channels, routes payments between them, and exposes a simple API to make and receive
payments. Individual `ChannelMonitor`s monitor the on-chain state of a channel, punish
counterparties if they misbehave, and force-close channels if they contain unresolved
-HTLCs which are near expiration. The `ManyChannelMonitor` API provides a way for you to
+HTLCs which are near expiration. The `chain::Watch` interface provides a way for you to
receive `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s from `ChannelManager` and persist them to disk before the
channel steps forward.
-----------------
| KeysInterface | --------------
----------------- | UserConfig |
- -------------------- | --------------
- /------| MessageSendEvent | | | ----------------
- | -------------------- | | | FeeEstimator |
- | (as MessageSendEventsProvider) | | ----------------
- | ^ | | / | ------------------------
- | \ | | / ---------> | BroadcasterInterface |
- | \ | | / / | ------------------------
- | \ v v v / v ^
- | (as ------------------ ----------------------
- | ChannelMessageHandler)-> | ChannelManager | ----> | ManyChannelMonitor |
- v / ------------------ ----------------------
---------------- / ^ (as EventsProvider) ^
-| PeerManager |- | \ / /
---------------- | -------\---/----------
- | ----------------------- / \ /
- | | ChainWatchInterface | - v
- | ----------------------- ---------
- | | | Event |
-(as RoutingMessageHandler) v ---------
- \ --------------------
- -----------------> | NetGraphMsgHandler |
- --------------------
+ -------------------- ^ --------------
+ ------| MessageSendEvent | | ^ ----------------
+ / -------------------- | | | FeeEstimator | <-----------------------
+ | (as MessageSendEventsProvider) | | ---------------- \
+ | ^ | | ^ ------------------------ |
+ | \ | | / ---------> | BroadcasterInterface | |
+ | \ | | / / ------------------------ |
+ | \ | | / / ^ |
+ | (as ------------------ ---------------- | |
+ | ChannelMessageHandler)-> | ChannelManager | ----> | chain::Watch | | |
+ v / ------------------ ---------------- | |
+--------------- / (as EventsProvider) ^ | |
+| PeerManager |- \ | | |
+--------------- \ | (is-a) | |
+ | ----------------- \ _---------------- / /
+ | | chain::Access | \ / | ChainMonitor |---------------
+ | ----------------- \ / ----------------
+ | ^ \ / |
+(as RoutingMessageHandler) | v v
+ \ ---------------------- --------- -----------------
+ -----------------> | NetGraphMsgHandler | | Event | | chain::Filter |
+ ---------------------- --------- -----------------
```
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface;
+use lightning::chain;
+use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
+use lightning::chain::channelmonitor;
+use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil,ChainWatchInterface};
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
}
}
-struct TestChannelMonitor {
+struct TestChainMonitor {
pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
- pub simple_monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<dyn ChainWatchInterface>>>,
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
// If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
// logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
pub should_update_manager: atomic::AtomicBool,
}
-impl TestChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<dyn chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>) -> Self {
+impl TestChainMonitor {
+ pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>) -> Self {
Self {
- simple_monitor: Arc::new(channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest)),
+ chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest)),
logger,
update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
}
-impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
+impl chain::Watch for TestChainMonitor {
type Keys = EnforcingChannelKeys;
- fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write_for_disk(&mut ser).unwrap();
if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
- panic!("Already had monitor pre-add_monitor");
+ panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
}
self.should_update_manager.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
- assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor).is_ok());
self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
- fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events();
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
macro_rules! make_node {
($node_id: expr) => { {
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin));
- let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
+ let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
macro_rules! reload_node {
($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr) => { {
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin));
- let monitor = Arc::new(TestChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone()));
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_id: $node_id, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU8::new(0) });
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
- monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
+ chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
}
let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
keys_manager,
fee_estimator: fee_est.clone(),
- monitor: monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
logger,
default_config: config,
channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
};
- (<(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestChannelMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, monitor)
+ (<(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor)
} }
}
macro_rules! confirm_txn {
($node: expr) => { {
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
- let mut posn = Vec::with_capacity(channel_txn.len());
- for i in 0..channel_txn.len() {
- txn.push(&channel_txn[i]);
- posn.push(i + 1);
- }
- $node.block_connected(&header, 1, &txn, &posn);
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
+ $node.block_connected(&header, &txdata, 1);
for i in 2..100 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- $node.block_connected(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
+ $node.block_connected(&header, &[], i);
}
} }
}
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
+use lightning::chain::channelmonitor;
use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
use utils::test_logger;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
+use lightning::chain;
+use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
+use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor};
use lightning::routing::router::get_route;
type ChannelMan = ChannelManager<
EnforcingChannelKeys,
- Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>>>,
+ Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
-type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan>, Arc<NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
+type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan>, Arc<NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<dyn chain::Access>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
- monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<
- OutPoint, EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>>>,
+ monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>,
peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
manager: Arc<ChannelMan>,
- monitor: Arc<channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>>>,
+ monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
MoneyLossDetector {
manager,
}
fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
- let mut txn = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
- let mut txn_idxs = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
+ let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
let txid = tx.txid();
match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(self.height);
- txn.push(tx);
- txn_idxs.push(idx + 1);
+ txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
},
_ => {},
}
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
self.height += 1;
self.blocks_connected += 1;
- self.manager.block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
- (*self.monitor).block_connected(&header, self.height as u32, &txn[..], &txn_idxs[..]);
+ self.manager.block_connected(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
+ (*self.monitor).block_connected(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
self.header_hashes[self.height] = header.block_hash();
} else {
fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height], merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
+ self.manager.block_disconnected(&header);
self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
self.height -= 1;
let removal_height = self.height;
Err(_) => return,
};
- let watch = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Bitcoin));
let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
- let monitor = Arc::new(channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(watch.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone()));
+ let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone()));
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis = 0;
let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(Network::Bitcoin, fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, 0));
let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = Arc::new(NetGraphMsgHandler::new(watch.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = Arc::new(NetGraphMsgHandler::new(None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a1:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000018 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a1:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000018 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10
}
}
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Block;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{ChainError,ChainWatchInterface};
+use lightning::chain;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
use lightning::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use lightning::ln::msgs;
}
}
-struct DummyChainWatcher {
+struct FuzzChainSource {
input: Arc<InputData>,
}
-
-impl ChainWatchInterface for DummyChainWatcher {
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, _txid: &Txid, _script_pub_key: &Script) { }
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, _outpoint: (Txid, u32), _out_script: &Script) { }
- fn watch_all_txn(&self) { }
- fn filter_block(&self, _block: &Block) -> Vec<usize> {
- Vec::new()
- }
- fn reentered(&self) -> usize { 0 }
-
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: BlockHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
+impl chain::Access for FuzzChainSource {
+ fn get_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: &BlockHash, _short_channel_id: u64) -> Result<TxOut, chain::AccessError> {
match self.input.get_slice(2) {
- Some(&[0, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotSupported),
- Some(&[1, _]) => Err(ChainError::NotWatched),
- Some(&[2, _]) => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
- Some(&[_, x]) => Ok((Builder::new().push_int(x as i64).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh(), 0)),
- None => Err(ChainError::UnknownTx),
+ Some(&[0, _]) => Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain),
+ Some(&[1, _]) => Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx),
+ Some(&[_, x]) => Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_int(x as i64).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh() }),
+ None => Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx),
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(DummyChainWatcher {
- input: Arc::clone(&input),
- });
+ let chain_source = if get_slice!(1)[0] % 2 == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(Arc::new(FuzzChainSource {
+ input: Arc::clone(&input),
+ }))
+ };
let our_pubkey = get_pubkey!();
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source, Arc::clone(&logger));
loop {
match get_slice!(1)[0] {
//! type TxBroadcaster = dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface;
//! type FeeEstimator = dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator;
//! type Logger = dyn lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-//! type ChainWatchInterface = dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface;
-//! type ChannelMonitor = lightning::ln::channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint, lightning::chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<TxBroadcaster>, Arc<FeeEstimator>, Arc<Logger>, Arc<ChainWatchInterface>>;
-//! type ChannelManager = lightning::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager<ChannelMonitor, TxBroadcaster, FeeEstimator, Logger>;
-//! type PeerManager = lightning::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager<lightning_net_tokio::SocketDescriptor, ChannelMonitor, TxBroadcaster, FeeEstimator, ChainWatchInterface, Logger>;
+//! type ChainAccess = dyn lightning::chain::Access;
+//! type ChainFilter = dyn lightning::chain::Filter;
+//! type ChainMonitor = lightning::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<lightning::chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<ChainFilter>, Arc<TxBroadcaster>, Arc<FeeEstimator>, Arc<Logger>>;
+//! type ChannelManager = lightning::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager<ChainMonitor, TxBroadcaster, FeeEstimator, Logger>;
+//! type PeerManager = lightning::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager<lightning_net_tokio::SocketDescriptor, ChainMonitor, TxBroadcaster, FeeEstimator, ChainAccess, Logger>;
//!
//! // Connect to node with pubkey their_node_id at addr:
-//! async fn connect_to_node(peer_manager: PeerManager, channel_monitor: Arc<ChannelMonitor>, channel_manager: ChannelManager, their_node_id: PublicKey, addr: SocketAddr) {
+//! async fn connect_to_node(peer_manager: PeerManager, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainMonitor>, channel_manager: ChannelManager, their_node_id: PublicKey, addr: SocketAddr) {
//! let (sender, mut receiver) = mpsc::channel(2);
//! lightning_net_tokio::connect_outbound(peer_manager, sender, their_node_id, addr).await;
//! loop {
//! for _event in channel_manager.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
//! // Handle the event!
//! }
-//! for _event in channel_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
+//! for _event in chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
//! // Handle the event!
//! }
//! }
//! }
//!
//! // Begin reading from a newly accepted socket and talk to the peer:
-//! async fn accept_socket(peer_manager: PeerManager, channel_monitor: Arc<ChannelMonitor>, channel_manager: ChannelManager, socket: TcpStream) {
+//! async fn accept_socket(peer_manager: PeerManager, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainMonitor>, channel_manager: ChannelManager, socket: TcpStream) {
//! let (sender, mut receiver) = mpsc::channel(2);
//! lightning_net_tokio::setup_inbound(peer_manager, sender, socket);
//! loop {
//! for _event in channel_manager.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
//! // Handle the event!
//! }
-//! for _event in channel_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
+//! for _event in chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().drain(..) {
//! // Handle the event!
//! }
//! }
//! Includes traits for monitoring and receiving notifications of new blocks and block
//! disconnections, transaction broadcasting, and feerate information requests.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
-
-use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, Arc};
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::ops::Deref;
-use std::marker::PhantomData;
-use std::ptr;
-
-/// Used to give chain error details upstream
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ChainError {
- /// Client doesn't support UTXO lookup (but the chain hash matches our genesis block hash)
- NotSupported,
- /// Chain isn't the one watched
- NotWatched,
- /// Tx doesn't exist or is unconfirmed
- UnknownTx,
-}
-
-/// An interface to request notification of certain scripts as they appear the
-/// chain.
-///
-/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
-/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
-/// events).
-pub trait ChainWatchInterface: Sync + Send {
- /// Provides a txid/random-scriptPubKey-in-the-tx which much be watched for.
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Txid, script_pub_key: &Script);
-
- /// Provides an outpoint which must be watched for, providing any transactions which spend the
- /// given outpoint.
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Txid, u32), out_script: &Script);
-
- /// Indicates that a listener needs to see all transactions.
- fn watch_all_txn(&self);
-
- /// Gets the script and value in satoshis for a given unspent transaction output given a
- /// short_channel_id (aka unspent_tx_output_identier). For BTC/tBTC channels the top three
- /// bytes are the block height, the next 3 the transaction index within the block, and the
- /// final two the output within the transaction.
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: BlockHash, unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError>;
-
- /// Gets the list of transaction indices within a given block that the ChainWatchInterface is
- /// watching for.
- fn filter_block(&self, block: &Block) -> Vec<usize>;
-
- /// Returns a usize that changes when the ChainWatchInterface's watched data is modified.
- /// Users of `filter_block` should pre-save a copy of `reentered`'s return value and use it to
- /// determine whether they need to re-filter a given block.
- fn reentered(&self) -> usize;
-}
/// An interface to send a transaction to the Bitcoin network.
pub trait BroadcasterInterface: Sync + Send {
fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction);
}
-/// A trait indicating a desire to listen for events from the chain
-pub trait ChainListener: Sync + Send {
- /// Notifies a listener that a block was connected.
- ///
- /// The txn_matched array should be set to references to transactions which matched the
- /// relevant installed watch outpoints/txn, or the full set of transactions in the block.
- ///
- /// Note that if txn_matched includes only matched transactions, and a new
- /// transaction/outpoint is watched during a block_connected call, the block *must* be
- /// re-scanned with the new transaction/outpoints and block_connected should be called
- /// again with the same header and (at least) the new transactions.
- ///
- /// Note that if non-new transaction/outpoints are be registered during a call, a second call
- /// *must not* happen.
- ///
- /// This also means those counting confirmations using block_connected callbacks should watch
- /// for duplicate headers and not count them towards confirmations!
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]);
- /// Notifies a listener that a block was disconnected.
- /// Unlike block_connected, this *must* never be called twice for the same disconnect event.
- /// Height must be the one of the block which was disconnected (not new height of the best chain)
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32);
-}
-
/// An enum that represents the speed at which we want a transaction to confirm used for feerate
/// estimation.
pub enum ConfirmationTarget {
/// horizons.
///
/// Note that all of the functions implemented here *must* be reentrant-safe (obviously - they're
-/// called from inside the library in response to ChainListener events, P2P events, or timer
-/// events).
+/// called from inside the library in response to chain events, P2P events, or timer events).
pub trait FeeEstimator: Sync + Send {
/// Gets estimated satoshis of fee required per 1000 Weight-Units.
///
/// Minimum relay fee as required by bitcoin network mempool policy.
pub const MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT: u64 = 4000;
-
-/// Utility for tracking registered txn/outpoints and checking for matches
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
-pub struct ChainWatchedUtil {
- watch_all: bool,
-
- // We are more conservative in matching during testing to ensure everything matches *exactly*,
- // even though during normal runtime we take more optimized match approaches...
- #[cfg(test)]
- watched_txn: HashSet<(Txid, Script)>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- watched_txn: HashSet<Script>,
-
- watched_outpoints: HashSet<(Txid, u32)>,
-}
-
-impl ChainWatchedUtil {
- /// Constructs an empty (watches nothing) ChainWatchedUtil
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- Self {
- watch_all: false,
- watched_txn: HashSet::new(),
- watched_outpoints: HashSet::new(),
- }
- }
-
- /// Registers a tx for monitoring, returning true if it was a new tx and false if we'd already
- /// been watching for it.
- pub fn register_tx(&mut self, txid: &Txid, script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- #[cfg(test)]
- {
- self.watched_txn.insert((txid.clone(), script_pub_key.clone()))
- }
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- {
- let _tx_unused = txid; // It's used in cfg(test), though
- self.watched_txn.insert(script_pub_key.clone())
- }
- }
-
- /// Registers an outpoint for monitoring, returning true if it was a new outpoint and false if
- /// we'd already been watching for it
- pub fn register_outpoint(&mut self, outpoint: (Txid, u32), _script_pub_key: &Script) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- self.watched_outpoints.insert(outpoint)
- }
-
- /// Sets us to match all transactions, returning true if this is a new setting and false if
- /// we'd already been set to match everything.
- pub fn watch_all(&mut self) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all { return false; }
- self.watch_all = true;
- true
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
- pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- if self.watch_all {
- return true;
- }
- for out in tx.output.iter() {
- #[cfg(test)]
- for &(ref txid, ref script) in self.watched_txn.iter() {
- if *script == out.script_pubkey {
- if tx.txid() == *txid {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- for script in self.watched_txn.iter() {
- if *script == out.script_pubkey {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- for outpoint in self.watched_outpoints.iter() {
- let &(outpoint_hash, outpoint_index) = outpoint;
- if outpoint_hash == input.previous_output.txid && outpoint_index == input.previous_output.vout {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- false
- }
-}
-
-/// BlockNotifierArc is useful when you need a BlockNotifier that points to ChainListeners with
-/// static lifetimes, e.g. when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires
-/// parameters with static lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more
-/// efficient, in which case BlockNotifierRef is a more appropriate type. Defining these type
-/// aliases prevents issues such as overly long function definitions.
-///
-/// (C-not exported) as we let clients handle any reference counting they need to do
-pub type BlockNotifierArc<C> = Arc<BlockNotifier<'static, Arc<ChainListener>, C>>;
-
-/// BlockNotifierRef is useful when you want a BlockNotifier that points to ChainListeners
-/// with nonstatic lifetimes. This is useful for when static lifetimes are not needed. Nonstatic
-/// lifetimes are more efficient but less flexible, and should be used by default unless static
-/// lifetimes are required, e.g. when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn
-/// requires parameters with static lifetimes), in which case BlockNotifierArc is a more
-/// appropriate type. Defining these type aliases for common usages prevents issues such as
-/// overly long function definitions.
-pub type BlockNotifierRef<'a, C> = BlockNotifier<'a, &'a ChainListener, C>;
-
-/// Utility for notifying listeners about new blocks, and handling block rescans if new watch
-/// data is registered.
-///
-/// Rather than using a plain BlockNotifier, it is preferable to use either a BlockNotifierArc
-/// or a BlockNotifierRef for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but essentially
-/// you should default to using a BlockNotifierRef, and use a BlockNotifierArc instead when you
-/// require ChainListeners with static lifetimes, such as when you're using lightning-net-tokio.
-pub struct BlockNotifier<'a, CL: Deref + 'a, C: Deref>
- where CL::Target: ChainListener + 'a, C::Target: ChainWatchInterface {
- listeners: Mutex<Vec<CL>>,
- chain_monitor: C,
- phantom: PhantomData<&'a ()>,
-}
-
-impl<'a, CL: Deref + 'a, C: Deref> BlockNotifier<'a, CL, C>
- where CL::Target: ChainListener + 'a, C::Target: ChainWatchInterface {
- /// Constructs a new BlockNotifier without any listeners.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: C) -> BlockNotifier<'a, CL, C> {
- BlockNotifier {
- listeners: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- chain_monitor,
- phantom: PhantomData,
- }
- }
-
- /// Register the given listener to receive events.
- pub fn register_listener(&self, listener: CL) {
- let mut vec = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- vec.push(listener);
- }
- /// Unregister the given listener to no longer
- /// receive events.
- ///
- /// If the same listener is registered multiple times, unregistering
- /// will remove ALL occurrences of that listener. Comparison is done using
- /// the pointer returned by the Deref trait implementation.
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) because the equality check would always fail
- pub fn unregister_listener(&self, listener: CL) {
- let mut vec = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- // item is a ref to an abstract thing that dereferences to a ChainListener,
- // so dereference it twice to get the ChainListener itself
- vec.retain(|item | !ptr::eq(&(**item), &(*listener)));
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was connected given a full, unfiltered block.
- ///
- /// Handles re-scanning the block and calling block_connected again if listeners register new
- /// watch data during the callbacks for you (see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
- pub fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let mut reentered = true;
- while reentered {
- let matched_indexes = self.chain_monitor.filter_block(block);
- let mut matched_txn = Vec::new();
- for index in matched_indexes.iter() {
- matched_txn.push(&block.txdata[*index]);
- }
- reentered = self.block_connected_checked(&block.header, height, matched_txn.as_slice(), matched_indexes.as_slice());
- }
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was connected, given pre-filtered list of transactions in the
- /// block which matched the filter (probably using does_match_tx).
- ///
- /// Returns true if notified listeners registered additional watch data (implying that the
- /// block must be re-scanned and this function called again prior to further block_connected
- /// calls, see ChainListener::block_connected for more info).
- pub fn block_connected_checked(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) -> bool {
- let last_seen = self.chain_monitor.reentered();
-
- let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- for listener in listeners.iter() {
- listener.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
- }
- return last_seen != self.chain_monitor.reentered();
- }
-
- /// Notify listeners that a block was disconnected.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let listeners = self.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- for listener in listeners.iter() {
- listener.block_disconnected(&header, disconnected_height);
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Utility to capture some common parts of ChainWatchInterface implementors.
-///
-/// Keeping a local copy of this in a ChainWatchInterface implementor is likely useful.
-pub struct ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- network: Network,
- watched: Mutex<ChainWatchedUtil>,
- reentered: AtomicUsize,
-}
-
-// We only expose PartialEq in test since its somewhat unclear exactly what it should do and we're
-// only comparing a subset of fields (essentially just checking that the set of things we're
-// watching is the same).
-#[cfg(test)]
-impl PartialEq for ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
- self.network == o.network &&
- *self.watched.lock().unwrap() == *o.watched.lock().unwrap()
- }
-}
-
-/// Register listener
-impl ChainWatchInterface for ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, txid: &Txid, script_pub_key: &Script) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.register_tx(txid, script_pub_key) {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, outpoint: (Txid, u32), out_script: &Script) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.register_outpoint(outpoint, out_script) {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn watch_all_txn(&self) {
- let mut watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- if watched.watch_all() {
- self.reentered.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
- }
- }
-
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: BlockHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
- if genesis_hash != genesis_block(self.network).header.block_hash() {
- return Err(ChainError::NotWatched);
- }
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported)
- }
-
- fn filter_block(&self, block: &Block) -> Vec<usize> {
- let mut matched_index = Vec::new();
- let mut matched_txids = HashSet::new();
- {
- let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- for (index, transaction) in block.txdata.iter().enumerate() {
- // A tx matches the filter if it either matches the filter directly (via
- // does_match_tx_unguarded) or if it is a descendant of another matched
- // transaction within the same block, which we check for in the loop.
- let mut matched = self.does_match_tx_unguarded(transaction, &watched);
- for input in transaction.input.iter() {
- if matched || matched_txids.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- matched = true;
- break;
- }
- }
- if matched {
- matched_txids.insert(transaction.txid());
- matched_index.push(index);
- }
- }
- }
- matched_index
- }
-
- fn reentered(&self) -> usize {
- self.reentered.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
- }
-}
-
-impl ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- /// Creates a new ChainWatchInterfaceUtil for the given network
- pub fn new(network: Network) -> ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- ChainWatchInterfaceUtil {
- network,
- watched: Mutex::new(ChainWatchedUtil::new()),
- reentered: AtomicUsize::new(1),
- }
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction matches the current filter.
- pub fn does_match_tx(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- let watched = self.watched.lock().unwrap();
- self.does_match_tx_unguarded (tx, &watched)
- }
-
- fn does_match_tx_unguarded(&self, tx: &Transaction, watched: &MutexGuard<ChainWatchedUtil>) -> bool {
- watched.does_match_tx(tx)
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use ln::functional_test_utils::{create_chanmon_cfgs, create_node_cfgs};
- use super::{BlockNotifier, ChainListener};
- use std::ptr;
-
- #[test]
- fn register_listener_test() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let block_notifier = BlockNotifier::new(node_cfgs[0].chain_monitor);
- assert_eq!(block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
- let listener = &node_cfgs[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener;
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 1);
- let item = vec.first().clone().unwrap();
- assert!(ptr::eq(&(**item), &(*listener)));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn unregister_single_listener_test() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let block_notifier = BlockNotifier::new(node_cfgs[0].chain_monitor);
- let listener1 = &node_cfgs[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener;
- let listener2 = &node_cfgs[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener;
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener1);
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener2);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 2);
- drop(vec);
- block_notifier.unregister_listener(listener1);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 1);
- let item = vec.first().clone().unwrap();
- assert!(ptr::eq(&(**item), &(*listener2)));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn unregister_single_listener_ref_test() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let block_notifier = BlockNotifier::new(node_cfgs[0].chain_monitor);
- block_notifier.register_listener(&node_cfgs[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener);
- block_notifier.register_listener(&node_cfgs[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 2);
- drop(vec);
- block_notifier.unregister_listener(&node_cfgs[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 1);
- let item = vec.first().clone().unwrap();
- assert!(ptr::eq(&(**item), &(*&node_cfgs[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor)));
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn unregister_multiple_of_the_same_listeners_test() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let block_notifier = BlockNotifier::new(node_cfgs[0].chain_monitor);
- let listener1 = &node_cfgs[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener;
- let listener2 = &node_cfgs[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &ChainListener;
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener1);
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener1);
- block_notifier.register_listener(listener2);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 3);
- drop(vec);
- block_notifier.unregister_listener(listener1);
- let vec = block_notifier.listeners.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(vec.len(), 1);
- let item = vec.first().clone().unwrap();
- assert!(ptr::eq(&(**item), &(*listener2)));
- }
-}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Logic to connect off-chain channel management with on-chain transaction monitoring.
+//!
+//! [`ChainMonitor`] is an implementation of [`chain::Watch`] used both to process blocks and to
+//! update [`ChannelMonitor`]s accordingly. If any on-chain events need further processing, it will
+//! make those available as [`MonitorEvent`]s to be consumed.
+//!
+//! `ChainMonitor` is parameterized by an optional chain source, which must implement the
+//! [`chain::Filter`] trait. This provides a mechanism to signal new relevant outputs back to light
+//! clients, such that transactions spending those outputs are included in block data.
+//!
+//! `ChainMonitor` may be used directly to monitor channels locally or as a part of a distributed
+//! setup to monitor channels remotely. In the latter case, a custom `chain::Watch` implementation
+//! would be responsible for routing each update to a remote server and for retrieving monitor
+//! events. The remote server would make use of `ChainMonitor` for block processing and for
+//! servicing `ChannelMonitor` updates from the client.
+//!
+//! [`ChainMonitor`]: struct.ChainMonitor.html
+//! [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
+//! [`ChannelMonitor`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html
+//! [`MonitorEvent`]: ../channelmonitor/enum.MonitorEvent.html
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+
+use chain;
+use chain::Filter;
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent, MonitorUpdateError};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::events;
+use util::events::Event;
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+/// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
+///
+/// Connected and disconnected blocks must be provided to `ChainMonitor` as documented by
+/// [`chain::Watch`]. May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally
+/// or used independently to monitor channels remotely. See the [module-level documentation] for
+/// details.
+///
+/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: ../../ln/channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
+/// [module-level documentation]: index.html
+pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ /// The monitors
+ pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
+ chain_source: Option<C>,
+ broadcaster: T,
+ logger: L,
+ fee_estimator: F
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ /// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
+ /// of a channel and reacting accordingly based on transactions in the connected block. See
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for details. Any HTLCs that were resolved on chain will
+ /// be returned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
+ ///
+ /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch, returning
+ /// `true` if so. Subsequent calls must not exclude any transactions matching the new outputs
+ /// nor any in-block descendants of such transactions. It is not necessary to re-fetch the block
+ /// to obtain updated `txdata`.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
+ /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
+ /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> bool {
+ let mut has_new_outputs_to_watch = false;
+ {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ has_new_outputs_to_watch |= !txn_outputs.is_empty();
+
+ if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ has_new_outputs_to_watch
+ }
+
+ /// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
+ /// of a channel based on the disconnected block. See [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for
+ /// details.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new `ChainMonitor` used to watch on-chain activity pertaining to channels.
+ ///
+ /// When an optional chain source implementing [`chain::Filter`] is provided, the chain monitor
+ /// will call back to it indicating transactions and outputs of interest. This allows clients to
+ /// pre-filter blocks or only fetch blocks matching a compact filter. Otherwise, clients may
+ /// always need to fetch full blocks absent another means for determining which blocks contain
+ /// transactions relevant to the watched channels.
+ ///
+ /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ chain_source,
+ broadcaster,
+ logger,
+ fee_estimator: feeest,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Adds the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ ///
+ /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
+ ///
+ /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
+ fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
+ };
+ {
+ let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
+
+ if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
+ for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
+ for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ entry.insert(monitor);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Updates the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
+ Some(orig_monitor) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
+ orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
+ },
+ None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ type Keys = ChanSigner;
+
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
+ Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
+ Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
+ for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
+ pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
+ }
+ pending_monitor_events
+ }
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
+ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
+ for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
+ pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
+ }
+ pending_events
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
+//! here.
+//!
+//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
+//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
+//! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
+//!
+//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
+//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
+//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
+//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
+//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
+//!
+//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
+
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
+
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
+use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
+use util::byte_utils;
+use util::events::Event;
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
+use std::{cmp, mem};
+use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::io::Error;
+
+/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
+/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+#[must_use]
+pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
+ /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
+ /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
+ /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
+ ///
+ /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
+ /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
+ /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
+ pub update_id: u64,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.update_id.write(w)?;
+ (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+ for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
+ update_step.write(w)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
+ for _ in 0..len {
+ updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
+ }
+ Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
+ }
+}
+
+/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
+ /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
+ /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
+ ///
+ /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
+ /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
+ /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
+ /// restore the channel to an operational state.
+ ///
+ /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
+ /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
+ /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
+ ///
+ /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
+ /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
+ /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
+ /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
+ /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
+ /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
+ /// been "frozen".
+ ///
+ /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
+ /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
+ /// operation.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
+ /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
+ /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
+ /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
+ /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
+ /// reload-time.
+ ///
+ /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
+ /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
+ /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
+ TemporaryFailure,
+ /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
+ /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
+ /// of this channel).
+ ///
+ /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
+ /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
+ /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
+ /// update must be rejected.
+ ///
+ /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
+ /// the channel monitor instance.
+ ///
+ /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
+ /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
+ /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
+ ///
+ /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
+ /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
+ /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
+ /// lagging behind on block processing.
+ PermanentFailure,
+}
+
+/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
+/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
+/// corrupted.
+/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+
+/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub enum MonitorEvent {
+ /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
+ HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
+
+ /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
+ CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
+}
+
+/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
+/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
+/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
+///
+/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct HTLCUpdate {
+ pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
+}
+impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
+
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
+/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
+pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
+/// HTLC-Success transaction.
+/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
+/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
+pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
+/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
+/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
+/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
+/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
+/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
+/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
+/// accurate block height.
+/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
+/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
+pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
+/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
+/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
+/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
+/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
+pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
+/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
+/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
+///
+/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
+/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
+/// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
+/// fail this HTLC,
+/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
+/// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
+/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
+/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
+///
+/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
+/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
+///
+/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
+/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
+/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
+///
+/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
+/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
+pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+struct HolderSignedTx {
+ /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
+ txid: Txid,
+ revocation_key: PublicKey,
+ a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+}
+
+/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
+/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
+ per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
+}
+
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
+ self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
+ w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.write(w)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
+ let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
+ htlcs.push(htlc);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+ per_htlc,
+ }
+ };
+ Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
+ }
+}
+
+/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
+/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
+/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
+ Revoked {
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
+ input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
+ amount: u64,
+ htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
+ },
+ CounterpartyHTLC {
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+ },
+ HolderHTLC {
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ Funding {
+ funding_redeemscript: Script,
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
+ input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
+ funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for InputMaterial {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ InputMaterial::Revoked {
+ per_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ per_commitment_key,
+ input_descriptor,
+ amount,
+ htlc,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
+ per_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage,
+ htlc
+ }
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
+ preimage,
+ amount,
+ }
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ InputMaterial::Funding {
+ funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ Ok(input_material)
+ }
+}
+
+/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
+/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
+/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
+/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
+/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
+pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
+ // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
+ // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
+ pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
+ // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
+ // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
+ // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
+ // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
+ // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
+ pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
+ // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
+ pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
+ // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
+ // and satisfy witness program.
+ pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
+}
+
+/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
+/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum OnchainEvent {
+ /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
+ /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
+ /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
+ HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
+ },
+ MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
+ },
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+ LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+ },
+ LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
+ unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
+ commitment_number: u64,
+ their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ },
+ PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ },
+ CommitmentSecret {
+ idx: u64,
+ secret: [u8; 32],
+ },
+ /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
+ /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
+ ChannelForceClosed {
+ /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
+ /// think we've fallen behind!
+ should_broadcast: bool,
+ },
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
+ 0u8.write(w)?;
+ commitment_tx.write(w)?;
+ (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+ for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ output.write(w)?;
+ signature.write(w)?;
+ source.write(w)?;
+ }
+ }
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
+ 1u8.write(w)?;
+ unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
+ commitment_number.write(w)?;
+ their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
+ (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+ for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ output.write(w)?;
+ source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
+ }
+ },
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ 2u8.write(w)?;
+ payment_preimage.write(w)?;
+ },
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
+ 3u8.write(w)?;
+ idx.write(w)?;
+ secret.write(w)?;
+ },
+ &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
+ 4u8.write(w)?;
+ should_broadcast.write(w)?;
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ match Readable::read(r)? {
+ 0u8 => {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
+ htlc_outputs: {
+ let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..len {
+ res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ })
+ },
+ 1u8 => {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
+ unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
+ commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
+ their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
+ htlc_outputs: {
+ let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..len {
+ res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ })
+ },
+ 2u8 => {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
+ })
+ },
+ 3u8 => {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
+ idx: Readable::read(r)?,
+ secret: Readable::read(r)?,
+ })
+ },
+ 4u8 => {
+ Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
+ should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
+ })
+ },
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
+/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
+///
+/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
+/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
+///
+/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
+/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
+/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
+/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+ latest_update_id: u64,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
+
+ destination_script: Script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
+ counterparty_payment_script: Script,
+ shutdown_script: Script,
+
+ keys: ChanSigner,
+ funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
+
+ counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
+ funding_redeemscript: Script,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
+ their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+
+ on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
+
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
+ /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
+ /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
+ /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
+ /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
+ /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
+ /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
+ /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
+ /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
+ /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
+
+ // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
+ // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
+ // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
+ // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
+
+ // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
+ // deserialization
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
+ // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
+ // deserialization
+ current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
+
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
+ pending_events: Vec<Event>,
+
+ // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
+ // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
+ // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+
+ // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
+ // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
+ // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
+ // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
+ outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
+
+ // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
+ // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
+ // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
+ lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
+
+ // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
+ // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
+ // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
+ //
+ // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
+ // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
+ // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
+ holder_tx_signed: bool,
+
+ // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
+ // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
+ // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
+ // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
+ // the full block_connected).
+ last_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
+ self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
+ self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
+ self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
+ self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
+ self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
+ self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
+ self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
+ self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
+ self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
+ self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
+ self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
+ self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
+ self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
+ self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
+ /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
+ /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
+ //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+ //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
+ self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.keys.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
+ self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ },
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
+
+ self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+ (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in txouts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
+ ($holder_tx: expr) => {
+ $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ htlc_source.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
+ for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
+ match event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ upd.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
+ for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
+ event.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ descriptor.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
+ txid.write(writer)?;
+ (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in output_scripts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
+ initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+
+ assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
+ let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+
+ let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
+
+ let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
+
+ let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
+ let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+ txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
+ revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
+ feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
+ };
+ onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
+
+ let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
+ outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
+
+ ChannelMonitor {
+ latest_update_id: 0,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
+
+ keys,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+
+ counterparty_tx_cache,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
+
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+ current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+ pending_events: Vec::new(),
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+ outputs_to_watch,
+
+ onchain_tx_handler,
+
+ lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+ holder_tx_signed: false,
+
+ last_block_hash: Default::default(),
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
+ /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
+ /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
+ fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+ }
+
+ // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+ // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
+ if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source = None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
+ let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
+ let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
+ let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
+ let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
+
+ self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if k == htlc.payment_hash {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if k == htlc.payment_hash {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
+ if *cn < min_idx {
+ return true
+ }
+ true
+ } else { false };
+ if contains {
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
+ }
+ false
+ });
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
+ /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
+ /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
+ /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
+ // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
+ // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
+ // timeouts)
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
+ self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
+ }
+
+ let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
+ self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
+ self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
+ //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ }
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
+ for htlc in htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+ htlcs.push(htlc.0);
+ }
+ }
+ self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
+ }
+
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
+ /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
+ /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
+ /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
+ /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
+ fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
+ let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
+ let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+ txid,
+ revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
+ feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
+ };
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
+ if self.holder_tx_signed {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
+ /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
+ pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ }
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
+ }
+
+ /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
+ /// itself.
+ ///
+ /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
+ panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
+ }
+ for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
+ match update {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
+ if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
+ self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
+ self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
+ self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
+ if should_broadcast {
+ self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
+ } else {
+ log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
+ /// ChannelMonitor.
+ pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.latest_update_id
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
+ &self.funding_info
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
+ /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
+ pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
+ &self.outputs_to_watch
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
+ /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
+ /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
+ /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
+ pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+ for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
+ /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
+ ///
+ /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
+ ret
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
+ /// in the process.
+ ///
+ /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
+ /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
+ /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+
+ /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
+ fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
+ /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
+ /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
+ /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
+ /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
+ // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+ let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
+
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
+ let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
+
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+
+ // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
+ if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
+ }
+ // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
+ }
+ } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
+ // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
+ // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
+ // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
+ // insert it here.
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
+ }
+
+ if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ let revocation_point_option =
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ self.counterparty_payment_script = {
+ // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
+ // script_pubkey version
+ let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
+ };
+
+ // Then, try to find htlc outputs
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+ if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
+ return (Vec::new(), None)
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
+ let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
+ let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
+ (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
+ }
+
+ fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+ let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
+
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
+ witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
+ preimage: if !htlc.offered {
+ if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ Some(preimage.clone())
+ } else {
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else { None },
+ amount: htlc.amount_msat,
+ }});
+ watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+ }
+ }
+
+ (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
+ /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
+ /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
+ fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
+ ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != $source
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
+ ($updates: expr) => {
+ claim_requests = $updates.0;
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
+ self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
+ let mut is_holder_tx = false;
+
+ if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_holder_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ append_onchain_update!(res);
+ } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_holder_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
+ append_onchain_update!(res);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
+ ($holder_tx: expr) => {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+ wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if is_holder_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ }
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
+ /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
+ /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
+ /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
+ /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
+ /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
+ /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
+ /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
+ /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
+ pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
+ let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
+ if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+ &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
+ res.push(htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
+ return res
+ }
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+
+ /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
+ /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
+ /// revoked commitment transaction.
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
+ let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
+ if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+ &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
+ res.push(htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return res
+ }
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+
+ /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
+ /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
+ /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
+ /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
+ /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
+ /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
+ ///
+ /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
+ /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
+ ///
+ /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
+ pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
+ for tx in &txn_matched {
+ let mut output_val = 0;
+ for out in tx.output.iter() {
+ if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+ output_val += out.value;
+ if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
+
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
+ for tx in &txn_matched {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 {
+ // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
+ // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
+ // filters.
+ let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
+ if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
+ if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
+ // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
+ // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
+ self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
+
+ self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
+ }
+ let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
+ if should_broadcast {
+ claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
+ }
+ if should_broadcast {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
+ payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
+ payment_preimage: None,
+ source: htlc_update.0,
+ }));
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
+ self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
+ outputs: vec![descriptor]
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
+
+ // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
+ // updating the latter in the process.
+ watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
+ let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
+ self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
+ });
+ watch_outputs
+ }
+
+ /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
+ /// appropriately.
+ pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
+
+ if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ //We may discard:
+ //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
+ //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
+ }
+
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
+ }
+
+ /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
+ /// transactions thereof.
+ fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
+ let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
+ txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
+ let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if matches { break; }
+ if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ matches = true;
+ }
+ }
+ if matches {
+ matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
+ }
+ matches
+ }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
+ }
+
+ /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
+ fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ false
+ }
+
+ fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+ // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
+ // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
+ // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
+ // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
+ // broadcast if we go on-chain.
+ // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
+ // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
+ // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
+ // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
+ for ref htlc in $htlcs {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
+ // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
+ let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
+ if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
+
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+
+ false
+ }
+
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
+ /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
+ let mut payment_data = None;
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+ || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+
+ macro_rules! log_claim {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
+ // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
+ // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
+ // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
+ ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
+ if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
+ for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
+ log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
+ payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
+ for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
+ if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
+ payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ } else if !$holder_tx {
+ check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
+ continue 'outer_loop;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
+ }
+ if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
+ "counterparty commitment tx", false);
+ }
+
+ // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
+ // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
+ if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
+ source,
+ payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+ payment_hash
+ }));
+ }
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
+ upd.source == source
+ } else { false }) {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
+ source,
+ payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+ payment_hash
+ }));
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != source
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
+ fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let mut spendable_output = None;
+ for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
+ if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
+ // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
+ // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
+ // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
+ // wishes to give us money for no reason.
+ // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
+ // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
+ // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
+ // non-standard due to their size.
+ // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
+ // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
+ // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
+ continue;
+ }
+ if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ break;
+ } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
+ if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
+ per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
+ to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
+ revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
+ });
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
+ });
+ break;
+ } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
+ },
+ 1 => { None },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let outpoint = OutPoint {
+ txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ index: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ };
+ let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
+ let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ HolderSignedTx {
+ txid,
+ revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_holder_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
+
+ let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
+ for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
+ pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
+ }
+
+ let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
+ for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
+ if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
+ pending_events.push(event);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ events.push(ev);
+ }
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
+ }
+
+ let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
+ let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_len {
+ outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
+ latest_update_id,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ destination_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
+
+ keys,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+
+ counterparty_tx_cache,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
+
+ commitment_secrets,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+ pending_monitor_events,
+ pending_events,
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+ outputs_to_watch,
+
+ onchain_tx_handler,
+
+ lockdown_from_offchain,
+ holder_tx_signed,
+
+ last_block_hash,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ }))
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+ use hex;
+ use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+ use ln::chan_utils;
+ use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use std::sync::Arc;
+ use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_prune_preimages() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
+
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+
+ let mut preimages = Vec::new();
+ {
+ for i in 0..20 {
+ let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ preimages.push((preimage, hash));
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: true,
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
+ transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
+ }, None));
+ }
+ res
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
+ res
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
+ for preimage in $preimages_slice {
+ assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ &secp_ctx,
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ [41; 32],
+ 0,
+ (0, 0)
+ );
+
+ // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
+ // old state.
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
+ (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
+ 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
+
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+ for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
+ }
+
+ // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
+ let mut secret = [0; 32];
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
+ // previous commitment tx's preimages too
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
+
+ // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
+ // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
+ // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+ let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
+ transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
+ };
+ let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+ if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
+ } else {
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ }
+ $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
+ }
+ }
+
+ let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
+ let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ }
+
+ // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
+}
//! Structs and traits which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the blockchain.
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
+
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
+use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+
pub mod chaininterface;
+pub mod chainmonitor;
+pub mod channelmonitor;
pub mod transaction;
pub mod keysinterface;
+
+/// The `Access` trait defines behavior for accessing chain data and state, such as blocks and
+/// UTXOs.
+pub trait Access: Send + Sync {
+ /// Returns the transaction output of a funding transaction encoded by [`short_channel_id`].
+ /// Returns an error if `genesis_hash` is for a different chain or if such a transaction output
+ /// is unknown.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#definition-of-short_channel_id
+ fn get_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: &BlockHash, short_channel_id: u64) -> Result<TxOut, AccessError>;
+}
+
+/// An error when accessing the chain via [`Access`].
+///
+/// [`Access`]: trait.Access.html
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum AccessError {
+ /// The requested chain is unknown.
+ UnknownChain,
+
+ /// The requested transaction doesn't exist or hasn't confirmed.
+ UnknownTx,
+}
+
+/// The `Watch` trait defines behavior for watching on-chain activity pertaining to channels as
+/// blocks are connected and disconnected.
+///
+/// Each channel is associated with a [`ChannelMonitor`]. Implementations of this trait are
+/// responsible for maintaining a set of monitors such that they can be updated accordingly as
+/// channel state changes and HTLCs are resolved. See method documentation for specific
+/// requirements.
+///
+/// Implementations **must** ensure that updates are successfully applied and persisted upon method
+/// completion. If an update fails with a [`PermanentFailure`], then it must immediately shut down
+/// without taking any further action such as persisting the current state.
+///
+/// If an implementation maintains multiple instances of a channel's monitor (e.g., by storing
+/// backup copies), then it must ensure that updates are applied across all instances. Otherwise, it
+/// could result in a revoked transaction being broadcast, allowing the counterparty to claim all
+/// funds in the channel. See [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for more details about how to handle
+/// multiple instances.
+///
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: channelmonitor/enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
+/// [`PermanentFailure`]: channelmonitor/enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html#variant.PermanentFailure
+pub trait Watch: Send + Sync {
+ /// Keys needed by monitors for creating and signing transactions.
+ type Keys: ChannelKeys;
+
+ /// Watches a channel identified by `funding_txo` using `monitor`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementations are responsible for watching the chain for the funding transaction along
+ /// with any spends of outputs returned by [`get_outputs_to_watch`]. In practice, this means
+ /// calling [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] on the monitor.
+ ///
+ /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.get_outputs_to_watch
+ /// [`block_connected`]: channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
+ /// [`block_disconnected`]: channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Updates a channel identified by `funding_txo` by applying `update` to its monitor.
+ ///
+ /// Implementations must call [`update_monitor`] with the given update. See
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for invariants around returning an error.
+ ///
+ /// [`update_monitor`]: channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.update_monitor
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: channelmonitor/enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
+ fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Returns any monitor events since the last call. Subsequent calls must only return new
+ /// events.
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
+}
+
+/// The `Filter` trait defines behavior for indicating chain activity of interest pertaining to
+/// channels.
+///
+/// This is useful in order to have a [`Watch`] implementation convey to a chain source which
+/// transactions to be notified of. Notification may take the form of pre-filtering blocks or, in
+/// the case of [BIP 157]/[BIP 158], only fetching a block if the compact filter matches. If
+/// receiving full blocks from a chain source, any further filtering is unnecessary.
+///
+/// After an output has been registered, subsequent block retrievals from the chain source must not
+/// exclude any transactions matching the new criteria nor any in-block descendants of such
+/// transactions.
+///
+/// Note that use as part of a [`Watch`] implementation involves reentrancy. Therefore, the `Filter`
+/// should not block on I/O. Implementations should instead queue the newly monitored data to be
+/// processed later. Then, in order to block until the data has been processed, any `Watch`
+/// invocation that has called the `Filter` must return [`TemporaryFailure`].
+///
+/// [`Watch`]: trait.Watch.html
+/// [`TemporaryFailure`]: channelmonitor/enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html#variant.TemporaryFailure
+/// [BIP 157]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0157.mediawiki
+/// [BIP 158]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0158.mediawiki
+pub trait Filter: Send + Sync {
+ /// Registers interest in a transaction with `txid` and having an output with `script_pubkey` as
+ /// a spending condition.
+ fn register_tx(&self, txid: &Txid, script_pubkey: &Script);
+
+ /// Registers interest in spends of a transaction output identified by `outpoint` having
+ /// `script_pubkey` as the spending condition.
+ fn register_output(&self, outpoint: &OutPoint, script_pubkey: &Script);
+}
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-//! Contains simple structs describing parts of transactions on the chain.
+//! Types describing on-chain transactions.
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+
+/// Transaction data where each item consists of a transaction reference paired with the index of
+/// the transaction within a block.
+///
+/// Useful for passing enumerated transactions from a block, possibly filtered, in order to retain
+/// the transaction index.
+///
+/// ```
+/// extern crate bitcoin;
+/// extern crate lightning;
+///
+/// use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Block;
+/// use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+/// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+/// use lightning::chain::transaction::TransactionData;
+///
+/// let block = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
+/// let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+/// check_block(&block, &txdata);
+///
+/// fn check_block(block: &Block, txdata: &TransactionData) {
+/// assert_eq!(block.txdata.len(), 1);
+/// assert_eq!(txdata.len(), 1);
+///
+/// let (index, tx) = txdata[0];
+/// assert_eq!(index, 0);
+/// assert_eq!(tx, &block.txdata[0]);
+/// }
+/// ```
+pub type TransactionData<'a> = [(usize, &'a Transaction)];
/// A reference to a transaction output.
///
/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
}
}
impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
- pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
}
48
}
- pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
//TODO This can be optimized?
let mut min = 1 << 48;
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
}
#[inline]
- pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
for i in 0..bits {
let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
res
}
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
}
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
//! There are a bunch of these as their handling is relatively error-prone so they are split out
//! here. See also the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
+use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channelmanager::{RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure};
-use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, RoutingMessageHandler};
let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &None), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}, {});
let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
{
let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
}
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
// Now set it to failed again...
let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
{
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &None), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, {});
// Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
{
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &None), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, {});
}
// Now fix monitor updating...
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.msgs[0]);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.commitment_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Now fail monitor updating.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
// Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
// update_add update.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
// Now we have a CS queued up which adds a new HTLC (which will need a RAA/CS response from
// nodes[1]) followed by an RAA. Fail the monitor updating prior to the CS, deliver the RAA,
// then restore channel monitor updates.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
// nodes[1] should be AwaitingRAA here!
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
// Now deliver a's reestablish, freeing the claim from the holding cell, but fail the monitor
// update.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Now un-fail the monitor, which will result in B sending its original commitment update,
// receiving the commitment update from A, and the resulting commitment dances.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect);
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
// Deliver the final RAA for the first payment, which does not require a response. RAAs
// generally require a commitment_signed, so the fact that we're expecting an opposite response
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_string(), 1);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, &None, 1_000_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Successfully update the monitor on the 1<->2 channel, but the 0<->1 channel should still be
// paused, so forward shouldn't succeed until we call channel_monitor_updated().
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
} else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
// Now restore monitor updating on the 0<->1 channel and claim the funds on B.
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
let as_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, &None, 1_000_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let channel_id = OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
};
if confirm_a_first {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].block_notifier, &nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &funding_tx);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
} else {
assert!(!restore_b_before_conf);
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].block_notifier, &nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &funding_tx);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
if !restore_b_before_conf {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].block_notifier, &nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &funding_tx);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let (channel_id, (announcement, as_update, bs_update)) = if !confirm_a_first {
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].block_notifier, &nodes[0].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &funding_tx);
let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
(channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked))
} else {
if restore_b_before_conf {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].block_notifier, &nodes[1].chain_monitor, &funding_tx, funding_tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &funding_tx);
}
let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
(channel_id, create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &funding_locked))
// Set it so that the first monitor update (for the path 0 -> 1 -> 3) succeeds, but the second
// (for the path 0 -> 2 -> 3) fails.
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.next_update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.next_update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
// Now check that we get the right return value, indicating that the first path succeeded but
// the second got a MonitorUpdateFailed err. This implies PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure as
if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = results[1] {} else { panic!(); }
} else { panic!(); }
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ *nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
// Pass the first HTLC of the payment along to nodes[3].
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// And check that, after we successfully update the monitor for chan_2 we can pass the second
// HTLC along to nodes[3] and claim the whole payment back to nodes[0].
- let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_id).unwrap().clone();
+ let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].node.channel_monitor_updated(&outpoint, latest_update);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::transaction_utils;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
}
}
}
- if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (*index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
+ if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
}
assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
}
}
}
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain;
+use chain::Watch;
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
+pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
path: Vec<RouteHop>,
///
/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
default_configuration: UserConfig,
genesis_hash: BlockHash,
fee_estimator: F,
- monitor: M,
+ chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
#[cfg(test)]
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
///
/// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
/// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
- /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
- /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
- /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
- /// go.
- pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
fee_estimator: fee_est,
- monitor,
+ chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
// force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
// the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
// ignore the result here.
- let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
+ let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
}
}
}, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
// Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
// that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
continue;
}
};
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
continue;
}
match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
if was_frozen_for_monitor {
assert!(msgs.is_none());
} else {
/// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
///
/// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
- /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
+ /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
/// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
/// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
/// any time it cannot do so instantly,
}
fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
+ let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
}
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_update) {
+ // lock before watch_channel
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
match e {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
// Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
Ok(update) => update,
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
}
(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
Err((Some(update), e)) => {
assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
- let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
+ let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
unreachable!();
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
//TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
}
let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
if was_frozen_for_monitor {
assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
// for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
// re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
{
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
unimplemented!();
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
}
}
- /// Process pending events from the ManyChannelMonitor.
+ /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
- for monitor_event in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() {
+ for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
- ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) {
+ /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
+ pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
let header_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
return false;
}
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
- for tx in txn_matched {
+ for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
}
- /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
+ /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
+ ///
+ /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
+ /// in the shutdown.
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
-/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
+/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
-/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
///
/// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
pub fee_estimator: F,
- /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
///
- /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
+ /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
/// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
- /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
- pub monitor: M,
+ /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
+ pub chain_monitor: M,
/// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
/// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
/// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
/// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
/// populate a HashMap directly from C.
- pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
+ pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
Self {
- keys_manager, fee_estimator, monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
+ keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
}
}
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
- where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
+ where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
- monitor: args.monitor,
+ chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
-// history.
-//
-// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
-// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
-// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
-// licenses.
-
-//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
-//! here.
-//!
-//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
-//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
-//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
-//!
-//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
-//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
-//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
-//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
-//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-
-use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
-use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::events::Event;
-
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
-use std::sync::Mutex;
-use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
-use std::ops::Deref;
-use std::io::Error;
-
-/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
-/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
-#[must_use]
-pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
- /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
- /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
- /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
- ///
- /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
- /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
- pub update_id: u64,
-}
-
-impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.update_id.write(w)?;
- (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
- update_step.write(w)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
- for _ in 0..len {
- updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
- }
- Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
- }
-}
-
-/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
- /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
- ///
- /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
- /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
- /// restore the channel to an operational state.
- ///
- /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
- /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
- /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
- ///
- /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
- /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
- /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
- /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
- /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
- /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
- /// been "frozen".
- ///
- /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
- /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
- /// operation.
- ///
- /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
- /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
- /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
- /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
- /// reload-time.
- ///
- /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
- /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
- /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
- TemporaryFailure,
- /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
- /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel).
- ///
- /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
- /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
- /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
- /// update must be rejected.
- ///
- /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
- /// the channel monitor instance.
- ///
- /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
- /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
- /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
- PermanentFailure,
-}
-
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
-/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
-/// corrupted.
-/// Contains a human-readable error message.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
-/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum MonitorEvent {
- /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
- HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
-
- /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
- CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
-}
-
-/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
-/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct HTLCUpdate {
- pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- pub(super) source: HTLCSource
-}
-impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
-
-/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
-/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
-///
-/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
-///
-/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
-/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
-/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
-///
-/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
-/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
-///
-/// (C-not exported) due to an unconstrained generic in `Key`
-pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
- where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
-{
- /// The monitors
- pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
- chain_monitor: C,
- broadcaster: T,
- logger: L,
- fee_estimator: F
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
- ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
- where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
-{
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) {
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
-
- for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
- where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
-{
- /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
- /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
- let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
- monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- chain_monitor,
- broadcaster,
- logger,
- fee_estimator: feeest,
- };
-
- res
- }
-
- /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
- };
- {
- let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as u32), &funding_txo.1);
- for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
- for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
- }
- }
- }
- entry.insert(monitor);
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
- orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
- },
- None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
- where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
-{
- type Keys = ChanSigner;
-
- fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
- }
-
- fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
- }
-
- fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
- for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
- }
- pending_monitor_events
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
- where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
-{
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
- }
- pending_events
- }
-}
-
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
-/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
-pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
-/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
-/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
-pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
-/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
-/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
-/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
-/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
-/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
-/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
-/// accurate block height.
-/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
-/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
-/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
-pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
-/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
-/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
-/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
-/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
-pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
-/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
-///
-/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
-/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
-/// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
-/// fail this HTLC,
-/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
-/// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
-/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
-/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
-///
-/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
-/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
-///
-/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
-/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
-/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
-///
-/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
-/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct HolderSignedTx {
- /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
- txid: Txid,
- revocation_key: PublicKey,
- a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u32,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
-}
-
-/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
-/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
- per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
-}
-
-impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
- self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
- w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
- for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- htlc.write(w)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
- htlcs.push(htlc);
- }
- if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
- CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv,
- per_htlc,
- }
- };
- Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
- }
-}
-
-/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
-/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
-/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
- Revoked {
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
- input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
- amount: u64,
- htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
- },
- CounterpartyHTLC {
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
- },
- HolderHTLC {
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- },
- Funding {
- funding_redeemscript: Script,
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
- input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- htlc.write(writer)?;
- on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- htlc.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
- writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
- funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl Readable for InputMaterial {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::Revoked {
- per_commitment_point,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- per_commitment_key,
- input_descriptor,
- amount,
- htlc,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
- per_commitment_point,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage,
- htlc
- }
- },
- 2 => {
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
- preimage,
- amount,
- }
- },
- 3 => {
- InputMaterial::Funding {
- funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- Ok(input_material)
- }
-}
-
-/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
-/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
-/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
-/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
-/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
-pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
- // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
- // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
- pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
- // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
- // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
- // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
- // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
- // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
- pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
- // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
- pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
- // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
- // and satisfy witness program.
- pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
-}
-
-/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
-/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum OnchainEvent {
- /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
- /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
- /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
- HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
- },
- MaturingOutput {
- descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
- },
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
- },
- LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
- commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
- },
- PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- },
- CommitmentSecret {
- idx: u64,
- secret: [u8; 32],
- },
- /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
- /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
- ChannelForceClosed {
- /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
- /// think we've fallen behind!
- should_broadcast: bool,
- },
-}
-
-impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
- 0u8.write(w)?;
- commitment_tx.write(w)?;
- (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
- output.write(w)?;
- signature.write(w)?;
- source.write(w)?;
- }
- }
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
- 1u8.write(w)?;
- unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
- commitment_number.write(w)?;
- their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
- (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
- output.write(w)?;
- source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
- }
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
- 2u8.write(w)?;
- payment_preimage.write(w)?;
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
- 3u8.write(w)?;
- idx.write(w)?;
- secret.write(w)?;
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
- 4u8.write(w)?;
- should_broadcast.write(w)?;
- },
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match Readable::read(r)? {
- 0u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
- htlc_outputs: {
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for _ in 0..len {
- res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
- }
- res
- },
- })
- },
- 1u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
- commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
- their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
- htlc_outputs: {
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for _ in 0..len {
- res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
- }
- res
- },
- })
- },
- 2u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- },
- 3u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
- idx: Readable::read(r)?,
- secret: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- },
- 4u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
- should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
- })
- },
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
-/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
-///
-/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
-/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
-///
-/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
-/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
-/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
-/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
-pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
- latest_update_id: u64,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
-
- destination_script: Script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
- counterparty_payment_script: Script,
- shutdown_script: Script,
-
- keys: ChanSigner,
- funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
- funding_redeemscript: Script,
- channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
- /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
- /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
- /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
- /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
- /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
- /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
- /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
- /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
- /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
-
- // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
- // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
- // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
- // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
-
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
-
- pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
- pending_events: Vec<Event>,
-
- // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
- // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
- // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
-
- // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
- // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
- // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
- // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
- outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
-
- // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
- // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
- // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
- lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
-
- // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
- // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
- // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
- //
- // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
- // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
- // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
- holder_tx_signed: bool,
-
- // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
- // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
- // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
- // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
- // the full block_connected).
- last_block_hash: BlockHash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
-}
-
-/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
-/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
-/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
-/// server(s).
-///
-/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
-/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
-/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
-/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
-/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
-/// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
-///
-/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
-/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
-/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
-/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
-///
-/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
-/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
-/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
-/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
-/// all registered listeners in one go.
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
- /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public
- /// keys.
- type Keys: ChannelKeys;
-
- /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
- /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
- /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
- ///
- /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
- /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
- /// any spends of any of the outputs.
- ///
- /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
- /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
- fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<Self::Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
- /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
- /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
- ///
- /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
- /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
- /// any spends of any of the outputs.
- ///
- /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
- /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
- ///
- /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, even if an Err is return, the new version
- /// must be written to disk, as state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing
- /// a commitment broadcast. This storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed
- /// onchain by another watchtower, lagging behind on block processing.
- fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
- /// with success or failure.
- ///
- /// You should probably just call through to
- /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() for each ChannelMonitor and return
- /// the full list.
- fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
- self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
- self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
- self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
- self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
- self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
- self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
- self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
- self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
- self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
- self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
- {
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
- /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
- /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
- //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
- //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
-
- // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- }
-
- self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
- self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
-
- self.keys.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
- self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
-
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
-
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
- writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
- match second_option {
- Some(second_pubkey) => {
- writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
- },
- }
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- },
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
-
- self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc_output: expr) => {
- writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
- (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in txouts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
- ($holder_tx: expr) => {
- $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- } else {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- }
- htlc_source.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
- for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
- for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
- match event {
- MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- upd.write(writer)?;
- },
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
- for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
- event.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
- for ev in events.iter() {
- match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
- txid.write(writer)?;
- (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in output_scripts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
-
- self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
-
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
- on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
-
- assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
-
- let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
-
- let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
-
- let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
- txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
- revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
- };
- onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
-
- ChannelMonitor {
- latest_update_id: 0,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
-
- keys,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
-
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
- pending_events: Vec::new(),
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
- outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
-
- onchain_tx_handler,
-
- lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- holder_tx_signed: false,
-
- last_block_hash: Default::default(),
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- }
- }
-
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
- /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
- /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
- }
-
- // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
- // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
- if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
- }
- }
-
- if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
- let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
- let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
-
- self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- }
- let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
- if *cn < min_idx {
- return true
- }
- true
- } else { false };
- if contains {
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
- }
- false
- });
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
- /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
- /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
- /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
- // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
- // timeouts)
- for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
- }
-
- let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- }
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
- for htlc in htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
- htlcs.push(htlc.0);
- }
- }
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
- /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
- /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
- };
- self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
- self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
- if self.holder_tx_signed {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
- /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
- self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- }
-
- /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
- /// itself.
- ///
- /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
- panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
- }
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
- match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
- if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
- self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
- if should_broadcast {
- self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- } else {
- log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
- }
- }
- }
- }
- self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
- /// ChannelMonitor.
- pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.latest_update_id
- }
-
- /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
- &self.funding_info
- }
-
- /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
- /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
- pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
- &self.outputs_to_watch
- }
-
- /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
- /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
- /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
- /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
- pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
- /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events().
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
- ///
- /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
- /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
- /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_holder_commitment_number
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
- /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
- // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
- };
- }
-
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
- let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
-
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
- }
- }
-
- // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
- if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
- }
- // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
- }
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
- continue $id;
- }
- }
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
- }
-
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- self.counterparty_payment_script = {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version
- let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
- };
-
- // Then, try to find htlc outputs
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
- return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
- (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
- }
-
- fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
-
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
- witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
- preimage: if !htlc.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- Some(preimage.clone())
- } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None },
- amount: htlc.amount_msat,
- }});
- watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
- /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
- ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != $source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
- claim_requests = $updates.0;
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
- }
- }
-
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_holder_tx = false;
-
- if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($holder_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source {
- wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if is_holder_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
- /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
- /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
- /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
- /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
- /// revoked commitment transaction.
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
- /// ChainListener::block_connected.
- /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
- /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
- /// on-chain.
- fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- for tx in txn_matched {
- let mut output_val = 0;
- for out in tx.output.iter() {
- if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- output_val += out.value;
- if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- }
- }
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- for tx in txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 {
- // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
- let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
-
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
- }
- let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
- if should_broadcast {
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
- }
- if should_broadcast {
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- }
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
- payment_preimage: None,
- source: htlc_update.0,
- }));
- },
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
- self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
- outputs: vec![descriptor]
- });
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
-
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
- self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
- }
-
- watch_outputs
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
- if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
- //We may discard:
- //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
-
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- }
-
- fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
- // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
- // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
- // broadcast if we go on-chain.
- // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
- // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
- // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
- // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
- // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for ref htlc in $htlcs {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
- // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
-
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
- /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
- let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
-
- macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
- log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
- ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
- if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
- if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
- payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
- if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$holder_tx {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "counterparty commitment tx", false);
- }
-
- // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
- // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
- if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
- upd.source == source
- } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
- fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut spendable_output = None;
- for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
- if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
- // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
- // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
- // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
- // wishes to give us money for no reason.
- // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
- // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
- // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
- // non-standard due to their size.
- // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
- // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
- // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
- continue;
- }
- if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- break;
- } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
- if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
- to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
- });
- break;
- }
- } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- });
- break;
- } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
- },
- 1 => { None },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
- let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
- let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_holder_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
-
- let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
- for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
- };
- pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
- }
-
- let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
- for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
- if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
- pending_events.push(event);
- }
- }
-
- let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
- descriptor
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- events.push(ev);
- }
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
- }
-
- let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
- for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
- for _ in 0..outputs_len {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
- let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
-
- keys,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv,
-
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
-
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events,
- pending_events,
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
-
- onchain_tx_handler,
-
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
-
- last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- }))
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
- use hex;
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use std::sync::Arc;
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-
- let mut preimages = Vec::new();
- {
- for i in 0..20 {
- let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- preimages.push((preimage, hash));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: true,
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 0,
- payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
- }
- res
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
- ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
- for preimage in $preimages_slice {
- assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
- }
- }
- }
-
- let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
- &secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- [41; 32],
- 0,
- (0, 0)
- );
-
- // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
- // old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
- (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
- 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
-
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
- for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
- }
-
- // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
- let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
-
- // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
-
- // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
- // previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
-
- // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
- // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
- // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
- let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
- };
- let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
- if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
- } else {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
- }
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
- }
- }
-
- let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
- let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
-
- // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
- }
-
- // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
-}
//! A bunch of useful utilities for building networks of nodes and exchanging messages between
//! nodes for functional tests.
-use chain::chaininterface;
+use chain::Watch;
+use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ManyChannelMonitor};
use routing::router::{Route, get_route};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
use util::test_utils;
-use util::test_utils::TestChannelMonitor;
+use util::test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable, Readable};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use std::collections::HashMap;
pub const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 100;
-pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b: 'a>(notifier: &'a chaininterface::BlockNotifierRef<'b, &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: i32) {
- assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id as usize; 1]);
+
+pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let dummy_tx_count = tx.version as usize;
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![dummy_tx; dummy_tx_count],
+ };
+ block.txdata.push(tx.clone());
+ connect_block(node, &block, 1);
for i in 2..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &vec![], &[0; 0]);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(node, &block, i);
}
}
-pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b>(notifier: &'a chaininterface::BlockNotifierRef<'b, &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, depth: u32, height: u32, parent: bool, prev_blockhash: BlockHash) -> BlockHash {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000000, prev_blockhash: if parent { prev_blockhash } else { Default::default() }, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, height + 1, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, depth: u32, height: u32, parent: bool, prev_blockhash: BlockHash) -> BlockHash {
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x2000000, prev_blockhash: if parent { prev_blockhash } else { Default::default() }, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(node, &block, height + 1);
for i in 2..depth + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, height + i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(node, &block, height + i);
}
- header.block_hash()
+ block.header.block_hash()
+}
+
+pub fn connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+ while node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height) {}
+ node.node.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height);
+}
+
+pub fn disconnect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_disconnected(header, height);
+ node.node.block_disconnected(header);
}
pub struct TestChanMonCfg {
pub tx_broadcaster: test_utils::TestBroadcaster,
pub fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
- pub chain_monitor: chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil,
+ pub chain_source: test_utils::TestChainSource,
pub logger: test_utils::TestLogger,
}
pub struct NodeCfg<'a> {
- pub chain_monitor: &'a chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil,
+ pub chain_source: &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
pub tx_broadcaster: &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster,
pub fee_estimator: &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
- pub chan_monitor: test_utils::TestChannelMonitor<'a>,
+ pub chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor<'a>,
pub keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
pub logger: &'a test_utils::TestLogger,
pub node_seed: [u8; 32],
}
pub struct Node<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c: 'b> {
- pub block_notifier: chaininterface::BlockNotifierRef<'a, &'c chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
- pub chain_monitor: &'c chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil,
+ pub chain_source: &'c test_utils::TestChainSource,
pub tx_broadcaster: &'c test_utils::TestBroadcaster,
- pub chan_monitor: &'b test_utils::TestChannelMonitor<'c>,
+ pub chain_monitor: &'b test_utils::TestChainMonitor<'c>,
pub keys_manager: &'b test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
- pub node: &'a ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'b TestChannelMonitor<'c>, &'c test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'b test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'c test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>,
- pub net_graph_msg_handler: NetGraphMsgHandler<&'c chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ pub node: &'a ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'b TestChainMonitor<'c>, &'c test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'b test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'c test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ pub net_graph_msg_handler: NetGraphMsgHandler<&'c test_utils::TestChainSource, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>,
pub node_seed: [u8; 32],
pub network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
pub network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
// Check that we processed all pending events
assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+ assert!(self.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
// Check that if we serialize the Router, we can deserialize it again.
{
let network_graph_deser = <NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap();
assert!(network_graph_deser == *self.net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap());
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::from_net_graph(
- self.chain_monitor, self.logger, network_graph_deser
+ Some(self.chain_source), self.logger, network_graph_deser
);
let mut chan_progress = 0;
loop {
let feeest = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
let mut deserialized_monitors = Vec::new();
{
- let old_monitors = self.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let old_monitors = self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for (_, old_monitor) in old_monitors.iter() {
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
old_monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
self.node.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(w.0), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(w.0), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager: self.keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 },
- monitor: self.chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: self.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: self.tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &test_utils::TestLogger::new(),
channel_monitors,
}).unwrap();
}
- let chain_watch = chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
- let channel_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chain_watch, self.tx_broadcaster.clone(), &self.logger, &feeest);
+ let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
+ let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), self.tx_broadcaster.clone(), &self.logger, &feeest);
for deserialized_monitor in deserialized_monitors.drain(..) {
- if let Err(_) = channel_monitor.add_monitor(deserialized_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, deserialized_monitor) {
+ if let Err(_) = chain_monitor.watch_channel(deserialized_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, deserialized_monitor) {
panic!();
}
}
- if chain_watch != *self.chain_monitor {
- panic!();
- }
+ assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap(), *self.chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap(), *self.chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap());
}
}
}
macro_rules! get_local_commitment_txn {
($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
{
- let mut monitors = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut monitors = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let mut commitment_txn = None;
for (funding_txo, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
if funding_txo.to_channel_id() == $channel_id {
macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
{
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = $node.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
added_monitors.clear();
}
node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
{
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
{
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
}
pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_recv: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'c>, node_conf: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
- confirm_transaction(&node_conf.block_notifier, &node_conf.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(node_conf, tx);
node_recv.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_conf.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_conf, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id()));
}
pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_a, node_b, tx);
- confirm_transaction(&node_a.block_notifier, &node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(node_a, tx);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_b, node_a)
}
for i in 0..node_count {
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
- let chain_monitor = chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
+ let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i));
- chan_mon_cfgs.push(TestChanMonCfg{ tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, logger });
+ chan_mon_cfgs.push(TestChanMonCfg{ tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator, chain_source, logger });
}
chan_mon_cfgs
for i in 0..node_count {
let seed = [i as u8; 32];
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
- let chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chanmon_cfgs[i].chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[i].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[i].fee_estimator);
- nodes.push(NodeCfg { chain_monitor: &chanmon_cfgs[i].chain_monitor, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[i].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[i].fee_estimator, chan_monitor, keys_manager, node_seed: seed });
+ let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[i].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[i].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[i].fee_estimator);
+ nodes.push(NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[i].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[i].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[i].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager, node_seed: seed });
}
nodes
}
-pub fn create_node_chanmgrs<'a, 'b>(node_count: usize, cfgs: &'a Vec<NodeCfg<'b>>, node_config: &[Option<UserConfig>]) -> Vec<ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a TestChannelMonitor<'b>, &'b test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'b test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'b test_utils::TestLogger>> {
+pub fn create_node_chanmgrs<'a, 'b>(node_count: usize, cfgs: &'a Vec<NodeCfg<'b>>, node_config: &[Option<UserConfig>]) -> Vec<ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a TestChainMonitor<'b>, &'b test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'b test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'b test_utils::TestLogger>> {
let mut chanmgrs = Vec::new();
for i in 0..node_count {
let mut default_config = UserConfig::default();
default_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
default_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
default_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1000; // sanitization being done by the sender, to exerce receiver logic we need to lift of limit
- let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, cfgs[i].fee_estimator, &cfgs[i].chan_monitor, cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, cfgs[i].logger.clone(), &cfgs[i].keys_manager, if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { default_config }, 0);
+ let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, cfgs[i].fee_estimator, &cfgs[i].chain_monitor, cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, cfgs[i].logger.clone(), &cfgs[i].keys_manager, if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { default_config }, 0);
chanmgrs.push(node);
}
chanmgrs
}
-pub fn create_network<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c: 'b>(node_count: usize, cfgs: &'b Vec<NodeCfg<'c>>, chan_mgrs: &'a Vec<ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'b TestChannelMonitor<'c>, &'c test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'b test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'c test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> Vec<Node<'a, 'b, 'c>> {
+pub fn create_network<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c: 'b>(node_count: usize, cfgs: &'b Vec<NodeCfg<'c>>, chan_mgrs: &'a Vec<ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'b TestChainMonitor<'c>, &'c test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'b test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'c test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'c test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> Vec<Node<'a, 'b, 'c>> {
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
for i in 0..node_count {
- let block_notifier = chaininterface::BlockNotifier::new(cfgs[i].chain_monitor);
- block_notifier.register_listener(&cfgs[i].chan_monitor.simple_monitor as &chaininterface::ChainListener);
- block_notifier.register_listener(&chan_mgrs[i] as &chaininterface::ChainListener);
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(cfgs[i].chain_monitor, cfgs[i].logger);
- nodes.push(Node{ chain_monitor: &cfgs[i].chain_monitor, block_notifier,
- tx_broadcaster: cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor: &cfgs[i].chan_monitor,
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(None, cfgs[i].logger);
+ nodes.push(Node{ chain_source: cfgs[i].chain_source,
+ tx_broadcaster: cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, chain_monitor: &cfgs[i].chain_monitor,
keys_manager: &cfgs[i].keys_manager, node: &chan_mgrs[i], net_graph_msg_handler,
node_seed: cfgs[i].node_seed, network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(), logger: cfgs[i].logger,
//! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
//! claim outputs on-chain.
+use chain::Watch;
+use chain::channelmonitor;
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
-use chain::chaininterface;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, BlockNotifier};
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
-use ln::channelmonitor;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, get_route};
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
- assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version as usize; 1]);
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![tx],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version as usize; 1]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &block, 1);
let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new(), &[0; 0]);
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &block, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, 1);
}
if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
{
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
{
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].block_notifier, &nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
}
// nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
{
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
added_monitors.clear();
}
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![tx.clone()]}, 1);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![tx.clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![tx.clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![tx.clone()]}, 1);
nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[3], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
{ // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[4], &Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
}
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
// buffer space).
let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[3], &block, 2);
for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[3], &block, i);
}
let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
// Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, 3_000_000);
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
- nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[4], &block, 2);
for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[4], &block, i);
}
let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[4], &block, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
(close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
// Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4, 3_000_000);
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
// Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
// Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1)
}
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
- // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
+ // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
// broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
// We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
// A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
{
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
added_monitors.clear();
}
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
{
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
// Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success)
// we already checked the same situation with A.
// Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
- // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
+ // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
// broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
// A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
// B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
// Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
let timeout_tx;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
node_txn.clear();
}
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
let (_, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
+ // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
// registering new transactions
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]}, 1);
}
#[test]
node_txn.remove(0)
};
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![tx.clone()],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, 1);
// Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
// Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
{
- let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
}
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &block, 1);
let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
headers.push(header.clone());
}
- let mut height = 99;
while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
- height -= 1;
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].block_notifier, &nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
match events_1[0] {
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].block_notifier, &nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
};
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 101, &[], &[]);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 101, &[], &[]);
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &block, 101);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, 101);
for i in 102..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 100 + 1 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS {
- header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[], &[]);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[], &[]);
+ block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &block, i);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, i);
}
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
}
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 101, &[], &[]);
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, 101);
for i in 102..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 100 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS {
- header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[], &[]);
+ block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, i);
}
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 100 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, &[], &[]);
+ block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 100 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
if forwarded_htlc {
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
- let new_chan_monitor: test_utils::TestChannelMonitor;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
let keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface;
- let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
- new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: config,
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &logger,
channel_monitors,
nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
- nodes[0].block_notifier.register_listener(nodes[0].node);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
- let new_chan_monitor: test_utils::TestChannelMonitor;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
let keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface;
- let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the event message FundingBroadcastSafe
node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
{
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
{
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
// Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: config,
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &logger,
channel_monitors,
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
// After deserializing, make sure the FundingBroadcastSafe event is still held by the channel manager
};
// Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
- nodes[0].block_notifier.register_listener(nodes[0].node);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
- let new_chan_monitor: test_utils::TestChannelMonitor;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
let keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface;
- let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
- new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &logger,
channel_monitors,
nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
- let new_chan_monitor: test_utils::TestChannelMonitor;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
let keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface;
- let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
- for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
// Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
// nodes[3])
let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
- for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
- new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &logger,
channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
logger: &logger,
channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
}
for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
($node: expr, $der_idx: expr, $keysinterface: expr, $chan_value: expr) => {
{
- let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let mut txn = Vec::new();
for event in events {
match event {
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 3_000_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
match events[0] {
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
// Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
match events[0] {
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
// A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3);
// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
// Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
// B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
// A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
let header_1 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_1, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
// Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
// didn't try to generate any new transactions.
#[test]
fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
- // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
+ // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
+ // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
// First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
// Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
// channel.
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
// So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
{
let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// ChannelMonitor: claim tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout tx
};
// Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, &None, 900_000);
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
match events[0] {
check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.block_hash());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false);
// Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 9_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
match events[0] {
};
let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_201, txdata: node_txn.clone() }, 201);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: node_txn.clone() }, 201);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
// Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
if announce_latest {
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![ds_last_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![ds_last_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
} else {
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![ds_prev_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: vec![ds_prev_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
}
- connect_blocks(&nodes[2].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
// Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
};
let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
// We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
let seed = [42; 32];
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
- let chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
- let node = NodeCfg { chain_monitor: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_monitor, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chan_monitor, keys_manager, node_seed: seed };
+ let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
+ let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager, node_seed: seed };
let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
node_cfgs.remove(0);
node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
// Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn_1[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn_1[0].clone()] }, 200);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
};
let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2, node_cfgs[1].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, i);
+ block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()}, i);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()}, i);
header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &block, i);
+ block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
}
if !check_revoke_no_close {
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
if announce_latest {
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![as_last_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![as_last_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
} else {
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![as_prev_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![as_prev_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.block_hash());
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &[(0, &dummy_tx)], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
// We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20, 1, true, header.block_hash());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
if local {
// We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![as_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![as_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
- let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.block_hash());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_2, txdata: vec![timeout_tx[0].clone()]}, 7);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_2, txdata: vec![timeout_tx[0].clone()]}, 7);
let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
} else {
// We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bs_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![bs_commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
- let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.block_hash());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.block_hash());
let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
if !revoked {
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_2, txdata: vec![timeout_tx[0].clone()]}, 7);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_2, txdata: vec![timeout_tx[0].clone()]}, 7);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
} else {
// If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
let logger;
let fee_estimator;
let tx_broadcaster;
- let chain_monitor;
+ let chain_source;
let monitor;
let node_state_0;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
// Cache node A state before any channel update
let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut previous_chan_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut previous_chan_monitor_state).unwrap();
+ let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// Restore node A from previous state
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
- let mut chan_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0)).unwrap().1;
- chain_monitor = ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
+ let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0)).unwrap().1;
+ chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet);
- monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chain_monitor, &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator);
+ monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator);
node_state_0 = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chan_monitor);
- <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChannelMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingChannelKeys, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
keys_manager: &keys_manager,
fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
- monitor: &monitor,
+ chain_monitor: &monitor,
logger: &logger,
tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
}).unwrap().1
};
nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
- assert!(monitor.add_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = &monitor;
- nodes[0].chain_monitor = &chain_monitor;
-
- nodes[0].block_notifier = BlockNotifier::new(&nodes[0].chain_monitor);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.register_listener(&nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor);
- nodes[0].block_notifier.register_listener(nodes[0].node);
+ assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
+ nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 0);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 0, true, header.block_hash());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1, node_cfgs[0].keys_manager, 100000);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}
// Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
- let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 114, 0, false, Default::default());
+ let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 114, 0, false, Default::default());
// Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] }, 115);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] }, 115);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
};
// After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
- let header = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 115, true, header.block_hash());
+ let header = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 3, 115, true, header.block_hash());
let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
let mut feerate_2 = 0;
{
assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
// After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 3, 118, true, header);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 3, 118, true, header);
let penalty_3;
let mut feerate_3 = 0;
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
// B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
let header_128 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_128, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 128);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_128, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 128);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 129);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 129);
let first;
let feerate_1;
let penalty_txn;
// Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() }, 131);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() }, 131);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
};
// Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
- let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 4, 131, true, header_131.block_hash());
+ let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4, 131, true, header_131.block_hash());
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
- let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135);
+ let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9, 135, true, header_135);
let node_txn = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
};
// Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn }, 145);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn }, 145);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20, 145, true, header_145.block_hash());
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
// Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
// One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
// After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 15, 1, true, header.block_hash());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15, 1, true, header.block_hash());
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks on node A to advance height towards TEST_FINAL_CLTV
- let prev_header_100 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 100, 0, false, Default::default());
+ let prev_header_100 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 100, 0, false, Default::default());
// Provide node A with both preimage
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, &None, 3_000_000);
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2, &None, 3_000_000);
// Connect blocks on node A commitment transaction
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: prev_header_100, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 101);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 101);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Verify node A broadcast tx claiming both HTLCs
}
// Connect blocks on node B
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 135, 0, false, Default::default());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 135, 0, false, Default::default());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
// Broadcast partial claim on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![partial_claim_tx.clone()] }, 102);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![partial_claim_tx.clone()] }, 102);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// Disconnect last block on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_disconnected(&header, 102);
+ disconnect_block(&nodes[0], &header, 102);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
}
//// Disconnect one more block and then reconnect multiple no transaction should be generated
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_disconnected(&header, 101);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1].block_notifier, 15, 101, false, prev_header_100);
+ disconnect_block(&nodes[0], &header, 101);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15, 101, false, prev_header_100);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 9_000_000);
// Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
- let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, false, Default::default());
+ let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 128, 0, false, Default::default());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 129);
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 129);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let penalty_txn = {
penalty_txn
};
let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 130, false, header_130.block_hash());
+ connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5, 130, false, header_130.block_hash());
{
- let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }) {
assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
// Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
- // Copy SimpleManyChannelMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
+ // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
+ let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
- let chain_monitor = chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
let watchtower = {
- let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(
&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
- let watchtower = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
- assert!(watchtower.add_monitor(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
+ let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
+ assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
watchtower
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- watchtower.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 200, &vec![], &vec![]);
+ watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &[], 200);
// Try to update ChannelMonitor
assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage, &None, 9_000_000));
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
if let Ok((_, _, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
- if let Err(_) = watchtower.simple_monitor.update_monitor(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_monitor(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
+ if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
} else { assert!(false); }
} else { assert!(false); };
// Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
// Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
- // Copy SimpleManyChannelMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
+ // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
+ let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
- let chain_monitor = chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
let watchtower_alice = {
- let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(
&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
- let watchtower = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
- assert!(watchtower.add_monitor(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
+ let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
+ assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
watchtower
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- watchtower_alice.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 135, &vec![], &vec![]);
+ watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], 135);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
{
txn.clear();
}
- // Copy SimpleManyChannelMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
+ // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
+ let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
- let chain_monitor = chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet);
let watchtower_bob = {
- let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(
&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
- let watchtower = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(&chain_monitor, &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
- assert!(watchtower.add_monitor(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
+ let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator);
+ assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
watchtower
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- watchtower_bob.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 134, &vec![], &vec![]);
+ watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], 134);
// Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
if let Ok((_, _, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
// Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
- if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.simple_monitor.update_monitor(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
- if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.simple_monitor.update_monitor(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
- if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_monitor(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
+ if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
+ if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
} else { assert!(false); }
} else { assert!(false); };
// Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
//// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
- watchtower_bob.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 135, &vec![], &vec![]);
+ watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![], 135);
// Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
let bob_state_y;
};
// We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
- watchtower_alice.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 136, &vec![&bob_state_y][..], &vec![]);
+ watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &vec![(0, &bob_state_y)], 136);
{
let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
//! call into your NetGraphMsgHandler.
pub mod channelmanager;
-pub mod channelmonitor;
pub mod msgs;
pub mod peer_handler;
pub mod chan_utils;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
use ln::channelmanager::PaymentPreimage;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
- pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, on_holder_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, on_holder_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
let key_storage = keys;
}
}
- pub(super) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
+ pub(crate) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
for inp in inputs {
// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
None
}
- pub(super) fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ pub(crate) fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
}
}
- pub(super) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
}
}
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
self.prev_holder_commitment = self.holder_commitment.take();
self.holder_commitment = Some(tx);
}
// have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
// before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
// to monitor before.
- pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
Ok(sig) => Some(holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)),
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
let holder_commitment = holder_commitment.clone();
match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
}
}
- pub(
super) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ pub(
crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
let mut htlc_tx = None;
if self.holder_commitment.is_some() {
let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().txid();
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub(
super) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ pub(
crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
//! These tests work by standing up full nodes and route payments across the network, checking the
//! returned errors decode to the correct thing.
+use chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCForwardInfo, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use ln::onion_utils;
use routing::router::{Route, get_route};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use util::config::UserConfig;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
{
// reset block height
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
- nodes[ix].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[], &[]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[ix], &block, 1);
}
macro_rules! expect_event {
run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &[], &[]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, height);
}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &[], &[]);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &block, height);
}, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use ln::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
+use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let mut headers = Vec::new();
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
let claim_txn = if local_commitment {
// Broadcast node 1 commitment txn to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
let node_1_commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[1], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Give node 2 node 1's transactions and get its response (claiming the HTLC instead).
- nodes[2].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
let node_2_commitment_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[0], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Confirm node 1's commitment txn (and HTLC-Timeout) on node 1
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
// ...but return node 1's commitment tx in case claim is set and we're preparing to reorg
vec![node_1_commitment_txn[0].clone(), node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone()]
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[1], node_2_commitment_txn[0]);
// Give node 1 node 2's commitment transaction and get its response (timing the HTLC out)
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
let node_1_commitment_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_1_commitment_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: 1 offered HTLC-Timeout, ChannelManger: 1 local commitment tx, 1 Offered HTLC-Timeout
assert_eq!(node_1_commitment_txn[1].output.len(), 2); // to-local and Offered HTLC (to-remote is dust)
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[0], node_2_commitment_txn[0]);
// Confirm node 2's commitment txn (and node 1's HTLC-Timeout) on node 1
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone(), node_1_commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone(), node_1_commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
// ...but return node 2's commitment tx (and claim) in case claim is set and we're preparing to reorg
node_2_commitment_txn
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
- headers.push(header.clone());
+ let mut block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
+ let mut blocks = Vec::new();
+ blocks.push(block.clone());
// At CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 we have a confirmation count of 1, so CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH +
// ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1 will give us a confirmation count of ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1.
for i in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &vec![], &[0; 0]);
- headers.push(header.clone());
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, i);
+ blocks.push(block.clone());
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
if claim {
// Now reorg back to CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH and confirm node 2's broadcasted transactions:
- for (height, header) in (CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1).zip(headers.iter()).rev() {
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_disconnected(&header, height);
+ for (height, block) in (CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1).zip(blocks.iter()).rev() {
+ disconnect_block(&nodes[1], &block.header, height);
}
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: claim_txn }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: claim_txn,
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
- // ChannelManager only polls ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events when we
+ // ChannelManager only polls chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events when we
// probe it for events, so we probe non-message events here (which should still end up empty):
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
} else {
// Confirm the timeout tx and check that we fail the HTLC backwards
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + ANTI_REORG_DELAY, &vec![], &[0; 0]);
+ block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![],
+ };
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
}
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
+use chain;
+use chain::Access;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
/// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
/// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
/// serving historical announcements.
-pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
/// Representation of the payment channel network
pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
- chain_monitor: C,
+ chain_access: Option<C>,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
logger: L,
}
-impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
/// assuming a fresh network graph.
/// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
/// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
/// channel owners' keys.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, logger: L) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
NetGraphMsgHandler {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph {
nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
}),
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
+ chain_access,
logger,
}
}
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
/// assuming an existing Network Graph.
- pub fn from_net_graph(chain_monitor: C, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
+ pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
NetGraphMsgHandler {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
+ chain_access,
logger,
}
}
};
}
-impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
}
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- let utxo_value = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Ok((script_pubkey, value)) => {
- let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- if script_pubkey != expected_script {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
- //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
- //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
- Some(value)
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
+ let utxo_value = match &self.chain_access {
+ &None => {
// Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
None
},
- Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.contents.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ &Some(ref chain_access) => {
+ match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
+ let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ if script_pubkey != expected_script {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
+ //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
+ Some(value)
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.contents.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ }
},
};
let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, utxo_value, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
+ use chain;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use hex;
use std::sync::Arc;
- fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
+ fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(None, Arc::clone(&logger));
(secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
}
fn handling_channel_announcements() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
-
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
};
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::NotSupported);
-
+ let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(None, Arc::clone(&logger));
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
}
}
-
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
};
-
// Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
+ net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
-
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), 0));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
// But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script, 0));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
fn handling_channel_update() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
.push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), amount_sats));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
chain_hash,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
use routing::router::{get_route, RouteHint, RoutingFees};
use routing::network_graph::NetGraphMsgHandler;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use std::sync::Arc;
// Using the same keys for LN and BTC ids
- fn add_channel(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_1_privkey: &SecretKey,
+ fn add_channel(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_1_privkey: &SecretKey,
node_2_privkey: &SecretKey, features: ChannelFeatures, short_channel_id: u64) {
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
};
}
- fn update_channel(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_privkey: &SecretKey, update: UnsignedChannelUpdate) {
+ fn update_channel(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_privkey: &SecretKey, update: UnsignedChannelUpdate) {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&update.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_privkey),
}
- fn add_or_update_node(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_privkey: &SecretKey,
+ fn add_or_update_node(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<
test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_privkey: &SecretKey,
features: NodeFeatures, timestamp: u32) {
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
}
}
- fn build_graph() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<std::sync::Arc<crate::chain::chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, std::sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>, std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>) {
+ fn build_graph() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<std::sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestChainSource>, std::sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>, std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(None, Arc::clone(&logger));
// Build network from our_id to node7:
//
// -1(1)2- node0 -1(3)2-
/// A human-readable error message
err: String
},
- /// An attempt to call add/update_monitor returned an Err (ie you did this!), causing the
+ /// An attempt to call watch/update_channel returned an Err (ie you did this!), causing the
/// attempted action to fail.
MonitorUpdateFailed,
}
}
macro_rules! log_funding_info {
($key_storage: expr) => {
- ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&$key_storage.funding_info)
+ ::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo($key_storage.get_funding_txo())
}
}
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
+use chain;
use chain::chaininterface;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ConfirmationTarget, ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
+use chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
+use chain::chainmonitor;
+use chain::channelmonitor;
+use chain::channelmonitor::MonitorEvent;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface;
-use ln::channelmonitor;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::OptionalField;
-use ln::channelmonitor::MonitorEvent;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
use util::events;
use util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Secp256k1, Signature};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::{cmp, mem};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
pub struct TestVecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
impl Writer for TestVecWriter {
}
}
-pub struct TestChannelMonitor<'a> {
+pub struct TestChainMonitor<'a> {
pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>>,
pub latest_monitor_update_id: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], (OutPoint, u64)>>,
- pub simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger, &'a ChainWatchInterface>,
+ pub chain_monitor: chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys, &'a TestChainSource, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger>,
pub update_ret: Mutex<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>,
// If this is set to Some(), after the next return, we'll always return this until update_ret
// is changed:
pub next_update_ret: Mutex<Option<Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>>>,
}
-impl<'a> TestChannelMonitor<'a> {
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: &'a chaininterface::ChainWatchInterface, broadcaster: &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, logger: &'a TestLogger, fee_estimator: &'a TestFeeEstimator) -> Self {
+impl<'a> TestChainMonitor<'a> {
+ pub fn new(chain_source: Option<&'a TestChainSource>, broadcaster: &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, logger: &'a TestLogger, fee_estimator: &'a TestFeeEstimator) -> Self {
Self {
added_monitors: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
latest_monitor_update_id: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- simple_monitor: channelmonitor::SimpleManyChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor, broadcaster, logger, fee_estimator),
+ chain_monitor: chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(chain_source, broadcaster, logger, fee_estimator),
update_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(())),
next_update_ret: Mutex::new(None),
}
}
}
-impl<'a> channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor<'a> {
+impl<'a> chain::Watch for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
type Keys = EnforcingChannelKeys;
- fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
// At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
// to a watchtower and disk...
let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
assert!(new_monitor == monitor);
self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo.to_channel_id(), (funding_txo, monitor.get_latest_update_id()));
self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, monitor));
- assert!(self.simple_monitor.add_monitor(funding_txo, new_monitor).is_ok());
+ assert!(self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, new_monitor).is_ok());
let ret = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone();
if let Some(next_ret) = self.next_update_ret.lock().unwrap().take() {
ret
}
- fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
// Every monitor update should survive roundtrip
let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
update.write(&mut w).unwrap();
&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == update);
self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo.to_channel_id(), (funding_txo, update.update_id));
- assert!(self.simple_monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, update).is_ok());
+ assert!(self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update).is_ok());
// At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
// to a watchtower and disk...
- let monitors = self.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ let monitors = self.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&funding_txo).unwrap();
w.0.clear();
monitor.write_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap();
ret
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events();
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
}
}
-pub struct TestChainWatcher {
- pub utxo_ret: Mutex<Result<(Script, u64), ChainError>>,
+pub struct TestChainSource {
+ pub genesis_hash: BlockHash,
+ pub utxo_ret: Mutex<Result<TxOut, chain::AccessError>>,
+ pub watched_txn: Mutex<HashSet<(Txid, Script)>>,
+ pub watched_outputs: Mutex<HashSet<(OutPoint, Script)>>,
}
-impl TestChainWatcher {
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
- Self { utxo_ret: Mutex::new(Ok((script, u64::max_value()))) }
+impl TestChainSource {
+ pub fn new(network: Network) -> Self {
+ let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
+ Self {
+ genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).block_hash(),
+ utxo_ret: Mutex::new(Ok(TxOut { value: u64::max_value(), script_pubkey })),
+ watched_txn: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
+ watched_outputs: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
+ }
}
}
-impl ChainWatchInterface for TestChainWatcher {
- fn install_watch_tx(&self, _txid: &Txid, _script_pub_key: &Script) { }
- fn install_watch_outpoint(&self, _outpoint: (Txid, u32), _out_script: &Script) { }
- fn watch_all_txn(&self) { }
- fn filter_block<'a>(&self, _block: &'a Block) -> Vec<usize> {
- Vec::new()
- }
- fn reentered(&self) -> usize { 0 }
+impl chain::Access for TestChainSource {
+ fn get_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: &BlockHash, _short_channel_id: u64) -> Result<TxOut, chain::AccessError> {
+ if self.genesis_hash != *genesis_hash {
+ return Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain);
+ }
- fn get_chain_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: BlockHash, _unspent_tx_output_identifier: u64) -> Result<(Script, u64), ChainError> {
self.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
}
+
+impl chain::Filter for TestChainSource {
+ fn register_tx(&self, txid: &Txid, script_pubkey: &Script) {
+ self.watched_txn.lock().unwrap().insert((*txid, script_pubkey.clone()));
+ }
+
+ fn register_output(&self, outpoint: &OutPoint, script_pubkey: &Script) {
+ self.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap().insert((*outpoint, script_pubkey.clone()));
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff