- }
- }
- }
- }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
- (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
- } else {
- // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
- // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
- (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
- }
- } else { unreachable!(); }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
- use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
- use ln::msgs;
- use util::ser::Writeable;
-
- use hex;
-
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-
- use super::OnionKeys;
-
- fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
- // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-
- let route = Route {
- hops: vec!(
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- ),
- };
-
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
- onion_keys
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn onion_vectors() {
- // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
- let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
-
- // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
- let payloads = vec!(
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: 0,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- );
-
- let packet = super::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
- // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
- // anyway...
- assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
- // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
-
- let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
- let onion_error = super::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
- assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_1 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_2 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_3 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_4 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_5 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use ln::msgs::HandleError;
-use ln::msgs;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine, Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
-
-use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
-use util::byte_utils;
-
-// Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
-const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
-// Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
-const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
-
-pub enum NextNoiseStep {
- ActOne,
- ActTwo,
- ActThree,
- NoiseComplete,
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum NoiseStep {
- PreActOne,
- PostActOne,
- PostActTwo,
- // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
-}
-
-struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
- h: [u8; 32],
- ck: [u8; 32],
-}
-enum DirectionalNoiseState {
- Outbound {
- ie: SecretKey,
- },
- Inbound {
- ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
- re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
- temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
- }
-}
-enum NoiseState {
- InProgress {
- state: NoiseStep,
- directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
- bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
- },
- Finished {
- sk: [u8; 32],
- sn: u64,
- sck: [u8; 32],
- rk: [u8; 32],
- rn: u64,
- rck: [u8; 32],
- }
-}
-
-pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
- their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
-
- noise_state: NoiseState,
-}
-
-impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
- pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&NOISE_H);
- sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
- let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- PeerChannelEncryptor {
- their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
- noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
- state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
- directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
- ie: ephemeral_key,
- },
- bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
- h: h,
- ck: NOISE_CK,
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- pub fn new_inbound(our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&NOISE_H);
- let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
- sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
- let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- PeerChannelEncryptor {
- their_node_id: None,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
- noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
- state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
- directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
- ie: None,
- re: None,
- temp_k2: None,
- },
- bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
- h: h,
- ck: NOISE_CK,
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
- let mut nonce = [0; 12];
- nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
- let mut tag = [0; 16];
- chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
- res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let mut nonce = [0; 12];
- nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
- if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bad MAC", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
- hmac.input(ikm);
- let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
- hmac.input(&[1; 1]);
- let t1 = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
- hmac.input(&t1);
- hmac.input(&[2; 1]);
- (t1, Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner())
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
- let (t1, t2) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&state.ck, &ss[..]);
- state.ck = t1;
- t2
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
- let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&state.h);
- sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
- state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
- let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
-
- let mut res = [0; 50];
- res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
- PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&state.h);
- sha.input(&res[34..]);
- state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- (res, temp_k)
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn inbound_noise_act(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], our_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), HandleError> {
- assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
-
- if act[0] != 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown handshake version number", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
- }
-
- let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Invalid public key", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })}),
- Ok(key) => key,
- };
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&state.h);
- sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
- state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, &our_key);
- let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
-
- let mut dec = [0; 0];
- PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&state.h);
- sha.input(&act[34..]);
- state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
- }
-
- pub fn get_act_one(&mut self) -> [u8; 50] {
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
- match directional_state {
- &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
- if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
- panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
- }
-
- let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
- *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
- res
- },
- _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
- },
- _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn process_act_one_with_keys(&mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey) -> Result<[u8; 50], HandleError> {
- assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
-
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
- match directional_state {
- &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
- if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
- panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
- }
-
- let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, &our_node_secret)?;
- ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
-
- re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
-
- let (res, temp_k) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
- *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
- *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
- Ok(res)
- },
- _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
- },
- _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn process_act_two(&mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), HandleError> {
- assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
-
- let final_hkdf;
- let ck;
- let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
- match directional_state {
- &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
- if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
- panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
- }
-
- let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
-
- let mut res = [0; 66];
- let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
-
- PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
- sha.input(&res[1..50]);
- bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let ss = SharedSecret::new(&re, our_node_secret);
- let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
-
- PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
- final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
- ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
- res
- },
- _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
- },
- _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
- };
-
- let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
- self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
- sk: sk,
- sn: 0,
- sck: ck.clone(),
- rk: rk,
- rn: 0,
- rck: ck,
- };
-
- Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
- }
-
- pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, HandleError> {
- assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
-
- let final_hkdf;
- let ck;
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
- match directional_state {
- &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
- if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
- panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
- }
- if act_three[0] != 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown handshake version number", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
- }
-
- let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
- PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
- self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Bad node_id from peer", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })}),
- });
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
- sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
- bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
- let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
-
- PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
- final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
- ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
- },
- _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
- },
- _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
- }
-
- let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
- self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
- sk: sk,
- sn: 0,
- sck: ck.clone(),
- rk: rk,
- rn: 0,
- rck: ck,
- };
-
- Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
- }
-
- /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version
- /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
- pub fn encrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
- if msg.len() > 65535 {
- panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
- }
-
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
- res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
-
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
- if *sn >= 1000 {
- let (new_sck, new_sk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(sck, sk);
- *sck = new_sck;
- *sk = new_sk;
- *sn = 0;
- }
-
- Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &byte_utils::be16_to_array(msg.len() as u16));
- *sn += 1;
-
- Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
- *sn += 1;
- },
- _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
- }
-
- res
- }
-
- /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
- /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
- pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, HandleError> {
- assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
-
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
- if *rn >= 1000 {
- let (new_rck, new_rk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(rck, rk);
- *rck = new_rck;
- *rk = new_rk;
- *rn = 0;
- }
-
- let mut res = [0; 2];
- Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
- *rn += 1;
- Ok(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&res))
- },
- _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
- }
- }
-
- /// Decrypts the given message.
- /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
- pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandleError> {
- if msg.len() > 65535 + 16 {
- panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
- }
-
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
- res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
- Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
- *rn += 1;
-
- Ok(res)
- },
- _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
- match state {
- &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
- &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
- &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
- }
- },
- NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
- }
- }
-
- pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
- match self.noise_state {
- NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
- NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-
- use hex;
-
- use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
-
- fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
- let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one()[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
- outbound_peer
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
- let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- {
- // transport-initiator successful handshake
- let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
-
- let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
-
- match outbound_peer.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
- assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(sn, 0);
- assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rn, 0);
- assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- },
- _ => panic!()
- }
- }
- {
- // transport-initiator act2 short read test
- // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
- }
- {
- // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
- let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
-
- let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
- }
-
- {
- // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
- let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
-
- let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
- }
-
- {
- // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
- let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
-
- let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
- let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- {
- // transport-responder successful handshake
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
- // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
- // from transport-initiator successful handshake
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
-
- match inbound_peer.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
- assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(sn, 0);
- assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rn, 0);
- assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- },
- _ => panic!()
- }
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act1 short read test
- // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act1 bad version test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act3 bad version test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act3 short read test
- // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
- }
- {
- // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
- }
- }
-
-
- #[test]
- fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
- // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
- // here and use them to encrypt.
- let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
-
- {
- let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
-
- match outbound_peer.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
- assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(sn, 0);
- assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rn, 0);
- assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- },
- _ => panic!()
- }
- }
-
- let mut inbound_peer;
-
- {
- // transport-responder successful handshake
- let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
-
- let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
-
- let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
- // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
- // from transport-initiator successful handshake
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
-
- match inbound_peer.noise_state {
- NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
- assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(sn, 0);
- assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(rn, 0);
- assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
- },
- _ => panic!()
- }
- }
-
- for i in 0..1005 {
- let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
- let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
- assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
-
- let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
-
- if i == 0 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
- } else if i == 1 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
- } else if i == 500 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
- } else if i == 501 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
- } else if i == 1000 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
- } else if i == 1001 {
- assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
- }
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Top level peer message handling and socket handling logic lives here.
-//!
-//! Instead of actually servicing sockets ourselves we require that you implement the
-//! SocketDescriptor interface and use that to receive actions which you should perform on the
-//! socket, and call into PeerManager with bytes read from the socket. The PeerManager will then
-//! call into the provided message handlers (probably a ChannelManager and Router) with messages
-//! they should handle, and encoding/sending response messages.
-
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-
-use ln::msgs;
-use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
-use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NextNoiseStep};
-use util::byte_utils;
-use util::events::{MessageSendEvent};
-use util::logger::Logger;
-
-use std::collections::{HashMap,hash_map,HashSet,LinkedList};
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::{cmp,error,hash,fmt};
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256Engine;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{HashEngine, Hash};
-
-/// Provides references to trait impls which handle different types of messages.
-pub struct MessageHandler {
- /// A message handler which handles messages specific to channels. Usually this is just a
- /// ChannelManager object.
- pub chan_handler: Arc<msgs::ChannelMessageHandler>,
- /// A message handler which handles messages updating our knowledge of the network channel
- /// graph. Usually this is just a Router object.
- pub route_handler: Arc<msgs::RoutingMessageHandler>,
-}
-
-/// Provides an object which can be used to send data to and which uniquely identifies a connection
-/// to a remote host. You will need to be able to generate multiple of these which meet Eq and
-/// implement Hash to meet the PeerManager API.
-///
-/// For efficiency, Clone should be relatively cheap for this type.
-///
-/// You probably want to just extend an int and put a file descriptor in a struct and implement
-/// send_data. Note that if you are using a higher-level net library that may close() itself, be
-/// careful to ensure you don't have races whereby you might register a new connection with an fd
-/// the same as a yet-to-be-disconnect_event()-ed.
-pub trait SocketDescriptor : cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + Clone {
- /// Attempts to send some data from the given slice to the peer.
- ///
- /// Returns the amount of data which was sent, possibly 0 if the socket has since disconnected.
- /// Note that in the disconnected case, a disconnect_event must still fire and further write
- /// attempts may occur until that time.
- ///
- /// If the returned size is smaller than data.len(), a write_available event must
- /// trigger the next time more data can be written. Additionally, until the a send_data event
- /// completes fully, no further read_events should trigger on the same peer!
- ///
- /// If a read_event on this descriptor had previously returned true (indicating that read
- /// events should be paused to prevent DoS in the send buffer), resume_read may be set
- /// indicating that read events on this descriptor should resume. A resume_read of false does
- /// *not* imply that further read events should be paused.
- fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], resume_read: bool) -> usize;
- /// Disconnect the socket pointed to by this SocketDescriptor. Once this function returns, no
- /// more calls to write_event, read_event or disconnect_event may be made with this descriptor.
- /// No disconnect_event should be generated as a result of this call, though obviously races
- /// may occur whereby disconnect_socket is called after a call to disconnect_event but prior to
- /// that event completing.
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self);
-}
-
-/// Error for PeerManager errors. If you get one of these, you must disconnect the socket and
-/// generate no further read/write_events for the descriptor, only triggering a single
-/// disconnect_event (unless it was provided in response to a new_*_connection event, in which case
-/// no such disconnect_event must be generated and the socket be silently disconencted).
-pub struct PeerHandleError {
- /// Used to indicate that we probably can't make any future connections to this peer, implying
- /// we should go ahead and force-close any channels we have with it.
- no_connection_possible: bool,
-}
-impl fmt::Debug for PeerHandleError {
- fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
- formatter.write_str("Peer Sent Invalid Data")
- }
-}
-impl fmt::Display for PeerHandleError {
- fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
- formatter.write_str("Peer Sent Invalid Data")
- }
-}
-impl error::Error for PeerHandleError {
- fn description(&self) -> &str {
- "Peer Sent Invalid Data"
- }
-}
-
-enum InitSyncTracker{
- NoSyncRequested,
- ChannelsSyncing(u64),
- NodesSyncing(PublicKey),
-}
-
-struct Peer {
- channel_encryptor: PeerChannelEncryptor,
- outbound: bool,
- their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_global_features: Option<msgs::GlobalFeatures>,
- their_local_features: Option<msgs::LocalFeatures>,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList<Vec<u8>>,
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: usize,
- awaiting_write_event: bool,
-
- pending_read_buffer: Vec<u8>,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: usize,
- pending_read_is_header: bool,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker,
-}
-
-impl Peer {
- /// Returns true if the channel announcements/updates for the given channel should be
- /// forwarded to this peer.
- /// If we are sending our routing table to this peer and we have not yet sent channel
- /// announcements/updates for the given channel_id then we will send it when we get to that
- /// point and we shouldn't send it yet to avoid sending duplicate updates. If we've already
- /// sent the old versions, we should send the update, and so return true here.
- fn should_forward_channel(&self, channel_id: u64)->bool{
- match self.sync_status {
- InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => true,
- InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(i) => i < channel_id,
- InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(_) => true,
- }
- }
-}
-
-struct PeerHolder<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> {
- peers: HashMap<Descriptor, Peer>,
- /// Added to by do_read_event for cases where we pushed a message onto the send buffer but
- /// didn't call do_attempt_write_data to avoid reentrancy. Cleared in process_events()
- peers_needing_send: HashSet<Descriptor>,
- /// Only add to this set when noise completes:
- node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>,
-}
-struct MutPeerHolder<'a, Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + 'a> {
- peers: &'a mut HashMap<Descriptor, Peer>,
- peers_needing_send: &'a mut HashSet<Descriptor>,
- node_id_to_descriptor: &'a mut HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>,
-}
-impl<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> PeerHolder<Descriptor> {
- fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutPeerHolder<Descriptor> {
- MutPeerHolder {
- peers: &mut self.peers,
- peers_needing_send: &mut self.peers_needing_send,
- node_id_to_descriptor: &mut self.node_id_to_descriptor,
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
-fn _check_usize_is_32_or_64() {
- // See below, less than 32 bit pointers may be unsafe here!
- unsafe { mem::transmute::<*const usize, [u8; 4]>(panic!()); }
-}
-
-/// A PeerManager manages a set of peers, described by their SocketDescriptor and marshalls socket
-/// events into messages which it passes on to its MessageHandlers.
-pub struct PeerManager<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> {
- message_handler: MessageHandler,
- peers: Mutex<PeerHolder<Descriptor>>,
- our_node_secret: SecretKey,
- ephemeral_key_midstate: Sha256Engine,
-
- // Usize needs to be at least 32 bits to avoid overflowing both low and high. If usize is 64
- // bits we will never realistically count into high:
- peer_counter_low: AtomicUsize,
- peer_counter_high: AtomicUsize,
-
- initial_syncs_sent: AtomicUsize,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! encode_msg {
- ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {{
- let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- ($msg_code as u16).write(&mut msg).unwrap();
- $msg.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
- msg.0
- }}
-}
-
-//TODO: Really should do something smarter for this
-const INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND: usize = 5;
-
-/// Manages and reacts to connection events. You probably want to use file descriptors as PeerIds.
-/// PeerIds may repeat, but only after disconnect_event() has been called.
-impl<Descriptor: SocketDescriptor> PeerManager<Descriptor> {
- /// Constructs a new PeerManager with the given message handlers and node_id secret key
- /// ephemeral_random_data is used to derive per-connection ephemeral keys and must be
- /// cryptographically secure random bytes.
- pub fn new(message_handler: MessageHandler, our_node_secret: SecretKey, ephemeral_random_data: &[u8; 32], logger: Arc<Logger>) -> PeerManager<Descriptor> {
- let mut ephemeral_key_midstate = Sha256::engine();
- ephemeral_key_midstate.input(ephemeral_random_data);
-
- PeerManager {
- message_handler: message_handler,
- peers: Mutex::new(PeerHolder {
- peers: HashMap::new(),
- peers_needing_send: HashSet::new(),
- node_id_to_descriptor: HashMap::new()
- }),
- our_node_secret: our_node_secret,
- ephemeral_key_midstate,
- peer_counter_low: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- peer_counter_high: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- initial_syncs_sent: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- logger,
- }
- }
-
- /// Get the list of node ids for peers which have completed the initial handshake.
- ///
- /// For outbound connections, this will be the same as the their_node_id parameter passed in to
- /// new_outbound_connection, however entries will only appear once the initial handshake has
- /// completed and we are sure the remote peer has the private key for the given node_id.
- pub fn get_peer_node_ids(&self) -> Vec<PublicKey> {
- let peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- peers.peers.values().filter_map(|p| {
- if !p.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || p.their_global_features.is_none() {
- return None;
- }
- p.their_node_id
- }).collect()
- }
-
- fn get_ephemeral_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
- let mut ephemeral_hash = self.ephemeral_key_midstate.clone();
- let low = self.peer_counter_low.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let high = if low == 0 {
- self.peer_counter_high.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel)
- } else {
- self.peer_counter_high.load(Ordering::Acquire)
- };
- ephemeral_hash.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(low as u64));
- ephemeral_hash.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(high as u64));
- SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(ephemeral_hash).into_inner()).expect("You broke SHA-256!")
- }
-
- /// Indicates a new outbound connection has been established to a node with the given node_id.
- /// Note that if an Err is returned here you MUST NOT call disconnect_event for the new
- /// descriptor but must disconnect the connection immediately.
- ///
- /// Returns a small number of bytes to send to the remote node (currently always 50).
- ///
- /// Panics if descriptor is duplicative with some other descriptor which has not yet has a
- /// disconnect_event.
- pub fn new_outbound_connection(&self, their_node_id: PublicKey, descriptor: Descriptor) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PeerHandleError> {
- let mut peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id.clone(), self.get_ephemeral_key());
- let res = peer_encryptor.get_act_one().to_vec();
- let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
-
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- outbound: true,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_global_features: None,
- their_local_features: None,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer: pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
- }).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(res)
- }
-
- /// Indicates a new inbound connection has been established.
- ///
- /// May refuse the connection by returning an Err, but will never write bytes to the remote end
- /// (outbound connector always speaks first). Note that if an Err is returned here you MUST NOT
- /// call disconnect_event for the new descriptor but must disconnect the connection
- /// immediately.
- ///
- /// Panics if descriptor is duplicative with some other descriptor which has not yet has a
- /// disconnect_event.
- pub fn new_inbound_connection(&self, descriptor: Descriptor) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
- let peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&self.our_node_secret);
- let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
-
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- if peers.peers.insert(descriptor, Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- outbound: false,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_global_features: None,
- their_local_features: None,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer: pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
- }).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn do_attempt_write_data(&self, descriptor: &mut Descriptor, peer: &mut Peer) {
- macro_rules! encode_and_send_msg {
- ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {
- {
- log_trace!(self, "Encoding and sending sync update message of type {} to {}", $msg_code, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!($msg, $msg_code)[..]));
- }
- }
- }
- const MSG_BUFF_SIZE: usize = 10;
- while !peer.awaiting_write_event {
- if peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() < MSG_BUFF_SIZE {
- match peer.sync_status {
- InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested => {},
- InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(c) if c < 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff => {
- let steps = ((MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() + 2) / 3) as u8;
- let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, steps);
- for &(ref announce, ref update_a, ref update_b) in all_messages.iter() {
- encode_and_send_msg!(announce, 256);
- encode_and_send_msg!(update_a, 258);
- encode_and_send_msg!(update_b, 258);
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(announce.contents.short_channel_id + 1);
- }
- if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff);
- }
- },
- InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(c) if c == 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff => {
- let steps = (MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len()) as u8;
- let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, steps);
- for msg in all_messages.iter() {
- encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 256);
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(msg.contents.node_id);
- }
- if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested;
- }
- },
- InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(_) => unreachable!(),
- InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(key) => {
- let steps = (MSG_BUFF_SIZE - peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len()) as u8;
- let all_messages = self.message_handler.route_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&key), steps);
- for msg in all_messages.iter() {
- encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 256);
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NodesSyncing(msg.contents.node_id);
- }
- if all_messages.is_empty() || all_messages.len() != steps as usize {
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested;
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- if {
- let next_buff = match peer.pending_outbound_buffer.front() {
- None => return,
- Some(buff) => buff,
- };
-
- let should_be_reading = peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() < MSG_BUFF_SIZE;
- let pending = &next_buff[peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset..];
- let data_sent = descriptor.send_data(pending, should_be_reading);
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset += data_sent;
- if peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset == next_buff.len() { true } else { false }
- } {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset = 0;
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.pop_front();
- } else {
- peer.awaiting_write_event = true;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Indicates that there is room to write data to the given socket descriptor.
- ///
- /// May return an Err to indicate that the connection should be closed.
- ///
- /// Will most likely call send_data on the descriptor passed in (or the descriptor handed into
- /// new_*\_connection) before returning. Thus, be very careful with reentrancy issues! The
- /// invariants around calling write_event in case a write did not fully complete must still
- /// hold - be ready to call write_event again if a write call generated here isn't sufficient!
- /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a new_\*_connection event.
- pub fn write_event(&self, descriptor: &mut Descriptor) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- match peers.peers.get_mut(descriptor) {
- None => panic!("Descriptor for write_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
- Some(peer) => {
- peer.awaiting_write_event = false;
- self.do_attempt_write_data(descriptor, peer);
- }
- };
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Indicates that data was read from the given socket descriptor.
- ///
- /// May return an Err to indicate that the connection should be closed.
- ///
- /// Will *not* call back into send_data on any descriptors to avoid reentrancy complexity.
- /// Thus, however, you almost certainly want to call process_events() after any read_event to
- /// generate send_data calls to handle responses.
- ///
- /// If Ok(true) is returned, further read_events should not be triggered until a write_event on
- /// this file descriptor has resume_read set (preventing DoS issues in the send buffer).
- ///
- /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a new_*_connection event.
- pub fn read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
- match self.do_read_event(peer_descriptor, data) {
- Ok(res) => Ok(res),
- Err(e) => {
- self.disconnect_event_internal(peer_descriptor, e.no_connection_possible);
- Err(e)
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn do_read_event(&self, peer_descriptor: &mut Descriptor, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<bool, PeerHandleError> {
- let pause_read = {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- let peers = peers_lock.borrow_parts();
- let pause_read = match peers.peers.get_mut(peer_descriptor) {
- None => panic!("Descriptor for read_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
- Some(peer) => {
- assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > 0);
- assert!(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() > peer.pending_read_buffer_pos);
-
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- while read_pos < data.len() {
- {
- let data_to_copy = cmp::min(peer.pending_read_buffer.len() - peer.pending_read_buffer_pos, data.len() - read_pos);
- peer.pending_read_buffer[peer.pending_read_buffer_pos..peer.pending_read_buffer_pos + data_to_copy].copy_from_slice(&data[read_pos..read_pos + data_to_copy]);
- read_pos += data_to_copy;
- peer.pending_read_buffer_pos += data_to_copy;
- }
-
- if peer.pending_read_buffer_pos == peer.pending_read_buffer.len() {
- peer.pending_read_buffer_pos = 0;
-
- macro_rules! encode_and_send_msg {
- ($msg: expr, $msg_code: expr) => {
- {
- log_trace!(self, "Encoding and sending message of type {} to {}", $msg_code, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!($msg, $msg_code)[..]));
- peers.peers_needing_send.insert(peer_descriptor.clone());
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! try_potential_handleerror {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(x) => x,
- Err(e) => {
- if let Some(action) = e.action {
- match action {
- msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: _ } => {
- //TODO: Try to push msg
- log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, disconnecting peer because {}", e.err);
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, ignoring because {}", e.err);
- continue;
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got Err handling message, sending Error message because {}", e.err);
- encode_and_send_msg!(msg, 17);
- continue;
- },
- }
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "Got Err handling message, action not yet filled in: {}", e.err);
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- }
- };
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! try_potential_decodeerror {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(x) => x,
- Err(e) => {
- match e {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => {
- log_debug!(self, "Got a channel/node announcement with an known required feature flag, you may want to update!");
- continue;
- },
- msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue => {
- log_debug!(self, "Got an invalid value while deserializing message");
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- },
- msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => {
- log_debug!(self, "Deserialization failed due to shortness of message");
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- },
- msgs::DecodeError::ExtraAddressesPerType => {
- log_debug!(self, "Error decoding message, ignoring due to lnd spec incompatibility. See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/1407");
- continue;
- },
- msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
- msgs::DecodeError::Io(_) => return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false }),
- }
- }
- };
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! insert_node_id {
- () => {
- match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false })
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Finished noise handshake for connection with {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- entry.insert(peer_descriptor.clone())
- },
- };
- }
- }
-
- let next_step = peer.channel_encryptor.get_noise_step();
- match next_step {
- NextNoiseStep::ActOne => {
- let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key())).to_vec();
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_two);
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 66].to_vec(); // act three is 66 bytes long
- },
- NextNoiseStep::ActTwo => {
- let (act_three, their_node_id) = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_three.to_vec());
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
-
- peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
- insert_node_id!();
- let mut local_features = msgs::LocalFeatures::new();
- if self.initial_syncs_sent.load(Ordering::Acquire) < INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND {
- self.initial_syncs_sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- local_features.set_initial_routing_sync();
- }
- encode_and_send_msg!(msgs::Init {
- global_features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- local_features,
- }, 16);
- },
- NextNoiseStep::ActThree => {
- let their_node_id = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_three(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
- peer.their_node_id = Some(their_node_id);
- insert_node_id!();
- },
- NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete => {
- if peer.pending_read_is_header {
- let msg_len = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_length_header(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- peer.pending_read_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(msg_len as usize + 16);
- peer.pending_read_buffer.resize(msg_len as usize + 16, 0);
- if msg_len < 2 { // Need at least the message type tag
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- peer.pending_read_is_header = false;
- } else {
- let msg_data = try_potential_handleerror!(peer.channel_encryptor.decrypt_message(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..]));
- assert!(msg_data.len() >= 2);
-
- // Reset read buffer
- peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec();
- peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
-
- let msg_type = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&msg_data[0..2]);
- log_trace!(self, "Received message of type {} from {}", msg_type, log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- if msg_type != 16 && peer.their_global_features.is_none() {
- // Need an init message as first message
- log_trace!(self, "Peer {} sent non-Init first message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- }
- let mut reader = ::std::io::Cursor::new(&msg_data[2..]);
- match msg_type {
- // Connection control:
- 16 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Init::read(&mut reader));
- if msg.global_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- log_info!(self, "Peer global features required unknown version bits");
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
- }
- if msg.local_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- log_info!(self, "Peer local features required unknown version bits");
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
- }
- if peer.their_global_features.is_some() {
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: false });
- }
-
- log_info!(self, "Received peer Init message: data_loss_protect: {}, initial_routing_sync: {}, upfront_shutdown_script: {}, unkown local flags: {}, unknown global flags: {}",
- if msg.local_features.supports_data_loss_protect() { "supported" } else { "not supported"},
- if msg.local_features.initial_routing_sync() { "requested" } else { "not requested" },
- if msg.local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { "supported" } else { "not supported"},
- if msg.local_features.supports_unknown_bits() { "present" } else { "none" },
- if msg.global_features.supports_unknown_bits() { "present" } else { "none" });
-
- if msg.local_features.initial_routing_sync() {
- peer.sync_status = InitSyncTracker::ChannelsSyncing(0);
- peers.peers_needing_send.insert(peer_descriptor.clone());
- }
- peer.their_global_features = Some(msg.global_features);
- peer.their_local_features = Some(msg.local_features);
-
- if !peer.outbound {
- let mut local_features = msgs::LocalFeatures::new();
- if self.initial_syncs_sent.load(Ordering::Acquire) < INITIAL_SYNCS_TO_SEND {
- self.initial_syncs_sent.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- local_features.set_initial_routing_sync();
- }
-
- encode_and_send_msg!(msgs::Init {
- global_features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- local_features,
- }, 16);
- }
-
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_connected(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap());
- },
- 17 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ErrorMessage::read(&mut reader));
- let mut data_is_printable = true;
- for b in msg.data.bytes() {
- if b < 32 || b > 126 {
- data_is_printable = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if data_is_printable {
- log_debug!(self, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()), msg.data);
- } else {
- log_debug!(self, "Got Err message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap()));
- }
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg);
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
- }
- },
-
- 18 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Ping::read(&mut reader));
- if msg.ponglen < 65532 {
- let resp = msgs::Pong { byteslen: msg.ponglen };
- encode_and_send_msg!(resp, 19);
- }
- },
- 19 => {
- try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Pong::read(&mut reader));
- },
-
- // Channel control:
- 32 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::OpenChannel::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_open_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_local_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 33 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::AcceptChannel::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_accept_channel(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), peer.their_local_features.clone().unwrap(), &msg));
- },
-
- 34 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingCreated::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_created(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 35 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingSigned::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 36 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::FundingLocked::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_funding_locked(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
-
- 38 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::Shutdown::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_shutdown(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 39 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_closing_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
-
- 128 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_add_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 130 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 131 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 135 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
-
- 132 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::CommitmentSigned::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_commitment_signed(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 133 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::RevokeAndACK::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_revoke_and_ack(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 134 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::UpdateFee::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_update_fee(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 136 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelReestablish::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_channel_reestablish(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
-
- // Routing control:
- 259 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures::read(&mut reader));
- try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_announcement_signatures(&peer.their_node_id.unwrap(), &msg));
- },
- 256 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement::read(&mut reader));
- let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&msg));
-
- if should_forward {
- // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
- }
- },
- 257 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut reader));
- let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_node_announcement(&msg));
-
- if should_forward {
- // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
- }
- },
- 258 => {
- let msg = try_potential_decodeerror!(msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut reader));
- let should_forward = try_potential_handleerror!(self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg));
-
- if should_forward {
- // TODO: forward msg along to all our other peers!
- }
- },
- _ => {
- if (msg_type & 1) == 0 {
- return Err(PeerHandleError{ no_connection_possible: true });
- }
- },
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- self.do_attempt_write_data(peer_descriptor, peer);
-
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.len() > 10 // pause_read
- }
- };
-
- pause_read
- };
-
- Ok(pause_read)
- }
-
- /// Checks for any events generated by our handlers and processes them. Includes sending most
- /// response messages as well as messages generated by calls to handler functions directly (eg
- /// functions like ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forward or send_payment).
- pub fn process_events(&self) {
- {
- // TODO: There are some DoS attacks here where you can flood someone's outbound send
- // buffer by doing things like announcing channels on another node. We should be willing to
- // drop optional-ish messages when send buffers get full!
-
- let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- let peers = peers_lock.borrow_parts();
- for event in events_generated.drain(..) {
- macro_rules! get_peer_for_forwarding {
- ($node_id: expr, $handle_no_such_peer: block) => {
- {
- let descriptor = match peers.node_id_to_descriptor.get($node_id) {
- Some(descriptor) => descriptor.clone(),
- None => {
- $handle_no_such_peer;
- continue;
- },
- };
- match peers.peers.get_mut(&descriptor) {
- Some(peer) => {
- if peer.their_global_features.is_none() {
- $handle_no_such_peer;
- continue;
- }
- (descriptor, peer)
- },
- None => panic!("Inconsistent peers set state!"),
- }
- }
- }
- }
- match event {
- MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Drop the pending channel? (or just let it timeout, but that sucks)
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 33)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Drop the pending channel? (or just let it timeout, but that sucks)
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 32)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id),
- log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
- //they should just throw away this funding transaction
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 34)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
- //they should just throw away this funding transaction
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 35)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendFundingLocked event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 36)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: generate a DiscardFunding event indicating to the wallet that
- //they should just throw away this funding transaction
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 259)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node {} with {} adds, {} fulfills, {} fails for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- update_add_htlcs.len(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
- update_fail_htlcs.len(),
- log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- for msg in update_add_htlcs {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 128)));
- }
- for msg in update_fulfill_htlcs {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 130)));
- }
- for msg in update_fail_htlcs {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 131)));
- }
- for msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 135)));
- }
- if let &Some(ref msg) = update_fee {
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 134)));
- }
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(commitment_signed, 132)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 133)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 39)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 38)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 136)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling BroadcastChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(msg).is_ok() && self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(update_msg).is_ok() {
- let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg, 256);
- let encoded_update_msg = encode_msg!(update_msg, 258);
-
- for (ref descriptor, ref mut peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
- if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_global_features.is_none() ||
- !peer.should_forward_channel(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- continue
- }
- match peer.their_node_id {
- None => continue,
- Some(their_node_id) => {
- if their_node_id == msg.contents.node_id_1 || their_node_id == msg.contents.node_id_2 {
- continue
- }
- }
- }
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_msg[..]));
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_update_msg[..]));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), peer);
- }
- }
- },
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- if self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(msg).is_ok() {
- let encoded_msg = encode_msg!(msg, 258);
-
- for (ref descriptor, ref mut peer) in peers.peers.iter_mut() {
- if !peer.channel_encryptor.is_ready_for_encryption() || peer.their_global_features.is_none() ||
- !peer.should_forward_channel(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- continue
- }
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encoded_msg[..]));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), peer);
- }
- }
- },
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
- self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(update);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, ref action } => {
- if let Some(ref action) = *action {
- match *action {
- msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } => {
- if let Some(mut descriptor) = peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(node_id) {
- peers.peers_needing_send.remove(&descriptor);
- if let Some(mut peer) = peers.peers.remove(&descriptor) {
- if let Some(ref msg) = *msg {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 17)));
- // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
- // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut peer);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with no message", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- }
- }
- descriptor.disconnect_socket();
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, false);
- }
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Handling SendErrorMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- let (mut descriptor, peer) = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id, {
- //TODO: Do whatever we're gonna do for handling dropped messages
- });
- peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg, 17)));
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer);
- },
- }
- } else {
- log_error!(self, "Got no-action HandleError Event in peer_handler for node {}, no such events should ever be generated!", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- for mut descriptor in peers.peers_needing_send.drain() {
- match peers.peers.get_mut(&descriptor) {
- Some(peer) => self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, peer),
- None => panic!("Inconsistent peers set state!"),
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Indicates that the given socket descriptor's connection is now closed.
- ///
- /// This must be called even if a PeerHandleError was given for a read_event or write_event,
- /// but must NOT be called if a PeerHandleError was provided out of a new_\*\_connection event!
- ///
- /// Panics if the descriptor was not previously registered in a successful new_*_connection event.
- pub fn disconnect_event(&self, descriptor: &Descriptor) {
- self.disconnect_event_internal(descriptor, false);
- }
-
- fn disconnect_event_internal(&self, descriptor: &Descriptor, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let mut peers = self.peers.lock().unwrap();
- peers.peers_needing_send.remove(descriptor);
- let peer_option = peers.peers.remove(descriptor);
- match peer_option {
- None => panic!("Descriptor for disconnect_event is not already known to PeerManager"),
- Some(peer) => {
- match peer.their_node_id {
- Some(node_id) => {
- peers.node_id_to_descriptor.remove(&node_id);
- self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id, no_connection_possible);
- },
- None => {}
- }
- }
- };
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor};
- use ln::msgs;
- use util::events;
- use util::test_utils;
- use util::logger::Logger;
-
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-
- use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
-
- use std::sync::{Arc};
-
- #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Hash)]
- struct FileDescriptor {
- fd: u16,
- }
-
- impl SocketDescriptor for FileDescriptor {
- fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
- data.len()
- }
-
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
- }
-
- fn create_network(peer_count: usize) -> Vec<PeerManager<FileDescriptor>> {
- let mut peers = Vec::new();
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let mut ephemeral_bytes = [0; 32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut ephemeral_bytes);
-
- for _ in 0..peer_count {
- let chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
- let router = test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new();
- let node_id = {
- let mut key_slice = [0;32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&key_slice).unwrap()
- };
- let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(chan_handler), route_handler: Arc::new(router) };
- let peer = PeerManager::new(msg_handler, node_id, &ephemeral_bytes, Arc::clone(&logger));
- peers.push(peer);
- }
-
- peers
- }
-
- fn establish_connection(peer_a: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor>, peer_b: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor>) {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peer_b.our_node_secret);
- let fd = FileDescriptor { fd: 1};
- peer_a.new_inbound_connection(fd.clone()).unwrap();
- peer_a.peers.lock().unwrap().node_id_to_descriptor.insert(their_id, fd.clone());
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_disconnect_peer() {
- // Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
- // push a DisconnectPeer event to remove the node flagged by id
- let mut peers = create_network(2);
- establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 1);
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let their_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &peers[1].our_node_secret);
-
- let chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
- chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: their_id,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }),
- });
- assert_eq!(chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- peers[0].message_handler.chan_handler = Arc::new(chan_handler);
-
- peers[0].process_events();
- assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.lock().unwrap().peers.len(), 0);
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! The top-level routing/network map tracking logic lives here.
-//!
-//! You probably want to create a Router and use that as your RoutingMessageHandler and then
-//! interrogate it to get routes for your own payments.
-
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
-use ln::channelmanager;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError,ErrorAction,HandleError,RoutingMessageHandler,NetAddress,GlobalFeatures};
-use ln::msgs;
-use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
-use util::logger::Logger;
-
-use std::cmp;
-use std::sync::{RwLock,Arc};
-use std::collections::{HashMap,BinaryHeap,BTreeMap};
-use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
-use std;
-
-/// A hop in a route
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct RouteHop {
- /// The node_id of the node at this hop.
- pub pubkey: PublicKey,
- /// The channel that should be used from the previous hop to reach this node.
- pub short_channel_id: u64,
- /// The fee taken on this hop. For the last hop, this should be the full value of the payment.
- pub fee_msat: u64,
- /// The CLTV delta added for this hop. For the last hop, this should be the full CLTV value
- /// expected at the destination, in excess of the current block height.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
-}
-
-/// A route from us through the network to a destination
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct Route {
- /// The list of hops, NOT INCLUDING our own, where the last hop is the destination. Thus, this
- /// must always be at least length one. By protocol rules, this may not currently exceed 20 in
- /// length.
- pub hops: Vec<RouteHop>,
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Route {
- fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.hops.len() as u8).write(writer)?;
- for hop in self.hops.iter() {
- hop.pubkey.write(writer)?;
- hop.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- hop.fee_msat.write(writer)?;
- hop.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for Route {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Route, DecodeError> {
- let hops_count: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(hops_count as usize);
- for _ in 0..hops_count {
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- fee_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
- cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
- });
- }
- Ok(Route {
- hops
- })
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: PublicKey,
- last_update: u32,
- enabled: bool,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
- htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- fee_base_msat: u32,
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- last_update_message: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
-}
-
-impl std::fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "src_node_id {}, last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fee_base_msat {}, fee_proportional_millionths {}", log_pubkey!(self.src_node_id), self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fee_base_msat, self.fee_proportional_millionths)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
- src_node_id,
- last_update,
- enabled,
- cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat,
- fee_base_msat,
- fee_proportional_millionths,
- last_update_message
-});
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures,
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo,
- two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo,
- //this is cached here so we can send out it later if required by route_init_sync
- //keep an eye on this to see if the extra memory is a problem
- announcement_message: Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>,
-}
-
-impl std::fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "features: {}, one_to_two: {}, two_to_one: {}", log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), self.one_to_two, self.two_to_one)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
- features,
- one_to_two,
- two_to_one,
- announcement_message
-});
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct NodeInfo {
- #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
- channels: Vec<(u64, Sha256dHash)>,
- #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
- channels: Vec<u64>,
-
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
-
- features: GlobalFeatures,
- last_update: u32,
- rgb: [u8; 3],
- alias: [u8; 32],
- addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
- //this is cached here so we can send out it later if required by route_init_sync
- //keep an eye on this to see if the extra memory is a problem
- announcement_message: Option<msgs::NodeAnnouncement>,
-}
-
-impl std::fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "features: {}, last_update: {}, lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: {}, lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: {}, channels: {:?}", log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), self.last_update, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, &self.channels[..])?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
- chan.write(writer)?;
- }
- self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
- self.features.write(writer)?;
- self.last_update.write(writer)?;
- self.rgb.write(writer)?;
- self.alias.write(writer)?;
- (self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for ref addr in &self.addresses {
- addr.write(writer)?;
- }
- self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for NodeInfo {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
- let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
- for _ in 0..channels_count {
- channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- let lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
- for _ in 0..addresses_count {
- match Readable::read(reader) {
- Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
- Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(NodeInfo {
- channels,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths,
- features,
- last_update,
- rgb,
- alias,
- addresses,
- announcement_message
- })
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct NetworkMap {
- #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
- channels: BTreeMap<(u64, Sha256dHash), ChannelInfo>,
- #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
- channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
-
- our_node_id: PublicKey,
- nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
-}
-
-impl Writeable for NetworkMap {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
- (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
- chan_info.write(writer)?;
- }
- self.our_node_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
- node_id.write(writer)?;
- node_info.write(writer)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for NetworkMap {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkMap, DecodeError> {
- let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
- for _ in 0..channels_count {
- let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
- channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
- }
- let our_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
- for _ in 0..nodes_count {
- let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
- nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
- }
- Ok(NetworkMap {
- channels,
- our_node_id,
- nodes,
- })
- }
-}
-
-struct MutNetworkMap<'a> {
- #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
- channels: &'a mut BTreeMap<(u64, Sha256dHash), ChannelInfo>,
- #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
- channels: &'a mut BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
- nodes: &'a mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
-}
-impl NetworkMap {
- fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutNetworkMap {
- MutNetworkMap {
- channels: &mut self.channels,
- nodes: &mut self.nodes,
- }
- }
-}
-impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkMap {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "Node id {} network map\n[Channels]\n", log_pubkey!(self.our_node_id))?;
- for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", key, val)?;
- }
- write!(f, "[Nodes]\n")?;
- for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl NetworkMap {
- #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
- #[inline]
- fn get_key(short_channel_id: u64, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> (u64, Sha256dHash) {
- (short_channel_id, chain_hash)
- }
-
- #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
- #[inline]
- fn get_key(short_channel_id: u64, _: Sha256dHash) -> u64 {
- short_channel_id
- }
-
- #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")]
- #[inline]
- fn get_short_id(id: &(u64, Sha256dHash)) -> &u64 {
- &id.0
- }
-
- #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))]
- #[inline]
- fn get_short_id(id: &u64) -> &u64 {
- id
- }
-}
-
-/// A channel descriptor which provides a last-hop route to get_route
-pub struct RouteHint {
- /// The node_id of the non-target end of the route
- pub src_node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The short_channel_id of this channel
- pub short_channel_id: u64,
- /// The static msat-denominated fee which must be paid to use this channel
- pub fee_base_msat: u32,
- /// The dynamic proportional fee which must be paid to use this channel, denominated in
- /// millionths of the value being forwarded to the next hop.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// The difference in CLTV values between this node and the next node.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
- /// The minimum value, in msat, which must be relayed to the next hop.
- pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
-}
-
-/// Tracks a view of the network, receiving updates from peers and generating Routes to
-/// payment destinations.
-pub struct Router {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
- network_map: RwLock<NetworkMap>,
- chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-impl Writeable for Router {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
- network.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-/// Arguments for the creation of a Router that are not deserialized.
-/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a Router and resuming normal operation is:
-/// 1) Deserialize the Router by filling in this struct and calling <Router>::read(reaser, args).
-/// 2) Register the new Router with your ChainWatchInterface
-pub struct RouterReadArgs {
- /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the Router in the future.
- ///
- /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
- pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
- /// deserialization.
- pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, RouterReadArgs> for Router {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, args: RouterReadArgs) -> Result<Router, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
- let network_map = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(Router {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
- network_map: RwLock::new(network_map),
- chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
- logger: args.logger,
- })
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
- ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
- match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
- Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node", action: None}),
- }
- };
-}
-
-impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router {
- fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
-
- if msg.contents.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- panic!("Unknown-required-features NodeAnnouncements should never deserialize!");
- }
-
- let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
- match network.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
- None => Err(HandleError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}),
- Some(node) => {
- if node.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- }
-
- node.features = msg.contents.features.clone();
- node.last_update = msg.contents.timestamp;
- node.rgb = msg.contents.rgb;
- node.alias = msg.contents.alias;
- node.addresses = msg.contents.addresses.clone();
-
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty() && !msg.contents.features.supports_unknown_bits();
- node.announcement_message = if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None };
- Ok(should_relay)
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- }
-
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
-
- if msg.contents.features.requires_unknown_bits() {
- panic!("Unknown-required-features ChannelAnnouncements should never deserialize!");
- }
-
- let checked_utxo = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Ok((script_pubkey, _value)) => {
- let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- if script_pubkey != expected_script {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announcement keys didn't match on-chain script", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- }
- //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
- //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
- true
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
- // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
- false
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced on an unknown chain", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- },
- Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- },
- };
-
- let mut network_lock = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
- let network = network_lock.borrow_parts();
-
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && !msg.contents.features.supports_unknown_bits();
-
- let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: false,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(),
- htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(),
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: false,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(),
- htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(),
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
- };
-
- match network.channels.entry(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
- //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
- //exactly how...
- if checked_utxo {
- // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
- // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
- // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
- // do that because
- // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
- // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
- // get reorg'd out.
- // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(network.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
- } else {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})
- }
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(chan_info);
- }
- };
-
- macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
- ( $node_id: expr ) => {
- match network.nodes.entry($node_id) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash));
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 0,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- }
- }
- };
- }
-
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
-
- Ok(should_relay)
- }
-
- fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
- match update {
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
- let _ = self.handle_channel_update(msg);
- },
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
- if *is_permanent {
- if let Some(chan) = network.channels.remove(short_channel_id) {
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut network.nodes, &chan, *short_channel_id);
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(chan) = network.channels.get_mut(short_channel_id) {
- chan.one_to_two.enabled = false;
- chan.two_to_one.enabled = false;
- }
- }
- },
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- if *is_permanent {
- //TODO: Wholly remove the node
- } else {
- self.mark_node_bad(node_id, false);
- }
- },
- }
- }
-
- fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap();
- let dest_node_id;
- let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
- let chan_was_enabled;
-
- match network.channels.get_mut(&NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) {
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}),
- Some(channel) => {
- macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
- ( $target: expr) => {
- if $target.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
- }
- chan_was_enabled = $target.enabled;
- $target.last_update = msg.contents.timestamp;
- $target.enabled = chan_enabled;
- $target.cltv_expiry_delta = msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta;
- $target.htlc_minimum_msat = msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat;
- $target.fee_base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
- $target.fee_proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
- $target.last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
- }
- }
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
- dest_node_id = channel.one_to_two.src_node_id.clone();
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.two_to_one.src_node_id);
- maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one);
- } else {
- dest_node_id = channel.two_to_one.src_node_id.clone();
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.one_to_two.src_node_id);
- maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if chan_enabled {
- let node = network.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
- node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, msg.contents.fee_base_msat);
- node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths);
- } else if chan_was_enabled {
- let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = u32::max_value();
- let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = u32::max_value();
-
- {
- let node = network.nodes.get(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
-
- for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
- let chan = network.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
- if chan.one_to_two.src_node_id == dest_node_id {
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, chan.two_to_one.fee_base_msat);
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, chan.two_to_one.fee_proportional_millionths);
- } else {
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat, chan.one_to_two.fee_base_msat);
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = cmp::min(lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths, chan.one_to_two.fee_proportional_millionths);
- }
- }
- }
-
- //TODO: satisfy the borrow-checker without a double-map-lookup :(
- let mut_node = network.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
- mut_node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat = lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat;
- mut_node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths = lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths;
- }
-
- Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
- }
-
-
- fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate,msgs::ChannelUpdate)> {
- let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
- let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
- let mut iter = network.channels.range(starting_point..);
- while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
- if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
- if chan.announcement_message.is_some() &&
- chan.one_to_two.last_update_message.is_some() &&
- chan.two_to_one.last_update_message.is_some() {
- result.push((chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap(),
- chan.one_to_two.last_update_message.clone().unwrap(),
- chan.two_to_one.last_update_message.clone().unwrap()));
- } else {
- // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
- // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
- }
- } else {
- return result;
- }
- }
- result
- }
-
- fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
- let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
- let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
- let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
- let mut iter = network.nodes.range((*pubkey)..);
- iter.next();
- iter
- } else {
- network.nodes.range(..)
- };
- while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
- if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
- if node.announcement_message.is_some() {
- result.push(node.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
- }
- } else {
- return result;
- }
- }
- result
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Eq, PartialEq)]
-struct RouteGraphNode {
- pubkey: PublicKey,
- lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: u64,
- lowest_fee_to_node: u64,
-}
-
-impl cmp::Ord for RouteGraphNode {
- fn cmp(&self, other: &RouteGraphNode) -> cmp::Ordering {
- other.lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node.cmp(&self.lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node)
- .then_with(|| other.pubkey.serialize().cmp(&self.pubkey.serialize()))
- }
-}
-
-impl cmp::PartialOrd for RouteGraphNode {
- fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &RouteGraphNode) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
- Some(self.cmp(other))
- }
-}
-
-struct DummyDirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: PublicKey,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
- htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- fee_base_msat: u32,
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
-}
-
-impl Router {
- /// Creates a new router with the given node_id to be used as the source for get_route()
- pub fn new(our_pubkey: PublicKey, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Router {
- let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
- nodes.insert(our_pubkey.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: Vec::new(),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 0,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- Router {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
- network_map: RwLock::new(NetworkMap {
- channels: BTreeMap::new(),
- our_node_id: our_pubkey,
- nodes: nodes,
- }),
- chain_monitor,
- logger,
- }
- }
-
- /// Dumps the entire network view of this Router to the logger provided in the constructor at
- /// level Trace
- pub fn trace_state(&self) {
- log_trace!(self, "{}", self.network_map.read().unwrap());
- }
-
- /// Get network addresses by node id
- pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
- let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
- network.nodes.get(pubkey).map(|n| n.addresses.clone())
- }
-
- /// Marks a node as having failed a route. This will avoid re-using the node in routes for now,
- /// with an exponential decay in node "badness". Note that there is deliberately no
- /// mark_channel_bad as a node may simply lie and suggest that an upstream channel from it is
- /// what failed the route and not the node itself. Instead, setting the blamed_upstream_node
- /// boolean will reduce the penalty, returning the node to usability faster. If the node is
- /// behaving correctly, it will disable the failing channel and we will use it again next time.
- pub fn mark_node_bad(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, _blamed_upstream_node: bool) {
- unimplemented!();
- }
-
- fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
- macro_rules! remove_from_node {
- ($node_id: expr) => {
- if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
- entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
- short_channel_id != *NetworkMap::get_short_id(chan_id)
- });
- if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
- entry.remove_entry();
- }
- } else {
- panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
- }
- }
- }
- remove_from_node!(chan.one_to_two.src_node_id);
- remove_from_node!(chan.two_to_one.src_node_id);
- }
-
- /// Gets a route from us to the given target node.
- ///
- /// Extra routing hops between known nodes and the target will be used if they are included in
- /// last_hops.
- ///
- /// If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in a first_hops with the
- /// results from a local ChannelManager::list_usable_channels() call. If it is filled in, our
- /// (this Router's) view of our local channels will be ignored, and only those in first_hops
- /// will be used.
- ///
- /// Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids
- /// (ChannelManager::list_usable_channels will never include such channels).
- ///
- /// The fees on channels from us to next-hops are ignored (as they are assumed to all be
- /// equal), however the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the htlc_minimum_msat
- /// *is* checked as they may change based on the receiving node.
- pub fn get_route(&self, target: &PublicKey, first_hops: Option<&[channelmanager::ChannelDetails]>, last_hops: &[RouteHint], final_value_msat: u64, final_cltv: u32) -> Result<Route, HandleError> {
- // TODO: Obviously *only* using total fee cost sucks. We should consider weighting by
- // uptime/success in using a node in the past.
- let network = self.network_map.read().unwrap();
-
- if *target == network.our_node_id {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate a route to ourselves", action: None});
- }
-
- if final_value_msat > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate a route of more value than all existing satoshis", action: None});
- }
-
- // We do a dest-to-source Dijkstra's sorting by each node's distance from the destination
- // plus the minimum per-HTLC fee to get from it to another node (aka "shitty A*").
- // TODO: There are a few tweaks we could do, including possibly pre-calculating more stuff
- // to use as the A* heuristic beyond just the cost to get one node further than the current
- // one.
-
- let dummy_directional_info = DummyDirectionalChannelInfo { // used for first_hops routes
- src_node_id: network.our_node_id.clone(),
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- };
-
- let mut targets = BinaryHeap::new(); //TODO: Do we care about switching to eg Fibbonaci heap?
- let mut dist = HashMap::with_capacity(network.nodes.len());
-
- let mut first_hop_targets = HashMap::with_capacity(if first_hops.is_some() { first_hops.as_ref().unwrap().len() } else { 0 });
- if let Some(hops) = first_hops {
- for chan in hops {
- let short_channel_id = chan.short_channel_id.expect("first_hops should be filled in with usable channels, not pending ones");
- if chan.remote_network_id == *target {
- return Ok(Route {
- hops: vec![RouteHop {
- pubkey: chan.remote_network_id,
- short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: final_value_msat,
- cltv_expiry_delta: final_cltv,
- }],
- });
- }
- first_hop_targets.insert(chan.remote_network_id, short_channel_id);
- }
- if first_hop_targets.is_empty() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot route when there are no outbound routes away from us", action: None});
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! add_entry {
- // Adds entry which goes from the node pointed to by $directional_info to
- // $dest_node_id over the channel with id $chan_id with fees described in
- // $directional_info.
- ( $chan_id: expr, $dest_node_id: expr, $directional_info: expr, $starting_fee_msat: expr ) => {
- //TODO: Explore simply adding fee to hit htlc_minimum_msat
- if $starting_fee_msat as u64 + final_value_msat >= $directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat {
- let proportional_fee_millions = ($starting_fee_msat + final_value_msat).checked_mul($directional_info.fee_proportional_millionths as u64);
- if let Some(new_fee) = proportional_fee_millions.and_then(|part| {
- ($directional_info.fee_base_msat as u64).checked_add(part / 1000000) })
- {
- let mut total_fee = $starting_fee_msat as u64;
- let hm_entry = dist.entry(&$directional_info.src_node_id);
- let old_entry = hm_entry.or_insert_with(|| {
- let node = network.nodes.get(&$directional_info.src_node_id).unwrap();
- (u64::max_value(),
- node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat,
- node.lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths,
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: $dest_node_id.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- })
- });
- if $directional_info.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
- // Ignore new_fee for channel-from-us as we assume all channels-from-us
- // will have the same effective-fee
- total_fee += new_fee;
- if let Some(fee_inc) = final_value_msat.checked_add(total_fee).and_then(|inc| { (old_entry.2 as u64).checked_mul(inc) }) {
- total_fee += fee_inc / 1000000 + (old_entry.1 as u64);
- } else {
- // max_value means we'll always fail the old_entry.0 > total_fee check
- total_fee = u64::max_value();
- }
- }
- let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
- pubkey: $directional_info.src_node_id,
- lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: total_fee,
- lowest_fee_to_node: $starting_fee_msat as u64 + new_fee,
- };
- if old_entry.0 > total_fee {
- targets.push(new_graph_node);
- old_entry.0 = total_fee;
- old_entry.3 = RouteHop {
- pubkey: $dest_node_id.clone(),
- short_channel_id: $chan_id.clone(),
- fee_msat: new_fee, // This field is ignored on the last-hop anyway
- cltv_expiry_delta: $directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
- }
- }
- }
- }
- };
- }
-
- macro_rules! add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node {
- ( $node: expr, $node_id: expr, $fee_to_target_msat: expr ) => {
- if first_hops.is_some() {
- if let Some(first_hop) = first_hop_targets.get(&$node_id) {
- add_entry!(first_hop, $node_id, dummy_directional_info, $fee_to_target_msat);
- }
- }
-
- for chan_id in $node.channels.iter() {
- let chan = network.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
- if chan.one_to_two.src_node_id == *$node_id {
- // ie $node is one, ie next hop in A* is two, via the two_to_one channel
- if first_hops.is_none() || chan.two_to_one.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
- if chan.two_to_one.enabled {
- add_entry!(chan_id, chan.one_to_two.src_node_id, chan.two_to_one, $fee_to_target_msat);
- }
- }
- } else {
- if first_hops.is_none() || chan.one_to_two.src_node_id != network.our_node_id {
- if chan.one_to_two.enabled {
- add_entry!(chan_id, chan.two_to_one.src_node_id, chan.one_to_two, $fee_to_target_msat);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- };
- }
-
- match network.nodes.get(target) {
- None => {},
- Some(node) => {
- add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, target, 0);
- },
- }
-
- for hop in last_hops.iter() {
- if first_hops.is_none() || hop.src_node_id != network.our_node_id { // first_hop overrules last_hops
- if network.nodes.get(&hop.src_node_id).is_some() {
- if first_hops.is_some() {
- if let Some(first_hop) = first_hop_targets.get(&hop.src_node_id) {
- add_entry!(first_hop, hop.src_node_id, dummy_directional_info, 0);
- }
- }
- add_entry!(hop.short_channel_id, target, hop, 0);
- }
- }
- }
-
- while let Some(RouteGraphNode { pubkey, lowest_fee_to_node, .. }) = targets.pop() {
- if pubkey == network.our_node_id {
- let mut res = vec!(dist.remove(&network.our_node_id).unwrap().3);
- while res.last().unwrap().pubkey != *target {
- let new_entry = match dist.remove(&res.last().unwrap().pubkey) {
- Some(hop) => hop.3,
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find a non-fee-overflowing path to the given destination", action: None}),
- };
- res.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = new_entry.fee_msat;
- res.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = new_entry.cltv_expiry_delta;
- res.push(new_entry);
- }
- res.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = final_value_msat;
- res.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = final_cltv;
- let route = Route { hops: res };
- log_trace!(self, "Got route: {}", log_route!(route));
- return Ok(route);
- }
-
- match network.nodes.get(&pubkey) {
- None => {},
- Some(node) => {
- add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, &pubkey, lowest_fee_to_node);
- },
- }
- }
-
- Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find a path to the given destination", action: None})
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
- use ln::channelmanager;
- use ln::router::{Router,NodeInfo,NetworkMap,ChannelInfo,DirectionalChannelInfo,RouteHint};
- use ln::msgs::GlobalFeatures;
- use util::test_utils;
- use util::test_utils::TestVecWriter;
- use util::logger::Logger;
- use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
-
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
- use hex;
-
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-
- use std::sync::Arc;
-
- #[test]
- fn route_test() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let router = Router::new(our_id, chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
-
- // Build network from our_id to node8:
- //
- // -1(1)2- node1 -1(3)2-
- // / \
- // our_id -1(12)2- node8 -1(13)2--- node3
- // \ /
- // -1(2)2- node2 -1(4)2-
- //
- //
- // chan1 1-to-2: disabled
- // chan1 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan2 1-to-2: enabled, ignored fee
- // chan2 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan3 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
- // chan3 2-to-1: enabled, 100 msat fee
- //
- // chan4 1-to-2: enabled, 100% fee
- // chan4 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan12 1-to-2: enabled, ignored fee
- // chan12 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan13 1-to-2: enabled, 200% fee
- // chan13 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- //
- // -1(5)2- node4 -1(8)2--
- // | 2 |
- // | (11) |
- // / 1 \
- // node3--1(6)2- node5 -1(9)2--- node7 (not in global route map)
- // \ /
- // -1(7)2- node6 -1(10)2-
- //
- // chan5 1-to-2: enabled, 100 msat fee
- // chan5 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan6 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
- // chan6 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan7 1-to-2: enabled, 100% fee
- // chan7 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan8 1-to-2: enabled, variable fee (0 then 1000 msat)
- // chan8 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan9 1-to-2: enabled, 1001 msat fee
- // chan9 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan10 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
- // chan10 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- //
- // chan11 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
- // chan11 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
-
- let node1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node3 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node4 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node5 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node6 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node7 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- let node8 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
-
- let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
-
- {
- let mut network = router.network_map.write().unwrap();
-
- network.nodes.insert(node1.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(1, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 100,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(1, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: false,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node1.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node2.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(2, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(2, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node2.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node8.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(12, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(12, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: our_id.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), // This value should be ignored
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node8.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node3.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(
- NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone()),
- NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone()),
- NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone()),
- NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()),
- NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()),
- NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(3, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node1.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (3 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (3 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 100,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(4, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node2.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (4 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (4 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(13, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node8.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (13 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 2000000,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (13 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node4.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(5, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (5 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 100,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node4.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (5 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node5.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()), NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(6, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (6 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node5.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (6 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(11, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node5.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (11 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node4.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (11 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.nodes.insert(node6.clone(), NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone())),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_base_msat: 0,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- last_update: 1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- network.channels.insert(NetworkMap::get_key(7, zero_hash.clone()), ChannelInfo {
- features: GlobalFeatures::new(),
- one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node3.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (7 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
- last_update_message: None,
- }, two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo {
- src_node_id: node6.clone(),
- last_update: 0,
- enabled: true,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (7 << 8) | 2,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- last_update_message: None,
- },
- announcement_message: None,
- });
- }
-
- { // Simple route to 3 via 2
- let route = router.get_route(&node3, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- { // Route to 1 via 2 and 3 because our channel to 1 is disabled
- let route = router.get_route(&node1, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 3);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (3 << 8) | 2);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node1);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- { // If we specify a channel to node8, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node8.clone(),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_live: true,
- }];
- let route = router.get_route(&node3, Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node8);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (13 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 13);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- let mut last_hops = vec!(RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node4.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 8,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (8 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- }, RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node5.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 9,
- fee_base_msat: 1001,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (9 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- }, RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node6.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 10,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (10 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- });
-
- { // Simple test across 2, 3, 5, and 4 via a last_hop channel
- let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 5);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node5);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 6);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 11);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].pubkey, node7);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].short_channel_id, 8);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- { // Simple test with outbound channel to 4 to test that last_hops and first_hops connect
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node4.clone(),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_live: true,
- }];
- let route = router.get_route(&node7, Some(&our_chans), &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 2);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node7);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 8);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- last_hops[0].fee_base_msat = 1000;
-
- { // Revert to via 6 as the fee on 8 goes up
- let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 4);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 200); // fee increased as its % of value transferred across node
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (7 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node6);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 7);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (10 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node7);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 10);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 100);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- { // ...but still use 8 for larger payments as 6 has a variable feerate
- let route = router.get_route(&node7, None, &last_hops, 2000, 42).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), 5);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].pubkey, node2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].short_channel_id, 2);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].fee_msat, 3000);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].pubkey, node3);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].short_channel_id, 4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].pubkey, node5);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].short_channel_id, 6);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].fee_msat, 0);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].pubkey, node4);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].short_channel_id, 11);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].fee_msat, 1000);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
-
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].pubkey, node7);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].short_channel_id, 8);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].fee_msat, 2000);
- assert_eq!(route.hops[4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- }
-
- { // Test Router serialization/deserialization
- let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- let network = router.network_map.read().unwrap();
- assert!(!network.channels.is_empty());
- assert!(!network.nodes.is_empty());
- network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- assert!(<NetworkMap>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
- ((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
- ((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
- ((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
- ((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
- ((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
- ((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
-}
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] // Used only by poly1305
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_le32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
- ((v[0] as u32) << 8*0) |
- ((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
- ((v[2] as u32) << 8*2) |
- ((v[3] as u32) << 8*3)
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be48(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
- ((v[0] as u64) << 8*5) |
- ((v[1] as u64) << 8*4) |
- ((v[2] as u64) << 8*3) |
- ((v[3] as u64) << 8*2) |
- ((v[4] as u64) << 8*1) |
- ((v[5] as u64) << 8*0)
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
- ((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
- ((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
- ((v[2] as u64) << 8*5) |
- ((v[3] as u64) << 8*4) |
- ((v[4] as u64) << 8*3) |
- ((v[5] as u64) << 8*2) |
- ((v[6] as u64) << 8*1) |
- ((v[7] as u64) << 8*0)
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn be16_to_array(u: u16) -> [u8; 2] {
- let mut v = [0; 2];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn be32_to_array(u: u32) -> [u8; 4] {
- let mut v = [0; 4];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] // Used only by poly1305
-#[inline]
-pub fn le32_to_array(u: u32) -> [u8; 4] {
- let mut v = [0; 4];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn be48_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 6] {
- assert!(u & 0xffff_0000_0000_0000 == 0);
- let mut v = [0; 6];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[4] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[5] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-#[inline]
-pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
- let mut v = [0; 8];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub fn le64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
- let mut v = [0; 8];
- v[0] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[1] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[2] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[3] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[4] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[5] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[6] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
- v[7] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
- v
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// This file was stolen from rust-crypto.
-// Copyright 2012-2013 The Rust Project Developers. See the COPYRIGHT
-// file at the top-level directory of this distribution and at
-// http://rust-lang.org/COPYRIGHT.
-
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
-// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
-// except according to those terms.
-
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-mod real_chacha {
- use std::cmp;
- use util::byte_utils::{slice_to_le32, le32_to_array};
-
- #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
- #[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
- struct u32x4(pub u32, pub u32, pub u32, pub u32);
- impl ::std::ops::Add for u32x4 {
- type Output = u32x4;
- fn add(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
- u32x4(self.0.wrapping_add(rhs.0),
- self.1.wrapping_add(rhs.1),
- self.2.wrapping_add(rhs.2),
- self.3.wrapping_add(rhs.3))
- }
- }
- impl ::std::ops::Sub for u32x4 {
- type Output = u32x4;
- fn sub(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
- u32x4(self.0.wrapping_sub(rhs.0),
- self.1.wrapping_sub(rhs.1),
- self.2.wrapping_sub(rhs.2),
- self.3.wrapping_sub(rhs.3))
- }
- }
- impl ::std::ops::BitXor for u32x4 {
- type Output = u32x4;
- fn bitxor(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
- u32x4(self.0 ^ rhs.0, self.1 ^ rhs.1, self.2 ^ rhs.2, self.3 ^ rhs.3)
- }
- }
- impl ::std::ops::Shr<u32x4> for u32x4 {
- type Output = u32x4;
- fn shr(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
- u32x4(self.0 >> rhs.0, self.1 >> rhs.1, self.2 >> rhs.2, self.3 >> rhs.3)
- }
- }
- impl ::std::ops::Shl<u32x4> for u32x4 {
- type Output = u32x4;
- fn shl(self, rhs: u32x4) -> u32x4 {
- u32x4(self.0 << rhs.0, self.1 << rhs.1, self.2 << rhs.2, self.3 << rhs.3)
- }
- }
-
- #[derive(Clone,Copy)]
- struct ChaChaState {
- a: u32x4,
- b: u32x4,
- c: u32x4,
- d: u32x4
- }
-
- #[derive(Copy)]
- pub struct ChaCha20 {
- state : ChaChaState,
- output : [u8; 64],
- offset : usize,
- }
-
- impl Clone for ChaCha20 { fn clone(&self) -> ChaCha20 { *self } }
-
- macro_rules! swizzle {
- ($b: expr, $c: expr, $d: expr) => {{
- let u32x4(b10, b11, b12, b13) = $b;
- $b = u32x4(b11, b12, b13, b10);
- let u32x4(c10, c11, c12, c13) = $c;
- $c = u32x4(c12, c13,c10, c11);
- let u32x4(d10, d11, d12, d13) = $d;
- $d = u32x4(d13, d10, d11, d12);
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! state_to_buffer {
- ($state: expr, $output: expr) => {{
- let u32x4(a1, a2, a3, a4) = $state.a;
- let u32x4(b1, b2, b3, b4) = $state.b;
- let u32x4(c1, c2, c3, c4) = $state.c;
- let u32x4(d1, d2, d3, d4) = $state.d;
- let lens = [
- a1,a2,a3,a4,
- b1,b2,b3,b4,
- c1,c2,c3,c4,
- d1,d2,d3,d4
- ];
- for i in 0..lens.len() {
- $output[i*4..(i+1)*4].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(lens[i]));
- }
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! round{
- ($state: expr) => {{
- $state.a = $state.a + $state.b;
- rotate!($state.d, $state.a, S16);
- $state.c = $state.c + $state.d;
- rotate!($state.b, $state.c, S12);
- $state.a = $state.a + $state.b;
- rotate!($state.d, $state.a, S8);
- $state.c = $state.c + $state.d;
- rotate!($state.b, $state.c, S7);
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! rotate {
- ($a: expr, $b: expr, $c:expr) => {{
- let v = $a ^ $b;
- let r = S32 - $c;
- let right = v >> r;
- $a = (v << $c) ^ right
- }}
- }
-
- const S32:u32x4 = u32x4(32, 32, 32, 32);
- const S16:u32x4 = u32x4(16, 16, 16, 16);
- const S12:u32x4 = u32x4(12, 12, 12, 12);
- const S8:u32x4 = u32x4(8, 8, 8, 8);
- const S7:u32x4 = u32x4(7, 7, 7, 7);
-
- impl ChaCha20 {
- pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20 {
- assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
- assert!(nonce.len() == 8 || nonce.len() == 12);
-
- ChaCha20{ state: ChaCha20::expand(key, nonce), output: [0u8; 64], offset: 64 }
- }
-
- fn expand(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaChaState {
- let constant = match key.len() {
- 16 => b"expand 16-byte k",
- 32 => b"expand 32-byte k",
- _ => unreachable!(),
- };
- ChaChaState {
- a: u32x4(
- slice_to_le32(&constant[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&constant[4..8]),
- slice_to_le32(&constant[8..12]),
- slice_to_le32(&constant[12..16])
- ),
- b: u32x4(
- slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[4..8]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[8..12]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[12..16])
- ),
- c: if key.len() == 16 {
- u32x4(
- slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[4..8]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[8..12]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[12..16])
- )
- } else {
- u32x4(
- slice_to_le32(&key[16..20]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[20..24]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[24..28]),
- slice_to_le32(&key[28..32])
- )
- },
- d: if nonce.len() == 16 {
- u32x4(
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[8..12]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[12..16])
- )
- } else if nonce.len() == 12 {
- u32x4(
- 0,
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[8..12])
- )
- } else {
- u32x4(
- 0,
- 0,
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[0..4]),
- slice_to_le32(&nonce[4..8])
- )
- }
- }
- }
-
- // put the the next 64 keystream bytes into self.output
- fn update(&mut self) {
- let mut state = self.state;
-
- for _ in 0..10 {
- round!(state);
- swizzle!(state.b, state.c, state.d);
- round!(state);
- swizzle!(state.d, state.c, state.b);
- }
- state.a = state.a + self.state.a;
- state.b = state.b + self.state.b;
- state.c = state.c + self.state.c;
- state.d = state.d + self.state.d;
-
- state_to_buffer!(state, self.output);
-
- self.state.d = self.state.d + u32x4(1, 0, 0, 0);
- let u32x4(c12, _, _, _) = self.state.d;
- if c12 == 0 {
- // we could increment the other counter word with an 8 byte nonce
- // but other implementations like boringssl have this same
- // limitation
- panic!("counter is exhausted");
- }
-
- self.offset = 0;
- }
-
- pub fn process(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) {
- assert!(input.len() == output.len());
- let len = input.len();
- let mut i = 0;
- while i < len {
- // If there is no keystream available in the output buffer,
- // generate the next block.
- if self.offset == 64 {
- self.update();
- }
-
- // Process the min(available keystream, remaining input length).
- let count = cmp::min(64 - self.offset, len - i);
- // explicitly assert lengths to avoid bounds checks:
- assert!(output.len() >= i + count);
- assert!(input.len() >= i + count);
- assert!(self.output.len() >= self.offset + count);
- for j in 0..count {
- output[i + j] = input[i + j] ^ self.output[self.offset + j];
- }
- i += count;
- self.offset += count;
- }
- }
- }
-}
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub use self::real_chacha::ChaCha20;
-
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-mod fuzzy_chacha {
- pub struct ChaCha20 {}
-
- impl ChaCha20 {
- pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20 {
- assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
- assert!(nonce.len() == 8 || nonce.len() == 12);
- Self {}
- }
-
- pub fn process(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) {
- output.copy_from_slice(input);
- }
- }
-}
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-pub use self::fuzzy_chacha::ChaCha20;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
- use std::iter::repeat;
-
- use super::ChaCha20;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_chacha20_256_tls_vectors() {
- struct TestVector {
- key: [u8; 32],
- nonce: [u8; 8],
- keystream: Vec<u8>,
- };
- // taken from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
- let test_vectors = vec!(
- TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90,
- 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28,
- 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a,
- 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7,
- 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d,
- 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37,
- 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c,
- 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96,
- 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96,
- 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60,
- 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41,
- 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2,
- 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c,
- 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81,
- 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xde, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf5,
- 0xe7, 0x86, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x65, 0x3a,
- 0x0b, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x15, 0xad, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x13,
- 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0x37, 0x82, 0x10, 0x31,
- 0xe8, 0x5a, 0x05, 0x02, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x45,
- 0x27, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xef, 0xc7, 0xfa, 0x5b,
- 0x52, 0x77, 0x06, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xa0, 0x43, 0x3e,
- 0x44, 0x5f, 0x41, 0xe3,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xef, 0x3f, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0x15, 0x78, 0xfb,
- 0xf5, 0xcf, 0x35, 0xbd, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x3b, 0x80,
- 0x09, 0x63, 0x16, 0x34, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xac,
- 0x33, 0x96, 0x0b, 0xd1, 0x38, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x32,
- 0x11, 0x1e, 0x4c, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x3c,
- 0xa8, 0xad, 0x64, 0x26, 0x19, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x54,
- 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0x46, 0x6e, 0x7d,
- 0x6b, 0xbd, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x6b,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
- 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
- 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
- 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xf7, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x89, 0xf1, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x69,
- 0x82, 0x10, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x75,
- 0x7f, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x93,
- 0xec, 0x01, 0xac, 0x56, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xc1,
- 0x34, 0xa4, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x41,
- 0x30, 0x42, 0xc9, 0x44, 0x00, 0x49, 0x17, 0x69,
- 0x05, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x59, 0xea, 0x1c, 0x53, 0xf1,
- 0x59, 0x16, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x1a,
- 0x38, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x35, 0x94,
- 0x1e, 0x24, 0x44, 0x17, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xde, 0x66,
- 0x89, 0xde, 0x95, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0xd9, 0x58,
- 0x89, 0xfb, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xbd,
- 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0xc1, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x56,
- 0x3e, 0xb9, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x2e,
- 0x09, 0xa7, 0xe7, 0x78, 0x49, 0x2b, 0x56, 0x2e,
- 0xf7, 0x13, 0x0e, 0x88, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xc7,
- 0x9d, 0xb9, 0xd4, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0xa8, 0x99, 0x15,
- 0x1b, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x50, 0x32, 0xb6, 0x3f, 0xc3,
- 0x85, 0x24, 0x5f, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xe3, 0xdd, 0x5a,
- 0x97, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x76, 0xfe, 0x06, 0x40, 0x25,
- 0xd3, 0xce, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xb2, 0xc5,
- 0x07, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xdb, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0x69,
- 0x59, 0x66, 0x09, 0x96, 0x54, 0x6c, 0xc9, 0xc4,
- 0xa6, 0xea, 0xfd, 0xc7, 0x77, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xd7,
- 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xad, 0x39, 0x79,
- 0xe5, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x33, 0x17, 0x16, 0x6a,
- 0x1c, 0x89, 0x4c, 0x94, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x87, 0x6a,
- 0x94, 0xdf, 0x76, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4e, 0xaa, 0xf2,
- 0xcc, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xe0, 0xad, 0x7a,
- 0xd0, 0xf9, 0xd4, 0xb6, 0xad, 0x3b, 0x54, 0x09,
- 0x87, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x38, 0x40, 0x7a,
- 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x3a, 0xb7, 0x8f, 0xab, 0x78, 0xc9,
- ),
- },
- );
-
- for tv in test_vectors.iter() {
- let mut c = ChaCha20::new(&tv.key, &tv.nonce);
- let input: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(tv.keystream.len()).collect();
- let mut output: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(input.len()).collect();
- c.process(&input[..], &mut output[..]);
- assert_eq!(output, tv.keystream);
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_chacha20_256_tls_vectors_96_nonce() {
- struct TestVector {
- key: [u8; 32],
- nonce: [u8; 12],
- keystream: Vec<u8>,
- };
- // taken from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
- let test_vectors = vec!(
- TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90,
- 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28,
- 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a,
- 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7,
- 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d,
- 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37,
- 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c,
- 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0x45, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x1f, 0xb2, 0x96,
- 0xd7, 0x73, 0x6e, 0x7b, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x96,
- 0xeb, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x83, 0x46, 0x88, 0xd2, 0x60,
- 0x4f, 0x45, 0x09, 0x52, 0xed, 0x43, 0x2d, 0x41,
- 0xbb, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x75, 0x66, 0xd2,
- 0xa5, 0xd1, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xaf, 0x2c,
- 0x53, 0xd7, 0x92, 0xb1, 0xc4, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x81,
- 0x7e, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xae, 0x54, 0x69, 0x63,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xde, 0x9c, 0xba, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0x9e, 0xf5,
- 0xe7, 0x86, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x65, 0x3a,
- 0x0b, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x15, 0xad, 0xbf, 0xf7, 0x13,
- 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0x37, 0x82, 0x10, 0x31,
- 0xe8, 0x5a, 0x05, 0x02, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x45,
- 0x27, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xef, 0xc7, 0xfa, 0x5b,
- 0x52, 0x77, 0x06, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xa0, 0x43, 0x3e,
- 0x44, 0x5f, 0x41, 0xe3,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ],
- nonce: [ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xef, 0x3f, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0x15, 0x78, 0xfb,
- 0xf5, 0xcf, 0x35, 0xbd, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x3b, 0x80,
- 0x09, 0x63, 0x16, 0x34, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x42, 0xac,
- 0x33, 0x96, 0x0b, 0xd1, 0x38, 0xe5, 0x0d, 0x32,
- 0x11, 0x1e, 0x4c, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x3c,
- 0xa8, 0xad, 0x64, 0x26, 0x19, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x54,
- 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x0b, 0x46, 0x6e, 0x7d,
- 0x6b, 0xbd, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x1b, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x6b,
- ),
- }, TestVector{
- key: [
- 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
- 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
- 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
- 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f,
- ],
- nonce: [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 ],
- keystream: vec!(
- 0xf7, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x89, 0xf1, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x69,
- 0x82, 0x10, 0x5f, 0xfb, 0x64, 0x0b, 0xb7, 0x75,
- 0x7f, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x93,
- 0xec, 0x01, 0xac, 0x56, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xc1,
- 0x34, 0xa4, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x46, 0x41,
- 0x30, 0x42, 0xc9, 0x44, 0x00, 0x49, 0x17, 0x69,
- 0x05, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x59, 0xea, 0x1c, 0x53, 0xf1,
- 0x59, 0x16, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x1a,
- 0x38, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x35, 0x94,
- 0x1e, 0x24, 0x44, 0x17, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xde, 0x66,
- 0x89, 0xde, 0x95, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0xd9, 0x58,
- 0x89, 0xfb, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xbd,
- 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0xc1, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x56,
- 0x3e, 0xb9, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x2e,
- 0x09, 0xa7, 0xe7, 0x78, 0x49, 0x2b, 0x56, 0x2e,
- 0xf7, 0x13, 0x0e, 0x88, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xc7,
- 0x9d, 0xb9, 0xd4, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0xa8, 0x99, 0x15,
- 0x1b, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x50, 0x32, 0xb6, 0x3f, 0xc3,
- 0x85, 0x24, 0x5f, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xe3, 0xdd, 0x5a,
- 0x97, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x76, 0xfe, 0x06, 0x40, 0x25,
- 0xd3, 0xce, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xb2, 0xc5,
- 0x07, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xdb, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0x69,
- 0x59, 0x66, 0x09, 0x96, 0x54, 0x6c, 0xc9, 0xc4,
- 0xa6, 0xea, 0xfd, 0xc7, 0x77, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xd7,
- 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xad, 0x39, 0x79,
- 0xe5, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x33, 0x17, 0x16, 0x6a,
- 0x1c, 0x89, 0x4c, 0x94, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x87, 0x6a,
- 0x94, 0xdf, 0x76, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4e, 0xaa, 0xf2,
- 0xcc, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xe0, 0xad, 0x7a,
- 0xd0, 0xf9, 0xd4, 0xb6, 0xad, 0x3b, 0x54, 0x09,
- 0x87, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x38, 0x40, 0x7a,
- 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x3a, 0xb7, 0x8f, 0xab, 0x78, 0xc9,
- ),
- },
- );
-
- for tv in test_vectors.iter() {
- let mut c = ChaCha20::new(&tv.key, &tv.nonce);
- let input: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(tv.keystream.len()).collect();
- let mut output: Vec<u8> = repeat(0).take(input.len()).collect();
- c.process(&input[..], &mut output[..]);
- assert_eq!(output, tv.keystream);
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// ring has a garbage API so its use is avoided, but rust-crypto doesn't have RFC-variant poly1305
-// Instead, we steal rust-crypto's implementation and tweak it to match the RFC.
-
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
-// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
-// except according to those terms.
-
-// This is a port of Andrew Moons poly1305-donna
-// https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
-
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-mod real_chachapoly {
- use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
- use util::poly1305::Poly1305;
- use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
-
- use util::byte_utils;
-
- #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
- pub struct ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- cipher: ChaCha20,
- mac: Poly1305,
- finished: bool,
- data_len: usize,
- aad_len: u64,
- }
-
- impl ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- #[inline]
- fn pad_mac_16(mac: &mut Poly1305, len: usize) {
- if len % 16 != 0 {
- mac.input(&[0; 16][0..16 - (len % 16)]);
- }
- }
- pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
- assert!(nonce.len() == 12);
-
- // Ehh, I'm too lazy to *also* tweak ChaCha20 to make it RFC-compliant
- assert!(nonce[0] == 0 && nonce[1] == 0 && nonce[2] == 0 && nonce[3] == 0);
-
- let mut cipher = ChaCha20::new(key, &nonce[4..]);
- let mut mac_key = [0u8; 64];
- let zero_key = [0u8; 64];
- cipher.process(&zero_key, &mut mac_key);
-
- let mut mac = Poly1305::new(&mac_key[..32]);
- mac.input(aad);
- ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut mac, aad.len());
-
- ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- cipher: cipher,
- mac: mac,
- finished: false,
- data_len: 0,
- aad_len: aad.len() as u64,
- }
- }
-
- pub fn encrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], out_tag: &mut [u8]) {
- assert!(input.len() == output.len());
- assert!(self.finished == false);
- self.cipher.process(input, output);
- self.data_len += input.len();
- self.mac.input(output);
- ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut self.mac, self.data_len);
- self.finished = true;
- self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.aad_len));
- self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.data_len as u64));
- self.mac.raw_result(out_tag);
- }
-
- pub fn decrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], tag: &[u8]) -> bool {
- assert!(input.len() == output.len());
- assert!(self.finished == false);
-
- self.finished = true;
-
- self.mac.input(input);
-
- self.data_len += input.len();
- ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::pad_mac_16(&mut self.mac, self.data_len);
- self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.aad_len));
- self.mac.input(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(self.data_len as u64));
-
- let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 16];
- self.mac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
- if fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, tag) {
- self.cipher.process(input, output);
- true
- } else {
- false
- }
- }
- }
-}
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub use self::real_chachapoly::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
-
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-mod fuzzy_chachapoly {
- #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
- pub struct ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- tag: [u8; 16],
- finished: bool,
- }
- impl ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- pub fn new(key: &[u8], nonce: &[u8], _aad: &[u8]) -> ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- assert!(key.len() == 16 || key.len() == 32);
- assert!(nonce.len() == 12);
-
- // Ehh, I'm too lazy to *also* tweak ChaCha20 to make it RFC-compliant
- assert!(nonce[0] == 0 && nonce[1] == 0 && nonce[2] == 0 && nonce[3] == 0);
-
- let mut tag = [0; 16];
- tag.copy_from_slice(&key[0..16]);
-
- ChaCha20Poly1305RFC {
- tag,
- finished: false,
- }
- }
-
- pub fn encrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], out_tag: &mut [u8]) {
- assert!(input.len() == output.len());
- assert!(self.finished == false);
-
- output.copy_from_slice(&input);
- out_tag.copy_from_slice(&self.tag);
- self.finished = true;
- }
-
- pub fn decrypt(&mut self, input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8], tag: &[u8]) -> bool {
- assert!(input.len() == output.len());
- assert!(self.finished == false);
-
- if tag[..] != self.tag[..] { return false; }
- output.copy_from_slice(input);
- self.finished = true;
- true
- }
- }
-}
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-pub use self::fuzzy_chachapoly::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
+++ /dev/null
-//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
-//! applies for you.
-
-use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-
-/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct UserConfig {
- /// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
- pub own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig,
- /// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
- pub peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
- /// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
- pub channel_options: ChannelConfig,
-}
-
-impl UserConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with 0 relay fees!)
- pub fn new() -> Self{
- UserConfig {
- own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::new(),
- peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits::new(),
- channel_options: ChannelConfig::new(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Configuration we set when applicable.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- /// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
- /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
- /// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
- pub minimum_depth: u32,
- /// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
- ///
- /// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
- /// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
- /// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
- /// Default is BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you can
- /// tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
- ///
- /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
- /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
- /// our channel.
- pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
-}
-
-impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for `ChannelHandshakeConfig`
- pub fn new() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- minimum_depth: 6,
- our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation.
-///
-/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
-///
-/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
- /// only applies to inbound channels.
- pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
- /// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
- pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
- /// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
- pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- /// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
- /// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
- /// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
- pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
- /// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
- pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- /// Outputs below a certain value will not be added to on-chain transactions. The dust value is
- /// required to always be higher than this value so this only applies to HTLC outputs (and
- /// potentially to-self outputs before any payments have been made).
- /// Thus, HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
- /// This setting allows you to set a minimum dust limit for their commitment transactions,
- /// reflecting the reality that tiny outputs are not considered standard transactions and will
- /// not propagate through the Bitcoin network.
- /// Defaults to 546, or the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
- pub min_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- /// Maximum allowed threshold above which outputs will not be generated in their commitment
- /// transactions.
- /// HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
- pub max_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- /// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
- /// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
- /// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
- /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. Defaults to
- /// 144 blocks or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
- pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
- /// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
- /// ChannelConfig.
- /// Defaults to true to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
- /// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
- pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
- /// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
- ///
- /// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
- /// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
- /// Default is MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, which we also enforce as a maximum value
- /// so you can tweak config to reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
- pub their_to_self_delay: u16
-}
-
-impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
- ///
- /// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
- /// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
- /// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- min_funding_satoshis: 0,
- max_htlc_minimum_msat: <u64>::max_value(),
- min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
- min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- min_dust_limit_satoshis: 546,
- max_dust_limit_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
- max_minimum_depth: 144,
- force_announced_channel_preference: true,
- their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
-/// with our counterparty.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelConfig {
- /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
- /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- /// channel.
- ///
- /// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- ///
- /// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- /// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
- ///
- /// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- pub announced_channel: bool,
- /// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- /// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- /// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- ///
- /// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- /// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- /// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- ///
- /// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool
-}
-
-impl ChannelConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with zero relay fees!).
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- ChannelConfig {
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- announced_channel: false,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
- }
- }
-}
-
-//Add write and readable traits to channelconfig
-impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 8+1+1, {
- fee_proportional_millionths,
- announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey
-});
+++ /dev/null
-//! Error types live here.
-
-use std::fmt;
-
-/// Indicates an error on the client's part (usually some variant of attempting to use too-low or
-/// too-high values)
-pub enum APIError {
- /// Indicates the API was wholly misused (see err for more). Cases where these can be returned
- /// are documented, but generally indicates some precondition of a function was violated.
- APIMisuseError {
- /// A human-readable error message
- err: &'static str
- },
- /// Due to a high feerate, we were unable to complete the request.
- /// For example, this may be returned if the feerate implies we cannot open a channel at the
- /// requested value, but opening a larger channel would succeed.
- FeeRateTooHigh {
- /// A human-readable error message
- err: String,
- /// The feerate which was too high.
- feerate: u64
- },
- /// A malformed Route was provided (eg overflowed value, node id mismatch, overly-looped route,
- /// too-many-hops, etc).
- RouteError {
- /// A human-readable error message
- err: &'static str
- },
- /// We were unable to complete the request as the Channel required to do so is unable to
- /// complete the request (or was not found). This can take many forms, including disconnected
- /// peer, channel at capacity, channel shutting down, etc.
- ChannelUnavailable {
- /// A human-readable error message
- err: &'static str
- },
- /// An attempt to call add_update_monitor returned an Err (ie you did this!), causing the
- /// attempted action to fail.
- MonitorUpdateFailed,
-}
-
-impl fmt::Debug for APIError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- match *self {
- APIError::APIMisuseError {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
- APIError::FeeRateTooHigh {ref err, ref feerate} => write!(f, "{} feerate: {}", err, feerate),
- APIError::RouteError {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable {ref err} => f.write_str(err),
- APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => f.write_str("Client indicated a channel monitor update failed"),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_onion_debug_field(error_code: u16) -> (&'static str, usize) {
- match error_code & 0xff {
- 4|5|6 => ("sha256_of_onion", 32),
- 11|12 => ("htlc_msat", 8),
- 13|18 => ("cltv_expiry", 4),
- 19 => ("incoming_htlc_msat", 8),
- 20 => ("flags", 2),
- _ => ("", 0),
- }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_onion_error_description(error_code: u16) -> (&'static str, &'static str) {
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- match error_code {
- _c if _c == PERM|1 => ("The realm byte was not understood by the processing node", "invalid_realm"),
- _c if _c == NODE|2 => ("Node indicated temporary node failure", "temporary_node_failure"),
- _c if _c == PERM|NODE|2 => ("Node indicated permanent node failure", "permanent_node_failure"),
- _c if _c == PERM|NODE|3 => ("Node indicated the required node feature is missing in the onion", "required_node_feature_missing"),
- _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|4 => ("Node indicated the version by is not understood", "invalid_onion_version"),
- _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|5 => ("Node indicated the HMAC of the onion is incorrect", "invalid_onion_hmac"),
- _c if _c == BADONION|PERM|6 => ("Node indicated the ephemeral public keys is not parseable", "invalid_onion_key"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|7 => ("Node indicated the outgoing channel is unable to handle the HTLC temporarily", "temporary_channel_failure"),
- _c if _c == PERM|8 => ("Node indicated the outgoing channel is unable to handle the HTLC peramanently", "permanent_channel_failure"),
- _c if _c == PERM|9 => ("Node indicated the required feature for the outgoing channel is not satisfied", "required_channel_feature_missing"),
- _c if _c == PERM|10 => ("Node indicated the outbound channel is not found for the specified short_channel_id in the onion packet", "unknown_next_peer"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|11 => ("Node indicated the HTLC amount was below the required minmum for the outbound channel", "amount_below_minimum"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|12 => ("Node indicated the fee amount does not meet the required level", "fee_insufficient"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|13 => ("Node indicated the cltv_expiry does not comply with the cltv_expiry_delta required by the outgoing channel", "incorrect_cltv_expiry"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|14 => ("Node indicated the CLTV expiry too close to the current block height for safe handling", "expiry_too_soon"),
- _c if _c == PERM|15 => ("The final node indicated the payment hash is unknown or amount is incorrect", "incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details"),
- _c if _c == PERM|16 => ("The final node indicated the payment amount is incorrect", "incorrect_payment_amount"),
- _c if _c == 17 => ("The final node indicated the CLTV expiry is too close to the current block height for safe handling", "final_expiry_too_soon"),
- _c if _c == 18 => ("The final node indicated the CLTV expiry in the HTLC does not match the value in the onion", "final_incorrect_cltv_expiry"),
- _c if _c == 19 => ("The final node indicated the amount in the HTLC does not match the value in the onion", "final_incorrect_htlc_amount"),
- _c if _c == UPDATE|20 => ("Node indicated the outbound channel has been disabled", "channel_disabled"),
- _c if _c == 21 => ("Node indicated the CLTV expiry in the HTLC is too far in the future", "expiry_too_far"),
- _ => ("Unknown", ""),
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Events are returned from various bits in the library which indicate some action must be taken
-//! by the client.
-//!
-//! Because we don't have a built-in runtime, it's up to the client to call events at a time in the
-//! future, as well as generate and broadcast funding transactions handle payment preimages and a
-//! few other things.
-//!
-//! Note that many events are handled for you by PeerHandler, so in the common design of having a
-//! PeerManager which marshalls messages to ChannelManager and Router you only need to call
-//! process_events on the PeerHandler and then get_and_clear_pending_events and handle the events
-//! that bubble up to the surface. If, however, you do not have a PeerHandler managing a
-//! ChannelManager you need to handle all of the events which may be generated.
-//TODO: We need better separation of event types ^
-
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-/// An Event which you should probably take some action in response to.
-pub enum Event {
- /// Used to indicate that the client should generate a funding transaction with the given
- /// parameters and then call ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated.
- /// Generated in ChannelManager message handling.
- /// Note that *all inputs* in the funding transaction must spend SegWit outputs or your
- /// counterparty can steal your funds!
- FundingGenerationReady {
- /// The random channel_id we picked which you'll need to pass into
- /// ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated.
- temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- /// The value, in satoshis, that the output should have.
- channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The script which should be used in the transaction output.
- output_script: Script,
- /// The value passed in to ChannelManager::create_channel
- user_channel_id: u64,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that the client may now broadcast the funding transaction it created for a
- /// channel. Broadcasting such a transaction prior to this event may lead to our counterparty
- /// trivially stealing all funds in the funding transaction!
- FundingBroadcastSafe {
- /// The output, which was passed to ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated, which is
- /// now safe to broadcast.
- funding_txo: OutPoint,
- /// The value passed in to ChannelManager::create_channel
- user_channel_id: u64,
- },
- /// Indicates we've received money! Just gotta dig out that payment preimage and feed it to
- /// ChannelManager::claim_funds to get it....
- /// Note that if the preimage is not known or the amount paid is incorrect, you must call
- /// ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards to free up resources for this HTLC.
- /// The amount paid should be considered 'incorrect' when it is less than or more than twice
- /// the amount expected.
- PaymentReceived {
- /// The hash for which the preimage should be handed to the ChannelManager.
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for. Note that you must
- /// compare this to the expected value before accepting the payment (as otherwise you are
- /// providing proof-of-payment for less than the value you expected!).
- amt: u64,
- },
- /// Indicates an outbound payment we made succeeded (ie it made it all the way to its target
- /// and we got back the payment preimage for it).
- /// Note that duplicative PaymentSent Events may be generated - it is your responsibility to
- /// deduplicate them by payment_preimage (which MUST be unique)!
- PaymentSent {
- /// The preimage to the hash given to ChannelManager::send_payment.
- /// Note that this serves as a payment receipt, if you wish to have such a thing, you must
- /// store it somehow!
- payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- },
- /// Indicates an outbound payment we made failed. Probably some intermediary node dropped
- /// something. You may wish to retry with a different route.
- /// Note that duplicative PaymentFailed Events may be generated - it is your responsibility to
- /// deduplicate them by payment_hash (which MUST be unique)!
- PaymentFailed {
- /// The hash which was given to ChannelManager::send_payment.
- payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// Indicates the payment was rejected for some reason by the recipient. This implies that
- /// the payment has failed, not just the route in question. If this is not set, you may
- /// retry the payment via a different route.
- rejected_by_dest: bool,
-#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Option<u16>,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards should be called at a
- /// time in the future.
- PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- /// The minimum amount of time that should be waited prior to calling
- /// process_pending_htlc_forwards. To increase the effort required to correlate payments,
- /// you should wait a random amount of time in roughly the range (now + time_forwardable,
- /// now + 5*time_forwardable).
- time_forwardable: Duration,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that an output was generated on-chain which you should know how to spend.
- /// Such an output will *not* ever be spent by rust-lightning, so you need to store them
- /// somewhere and spend them when you create on-chain spends.
- SpendableOutputs {
- /// The outputs which you should store as spendable by you.
- outputs: Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>,
- },
-}
-
-/// An event generated by ChannelManager which indicates a message should be sent to a peer (or
-/// broadcast to most peers).
-/// These events are handled by PeerManager::process_events if you are using a PeerManager.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum MessageSendEvent {
- /// Used to indicate that we've accepted a channel open and should send the accept_channel
- /// message provided to the given peer.
- SendAcceptChannel {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::AcceptChannel,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that we've initiated a channel open and should send the open_channel
- /// message provided to the given peer.
- SendOpenChannel {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a funding_created message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendFundingCreated {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::FundingCreated,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a funding_signed message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendFundingSigned {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::FundingSigned,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a funding_locked message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendFundingLocked {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The funding_locked message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::FundingLocked,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that an announcement_signatures message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The announcement_signatures message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::AnnouncementSignatures,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a series of HTLC update messages, as well as a commitment_signed
- /// message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- UpdateHTLCs {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive these message(s)
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The update messages which should be sent. ALL messages in the struct should be sent!
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a revoke_and_ack message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendRevokeAndACK {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::RevokeAndACK,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a closing_signed message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendClosingSigned {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::ClosingSigned,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a shutdown message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendShutdown {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::Shutdown,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a channel_reestablish message should be sent to the peer with the given node_id.
- SendChannelReestablish {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The message which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a channel_announcement and channel_update should be broadcast to all
- /// peers (except the peer with node_id either msg.contents.node_id_1 or msg.contents.node_id_2).
- BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- /// The channel_announcement which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement,
- /// The followup channel_update which should be sent.
- update_msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
- },
- /// Used to indicate that a channel_update should be broadcast to all peers.
- BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- /// The channel_update which should be sent.
- msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
- },
- /// Broadcast an error downstream to be handled
- HandleError {
- /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
- node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The action which should be taken.
- action: Option<msgs::ErrorAction>
- },
- /// When a payment fails we may receive updates back from the hop where it failed. In such
- /// cases this event is generated so that we can inform the router of this information.
- PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
- /// The channel/node update which should be sent to router
- update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
- }
-}
-
-/// A trait indicating an object may generate message send events
-pub trait MessageSendEventsProvider {
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
- fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent>;
-}
-
-/// A trait indicating an object may generate events
-pub trait EventsProvider {
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event>;
-}
+++ /dev/null
-macro_rules! hash_to_message {
- ($slice: expr) => {
- {
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- {
- ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice($slice).unwrap()
- }
- #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- {
- match ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice($slice) {
- Ok(msg) => msg,
- Err(_) => ::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap()
- }
- }
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-// Pruned copy of crate rust log, without global logger
-// https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/log #7a60286
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
-// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
-// except according to those terms.
-
-//! Log traits live here, which are called throughout the library to provide useful information for
-//! debugging purposes.
-//!
-//! There is currently 2 ways to filter log messages. First one, by using compilation features, e.g "max_level_off".
-//! The second one, client-side by implementing check against Record Level field.
-//! Each module may have its own Logger or share one.
-
-use std::cmp;
-use std::fmt;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-static LOG_LEVEL_NAMES: [&'static str; 6] = ["OFF", "ERROR", "WARN", "INFO", "DEBUG", "TRACE"];
-
-/// An enum representing the available verbosity levels of the logger.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash)]
-pub enum Level {
- ///Designates logger being silent
- Off,
- /// Designates very serious errors
- Error,
- /// Designates hazardous situations
- Warn,
- /// Designates useful information
- Info,
- /// Designates lower priority information
- Debug,
- /// Designates very low priority, often extremely verbose, information
- Trace,
-}
-
-impl PartialOrd for Level {
- #[inline]
- fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Level) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
- Some(self.cmp(other))
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn lt(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
- (*self as usize) < *other as usize
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn le(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
- *self as usize <= *other as usize
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn gt(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
- *self as usize > *other as usize
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn ge(&self, other: &Level) -> bool {
- *self as usize >= *other as usize
- }
-}
-
-impl Ord for Level {
- #[inline]
- fn cmp(&self, other: &Level) -> cmp::Ordering {
- (*self as usize).cmp(&(*other as usize))
- }
-}
-
-impl fmt::Display for Level {
- fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- fmt.pad(LOG_LEVEL_NAMES[*self as usize])
- }
-}
-
-impl Level {
- /// Returns the most verbose logging level.
- #[inline]
- pub fn max() -> Level {
- Level::Trace
- }
-}
-
-/// A Record, unit of logging output with Metadata to enable filtering
-/// Module_path, file, line to inform on log's source
-#[derive(Clone,Debug)]
-pub struct Record<'a> {
- /// The verbosity level of the message.
- pub level: Level,
- /// The message body.
- pub args: fmt::Arguments<'a>,
- /// The module path of the message.
- pub module_path: &'a str,
- /// The source file containing the message.
- pub file: &'a str,
- /// The line containing the message.
- pub line: u32,
-}
-
-impl<'a> Record<'a> {
- /// Returns a new Record.
- #[inline]
- pub fn new(level: Level, args: fmt::Arguments<'a>, module_path: &'a str, file: &'a str, line: u32) -> Record<'a> {
- Record {
- level,
- args,
- module_path,
- file,
- line
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// A trait encapsulating the operations required of a logger
-pub trait Logger: Sync + Send {
- /// Logs the `Record`
- fn log(&self, record: &Record);
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct LogHolder<'a> { pub(crate) logger: &'a Arc<Logger> }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use std::sync::{Arc};
-
- #[test]
- fn test_level_show() {
- assert_eq!("INFO", Level::Info.to_string());
- assert_eq!("ERROR", Level::Error.to_string());
- assert_ne!("WARN", Level::Error.to_string());
- }
-
- struct WrapperLog {
- logger: Arc<Logger>
- }
-
- impl WrapperLog {
- fn new(logger: Arc<Logger>) -> WrapperLog {
- WrapperLog {
- logger,
- }
- }
-
- fn call_macros(&self) {
- log_error!(self, "This is an error");
- log_warn!(self, "This is a warning");
- log_info!(self, "This is an info");
- log_debug!(self, "This is a debug");
- log_trace!(self, "This is a trace");
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_logging_macros() {
- let mut logger = TestLogger::new();
- logger.enable(Level::Trace);
- let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(logger);
- let wrapper = WrapperLog::new(Arc::clone(&logger));
- wrapper.call_macros();
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
-
-use ln::router::Route;
-
-use std;
-
-pub(crate) struct DebugPubKey<'a>(pub &'a PublicKey);
-impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugPubKey<'a> {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- for i in self.0.serialize().iter() {
- write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-macro_rules! log_pubkey {
- ($obj: expr) => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugPubKey(&$obj)
- }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct DebugBytes<'a>(pub &'a [u8]);
-impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugBytes<'a> {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- for i in self.0 {
- write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-macro_rules! log_bytes {
- ($obj: expr) => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugBytes(&$obj)
- }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct DebugFundingChannelId<'a>(pub &'a Sha256dHash, pub u16);
-impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugFundingChannelId<'a> {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- for i in OutPoint::new(self.0.clone(), self.1).to_channel_id().iter() {
- write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-macro_rules! log_funding_channel_id {
- ($funding_txid: expr, $funding_txo: expr) => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingChannelId(&$funding_txid, $funding_txo)
- }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct DebugFundingInfo<'a, T: 'a>(pub &'a Option<(OutPoint, T)>);
-impl<'a, T> std::fmt::Display for DebugFundingInfo<'a, T> {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- match self.0.as_ref() {
- Some(&(ref funding_output, _)) => DebugBytes(&funding_output.to_channel_id()[..]).fmt(f),
- None => write!(f, "without funding output set"),
- }
- }
-}
-macro_rules! log_funding_info {
- ($key_storage: expr) => {
- match $key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&funding_info)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&None)
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct DebugRoute<'a>(pub &'a Route);
-impl<'a> std::fmt::Display for DebugRoute<'a> {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
- for h in self.0.hops.iter() {
- write!(f, "node_id: {}, short_channel_id: {}, fee_msat: {}, cltv_expiry_delta: {}\n", log_pubkey!(h.pubkey), h.short_channel_id, h.fee_msat, h.cltv_expiry_delta)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-macro_rules! log_route {
- ($obj: expr) => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugRoute(&$obj)
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_internal {
- ($self: ident, $lvl:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => (
- &$self.logger.log(&::util::logger::Record::new($lvl, format_args!($($arg)+), module_path!(), file!(), line!()));
- );
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_error {
- ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off")))]
- log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
- )
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_warn {
- ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error")))]
- log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
- )
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_info {
- ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn")))]
- log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
- )
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_debug {
- ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info")))]
- log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
- )
-}
-
-macro_rules! log_trace {
- ($self: ident, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- #[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug")))]
- log_internal!($self, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*);
- )
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! Some utility modules live here. See individual sub-modules for more info.
-
-pub mod events;
-pub mod errors;
-pub mod ser;
-
-pub(crate) mod byte_utils;
-pub(crate) mod chacha20;
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub(crate) mod poly1305;
-pub(crate) mod chacha20poly1305rfc;
-pub(crate) mod transaction_utils;
-
-#[macro_use]
-pub(crate) mod ser_macros;
-#[macro_use]
-pub(crate) mod macro_logger;
-
-// These have to come after macro_logger to build
-pub mod logger;
-pub mod config;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub(crate) mod test_utils;
-
-#[macro_use]
-pub(crate) mod fuzz_wrappers;
+++ /dev/null
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
-// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
-// except according to those terms.
-
-// This is a port of Andrew Moons poly1305-donna
-// https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
-
-use std::cmp::min;
-use util::byte_utils::{slice_to_le32, le32_to_array};
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct Poly1305 {
- r : [u32; 5],
- h : [u32; 5],
- pad : [u32; 4],
- leftover : usize,
- buffer : [u8; 16],
- finalized : bool,
-}
-
-impl Poly1305 {
- pub fn new(key: &[u8]) -> Poly1305 {
- assert!(key.len() == 32);
- let mut poly = Poly1305{ r: [0u32; 5], h: [0u32; 5], pad: [0u32; 4], leftover: 0, buffer: [0u8; 16], finalized: false };
-
- // r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff
- poly.r[0] = (slice_to_le32(&key[0..4]) ) & 0x3ffffff;
- poly.r[1] = (slice_to_le32(&key[3..7]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03;
- poly.r[2] = (slice_to_le32(&key[6..10]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff;
- poly.r[3] = (slice_to_le32(&key[9..13]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff;
- poly.r[4] = (slice_to_le32(&key[12..16]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff;
-
- poly.pad[0] = slice_to_le32(&key[16..20]);
- poly.pad[1] = slice_to_le32(&key[20..24]);
- poly.pad[2] = slice_to_le32(&key[24..28]);
- poly.pad[3] = slice_to_le32(&key[28..32]);
-
- poly
- }
-
- fn block(&mut self, m: &[u8]) {
- let hibit : u32 = if self.finalized { 0 } else { 1 << 24 };
-
- let r0 = self.r[0];
- let r1 = self.r[1];
- let r2 = self.r[2];
- let r3 = self.r[3];
- let r4 = self.r[4];
-
- let s1 = r1 * 5;
- let s2 = r2 * 5;
- let s3 = r3 * 5;
- let s4 = r4 * 5;
-
- let mut h0 = self.h[0];
- let mut h1 = self.h[1];
- let mut h2 = self.h[2];
- let mut h3 = self.h[3];
- let mut h4 = self.h[4];
-
- // h += m
- h0 += (slice_to_le32(&m[0..4]) ) & 0x3ffffff;
- h1 += (slice_to_le32(&m[3..7]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff;
- h2 += (slice_to_le32(&m[6..10]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff;
- h3 += (slice_to_le32(&m[9..13]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff;
- h4 += (slice_to_le32(&m[12..16]) >> 8) | hibit;
-
- // h *= r
- let d0 = (h0 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * s3 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s2 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s1 as u64);
- let mut d1 = (h0 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s3 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s2 as u64);
- let mut d2 = (h0 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * s4 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s3 as u64);
- let mut d3 = (h0 as u64 * r3 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * r0 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * s4 as u64);
- let mut d4 = (h0 as u64 * r4 as u64) + (h1 as u64 * r3 as u64) + (h2 as u64 * r2 as u64) + (h3 as u64 * r1 as u64) + (h4 as u64 * r0 as u64);
-
- // (partial) h %= p
- let mut c : u32;
- c = (d0 >> 26) as u32; h0 = d0 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
- d1 += c as u64; c = (d1 >> 26) as u32; h1 = d1 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
- d2 += c as u64; c = (d2 >> 26) as u32; h2 = d2 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
- d3 += c as u64; c = (d3 >> 26) as u32; h3 = d3 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
- d4 += c as u64; c = (d4 >> 26) as u32; h4 = d4 as u32 & 0x3ffffff;
- h0 += c * 5; c = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
- h1 += c;
-
- self.h[0] = h0;
- self.h[1] = h1;
- self.h[2] = h2;
- self.h[3] = h3;
- self.h[4] = h4;
- }
-
- pub fn finish(&mut self) {
- if self.leftover > 0 {
- self.buffer[self.leftover] = 1;
- for i in self.leftover+1..16 {
- self.buffer[i] = 0;
- }
- self.finalized = true;
- let tmp = self.buffer;
- self.block(&tmp);
- }
-
- // fully carry h
- let mut h0 = self.h[0];
- let mut h1 = self.h[1];
- let mut h2 = self.h[2];
- let mut h3 = self.h[3];
- let mut h4 = self.h[4];
-
- let mut c : u32;
- c = h1 >> 26; h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff;
- h2 += c; c = h2 >> 26; h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff;
- h3 += c; c = h3 >> 26; h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff;
- h4 += c; c = h4 >> 26; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff;
- h0 += c * 5; c = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
- h1 += c;
-
- // compute h + -p
- let mut g0 = h0.wrapping_add(5); c = g0 >> 26; g0 &= 0x3ffffff;
- let mut g1 = h1.wrapping_add(c); c = g1 >> 26; g1 &= 0x3ffffff;
- let mut g2 = h2.wrapping_add(c); c = g2 >> 26; g2 &= 0x3ffffff;
- let mut g3 = h3.wrapping_add(c); c = g3 >> 26; g3 &= 0x3ffffff;
- let mut g4 = h4.wrapping_add(c).wrapping_sub(1 << 26);
-
- // select h if h < p, or h + -p if h >= p
- let mut mask = (g4 >> (32 - 1)).wrapping_sub(1);
- g0 &= mask;
- g1 &= mask;
- g2 &= mask;
- g3 &= mask;
- g4 &= mask;
- mask = !mask;
- h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0;
- h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1;
- h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2;
- h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3;
- h4 = (h4 & mask) | g4;
-
- // h = h % (2^128)
- h0 = ((h0 ) | (h1 << 26)) & 0xffffffff;
- h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) & 0xffffffff;
- h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) & 0xffffffff;
- h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) & 0xffffffff;
-
- // h = mac = (h + pad) % (2^128)
- let mut f : u64;
- f = h0 as u64 + self.pad[0] as u64 ; h0 = f as u32;
- f = h1 as u64 + self.pad[1] as u64 + (f >> 32); h1 = f as u32;
- f = h2 as u64 + self.pad[2] as u64 + (f >> 32); h2 = f as u32;
- f = h3 as u64 + self.pad[3] as u64 + (f >> 32); h3 = f as u32;
-
- self.h[0] = h0;
- self.h[1] = h1;
- self.h[2] = h2;
- self.h[3] = h3;
- }
-
- pub fn input(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
- assert!(!self.finalized);
- let mut m = data;
-
- if self.leftover > 0 {
- let want = min(16 - self.leftover, m.len());
- for i in 0..want {
- self.buffer[self.leftover+i] = m[i];
- }
- m = &m[want..];
- self.leftover += want;
-
- if self.leftover < 16 {
- return;
- }
-
- // self.block(self.buffer[..]);
- let tmp = self.buffer;
- self.block(&tmp);
-
- self.leftover = 0;
- }
-
- while m.len() >= 16 {
- self.block(&m[0..16]);
- m = &m[16..];
- }
-
- for i in 0..m.len() {
- self.buffer[i] = m[i];
- }
- self.leftover = m.len();
- }
-
- pub fn raw_result(&mut self, output: &mut [u8]) {
- assert!(output.len() >= 16);
- if !self.finalized{
- self.finish();
- }
- output[0..4].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[0]));
- output[4..8].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[1]));
- output[8..12].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[2]));
- output[12..16].copy_from_slice(&le32_to_array(self.h[3]));
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
- use std::iter::repeat;
-
- use util::poly1305::Poly1305;
-
- fn poly1305(key: &[u8], msg: &[u8], mac: &mut [u8]) {
- let mut poly = Poly1305::new(key);
- poly.input(msg);
- poly.raw_result(mac);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_nacl_vector() {
- let key = [
- 0xee,0xa6,0xa7,0x25,0x1c,0x1e,0x72,0x91,
- 0x6d,0x11,0xc2,0xcb,0x21,0x4d,0x3c,0x25,
- 0x25,0x39,0x12,0x1d,0x8e,0x23,0x4e,0x65,
- 0x2d,0x65,0x1f,0xa4,0xc8,0xcf,0xf8,0x80,
- ];
-
- let msg = [
- 0x8e,0x99,0x3b,0x9f,0x48,0x68,0x12,0x73,
- 0xc2,0x96,0x50,0xba,0x32,0xfc,0x76,0xce,
- 0x48,0x33,0x2e,0xa7,0x16,0x4d,0x96,0xa4,
- 0x47,0x6f,0xb8,0xc5,0x31,0xa1,0x18,0x6a,
- 0xc0,0xdf,0xc1,0x7c,0x98,0xdc,0xe8,0x7b,
- 0x4d,0xa7,0xf0,0x11,0xec,0x48,0xc9,0x72,
- 0x71,0xd2,0xc2,0x0f,0x9b,0x92,0x8f,0xe2,
- 0x27,0x0d,0x6f,0xb8,0x63,0xd5,0x17,0x38,
- 0xb4,0x8e,0xee,0xe3,0x14,0xa7,0xcc,0x8a,
- 0xb9,0x32,0x16,0x45,0x48,0xe5,0x26,0xae,
- 0x90,0x22,0x43,0x68,0x51,0x7a,0xcf,0xea,
- 0xbd,0x6b,0xb3,0x73,0x2b,0xc0,0xe9,0xda,
- 0x99,0x83,0x2b,0x61,0xca,0x01,0xb6,0xde,
- 0x56,0x24,0x4a,0x9e,0x88,0xd5,0xf9,0xb3,
- 0x79,0x73,0xf6,0x22,0xa4,0x3d,0x14,0xa6,
- 0x59,0x9b,0x1f,0x65,0x4c,0xb4,0x5a,0x74,
- 0xe3,0x55,0xa5,
- ];
-
- let expected = [
- 0xf3,0xff,0xc7,0x70,0x3f,0x94,0x00,0xe5,
- 0x2a,0x7d,0xfb,0x4b,0x3d,0x33,0x05,0xd9,
- ];
-
- let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
- poly1305(&key, &msg, &mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
-
- let mut poly = Poly1305::new(&key);
- poly.input(&msg[0..32]);
- poly.input(&msg[32..96]);
- poly.input(&msg[96..112]);
- poly.input(&msg[112..120]);
- poly.input(&msg[120..124]);
- poly.input(&msg[124..126]);
- poly.input(&msg[126..127]);
- poly.input(&msg[127..128]);
- poly.input(&msg[128..129]);
- poly.input(&msg[129..130]);
- poly.input(&msg[130..131]);
- poly.raw_result(&mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn donna_self_test() {
- let wrap_key = [
- 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ];
-
- let wrap_msg = [
- 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
- 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
- ];
-
- let wrap_mac = [
- 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ];
-
- let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
- poly1305(&wrap_key, &wrap_msg, &mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &wrap_mac[..]);
-
- let total_key = [
- 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0xff,
- 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xff, 0xff,
- 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
- 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
- ];
-
- let total_mac = [
- 0x64, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0xe8, 0xd6, 0xad, 0x7b, 0xbd,
- 0xd2, 0x87, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0x44, 0x62, 0x3d, 0x39,
- ];
-
- let mut tpoly = Poly1305::new(&total_key);
- for i in 0..256 {
- let key: Vec<u8> = repeat(i as u8).take(32).collect();
- let msg: Vec<u8> = repeat(i as u8).take(256).collect();
- let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
- poly1305(&key[..], &msg[0..i], &mut mac);
- tpoly.input(&mac);
- }
- tpoly.raw_result(&mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &total_mac[..]);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_tls_vectors() {
- // from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
- let key = b"this is 32-byte key for Poly1305";
- let msg = [0u8; 32];
- let expected = [
- 0x49, 0xec, 0x78, 0x09, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x1e, 0xc6,
- 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x33, 0xb9, 0x1c, 0xcc, 0x03, 0x07,
- ];
- let mut mac = [0u8; 16];
- poly1305(key, &msg, &mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
-
- let msg = b"Hello world!";
- let expected= [
- 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x45, 0x00, 0x8f, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x16,
- 0xa2, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x74, 0xee, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0xf0,
- ];
- poly1305(key, msg, &mut mac);
- assert_eq!(&mac[..], &expected[..]);
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-//! A very simple serialization framework which is used to serialize/deserialize messages as well
-//! as ChannelsManagers and ChannelMonitors.
-
-use std::result::Result;
-use std::io::{Read, Write};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::hash::Hash;
-
-use secp256k1::Signature;
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use std::marker::Sized;
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use util::byte_utils;
-
-use util::byte_utils::{be64_to_array, be48_to_array, be32_to_array, be16_to_array, slice_to_be16, slice_to_be32, slice_to_be48, slice_to_be64};
-
-const MAX_BUF_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
-
-/// A trait that is similar to std::io::Write but has one extra function which can be used to size
-/// buffers being written into.
-/// An impl is provided for any type that also impls std::io::Write which simply ignores size
-/// hints.
-pub trait Writer {
- /// Writes the given buf out. See std::io::Write::write_all for more
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error>;
- /// Hints that data of the given size is about the be written. This may not always be called
- /// prior to data being written and may be safely ignored.
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize);
-}
-
-impl<W: Write> Writer for W {
- #[inline]
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- <Self as ::std::io::Write>::write_all(self, buf)
- }
- #[inline]
- fn size_hint(&mut self, _size: usize) { }
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct WriterWriteAdaptor<'a, W: Writer + 'a>(pub &'a mut W);
-impl<'a, W: Writer + 'a> Write for WriterWriteAdaptor<'a, W> {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.write_all(buf)
- }
- fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.write_all(buf)?;
- Ok(buf.len())
- }
- fn flush(&mut self) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-/// A trait that various rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be written out to a Writer
-pub trait Writeable {
- /// Writes self out to the given Writer
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error>;
-
- /// Writes self out to a Vec<u8>
- fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- self.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
- msg.0
- }
-
- /// Writes self out to a Vec<u8>
- fn encode_with_len(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- let mut msg = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- 0u16.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
- self.write(&mut msg).unwrap();
- let len = msg.0.len();
- msg.0[..2].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(len as u16 - 2));
- msg.0
- }
-}
-
-/// A trait that various rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be read in from a Read
-pub trait Readable<R>
- where Self: Sized,
- R: Read
-{
- /// Reads a Self in from the given Read
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError>;
-}
-
-/// A trait that various higher-level rust-lightning types implement allowing them to be read in
-/// from a Read given some additional set of arguments which is required to deserialize.
-pub trait ReadableArgs<R, P>
- where Self: Sized,
- R: Read
-{
- /// Reads a Self in from the given Read
- fn read(reader: &mut R, params: P) -> Result<Self, DecodeError>;
-}
-
-pub(crate) struct U48(pub u64);
-impl Writeable for U48 {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&be48_to_array(self.0))
- }
-}
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for U48 {
- #[inline]
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<U48, DecodeError> {
- let mut buf = [0; 6];
- reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok(U48(slice_to_be48(&buf)))
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! impl_writeable_primitive {
- ($val_type:ty, $meth_write:ident, $len: expr, $meth_read:ident) => {
- impl Writeable for $val_type {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&$meth_write(*self))
- }
- }
- impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for $val_type {
- #[inline]
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<$val_type, DecodeError> {
- let mut buf = [0; $len];
- reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok($meth_read(&buf))
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_primitive!(u64, be64_to_array, 8, slice_to_be64);
-impl_writeable_primitive!(u32, be32_to_array, 4, slice_to_be32);
-impl_writeable_primitive!(u16, be16_to_array, 2, slice_to_be16);
-
-impl Writeable for u8 {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&[*self])
- }
-}
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for u8 {
- #[inline]
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<u8, DecodeError> {
- let mut buf = [0; 1];
- reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok(buf[0])
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for bool {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&[if *self {1} else {0}])
- }
-}
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for bool {
- #[inline]
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
- let mut buf = [0; 1];
- reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- if buf[0] != 0 && buf[0] != 1 {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- Ok(buf[0] == 1)
- }
-}
-
-// u8 arrays
-macro_rules! impl_array {
- ( $size:expr ) => (
- impl Writeable for [u8; $size]
- {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.write_all(self)
- }
- }
-
- impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for [u8; $size]
- {
- #[inline]
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let mut buf = [0u8; $size];
- r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok(buf)
- }
- }
- );
-}
-
-//TODO: performance issue with [u8; size] with impl_array!()
-impl_array!(3); // for rgb
-impl_array!(4); // for IPv4
-impl_array!(10); // for OnionV2
-impl_array!(16); // for IPv6
-impl_array!(32); // for channel id & hmac
-impl_array!(33); // for PublicKey
-impl_array!(64); // for Signature
-impl_array!(1300); // for OnionPacket.hop_data
-
-// HashMap
-impl<K, V> Writeable for HashMap<K, V>
- where K: Writeable + Eq + Hash,
- V: Writeable
-{
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- for (key, value) in self.iter() {
- key.write(w)?;
- value.write(w)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R, K, V> Readable<R> for HashMap<K, V>
- where R: Read,
- K: Readable<R> + Eq + Hash,
- V: Readable<R>
-{
- #[inline]
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut ret = HashMap::with_capacity(len as usize);
- for _ in 0..len {
- ret.insert(K::read(r)?, V::read(r)?);
- }
- Ok(ret)
- }
-}
-
-// Vectors
-impl Writeable for Vec<u8> {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&self)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Vec<u8> {
- #[inline]
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
- ret.resize(len as usize, 0);
- r.read_exact(&mut ret)?;
- Ok(ret)
- }
-}
-impl Writeable for Vec<Signature> {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- for e in self.iter() {
- e.write(w)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Vec<Signature> {
- #[inline]
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let byte_size = (len as usize)
- .checked_mul(33)
- .ok_or(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor)?;
- if byte_size > MAX_BUF_SIZE {
- return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
- }
- let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
- for _ in 0..len { ret.push(Signature::read(r)?); }
- Ok(ret)
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Script {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- w.write_all(self.as_bytes())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Script {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let len = <u16 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? as usize;
- let mut buf = vec![0; len];
- r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
- Ok(Script::from(buf))
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for PublicKey {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.serialize().write(w)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PublicKey {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let buf: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(r)?;
- match PublicKey::from_slice(&buf) {
- Ok(key) => Ok(key),
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for SecretKey {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- let mut ser = [0; 32];
- ser.copy_from_slice(&self[..]);
- ser.write(w)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for SecretKey {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&buf) {
- Ok(key) => Ok(key),
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Sha256dHash {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.write_all(&self[..])
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Sha256dHash {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-
- let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
- Ok(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&buf[..]).unwrap())
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Signature {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.serialize_compact().write(w)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for Signature {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let buf: [u8; 64] = Readable::read(r)?;
- match Signature::from_compact(&buf) {
- Ok(sig) => Ok(sig),
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for PaymentPreimage {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.write(w)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PaymentPreimage {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
- Ok(PaymentPreimage(buf))
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for PaymentHash {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.write(w)
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for PaymentHash {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
- Ok(PaymentHash(buf))
- }
-}
-
-impl<T: Writeable> Writeable for Option<T> {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match *self {
- None => 0u8.write(w)?,
- Some(ref data) => {
- 1u8.write(w)?;
- data.write(w)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R, T> Readable<R> for Option<T>
- where R: Read,
- T: Readable<R>
-{
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(r)? {
- 0 => Ok(None),
- 1 => Ok(Some(Readable::read(r)?)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for OutPoint {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.txid.write(w)?;
- self.vout.write(w)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<R: Read> Readable<R> for OutPoint {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let txid = Readable::read(r)?;
- let vout = Readable::read(r)?;
- Ok(OutPoint {
- txid,
- vout,
- })
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-macro_rules! impl_writeable {
- ($st:ident, $len: expr, {$($field:ident),*}) => {
- impl ::util::ser::Writeable for $st {
- fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- if $len != 0 {
- w.size_hint($len);
- }
- $( self.$field.write(w)?; )*
- Ok(())
- }
- }
-
- impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ::util::ser::Readable<R> for $st {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- $($field: ::util::ser::Readable::read(r)?),*
- })
- }
- }
- }
-}
-macro_rules! impl_writeable_len_match {
- ($st:ident, {$({$m: pat, $l: expr}),*}, {$($field:ident),*}) => {
- impl Writeable for $st {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- w.size_hint(match *self {
- $($m => $l,)*
- });
- $( self.$field.write(w)?; )*
- Ok(())
- }
- }
-
- impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for $st {
- fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(Self {
- $($field: Readable::read(r)?),*
- })
- }
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use chain::chaininterface;
-use chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface;
-use ln::channelmonitor;
-use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::HTLCUpdate;
-use util::events;
-use util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
-use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer};
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
-use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-
-use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::{mem};
-
-pub struct TestVecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
-impl Writer for TestVecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
- }
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestFeeEstimator {
- pub sat_per_kw: u64,
-}
-impl chaininterface::FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
- fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
- self.sat_per_kw
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestChannelMonitor {
- pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>>,
- pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint>>,
- pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
-}
-impl TestChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, fee_estimator: Arc<chaininterface::FeeEstimator>) -> Self {
- Self {
- added_monitors: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, fee_estimator),
- update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
- }
- }
-}
-impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- // At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
- // to a watchtower and disk...
- let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
- assert!(<(Sha256dHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read(
- &mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0), Arc::new(TestLogger::new())).unwrap().1 == monitor);
- w.0.clear();
- monitor.write_for_watchtower(&mut w).unwrap(); // This at least shouldn't crash...
- self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, monitor.clone()));
- assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
- self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
- }
-
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- return self.simple_monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated();
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestBroadcaster {
- pub txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
-}
-impl chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
- self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestChannelMessageHandler {
- pub pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
-}
-
-impl TestChannelMessageHandler {
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- TestChannelMessageHandler {
- pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl msgs::ChannelMessageHandler for TestChannelMessageHandler {
- fn handle_open_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_local_features: LocalFeatures, _msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_accept_channel(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _their_local_features: LocalFeatures, _msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_funding_created(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_funding_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_funding_locked(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_shutdown(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_closing_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_update_fee(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn peer_disconnected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _no_connection_possible: bool) {}
- fn peer_connected(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) {}
- fn handle_error(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {}
-}
-
-impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for TestChannelMessageHandler {
- fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
- ret
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestRoutingMessageHandler {}
-
-impl TestRoutingMessageHandler {
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- TestRoutingMessageHandler {}
- }
-}
-impl msgs::RoutingMessageHandler for TestRoutingMessageHandler {
- fn handle_node_announcement(&self, _msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, _msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_channel_update(&self, _msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, HandleError> {
- Err(HandleError { err: "", action: None })
- }
- fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, _update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {}
- fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, _starting_point: u64, _batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate,msgs::ChannelUpdate)> {
- Vec::new()
- }
- fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, _starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, _batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
- Vec::new()
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestLogger {
- level: Level,
- id: String,
-}
-
-impl TestLogger {
- pub fn new() -> TestLogger {
- Self::with_id("".to_owned())
- }
- pub fn with_id(id: String) -> TestLogger {
- TestLogger {
- level: Level::Trace,
- id,
- }
- }
- pub fn enable(&mut self, level: Level) {
- self.level = level;
- }
-}
-
-impl Logger for TestLogger {
- fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
- if self.level >= record.level {
- println!("{:<5} {} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), self.id, record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub struct TestKeysInterface {
- backing: keysinterface::KeysManager,
- pub override_session_priv: Mutex<Option<SecretKey>>,
- pub override_channel_id_priv: Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>,
-}
-
-impl keysinterface::KeysInterface for TestKeysInterface {
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { self.backing.get_node_secret() }
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { self.backing.get_destination_script() }
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey { self.backing.get_shutdown_pubkey() }
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool) -> keysinterface::ChannelKeys { self.backing.get_channel_keys(inbound) }
-
- fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey {
- match *self.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() {
- Some(key) => key.clone(),
- None => self.backing.get_session_key()
- }
- }
-
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- match *self.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() {
- Some(key) => key.clone(),
- None => self.backing.get_channel_id()
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl TestKeysInterface {
- pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Self {
- let now = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time went backwards");
- Self {
- backing: keysinterface::KeysManager::new(seed, network, logger, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_nanos()),
- override_session_priv: Mutex::new(None),
- override_channel_id_priv: Mutex::new(None),
- }
- }
-}
+++ /dev/null
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
-
-use std::cmp::Ordering;
-
-pub fn sort_outputs<T, C : Fn(&T, &T) -> Ordering>(outputs: &mut Vec<(TxOut, T)>, tie_breaker: C) {
- outputs.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| {
- a.0.value.cmp(&b.0.value).then_with(|| {
- a.0.script_pubkey[..].cmp(&b.0.script_pubkey[..]).then_with(|| {
- tie_breaker(&a.1, &b.1)
- })
- })
- });
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use super::*;
-
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
-
- use hex::decode;
-
- #[test]
- fn sort_output_by_value() {
- let txout1 = TxOut {
- value: 100,
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(0).into_script()
- };
- let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
-
- let txout2 = TxOut {
- value: 99,
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(0).into_script()
- };
- let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
-
- let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
- sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
-
- assert_eq!(
- &outputs,
- &vec![(txout2_, "ignore"), (txout1_, "ignore")]
- );
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn sort_output_by_script_pubkey() {
- let txout1 = TxOut {
- value: 100,
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(3).into_script(),
- };
- let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
-
- let txout2 = TxOut {
- value: 100,
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(1).push_int(2).into_script()
- };
- let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
-
- let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
- sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
-
- assert_eq!(
- &outputs,
- &vec![(txout2_, "ignore"), (txout1_, "ignore")]
- );
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn sort_output_by_bip_test() {
- let txout1 = TxOut {
- value: 100000000,
- script_pubkey: script_from_hex("41046a0765b5865641ce08dd39690aade26dfbf5511430ca428a3089261361cef170e3929a68aee3d8d4848b0c5111b0a37b82b86ad559fd2a745b44d8e8d9dfdc0cac")
- };
- let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
-
- // doesn't deserialize cleanly:
- let txout2 = TxOut {
- value: 2400000000,
- script_pubkey: script_from_hex("41044a656f065871a353f216ca26cef8dde2f03e8c16202d2e8ad769f02032cb86a5eb5e56842e92e19141d60a01928f8dd2c875a390f67c1f6c94cfc617c0ea45afac")
- };
- let txout2_ = txout2.clone();
-
- let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, "ignore"), (txout2, "ignore")];
- sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
-
- assert_eq!(&outputs, &vec![(txout1_, "ignore"), (txout2_, "ignore")]);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn sort_output_tie_breaker_test() {
- let txout1 = TxOut {
- value: 100,
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(1).push_int(2).into_script()
- };
- let txout1_ = txout1.clone();
-
- let txout2 = txout1.clone();
- let txout2_ = txout1.clone();
-
- let mut outputs = vec![(txout1, 420), (txout2, 69)];
- sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |a, b| { a.cmp(b) });
-
- assert_eq!(
- &outputs,
- &vec![(txout2_, 69), (txout1_, 420)]
- );
- }
-
- fn script_from_hex(hex_str: &str) -> Script {
- Script::from(decode(hex_str).unwrap())
- }
-
- macro_rules! bip_txout_tests {
- ($($name:ident: $value:expr,)*) => {
- $(
- #[test]
- fn $name() {
- let expected_raw: Vec<(u64, &str)> = $value;
- let expected: Vec<(TxOut, &str)> = expected_raw.iter()
- .map(|txout_raw| TxOut {
- value: txout_raw.0,
- script_pubkey: script_from_hex(txout_raw.1)
- }).map(|txout| (txout, "ignore"))
- .collect();
-
- let mut outputs = expected.clone();
- outputs.reverse(); // prep it
-
- // actually do the work!
- sort_outputs(&mut outputs, |_, _| { unreachable!(); });
-
- assert_eq!(outputs, expected);
- }
- )*
- }
- }
-
- const TXOUT1: [(u64, &str); 2] = [
- (400057456, "76a9144a5fba237213a062f6f57978f796390bdcf8d01588ac"),
- (40000000000, "76a9145be32612930b8323add2212a4ec03c1562084f8488ac"),
- ];
- const TXOUT2: [(u64, &str); 2] = [
- (100000000, "41046a0765b5865641ce08dd39690aade26dfbf5511430ca428a3089261361cef170e3929a68aee3d8d4848b0c5111b0a37b82b86ad559fd2a745b44d8e8d9dfdc0cac"),
- (2400000000, "41044a656f065871a353f216ca26cef8dde2f03e8c16202d2e8ad769f02032cb86a5eb5e56842e92e19141d60a01928f8dd2c875a390f67c1f6c94cfc617c0ea45afac"),
- ];
- bip_txout_tests! {
- bip69_txout_test_1: TXOUT1.to_vec(),
- bip69_txout_test_2: TXOUT2.to_vec(),
- }
-}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff