- name: Checkout source code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }} toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+ rustup override set ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
- name: Install no-std-check dependencies for ARM Embedded
if: "matrix.platform == 'ubuntu-latest'"
run: |
- name: Checkout source code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install Rust ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }} toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
+ rustup override set ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- name: Cache routing graph snapshot
id: cache-graph
uses: actions/cache@v3
cd ..
- name: Run benchmarks on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
run: |
- RUSTC_BOOTSTRAP=1 cargo bench --features _bench_unstable
+ cd bench
+ RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=ldk_bench --cfg=require_route_graph_test" cargo bench
+ - name: Run benchmarks with hashbrown on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+ run: |
+ cd bench
+ RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=ldk_bench --cfg=require_route_graph_test" cargo bench --features hashbrown
check_commits:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Install Rust ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }} toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
+ rustup override set ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- name: Fetch full tree and rebase on upstream
run: |
git remote add upstream https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Install Rust ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }} toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
+ rustup override set ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- name: Run cargo check for release build.
run: |
cargo check --release
cargo check --no-default-features --features=no-std --release
cargo check --no-default-features --features=futures --release
cargo doc --release
- RUSTDOCFLAGS="--cfg=anchors" cargo doc --release
- name: Run cargo check for Taproot build.
run: |
cargo check --release
cargo check --no-default-features --features=futures --release
cargo doc --release
env:
- RUSTFLAGS: '--cfg=anchors --cfg=taproot'
- RUSTDOCFLAGS: '--cfg=anchors --cfg=taproot'
+ RUSTFLAGS: '--cfg=taproot'
+ RUSTDOCFLAGS: '--cfg=taproot'
fuzz:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
- TOOLCHAIN: stable
+ TOOLCHAIN: 1.58
steps:
- name: Checkout source code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- - name: Install Rust 1.58 toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: 1.58
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ - name: Install Rust ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }} toolchain
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
+ rustup override set ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- name: Install dependencies for honggfuzz
run: |
sudo apt-get update
- name: Checkout source code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install Rust ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }} toolchain
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
- with:
- toolchain: ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- override: true
- profile: minimal
+ run: |
+ curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile=minimal --default-toolchain ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
+ rustup override set ${{ env.TOOLCHAIN }}
- name: Install clippy
run: |
rustup component add clippy
Cargo.lock
.idea
lightning/target
-lightning/ldk-net_graph-*.bin
+lightning/net_graph-*.bin
+lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip
lightning-custom-message/target
lightning-transaction-sync/target
no-std-check/target
"lightning-custom-message",
"lightning-transaction-sync",
"no-std-check",
+ "bench",
]
# Our tests do actual crypto and lots of work, the tradeoff for -O2 is well
opt-level = 3
lto = true
panic = "abort"
-
-[profile.bench]
-opt-level = 3
-codegen-units = 1
-lto = true
* BD6EED4D339EDBF7E7CE7F8836153082BDF676FD (Elias Rohrer)
* 6E0287D8849AE741E47CC586FD3E106A2CE099B4 (Valentine Wallace)
* 69CFEA635D0E6E6F13FD9D9136D932FCAC0305F0 (Arik Sosman)
- * A5A6868D7AA91DD00AC1A67F817FFA028EF61C94 (Antoine Riard)
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning-bench"
+version = "0.0.1"
+authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
+edition = "2018"
+
+[[bench]]
+name = "bench"
+harness = false
+
+[features]
+hashbrown = ["lightning/hashbrown"]
+
+[dependencies]
+lightning = { path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils", "criterion"] }
+lightning-persister = { path = "../lightning-persister", features = ["criterion"] }
+lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync", features = ["criterion"] }
+criterion = { version = "0.4", default-features = false }
+
+[profile.release]
+opt-level = 3
+codegen-units = 1
+lto = true
+panic = "abort"
+debug = true
--- /dev/null
+This crate uses criterion to benchmark various LDK functions.
+
+It can be run as `RUSTFLAGS=--cfg=ldk_bench cargo bench`.
+
+For routing or other HashMap-bottlenecked functions, the `hashbrown` feature
+should also be benchmarked.
--- /dev/null
+extern crate lightning;
+extern crate lightning_persister;
+
+extern crate criterion;
+
+use criterion::{criterion_group, criterion_main};
+
+criterion_group!(benches,
+ // Note that benches run in the order given here. Thus, they're sorted according to how likely
+ // developers are to be working on the specific code listed, then by runtime.
+ lightning::routing::router::benches::generate_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer,
+ lightning::routing::router::benches::generate_mpp_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer,
+ lightning::routing::router::benches::generate_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer,
+ lightning::routing::router::benches::generate_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer,
+ lightning::routing::router::benches::generate_large_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer,
+ lightning::sign::benches::bench_get_secure_random_bytes,
+ lightning::ln::channelmanager::bench::bench_sends,
+ lightning_persister::bench::bench_sends,
+ lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::bench::bench_reading_full_graph_from_file,
+ lightning::routing::gossip::benches::read_network_graph,
+ lightning::routing::gossip::benches::write_network_graph);
+criterion_main!(benches);
HOST_PLATFORM="$(rustc --version --verbose | grep "host:" | awk '{ print $2 }')"
# Tokio MSRV on versions 1.17 through 1.26 is rustc 1.49. Above 1.26 MSRV is 1.56.
-[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 49 ] && cargo update -p tokio --precise "1.14.0" --verbose
-[[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -gt 48 && "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 56 ]] && cargo update -p tokio --precise "1.26.0" --verbose
+[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 49 ] && cargo update -p tokio --precise "1.14.1" --verbose
+[[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -gt 48 && "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 56 ]] && cargo update -p tokio --precise "1.25.1" --verbose
+
+# Sadly the log crate is always a dependency of tokio until 1.20, and has no reasonable MSRV guarantees
+[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 49 ] && cargo update -p log --precise "0.4.18" --verbose
+
+# The addr2line v0.20 crate (a dependency of `backtrace` starting with 0.3.68) relies on 1.55+
+[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 55 ] && cargo update -p backtrace --precise "0.3.67" --verbose
+
[ "$LDK_COVERAGE_BUILD" != "" ] && export RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code"
export RUST_BACKTRACE=1
popd
fi
-echo -e "\n\nTest anchors builds"
-pushd lightning
-RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=anchors" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
echo -e "\n\nTest Taproot builds"
-RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=anchors --cfg=taproot" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
+pushd lightning
+RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=taproot" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
popd
pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) { }
+ fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
}
pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
}
#[inline]
-fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError) {
+fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
match api_err {
APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
// is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
match err.as_str() {
"Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
- _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at") => {},
+ _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
+ _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
_ => panic!("{}", err),
}
+ assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
},
APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
// We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
}
}
#[inline]
-fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure) {
+fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
match send_err {
- PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err),
+ PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
- for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
+ for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
},
PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
- for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err); }
+ for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
},
PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
- for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err); } }
+ for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
},
PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
}
let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
*payment_idx += 1;
+ let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
+ .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
+ .map(|chan|
+ (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
+ .unwrap_or((0, 0));
if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
}], blinded_tail: None }],
payment_params: None,
}, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
- check_payment_err(err);
+ check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
false
- } else { true }
+ } else {
+ // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
+ // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
+ // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
+ assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
+ true
+ }
}
#[inline]
fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
*payment_idx += 1;
+ let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
+ .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
+ .map(|chan|
+ (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
+ .unwrap_or((0, 0));
+ let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
node_features: middle.node_features(),
short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
- fee_msat: 50000,
+ fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
},RouteHop {
pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
}], blinded_tail: None }],
payment_params: None,
}, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
- check_payment_err(err);
+ let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
+ check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
false
- } else { true }
+ } else {
+ // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
+ // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
+ // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
+ assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
+ true
+ }
}
#[inline]
config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
+ let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
let params = ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
};
- (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params),
+ (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
monitor, keys_manager)
} }
}
let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
macro_rules! make_channel {
($source: expr, $dest: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
- $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $dest.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: $source.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
$source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = {
},
0x0e => {
if chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
chan_a_disconnected = false;
}
},
0x0f => {
if chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
chan_b_disconnected = false;
}
},
// Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
if chan_a_disconnected {
- nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[0].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
chan_a_disconnected = false;
}
if chan_b_disconnected {
- nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[2].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
chan_b_disconnected = false;
}
use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
-use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
+use lightning::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
}
impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
- self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
+ fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[&Transaction]) {
+ let owned_txs: Vec<Transaction> = txs.iter().map(|tx| (*tx).clone()).collect();
+ self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().extend(owned_txs);
}
}
});
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
+ let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
let params = ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
};
- let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
+ let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp));
// Adding new calls to `EntropySource::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
// keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
// it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
//
// 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
//
+ // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
// 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
+ // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: UpdateHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
//
+ // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
+ // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
// - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
//
+ // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
+ // 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
// 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
//
+ // 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
// 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
//
// - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
},
];
- let payment_paths = paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect();
+ let payment_paths = payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect();
let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash)?.build()
}
use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, OnionMessenger};
+use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger};
use crate::utils::test_logger;
/// Actual fuzz test, method signature and name are fixed
pub fn do_test<L: Logger>(data: &[u8], logger: &L) {
if let Ok(msg) = <msgs::OnionMessage as Readable>::read(&mut Cursor::new(data)) {
- let mut secret_bytes = [0; 32];
+ let mut secret_bytes = [1; 32];
secret_bytes[31] = 2;
let secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret_bytes).unwrap();
let keys_manager = KeyProvider {
node_secret: secret,
counter: AtomicU64::new(0),
};
+ let message_router = TestMessageRouter {};
+ let offers_msg_handler = TestOffersMessageHandler {};
let custom_msg_handler = TestCustomMessageHandler {};
- let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, &keys_manager, logger, &custom_msg_handler);
+ let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(
+ &keys_manager, &keys_manager, logger, &message_router, &offers_msg_handler,
+ &custom_msg_handler
+ );
let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
let peer_node_id_not_used = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
onion_messenger.handle_onion_message(&peer_node_id_not_used, &msg);
do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
}
+struct TestMessageRouter {}
+
+impl MessageRouter for TestMessageRouter {
+ fn find_path(
+ &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination
+ ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
+ Ok(OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+struct TestOffersMessageHandler {}
+
+impl OffersMessageHandler for TestOffersMessageHandler {
+ fn handle_message(&self, _message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
+ None
+ }
+}
+
struct TestCustomMessage {}
const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4242;
impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for TestCustomMessageHandler {
type CustomMessage = TestCustomMessage;
- fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) {}
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) -> Option<Self::CustomMessage> {
+ Some(TestCustomMessage {})
+ }
fn read_custom_message<R: io::Read>(&self, _message_type: u64, buffer: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self::CustomMessage>, msgs::DecodeError> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
buffer.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
#[test]
fn test_no_onion_message_breakage() {
- let one_hop_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0136041095000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let one_hop_om = "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";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(one_hop_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
- "Received an onion message with path_id None and no reply_path".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ "Received an onion message with path_id None and a reply_path".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
+ "Responding to onion message with path_id None".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
+ "Failed responding to onion message with path_id None: TooFewBlindedHops".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let two_unblinded_hops_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000029500000000000000000000000000000036000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604104b000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let two_unblinded_hops_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026d000000000000000000000000000000eb0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000036041096000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(two_unblinded_hops_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let two_unblinded_two_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01350433042102000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000295000000000000000000000000000000400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000058045604210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020821020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e014b000000000000000000000000000000b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000029500000000000000000000000000000036000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604104b000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let two_unblinded_two_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026d0000000000000000000000000000009e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000058045604210203030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303020821020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0196000000000000000000000000000000e9000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003504330421020404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040402ca00000000000000000000000000000042000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604103f000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(two_unblinded_two_blinded_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let three_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e013504330421020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002950000000000000000000000000000006c0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000024b000000000000000000000000000000ac00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000360410d1000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let three_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026d000000000000000000000000000000b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210203030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303029600000000000000000000000000000033000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604104e000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(three_blinded_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
}
}
},
];
- let payment_paths = paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect();
+ let payment_paths = payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect();
let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
refund.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash, signing_pubkey)?.build()
}
balance_msat: 0,
outbound_capacity_msat: capacity.saturating_mul(1000),
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: capacity.saturating_mul(1000),
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: None,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
});
}
Some(&first_hops_vec[..])
[package]
name = "lightning-background-processor"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Valentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = { version = "0.29.0", default-features = false }
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
-lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync", default-features = false }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
+lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync", default-features = false }
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { version = "1.14", features = [ "macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "time" ] }
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
-lightning-invoice = { version = "0.23.0", path = "../lightning-invoice" }
-lightning-persister = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning-persister" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning-invoice = { version = "0.24.0-alpha1", path = "../lightning-invoice" }
+lightning-persister = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning-persister" }
const NETWORK_PRUNE_TIMER: u64 = 60 * 60;
#[cfg(not(test))]
-const SCORER_PERSIST_TIMER: u64 = 30;
+const SCORER_PERSIST_TIMER: u64 = 60 * 60;
#[cfg(test)]
const SCORER_PERSIST_TIMER: u64 = 1;
}
}
+/// Updates scorer based on event and returns whether an update occurred so we can decide whether
+/// to persist.
fn update_scorer<'a, S: 'static + Deref<Target = SC> + Send + Sync, SC: 'a + WriteableScore<'a>>(
scorer: &'a S, event: &Event
-) {
+) -> bool {
let mut score = scorer.lock();
match event {
Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref path, short_channel_id: Some(scid), .. } => {
Event::ProbeFailed { path, short_channel_id: Some(scid), .. } => {
score.probe_failed(path, *scid);
},
- _ => {},
+ _ => return false,
}
+ true
}
macro_rules! define_run_body {
// Note that we want to run a graph prune once not long after startup before
// falling back to our usual hourly prunes. This avoids short-lived clients never
// pruning their network graph. We run once 60 seconds after startup before
- // continuing our normal cadence.
+ // continuing our normal cadence. For RGS, since 60 seconds is likely too long,
+ // we prune after an initial sync completes.
let prune_timer = if have_pruned { NETWORK_PRUNE_TIMER } else { FIRST_NETWORK_PRUNE_TIMER };
- if $timer_elapsed(&mut last_prune_call, prune_timer) {
+ let prune_timer_elapsed = $timer_elapsed(&mut last_prune_call, prune_timer);
+ let should_prune = match $gossip_sync {
+ GossipSync::Rapid(_) => !have_pruned || prune_timer_elapsed,
+ _ => prune_timer_elapsed,
+ };
+ if should_prune {
// The network graph must not be pruned while rapid sync completion is pending
if let Some(network_graph) = $gossip_sync.prunable_network_graph() {
#[cfg(feature = "std")] {
let network_graph = gossip_sync.network_graph();
let event_handler = &event_handler;
let scorer = &scorer;
+ let logger = &logger;
+ let persister = &persister;
async move {
if let Some(network_graph) = network_graph {
handle_network_graph_update(network_graph, &event)
}
if let Some(ref scorer) = scorer {
- update_scorer(scorer, &event);
+ if update_scorer(scorer, &event) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Persisting scorer after update");
+ if let Err(e) = persister.persist_scorer(&scorer) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Error: Failed to persist scorer, check your disk and permissions {}", e)
+ }
+ }
}
event_handler(event).await;
}
handle_network_graph_update(network_graph, &event)
}
if let Some(ref scorer) = scorer {
- update_scorer(scorer, &event);
+ if update_scorer(scorer, &event) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Persisting scorer after update");
+ if let Err(e) = persister.persist_scorer(&scorer) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Error: Failed to persist scorer, check your disk and permissions {}", e)
+ }
+ }
}
event_handler.handle_event(event);
};
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", test))]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
}
- type ChannelManager = channelmanager::ChannelManager<Arc<ChainMonitor>, Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>, Arc<DefaultRouter<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>, Arc<Mutex<TestScorer>>, (), TestScorer>>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>;
+ type ChannelManager =
+ channelmanager::ChannelManager<
+ Arc<ChainMonitor>,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
+ Arc<DefaultRouter<
+ Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>>,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ Arc<Mutex<TestScorer>>,
+ (),
+ TestScorer>
+ >,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>;
type ChainMonitor = chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>, Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>, Arc<FilesystemPersister>>;
fn create_nodes(num_nodes: usize, persist_dir: &str) -> (String, Vec<Node>) {
let persist_temp_path = env::temp_dir().join(persist_dir);
let persist_dir = persist_temp_path.to_string_lossy().to_string();
- let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let network = Network::Bitcoin;
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
for i in 0..num_nodes {
let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network));
let scorer = Arc::new(Mutex::new(TestScorer::new()));
let seed = [i as u8; 32];
let router = Arc::new(DefaultRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), logger.clone(), seed, scorer.clone(), ()));
- let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Bitcoin));
let persister = Arc::new(FilesystemPersister::new(format!("{}_persister_{}", &persist_dir, i)));
let now = Duration::from_secs(genesis_block.header.time as u64);
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&seed, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_nanos()));
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(Some(chain_source.clone()), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_estimator.clone(), persister.clone()));
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
let params = ChainParameters { network, best_block };
- let manager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_estimator.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), router.clone(), logger.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), UserConfig::default(), params));
+ let manager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_estimator.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), router.clone(), logger.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), UserConfig::default(), params, genesis_block.header.time));
let p2p_gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), Some(chain_source.clone()), logger.clone()));
let rapid_gossip_sync = Arc::new(RapidGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), logger.clone()));
let msg_handler = MessageHandler {
- chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new()),
+ chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet))),
route_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new()),
onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler{}, custom_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler{}
};
for i in 0..num_nodes {
for j in (i+1)..num_nodes {
- nodes[i].node.peer_connected(&nodes[j].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[j].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[j].node.peer_connected(&nodes[i].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[i].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[i].node.peer_connected(&nodes[j].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[j].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[j].node.peer_connected(&nodes[i].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[i].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
}
}
if !std::thread::panicking() {
bg_processor.stop().unwrap();
}
+
+ let log_entries = nodes[0].logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
+ let expected_log = "Persisting scorer after update".to_string();
+ assert_eq!(*log_entries.get(&("lightning_background_processor".to_string(), expected_log)).unwrap(), 5);
}
#[tokio::test]
let t2 = tokio::spawn(async move {
do_test_payment_path_scoring!(nodes, receiver.recv().await);
exit_sender.send(()).unwrap();
+
+ let log_entries = nodes[0].logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
+ let expected_log = "Persisting scorer after update".to_string();
+ assert_eq!(*log_entries.get(&("lightning_background_processor".to_string(), expected_log)).unwrap(), 5);
});
let (r1, r2) = tokio::join!(t1, t2);
[package]
name = "lightning-block-sync"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Jeffrey Czyz", "Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.29.0"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "net", "time" ], optional = true }
serde_json = { version = "1.0", optional = true }
chunked_transfer = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
tokio = { version = "1.14", features = [ "macros", "rt" ] }
[package]
name = "lightning-custom-message"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Jeffrey Czyz"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.29.0"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning" }
[package]
name = "lightning-invoice"
description = "Data structures to parse and serialize BOLT11 lightning invoices"
-version = "0.23.0"
+version = "0.24.0-alpha1"
authors = ["Sebastian Geisler <sgeisler@wh2.tu-dresden.de>"]
documentation = "https://docs.rs/lightning-invoice/"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
[dependencies]
bech32 = { version = "0.9.0", default-features = false }
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
secp256k1 = { version = "0.24.0", default-features = false, features = ["recovery", "alloc"] }
num-traits = { version = "0.2.8", default-features = false }
bitcoin_hashes = { version = "0.11", default-features = false }
bitcoin = { version = "0.29.0", default-features = false }
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", default-features = false, features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", default-features = false, features = ["_test_utils"] }
hex = "0.4"
serde_json = { version = "1"}
/// Pays the given [`Invoice`], retrying if needed based on [`Retry`].
///
/// [`Invoice::payment_hash`] is used as the [`PaymentId`], which ensures idempotency as long
-/// as the payment is still pending. Once the payment completes or fails, you must ensure that
-/// a second payment with the same [`PaymentHash`] is never sent.
+/// as the payment is still pending. If the payment succeeds, you must ensure that a second payment
+/// with the same [`PaymentHash`] is never sent.
///
/// If you wish to use a different payment idempotency token, see [`pay_invoice_with_id`].
pub fn pay_invoice<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>(
/// [`Retry`].
///
/// [`Invoice::payment_hash`] is used as the [`PaymentId`], which ensures idempotency as long
-/// as the payment is still pending. Once the payment completes or fails, you must ensure that
-/// a second payment with the same [`PaymentHash`] is never sent.
+/// as the payment is still pending. If the payment succeeds, you must ensure that a second payment
+/// with the same [`PaymentHash`] is never sent.
///
/// If you wish to use a different payment idempotency token, see
/// [`pay_zero_value_invoice_with_id`].
}
/// Pays the given zero-value [`Invoice`] using the given amount and custom idempotency key,
-/// , retrying if needed based on [`Retry`].
+/// retrying if needed based on [`Retry`].
///
/// Note that idempotency is only guaranteed as long as the payment is still pending. Once the
/// payment completes or fails, no idempotency guarantees are made.
}
/// An error that may occur when making a payment.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PaymentError {
/// An error resulting from the provided [`Invoice`] or payment hash.
Invoice(&'static str),
use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
+use core::iter::Iterator;
/// Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a "phantom invoice."
/// See [`PhantomKeysManager`] for more information on phantom node payments.
)
}
+const MAX_CHANNEL_HINTS: usize = 3;
+
fn _create_phantom_invoice<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
amt_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>, description: InvoiceDescription,
invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, phantom_route_hints: Vec<PhantomRouteHints>, entropy_source: ES,
invoice = invoice.amount_milli_satoshis(amt);
}
- for route_hint in select_phantom_hints(amt_msat, phantom_route_hints, logger) {
+
+ for route_hint in select_phantom_hints(amt_msat, phantom_route_hints, logger).take(MAX_CHANNEL_HINTS) {
invoice = invoice.private_route(route_hint);
}
///
/// [`PhantomKeysManager`]: lightning::sign::PhantomKeysManager
fn select_phantom_hints<L: Deref>(amt_msat: Option<u64>, phantom_route_hints: Vec<PhantomRouteHints>,
- logger: L) -> Vec<RouteHint>
+ logger: L) -> impl Iterator<Item = RouteHint>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
- let mut phantom_hints: Vec<Vec<RouteHint>> = Vec::new();
+ let mut phantom_hints: Vec<_> = Vec::new();
for PhantomRouteHints { channels, phantom_scid, real_node_pubkey } in phantom_route_hints {
log_trace!(logger, "Generating phantom route hints for node {}",
log_pubkey!(real_node_pubkey));
- let mut route_hints = sort_and_filter_channels(channels, amt_msat, &logger);
+ let route_hints = sort_and_filter_channels(channels, amt_msat, &logger);
// If we have any public channel, the route hints from `sort_and_filter_channels` will be
// empty. In that case we create a RouteHint on which we will push a single hop with the
// phantom route into the invoice, and let the sender find the path to the `real_node_pubkey`
// node by looking at our public channels.
- if route_hints.is_empty() {
- route_hints.push(RouteHint(vec![]))
- }
- for route_hint in &mut route_hints {
- route_hint.0.push(RouteHintHop {
- src_node_id: real_node_pubkey,
- short_channel_id: phantom_scid,
- fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: 0,
- proportional_millionths: 0,
- },
- cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
- htlc_minimum_msat: None,
- htlc_maximum_msat: None,});
- }
+ let empty_route_hints = route_hints.len() == 0;
+ let mut have_pushed_empty = false;
+ let route_hints = route_hints
+ .chain(core::iter::from_fn(move || {
+ if empty_route_hints && !have_pushed_empty {
+ // set flag of having handled the empty route_hints and ensure empty vector
+ // returned only once
+ have_pushed_empty = true;
+ Some(RouteHint(Vec::new()))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }))
+ .map(move |mut hint| {
+ hint.0.push(RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: real_node_pubkey,
+ short_channel_id: phantom_scid,
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 0,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: None,
+ });
+ hint
+ });
phantom_hints.push(route_hints);
}
// the hints across our real nodes we add one hint from each in turn until no node has any hints
// left (if one node has more hints than any other, these will accumulate at the end of the
// vector).
- let mut invoice_hints: Vec<RouteHint> = Vec::new();
- let mut hint_idx = 0;
+ rotate_through_iterators(phantom_hints)
+}
- loop {
- let mut remaining_hints = false;
+/// Draw items iteratively from multiple iterators. The items are retrieved by index and
+/// rotates through the iterators - first the zero index then the first index then second index, etc.
+fn rotate_through_iterators<T, I: Iterator<Item = T>>(mut vecs: Vec<I>) -> impl Iterator<Item = T> {
+ let mut iterations = 0;
- for hints in phantom_hints.iter() {
- if invoice_hints.len() == 3 {
- return invoice_hints
+ core::iter::from_fn(move || {
+ let mut exhausted_iterators = 0;
+ loop {
+ if vecs.is_empty() {
+ return None;
}
-
- if hint_idx < hints.len() {
- invoice_hints.push(hints[hint_idx].clone());
- remaining_hints = true
+ let next_idx = iterations % vecs.len();
+ iterations += 1;
+ if let Some(item) = vecs[next_idx].next() {
+ return Some(item);
+ }
+ // exhausted_vectors increase when the "next_idx" vector is exhausted
+ exhausted_iterators += 1;
+ // The check for exhausted iterators gets reset to 0 after each yield of `Some()`
+ // The loop will return None when all of the nested iterators are exhausted
+ if exhausted_iterators == vecs.len() {
+ return None;
}
}
-
- if !remaining_hints {
- return invoice_hints
- }
-
- hint_idx +=1;
- }
+ })
}
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
/// * Sorted by lowest inbound capacity if an online channel with the minimum amount requested exists,
/// otherwise sort by highest inbound capacity to give the payment the best chance of succeeding.
fn sort_and_filter_channels<L: Deref>(
- channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>, min_inbound_capacity_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
-) -> Vec<RouteHint> where L::Target: Logger {
+ channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
+ min_inbound_capacity_msat: Option<u64>,
+ logger: &L,
+) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = RouteHint>
+where
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
let mut filtered_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, ChannelDetails> = HashMap::new();
let min_inbound_capacity = min_inbound_capacity_msat.unwrap_or(0);
let mut min_capacity_channel_exists = false;
let mut online_min_capacity_channel_exists = false;
let mut has_pub_unconf_chan = false;
+ let route_hint_from_channel = |channel: ChannelDetails| {
+ let forwarding_info = channel.counterparty.forwarding_info.as_ref().unwrap();
+ RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: channel.counterparty.node_id,
+ short_channel_id: channel.get_inbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: forwarding_info.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: forwarding_info.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: forwarding_info.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: channel.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: channel.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,}])
+ };
+
log_trace!(logger, "Considering {} channels for invoice route hints", channels.len());
for channel in channels.into_iter().filter(|chan| chan.is_channel_ready) {
if channel.get_inbound_payment_scid().is_none() || channel.counterparty.forwarding_info.is_none() {
// look at the public channels instead.
log_trace!(logger, "Not including channels in invoice route hints on account of public channel {}",
log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
- return vec![]
+ return vec![].into_iter().take(MAX_CHANNEL_HINTS).map(route_hint_from_channel);
}
}
}
}
- let route_hint_from_channel = |channel: ChannelDetails| {
- let forwarding_info = channel.counterparty.forwarding_info.as_ref().unwrap();
- RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
- src_node_id: channel.counterparty.node_id,
- short_channel_id: channel.get_inbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
- fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: forwarding_info.fee_base_msat,
- proportional_millionths: forwarding_info.fee_proportional_millionths,
- },
- cltv_expiry_delta: forwarding_info.cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat: channel.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- htlc_maximum_msat: channel.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,}])
- };
// If all channels are private, prefer to return route hints which have a higher capacity than
// the payment value and where we're currently connected to the channel counterparty.
// Even if we cannot satisfy both goals, always ensure we include *some* hints, preferring
} else {
b.inbound_capacity_msat.cmp(&a.inbound_capacity_msat)
}});
- eligible_channels.into_iter().take(3).map(route_hint_from_channel).collect::<Vec<RouteHint>>()
+
+ eligible_channels.into_iter().take(MAX_CHANNEL_HINTS).map(route_hint_from_channel)
}
/// prefer_current_channel chooses a channel to use for route hints between a currently selected and candidate
use lightning::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use lightning::util::test_utils;
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
- use crate::utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch;
+ use crate::utils::{create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch, rotate_through_iterators};
use std::collections::HashSet;
#[test]
} else {
None
};
+ let genesis_timestamp = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(bitcoin::Network::Testnet).header.time as u64;
let non_default_invoice_expiry_secs = 4200;
let invoice =
crate::utils::create_phantom_invoice::<&test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestLogger>(
Some(payment_amt), payment_hash, "test".to_string(), non_default_invoice_expiry_secs,
route_hints, nodes[1].keys_manager, nodes[1].keys_manager, nodes[1].logger,
- Currency::BitcoinTestnet, None, Duration::from_secs(1234567)
+ Currency::BitcoinTestnet, None, Duration::from_secs(genesis_timestamp)
).unwrap();
let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = (PaymentHash(invoice.payment_hash().into_inner()), *invoice.payment_secret());
let payment_preimage = if user_generated_pmt_hash {
_ => panic!(),
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_rotate_through_iterators() {
+ // two nested vectors
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"].into_iter(), vec!["a1", "b1"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "a1", "b0", "b1", "c0"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test single nested vector
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test second vector with only one element
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"].into_iter(), vec!["a1"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "a1", "b0", "c0"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test three nestend vectors
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0"].into_iter(), vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"].into_iter(), vec!["a2"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "a1", "a2", "b1", "c1"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test single nested vector with a single value
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test single empty nested vector
+ let a:Vec<std::vec::IntoIter<&str>> = vec![vec![].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<&str>>();
+ let expected:Vec<&str> = vec![];
+
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test first nested vector is empty
+ let a:Vec<std::vec::IntoIter<&str>>= vec![vec![].into_iter(), vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<&str>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test two empty vectors
+ let a:Vec<std::vec::IntoIter<&str>> = vec![vec![].into_iter(), vec![].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<&str>>();
+
+ let expected:Vec<&str> = vec![];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test an empty vector amongst other filled vectors
+ let a = vec![
+ vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"].into_iter(),
+ vec![].into_iter(),
+ vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"].into_iter(),
+ vec!["a2", "b2", "c2"].into_iter(),
+ ];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "a1", "a2", "b0", "b1", "b2", "c0", "c1", "c2"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test a filled vector between two empty vectors
+ let a = vec![vec![].into_iter(), vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"].into_iter(), vec![].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test an empty vector at the end of the vectors
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"].into_iter(), vec![].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "b0", "c0"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test multiple empty vectors amongst multiple filled vectors
+ let a = vec![
+ vec![].into_iter(),
+ vec!["a1", "b1", "c1"].into_iter(),
+ vec![].into_iter(),
+ vec!["a3", "b3"].into_iter(),
+ vec![].into_iter(),
+ ];
+
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a1", "a3", "b1", "b3", "c1"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+
+ // test one element in the first nested vectore and two elements in the second nested
+ // vector
+ let a = vec![vec!["a0"].into_iter(), vec!["a1", "b1"].into_iter()];
+ let result = rotate_through_iterators(a).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ let expected = vec!["a0", "a1", "b1"];
+ assert_eq!(expected, result);
+ }
}
[package]
name = "lightning-net-tokio"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.29.0"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "macros", "rt", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { version = "1.14", features = [ "io-util", "macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
use lightning::routing::gossip::NodeId;
use lightning::events::*;
use lightning::util::test_utils::TestNodeSigner;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
fn handle_error(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: &ErrorMessage) {}
fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { NodeFeatures::empty() }
fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures { InitFeatures::empty() }
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet)])
+ }
}
impl MessageSendEventsProvider for MsgHandler {
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
[package]
name = "lightning-persister"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Valentine Wallace", "Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/"
all-features = true
rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"]
-[features]
-_bench_unstable = ["lightning/_bench_unstable"]
-
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.29.0"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning" }
libc = "0.2"
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
winapi = { version = "0.3", features = ["winbase"] }
+[target.'cfg(ldk_bench)'.dependencies]
+criterion = { version = "0.4", optional = true, default-features = false }
+
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg))]
-#![cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature(test))]
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))] extern crate test;
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)] extern crate criterion;
mod util;
continue;
}
- let txid = Txid::from_hex(filename.split_at(64).0)
+ let txid: Txid = Txid::from_hex(filename.split_at(64).0)
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"Invalid tx ID in filename",
))?;
- let index = filename.split_at(65).1.parse()
+ let index: u16 = filename.split_at(65).1.parse()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"Invalid tx index in filename",
}
}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
+/// Benches
pub mod bench {
- use test::Bencher;
+ use criterion::Criterion;
- #[bench]
- fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ /// Bench!
+ pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let persister_a = super::FilesystemPersister::new("bench_filesystem_persister_a".to_string());
let persister_b = super::FilesystemPersister::new("bench_filesystem_persister_b".to_string());
- lightning::ln::channelmanager::bench::bench_two_sends(bench, persister_a, persister_b);
+ lightning::ln::channelmanager::bench::bench_two_sends(
+ bench, "bench_filesystem_persisted_sends", persister_a, persister_b);
}
}
[package]
name = "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Arik Sosman <git@arik.io>"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
default = ["std"]
no-std = ["lightning/no-std"]
std = ["lightning/std"]
-_bench_unstable = []
[dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
bitcoin = { version = "0.29.0", default-features = false }
+[target.'cfg(ldk_bench)'.dependencies]
+criterion = { version = "0.4", optional = true, default-features = false }
+
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
#![cfg_attr(all(not(feature = "std"), not(test)), no_std)]
-// Allow and import test features for benching
-#![cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature(test))]
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
-extern crate test;
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)] extern crate criterion;
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
extern crate alloc;
}
}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
+/// Benches
pub mod bench {
- use test::Bencher;
-
use bitcoin::Network;
- use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use criterion::Criterion;
+
+ use std::fs;
+
use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use lightning::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use crate::RapidGossipSync;
- #[bench]
- fn bench_reading_full_graph_from_file(b: &mut Bencher) {
+ /// Bench!
+ pub fn bench_reading_full_graph_from_file(b: &mut Criterion) {
let logger = TestLogger::new();
- b.iter(|| {
+ b.bench_function("read_full_graph_from_rgs", |b| b.iter(|| {
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
- let sync_result = rapid_sync.sync_network_graph_with_file_path("./res/full_graph.lngossip");
- if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
- let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
- #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
- {
- println!("{}", error_string);
- return;
- }
- #[cfg(require_route_graph_test)]
- panic!("{}", error_string);
- }
- assert!(sync_result.is_ok())
- });
+ let mut file = match fs::read("../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip") {
+ Ok(f) => f,
+ Err(io_error) => {
+ let error_string = format!(
+ "Input file lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}",
+ io_error);
+ #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
+ {
+ println!("{}", error_string);
+ return;
+ }
+ #[cfg(require_route_graph_test)]
+ panic!("{}", error_string);
+ },
+ };
+ rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&mut file, None).unwrap();
+ }));
}
}
}
let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let ng_genesis_hash = self.network_graph.get_genesis_hash();
+ if chain_hash != ng_genesis_hash {
+ return Err(
+ LightningError {
+ err: "Rapid Gossip Sync data's chain hash does not match the network graph's".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ }.into()
+ );
+ }
+
let latest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
if let Some(time) = current_time_unix {
panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn fails_early_on_chain_hash_mismatch() {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ // Set to testnet so that the VALID_RGS_BINARY chain hash of mainnet does not match.
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
+ let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(0));
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(err)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(err.err, "Rapid Gossip Sync data's chain hash does not match the network graph's");
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
}
[package]
name = "lightning-transaction-sync"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Elias Rohrer"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
async-interface = []
[dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", default-features = false }
bitcoin = { version = "0.29.0", default-features = false }
bdk-macros = "0.6"
futures = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
reqwest = { version = "0.11", optional = true, default-features = false, features = ["json"] }
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.115", path = "../lightning", features = ["std"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.116-alpha1", path = "../lightning", features = ["std"] }
electrsd = { version = "0.22.0", features = ["legacy", "esplora_a33e97e1", "bitcoind_23_0"] }
electrum-client = "0.12.0"
tokio = { version = "1.14.0", features = ["full"] }
[package]
name = "lightning"
-version = "0.0.115"
+version = "0.0.116-alpha1"
authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/"
# Allow signing of local transactions that may have been revoked or will be revoked, for functional testing (e.g. justice tx handling).
# This is unsafe to use in production because it may result in the counterparty publishing taking our funds.
unsafe_revoked_tx_signing = []
-_bench_unstable = []
# Override signing to not include randomness when generating signatures for test vectors.
_test_vectors = []
default-features = false
features = ["bitcoinconsensus", "secp-recovery"]
+[target.'cfg(ldk_bench)'.dependencies]
+criterion = { version = "0.4", optional = true, default-features = false }
+
[target.'cfg(taproot)'.dependencies]
musig2 = { git = "https://github.com/arik-so/rust-musig2", rev = "27797d7" }
/// An interface to send a transaction to the Bitcoin network.
pub trait BroadcasterInterface {
- /// Sends a transaction out to (hopefully) be mined.
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction);
+ /// Sends a list of transactions out to (hopefully) be mined.
+ /// This only needs to handle the actual broadcasting of transactions, LDK will automatically
+ /// rebroadcast transactions that haven't made it into a block.
+ ///
+ /// In some cases LDK may attempt to broadcast a transaction which double-spends another
+ /// and this isn't a bug and can be safely ignored.
+ ///
+ /// If more than one transaction is given, these transactions should be considered to be a
+ /// package and broadcast together. Some of the transactions may or may not depend on each other,
+ /// be sure to manage both cases correctly.
+ ///
+ /// Bitcoin transaction packages are defined in BIP 331 and here:
+ /// https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/policy/packages.md
+ fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[&Transaction]);
}
/// An enum that represents the speed at which we want a transaction to confirm used for feerate
self.event_notifier.notify();
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
use crate::events::EventsProvider;
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
L::Target: Logger,
P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
- #[cfg(not(anchors))]
- /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
- ///
- /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
- /// order to handle these events.
- ///
- /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: events::Event::SpendableOutputs
- fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
- let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- for monitor_state in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
- pending_events.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events());
- }
- for event in pending_events {
- handler.handle_event(event);
- }
- }
- #[cfg(anchors)]
/// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
///
/// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
/// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
/// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
- /// safety of funds, this method must be invoked frequently, ideally once for every chain tip
- /// update (block connected or disconnected).
+ /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
+ /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
///
/// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
/// order to handle these events.
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
-use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
use crate::chain::Filter;
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use crate::util::byte_utils;
use crate::events::Event;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
use crate::prelude::*;
(14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
});
-#[cfg(anchors)]
impl HolderSignedTx {
fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
},
}
+impl Balance {
+ /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
+ /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
+ /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
+ /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
+ ///
+ /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
+ pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ } => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ ..
+ } => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ ..
+ } => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ ..
+ } => 0,
+ Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ ..
+ } => 0,
+ Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ ..
+ } => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
} else {
- debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
}
} else {
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
+ let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
+ let mut txs = vec![];
+ for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ txs.push(tx);
}
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
}
// If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
// event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
// high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
- if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
);
let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
+ for (claim_id, claim_event) in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
match claim_event {
ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
+ claim_id,
package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
commitment_tx,
commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
});
}
ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ claim_id,
target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
htlc_descriptors,
tx_lock_time,
// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
+ let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
to_counterparty_output_info =
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
to_counterparty_output_info);
}
- let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
+ let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
}
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
} else {
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
+ htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
};
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
- htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
);
htlc_output
} else {
continue;
};
let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
- payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
);
htlc_output
};
let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
// When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
// transaction confirms.
- if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
return holder_transactions;
}
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
// When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
// transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
- if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
return holder_transactions;
}
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
- let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
+ let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
// We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
// unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
// `transactions_confirmed`.
- if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
// Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
// assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
// "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::io;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
+ use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
selected_contest_delay: 67,
}),
funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
- opt_anchors: None,
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
};
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
value: 0,
});
let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
}
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
value: 0,
});
let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
}
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
{
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
self.1.block_disconnected(header, height);
}
}
+
+/// A unique identifier to track each pending output claim within a [`ChannelMonitor`].
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ClaimId(pub [u8; 32]);
//! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
-
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
-use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
-use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, ChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+use crate::chain::ClaimId;
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
use crate::sign::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::package::PackageSolvingData;
-use crate::chain::package::PackageTemplate;
+use crate::chain::package::{PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
use core::cmp;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::mem::replace;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use core::mem::swap;
-use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
/// transaction has met [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations, we consider it final and remove the
/// pending request.
Claim {
- package_id: PackageID,
+ claim_id: ClaimId,
},
/// The counterparty has claimed an outpoint from one of our pending requests through a
/// different transaction than ours. If our transaction was attempting to claim multiple
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, Claim) => {
- (0, package_id, required),
+ (0, claim_id, required),
},
(1, ContentiousOutpoint) => {
(0, package, required),
}
}
-#[cfg(anchors)]
/// The claim commonly referred to as the pre-signed second-stage HTLC transaction.
pub(crate) struct ExternalHTLCClaim {
pub(crate) commitment_txid: Txid,
// Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
// claims.
-#[cfg(anchors)]
pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
/// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
/// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
/// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
Tx(Transaction),
- #[cfg(anchors)]
/// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
/// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
Event(ClaimEvent),
}
-/// An internal identifier to track pending package claims within the `OnchainTxHandler`.
-type PackageID = [u8; 32];
-
/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
/// do RBF bumping if possible.
pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
// us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
// Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<PackageID, PackageTemplate>,
+ pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap<PackageID, PackageTemplate>,
+ pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
// Used to track external events that need to be forwarded to the `ChainMonitor`. This `Vec`
// essentially acts as an insertion-ordered `HashMap` – there should only ever be one occurrence
- // of a `PackageID`, which tracks its latest `ClaimEvent`, i.e., if a pending claim exists, and
+ // of a `ClaimId`, which tracks its latest `ClaimEvent`, i.e., if a pending claim exists, and
// a new block has been connected, resulting in a new claim, the previous will be replaced with
// the new.
//
// - A channel has been force closed by broadcasting the holder's latest commitment transaction
// - A block being connected/disconnected
// - Learning the preimage for an HTLC we can claim onchain
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- pending_claim_events: Vec<(PackageID, ClaimEvent)>,
+ pending_claim_events: Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)>,
// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. The keys
// represent the outpoints that our `ChannelMonitor` has detected we have keys/scripts to
// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]. The initial confirmation block height is used to remove the entry if
// the block gets disconnected.
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (PackageID, u32)>,
+ pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (PackageID, u32)>,
+ claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
locktimed_packages,
pending_claim_requests,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
- #[cfg(anchors)]
pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
secp_ctx,
})
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
- #[cfg(anchors)]
pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
secp_ctx,
}
self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<ClaimEvent> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)> {
let mut events = Vec::new();
swap(&mut events, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
- events.into_iter().map(|(_, event)| event).collect()
+ events
}
/// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
L::Target: Logger,
{
let mut bump_requests = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_claim_requests.len());
- for (package_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+ for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
let inputs = request.outpoints();
log_info!(logger, "Triggering rebroadcast/fee-bump for request with inputs {:?}", inputs);
- bump_requests.push((*package_id, request.clone()));
+ bump_requests.push((*claim_id, request.clone()));
}
- for (package_id, request) in bump_requests {
+ for (claim_id, request) in bump_requests {
self.generate_claim(current_height, &request, false /* force_feerate_bump */, fee_estimator, logger)
.map(|(_, new_feerate, claim)| {
let mut bumped_feerate = false;
- if let Some(mut_request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&package_id) {
+ if let Some(mut_request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&claim_id) {
bumped_feerate = request.previous_feerate() > new_feerate;
mut_request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
}
OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Broadcasting RBF-bumped" } else { "Rebroadcasting" };
log_info!(logger, "{} onchain {}", log_start, log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
OnchainClaim::Event(event) => {
let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Yielding fee-bumped" } else { "Replaying" };
log_info!(logger, "{} onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", log_start,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
debug_assert!(request.requires_external_funding());
let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
- .filter(|entry| entry.0 == package_id).count();
+ .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
}
- self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != package_id);
- self.pending_claim_events.push((package_id, event));
+ self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != claim_id);
+ self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, event));
}
}
});
// transaction is reorged out.
let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true;
for outpoint in request_outpoints.iter() {
- if let Some((request_package_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(*outpoint) {
+ if let Some((request_claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(*outpoint) {
// We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set
// since requests can have outpoints split off.
if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter()
- .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id } = event_entry.event {
- *request_package_id == package_id
+ .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } = event_entry.event {
+ *request_claim_id == claim_id
} else {
// The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one.
false
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
let new_timer = cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height);
if cached_request.is_malleable() {
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
- if cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
- let target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request.compute_package_feerate(
- fee_estimator, ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority, force_feerate_bump
- );
- if let Some(htlcs) = cached_request.construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding(self) {
- return Some((
- new_timer,
- target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
- OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
- target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
- htlcs,
- tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime(cached_request.package_locktime(cur_height)),
- }),
- ));
- } else {
- return None;
- }
+ if cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
+ let target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request.compute_package_feerate(
+ fee_estimator, ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority, force_feerate_bump
+ );
+ if let Some(htlcs) = cached_request.construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding(self) {
+ return Some((
+ new_timer,
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
+ OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ htlcs,
+ tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime(cached_request.package_locktime(cur_height)),
+ }),
+ ));
+ } else {
+ return None;
}
}
// Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
// packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
// which require external funding.
- #[cfg(not(anchors))]
- let inputs = cached_request.inputs();
- #[cfg(anchors)]
let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
// Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
// thus far that require external funding.
) {
req.set_timer(new_timer);
req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- let package_id = match claim {
+ let claim_id = match claim {
OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- tx.txid().into_inner()
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
+ ClaimId(tx.txid().into_inner())
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
- let package_id = match claim_event {
- ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } => commitment_tx.txid().into_inner(),
+ let claim_id = match claim_event {
+ ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } =>
+ // For commitment claims, we can just use their txid as it should
+ // already be unique.
+ ClaimId(commitment_tx.txid().into_inner()),
ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => {
- // Use the same construction as a lightning channel id to generate
- // the package id for this request based on the first HTLC. It
- // doesn't matter what we use as long as it's unique per request.
- let mut package_id = [0; 32];
- package_id[..].copy_from_slice(&htlcs[0].commitment_txid[..]);
- let htlc_output_index = htlcs[0].htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
- package_id[30] ^= ((htlc_output_index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
- package_id[31] ^= ((htlc_output_index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
- package_id
+ // For HTLC claims, commit to the entire set of HTLC outputs to
+ // claim, which will always be unique per request. Once a claim ID
+ // is generated, it is assigned and remains unchanged, even if the
+ // underlying set of HTLCs changes.
+ let mut engine = Sha256::engine();
+ for htlc in htlcs {
+ engine.input(&htlc.commitment_txid.into_inner());
+ engine.input(&htlc.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap().to_be_bytes());
+ }
+ ClaimId(Sha256::from_engine(engine).into_inner())
},
};
- debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == package_id).count(), 0);
- self.pending_claim_events.push((package_id, claim_event));
- package_id
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
+ debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(), 0);
+ self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, claim_event));
+ claim_id
},
};
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
for k in req.outpoints() {
log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
- self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (package_id, conf_height));
+ self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (claim_id, conf_height));
}
- self.pending_claim_requests.insert(package_id, req);
+ self.pending_claim_requests.insert(claim_id, req);
}
}
}
// Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
for inp in &tx.input {
- if let Some((package_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
+ if let Some((claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
// If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(package_id) {
+ if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
//... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
// outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
// by us.
txid: tx.txid(),
height: conf_height,
block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
- event: OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id: *package_id }
+ event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id: *claim_id }
};
if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
//TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
if at_least_one_drop {
- bump_candidates.insert(*package_id, request.clone());
+ bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
// If we have any pending claim events for the request being updated
// that have yet to be consumed, we'll remove them since they will
// end up producing an invalid transaction by double spending
// input(s) that already have a confirmed spend. If such spend is
// reorged out of the chain, then we'll attempt to re-spend the
// inputs once we see it.
- #[cfg(anchors)] {
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
- let existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
- .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *package_id).count();
- assert!(existing == 0 || existing == 1);
- }
- self.pending_claim_events.retain(|entry| entry.0 != *package_id);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
+ .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
+ assert!(existing == 0 || existing == 1);
}
+ self.pending_claim_events.retain(|entry| entry.0 != *claim_id);
}
}
break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(cur_height) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id } => {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } => {
// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
// been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&package_id) {
+ if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_id) {
for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim package {}.",
- outpoint, log_bytes!(package_id));
+ outpoint, log_bytes!(claim_id.0));
self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint);
}
- #[cfg(anchors)] {
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
- let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
- .filter(|entry| entry.0 == package_id).count();
- assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
- }
- self.pending_claim_events.retain(|(id, _)| *id != package_id);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
+ .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
+ assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
}
+ self.pending_claim_events.retain(|(id, _)| *id != claim_id);
}
},
OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
}
// Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
- for (package_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+ for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
if cur_height >= request.timer() {
- bump_candidates.insert(*package_id, request.clone());
+ bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
}
}
// Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
- for (package_id, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
+ for (claim_id, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
cur_height, &request, true /* force_feerate_bump */, &*fee_estimator, &*logger,
) {
match bump_claim {
OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]);
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
#[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter().
- filter(|entry| entry.0 == *package_id).count();
+ filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
}
- self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *package_id);
- self.pending_claim_events.push((*package_id, claim_event));
+ self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *claim_id);
+ self.pending_claim_events.push((*claim_id, claim_event));
},
}
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(package_id) {
+ if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
request.set_timer(new_timer);
request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
}
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
- for ((_package_id, _), ref mut request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
+ for ((_claim_id, _), ref mut request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
// `height` is the height being disconnected, so our `current_height` is 1 lower.
let current_height = height - 1;
if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
match bump_claim {
OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]);
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
#[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
- .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *_package_id).count();
+ .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *_claim_id).count();
assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
}
- self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *_package_id);
- self.pending_claim_events.push((*_package_id, claim_event));
+ self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *_claim_id);
+ self.pending_claim_events.push((*_claim_id, claim_event));
},
}
}
htlc_tx
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
pub(crate) fn generate_external_htlc_claim(
&self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
) -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
.or_else(|| self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| find_htlc(c)).flatten())
}
- pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ pub(crate) fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use crate::sign::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::onchaintx::ExternalHTLCClaim;
-use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ExternalHTLCClaim, OnchainTxHandler};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable, RequiredWrapper};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::mem;
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
- if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
}
-pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
- if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
}
-pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
- if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
}
-pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
- if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
+}
+
+/// Verifies deserializable channel type features
+pub(crate) fn verify_channel_type_features(channel_type_features: &Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>, additional_permitted_features: Option<&ChannelTypeFeatures>) -> Result<(), DecodeError> {
+ if let Some(features) = channel_type_features.as_ref() {
+ if features.requires_unknown_bits() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
+ }
+
+ let mut supported_feature_set = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
+ supported_feature_set.set_scid_privacy_required();
+ supported_feature_set.set_zero_conf_required();
+
+ // allow the passing of an additional necessary permitted flag
+ if let Some(additional_permitted_features) = additional_permitted_features {
+ supported_feature_set |= additional_permitted_features;
+ }
+
+ if !features.is_subset(&supported_feature_set) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
}
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
}
impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
- let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
+ let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features) };
RevokedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
/// witnessScript.
///
/// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
+///
+/// Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
preimage: PaymentPreimage,
htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
- opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
}
impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
preimage,
htlc,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
+ channel_type_features,
}
}
+}
- fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = chan_utils::legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.per_commitment_point, required),
+ (2, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+ (4, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+ (6, self.preimage, required),
+ (8, self.htlc, required),
+ (10, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
- (0, per_commitment_point, required),
- (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
- (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
- (6, preimage, required),
- (8, htlc, required),
- (10, opt_anchors, option),
-});
+impl Readable for CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut per_commitment_point = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut preimage = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut htlc = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+ (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+ (6, preimage, required),
+ (8, htlc, required),
+ (10, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, None)?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
+ preimage: preimage.0.unwrap(),
+ htlc: htlc.0.unwrap(),
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
///
/// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
/// witnessScript.
+///
+/// Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
- opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
}
impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
htlc,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
+ channel_type_features
}
}
+}
- fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = chan_utils::legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.per_commitment_point, required),
+ (2, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+ (4, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+ (6, self.htlc, required),
+ (8, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (9, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
- (0, per_commitment_point, required),
- (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
- (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
- (6, htlc, required),
- (8, opt_anchors, option),
-});
+impl Readable for CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut per_commitment_point = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut htlc = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+ (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+ (6, htlc, required),
+ (8, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (9, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, None)?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
+ htlc: htlc.0.unwrap(),
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
///
/// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
/// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
+///
+/// Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
amount_msat: u64,
/// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
cltv_expiry: u32,
- opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
}
impl HolderHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: None,
amount_msat,
cltv_expiry,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
+ channel_type_features,
}
}
- pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount_msat: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount_msat: u64, channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: Some(preimage),
amount_msat,
cltv_expiry: 0,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
+ channel_type_features,
}
}
+}
- fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+impl Writeable for HolderHTLCOutput {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = chan_utils::legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.amount_msat, required),
+ (2, self.cltv_expiry, required),
+ (4, self.preimage, option),
+ (6, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (7, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
- (0, amount_msat, required),
- (2, cltv_expiry, required),
- (4, preimage, option),
- (6, opt_anchors, option)
-});
+impl Readable for HolderHTLCOutput {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut amount_msat = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut cltv_expiry = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut preimage = None;
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, amount_msat, required),
+ (2, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (4, preimage, option),
+ (6, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (7, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, None)?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ amount_msat: amount_msat.0.unwrap(),
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
+ preimage,
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
///
/// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
+///
+/// Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript: Script,
funding_amount: Option<u64>,
- opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
}
impl HolderFundingOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Self {
HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript,
funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
+ channel_type_features,
}
}
+}
- fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+impl Writeable for HolderFundingOutput {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = chan_utils::legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.funding_redeemscript, required),
+ (1, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ (2, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (3, self.funding_amount, option),
+ });
+ Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
- (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
- (2, opt_anchors, option),
- (3, funding_amount, option),
-});
+impl Readable for HolderFundingOutput {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut funding_redeemscript = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+ let mut funding_amount = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
+ (1, channel_type_features, option),
+ (2, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (3, funding_amount, option)
+ });
+
+ verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, None)?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ funding_redeemscript: funding_redeemscript.0.unwrap(),
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()),
+ funding_amount
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
///
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
outp.amount_msat / 1000
},
PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
- debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
}
};
match self {
PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_offered_htlc(&outp.channel_type_features) as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_received_htlc(&outp.channel_type_features) as usize,
PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
if outp.preimage.is_none() {
- weight_offered_htlc(true) as usize
+ weight_offered_htlc(&outp.channel_type_features) as usize
} else {
- weight_received_htlc(true) as usize
+ weight_received_htlc(&outp.channel_type_features) as usize
}
},
// Since HolderFundingOutput maps to an untractable package that is already signed, its
},
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.channel_type_features(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
//TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
},
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.channel_type_features(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
},
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.channel_type_features(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
match self {
PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- debug_assert!(!outp.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(!outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage);
}
PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.opt_anchors() {
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
(PackageMalleability::Malleable, outp.preimage.is_some())
} else {
(PackageMalleability::Untractable, false)
let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
pub(crate) fn construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
) -> Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> {
for (previous_output, input) in &self.inputs {
match input {
PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ debug_assert!(outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
onchain_handler.generate_external_htlc_claim(&previous_output, &outp.preimage).map(|htlc| {
htlcs.get_or_insert_with(|| Vec::with_capacity(self.inputs.len())).push(htlc);
});
None
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
/// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
/// the new feerate is below it, and `force_feerate_bump` is set, we'll use a 25% increase of
/// the previous feerate instead of the new feerate.
/// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(),
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(),
_ => false,
}).is_some()
}
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
($secp_ctx: expr, $is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: expr) => {
() => {
{
let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0, false))
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0, ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()))
}
}
}
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, 100);
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, 100);
fn test_package_amounts() {
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, 100);
assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
}
{
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, channel_type_features.clone());
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, 100);
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features) as usize);
}
}
{
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, channel_type_features.clone());
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, 100);
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features) as usize);
}
}
}
//! Utitilies for bumping transactions originating from [`super::Event`]s.
-use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
+use core::convert::TryInto;
+use core::ops::Deref;
+
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface;
+use crate::chain::ClaimId;
+use crate::events::Event;
+use crate::io_extras::sink;
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
-use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{
+ ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT,
+ HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT, ChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment
+};
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
+use crate::prelude::*;
+use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sync::Mutex;
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
-use bitcoin::{OutPoint, PackedLockTime, Script, Transaction, Txid, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{OutPoint, PackedLockTime, PubkeyHash, Sequence, Script, Transaction, Txid, TxIn, TxOut, Witness, WPubkeyHash};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+use bitcoin::consensus::Encodable;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
+const EMPTY_SCRIPT_SIG_WEIGHT: u64 = 1 /* empty script_sig */ * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64;
+
+const BASE_INPUT_SIZE: u64 = 32 /* txid */ + 4 /* vout */ + 4 /* sequence */;
+
+const BASE_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = BASE_INPUT_SIZE * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64;
+
+// TODO: Define typed abstraction over feerates to handle their conversions.
+fn compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(fee_sat: u64, weight: u64) -> u32 {
+ (fee_sat * 1000 / weight).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
+}
+const fn fee_for_weight(feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, weight: u64) -> u64 {
+ ((feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64 * weight) + 1000 - 1) / 1000
+}
+
/// A descriptor used to sign for a commitment transaction's anchor output.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AnchorDescriptor {
/// Returns the unsigned transaction input spending the HTLC output in the commitment
/// transaction.
pub fn unsigned_tx_input(&self) -> TxIn {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_input(&self.commitment_txid, &self.htlc, true /* opt_anchors */)
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_input(&self.commitment_txid, &self.htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies())
}
/// Returns the delayed output created as a result of spending the HTLC output in the commitment
secp, per_commitment_point, &counterparty_keys.revocation_basepoint
);
chan_utils::build_htlc_output(
- 0 /* feerate_per_kw */, channel_params.contest_delay(), &self.htlc, true /* opt_anchors */,
- false /* use_non_zero_fee_anchors */, &broadcaster_delayed_key, &counterparty_revocation_key
+ 0 /* feerate_per_kw */, channel_params.contest_delay(), &self.htlc,
+ &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &broadcaster_delayed_key, &counterparty_revocation_key
)
}
secp, per_commitment_point, &counterparty_keys.revocation_basepoint
);
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(
- &self.htlc, true /* opt_anchors */, &broadcaster_htlc_key, &counterparty_htlc_key,
+ &self.htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &broadcaster_htlc_key, &counterparty_htlc_key,
&counterparty_revocation_key,
)
}
/// transaction.
pub fn tx_input_witness(&self, signature: &Signature, witness_script: &Script) -> Witness {
chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
- signature, &self.counterparty_sig, &self.preimage, witness_script, true /* opt_anchors */
+ signature, &self.counterparty_sig, &self.preimage, witness_script, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies() /* opt_anchors */
)
}
}
/// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_anchor_input`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_anchor_input
/// [`build_anchor_input_witness`]: crate::ln::chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness
ChannelClose {
+ /// The unique identifier for the claim of the anchor output in the commitment transaction.
+ ///
+ /// The identifier must map to the set of external UTXOs assigned to the claim, such that
+ /// they can be reused when a new claim with the same identifier needs to be made, resulting
+ /// in a fee-bumping attempt.
+ claim_id: ClaimId,
/// The target feerate that the transaction package, which consists of the commitment
/// transaction and the to-be-crafted child anchor transaction, must meet.
package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
/// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction
/// [`HTLCDescriptor::tx_input_witness`]: HTLCDescriptor::tx_input_witness
HTLCResolution {
+ /// The unique identifier for the claim of the HTLCs in the confirmed commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ ///
+ /// The identifier must map to the set of external UTXOs assigned to the claim, such that
+ /// they can be reused when a new claim with the same identifier needs to be made, resulting
+ /// in a fee-bumping attempt.
+ claim_id: ClaimId,
/// The target feerate that the resulting HTLC transaction must meet.
target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
/// The set of pending HTLCs on the confirmed commitment that need to be claimed, preferably
tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime,
},
}
+
+/// An input that must be included in a transaction when performing coin selection through
+/// [`CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos`]. It is guaranteed to be a SegWit input, so it
+/// must have an empty [`TxIn::script_sig`] when spent.
+pub struct Input {
+ /// The unique identifier of the input.
+ pub outpoint: OutPoint,
+ /// The upper-bound weight consumed by the input's full [`TxIn::script_sig`] and
+ /// [`TxIn::witness`], each with their lengths included, required to satisfy the output's
+ /// script.
+ pub satisfaction_weight: u64,
+}
+
+/// An unspent transaction output that is available to spend resulting from a successful
+/// [`CoinSelection`] attempt.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct Utxo {
+ /// The unique identifier of the output.
+ pub outpoint: OutPoint,
+ /// The output to spend.
+ pub output: TxOut,
+ /// The upper-bound weight consumed by the input's full [`TxIn::script_sig`] and [`TxIn::witness`], each
+ /// with their lengths included, required to satisfy the output's script. The weight consumed by
+ /// the input's `script_sig` must account for [`WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR`].
+ pub satisfaction_weight: u64,
+}
+
+impl Utxo {
+ const P2WPKH_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 1 /* num stack items */ +
+ 1 /* sig length */ +
+ 73 /* sig including sighash flag */ +
+ 1 /* pubkey length */ +
+ 33 /* pubkey */;
+
+ /// Returns a `Utxo` with the `satisfaction_weight` estimate for a legacy P2PKH output.
+ pub fn new_p2pkh(outpoint: OutPoint, value: u64, pubkey_hash: &PubkeyHash) -> Self {
+ let script_sig_size = 1 /* script_sig length */ +
+ 1 /* OP_PUSH73 */ +
+ 73 /* sig including sighash flag */ +
+ 1 /* OP_PUSH33 */ +
+ 33 /* pubkey */;
+ Self {
+ outpoint,
+ output: TxOut {
+ value,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_p2pkh(pubkey_hash),
+ },
+ satisfaction_weight: script_sig_size * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64 + 1 /* empty witness */,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a `Utxo` with the `satisfaction_weight` estimate for a P2WPKH nested in P2SH output.
+ pub fn new_nested_p2wpkh(outpoint: OutPoint, value: u64, pubkey_hash: &WPubkeyHash) -> Self {
+ let script_sig_size = 1 /* script_sig length */ +
+ 1 /* OP_0 */ +
+ 1 /* OP_PUSH20 */ +
+ 20 /* pubkey_hash */;
+ Self {
+ outpoint,
+ output: TxOut {
+ value,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_p2sh(&Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(pubkey_hash).script_hash()),
+ },
+ satisfaction_weight: script_sig_size * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64 + Self::P2WPKH_WITNESS_WEIGHT,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a `Utxo` with the `satisfaction_weight` estimate for a SegWit v0 P2WPKH output.
+ pub fn new_v0_p2wpkh(outpoint: OutPoint, value: u64, pubkey_hash: &WPubkeyHash) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ outpoint,
+ output: TxOut {
+ value,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(pubkey_hash),
+ },
+ satisfaction_weight: EMPTY_SCRIPT_SIG_WEIGHT + Self::P2WPKH_WITNESS_WEIGHT,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// The result of a successful coin selection attempt for a transaction requiring additional UTXOs
+/// to cover its fees.
+pub struct CoinSelection {
+ /// The set of UTXOs (with at least 1 confirmation) to spend and use within a transaction
+ /// requiring additional fees.
+ confirmed_utxos: Vec<Utxo>,
+ /// An additional output tracking whether any change remained after coin selection. This output
+ /// should always have a value above dust for its given `script_pubkey`. It should not be
+ /// spent until the transaction it belongs to confirms to ensure mempool descendant limits are
+ /// not met. This implies no other party should be able to spend it except us.
+ change_output: Option<TxOut>,
+}
+
+/// An abstraction over a bitcoin wallet that can perform coin selection over a set of UTXOs and can
+/// sign for them. The coin selection method aims to mimic Bitcoin Core's `fundrawtransaction` RPC,
+/// which most wallets should be able to satisfy. Otherwise, consider implementing [`WalletSource`],
+/// which can provide a default implementation of this trait when used with [`Wallet`].
+pub trait CoinSelectionSource {
+ /// Performs coin selection of a set of UTXOs, with at least 1 confirmation each, that are
+ /// available to spend. Implementations are free to pick their coin selection algorithm of
+ /// choice, as long as the following requirements are met:
+ ///
+ /// 1. `must_spend` contains a set of [`Input`]s that must be included in the transaction
+ /// throughout coin selection, but must not be returned as part of the result.
+ /// 2. `must_pay_to` contains a set of [`TxOut`]s that must be included in the transaction
+ /// throughout coin selection. In some cases, like when funding an anchor transaction, this
+ /// set is empty. Implementations should ensure they handle this correctly on their end,
+ /// e.g., Bitcoin Core's `fundrawtransaction` RPC requires at least one output to be
+ /// provided, in which case a zero-value empty OP_RETURN output can be used instead.
+ /// 3. Enough inputs must be selected/contributed for the resulting transaction (including the
+ /// inputs and outputs noted above) to meet `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementations must take note that [`Input::satisfaction_weight`] only tracks the weight of
+ /// the input's `script_sig` and `witness`. Some wallets, like Bitcoin Core's, may require
+ /// providing the full input weight. Failing to do so may lead to underestimating fee bumps and
+ /// delaying block inclusion.
+ ///
+ /// The `claim_id` must map to the set of external UTXOs assigned to the claim, such that they
+ /// can be re-used within new fee-bumped iterations of the original claiming transaction,
+ /// ensuring that claims don't double spend each other. If a specific `claim_id` has never had a
+ /// transaction associated with it, and all of the available UTXOs have already been assigned to
+ /// other claims, implementations must be willing to double spend their UTXOs. The choice of
+ /// which UTXOs to double spend is left to the implementation, but it must strive to keep the
+ /// set of other claims being double spent to a minimum.
+ fn select_confirmed_utxos(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, must_spend: &[Input], must_pay_to: &[TxOut],
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ ) -> Result<CoinSelection, ()>;
+ /// Signs and provides the full witness for all inputs within the transaction known to the
+ /// trait (i.e., any provided via [`CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos`]).
+ fn sign_tx(&self, tx: &mut Transaction) -> Result<(), ()>;
+}
+
+/// An alternative to [`CoinSelectionSource`] that can be implemented and used along [`Wallet`] to
+/// provide a default implementation to [`CoinSelectionSource`].
+pub trait WalletSource {
+ /// Returns all UTXOs, with at least 1 confirmation each, that are available to spend.
+ fn list_confirmed_utxos(&self) -> Result<Vec<Utxo>, ()>;
+ /// Returns a script to use for change above dust resulting from a successful coin selection
+ /// attempt.
+ fn get_change_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()>;
+ /// Signs and provides the full [`TxIn::script_sig`] and [`TxIn::witness`] for all inputs within
+ /// the transaction known to the wallet (i.e., any provided via
+ /// [`WalletSource::list_confirmed_utxos`]).
+ fn sign_tx(&self, tx: &mut Transaction) -> Result<(), ()>;
+}
+
+/// A wrapper over [`WalletSource`] that implements [`CoinSelection`] by preferring UTXOs that would
+/// avoid conflicting double spends. If not enough UTXOs are available to do so, conflicting double
+/// spends may happen.
+pub struct Wallet<W: Deref> where W::Target: WalletSource {
+ source: W,
+ // TODO: Do we care about cleaning this up once the UTXOs have a confirmed spend? We can do so
+ // by checking whether any UTXOs that exist in the map are no longer returned in
+ // `list_confirmed_utxos`.
+ locked_utxos: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ClaimId>>,
+}
+
+impl<W: Deref> Wallet<W> where W::Target: WalletSource {
+ /// Returns a new instance backed by the given [`WalletSource`] that serves as an implementation
+ /// of [`CoinSelectionSource`].
+ pub fn new(source: W) -> Self {
+ Self { source, locked_utxos: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) }
+ }
+
+ /// Performs coin selection on the set of UTXOs obtained from
+ /// [`WalletSource::list_confirmed_utxos`]. Its algorithm can be described as "smallest
+ /// above-dust-after-spend first", with a slight twist: we may skip UTXOs that are above dust at
+ /// the target feerate after having spent them in a separate claim transaction if
+ /// `force_conflicting_utxo_spend` is unset to avoid producing conflicting transactions. If
+ /// `tolerate_high_network_feerates` is set, we'll attempt to spend UTXOs that contribute at
+ /// least 1 satoshi at the current feerate, otherwise, we'll only attempt to spend those which
+ /// contribute at least twice their fee.
+ fn select_confirmed_utxos_internal(
+ &self, utxos: &[Utxo], claim_id: ClaimId, force_conflicting_utxo_spend: bool,
+ tolerate_high_network_feerates: bool, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ preexisting_tx_weight: u64, target_amount_sat: u64,
+ ) -> Result<CoinSelection, ()> {
+ let mut locked_utxos = self.locked_utxos.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut eligible_utxos = utxos.iter().filter_map(|utxo| {
+ if let Some(utxo_claim_id) = locked_utxos.get(&utxo.outpoint) {
+ if *utxo_claim_id != claim_id && !force_conflicting_utxo_spend {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+ let fee_to_spend_utxo = fee_for_weight(
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, BASE_INPUT_WEIGHT as u64 + utxo.satisfaction_weight,
+ );
+ let should_spend = if tolerate_high_network_feerates {
+ utxo.output.value > fee_to_spend_utxo
+ } else {
+ utxo.output.value >= fee_to_spend_utxo * 2
+ };
+ if should_spend {
+ Some((utxo, fee_to_spend_utxo))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ eligible_utxos.sort_unstable_by_key(|(utxo, _)| utxo.output.value);
+
+ let mut selected_amount = 0;
+ let mut total_fees = fee_for_weight(target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, preexisting_tx_weight);
+ let mut selected_utxos = Vec::new();
+ for (utxo, fee_to_spend_utxo) in eligible_utxos {
+ if selected_amount >= target_amount_sat + total_fees {
+ break;
+ }
+ selected_amount += utxo.output.value;
+ total_fees += fee_to_spend_utxo;
+ selected_utxos.push(utxo.clone());
+ }
+ if selected_amount < target_amount_sat + total_fees {
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ for utxo in &selected_utxos {
+ locked_utxos.insert(utxo.outpoint, claim_id);
+ }
+ core::mem::drop(locked_utxos);
+
+ let remaining_amount = selected_amount - target_amount_sat - total_fees;
+ let change_script = self.source.get_change_script()?;
+ let change_output_fee = fee_for_weight(
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ (8 /* value */ + change_script.consensus_encode(&mut sink()).unwrap() as u64) *
+ WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64,
+ );
+ let change_output_amount = remaining_amount.saturating_sub(change_output_fee);
+ let change_output = if change_output_amount < change_script.dust_value().to_sat() {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(TxOut { script_pubkey: change_script, value: change_output_amount })
+ };
+
+ Ok(CoinSelection {
+ confirmed_utxos: selected_utxos,
+ change_output,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl<W: Deref> CoinSelectionSource for Wallet<W> where W::Target: WalletSource {
+ fn select_confirmed_utxos(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, must_spend: &[Input], must_pay_to: &[TxOut],
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ ) -> Result<CoinSelection, ()> {
+ let utxos = self.source.list_confirmed_utxos()?;
+ // TODO: Use fee estimation utils when we upgrade to bitcoin v0.30.0.
+ const BASE_TX_SIZE: u64 = 4 /* version */ + 1 /* input count */ + 1 /* output count */ + 4 /* locktime */;
+ let total_output_size: u64 = must_pay_to.iter().map(|output|
+ 8 /* value */ + 1 /* script len */ + output.script_pubkey.len() as u64
+ ).sum();
+ let total_satisfaction_weight: u64 = must_spend.iter().map(|input| input.satisfaction_weight).sum();
+ let total_input_weight = (BASE_INPUT_WEIGHT * must_spend.len() as u64) + total_satisfaction_weight;
+
+ let preexisting_tx_weight = 2 /* segwit marker & flag */ + total_input_weight +
+ ((BASE_TX_SIZE + total_output_size) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR as u64);
+ let target_amount_sat = must_pay_to.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum();
+ let do_coin_selection = |force_conflicting_utxo_spend: bool, tolerate_high_network_feerates: bool| {
+ self.select_confirmed_utxos_internal(
+ &utxos, claim_id, force_conflicting_utxo_spend, tolerate_high_network_feerates,
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, preexisting_tx_weight, target_amount_sat,
+ )
+ };
+ do_coin_selection(false, false)
+ .or_else(|_| do_coin_selection(false, true))
+ .or_else(|_| do_coin_selection(true, false))
+ .or_else(|_| do_coin_selection(true, true))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_tx(&self, tx: &mut Transaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ self.source.sign_tx(tx)
+ }
+}
+
+/// A handler for [`Event::BumpTransaction`] events that sources confirmed UTXOs from a
+/// [`CoinSelectionSource`] to fee bump transactions via Child-Pays-For-Parent (CPFP) or
+/// Replace-By-Fee (RBF).
+pub struct BumpTransactionEventHandler<B: Deref, C: Deref, SP: Deref, L: Deref>
+where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ C::Target: CoinSelectionSource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ broadcaster: B,
+ utxo_source: C,
+ signer_provider: SP,
+ logger: L,
+ secp: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+}
+
+impl<B: Deref, C: Deref, SP: Deref, L: Deref> BumpTransactionEventHandler<B, C, SP, L>
+where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ C::Target: CoinSelectionSource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ /// Returns a new instance capable of handling [`Event::BumpTransaction`] events.
+ pub fn new(broadcaster: B, utxo_source: C, signer_provider: SP, logger: L) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ broadcaster,
+ utxo_source,
+ signer_provider,
+ logger,
+ secp: Secp256k1::new(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Updates a transaction with the result of a successful coin selection attempt.
+ fn process_coin_selection(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, mut coin_selection: CoinSelection) {
+ for utxo in coin_selection.confirmed_utxos.drain(..) {
+ tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: utxo.outpoint,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::ZERO,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(change_output) = coin_selection.change_output.take() {
+ tx.output.push(change_output);
+ } else if tx.output.is_empty() {
+ // We weren't provided a change output, likely because the input set was a perfect
+ // match, but we still need to have at least one output in the transaction for it to be
+ // considered standard. We choose to go with an empty OP_RETURN as it is the cheapest
+ // way to include a dummy output.
+ tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ value: 0,
+ script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns an unsigned transaction spending an anchor output of the commitment transaction, and
+ /// any additional UTXOs sourced, to bump the commitment transaction's fee.
+ fn build_anchor_tx(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ commitment_tx: &Transaction, anchor_descriptor: &AnchorDescriptor,
+ ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+ let must_spend = vec![Input {
+ outpoint: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
+ satisfaction_weight: commitment_tx.weight() as u64 + ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT + EMPTY_SCRIPT_SIG_WEIGHT,
+ }];
+ let coin_selection = self.utxo_source.select_confirmed_utxos(
+ claim_id, &must_spend, &[], target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ )?;
+
+ let mut tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, // TODO: Use next best height.
+ input: vec![TxIn {
+ previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::ZERO,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ }],
+ output: vec![],
+ };
+ self.process_coin_selection(&mut tx, coin_selection);
+ Ok(tx)
+ }
+
+ /// Handles a [`BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose`] event variant by producing a fully-signed
+ /// transaction spending an anchor output of the commitment transaction to bump its fee and
+ /// broadcasts them to the network as a package.
+ fn handle_channel_close(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ commitment_tx: &Transaction, commitment_tx_fee_sat: u64, anchor_descriptor: &AnchorDescriptor,
+ ) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ // Compute the feerate the anchor transaction must meet to meet the overall feerate for the
+ // package (commitment + anchor transactions).
+ let commitment_tx_sat_per_1000_weight: u32 = compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(
+ commitment_tx_fee_sat, commitment_tx.weight() as u64,
+ );
+ if commitment_tx_sat_per_1000_weight >= package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight {
+ // If the commitment transaction already has a feerate high enough on its own, broadcast
+ // it as is without a child.
+ self.broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&commitment_tx]);
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ let mut anchor_tx = self.build_anchor_tx(
+ claim_id, package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor,
+ )?;
+ debug_assert_eq!(anchor_tx.output.len(), 1);
+
+ self.utxo_source.sign_tx(&mut anchor_tx)?;
+ let signer = self.signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(
+ anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ let anchor_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&anchor_tx, 0, &self.secp)?;
+ anchor_tx.input[0].witness =
+ chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(&signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &anchor_sig);
+
+ self.broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Returns an unsigned, fee-bumped HTLC transaction, along with the set of signers required to
+ /// fulfill the witness for each HTLC input within it.
+ fn build_htlc_tx(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ htlc_descriptors: &[HTLCDescriptor], tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime,
+ ) -> Result<(Transaction, HashMap<[u8; 32], <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), ()> {
+ let mut tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: tx_lock_time,
+ input: vec![],
+ output: vec![],
+ };
+ // Unfortunately, we need to derive the signer for each HTLC ahead of time to obtain its
+ // input.
+ let mut signers = HashMap::new();
+ let mut must_spend = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_descriptors.len());
+ for htlc_descriptor in htlc_descriptors {
+ let signer = signers.entry(htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id)
+ .or_insert_with(||
+ self.signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(
+ htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ )
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
+ htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &self.secp
+ );
+
+ let htlc_input = htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input();
+ must_spend.push(Input {
+ outpoint: htlc_input.previous_output.clone(),
+ satisfaction_weight: EMPTY_SCRIPT_SIG_WEIGHT + if htlc_descriptor.preimage.is_some() {
+ HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT
+ } else {
+ HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT
+ },
+ });
+ tx.input.push(htlc_input);
+ let htlc_output = htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &self.secp);
+ tx.output.push(htlc_output);
+ }
+
+ let coin_selection = self.utxo_source.select_confirmed_utxos(
+ claim_id, &must_spend, &tx.output, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ )?;
+ self.process_coin_selection(&mut tx, coin_selection);
+ Ok((tx, signers))
+ }
+
+ /// Handles a [`BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution`] event variant by producing a
+ /// fully-signed, fee-bumped HTLC transaction that is broadcast to the network.
+ fn handle_htlc_resolution(
+ &self, claim_id: ClaimId, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ htlc_descriptors: &[HTLCDescriptor], tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime,
+ ) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let (mut htlc_tx, signers) = self.build_htlc_tx(
+ claim_id, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time,
+ )?;
+
+ self.utxo_source.sign_tx(&mut htlc_tx)?;
+ for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in htlc_descriptors.iter().enumerate() {
+ let signer = signers.get(&htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id).unwrap();
+ let htlc_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
+ &htlc_tx, idx, htlc_descriptor, &self.secp
+ )?;
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
+ htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &self.secp
+ );
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &self.secp);
+ htlc_tx.input[idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&htlc_sig, &witness_script);
+ }
+
+ self.broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&htlc_tx]);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Handles all variants of [`BumpTransactionEvent`], immediately returning otherwise.
+ pub fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
+ let event = if let Event::BumpTransaction(event) = event {
+ event
+ } else {
+ return;
+ };
+ match event {
+ BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
+ claim_id, package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx,
+ anchor_descriptor, commitment_tx_fee_satoshis, ..
+ } => {
+ if let Err(_) = self.handle_channel_close(
+ *claim_id, *package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx,
+ *commitment_tx_fee_satoshis, anchor_descriptor,
+ ) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed bumping commitment transaction fee for {}",
+ commitment_tx.txid());
+ }
+ }
+ BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ claim_id, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time,
+ } => {
+ if let Err(_) = self.handle_htlc_resolution(
+ *claim_id, *target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlc_descriptors, *tx_lock_time,
+ ) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed bumping HTLC transaction fee for commitment {}",
+ htlc_descriptors[0].commitment_txid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
//! future, as well as generate and broadcast funding transactions handle payment preimages and a
//! few other things.
-#[cfg(anchors)]
pub mod bump_transaction;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
pub use bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
use crate::sign::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Transaction, OutPoint};
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use bitcoin::{Txid, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
///
/// Payments received on LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 will have this field unset.
onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
- /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for.
+ /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is claimable for. May be greater
+ /// than the invoice amount.
+ ///
+ /// May be less than the invoice amount if [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set
+ /// and the previous hop took an extra fee.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// If [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set and you claim without verifying this
+ /// field, you may lose money!
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The value, in thousands of a satoshi, that was skimmed off of this payment as an extra fee
+ /// taken by our channel counterparty.
+ ///
+ /// Will always be 0 unless [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`] is set.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: u64,
/// Information for claiming this received payment, based on whether the purpose of the
/// payment is to pay an invoice or to send a spontaneous payment.
purpose: PaymentPurpose,
/// The payment hash of the claimed payment. Note that LDK will not stop you from
/// registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound payments.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for.
+ /// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for. May be greater than the
+ /// invoice amount.
amount_msat: u64,
/// The purpose of the claimed payment, i.e. whether the payment was for an invoice or a
/// spontaneous payment.
inbound_amount_msat: u64,
/// How many msats the payer intended to route to the next node. Depending on the reason you are
/// intercepting this payment, you might take a fee by forwarding less than this amount.
+ /// Forwarding less than this amount may break compatibility with LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
///
/// Note that LDK will NOT check that expected fees were factored into this value. You MUST
/// check that whatever fee you want has been included here or subtract it as required. Further,
/// Destination of the HTLC that failed to be processed.
failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination,
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
/// Indicates that a transaction originating from LDK needs to have its fee bumped. This event
/// requires confirmed external funds to be readily available to spend.
///
- /// LDK does not currently generate this event. It is limited to the scope of channels with
- /// anchor outputs, which will be introduced in a future release.
+ /// LDK does not currently generate this event unless the
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`] config flag is set to true.
+ /// It is limited to the scope of channels with anchor outputs.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx
BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent),
}
// We never write out FundingGenerationReady events as, upon disconnection, peers
// drop any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_signed.
},
- &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, ref purpose,
- ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
+ &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
+ ref purpose, ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
ref claim_deadline, ref onion_fields
} => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
payment_preimage = Some(*preimage);
}
}
+ let skimmed_fee_opt = if counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None }
+ else { Some(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat) };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
(1, receiver_node_id, option),
(3, via_channel_id, option),
(4, amount_msat, required),
(5, via_user_channel_id, option),
- (6, 0u64, required), // user_payment_id required for compatibility with 0.0.103 and earlier
+ // Type 6 was `user_payment_id` on 0.0.103 and earlier
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
(9, onion_fields, option),
+ (10, skimmed_fee_opt, option),
});
},
&Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_id, ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, ref fee_paid_msat } => {
(2, failed_next_destination, required),
})
},
- #[cfg(anchors)]
&Event::BumpTransaction(ref event)=> {
27u8.write(writer)?;
match event {
let mut payment_preimage = None;
let mut payment_secret = None;
let mut amount_msat = 0;
+ let mut counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt = None;
let mut receiver_node_id = None;
- let mut _user_payment_id = None::<u64>; // For compatibility with 0.0.103 and earlier
+ let mut _user_payment_id = None::<u64>; // Used in 0.0.103 and earlier, no longer written in 0.0.116+.
let mut via_channel_id = None;
let mut claim_deadline = None;
let mut via_user_channel_id = None;
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
(9, onion_fields, option),
+ (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt, option),
});
let purpose = match payment_secret {
Some(secret) => PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
receiver_node_id,
payment_hash,
amount_msat,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat_opt.unwrap_or(0),
purpose,
via_channel_id,
via_user_channel_id,
//! * `max_level_trace`
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), deny(missing_docs))]
-#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
+#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
// Prefix these with `rustdoc::` when we update our MSRV to be >= 1.52 to remove warnings.
#![deny(broken_intra_doc_links)]
#![cfg_attr(all(not(feature = "std"), not(test)), no_std)]
-#![cfg_attr(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature(test))]
-#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))] extern crate test;
-
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "std", feature = "no-std")))]
compile_error!("at least one of the `std` or `no-std` features must be enabled");
extern crate core;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate hex;
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate regex;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] extern crate regex;
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] extern crate core2;
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)] extern crate criterion;
+
#[macro_use]
pub mod util;
pub mod chain;
pub use alloc::string::ToString;
}
-#[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature = "backtrace", feature = "std", test))]
+#[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), feature = "backtrace", feature = "std", test))]
extern crate backtrace;
mod sync;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::transaction_utils;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::chain;
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::util::crypto::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
/// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
+/// The upper bound weight of an anchor input.
+pub const ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 116;
+/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC timeout input from a commitment transaction with anchor
+/// outputs.
+pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 288;
+/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC success input from a commitment transaction with anchor
+/// outputs.
+pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 327;
+
/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
#[inline]
-pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
- if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
}
/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
#[inline]
-pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
- if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
}
/// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
});
#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
if htlc.offered {
let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
- if opt_anchors {
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
- if opt_anchors {
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
/// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
/// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
- get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
+ get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
///
/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
/// commitment transaction).
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, opt_anchors));
+ txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, channel_type_features));
let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
txouts.push(build_htlc_output(
- feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, opt_anchors, use_non_zero_fee_anchors,
+ feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, channel_type_features,
broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key
));
}
}
-pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> TxIn {
+pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> TxIn {
TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
+ sequence: Sequence(if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 1 } else { 0 }),
witness: Witness::new(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output(
- feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool,
- use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey
) -> TxOut {
let weight = if htlc.offered {
- htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
+ htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
} else {
- htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
+ htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
};
- let output_value = if opt_anchors && !use_non_zero_fee_anchors {
+ let output_value = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() && !channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx() {
htlc.amount_msat / 1000
} else {
let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input.
pub fn build_htlc_input_witness(
local_sig: &Signature, remote_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- redeem_script: &Script, opt_anchors: bool,
+ redeem_script: &Script, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
) -> Witness {
- let remote_sighash_type = if opt_anchors {
+ let remote_sighash_type = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
} else {
EcdsaSighashType::All
witness
}
+/// Pre-anchors channel type features did not use to get serialized in the following six structs:
+/// — [`ChannelTransactionParameters`]
+/// — [`CommitmentTransaction`]
+/// — [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`HolderHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`HolderFundingOutput`]
+///
+/// To ensure a forwards-compatible serialization, we use odd TLV fields. However, if new features
+/// are used that could break security, where old signers should be prevented from handling the
+/// serialized data, an optional even-field TLV will be used as a stand-in to break compatibility.
+///
+/// This method determines whether or not that option needs to be set based on the chanenl type
+/// features, and returns it.
+///
+/// [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput
+/// [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput
+/// [`HolderHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderHTLCOutput
+/// [`HolderFundingOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderFundingOutput
+pub(crate) fn legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Option<()> {
+ let mut legacy_version_bit_set = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ legacy_version_bit_set.set_scid_privacy_required();
+ legacy_version_bit_set.set_zero_conf_required();
+
+ if features.is_subset(&legacy_version_bit_set) {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(())
+ }
+}
+
/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
#[inline]
pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
.into_script()
}
-#[cfg(anchors)]
/// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
/// The late-bound funding outpoint
pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
- /// Are anchors (zero fee HTLC transaction variant) used for this channel. Boolean is
- /// serialization backwards-compatible.
- pub opt_anchors: Option<()>,
- /// Are non-zero-fee anchors are enabled (used in conjuction with opt_anchors)
- /// It is intended merely for backwards compatibility with signers that need it.
- /// There is no support for this feature in LDK channel negotiation.
- pub opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
+ /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open. For old objects where this field
+ /// wasn't serialized, it will default to static_remote_key at deserialization.
+ pub channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures
}
/// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
(2, selected_contest_delay, required),
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
- (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
- (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
- (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
- (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
- (8, funding_outpoint, option),
- (10, opt_anchors, option),
- (12, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
-});
+impl Writeable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.holder_pubkeys, required),
+ (2, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
+ (4, self.is_outbound_from_holder, required),
+ (6, self.counterparty_parameters, option),
+ (8, self.funding_outpoint, option),
+ (10, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut holder_pubkeys = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut holder_selected_contest_delay = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut is_outbound_from_holder = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_parameters = None;
+ let mut funding_outpoint = None;
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
+ (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
+ (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
+ (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
+ (8, funding_outpoint, option),
+ (10, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
+ additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.0.unwrap(),
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: holder_selected_contest_delay.0.unwrap(),
+ is_outbound_from_holder: is_outbound_from_holder.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_parameters,
+ funding_outpoint,
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
/// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
/// broadcaster/countersignatory.
}
/// Whether to use anchors for this channel
- pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.inner.channel_type_features
}
}
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None,
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
};
let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..htlcs.len() {
counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(dummy_sig);
}
- let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
+ let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
htlcs.sort_by_key(|htlc| htlc.0.transaction_output_index);
HolderCommitmentTransaction {
inner,
to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
feerate_per_kw: u32,
htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
- // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
- opt_anchors: Option<()>,
- // Whether non-zero-fee anchors should be used
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
+ // Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
// A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
keys: TxCreationKeys,
// For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
- self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
+ self.channel_type_features == o.channel_type_features &&
self.keys == o.keys;
if eq {
debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
- (0, commitment_number, required),
- (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
- (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
- (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
- (8, keys, required),
- (10, built, required),
- (12, htlcs, vec_type),
- (14, opt_anchors, option),
- (16, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
-});
+impl Writeable for CommitmentTransaction {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.commitment_number, required),
+ (2, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
+ (4, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
+ (6, self.feerate_per_kw, required),
+ (8, self.keys, required),
+ (10, self.built, required),
+ (12, self.htlcs, vec_type),
+ (14, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (15, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for CommitmentTransaction {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut commitment_number = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut to_broadcaster_value_sat = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut to_countersignatory_value_sat = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut keys = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut built = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ _init_tlv_field_var!(htlcs, vec_type);
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, commitment_number, required),
+ (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
+ (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
+ (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
+ (8, keys, required),
+ (10, built, required),
+ (12, htlcs, vec_type),
+ (14, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (15, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
+ additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ commitment_number: commitment_number.0.unwrap(),
+ to_broadcaster_value_sat: to_broadcaster_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
+ to_countersignatory_value_sat: to_countersignatory_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw.0.unwrap(),
+ keys: keys.0.unwrap(),
+ built: built.0.unwrap(),
+ htlcs: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlcs, vec_type),
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
impl CommitmentTransaction {
/// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
/// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
- pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
+ pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
// Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
- let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
+ let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
to_countersignatory_value_sat,
feerate_per_kw,
htlcs,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
+ channel_type_features: channel_parameters.channel_type_features().clone(),
keys,
built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
transaction,
txid
},
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
}
}
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
- self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors = Some(());
+ self.channel_type_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
self
}
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
- let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
+ let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
let txid = transaction.txid();
// - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
// caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
// - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
- fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
+ fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
- let script = if opt_anchors {
+ let script = if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
} else {
Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()
));
}
- if opt_anchors {
+ if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
txouts.push((
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
- let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
+ let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &channel_parameters.channel_type_features(), &keys);
let txout = TxOut {
script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
}
/// Should anchors be used.
- pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.inner.channel_type_features
}
/// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
ret.push(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key, entropy_source));
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
- signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, self.opt_anchors(),
+ signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features,
);
htlc_tx
}
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
+ use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
#[test]
fn test_anchors() {
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None,
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
};
let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
// Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 1000, 2000,
- false,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey());
// Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 1000, 2000,
- true,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
// Generate broadcaster output and anchor
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 3000, 0,
- true,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
// Generate counterparty output and anchor
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 0, 3000,
- true,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
};
// Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 3000, 0,
- false,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
&channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
"0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb");
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
"0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d");
// Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
- channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
0, 3000, 0,
- true,
holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
keys.clone(), 1,
&channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
"0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc");
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
"002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7");
}
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
assert_eq!(get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap(), as_reestablish);
assert_eq!(get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap(), bs_reestablish);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let as_reconnect = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
let bs_reconnect = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
{
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
+ get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id).context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
{
let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
- get_channel_ref!(nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
+ get_channel_ref!(nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, channel_id).context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
// Route the payment and deliver the initial commitment_signed (with a monitor update failure
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let as_reconnect = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
let bs_reconnect = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let as_connect_msg = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_connect_msg = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_connect_msg);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let as_connect_msg = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_connect_msg = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_connect_msg);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Now reconnect the two
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
-use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use crate::io;
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
/// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
+
+pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+ const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+
+pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
+
+/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
+/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
+/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
+/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
+
+/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
+/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
+/// It's 2^24 - 1.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
+
+/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
+pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
+
+/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
+/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
+/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
+/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
+/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
+pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
+
+/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
+pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
+
+/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
+/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
+/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
+/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
+/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
+/// standard.
+/// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
+pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
+
+// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
+pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
+
+/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
+/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
+/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+ Ignore(String),
+ Warn(String),
+ Close(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+ ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(thing) => thing,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
/// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
/// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
/// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
}
/// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
-pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
+pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
/// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
/// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
/// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
NewClaim {
/// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
- monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
+ monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
/// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
htlc_value_msat: u64,
},
pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
}
+/// The return type of `force_shutdown`
+pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
+ Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
+ Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
+);
+
/// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
/// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
/// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
/// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
+/// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
+/// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
+/// them.
+///
+/// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
+pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
+
struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
- /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
- /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
- /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
- blocked: bool,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
(0, update, required),
- (2, blocked, required),
});
-// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
-// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
-// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
-// inbound channel.
-//
-// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
-// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
-pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+/// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
+pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
config: LegacyChannelConfig,
// Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
/// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
+ /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
+ /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
+ /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
+ /// unblock the state machine.
+ ///
+ /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
+ /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
+ /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
+ ///
+ /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
+ /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
+
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
// When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
// corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
/// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
- /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
- /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
- /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
- /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
- pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
+ /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
+ /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
+ blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
}
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
-struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee: u64,
- total_pending_htlcs: usize,
- next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
- feerate: u32,
-}
+impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.update_time_counter
+ }
-pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
+ pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id
+ }
-pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
- const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
- if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
-}
+ pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
+ self.config.announced_channel
+ }
-#[cfg(not(test))]
-const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
+ }
-pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
+ /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ }
-/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
-/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
-/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
-/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
-pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
+ /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+ pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ }
-/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
-/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
-/// It's 2^24 - 1.
-pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
+ let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
+ (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
+ }
-/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
-pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
+ /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
+ pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
+ }
+ return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
+ }
-/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
-/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
-/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
-/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
-/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
-pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
+ fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
+ self.channel_state &
+ (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
+ ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
+ ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
+ ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
+ }
-/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
-pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
+ /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
+ /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
+ }
-/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
-/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
-/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
-/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
-/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
-/// standard.
-/// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
-pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
+ // Public utilities:
-// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
-pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ self.channel_id
+ }
-/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
-/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
-/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
-pub(super) enum ChannelError {
- Ignore(String),
- Warn(String),
- Close(String),
-}
+ // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
+ //
+ // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
+ pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ self.temporary_channel_id
+ }
-impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- match self {
- &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
- }
+ pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ self.minimum_depth
}
-}
-macro_rules! secp_check {
- ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(thing) => thing,
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
- }
- };
-}
+ /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
+ /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
+ pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
+ self.user_id
+ }
-impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
- /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
- /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
- ///
- /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
- fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
- let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
- 1
- } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
- 100
- } else {
- config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
- };
- channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
+ /// Gets the channel's type
+ pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.channel_type
}
- /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
- /// required by us according to the configured or default
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
- ///
- /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
- ///
- /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
- /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
- pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
- let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
+ /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
+ /// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id
}
- /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
- /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
- /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
- /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
- pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
}
- pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.outbound_scid_alias
}
- fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
- // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
- // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
- // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
- // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
- let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
- if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
- config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
- their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
- ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
- }
-
- // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
- // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
- // `only_static_remotekey`.
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
- if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
- their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
- }
- }
-
- ret
+ /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
+ /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
+ pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
+ assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
+ self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
}
- /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
- /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
- /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
- pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
- if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
- if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- // We've exhausted our options
- return Err(());
- }
- // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
- // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
- // accepted one.
- //
- // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
- // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
- // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
- // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
- // whatever reason.
- if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
- assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
- } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
- self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
- } else {
- self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
- }
- Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
+ /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
+ /// get_outbound_funding_created.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
}
- // Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
- channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
- outbound_scid_alias: u64
- ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- {
- let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
- let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
- let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
- let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+ /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
+ }
- if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
- }
- if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
- }
- let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
- }
- if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
- }
- let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
- // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
+ /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
+ return 0;
}
- let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
- debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
+ height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
+ }
- let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
+ }
- let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
- let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
- }
+ fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
+ }
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
+ .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
+ }
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
- }
- } else { None };
+ fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
+ }
- if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
- return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
- }
- }
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.counterparty_node_id
+ }
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
- Ok(script) => script,
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
- };
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
- let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
+ pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
+ }
- Ok(Channel {
- user_id,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ return cmp::min(
+ // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
+ // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
+ // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
+ self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
- config: LegacyChannelConfig {
- options: config.channel_config.clone(),
- announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
- },
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ );
+ }
- prev_config: None,
-
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
-
- channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
- channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
- secp_ctx,
- channel_value_satoshis,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
- update_time_counter: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
-
- inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
- short_channel_id: None,
- channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
-
- feerate_per_kw: feerate,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
- minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
-
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
-
- channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
- holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
- is_outbound_from_holder: true,
- counterparty_parameters: None,
- funding_outpoint: None,
- opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
- },
- funding_transaction: None,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_node_id,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
+ pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
+ }
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+ fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
+ let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ cmp::min(
+ (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
+ party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ )
+ })
+ }
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.channel_value_satoshis
+ }
- channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+ pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
- announcement_sigs: None,
+ pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
+ cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
+ }
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
+ let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
+ ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
+ },
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
+ }
+ }
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
+ pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
+ self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
+ }
- latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
- outbound_scid_alias,
+ // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
+ self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ }
- channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
- channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+ // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ }
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+ // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
+ self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
+ }
- channel_type,
- channel_keys_id,
+ // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
+ pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
+ }
- pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
- })
+ // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
+ pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
+ self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
}
- fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
- feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
- {
- // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
- // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
- // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
- // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
- let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
- fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
- if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
+ /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
+ /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
+ /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
+ pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
+ if self.prev_config.is_none() {
+ return;
}
- let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
- // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
- // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
- // sat/kw before the comparison here.
- if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
- if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
- if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
- log_warn!(logger,
- "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
- cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
- return Ok(());
- }
- }
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
+ let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
+ prev_config.1 += 1;
+ if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
+ self.prev_config = None;
}
- Ok(())
}
- /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
- /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
- counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
- their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
- current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
- ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
+ pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
+ self.config.options
+ }
- // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
- // support this channel type.
- let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
- if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
- }
-
- // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
- // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
- // `static_remote_key`.
- if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
- }
- // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
- if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type.clone()
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type
- };
- let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
-
- let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
- let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
- let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
- let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
- funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
- };
-
- if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
- }
-
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
- }
- Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
-
- let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
- }
-
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
-
- // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
-
- if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
- if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
- }
- }
-
- let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
- // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
- msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
- }
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
-
- // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
- // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
- let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
- let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
- if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
- }
-
- let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
- // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
- // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
- if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
- }
-
- let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &Some(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
- }
- Some(script.clone())
- }
- },
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &None => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
- }
- }
- } else { None };
-
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
- }
- } else { None };
-
- if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
- }
+ /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
+ /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
+ pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
+ let did_channel_update =
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
+ self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
+ if did_channel_update {
+ self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
+ // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
+ // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
}
+ self.config.options = *config;
+ did_channel_update
+ }
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
- Ok(script) => script,
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
- };
-
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- let chan = Channel {
- user_id,
-
- config: LegacyChannelConfig {
- options: config.channel_config.clone(),
- announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
- },
-
- prev_config: None,
-
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
-
- channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
- channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
- secp_ctx,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
- update_time_counter: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
-
- inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
- short_channel_id: None,
- channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
-
- feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
- channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
- minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
-
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
-
- channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
- holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
- is_outbound_from_holder: false,
- counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
- selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
- }),
- funding_outpoint: None,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
- },
- funding_transaction: None,
-
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_node_id,
-
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
-
- channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
-
- announcement_sigs: None,
-
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
-
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
-
- latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
- outbound_scid_alias,
-
- channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
- channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
-
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
-
- channel_type,
- channel_keys_id,
-
- pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- Ok(chan)
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
}
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
- let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
+ let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
0
} else {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
};
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
}
} else {
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
- let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
+ let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
0
} else {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
};
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
}
- let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
- let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
+ let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
+ let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
} else {
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
value_to_a as u64,
value_to_b as u64,
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
funding_pubkey_a,
funding_pubkey_b,
keys.clone(),
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
- // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
- // outside of those situations will fail.
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
- }
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
+ /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
+ /// our counterparty!)
+ /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
+ /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
+ fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- #[inline]
- fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
- let mut ret =
- (4 + // version
- 1 + // input count
- 36 + // prevout
- 1 + // script length (0)
- 4 + // sequence
- 1 + // output count
- 4 // lock time
- )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
- 2 + // witness marker and flag
- 1 + // witness element count
- 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
- self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
- 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
- if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
- ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
- spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
- }
- if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
- ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
- spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
- }
- ret
+ TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
}
#[inline]
- fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
- assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
+ /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
+ //may see payments to it!
+ let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
+ }
- if value_to_holder < 0 {
- assert!(self.is_outbound());
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
- } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
- }
-
- if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- value_to_counterparty = 0;
- }
-
- if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- value_to_holder = 0;
- }
-
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
- let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
- let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
- let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
+ /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
+ /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+ /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
+ }
- let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
- (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
+ fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
+ pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
}
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
- /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
- /// our counterparty!)
- /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
- /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
- let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
+ pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
+ // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
+ // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
+ // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
+ // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
+ // which are near the dust limit.
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
+ // potential feerate updates coming soon.
+ if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
+ }
+ if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
+ feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
+ }
+ cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
+ }
- TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
+ /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
+ pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
}
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
- /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
- //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
- //may see payments to it!
- let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
+ /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
+ fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
+ let context = self;
+ let mut stats = HTLCStats {
+ pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
+ pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ holding_cell_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
+ };
- TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
+ };
+ let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ stats
}
- /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
- /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
- /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
- }
+ /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
+ fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
+ let context = self;
+ let mut stats = HTLCStats {
+ pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
+ pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ holding_cell_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
+ };
- /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
- /// entirely.
- ///
- /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
- /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
- ///
- /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
- /// disconnected).
- pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
- (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
- where L::Target: Logger {
- // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
- // (see equivalent if condition there).
- assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
- let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
- let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
- if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
- assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
+ };
+ let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
+ stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
+ stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
+ if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
+ }
+ if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
+ }
+ }
}
+ stats
}
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
- // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
- // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
- // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
- // either.
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
+ /// Doesn't bother handling the
+ /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
+ /// corner case properly.
+ pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
+ -> AvailableBalances
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let context = &self;
+ // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
+ let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+
+ let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
+ balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
- let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
+ .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
+ .saturating_sub(
+ context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+ let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
- let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
- let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- } else {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
- }
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
- }
- }
- pending_idx = idx;
- htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
- break;
+ if context.is_outbound() {
+ // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
+ // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
+ //
+ // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
+ // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
+ // dependency.
+ // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
+ let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
+ }
+
+ let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
+ let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
+
+ // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
+ // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
+ // match the value to right-below-dust.
+ let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
+ if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
+ let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
+ debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
+ capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
+ capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
+ } else {
+ available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
+ // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
+ let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
+ }
+
+ let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
+
+ let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
+ .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
+
+ if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
+ // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
+ // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
}
- }
- if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
- // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
}
- // Now update local state:
- //
- // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
- // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
- }],
+ let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
+
+ // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
+ // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
+ // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
+ // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
+ let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
+ let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
+ (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
+ let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
+ Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
+ dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
+ }
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
- // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
- // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
- // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
- // do not not get into this branch.
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
- self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
- // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- });
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
- {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
+ if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
+ if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
} else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
}
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
- monitor_update,
- htlc_value_msat,
- msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
- }),
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
+ context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
+
+ if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ available_capacity_msat = 0;
}
- }
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
- let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
- // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
- // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
- // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
- // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
- // update_ids of all the following monitors.
- let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
- let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
- // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
- });
- self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
- } else {
- let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
- .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
- let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
- .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
- monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
- self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
- });
- for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
- held_update.update.update_id += 1;
- }
- if msg.is_some() {
- debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
- let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update, blocked: true,
- });
- }
- insert_pos
- };
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
- monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
- .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
- htlc_value_msat,
- }
- },
- UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
+ AvailableBalances {
+ inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
+ - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
+ - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ balance_msat,
}
}
- /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
- /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
- /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
- /// before we fail backwards.
- ///
- /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
- /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
- /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
- .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
+ pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
+ let context = &self;
+ (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
}
- /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
- /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
- /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
- /// before we fail backwards.
+ /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
+ /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
///
- /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
- /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
- /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
+ /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
+ ///
+ /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
+ /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
+ ///
+ /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
+ fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ let context = &self;
+ assert!(context.is_outbound());
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
+ };
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
- }
- return Ok(None);
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
- }
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
}
- pending_idx = idx;
}
}
- if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
- // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return Ok(None);
+
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
+ // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
+ included_htlcs += 1;
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
- debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
- force_holding_cell = true;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
+ // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
+ // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
- // Now update local state:
- if force_holding_cell {
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return Ok(None);
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
+ for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match htlc {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
+ if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1
+ },
+ _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
+ // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- err_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
}
-
- Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- reason: err_packet
- }))
+ res
}
- // Message handlers:
+ /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
+ /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
+ ///
+ /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
+ /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
+ ///
+ /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
+ /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
+ ///
+ /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
+ fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ let context = &self;
+ assert!(!context.is_outbound());
- pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
+ };
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
- msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
}
- let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
+
+ // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
+ // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
+ // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1;
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
+
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
+ // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
+
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
}
+ res
+ }
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
+ /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
+ pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
+ self.funding_transaction.clone()
+ } else {
+ None
}
+ }
- if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
- if *ty != self.channel_type {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
- }
- } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
- // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
- }
- self.channel_type = channel_type;
- }
+ /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
+ // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
+ // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
+ // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
+ // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
+ assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
- let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &Some(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
- }
- Some(script.clone())
- }
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
},
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &None => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
- }
+ _ => {}
}
- } else { None };
-
- self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
-
- if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
- self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
- } else {
- self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
}
+ let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
+ // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
+ // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
+ // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
+ // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
+ // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
+ Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
- let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
- funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
- };
-
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
- selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
- });
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+// Internal utility functions for channels
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
- self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
+/// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
+/// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
+///
+/// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
+///
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
+fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
+ let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
+ 1
+ } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
+ 100
+ } else {
+ config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
+ };
+ channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
+}
- Ok(())
- }
+/// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
+/// required by us according to the configured or default
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
+///
+/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
+///
+/// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
+/// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
+pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
+ let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
+}
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+/// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
+/// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
+/// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
+/// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
+pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
+}
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
- encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
- }
+// Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
+// Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
+#[inline]
+fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+}
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+// Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
+// Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
+fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
+ // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
+ (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
+}
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
+// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
+// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
+// inbound channel.
+//
+// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
+// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
+pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
- let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee: u64,
+ total_pending_htlcs: usize,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
+ feerate: u32,
+}
- // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
+ fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
+ // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
+ // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
+ // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
+ let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
+ fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
+ if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
+ }
+ let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
+ // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
+ // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
+ // sat/kw before the comparison here.
+ if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
+ if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
+ if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
+ log_warn!(logger,
+ "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
+ cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ }
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
+ }
+ Ok(())
}
- fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
- &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
+ // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
+ // outside of those situations will fail.
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
}
- pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
- // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
- // channel.
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
+ let mut ret =
+ (4 + // version
+ 1 + // input count
+ 36 + // prevout
+ 1 + // script length (0)
+ 4 + // sequence
+ 1 + // output count
+ 4 // lock time
+ )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
+ 2 + // witness marker and flag
+ 1 + // witness element count
+ 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
+ self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
+ 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
+ if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
}
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
}
+ ret
+ }
- let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
- // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
- // funding_created_signature may fail.
- self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
-
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
- },
- Err(e) => {
- // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
- // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
- panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
- }
- };
-
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
- initial_commitment_tx,
- msg.signature,
- Vec::new(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
- );
-
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
+ assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+ let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
+ let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
- let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
- monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
- shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
+ if value_to_holder < 0 {
+ assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
+ } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
+ assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
+ }
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
+ if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ value_to_counterparty = 0;
+ }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ value_to_holder = 0;
+ }
- log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+ let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
+ let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
- let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
+ (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
+ }
- Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, channel_monitor))
+ fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
}
- /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
- /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
+ /// entirely.
+ ///
+ /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
+ /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
+ ///
+ /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
+ /// disconnected).
+ pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
+ (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
+ where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
+ // (see equivalent if condition there).
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
+ let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
+ let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
+ if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
+ assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
}
+ }
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
+ // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
+ // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
+ // either.
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
+ let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
+ }
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
+ break;
}
}
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
+ // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
+ }
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
- initial_commitment_tx,
- msg.signature,
- Vec::new(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
- );
-
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
-
+ // Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
- let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
- monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
- shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
+ // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
+ // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
+ // do not not get into this branch.
+ for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+ // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ });
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ }
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
+ }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
+ monitor_update,
+ htlc_value_msat,
+ msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
+ }),
+ }
+ }
- log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
+ let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
+ // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
+ // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
+ // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
+ // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
+ // update_ids of all the following monitors.
+ if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
+ // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ } else {
+ let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
+ .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
+ monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
+ for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
+ held_update.update.update_id += 1;
+ }
+ if msg.is_some() {
+ debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
+ let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update,
+ });
+ }
+ }
- let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok(channel_monitor)
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
+ },
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
+ }
}
- /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
- /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
- /// reply with.
- pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
- user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
- where
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
- }
+ /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
+ /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
+ /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
+ /// before we fail backwards.
+ ///
+ /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
+ /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
+ /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
+ pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
+ .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
+ }
- if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
- if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
- // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
- // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
- // when routing outbound payments.
- self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
- }
+ /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
+ /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
+ /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
+ /// before we fail backwards.
+ ///
+ /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
+ /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
+ /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
+ fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
- // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
- (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
- {
- // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
- // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
- let expected_point =
- if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
- // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
- // the current one.
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
- } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
- // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
- // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
- debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
- } else {
- // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
- // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
- Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
- &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
- ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
- };
- if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
+ }
+ return Ok(None);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
}
+ }
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
+ // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
return Ok(None);
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
+ force_holding_cell = true;
+ }
- log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ // Now update local state:
+ if force_holding_cell {
+ for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ err_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
- Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ }
+
+ Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ reason: err_packet
+ }))
}
- /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
- pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
- self.funding_transaction.clone()
- } else {
- None
+ // Message handlers:
+
+ /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
+ /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+ pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- }
- /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
- fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
- let mut stats = HTLCStats {
- pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
- pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- holding_cell_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
- };
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
}
- stats
- }
- /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
- fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
- let mut stats = HTLCStats {
- pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
- pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- holding_cell_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
- };
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
+
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
+ let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
+ let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
+ monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
+ shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
+
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
+
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+
+ let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ Ok(channel_monitor)
+ }
+
+ /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
+ /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
+ /// reply with.
+ pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
+ where
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
}
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
- stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
- stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
- if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
- }
- if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
- } else {
- stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
- }
+ if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
+ if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
+ // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
+ // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
+ // when routing outbound payments.
+ self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
}
}
- stats
- }
- /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
- /// Doesn't bother handling the
- /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
- /// corner case properly.
- pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
- // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
- balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
+ // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
+ (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
+ (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
+ {
+ // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
+ // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
+ let expected_point =
+ if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
+ // the current one.
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
+ } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
+ // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
+ // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
+ } else {
+ // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
+ // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
+ Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
+ &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
+ ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
+ };
+ if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
}
+ return Ok(None);
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
- balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
- let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
- - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
- - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
- 0) as u64;
- AvailableBalances {
- inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
- - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
- - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
- - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
- 0) as u64,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
- - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
- 0) as u64,
- balance_msat,
- }
- }
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
- (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
- }
+ log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
- // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
- // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
- fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
- // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
- (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
+ Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
}
- // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
- // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
- #[inline]
- fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- }
+ pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
+ create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
+ FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
+ let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
+ if local_sent_shutdown {
+ pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
+ }
+ // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
+ let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
+ if remote_sent_shutdown {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
+ }
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
- // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
- // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
- // are excluded.
- fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
- assert!(self.is_outbound());
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ }
+ if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ }
+ // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
+ // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
+ // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
+ // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
+ // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
+ // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
+ // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
+ // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
+ // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
+ // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
+ // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
+ // transaction).
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
(0, 0)
} else {
- (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
- let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
-
- let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
- match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- },
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
+ let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
+ let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
+ if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
+ log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
+ pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
- let mut included_htlcs = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- continue
- }
- // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
- // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
- included_htlcs += 1;
- }
-
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
- // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
- // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
- _ => {},
- }
- }
-
- for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match htlc {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
- if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- included_htlcs += 1
- },
- _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
- // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
- }
- }
-
- let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
- let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- let mut fee = res;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
- fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
- }
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
- + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
- let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee,
- total_pending_htlcs,
- next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- },
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
- },
- feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
- };
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
- }
- res
- }
-
- // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
- // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
- // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
- // excluded.
- fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound());
-
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
-
- let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
- match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- },
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
- // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
- // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
- let mut included_htlcs = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- included_htlcs += 1;
- }
-
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- continue
- }
- // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
- // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
-
- let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
- let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- let mut fee = res;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
- fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
- }
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
- let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee,
- total_pending_htlcs,
- next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- },
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
- },
- feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
- };
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
- }
- res
- }
-
- pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
- where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
- // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
- let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
- if local_sent_shutdown {
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
- }
- // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
- let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
- if remote_sent_shutdown {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
- }
-
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
- }
- if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
- }
- // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
- // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
- // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
- // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
- // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
- // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
- // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
- // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
- // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
- // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
- // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
- // transaction).
- let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
- removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
- removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- }
-
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
- let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
- log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
- }
- }
-
- let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
- on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
+ on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
let pending_value_to_self_msat =
- self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
let pending_remote_value_msat =
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
}
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
+ self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
};
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
};
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
// `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
// the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
// receiver's side, only on the sender's.
// still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
// sensitive to fee spikes.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
+ let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
+ if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
} else {
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
- if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
+ if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
}
}
// Now update local state:
- self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
#[inline]
fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
let outcome = match check_preimage {
None => fail_reason.into(),
}
pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
}
pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
}
pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
+ pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger
{
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
let commitment_txid = {
let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
- log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
- log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
bitcoin_tx.txid
// If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
// they can actually afford the new fee now.
- let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
} else { false };
if update_fee {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
}
}
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- if self.is_outbound() {
- let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
- + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
- && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
- && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
- && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
}
}
for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
- self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
- false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
+ &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
commitment_stats.tx,
msg.signature,
msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let mut need_commitment = false;
- if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
*update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
need_commitment = true;
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
Some(forward_info.clone())
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
}
}
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
}]
};
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
// the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
// includes the right HTLCs.
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
- let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
true
} else { false };
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
/// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
/// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
/// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
- pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
- self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
+ pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
+ (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
+ self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
} else { (None, Vec::new()) }
}
/// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
/// for our counterparty.
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
- if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
- if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
+ if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
updates: Vec::new(),
};
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
// handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
// to rebalance channels.
match &htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
+ onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
+ {
Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
match e {
ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
// If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
// be failed backwards. Failing to send here
// indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
},
}
}
- if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
+ if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
}
- let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
- self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
+ let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
+ self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
} else {
None
};
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
// but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
- where L::Target: Logger,
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
- if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
}
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
// Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
// haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
// take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
}
- self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
&secret
).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
- self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
- idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
}],
};
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
{
- // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
- let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
- let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
+ let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
+ let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
}
}
}
- self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
match update_state {
FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
- debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
+ debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
},
- FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
+ FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
require_commitment = true;
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
},
}
}
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
if require_commitment {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
// When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
// which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
// before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
- self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
- self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
- self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
}
- match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
- (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
- let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
+ (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
// free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
}
/// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
/// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
/// commitment update.
- pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
+ pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
}
///
/// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
/// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
- fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
}
- if !self.is_live() {
+ if !self.context.is_live() {
panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
}
// Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
- let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
+ let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
- if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
+ if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
//TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
// Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
force_holding_cell = true;
}
if force_holding_cell {
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
- self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
+ debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
feerate_per_kw,
})
}
/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
/// completed.
pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
return;
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
// While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
// redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
return;
}
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
}
// Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
// will be retransmitted.
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
- self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
- self.closing_fee_limits = None;
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
+ self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
// They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
},
}
});
- self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+ self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
- if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
}
}
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
+
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
) {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
- self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
- self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
- self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
}
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
- let mut found_blocked = false;
- self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
- if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
- if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
- upd.blocked
- });
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
// If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
// first received the funding_signed.
let mut funding_broadcastable =
- if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.funding_transaction.take()
+ if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.funding_transaction.take()
} else { None };
// That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
// minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
- if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
funding_broadcastable = None;
}
// * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
// the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
// * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
- let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
+ let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
+ assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
"Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
})
} else { None };
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+ mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
+ mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
};
}
- let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+ let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
} else { None };
- let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ self.mark_awaiting_response();
Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
} else { None };
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- let order = self.resend_order.clone();
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
MonitorRestoreUpdates {
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
- let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
+ let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
- self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
// If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
// `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
// won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
}
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
next_per_commitment_point,
#[cfg(taproot)]
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
});
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
match reason {
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
reason: err_packet.clone()
});
},
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
},
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
});
}
}
- let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
})
} else { None };
log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
// just close here instead of trying to recover.
}
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
- let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
- if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
+ if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
macro_rules! log_and_panic {
($err_msg: expr) => {
- log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
- panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
+ log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
+ panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
}
}
log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
// Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
// commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
- let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
+ let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
return Err(
ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
- let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
})
} else { None };
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
- self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
+ self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
}
}
// We have OurChannelReady set!
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
}),
raa: None, commitment_update: None,
order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
});
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
} else {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
// revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
// AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
// the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
- let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+ let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
+ if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ self.mark_awaiting_response();
+ }
+ let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
- let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
// We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
})
} else { None };
if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
raa: required_revoke,
commitment_update: None,
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
commitment_update: None, raa: None,
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
} else {
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
raa: required_revoke,
commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
}
} else {
-> (u64, u64)
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
+ if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
// Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
// force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
// If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
+ let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
// The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
// channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
// very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
// some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
- if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
- let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
+ if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
+ let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
}
// come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
// relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
// if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
- let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
- let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
+ let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
// We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
// feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
// target feerate-calculated fee.
- cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
+ cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
} else {
- self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
};
- self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
- self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
}
/// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
/// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
/// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
- self.channel_state &
- (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
- ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
- == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
- self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
+ self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
}
/// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
/// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
- if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
+ if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
} else {
- self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
+ self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
}
}
Ok(())
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
return Ok((None, None));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
}
return Ok((None, None));
let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
- let sig = self.holder_signer
- .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.context.holder_signer
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
signature: sig,
fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
}), None))
}
+ // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
+ // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
+ // a reconnection.
+ fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
+ }
+
+ /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
+ /// within our expected timeframe.
+ ///
+ /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
+ pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
+ let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
+ ticks_elapsed
+ } else {
+ // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
+ return false;
+ };
+ *ticks_elapsed += 1;
+ *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
+ }
+
pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
- ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
+ ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
where SP::Target: SignerProvider
{
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
// are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
// can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
- if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
- if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
+ if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
+ if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
} else {
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
}
// If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
// immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
// any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
- let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(_) => false,
None => {
assert!(send_shutdown);
if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
}
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
true
},
};
// From here on out, we may not fail!
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
};
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
- } else { None }
+ self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
} else { None };
let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
})
} else { None };
// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
// cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
}
});
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
- let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
+ let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
}
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
tx
}
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
}
- if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
- self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
+ self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
return Ok((None, None));
}
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
}
- let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
- let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
+ let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
},
};
}
}
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
- if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
}
}
self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
};
- let sig = self.holder_signer
- .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.context.holder_signer
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
Some(tx)
} else { None };
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: used_fee,
signature: sig,
fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
// They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
// We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
- debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
+ debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
} else {
if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
} else {
// Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
// with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
- if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
}
}
- // Public utilities:
-
- pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- self.channel_id
- }
-
- // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
- //
- // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
- pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- self.temporary_channel_id
+ fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
+ &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
+ ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
+ if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
+ (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
+ return Err((
+ "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
+ 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
+ ));
+ }
+ if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
+ return Err((
+ "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
+ 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ ));
+ }
+ Ok(())
}
- pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
- self.minimum_depth
+ /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
+ /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
+ /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
+ pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
+ &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
+ self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
+ .or_else(|err| {
+ if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
+ self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
+ } else {
+ Err(err)
+ }
+ })
}
- /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
- /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
- pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
- self.user_id
+ pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
}
- /// Gets the channel's type
- pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
- &self.channel_type
+ pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
}
- /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
- /// is_usable() returns true).
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id
+ pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
}
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
+ &self.context.holder_signer
}
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
- self.outbound_scid_alias
- }
- /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
- /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
- pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
- assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
- self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
- }
-
- /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
- /// get_outbound_funding_created.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
- }
-
- /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
- pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
- }
-
- /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
- // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
- return 0;
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
+ ChannelValueStat {
+ value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
+ channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
+ let mut res = 0;
+ for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match h {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
+ res += amount_msat;
+ }
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
}
-
- height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
- }
-
- fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
- }
-
- fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
- }
-
- pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
- .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
- }
-
- fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.counterparty_node_id
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
- pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- return cmp::min(
- // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
- // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
- // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
-
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- );
}
+ /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
+ pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
}
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
- pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
+ /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
+ pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
+ self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
}
- fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
- let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
- cmp::min(
- (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
- party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- )
- })
+ /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
+ /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
+ pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
+ if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
+ Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
+ !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
}
- pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
- self.channel_value_satoshis
+ /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
+ /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
+ fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
+ -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
+ let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
+ if !release_monitor {
+ self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update,
+ });
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(update)
+ }
}
- pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
+ self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
}
- pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
- cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
+ /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
+ /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
+ /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
+ /// advanced state.
+ pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
+ if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
+ if self.context.channel_state &
+ !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
+ == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
+ // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
+ // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
+ // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
+ // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
+ //
+ // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
+ // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
+ // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
+ //
+ // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
+ // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
+ // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
+ if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
+ assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+ false
}
- pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
+ /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
+ pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
}
- /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
- pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
- self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
+ /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
+ pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
}
- // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
- self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
+ pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
}
- // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
+ /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
+ /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
+ pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ true
+ } else { false }
}
- // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
- self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
+ pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
+ self.context.channel_update_status
}
- // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
- pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
+ pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_update_status = status;
}
- // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
- pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
- self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
- }
+ fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
+ // Called:
+ // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
+ // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ return None;
+ }
- /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
- /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
- /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
- pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
- if self.prev_config.is_none() {
- return;
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
}
- let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
- prev_config.1 += 1;
- if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
- self.prev_config = None;
+
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
+ return None;
}
- }
- /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
- pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
- self.config.options
- }
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ } else {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
+ // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
+ // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
+ // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
+ // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
+ Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
+ self.context.channel_state);
+ }
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ };
- /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
- /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
- pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let did_channel_update =
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
- self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
- if did_channel_update {
- self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
- // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
- // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_point =
+ self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
+ }
}
- self.config.options = *config;
- did_channel_update
- }
-
- fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
- &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
- ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
- .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
- if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
- (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
- return Err((
- "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
- 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
- ));
- }
- if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
- return Err((
- "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- ));
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
- /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
- /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
- pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
- &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
- ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
- self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
- .or_else(|err| {
- if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
- self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
- } else {
- Err(err)
- }
- })
- }
-
- pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
- self.feerate_per_kw
- }
-
- pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
- // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
- // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
- // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
- // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
- // which are near the dust limit.
- let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
- // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
- // potential feerate updates coming soon.
- if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
- feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
- }
- if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
- feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
- }
- cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
- }
-
- pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
- }
-
- pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
- }
-
- pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
- &self.holder_signer
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
- ChannelValueStat {
- value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
- channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
- channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
- pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
- pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
- holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
- let mut res = 0;
- for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match h {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
- res += amount_msat;
- }
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- res
- },
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
- }
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
- self.update_time_counter
- }
-
- pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id
- }
-
- pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
- self.config.announced_channel
- }
-
- pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
- }
-
- /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
- }
-
- /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
- pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
- let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
- (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
- /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
- }
-
- pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
- self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
- }
-
- /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
- /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
- pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
- for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
- if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
- self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
- return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
- self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
- }
- }
- None
- }
-
- /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
- /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
- fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
- let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update, blocked: !release_monitor
- });
- release_monitor
- }
-
- /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
- /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
- /// blocked.
- fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
- -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
- let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
- if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
- }
-
- pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
- }
-
- pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
- }
-
- /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
- pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
- }
-
- /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
- /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
- /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
- /// advanced state.
- pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
- if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
- if self.channel_state &
- !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
- == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
- // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
- debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
- return true;
- }
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
- // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
- // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
- // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
- // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
- //
- // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
- // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
- // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
- //
- // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
- // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
- // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
- if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
- assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
- assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
- return true;
- }
- false
- }
-
- /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
- pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
- }
-
- /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
- pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
- }
-
- /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
- pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
- /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
- /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
- pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
- assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
- true
- } else { false }
- }
-
- pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
- self.channel_update_status
- }
-
- pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- self.channel_update_status = status;
- }
-
- fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
- // Called:
- // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
- // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
- return None;
- }
-
- let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
- if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
- }
-
- if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
- return None;
- }
-
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
- false
- } else {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
- // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
- // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
- // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
- // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
- #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
- Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
- self.channel_state);
- }
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
- false
- };
-
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_point =
- self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
- return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
- });
- }
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
- }
- }
- None
+ None
}
/// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
// Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
// check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
}
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
} else {
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if input.witness.is_empty() {
// We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
}
}
}
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
- self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
+ self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
}
// send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
// may have already happened for this block).
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
}
}
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
- log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
}
}
// forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
// ~now.
let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
}
});
- self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
+ self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
} else { None };
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
- let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
// Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
// zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
// indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
// 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
// `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
// to.
- if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
+ if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
- self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
+ self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
}
- } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
- height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
- log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
+ height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
+ log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
// If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
/// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
/// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
// We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
// below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
- let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
+ let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
// We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
// larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
// time we saw and it will be ignored.
- let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
+ let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
+ /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
+ /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
+ /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
+ /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
+ ///
+ /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+ /// closing).
+ ///
+ /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
+ fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
+ &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
+ ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
+ if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
- }
-
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
-
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
-
- msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash,
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
- push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
- None => Builder::new().into_script(),
- }),
- channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
- self.inbound_awaiting_accept
- }
-
- /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
- pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
- assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
- self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
- }
-
- /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
- /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
- }
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
- if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
- panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
- }
-
- self.user_id = user_id;
- self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
-
- self.generate_accept_channel_message()
- }
-
- /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
- /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
- /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
-
- msgs::AcceptChannel {
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
- to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
- None => Builder::new().into_script(),
- }),
- channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- }
- }
-
- /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
- /// inbound channel without accepting it.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- self.generate_accept_channel_message()
- }
-
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
- }
-
- /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
- /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
- /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
- /// or if called on an inbound channel.
- /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
- /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
- }
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
- self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
-
- let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err(e);
- }
- };
-
- let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
-
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
-
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
-
- Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- })
- }
-
- /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
- /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
- /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
- /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
- ///
- /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
- /// closing).
- ///
- /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
- fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
- &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
- ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if !self.config.announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
- }
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
}
let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
- let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
chain_hash,
- short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
- bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
+ bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
+ bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return None;
}
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
return None;
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
return None;
}
- if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
return None;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
},
Ok(v) => v
};
- let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
Err(_) => {
log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
return None;
},
Ok(v) => v
};
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_signature: our_node_sig,
bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
})
fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
&self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
+ if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
- let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
+ if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
- &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
+ &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
}
- if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
+ if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
- &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
+ &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
}
- self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
"Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
}
pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
&self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return None;
}
let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
- pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+ pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
// Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
// current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
// set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
// valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
- let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
remote_last_secret
} else {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
[0;32]
};
+ self.mark_awaiting_response();
msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
// The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
// transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
// index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
// next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
// receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
- next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
// We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
// receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
// (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
// cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
// dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
// overflow here.
- next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
// TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
/// commitment update.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
self
- .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
+ .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
.map_err(|err| {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
/// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
}
- let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
}
-
- if amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
+
+ if amount_msat == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
+ if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
+ available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ }
+
+ if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
+ available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
+ }
+
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+ // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+ // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+ // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+ // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+ // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
+ log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
+ if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
+ else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
+ else { "to peer" });
+
+ if need_holding_cell {
+ force_holding_cell = true;
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if force_holding_cell {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ source,
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
+ source,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
+ });
+
+ let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
+ };
+ self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
+
+ Ok(Some(res))
+ }
+
+ fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
+ // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
+ // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
+ // is acceptable.
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(state) = new_state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = state;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
+ let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
+ mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
+ if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+
+ let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+ let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
+ htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
+ }
+
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
+ commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ }]
+ };
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ monitor_update
+ }
+
+ fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
+ let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
+ assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
+ }
+
+ /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
+ /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+ let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+
+ {
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
+ htlcs.push(htlc);
+ }
+
+ let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
+ signature = res.0;
+ htlc_signatures = res.1;
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
+ log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+
+ for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ signature,
+ htlc_signatures,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
+ /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
+ ///
+ /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
+ /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
+ source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
+ onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
+ if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
+ match send_res? {
+ Some(_) => {
+ let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ }
+ self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
+ /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
+ ///
+ /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
+ pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
+ -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
+ where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
+ }
+ else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
+ }
+
+ // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
+ // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
+ let mut chan_closed = false;
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ chan_closed = true;
+ }
+
+ let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(_) => false,
+ None if !chan_closed => {
+ // use override shutdown script if provided
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
+ Some(script) => script,
+ None => {
+ // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
+ }
+ },
+ };
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
+ return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
+ }
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+ true
+ },
+ None => false,
+ };
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+ self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ } else {
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ }
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+
+ let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ }],
+ };
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
+ } else { None };
+ let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ };
+
+ // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
+ // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+
+ debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
+ "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
+
+ Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
+ .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
+ => Some((source, payment_hash)),
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ })
+ .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
+ }
+}
+
+/// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
+pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
+
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
+ pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
+ outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
+ where ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ {
+ let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
+ let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
+ let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+
+ if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
+ }
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
+ }
+ let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
+ }
+ if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
+ }
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
+ // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
+ }
+
+ let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
+ debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
+
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+
+ let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
+ let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
+ if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
+ }
+
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
+ return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
+ }
+ }
+
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ Ok(script) => script,
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
+
+ config: LegacyChannelConfig {
+ options: config.channel_config.clone(),
+ announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
+ },
+
+ prev_config: None,
+
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
+
+ channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
+ temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
+ channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
+ announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
+ secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
+
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
+
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
+
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
+ minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
+
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: true,
+ counterparty_parameters: None,
+ funding_outpoint: None,
+ channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
+
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
+
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+
+ announcement_sigs: None,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias,
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+
+ channel_type,
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
+ }
+ })
+ }
+
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
+ /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
+ /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
+ /// or if called on an inbound channel.
+ /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
+ }
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+
+ let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err((self, e));
+ }
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
+ self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
+
+ let channel = Channel {
+ context: self.context,
+ };
+
+ Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
+ funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ next_local_nonce: None,
+ }))
+ }
+
+ fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
+ // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
+ // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
+ // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
+ let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
+ their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
+ ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
+ }
+
+ // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
+ // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
+ // `only_static_remotekey`.
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
+ their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ }
+
+ ret
+ }
+
+ /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
+ /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
+ /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
+ pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
+ if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ // We've exhausted our options
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
+ // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
+ // accepted one.
+ //
+ // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
+ // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
+ // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
+ // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
+ // whatever reason.
+ if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
+ assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
+ } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
+ self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
+ } else {
+ self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ }
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
+ Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
+ }
+
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
+
+ msgs::OpenChannel {
+ chain_hash,
+ temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
+ to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
+ None => Builder::new().into_script(),
+ }),
+ channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Message handlers
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
+ msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
+ }
+ } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
+ // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &Some(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
+ }
+ Some(script.clone())
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &None => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
+ self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
+ self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
+
+ if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+ } else {
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: msg.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ });
+
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
+ self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
+pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
+
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
+ /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
+ /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
+ pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
+ their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
+ current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+
+ // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
+ // support this channel type.
+ let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
+ // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
+ // `static_remote_key`.
+ if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
+ }
+ // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
+ if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ channel_type.clone()
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ channel_type
+ };
+
+ let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
+ let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: msg.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
+ }
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
+
+ let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
- if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
}
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
- // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
- // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
- // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
- // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
- // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
- // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
}
-
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
- // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
}
-
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
- let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
- if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
- }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
-
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
- let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
- on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
- }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
- let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
- on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
+ // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
+
+ if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
}
}
- let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
- if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
+ // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
-
- // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
- let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
- let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
- } else { 0 };
- if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
}
-
- // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
- // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
- let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
- if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
+ msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
}
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
- force_holding_cell = true;
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
}
- // Now update local state:
- if force_holding_cell {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry,
- source,
- onion_routing_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
+ // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+ // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
+ let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+ let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
+ if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
}
- self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- cltv_expiry,
- state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
- source,
- });
-
- let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet,
- };
- self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
-
- Ok(Some(res))
- }
+ let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
+ // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
+ // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
+ if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
+ }
- fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
- // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
- // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
- // is acceptable.
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
- Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
- } else { None };
- if let Some(state) = new_state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = state;
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &Some(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
+ }
+ Some(script.clone())
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &None => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
- let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
- mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
+ } else { None };
+
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
}
- }
- if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ } else { None };
+
+ if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
}
}
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
- let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
- htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ Ok(script) => script,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
+ };
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
- }
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
- commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
- }]
- };
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- monitor_update
- }
+ let chan = Self {
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
- fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
- let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+ config: LegacyChannelConfig {
+ options: config.channel_config.clone(),
+ announced_channel,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
+ },
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
- if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
- if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
- && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
- && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
- && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
- let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ prev_config: None,
+
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
+
+ temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
+ channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
+ announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
+ secp_ctx,
+
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
+
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
+
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
+
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
+ channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
+ minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
+
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ }),
+ funding_outpoint: None,
+ channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
- (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
- }
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
- /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
- let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
- let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- {
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
- for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
- htlcs.push(htlc);
- }
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
- let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
- signature = res.0;
- htlc_signatures = res.1;
+ announcement_sigs: None,
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
- &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
- log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
- log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
- log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias,
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+
+ channel_type,
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
}
+ };
+
+ Ok(chan)
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
+ self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
+ }
+
+ /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
+ pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
+ assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
+ }
+
+ /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
+ /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
+ ///
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
+ }
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+ if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
+ panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
}
- Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature,
- htlc_signatures,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
+ self.context.user_id = user_id;
+ self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
+
+ self.generate_accept_channel_message()
}
- /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
- /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
+ /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
+ /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
+ /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
///
- /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
- /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
- if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
- match send_res? {
- Some(_) => {
- let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
- },
- None => Ok(None)
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
+
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
+ to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
+ None => Builder::new().into_script(),
+ }),
+ channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ next_local_nonce: None,
}
}
- /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
- pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
- self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
+ /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
+ /// inbound channel without accepting it.
+ ///
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ self.generate_accept_channel_message()
}
- pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
}
- self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
- fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
- cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
- });
- Ok(())
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
+
+ // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
}
- /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
- /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- ///
- /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
- pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
- target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
- -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
- where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
- }
+ pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
- }
- else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
- }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+ // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+ // channel.
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
}
- if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
+ if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
- // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
- let mut chan_closed = false;
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- chan_closed = true;
- }
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
+ // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(_) => false,
- None if !chan_closed => {
- // use override shutdown script if provided
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
- Some(script) => script,
- None => {
- // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
- }
- },
- };
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
- return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
- }
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
- true
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
},
- None => false,
+ Err(e) => {
+ // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
+ // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
+ panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
+ }
};
- // From here on out, we may not fail!
- self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- } else {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- }
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
- let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- }],
- };
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
- } else { None }
- } else { None };
- let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- };
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
+ }
- // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
- // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
- "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
+ let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
+ let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
+ monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
+ shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
- Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
- }
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
- /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
- /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
- /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
- /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
- // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
- // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
- // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
- // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
- assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
- // return them to fail the payment.
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
- for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
- match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
- // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
- // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
- // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
- // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
- // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
- // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
- // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
- Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
- }))
- } else { None }
- } else { None };
+ log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
- }
+ // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
+ // `ChannelMonitor`.
+ let mut channel = Channel {
+ context: self.context,
+ };
+ let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
+ let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
+ channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
- .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
- => Some((source, payment_hash)),
- _ => None,
- }
- })
- .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
+ Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ }, channel_monitor))
}
}
// `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
// versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
// the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
- let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
+ let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
user_id_low.write(writer)?;
// Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
// `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
- self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
(key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
// Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
// deserialized from that format.
- match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
+ match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
}
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
}
}
- (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
continue; // Drop
}
}
let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
+ let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
- (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
reason.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
+ if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+ }
+ pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
+ } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
+ }
}
- (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
+ (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
match update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat,
+ } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
amount_msat.write(writer)?;
cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
source.write(writer)?;
onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
+
+ if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
+ if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
+ for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
+ }
+ holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
+ } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
}
}
- match self.resend_order {
+ match self.context.resend_order {
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
}
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
- (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
+ (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
pending_forward.write(writer)?;
htlc_id.write(writer)?;
}
- (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
+ (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
htlc_source.write(writer)?;
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
fail_reason.write(writer)?;
}
- if self.is_outbound() {
- self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
- } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
+ } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
} else {
// As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
// commitment_signed, drop it.
None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
}
- self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
- self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
- self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
// Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
// however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
// consider the stale state on reload.
0u8.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
// Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
// Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
- self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
- match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
+ match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
Some(info) => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
None => 0u8.write(writer)?
}
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
- self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
htlc.write(writer)?;
}
// older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
// only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
// out at all.
- let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
+ let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
// The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
// the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
// a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
// to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
- if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
- { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
+ if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
+ { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
- if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
- { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
+ if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
+ { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
- let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
- let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
+ let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
+ let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
// `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
// versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
// we write the high bytes as an option here.
- let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
+ let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
- let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
+ let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
- (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
+ (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
// minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
// default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
// them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
// here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
// and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
// override that.
- (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
+ (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
(2, chan_type, option),
- (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
+ (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
(4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
- (5, self.config, required),
+ (5, self.context.config, required),
(6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
- (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
- (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
- (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
- (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
+ (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
+ (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
+ (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
+ (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
(15, preimages, vec_type),
- (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
- (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
- (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
+ (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
+ (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
+ (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
(23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
(25, user_id_high_opt, option),
- (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
+ (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
(28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
- (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
+ (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
(31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
- (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
+ (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
});
Ok(())
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
});
}
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
},
1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut announcement_sigs = None;
let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
- let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
- let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
+ let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
+ let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
// Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
// only, so we default to that if none was written.
let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
- let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
+
+ let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
+ let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, announcement_sigs, option),
(5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
(6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
(7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
+ (8, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
(9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
(11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
(13, channel_creation_height, option),
(28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
(29, temporary_channel_id, option),
(31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
- (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
+ (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
});
let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
}
+ // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
+ // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
+
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
+ if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
+ let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+ if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
+ let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
+ for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
+ if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
+ *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ }
+ }
+ // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
+ if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ }
+
Ok(Channel {
- user_id,
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
- config: config.unwrap(),
+ config: config.unwrap(),
- prev_config: None,
+ prev_config: None,
- // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
- // channel data after the handshake has completed.
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
+ // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
+ // channel data after the handshake has completed.
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
- channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id,
- channel_state,
- announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
- secp_ctx,
- channel_value_satoshis,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- value_to_self_msat,
-
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- pending_inbound_htlcs,
- pending_outbound_htlcs,
- holding_cell_htlc_updates,
-
- resend_order,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
- monitor_pending_forwards,
- monitor_pending_failures,
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
-
- pending_update_fee,
- holding_cell_update_fee,
- next_holder_htlc_id,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- update_time_counter,
- feerate_per_kw,
+ channel_id,
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state,
+ announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
+ secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ latest_monitor_update_id,
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
- inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ value_to_self_msat,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height,
- short_channel_id,
- channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ pending_inbound_htlcs,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth,
+ resend_order,
- counterparty_forwarding_info,
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
+ monitor_pending_forwards,
+ monitor_pending_failures,
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
- channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- funding_transaction,
+ pending_update_fee,
+ holding_cell_update_fee,
+ next_holder_htlc_id,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ update_time_counter,
+ feerate_per_kw,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
- counterparty_node_id,
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
- commitment_secrets,
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
- channel_update_status,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height,
+ short_channel_id,
+ channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
- announcement_sigs,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth,
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ counterparty_forwarding_info,
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
+ funding_transaction,
- latest_inbound_scid_alias,
- // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
- outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
- channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
+ commitment_secrets,
- channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
- channel_keys_id,
+ channel_update_status,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
- pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
+ announcement_sigs,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias,
+ // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
+ outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
+
+ channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
+ }
})
}
}
use hex;
use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
- #[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
- use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
+ use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
}
}
- #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
+ match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
},
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
let network = Network::Testnet;
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
// they have different dust limits.
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
- node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+ node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+
+ // Node A --> Node B: funding created
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
- node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
});
- node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
- }
+ },
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
});
// Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
// the dust limit check.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
+ let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
// Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
// of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
- node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
- let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
+ node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
}
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
- let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
+ let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
+ let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
// If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
// counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
- let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
- let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
- let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
- let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
}
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel
let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
- let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
- let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
- // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+ let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+ let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+ let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+ let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
- // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+ let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
- // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
+ let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
- // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+ let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
- // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
+ let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
}
#[test]
fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
- // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
// channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
- let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
- assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
+ assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
- let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
+ let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
- assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
- assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
} else {
// Channel Negotiations failed
- let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
+ let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}
#[test]
fn channel_update() {
let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
- // Create a channel.
+ // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
- assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
- assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
+ // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
+ let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
+ accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
+ node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+
+ // Node A --> Node B: funding created
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
let update = ChannelUpdate {
// The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
// change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
- assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
- match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
Some(info) => {
assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
- chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
};
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
selected_contest_delay: 144
});
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
- signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
+ signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
- test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
};
}
macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
- test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
+ test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
};
}
$( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
} ) => { {
let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
- let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
+ let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
};
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
commitment_tx.clone(),
counterparty_signature,
counterparty_htlc_sigs,
- &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
- let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
- chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
- &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
+ chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
+ &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
}
let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
- let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
+ let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
- let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
"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", {});
// simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
"30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
"30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
"02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: 1000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: 2000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 2,
amount_msat: 2000000,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 3,
amount_msat: 3000000,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 4,
amount_msat: 4000000,
});
// commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
"304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
} );
// commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
"30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
} );
// commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
"3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
"3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
} );
// commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
"3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
} );
// commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
"3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
} );
// commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
"3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
} );
// commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
"3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
+ let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
+ chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
"3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
} );
// commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
"3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
} );
// commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
"304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
+ chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
"3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
} );
// commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
"3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
} );
// commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
"30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
"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", {});
// anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
"30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
"3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
// anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
"30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: 2000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 6,
amount_msat: 5000001,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 5,
amount_msat: 5000000,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
"020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
} );
+ chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
"3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
"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", {
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
+ let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
assert!(res.is_ok());
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
// Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
// It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
// need to signal it.
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
&config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
- assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
+ assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
- assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
+ assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
+ assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
// Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
// Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
// `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
assert!(channel_b.is_err());
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
// Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
- assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
- assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
+ assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
+ assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
// First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
// the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
// B as it's not supported by LDK.
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
- let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
// `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
// original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
// LDK.
- let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
-use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
-use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
+ /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
+ payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
/// may overshoot this in either case)
pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
+ /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
+ pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
total_value_received: Option<u64>,
/// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
total_msat: u64,
+ /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
}
}
impl HTLCSource {
- #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
}
-type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
-
/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
}
-/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
-/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
-/// quite some time lag.
+/// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
+/// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
+/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
enum BackgroundEvent {
- /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
+ /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
+ /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
+ /// need the counterparty node_id.
+ ///
+ /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
+ /// are regenerated on startup.
+ ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
+ /// channel to continue normal operation.
+ ///
+ /// In general this should be used rather than
+ /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
+ /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
+ /// error the other variant is acceptable.
///
/// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
/// are regenerated on startup.
- MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
+ },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
/// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
/// event can be generated.
PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
- /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
- EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
+ /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
+ /// operation of another channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
+ /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
+ /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
+ /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
+ /// outbound edge.
+ EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event: events::Event,
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
+ },
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
(0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
- (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
+ (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
+ (0, event, upgradable_required),
+ // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
+ // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
+ // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
+ // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
+ // downgrades to prior versions.
+ (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
+ },
);
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
};
);
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+/// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
+/// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
+pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
+ /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
+ /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
+ /// durably to disk.
+ ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
+ /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ },
+}
+
+impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
+ Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
+ channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+ (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
+;);
+
+
/// State we hold per-peer.
pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
- /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
+ /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
///
- /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
- /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
- /// `channel_id`.
+ /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
+ ///
+ /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
+ /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
+ /// `channel_by_id`.
+ pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
+ ///
+ /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
+ /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
+ /// `channel_by_id`.
+ pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
+ /// user but which have not yet completed.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
+ /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
+ /// for a missing channel.
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
/// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
///
/// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
/// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
+ /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
+ /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
+ /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
return false
}
self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
+ && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
+ }
+
+ // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
+ fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
+ self.channel_by_id.len() +
+ self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
+ }
+
+ // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
+ fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
+ self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
+ self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
}
}
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
-
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
+ ChannelManager<
+ &'a M,
+ &'b T,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'c KeysManager,
+ &'d F,
+ &'e DefaultRouter<
+ &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
+ &'g L,
+ &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
+ ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
+ ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
+ >,
+ &'g L
+ >;
+
+macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-pub trait AChannelManager {
- type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
+$vis trait AChannelManager {
+ type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
- type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
+ type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
- type EntropySource: EntropySource;
+ type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
- type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
+ type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
- type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
- type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
+ type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
+ type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
- type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
+ type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
- type Router: Router;
+ type Router: Router + ?Sized;
type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
- type Logger: Logger;
+ type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
}
+} }
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
+#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
+define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
- M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
- ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
- R::Target: Router + Sized,
- L::Target: Logger + Sized,
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
type Watch = M::Target;
type M = M;
pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
/// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
+
+ /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
+ /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
+ /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
+ /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
+ ///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
/// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
/// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
/// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
+
persistence_notifier: Notifier,
entropy_source: ES,
}
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[must_use]
enum NotifyOption {
DoPersist,
SkipPersist,
}
impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
- fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
+ fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
+ let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
+
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard {
+ persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
+ should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
+ _read_guard: read_guard,
+ }
+
}
+ /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
+ /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
/// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
/// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
+ /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
+ /// route which is valid.
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
/// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
///
/// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
///
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
- best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
-
- let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
+ fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ ) -> Self
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
+ context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(),
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
features: latest_features,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
// Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
// from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
// message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
// Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
// default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
- Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
+ Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
+ outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
},
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
+ funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
// Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
// `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
+ channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
+ short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
+ outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
+ inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
- is_usable: channel.is_live(),
- is_public: channel.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(channel.config()),
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
+ confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
+ confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
+ force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
+ is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
+ is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: context.is_live(),
+ is_public: context.should_announce(),
+ inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
+ inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
Err(err)
},
}
- } }
+ } };
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
+ match $internal {
+ Ok(res) => Ok(res),
+ Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
+ },
+ }
+ };
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
- ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
- $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
+ ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
+ $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
} else {
// If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
// also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
// opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
// stage.
- let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
debug_assert!(alias_removed);
}
- short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
}}
}
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
- let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
+ let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
},
}
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
+ match $err {
+ // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
+ // In any case, just close the channel.
+ ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
+ let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
+ shutdown_res, None))
+ },
+ }
}
}
}
}
+macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
+ if drop {
+ $entry.remove_entry();
+ }
+ return Err(res);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
channel
}
}
macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
$pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
- node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: $channel_ready_msg,
});
// Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
// we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
+ let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
- if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
+ if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
}
}}
macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
- if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
+ if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
$locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
- channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
- former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
- counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
- funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
+ former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
}, None));
- $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
+ $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
}
}
}
macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
- if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
- debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
+ if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
+ debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
$locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
- counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
}, None));
- $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
+ $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
}
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
- ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
&$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
- let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
// channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
// channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
} else { None };
let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
- .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
&mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
$peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
+ let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
}
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
// update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
// any case so that it won't deadlock.
debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+ }
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
- log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
- Ok(())
+ log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ Ok(false)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
- log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
- "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
- $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
+ log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
+ let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
+ "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
+ $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
$self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
$remove;
res
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
- if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
- handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
- }
- Ok(())
+ $completed;
+ Ok(true)
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
+ $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
+ let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
+ // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
+ // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
+ // filter for uniqueness here.
+ let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
+ .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+ in_flight_updates.push($update);
+ in_flight_updates.len() - 1
+ });
+ let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
+ $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
+ {
+ let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
+ if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
+ }
+ })
+ } };
+ ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
}
}
// persists happen while processing monitor events.
let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
+ // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
+ if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
{
/// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
///
+ /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
+ ///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
///
/// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
/// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
/// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
- pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(
+ fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
+ node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
+ current_timestamp: u32,
+ ) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
entropy_source,
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
// We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
- match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
+ match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
{
};
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
- let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
+ let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
+ match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if cfg!(fuzzing) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
/// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
/// more information.
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
- self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
+ // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
+ // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
+ // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
+ // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
+ // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
+ // the same channel.
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
+ {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
+ res.push(details);
+ }
+ for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
+ res.push(details);
+ }
+ for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
+ res.push(details);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ res
}
/// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
// Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
// internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
// really wanted anyway.
- self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
+ self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
}
/// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
.map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
.collect();
}
vec![]
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
+ match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
}, None));
},
None => {},
}
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
reason: closure_reason
}, None));
}
fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
}
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
msg: channel_update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
break Ok(());
},
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
+ if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
// force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
// the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
- let mut chan = {
+ let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ };
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
- } else {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
- }
- remove_channel!(self, chan)
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
+ (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ // Prefunded channel has no update
+ (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ // Prefunded channel has no update
+ (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
}
};
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ if let Some(update) = update_opt {
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
- Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
}
}
- fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
- {
+ fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
return Err(ReceiveError {
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
+ if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
+ {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
});
},
msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
- if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- }
- } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
// We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
// payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
// could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
});
}
-
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ }
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_data,
payment_preimage,
payment_metadata,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
}
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ }
} else {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
+ ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
},
};
+ let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ }, ..
+ } => {
+ let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
+ msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
+ },
+ // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
+ // inbound channel's state.
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
+ next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
+ } => {
+ return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
+ }
+ };
- let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
+ // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
+ // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
+ if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
+ let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
+ // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
+ // phantom or an intercept.
+ if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ {
+ None
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ },
+ Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
+ };
+ let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ None => {
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
+ // have no consistency guarantees.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(chan) => chan
+ };
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
+ // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
+ // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ }
+ if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
+ break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ chan_update_opt
+ } else {
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
+ // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
+ // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
+ break Some((
+ "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
+ 0x2000 | 2, None,
+ ));
+ }
+ None
+ };
+
+ let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
+ // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ }
+ // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
+ // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
+ // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
+ // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
+ // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
+ // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
+ // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
+ // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
+ if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+
+ break None;
+ }
+ {
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
+ if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ code = 0x2000 | 2;
+ }
+ return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
+ }
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
+ }
+
+ fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
+ allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match decoded_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
// OUR PAYMENT!
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
+ msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
+ {
Ok(info) => {
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
// message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
version: 0,
- public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
};
incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
})
}
- };
-
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
- // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
- // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
- // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
- if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
- if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
- let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
- // phantom or an intercept.
- if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
- {
- None
- } else {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- },
- Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
- };
- let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
- None => {
- // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
- // have no consistency guarantees.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- },
- Some(chan) => chan
- };
- if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
- // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
- // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
- // we don't have the channel here.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
- // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
- // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
- if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
- } else {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
- }
- }
- if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
- break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
- }
- chan_update_opt
- } else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
- // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
- // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
- // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
- break Some((
- "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
- 0x2000 | 2, None,
- ));
- }
- None
- };
-
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
- // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
- // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
- }
- // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
- // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
- // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
- // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
- // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
- // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
- // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
- // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
- if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
- }
-
- break None;
- }
- {
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
- if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
- 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
- // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
- // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
- // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
- // instead.
- code = 0x2000 | 2;
- }
- return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
- }
- }
}
-
- pending_forward_info
}
/// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- if !chan.should_announce() {
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
});
}
- if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
+ if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
};
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
+
fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
short_channel_id,
- timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
+ timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
- htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
- htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
- fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
- fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
+ htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
+ fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
+ fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
// Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: path.clone(),
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
- break Err(e);
- }
- if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
- // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
- // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
- // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
- // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
- // which we do in the send_payment check for
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
+ Err(e) => break Err(e),
+ Ok(false) => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ Ok(true) => {},
}
},
None => { },
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
}
- /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
+ /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
/// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
}
/// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
/// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
///
- /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
- ///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
&self.node_signer, best_block_height,
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
/// us to easily discern them from real payments.
pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
+ let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(chan) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
- .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
+ let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
} else { unreachable!(); });
match funding_res {
- Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
- Err(_) => {
+ Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
+ Err((chan, err)) => {
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
});
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
- if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
+ if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
}
e.insert(chan);
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
if inp.witness.is_empty() {
}
let mut output_index = None;
- let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
if output_index.is_some() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
})
}
- /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
///
/// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
/// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
- pub fn update_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
+ if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
});
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
- &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
- );
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
}
for channel_id in channel_ids {
let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- if !channel.update_config(config) {
+ let mut config = channel.context.config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
continue;
}
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
} else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
}
Ok(())
}
+ /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+ ///
+ /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+ /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+ /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+ /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+ ///
+ /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+ /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+ ///
+ /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+ /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+ ///
+ /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+ ///
+ /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+ /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+ /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+ /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+ pub fn update_channel_config(
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
+ }
+
/// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
/// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
///
/// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
///
/// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
- /// you from forwarding more than you received.
+ /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
+ /// than expected.
///
/// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
/// backwards.
///
/// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let next_hop_scid = {
let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
Some(chan) => {
- if !chan.is_usable() {
+ if !chan.context.is_usable() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
})
}
- chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
+ chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
+ err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
+ log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
})
}
};
},
_ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
};
+ let skimmed_fee_msat =
+ payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
+ skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
};
///
/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
+ outgoing_cltv_value, ..
}
}) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler {
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
+ {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
}) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
});
if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
));
continue;
}
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
+ skimmed_fee_msat, ..
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
- let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
+ payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata
+ };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
- None, None, onion_fields)
+ payment_data, None, onion_fields)
},
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
};
- let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
+ let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
};
let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
}
macro_rules! check_total_value {
- ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ ($purpose: expr) => {{
let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
- let purpose = || {
- events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
- payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
- }
+ let is_keysend = match $purpose {
+ events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
+ events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
};
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
.or_insert_with(|| {
committed_to_claimable = true;
ClaimablePayment {
- purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
+ purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
}
});
+ if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
+ let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
}
let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
- if htlcs.len() == 1 {
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- }
let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
- if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
- total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
+ if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
}
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
}
// The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
// match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
#[allow(unused_assignments)] {
committed_to_claimable = true;
}
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
+ let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
+ .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
+ debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
payment_hash,
- purpose: purpose(),
+ purpose: $purpose,
amount_msat,
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
}
- check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+ payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
+ };
+ check_total_value!(purpose);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
- let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
- claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
- let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
- let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
- e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
- purpose: purpose.clone(),
- onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
- htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
- });
- let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
- new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
- receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
- payment_hash,
- amount_msat,
- purpose,
- via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
- via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
- claim_deadline,
- onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
- }, None));
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- }
- }
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
+ check_total_value!(purpose);
}
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
- if payment_data.is_none() {
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- };
+ }
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
- let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
+ };
+ let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
if payment_claimable_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
}
events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
- ///
- /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
- /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
+ /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
///
/// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
- fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
+ fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
if background_events.is_empty() {
- return false;
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
- BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
// The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
// monitor updating completing.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
},
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
+ let mut updated_chan = false;
+ let res = {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ updated_chan = true;
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
+ }
+ } else { Ok(()) }
+ };
+ if !updated_chan {
+ // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
+ let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
+ }
+ // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
+ // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
+ // however, ensure that.
+ if res.is_err() {
+ log_error!(self.logger,
+ "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
+ }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
+ },
}
}
- true
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
/// Process background events, for functional testing
pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
- self.process_background_events();
+ let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _ = self.process_background_events();
}
fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
- if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
- if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
+ if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
- if !chan.is_live() {
+ if !chan.context.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
/// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
/// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
- if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+ let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
}
match chan.channel_update_status() {
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
=> chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
=> chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
n += 1;
if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
}
},
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
n += 1;
if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
_ => {},
}
- chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+
+ if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
+ counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ }
true
});
///
/// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
// an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
- let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
- chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
+ let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
+ chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
} else {
- chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
+ chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
};
if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut sources = {
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
debug_assert!(false);
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
- expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
-
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
- // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
- // that there's one payment here and move on.
- if sources.len() != 1 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
- debug_assert!(false);
- valid_mpp = false;
- break;
- }
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
}
-
+ expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
}
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
if let Err(e) = res {
// TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
} else { None };
- let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
- let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
-
- Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- fee_earned_msat,
- claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
- prev_channel_id,
- next_channel_id,
- outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
- }})
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
+ fee_earned_msat,
+ claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
+ next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
+ outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
+ },
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
+ })
} else { None }
});
if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
}, None));
}
},
- MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
+ } => {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
+ if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
+ }
},
}
}
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
+ log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
- let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
- channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
+ htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
+ channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
}
{
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
}
};
- log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
- highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ let remaining_in_flight =
+ if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
+ pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
+ pending.len()
+ } else { 0 };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
+ highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ remaining_in_flight);
+ if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
}
fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
+ let peers_without_funded_channels =
+ self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
+ let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
+ match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
+ if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
}
if accept_0conf {
channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
}
// channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
}
}
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
});
}
let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
- if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
+ if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
}
}
) -> usize {
let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
- chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
+ // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
+ // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
+ chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
{
num_unfunded_channels += 1;
}
}
+ for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
+ if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
+ num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ }
num_unfunded_channels
}
// Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
// about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
// channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
- let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
+ let channeled_peers_without_funding =
+ self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
// If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
// with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
// channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
+ if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
!self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
{
msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
&self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
{
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
- }, None));
+ let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
+ let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
+ if channel_exists {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
+ } else {
+ if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
+ if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
-
- entry.insert(channel);
+ if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
+ });
+ } else {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ }, None));
}
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
}
Ok(())
}
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
- (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
+ (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
+ let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
+ match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(inbound_chan) => {
+ match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
+ // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
+ // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
+ // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
+ let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
+ msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
+ },
+ }
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
- i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
}
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
let chan = e.insert(chan);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
- per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
+ let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
+ per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
+ { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
// Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
// channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
res.0 = None;
}
- res
+ res.map(|_| ())
}
}
}
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
+ let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
// it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
shutdown_finish.0.take();
}
}
- res
+ res.map(|_| ())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
// If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
// channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
// counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
}
break Ok(());
},
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
msg: update
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
Ok(())
}
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
+ };
let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
} else { Ok(()) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
+ /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
+ /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
+ /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
+ /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
+ fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
+ ) -> bool {
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
+ || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
+ action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ })
+ })
+ }
+
fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
} else { Ok(()) };
(htlcs_to_fail, res)
},
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if chan.get().should_announce() {
+ if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
// If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
// other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
// a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
}
- let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
- } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
// If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
// down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
// they have the latest channel parameters.
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
}
}
- let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
+ let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
+ failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
} else {
ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
};
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
},
});
}
/// update events as a separate process method here.
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
- NotifyOption::DoPersist
- } else {
- NotifyOption::SkipPersist
- }
- });
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
}
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
- funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
if res.is_err() {
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
has_update = true;
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
});
}
if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
});
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
false
} else { true }
},
Err(e) => {
has_update = true;
let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
!close_channel
}
}
// Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
// so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
// timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
- if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
assert!(should_broadcast);
} else { unreachable!(); }
- self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)));
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
+ });
}
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
}
- fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
-
- if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
- }
-
- let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
- payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
- user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
- // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
- // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
- // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
- // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
- // never fail a payment too early.
- // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
- // timestamps.
- expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
- });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
- }
- Ok(payment_secret)
- }
-
/// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
/// to pay us.
///
min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
}
- /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
- /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
- ///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
- /// # Note
- /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
- ///
- /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
- #[deprecated]
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
- let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
- Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
- }
-
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// stored external to LDK.
///
min_final_cltv_expiry)
}
- /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
- /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
- ///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
- /// # Note
- /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
- ///
- /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- #[deprecated]
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
- }
-
/// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
/// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
///
inflight_htlcs
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
}
- fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
+ /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
+ /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
+ /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
+ /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
+ fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
let mut errors = Vec::new();
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
- if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
- .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
- channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
- }))
- {
- // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
- // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
- // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
+
+ if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
+ // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
+ if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ {
+ blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
+ channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
+ // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
+ // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
+ // update(s) when those blockers complete.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
break;
}
+
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
+ debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
+ if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
{
errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
} => {
- self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
}
}
}
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ let mut result = self.process_background_events();
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
+ &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
let new_height = height - 1;
{
let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
+ &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
+ &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
- if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
+ if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
}
}
}
fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
+ &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
- if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
}
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
- if channel.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if channel.context.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
}
}
if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
- if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
// If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
// to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
// can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
// un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
// is always consistent.
let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
}
}
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
+ failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
data: reason_message,
} },
});
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
+ let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
- persist
+ if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
} else {
NotifyOption::SkipPersist
}
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
}
true
});
+ peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ false
+ });
+ peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ false
+ });
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
// V1 Channel Establishment
return Err(());
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
// If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
// peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
}
e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
is_connected: true,
}));
},
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.have_received_message() {
+ let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
+ if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
// If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
// peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
// lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
false
} else {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
});
true
}
} else { true };
- if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
+ .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
+ .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
};
for channel_id in channel_ids {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
+ }
+
fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
-pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
+pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
// Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
// should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
// [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
features.set_channel_type_optional();
features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
features.set_zero_conf_optional();
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
- if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
- features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
- }
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
+ features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
}
features
}
(14, user_channel_id_low, required),
(16, self.balance_msat, required),
(18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
- // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
- // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
- (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
+ (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
(20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
(22, self.confirmations_required, option),
(24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
(26, self.is_outbound, required),
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
Ok(())
}
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
(20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
(22, confirmations_required, option),
(24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
(26, is_outbound, required),
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
confirmations_required,
confirmations,
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ channel_shutdown_state,
})
}
}
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
},
;);
(6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
(8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
(9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
+ (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
(5, self.total_value_received, option),
(6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
(8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
- let mut value = 0;
- let mut sender_intended_value = None;
- let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
- let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
- let mut total_value_received = None;
- let mut total_msat = None;
- let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
- (2, value, required),
+ (2, value_ser, required),
(3, sender_intended_value, option),
- (4, payment_data, option),
+ (4, payment_data_opt, option),
(5, total_value_received, option),
(6, cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option)
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
});
+ let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
+ let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
Some(p) => {
if payment_data.is_some() {
total_value_received,
total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
- cltv_expiry,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
}
}
number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
unfunded_channels += 1;
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
channel.write(writer)?;
}
}
pending_claiming_payments = None;
}
+ let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
+ for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
+ for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
+ if !updates.is_empty() {
+ if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
+ in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
(9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
}
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
+ (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
+ (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
+ (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
+ (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
+ (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
+);
+
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
pub default_config: UserConfig,
/// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
- /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
+ /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
///
/// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
/// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
- let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
- let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
- if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
- // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
+ if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
- channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
// But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(monitor_update));
+ log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
+ let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
+ });
}
failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
log_info!(args.logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
+ log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ monitor.get_latest_update_id());
+ if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
- id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
+ id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
- match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
+ match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
entry.insert(by_id_map);
}
}
// If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
// was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
// safely discard the channel.
- let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
+ let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
- channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
- pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
}
+ let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
+ PeerState {
+ channel_by_id,
+ outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ is_connected: false,
+ }
+ };
+
let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
for _ in 0..peer_count {
let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let peer_state = PeerState {
- channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
- latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
- pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
- is_connected: false,
- };
+ let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
+ peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
}
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
- let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
let mut events_override = None;
+ let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(8, events_override, option),
(9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
};
+ // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
+ // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
+ // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
+ // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
+ // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
+ //
+ // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
+ // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
+ // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
+ //
+ // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
+ let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
+ macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
+ ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
+ $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
+ ) => { {
+ let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
+ $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
+ for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
+ log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
+ update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: $funding_txo,
+ update: update.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ max_in_flight_update_id
+ } }
+ }
+
+ for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
+ // discarded.
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
+ .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
+ let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
+ if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
+ if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
+ max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
+ handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ }
+ }
+ if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
+ // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
+ log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
+ log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
+ log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
+ for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
+ if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
+ // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
+ // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
+ // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
+ Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
+ });
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
+ } else {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
+ log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
+ pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
+
{
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
let mut outbound_scid_alias;
loop {
outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
}
- chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
- } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
+ chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- if chan.is_usable() {
- if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
}
for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
- if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
+ if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
+ for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
+ for action in actions.iter() {
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
+ Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
+ } = action {
+ if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
+ blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
- use crate::ln::msgs;
+ use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
#[test]
#[test]
fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
+ do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
+ do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
// (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
// outbound regular payment fails as expected.
// (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
// fails as expected.
+ // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
+ // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
+ // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
+ // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
+ // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
+ // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
final_value_msat: 100_000,
};
let route = find_route(
// Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
+
+ // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
+ let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
+ let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let event = events.pop().unwrap();
+ let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
+
+ // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
+ final_value_msat: 100_000,
+ };
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
+ let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
+
+ // Finally, claim the original payment.
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
}
#[test]
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10_000,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
#[test]
fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
- // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
+ // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
+ // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
+ let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10_000,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
peer_pks.push(random_pk);
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
}
let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap_err();
// Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
// them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
}
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap_err();
// but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
// "protected" and can connect again.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
- features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
+ #[test]
+ fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+ let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
+ let extra_fee_msat = 10;
+ let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
+ amt_to_forward: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ }
+ };
+ // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
+ // intended amount, we fail the payment.
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
+ node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
+ {
+ assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
+ let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_to_forward: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
+ format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ }
+ };
+ assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
+ // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
+ // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
+ let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+
+ let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
+ anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
+ &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match &msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ match action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
+ nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
// Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_channel_config() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+ let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
+
+ nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+
+ user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
+ nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+
+ let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+
+ let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
+ }
+ }
}
-#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
pub mod bench {
use crate::chain::Listen;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use test::Bencher;
+ use criterion::Criterion;
type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
&'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- #[bench]
- fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
+ pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
}
- pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
+ pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
// Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
// Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
// calls per node.
let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
+ let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
- });
+ }, genesis_block.header.time);
let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
}
}
- bench.iter(|| {
+ bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
- });
+ }));
}
}
//! [BOLT-3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md) for more
//! information).
//!
+//! LDK knows about the following features, but does not support them:
+//! - `AnchorsNonzeroFeeHtlcTx` - the initial version of anchor outputs, which was later found to be
+//! vulnerable (see this
+//! [mailing list post](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html)
+//! for more information).
+//!
//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
//! [messages]: crate::ln::msgs
use crate::{io, io_extras};
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
+use core::borrow::Borrow;
use core::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use core::marker::PhantomData;
// Byte 1
VariableLengthOnion | StaticRemoteKey | PaymentSecret,
// Byte 2
- BasicMPP | Wumbo | AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
+ BasicMPP | Wumbo | AnchorsNonzeroFeeHtlcTx | AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
// Byte 3
ShutdownAnySegwit,
// Byte 4
// Byte 1
VariableLengthOnion | StaticRemoteKey | PaymentSecret,
// Byte 2
- BasicMPP | Wumbo | AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
+ BasicMPP | Wumbo | AnchorsNonzeroFeeHtlcTx | AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
// Byte 3
ShutdownAnySegwit,
// Byte 4
// Byte 1
StaticRemoteKey,
// Byte 2
- AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
+ AnchorsNonzeroFeeHtlcTx | AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx,
// Byte 3
,
// Byte 4
define_feature!(19, Wumbo, [InitContext, NodeContext],
"Feature flags for `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels).", set_wumbo_optional, set_wumbo_required,
supports_wumbo, requires_wumbo);
+ define_feature!(21, AnchorsNonzeroFeeHtlcTx, [InitContext, NodeContext, ChannelTypeContext],
+ "Feature flags for `option_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx`.", set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_optional,
+ set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required, supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx, requires_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx);
define_feature!(23, AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx, [InitContext, NodeContext, ChannelTypeContext],
"Feature flags for `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`.", set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional,
set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required, supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx, requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx);
mark: PhantomData<T>,
}
+impl<T: sealed::Context, Rhs: Borrow<Self>> core::ops::BitOrAssign<Rhs> for Features<T> {
+ fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Rhs) {
+ let total_feature_len = cmp::max(self.flags.len(), rhs.borrow().flags.len());
+ self.flags.resize(total_feature_len, 0u8);
+ for (byte, rhs_byte) in self.flags.iter_mut().zip(rhs.borrow().flags.iter()) {
+ *byte |= *rhs_byte;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl<T: sealed::Context> core::ops::BitOr for Features<T> {
type Output = Self;
fn bitor(mut self, o: Self) -> Self {
- let total_feature_len = cmp::max(self.flags.len(), o.flags.len());
- self.flags.resize(total_feature_len, 0u8);
- for (byte, o_byte) in self.flags.iter_mut().zip(o.flags.iter()) {
- *byte |= *o_byte;
- }
+ self |= o;
self
}
}
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`], thus omitting the need for payers to manually construct an
/// `InvoiceFeatures` for [`find_route`].
///
+ /// MPP keysend is not widely supported yet, so we parameterize support to allow the user to
+ /// choose whether their router should find multi-part routes.
+ ///
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
/// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
- pub(crate) fn for_keysend() -> InvoiceFeatures {
+ pub(crate) fn for_keysend(allow_mpp: bool) -> InvoiceFeatures {
let mut res = InvoiceFeatures::empty();
res.set_variable_length_onion_optional();
+ if allow_mpp {
+ res.set_basic_mpp_optional();
+ }
res
}
}
<sealed::ChannelTypeContext as sealed::StaticRemoteKey>::set_required_bit(&mut ret.flags);
ret
}
+
+ /// Constructs a ChannelTypeFeatures with anchors support
+ pub(crate) fn anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies() -> Self {
+ let mut ret = Self::empty();
+ <sealed::ChannelTypeContext as sealed::StaticRemoteKey>::set_required_bit(&mut ret.flags);
+ <sealed::ChannelTypeContext as sealed::AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx>::set_required_bit(&mut ret.flags);
+ ret
+ }
}
impl ToBase32 for InvoiceFeatures {
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::test_utils::{panicking, TestChainMonitor, TestScorer, TestKeysInterface};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
-use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
}
}
+#[cfg(test)]
+macro_rules! get_outbound_v1_channel_ref {
+ ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: ident, $peer_state_lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ $per_peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ $peer_state_lock = $per_peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ $peer_state_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+macro_rules! get_inbound_v1_channel_ref {
+ ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: ident, $peer_state_lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ $per_peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ $peer_state_lock = $per_peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ $peer_state_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
macro_rules! get_feerate {
($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
let mut per_peer_state_lock;
let mut peer_state_lock;
let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, $counterparty_node, per_peer_state_lock, peer_state_lock, $channel_id);
- chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()
+ chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
-macro_rules! get_opt_anchors {
+macro_rules! get_channel_type_features {
($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
{
let mut per_peer_state_lock;
let mut peer_state_lock;
let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, $counterparty_node, per_peer_state_lock, peer_state_lock, $channel_id);
- chan.opt_anchors()
+ chan.context.get_channel_type().clone()
}
}
}
assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
assert_eq!(node_a.node.list_channels().iter().find(|channel| channel.channel_id == create_chan_id).unwrap().user_channel_id, 42);
node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
+ if node_b.node.get_current_default_configuration().manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let events = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } =>
+ node_b.node.accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 42).unwrap(),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(accept_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_msg);
}
#[macro_export]
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, ldk_bench, feature = "_test_utils"))]
macro_rules! expect_payment_claimable {
($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_payment_secret: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
expect_payment_claimable!($node, $expected_payment_hash, $expected_payment_secret, $expected_recv_value, None, $node.node.get_our_node_id())
}
#[macro_export]
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, ldk_bench, feature = "_test_utils"))]
macro_rules! expect_payment_claimed {
($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! expect_channel_shutdown_state {
+ ($node: expr, $chan_id: expr, $state: path) => {
+ let chan_details = $node.node.list_channels().into_iter().filter(|cd| cd.channel_id == $chan_id).collect::<Vec<ChannelDetails>>();
+ assert_eq!(chan_details.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(chan_details[0].channel_shutdown_state, Some($state));
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(test, ldk_bench, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn expect_channel_pending_event<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, expected_counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, ldk_bench, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn expect_channel_ready_event<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, expected_counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match &events_2[0] {
Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat,
receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
- claim_deadline, onion_fields,
+ claim_deadline, onion_fields, ..
} => {
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
},
PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
assert_eq!(expected_preimage.unwrap(), *payment_preimage);
- assert!(our_payment_secret.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_secret, onion_fields.as_ref().unwrap().payment_secret);
},
}
assert_eq!(*amount_msat, recv_value);
(our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, payment_id)
}
-pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> u64 {
+pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(
+ origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], skip_last: bool,
+ our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage
+) -> u64 {
+ let extra_fees = vec![0; expected_paths.len()];
+ do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees(origin_node, expected_paths,
+ &extra_fees[..], skip_last, our_payment_preimage)
+}
+
+pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees<'a, 'b, 'c>(
+ origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], expected_extra_fees:
+ &[u32], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage
+) -> u64 {
+ assert_eq!(expected_paths.len(), expected_extra_fees.len());
for path in expected_paths.iter() {
assert_eq!(path.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), expected_paths[0].last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id());
}
}
}
- for (expected_route, (path_msgs, next_hop)) in expected_paths.iter().zip(per_path_msgs.drain(..)) {
+ for (i, (expected_route, (path_msgs, next_hop))) in expected_paths.iter().zip(per_path_msgs.drain(..)).enumerate() {
let mut next_msgs = Some(path_msgs);
let mut expected_next_node = next_hop;
}
}
macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
+ ($idx: expr, $node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
{
$node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0);
- let fee = {
+ let mut fee = {
let per_peer_state = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id())
.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0.channel_id).unwrap();
- if let Some(prev_config) = channel.prev_config() {
+ if let Some(prev_config) = channel.context.prev_config() {
prev_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
} else {
- channel.config().forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ channel.context.config().forwarding_fee_base_msat
}
};
+ if $idx == 1 { fee += expected_extra_fees[i]; }
expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false);
expected_total_fee_msat += fee as u64;
check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
} else {
next_node = expected_route[expected_route.len() - 1 - idx - 1];
}
- mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, next_node, update_next_msgs);
+ mid_update_fulfill_dance!(idx, node, prev_node, next_node, update_next_msgs);
} else {
assert!(!update_next_msgs);
assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// It now defaults to 1, so we simply set it to the expected value here.
default_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1000;
// When most of our tests were written, we didn't have the notion of a `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`,
- // It now defaults to 5_000_000 msat; to avoid interfering with tests we bump it to 50_000_000 msat.
- default_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 50_000_000;
+ // to avoid interfering with tests we bump it to 50_000_000 msat (assuming the default test
+ // feerate of 253).
+ default_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure =
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(50_000_000 / 253);
default_config
}
let mut chanmgrs = Vec::new();
for i in 0..node_count {
let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
let params = ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
};
let node = ChannelManager::new(cfgs[i].fee_estimator, &cfgs[i].chain_monitor, cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, &cfgs[i].router, cfgs[i].logger, cfgs[i].keys_manager,
- cfgs[i].keys_manager, cfgs[i].keys_manager, if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { test_default_channel_config() }, params);
+ cfgs[i].keys_manager, cfgs[i].keys_manager, if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { test_default_channel_config() }, params, genesis_block.header.time);
chanmgrs.push(node);
}
for i in 0..node_count {
for j in (i+1)..node_count {
- nodes[i].node.peer_connected(&nodes[j].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[j].override_init_features.borrow().clone().unwrap_or_else(|| nodes[j].node.init_features()), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[j].node.peer_connected(&nodes[i].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[i].override_init_features.borrow().clone().unwrap_or_else(|| nodes[i].node.init_features()), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[i].node.peer_connected(&nodes[j].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[j].override_init_features.borrow().clone().unwrap_or_else(|| nodes[j].node.init_features()),
+ networks: None,
+ remote_network_address: None,
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[j].node.peer_connected(&nodes[i].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[i].override_init_features.borrow().clone().unwrap_or_else(|| nodes[i].node.init_features()),
+ networks: None,
+ remote_network_address: None,
+ }, false).unwrap();
}
}
/// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
/// for claims/fails they are separated out.
pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_a: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_b: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, send_channel_ready: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
- node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: node_b.node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: node_b.node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
- node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: node_a.node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: node_a.node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
if send_channel_ready.0 {
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
-use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
+use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
+use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
-use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
-use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
// funding satoshis
let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
- let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
+ let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
let feerate_per_kw = 253;
- let opt_anchors = false;
- push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
- let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
- chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
- chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ if send_from_initiator {
+ let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
+ chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ } else {
+ let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
+ chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
+ }
}
let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
// Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
// "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
// well as an additional HTLC.
- - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
+ - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
} else {
send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
}
let channel_id = chan.2;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
+ let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
// CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
// calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
// remote limit.
- let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
- let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
+ let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
+ let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = feerate;
//We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
- let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
+ let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
push_sats,
- channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
- opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
+ channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
+ local_funding, remote_funding,
commit_tx_keys.clone(),
non_buffer_feerate + 4,
&mut htlcs,
- &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
+ &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
+
let mut payments = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..50 {
let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
// There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
// the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
// another HTLC.
- let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
{
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
}
// This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
// The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
+ let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
match err {
PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
- match &fails[0] {
- &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
- }
+ if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
+ else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
}
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
}
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
commitment_number,
95000,
local_chan_balance,
- local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
+ local_funding, remote_funding,
commit_tx_keys.clone(),
feerate_per_kw,
&mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
- &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
+ &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
// Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
// However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
// channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
// transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
// Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
}
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
// channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
// transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
- + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
+ + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
// In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
// reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
// commitment transaction fee.
}
// One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
}
#[test]
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
// HTLC.
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
- push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
+ push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
// During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
// requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
- push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
+ push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
// Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
- let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
+ let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
+ route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
// Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
- let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
+ let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
}
-fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
+fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
}
#[test]
let feemsat = 239; // set above
let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
}
// channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
// 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
// Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
// ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
- let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
break;
// the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
// is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
// policy.
- let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
// channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
{
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
+ let mut route = route_1.clone();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
+ let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}
// split the rest to test holding cell
- let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
// test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
{
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
}
let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
- let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
- let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
// The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
// well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
} else { 3000000 };
let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
}
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
}
#[test]
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// 0th HTLC:
let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
// 1st HTLC:
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
- let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
// Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
- let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
- hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
// Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
let amt_1 = 20000;
- let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
+ let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
- let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
- hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
// Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
- // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
- // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
+ config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
// Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
- let feemsat = 239;
- let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
- let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
+ let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
let payment_event = {
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
}
#[test]
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let payment_event = {
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
}
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
}
#[test]
route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
-
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
}
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
- htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
+ htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
}
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
// The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
- let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
+ let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
+ let send_amt = 3999999;
+ let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
- &route.paths[0], 3999999, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
+ &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
for i in 0..50 {
//Disconnect and Reconnect
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
// We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
- .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
+ if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
&low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
{
}
} else { assert!(false) }
- // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
{
} else { panic!(); }
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
- // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
+ if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
&nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
&high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
{
}
}
// Reconnect peers
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
}
}
-#[test]
-fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
- // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
- // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
-
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
- // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
- // can get our balance.
-
- // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
- // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
- // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
- let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
- route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
- route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
-}
-
#[test]
fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
// Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
let accept_chan_msg = {
let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
- let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
+ let channel = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
channel.get_accept_channel_message()
};
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
}
}
-#[test]
-#[allow(deprecated)]
-fn test_secret_timeout() {
- // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
- // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
- let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
-
- let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
-
- // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
- // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
- if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
- } else { panic!(); }
- let mut block = {
- let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
- create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
- };
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
- if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
- } else { panic!(); }
-
- // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
- // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
- block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
- block.header.time += 1;
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
- let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
- assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
-
- {
- let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- }
- // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
- // values from previous calls.
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
- assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
- assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
- // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
#[test]
fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
// Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
- let funding_created = {
+ let (_, funding_created) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
// Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
// another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
// try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
// channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
- let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
+ let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
+ as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10000,
};
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
final_value_msat: 10000,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
}
-fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
+fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
// Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
// policy.
//
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
- config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
+ // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
+ // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
+ // originally written.
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
+ } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
- let opt_anchors = false;
+ let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
if on_holder_tx {
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
- let dust_buffer_feerate = {
+ // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
+ get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
+
+ let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
+ (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
+ chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
};
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
- let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
- let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
+ let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
+ let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
if on_holder_tx {
if dust_outbound_balance {
if dust_outbound_balance {
// Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
// Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
- for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
+ for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
} else {
// Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
// Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
- for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
+ for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
}
}
}
- let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
- let mut config = UserConfig::default();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
+ if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
// With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
if on_holder_tx {
- let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
- let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
} else {
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
+ let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
} else {
// Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
+ format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
+ dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
}
} else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
- let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
- RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
+ // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
+ // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
+ // to cross the threshold.
+ for _ in 0..20 {
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
+ }
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
added_monitors.clear();
}
+fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
- do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
+ do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
}
#[test]
do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
+ // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
+ // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
+ let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
+ let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
+ Some(())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ );
+ assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
+ };
+
+ // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
+ // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
+ // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+
+ // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+ }
+
+ // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, true);
+
+ // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, true);
+ };
+
+ create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+
+ // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
+ let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
+ // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
+ // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
+
+ // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
+ //
+ // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
+ // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bob_init = msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ };
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
+ let alice_init = msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
+
+ // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
+ // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
+ // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
+ nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
+
+ // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
+ let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ ).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
+
+ // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
+ }
+
+ // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
+ // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
+ check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
+
+ // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
+ // waiting on any messages.
+ for node in &nodes {
+ for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
+ node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_disconnect_event(node, false);
+ }
+ }
+}
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::crypto::sign;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::test_utils;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
-use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
-use bitcoin::Transaction;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
use crate::prelude::*;
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
// as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
// The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
- chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
+ chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
}, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
// call, as described, two hunks down.
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
// Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
};
let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
};
let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
};
confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
// B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
// to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
// to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
- let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
{
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in A's revoked commitment
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
- (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
}]),
fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
// Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
// `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
- if anchors {
- assert!(cfg!(anchors));
- }
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
if anchors {
- #[cfg(anchors)] {
- config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
- }
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
}
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
};
#[allow(unused_assignments)]
let mut feerate = 0;
- #[cfg(anchors)] {
- feerate = if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
- target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time,
- }) = events.pop().unwrap() {
- let secp = Secp256k1::new();
- assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
- let descriptor = htlc_descriptors.pop().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(descriptor.commitment_txid, commitment_txn[0].txid());
- let htlc_output_idx = descriptor.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as usize;
- assert!(htlc_output_idx < commitment_txn[0].output.len());
- tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
- // Note that we don't care about actually making the HTLC transaction meet the
- // feerate for the test, we just want to make sure the feerates we receive from
- // the events never decrease.
- tx.input.push(descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
- let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
- descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id,
- );
- let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
- descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp
- );
- tx.output.push(descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
- let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut tx, 0, &descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
- let witness_script = descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
- tx.input[0].witness = descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
- target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64
- } else { panic!("unexpected event"); };
- }
+ feerate = if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, ..
+ }) = events.pop().unwrap() {
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
+ let descriptor = htlc_descriptors.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(descriptor.commitment_txid, commitment_txn[0].txid());
+ let htlc_output_idx = descriptor.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as usize;
+ assert!(htlc_output_idx < commitment_txn[0].output.len());
+ tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
+ // Note that we don't care about actually making the HTLC transaction meet the
+ // feerate for the test, we just want to make sure the feerates we receive from
+ // the events never decrease.
+ tx.input.push(descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+ descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+ );
+ let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
+ descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp
+ );
+ tx.output.push(descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut tx, 0, &descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let witness_script = descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+ tx.input[0].witness = descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64
+ } else { panic!("unexpected event"); };
(tx, feerate)
} else {
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
#[test]
fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
- #[cfg(anchors)]
do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
}
-#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
// Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}
-#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
// Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
//! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
//! track the network on the less-secure system.
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
pub struct Init {
/// The relevant features which the sender supports.
pub features: InitFeatures,
+ /// Indicates chains the sender is interested in.
+ ///
+ /// If there are no common chains, the connection will be closed.
+ pub networks: Option<Vec<ChainHash>>,
/// The receipient's network address.
///
/// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
/// The expiry height of the HTLC
pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The extra fee skimmed by the sender of this message. See
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
+ pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
}
/// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
},
+ /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels and disconnect them.
+ DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
+ /// A warning message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
+ msg: WarningMessage,
+ },
/// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
// New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
IgnoreError,
///
/// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
+
+ /// Gets the genesis hashes for this `ChannelMessageHandler` indicating which chains it supports.
+ ///
+ /// If it's `None`, then no particular network chain hash compatibility will be enforced when
+ /// connecting to peers.
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>>;
}
/// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
self.features.write(w)?;
encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
- (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
+ (1, self.networks.as_ref().map(|n| WithoutLength(n)), option),
+ (3, self.remote_network_address, option),
});
Ok(())
}
let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
+ let mut networks: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<ChainHash>>> = None;
decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
+ (1, networks, option),
(3, remote_network_address, option)
});
Ok(Init {
features: features | global_features,
+ networks: networks.map(|n| n.0),
remote_network_address,
})
}
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet
-}, {});
+ onion_routing_packet,
+}, {
+ (65537, skimmed_fee_msat, option)
+});
impl Readable for OnionMessage {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::{Transaction, PackedLockTime, TxIn, Script, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
use hex;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
cltv_expiry: 821716,
- onion_routing_packet
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
#[test]
fn encoding_init() {
+ let mainnet_hash = ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap();
assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
+ networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
remote_network_address: None,
- }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
+ }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff01206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
+ networks: None,
remote_network_address: None,
}.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
+ networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
remote_network_address: None,
- }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
-
+ }.encode(), hex::decode("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
+ features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
+ networks: Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&[1; 32][..]), ChainHash::from(&[2; 32][..])]),
+ remote_network_address: None,
+ }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000014001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
+ networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
port: 1000,
}),
};
let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
- let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
+ let target_value = hex::decode("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d61900000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
}
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::test_utils;
-use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
let short_channel_id = channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id;
let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
.unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap()
- .get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
+ .context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
let route_len = bogus_route.paths[0].hops.len();
bogus_route.paths[0].hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = announced_channel;
config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
config.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = !announced_channel;
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let persister;
let chain_monitor;
#[test]
fn test_phantom_dust_exposure_failure() {
+ do_test_phantom_dust_exposure_failure(false);
+ do_test_phantom_dust_exposure_failure(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_phantom_dust_exposure_failure(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
// Set the max dust exposure to the dust limit.
let max_dust_exposure = 546;
let mut receiver_config = UserConfig::default();
- receiver_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = max_dust_exposure;
+ // Default test fee estimator rate is 253, so to set the max dust exposure to the dust limit,
+ // we need to set the multiplier to 2.
+ receiver_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure =
+ if multiplier_dust_limit { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(2) }
+ else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(max_dust_exposure) };
receiver_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
},
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "no-std"), not(test)))]
(Retry::Timeout(max_duration), PaymentAttempts { first_attempted_at, .. }) =>
- *max_duration >= std::time::Instant::now().duration_since(*first_attempted_at),
+ *max_duration >= crate::util::time::MonotonicTime::now().duration_since(*first_attempted_at),
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "no-std"), test))]
(Retry::Timeout(max_duration), PaymentAttempts { first_attempted_at, .. }) =>
*max_duration >= SinceEpoch::now().duration_since(*first_attempted_at),
}
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "no-std", test)))]
-type ConfiguredTime = std::time::Instant;
+type ConfiguredTime = crate::util::time::MonotonicTime;
#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
type ConfiguredTime = crate::util::time::Eternity;
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "no-std"), test))]
/// [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_payment
/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentFailed
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RetryableSendFailure {
/// The provided [`PaymentParameters::expiry_time`] indicated that the payment has expired. Note
/// that this error is *not* caused by [`Retry::Timeout`].
/// If you do not have one, the [`Route`] you pay over must not contain multiple paths as
/// multi-path payments require a recipient-provided secret.
///
- /// Note that for spontaneous payments most lightning nodes do not currently support MPP
- /// receives, thus you should generally never be providing a secret here for spontaneous
- /// payments.
+ /// Some implementations may reject spontaneous payments with payment secrets, so you may only
+ /// want to provide a secret for a spontaneous payment if MPP is needed and you know your
+ /// recipient will not reject it.
pub payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
/// The payment metadata serves a similar purpose as [`Self::payment_secret`] but is of
/// arbitrary length. This gives recipients substantially more flexibility to receive
}
/// Creates a new [`RecipientOnionFields`] with no fields. This generally does not create
- /// payable HTLCs except for spontaneous payments, i.e. this should generally only be used for
- /// calls to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`].
+ /// payable HTLCs except for single-path spontaneous payments, i.e. this should generally
+ /// only be used for calls to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`]. If you are sending
+ /// a spontaneous MPP this will not work as all MPP require payment secrets; you may
+ /// instead want to use [`RecipientOnionFields::secret_only`].
///
/// [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::secret_only`]: RecipientOnionFields::secret_only
pub fn spontaneous_empty() -> Self {
Self { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata: None }
}
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::channel::EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, HTLCForwardInfo, PendingHTLCRouting, PendingAddHTLCInfo};
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
-use crate::ln::msgs;
+use crate::ln::{msgs, PaymentSecret, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::ln::outbound_payment::Retry;
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, RoutingFees};
-use crate::routing::router::{get_route, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, Router, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
+use crate::routing::router::{get_route, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, Router, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
use crate::routing::scoring::ChannelUsage;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
do_mpp_receive_timeout(false);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_mpp_keysend() {
+ let mut mpp_keysend_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ mpp_keysend_config.accept_mpp_keysend = true;
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, Some(mpp_keysend_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
+
+ let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let payee_pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let recv_value = 15_000_000;
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, true),
+ final_value_msat: recv_value,
+ };
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger,
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
+ let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(payment_preimage.0);
+ let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
+ RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
+
+ let expected_route: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+
+ let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_route[0], recv_value, payment_hash.clone(),
+ Some(payment_secret), ev.clone(), false, Some(payment_preimage));
+
+ let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_route[1], recv_value, payment_hash.clone(),
+ Some(payment_secret), ev.clone(), true, Some(payment_preimage));
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_route, false, payment_preimage);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_reject_mpp_keysend_htlc() {
+ // This test enforces that we reject MPP keysend HTLCs if our config states we don't support
+ // MPP keysend. When receiving a payment, if we don't support MPP keysend we'll reject the
+ // payment if it's keysend and has a payment secret, never reaching our payment validation
+ // logic. To check that we enforce rejecting MPP keysends in our payment logic, here we send
+ // keysend payments without payment secrets, then modify them by adding payment secrets in the
+ // final node in between receiving the HTLCs and actually processing them.
+ let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let (update_a, _, chan_4_channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ let chan_4_id = update_a.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let amount = 40_000;
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], amount);
+
+ // Pay along nodes[1]
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
+ route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
+
+ let payment_id_0 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[3].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { ref mut forward_info, .. }) => {
+ match forward_info.routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { ref mut payment_data, .. } => {
+ *payment_data = Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([42; 32]),
+ total_msat: amount * 2,
+ });
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+
+ // Pay along nodes[2]
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
+ route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
+ route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
+
+ let payment_id_1 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let update_add_2 = update_2.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_2);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], &update_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
+ let update_3 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let update_add_3 = update_3.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_3);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], update_3.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[3].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { ref mut forward_info, .. }) => {
+ match forward_info.routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { ref mut payment_data, .. } => {
+ *payment_data = Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([42; 32]),
+ total_msat: amount * 2,
+ });
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
+
+ // Fail back along nodes[2]
+ let update_fail_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_0.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], update_fail_0.commitment_signed, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_4_channel_id }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let update_fail_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], update_fail_1.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
+}
+
+
#[test]
fn no_pending_leak_on_initial_send_failure() {
// In an earlier version of our payment tracking, we'd have a retry entry even when the initial
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Now nodes[1] should send a channel reestablish, which nodes[0] will respond to with an
// error, as the channel has hit the chain.
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
let as_err = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let mut peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let mut channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&chan_id_2).unwrap();
- let mut new_config = channel.config();
+ let mut new_config = channel.context.config();
new_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 100_000;
- channel.update_config(&new_config);
+ channel.context.update_config(&new_config);
new_route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 100_000;
}
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Now nodes[1] should send a channel reestablish, which nodes[0] will respond to with an
// error, as the channel has hit the chain.
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
let as_err = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], second_persister, second_new_chain_monitor, second_nodes_0_deserialized);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
// Now resend the payment, delivering the HTLC and actually claiming it this time. This ensures
reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], third_persister, third_new_chain_monitor, third_nodes_0_deserialized);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&new_route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id) {
let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
}
#[test]
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
}
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
// First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee
assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000));
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, Some(500000));
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_1.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
}
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel_2.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
}
let used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
+ channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(used_liquidity, Some(2000000));
// Check for unknown channel id error.
let unknown_chan_id_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &[42; 32], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err();
- assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
+ assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
+ log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
if test == InterceptTest::Fail {
// Ensure we can fail the intercepted payment back.
// Check that we'll fail as expected when sending to a channel that isn't in `ChannelReady` yet.
let temp_chan_id = nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
let unusable_chan_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &temp_chan_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err();
- assert_eq!(unusable_chan_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(temp_chan_id)) });
+ assert_eq!(unusable_chan_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
+ log_bytes!(temp_chan_id), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
// Open the just-in-time channel so the payment can then be forwarded.
}
}
+#[test]
+fn accept_underpaying_htlcs_config() {
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(1);
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(2);
+ do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(3);
+}
+
+fn do_accept_underpaying_htlcs_config(num_mpp_parts: usize) {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut intercept_forwards_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ intercept_forwards_config.accept_intercept_htlcs = true;
+ let mut underpay_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ underpay_config.channel_config.accept_underpaying_htlcs = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(intercept_forwards_config), Some(underpay_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let mut chan_ids = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts {
+ let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 10_000, 0);
+ let channel_id = create_unannounced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 2_000_000, 0).0.channel_id;
+ chan_ids.push(channel_id);
+ }
+
+ // Send the initial payment.
+ let amt_msat = 900_000;
+ let skimmed_fee_msat = 20;
+ let mut route_hints = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts {
+ route_hints.push(RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: nodes[1].node.get_intercept_scid(),
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 1000,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: Some(amt_msat / num_mpp_parts as u64 + 5),
+ }]));
+ }
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_route_hints(route_hints).unwrap()
+ .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params,
+ final_value_msat: amt_msat,
+ };
+ let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[2].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(amt_msat), 60 * 60, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], num_mpp_parts); // one monitor per path
+ let mut events: Vec<SendEvent> = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().into_iter().map(|e| SendEvent::from_event(e)).collect();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), num_mpp_parts);
+
+ // Forward the intercepted payments.
+ for (idx, ev) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &ev.msgs[0]);
+ do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &ev.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let (intercept_id, expected_outbound_amt_msat) = match events[0] {
+ crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
+ intercept_id, expected_outbound_amount_msat, payment_hash: pmt_hash, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(pmt_hash, payment_hash);
+ (intercept_id, expected_outbound_amount_msat)
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &chan_ids[idx],
+ nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amt_msat - skimmed_fee_msat).unwrap();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let payment_event = {
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+ if idx == num_mpp_parts - 1 {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Claim the payment and check that the skimmed fee is as expected.
+ let payment_preimage = nodes[2].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
+ ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, receiver_node_id, ..
+ } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt_msat - skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64, amount_msat);
+ assert_eq!(skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
+ match purpose {
+ crate::events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: ev_payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: ev_payment_secret, .. } =>
+ {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, ev_payment_preimage.unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_secret, *ev_payment_secret);
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let mut expected_paths_vecs = Vec::new();
+ let mut expected_paths = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..num_mpp_parts { expected_paths_vecs.push(vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])); }
+ for i in 0..num_mpp_parts { expected_paths.push(&expected_paths_vecs[i][..]); }
+ let total_fee_msat = do_claim_payment_along_route_with_extra_penultimate_hop_fees(
+ &nodes[0], &expected_paths[..], &vec![skimmed_fee_msat as u32; num_mpp_parts][..], false,
+ payment_preimage);
+ // The sender doesn't know that the penultimate hop took an extra fee.
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage,
+ Some(Some(total_fee_msat - skimmed_fee_msat * num_mpp_parts as u64)), true);
+}
+
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum AutoRetry {
Success,
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: ev_payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently: false,
- failure: PathFailure::InitialSend { err: APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: ref err_msg }},
+ failure: PathFailure::InitialSend { err: APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }},
short_channel_id: Some(expected_scid), .. } =>
{
assert_eq!(payment_hash, ev_payment_hash);
assert_eq!(expected_scid, route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id);
- assert!(err_msg.contains("max HTLC"));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: ev_payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently: false,
- failure: PathFailure::InitialSend { err: APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: ref err_msg }},
+ failure: PathFailure::InitialSend { err: APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }},
short_channel_id: Some(expected_scid), .. } =>
{
assert_eq!(payment_hash, ev_payment_hash);
assert_eq!(expected_scid, route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id);
- assert!(err_msg.contains("max HTLC"));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_c, chain_monitor_c, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert!(events.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
}
#[test]
//! call into the provided message handlers (probably a ChannelManager and P2PGossipSync) with
//! messages they should handle, and encoding/sending response messages.
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
use crate::sign::{KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::util::ser::{VecWriter, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NextNoiseStep};
use crate::ln::wire;
-use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
+use crate::ln::wire::{Encode, Type};
+use crate::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync, NodeId, NodeAlias};
use crate::util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::io;
use alloc::collections::LinkedList;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, FairRwLock};
-use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, Ordering};
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, AtomicI32, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, hash, fmt, mem};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::convert::Infallible;
InitFeatures::empty()
}
}
+impl OffersMessageHandler for IgnoringMessageHandler {
+ fn handle_message(&self, _msg: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> { None }
+}
impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for IgnoringMessageHandler {
type CustomMessage = Infallible;
- fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Infallible) {
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Infallible) -> Option<Infallible> {
// Since we always return `None` in the read the handle method should never be called.
unreachable!();
}
features
}
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ // We don't enforce any chains upon peer connection for `ErroringMessageHandler` and leave it up
+ // to users of `ErroringMessageHandler` to make decisions on network compatiblility.
+ // There's not really any way to pull in specific networks here, and hardcoding can cause breakages.
+ None
+ }
+
fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
ErroringMessageHandler::push_error(self, their_node_id, msg.temporary_channel_id);
}
/// issues such as overly long function definitions.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as `Arc`s don't make sense in bindings.
-pub type SimpleArcPeerManager<SD, M, T, F, C, L> = PeerManager<SD, Arc<SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L>>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<C>, Arc<L>>>, Arc<SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L>>, Arc<L>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<KeysManager>>;
+pub type SimpleArcPeerManager<SD, M, T, F, C, L> = PeerManager<
+ SD,
+ Arc<SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L>>,
+ Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<C>, Arc<L>>>,
+ Arc<SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L>>,
+ Arc<L>,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ Arc<KeysManager>
+>;
/// SimpleRefPeerManager is a type alias for a PeerManager reference, and is the reference
/// counterpart to the SimpleArcPeerManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as general type aliases don't make sense in bindings.
-pub type SimpleRefPeerManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, 'i, 'j, 'k, 'l, 'm, SD, M, T, F, C, L> = PeerManager<SD, SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'm, M, T, F, L>, &'f P2PGossipSync<&'g NetworkGraph<&'f L>, &'h C, &'f L>, &'i SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'j, 'k, L>, &'f L, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'c KeysManager>;
+pub type SimpleRefPeerManager<
+ 'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, 'i, 'j, 'k, 'l, 'm, 'n, SD, M, T, F, C, L
+> = PeerManager<
+ SD,
+ &'n SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'm, M, T, F, L>,
+ &'f P2PGossipSync<&'g NetworkGraph<&'f L>, &'h C, &'f L>,
+ &'i SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'g, 'm, 'n, L>,
+ &'f L,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ &'c KeysManager
+>;
/// A generic trait which is implemented for all [`PeerManager`]s. This makes bounding functions or
/// lock held. Entries may be added with only the `peers` read lock held (though the
/// `Descriptor` value must already exist in `peers`).
node_id_to_descriptor: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, Descriptor>>,
- /// We can only have one thread processing events at once, but we don't usually need the full
- /// `peers` write lock to do so, so instead we block on this empty mutex when entering
- /// `process_events`.
- event_processing_lock: Mutex<()>,
- /// Because event processing is global and always does all available work before returning,
- /// there is no reason for us to have many event processors waiting on the lock at once.
- /// Instead, we limit the total blocked event processors to always exactly one by setting this
- /// when an event process call is waiting.
- blocked_event_processors: AtomicBool,
+ /// We can only have one thread processing events at once, but if a second call to
+ /// `process_events` happens while a first call is in progress, one of the two calls needs to
+ /// start from the top to ensure any new messages are also handled.
+ ///
+ /// Because the event handler calls into user code which may block, we don't want to block a
+ /// second thread waiting for another thread to handle events which is then blocked on user
+ /// code, so we store an atomic counter here:
+ /// * 0 indicates no event processor is running
+ /// * 1 indicates an event processor is running
+ /// * > 1 indicates an event processor is running but needs to start again from the top once
+ /// it finishes as another thread tried to start processing events but returned early.
+ event_processing_state: AtomicI32,
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
message_handler,
peers: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
node_id_to_descriptor: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- event_processing_lock: Mutex::new(()),
- blocked_event_processors: AtomicBool::new(false),
+ event_processing_state: AtomicI32::new(0),
ephemeral_key_midstate,
peer_counter: AtomicCounter::new(),
gossip_processing_backlogged: AtomicBool::new(false),
Ok(x) => x,
Err(e) => {
match e.action {
- msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: _ } => {
- //TODO: Try to push msg
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. } => {
+ // We may have an `ErrorMessage` to send to the peer,
+ // but writing to the socket while reading can lead to
+ // re-entrant code and possibly unexpected behavior. The
+ // message send is optimistic anyway, and in this case
+ // we immediately disconnect the peer.
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; disconnecting peer with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { });
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } => {
+ // We have a `WarningMessage` to send to the peer, but
+ // writing to the socket while reading can lead to
+ // re-entrant code and possibly unexpected behavior. The
+ // message send is optimistic anyway, and in this case
+ // we immediately disconnect the peer.
log_debug!(self.logger, "Error handling message{}; disconnecting peer with: {}", OptionalFromDebugger(&peer_node_id), e.err);
return Err(PeerHandleError { });
},
peer.set_their_node_id(their_node_id);
insert_node_id!();
let features = self.init_features(&their_node_id);
- let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
+ let networks = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_genesis_hashes();
+ let resp = msgs::Init { features, networks, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
},
peer.set_their_node_id(their_node_id);
insert_node_id!();
let features = self.init_features(&their_node_id);
- let resp = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
+ let networks = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_genesis_hashes();
+ let resp = msgs::Init { features, networks, remote_network_address: filter_addresses(peer.their_net_address.clone()) };
self.enqueue_message(peer, &resp);
peer.awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals = 0;
},
Ok(x) => x,
Err(e) => {
match e {
- // Note that to avoid recursion we never call
+ // Note that to avoid re-entrancy we never call
// `do_attempt_write_data` from here, causing
// the messages enqueued here to not actually
// be sent before the peer is disconnected.
});
continue;
}
- (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, ty) => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Received a message with an unknown required feature flag or TLV, you may want to update!");
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: format!("Received an unknown required feature/TLV in message type {:?}", ty) });
+ (msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature, _) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received a message with an unknown required feature flag or TLV, you may want to update!");
return Err(PeerHandleError { });
}
(msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { }),
// Need an Init as first message
if let wire::Message::Init(msg) = message {
+ // Check if we have any compatible chains if the `networks` field is specified.
+ if let Some(networks) = &msg.networks {
+ if let Some(our_chains) = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_genesis_hashes() {
+ let mut have_compatible_chains = false;
+ 'our_chains: for our_chain in our_chains.iter() {
+ for their_chain in networks {
+ if our_chain == their_chain {
+ have_compatible_chains = true;
+ break 'our_chains;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !have_compatible_chains {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer does not support any of our supported chains");
+ return Err(PeerHandleError { }.into());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let our_features = self.init_features(&their_node_id);
if msg.features.requires_unknown_bits_from(&our_features) {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer requires features unknown to us");
// Handled above
},
wire::Message::Error(msg) => {
- let mut data_is_printable = true;
- for b in msg.data.bytes() {
- if b < 32 || b > 126 {
- data_is_printable = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if data_is_printable {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.data);
- } else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
- }
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), PrintableString(&msg.data));
self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&their_node_id, &msg);
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
return Err(PeerHandleError { }.into());
}
},
wire::Message::Warning(msg) => {
- let mut data_is_printable = true;
- for b in msg.data.bytes() {
- if b < 32 || b > 126 {
- data_is_printable = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if data_is_printable {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.data);
- } else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {} with non-ASCII error message", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
- }
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Got warning message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), PrintableString(&msg.data));
},
wire::Message::Ping(msg) => {
/// [`ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::process_pending_htlc_forwards
/// [`send_data`]: SocketDescriptor::send_data
pub fn process_events(&self) {
- let mut _single_processor_lock = self.event_processing_lock.try_lock();
- if _single_processor_lock.is_err() {
- // While we could wake the older sleeper here with a CV and make more even waiting
- // times, that would be a lot of overengineering for a simple "reduce total waiter
- // count" goal.
- match self.blocked_event_processors.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire) {
- Err(val) => {
- debug_assert!(val, "compare_exchange failed spuriously?");
- return;
- },
- Ok(val) => {
- debug_assert!(!val, "compare_exchange succeeded spuriously?");
- // We're the only waiter, as the running process_events may have emptied the
- // pending events "long" ago and there are new events for us to process, wait until
- // its done and process any leftover events before returning.
- _single_processor_lock = Ok(self.event_processing_lock.lock().unwrap());
- self.blocked_event_processors.store(false, Ordering::Release);
- }
- }
+ if self.event_processing_state.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) > 0 {
+ // If we're not the first event processor to get here, just return early, the increment
+ // we just did will be treated as "go around again" at the end.
+ return;
}
- self.update_gossip_backlogged();
- let flush_read_disabled = self.gossip_processing_backlog_lifted.swap(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
-
- let mut peers_to_disconnect = HashMap::new();
- let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- events_generated.append(&mut self.message_handler.route_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
+ loop {
+ self.update_gossip_backlogged();
+ let flush_read_disabled = self.gossip_processing_backlog_lifted.swap(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
- {
- // TODO: There are some DoS attacks here where you can flood someone's outbound send
- // buffer by doing things like announcing channels on another node. We should be willing to
- // drop optional-ish messages when send buffers get full!
+ let mut peers_to_disconnect = HashMap::new();
+ let mut events_generated = self.message_handler.chan_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ events_generated.append(&mut self.message_handler.route_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
- let peers_lock = self.peers.read().unwrap();
- let peers = &*peers_lock;
- macro_rules! get_peer_for_forwarding {
- ($node_id: expr) => {
- {
- if peers_to_disconnect.get($node_id).is_some() {
- // If we've "disconnected" this peer, do not send to it.
- continue;
- }
- let descriptor_opt = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().get($node_id).cloned();
- match descriptor_opt {
- Some(descriptor) => match peers.get(&descriptor) {
- Some(peer_mutex) => {
- let peer_lock = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- if !peer_lock.handshake_complete() {
+ {
+ // TODO: There are some DoS attacks here where you can flood someone's outbound send
+ // buffer by doing things like announcing channels on another node. We should be willing to
+ // drop optional-ish messages when send buffers get full!
+
+ let peers_lock = self.peers.read().unwrap();
+ let peers = &*peers_lock;
+ macro_rules! get_peer_for_forwarding {
+ ($node_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ if peers_to_disconnect.get($node_id).is_some() {
+ // If we've "disconnected" this peer, do not send to it.
+ continue;
+ }
+ let descriptor_opt = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().get($node_id).cloned();
+ match descriptor_opt {
+ Some(descriptor) => match peers.get(&descriptor) {
+ Some(peer_mutex) => {
+ let peer_lock = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if !peer_lock.handshake_complete() {
+ continue;
+ }
+ peer_lock
+ },
+ None => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Inconsistent peers set state!");
continue;
}
- peer_lock
},
None => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Inconsistent peers set state!");
continue;
- }
- },
- None => {
- continue;
- },
+ },
+ }
}
}
}
- }
- for event in events_generated.drain(..) {
- match event {
- MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id),
- log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
- // TODO: If the peer is gone we should generate a DiscardFunding event
- // indicating to the wallet that they should just throw away this funding transaction
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxComplete event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxInitRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAckRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAbort event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node {} with {} adds, {} fulfills, {} fails for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- update_add_htlcs.len(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
- update_fail_htlcs.len(),
- log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
- let mut peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
- for msg in update_add_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
- }
- for msg in update_fulfill_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
- }
- for msg in update_fail_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
- }
- for msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
- }
- if let &Some(ref msg) = update_fee {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
- }
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, commitment_signed);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for node {} for short channel id {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), update_msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, update_msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&msg) {
- Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
- self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelAnnouncement(msg), None),
- _ => {},
- }
- if let Some(msg) = update_msg {
+ for event in events_generated.drain(..) {
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id),
+ log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
+ // TODO: If the peer is gone we should generate a DiscardFunding event
+ // indicating to the wallet that they should just throw away this funding transaction
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxComplete event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxInitRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAckRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAbort event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node {} with {} adds, {} fulfills, {} fails for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ update_add_htlcs.len(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
+ update_fail_htlcs.len(),
+ log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
+ let mut peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
+ for msg in update_add_htlcs {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
+ }
+ for msg in update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
+ }
+ for msg in update_fail_htlcs {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
+ }
+ for msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref msg) = update_fee {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
+ }
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, commitment_signed);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for node {} for short channel id {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), update_msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, update_msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelAnnouncement event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&msg) {
+ Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
+ self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelAnnouncement(msg), None),
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = update_msg {
+ match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg) {
+ Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
+ self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg), None),
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg) {
Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg), None),
_ => {},
}
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event in peer_handler for node {}", msg.contents.node_id);
+ match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_node_announcement(&msg) {
+ Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
+ self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::NodeAnnouncement(msg), None),
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
+ match action {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } => {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg.as_ref() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.data);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ }
+ // We do not have the peers write lock, so we just store that we're
+ // about to disconenct the peer and do it after we finish
+ // processing most messages.
+ let msg = msg.map(|msg| wire::Message::<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>::Error(msg));
+ peers_to_disconnect.insert(node_id, msg);
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.data);
+ // We do not have the peers write lock, so we just store that we're
+ // about to disconenct the peer and do it after we finish
+ // processing most messages.
+ peers_to_disconnect.insert(node_id, Some(wire::Message::Warning(msg)));
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level) => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Received a HandleError event to be ignored for node {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip => {},
+ msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received a HandleError event to be ignored for node {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendErrorMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.data);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), msg);
+ },
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { ref msg, ref log_level } => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, *log_level, "Handling SendWarningMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.data);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), msg);
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
+ },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
- },
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg) {
- Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
- self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg), None),
- _ => {},
- }
- },
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event in peer_handler for node {}", msg.contents.node_id);
- match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_node_announcement(&msg) {
- Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
- self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::NodeAnnouncement(msg), None),
- _ => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Handling SendReplyChannelRange event in peer_handler for node {} with num_scids={} first_blocknum={} number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id),
+ msg.short_channel_ids.len(),
+ msg.first_blocknum,
+ msg.number_of_blocks,
+ msg.sync_complete);
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, ref action } => {
- match *action {
- msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } => {
- // We do not have the peers write lock, so we just store that we're
- // about to disconenct the peer and do it after we finish
- // processing most messages.
- peers_to_disconnect.insert(*node_id, msg.clone());
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level) => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Received a HandleError event to be ignored for node {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip => {},
- msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received a HandleError event to be ignored for node {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendErrorMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { ref msg, ref log_level } => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, *log_level, "Handling SendWarningMessage HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
+ MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- },
- MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- }
- MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- log_gossip!(self.logger, "Handling SendReplyChannelRange event in peer_handler for node {} with num_scids={} first_blocknum={} number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.short_channel_ids.len(),
- msg.first_blocknum,
- msg.number_of_blocks,
- msg.sync_complete);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
- }
- MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
}
}
- }
- for (node_id, msg) in self.message_handler.custom_message_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg() {
- if peers_to_disconnect.get(&node_id).is_some() { continue; }
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), &msg);
- }
+ for (node_id, msg) in self.message_handler.custom_message_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg() {
+ if peers_to_disconnect.get(&node_id).is_some() { continue; }
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(&node_id), &msg);
+ }
- for (descriptor, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
- let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- if flush_read_disabled { peer.received_channel_announce_since_backlogged = false; }
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), &mut *peer, flush_read_disabled);
+ for (descriptor, peer_mutex) in peers.iter() {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if flush_read_disabled { peer.received_channel_announce_since_backlogged = false; }
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut (*descriptor).clone(), &mut *peer, flush_read_disabled);
+ }
}
- }
- if !peers_to_disconnect.is_empty() {
- let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
- let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
- for (node_id, msg) in peers_to_disconnect.drain() {
- // Note that since we are holding the peers *write* lock we can
- // remove from node_id_to_descriptor immediately (as no other
- // thread can be holding the peer lock if we have the global write
- // lock).
-
- let descriptor_opt = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
- if let Some(mut descriptor) = descriptor_opt {
- if let Some(peer_mutex) = peers.remove(&descriptor) {
- let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(msg) = msg {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling DisconnectPeer HandleError event in peer_handler for node {} with message {}",
- log_pubkey!(node_id),
- msg.data);
- self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, &msg);
- // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
- // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
- self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut *peer, false);
- }
- self.do_disconnect(descriptor, &*peer, "DisconnectPeer HandleError");
- } else { debug_assert!(false, "Missing connection for peer"); }
+ if !peers_to_disconnect.is_empty() {
+ let mut peers_lock = self.peers.write().unwrap();
+ let peers = &mut *peers_lock;
+ for (node_id, msg) in peers_to_disconnect.drain() {
+ // Note that since we are holding the peers *write* lock we can
+ // remove from node_id_to_descriptor immediately (as no other
+ // thread can be holding the peer lock if we have the global write
+ // lock).
+
+ let descriptor_opt = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ if let Some(mut descriptor) = descriptor_opt {
+ if let Some(peer_mutex) = peers.remove(&descriptor) {
+ let mut peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(msg) = msg {
+ self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, &msg);
+ // This isn't guaranteed to work, but if there is enough free
+ // room in the send buffer, put the error message there...
+ self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut *peer, false);
+ }
+ self.do_disconnect(descriptor, &*peer, "DisconnectPeer HandleError");
+ } else { debug_assert!(false, "Missing connection for peer"); }
+ }
}
}
+
+ if self.event_processing_state.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) != 1 {
+ // If another thread incremented the state while we were running we should go
+ // around again, but only once.
+ self.event_processing_state.store(1, Ordering::Release);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
}
}
use crate::ln::msgs::{LightningError, NetAddress};
use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use crate::prelude::*;
};
cfgs.push(
PeerManagerCfg{
- chan_handler: test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(),
+ chan_handler: test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet)),
logger: test_utils::TestLogger::new(),
routing_handler: test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new(),
custom_handler: TestCustomMessageHandler { features },
cfgs
}
- fn create_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(peer_count: usize) -> Vec<PeerManagerCfg> {
+ fn create_
feature_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(peer_count: usize) -> Vec<PeerManagerCfg> {
let mut cfgs = Vec::new();
for i in 0..peer_count {
let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42 + i as u8; 32]).unwrap();
};
cfgs.push(
PeerManagerCfg{
- chan_handler: test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(),
+ chan_handler: test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet)),
+ logger: test_utils::TestLogger::new(),
+ routing_handler: test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new(),
+ custom_handler: TestCustomMessageHandler { features },
+ node_signer: test_utils::TestNodeSigner::new(node_secret),
+ }
+ );
+ }
+
+ cfgs
+ }
+
+ fn create_chain_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(peer_count: usize) -> Vec<PeerManagerCfg> {
+ let mut cfgs = Vec::new();
+ for i in 0..peer_count {
+ let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42 + i as u8; 32]).unwrap();
+ let features = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0u8; 33]);
+ let network = ChainHash::from(&[i as u8; 32][..]);
+ cfgs.push(
+ PeerManagerCfg{
+ chan_handler: test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(network),
logger: test_utils::TestLogger::new(),
routing_handler: test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new(),
custom_handler: TestCustomMessageHandler { features },
}
#[test]
- fn test_incompatible_peers() {
+ fn test_feature_incompatible_peers() {
let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
- let incompatible_cfgs = create_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(2);
+ let incompatible_cfgs = create_feature_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(2);
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
let incompatible_peers = create_network(2, &incompatible_cfgs);
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_chain_incompatible_peers() {
+ let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
+ let incompatible_cfgs = create_chain_incompatible_peermgr_cfgs(2);
+
+ let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
+ let incompatible_peers = create_network(2, &incompatible_cfgs);
+ let peer_pairs = [(&peers[0], &incompatible_peers[0]), (&incompatible_peers[1], &peers[1])];
+ for (peer_a, peer_b) in peer_pairs.iter() {
+ let id_a = peer_a.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_a = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1000};
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_b = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1001};
+ let initial_data = peer_b.new_outbound_connection(id_a, fd_b.clone(), Some(addr_a.clone())).unwrap();
+ peer_a.new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), Some(addr_b.clone())).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(peer_a.read_event(&mut fd_a, &initial_data).unwrap(), false);
+ peer_a.process_events();
+
+ let a_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(peer_b.read_event(&mut fd_b, &a_data).unwrap(), false);
+
+ peer_b.process_events();
+ let b_data = fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+
+ // Should fail because of incompatible chains
+ assert!(peer_a.read_event(&mut fd_a, &b_data).is_err());
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_disconnect_peer() {
// Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
// Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
// push a message from one peer to another.
let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
- let a_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
- let b_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new();
+ let a_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet));
+ let b_chan_handler = test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet));
let mut peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
let (fd_a, mut fd_b) = establish_connection(&peers[0], &peers[1]);
assert_eq!(peers[0].peers.read().unwrap().len(), 1);
// For (None)
assert_eq!(filter_addresses(None), None);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ fn test_process_events_multithreaded() {
+ use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+ // Test that `process_events` getting called on multiple threads doesn't generate too many
+ // loop iterations.
+ // Each time `process_events` goes around the loop we call
+ // `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`, which we count using the `TestMessageHandler`.
+ // Because the loop should go around once more after a call which fails to take the
+ // single-threaded lock, if we write zero to the counter before calling `process_events` we
+ // should never observe there having been more than 2 loop iterations.
+ // Further, because the last thread to exit will call `process_events` before returning, we
+ // should always have at least one count at the end.
+ let cfg = Arc::new(create_peermgr_cfgs(1));
+ // Until we have std::thread::scoped we have to unsafe { turn off the borrow checker }.
+ let peer = Arc::new(create_network(1, unsafe { &*(&*cfg as *const _) as &'static _ }).pop().unwrap());
+
+ let exit_flag = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
+ macro_rules! spawn_thread { () => { {
+ let thread_cfg = Arc::clone(&cfg);
+ let thread_peer = Arc::clone(&peer);
+ let thread_exit = Arc::clone(&exit_flag);
+ std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ while !thread_exit.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+ thread_cfg[0].chan_handler.message_fetch_counter.store(0, Ordering::Release);
+ thread_peer.process_events();
+ std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_micros(1));
+ }
+ })
+ } } }
+
+ let thread_a = spawn_thread!();
+ let thread_b = spawn_thread!();
+ let thread_c = spawn_thread!();
+
+ let start_time = Instant::now();
+ while start_time.elapsed() < Duration::from_millis(100) {
+ let val = cfg[0].chan_handler.message_fetch_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ assert!(val <= 2);
+ std::thread::yield_now(); // Winblowz seemingly doesn't ever interrupt threads?!
+ }
+
+ exit_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ thread_a.join().unwrap();
+ thread_b.join().unwrap();
+ thread_c.join().unwrap();
+ assert!(cfg[0].chan_handler.message_fetch_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) >= 1);
+ }
}
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::test_utils;
no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
reload_node!(nodes[1], no_announce_cfg, &nodes_1_serialized, &[&monitor_a_serialized, &monitor_b_serialized], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2]).pop().unwrap();
let cs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
});
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
});
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
}
#[test]
let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert!(events_2.is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
// nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).encode();
reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
// Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
- new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
//... and we can even still claim the payment!
claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[3].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[3].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
let mut found_err = false;
for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
reload_node!(nodes[0], previous_node_state, &[&previous_chain_monitor_state], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
if reconnect_panicing {
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
// after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
// use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
if persist_both_monitors {
if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[3], 2);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[3], 1);
}
// On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
if !persist_both_monitors {
// If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
- nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
- nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[3].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[3].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ nodes[1].node.test_process_background_events();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+
// Now that the ChannelManager has force-closed the channel which had the HTLC removed, it is
// now forgotten everywhere. The ChannelManager should have, as a side-effect of reload,
// learned that the HTLC is gone from the ChannelMonitor and added it to the to-fail-back set.
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events(); // Required to free the pending background monitor update
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let expected_err = "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.";
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Channel closed because of an exception: {}", expected_err)) });
+ if reorg_after_reload || !reload_node {
+ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Channel closed because of an exception: {}", expected_err)) });
+ }
+
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_owned() });
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
// If we dropped the channel before reloading the node, nodes[1] was also dropped from
// nodes[0] storage, and hence not connected again on startup. We therefore need to
// reconnect to the node before attempting to create a new channel.
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
}
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, ChannelShutdownState, ChannelDetails};
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
+#[test]
+fn expect_channel_shutdown_state() {
+ // Test sending a shutdown prior to channel_ready after funding generation
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
+
+ // node1 goes into NegotiatingClosingFee since there are no HTLCs in flight, note that it
+ // doesnt mean that node1 has sent/recved its closing signed message
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee);
+
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee);
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn expect_channel_shutdown_state_with_htlc() {
+ // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let _chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ let (payment_preimage_0, payment_hash_0, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100_000);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs);
+
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Claim Funds on Node2
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_0);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_0, 100_000);
+
+ // Fulfil HTLCs on node1 and node0
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ // Still in "resolvingHTLCs" on chan1 after htlc removed on chan2
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs);
+
+ assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_0);
+
+ // all htlcs removed, chan1 advances to NegotiatingClosingFee
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee);
+
+ // ClosingSignNegotion process
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+
+ // Shutdown basically removes the channelDetails, testing of shutdowncomplete state unnecessary
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn expect_channel_shutdown_state_with_force_closure() {
+ // Test sending a shutdown prior to channel_ready after funding generation
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[1], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ expect_channel_shutdown_state!(nodes[0], chan_1.2, ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+}
+
#[test]
fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
// Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let node_0_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
let node_1_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
if recv_count == 0 {
// If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
{
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_id).closing_fee_limits.as_mut().unwrap().1 *= 10;
+ get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_id).context.closing_fee_limits.as_mut().unwrap().1 *= 10;
}
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
Custom(T),
}
-impl<T> Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
+impl<T> Writeable for Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &Message::Init(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Error(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Warning(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Ping(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Pong(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::OpenChannel(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::OpenChannelV2(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::AcceptChannel(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::AcceptChannelV2(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::FundingCreated(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::FundingSigned(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxAddInput(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxAddOutput(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxRemoveInput(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxRemoveOutput(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxComplete(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxSignatures(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxInitRbf(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxAckRbf(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::TxAbort(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ChannelReady(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Shutdown(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ClosingSigned(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::OnionMessage(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::UpdateAddHTLC(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::UpdateFulfillHTLC(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::UpdateFailHTLC(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::CommitmentSigned(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::RevokeAndACK(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::UpdateFee(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ChannelReestablish(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::AnnouncementSignatures(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::QueryShortChannelIds(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::QueryChannelRange(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::ReplyChannelRange(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::GossipTimestampFilter(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ &Message::Unknown(_) => { Ok(()) },
+ &Message::Custom(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T> Type for Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
/// Returns the type that was used to decode the message payload.
- pub fn type_id(&self) -> u16 {
+ fn type_id(&self) -> u16 {
match self {
&Message::Init(ref msg) => msg.type_id(),
&Message::Error(ref msg) => msg.type_id(),
&Message::Custom(ref msg) => msg.type_id(),
}
}
+}
+impl<T> Message<T> where T: core::fmt::Debug + Type + TestEq {
/// Returns whether the message's type is even, indicating both endpoints must support it.
pub fn is_even(&self) -> bool {
(self.type_id() & 1) == 0
//! # use lightning::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
//! # use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
//! #
-//! # fn create_payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)> { unimplemented!() }
+//! # fn create_payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)> { unimplemented!() }
//! # fn create_payment_hash() -> PaymentHash { unimplemented!() }
//! #
//! # fn parse_invoice_request(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), lightning::offers::parse::ParseError> {
impl<'a> InvoiceBuilder<'a, ExplicitSigningPubkey> {
pub(super) fn for_offer(
- invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration, payment_hash: PaymentHash
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = Self::check_amount_msats(invoice_request)?;
}
pub(super) fn for_refund(
- refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, signing_pubkey: PublicKey
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
impl<'a> InvoiceBuilder<'a, DerivedSigningPubkey> {
pub(super) fn for_offer_using_keys(
- invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ invoice_request: &'a InvoiceRequest, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration, payment_hash: PaymentHash, keys: KeyPair
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = Self::check_amount_msats(invoice_request)?;
}
pub(super) fn for_refund_using_keys(
- refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ refund: &'a Refund, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, keys: KeyPair,
) -> Result<Self, SemanticError> {
let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
}
fn fields(
- payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, created_at: Duration,
+ payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, created_at: Duration,
payment_hash: PaymentHash, amount_msats: u64, signing_pubkey: PublicKey
) -> InvoiceFields {
InvoiceFields {
/// Invoice-specific fields for an `invoice` message.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
struct InvoiceFields {
- payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
+ payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
created_at: Duration,
relative_expiry: Option<Duration>,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
///
/// Blinded paths provide recipient privacy by obfuscating its node id. Note, however, that this
/// privacy is lost if a public node id is used for [`Invoice::signing_pubkey`].
- pub fn payment_paths(&self) -> &[(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)] {
+ pub fn payment_paths(&self) -> &[(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)] {
&self.contents.fields().payment_paths[..]
}
};
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(self.payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(self.created_at.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: self.relative_expiry.map(|duration| duration.as_secs() as u32),
payment_hash: Some(&self.payment_hash),
});
type BlindedPathIter<'a> = core::iter::Map<
- core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
- for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)) -> &'r BlindedPath,
+ core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
+ for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)) -> &'r BlindedPath,
>;
type BlindedPayInfoIter<'a> = core::iter::Map<
- core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>,
- for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)) -> &'r BlindedPayInfo,
+ core::slice::Iter<'a, (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>,
+ for<'r> fn(&'r (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)) -> &'r BlindedPayInfo,
>;
/// Information needed to route a payment across a [`BlindedPath`].
},
) = tlv_stream;
- let payment_paths = match (paths, blindedpay) {
- (None, _) => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
- (_, None) => return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo),
- (Some(paths), _) if paths.is_empty() => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
- (Some(paths), Some(blindedpay)) if paths.len() != blindedpay.len() => {
+ let payment_paths = match (blindedpay, paths) {
+ (_, None) => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
+ (None, _) => return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo),
+ (_, Some(paths)) if paths.is_empty() => return Err(SemanticError::MissingPaths),
+ (Some(blindedpay), Some(paths)) if paths.len() != blindedpay.len() => {
return Err(SemanticError::InvalidPayInfo);
},
- (Some(paths), Some(blindedpay)) => {
- paths.into_iter().zip(blindedpay.into_iter()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+ (Some(blindedpay), Some(paths)) => {
+ blindedpay.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
},
};
payer_note: None,
},
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(now.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: None,
payment_hash: Some(&payment_hash),
payer_note: None,
},
InvoiceTlvStreamRef {
- paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path))),
- blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo))),
+ paths: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path))),
+ blindedpay: Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo))),
created_at: Some(now.as_secs()),
relative_expiry: None,
payment_hash: Some(&payment_hash),
let empty_payment_paths = vec![];
let mut tlv_stream = invoice.as_tlv_stream();
- tlv_stream.3.paths = Some(Iterable(empty_payment_paths.iter().map(|(path, _)| path)));
+ tlv_stream.3.paths = Some(Iterable(empty_payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, path)| path)));
match Invoice::try_from(tlv_stream.to_bytes()) {
Ok(_) => panic!("expected error"),
let mut payment_paths = payment_paths();
payment_paths.pop();
let mut tlv_stream = invoice.as_tlv_stream();
- tlv_stream.3.blindedpay = Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(_, payinfo)| payinfo)));
+ tlv_stream.3.blindedpay = Some(Iterable(payment_paths.iter().map(|(payinfo, _)| payinfo)));
match Invoice::try_from(tlv_stream.to_bytes()) {
Ok(_) => panic!("expected error"),
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Data structures and encoding for `invoice_error` messages.
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::offers::parse::SemanticError;
+use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Readable, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
+/// An error in response to an [`InvoiceRequest`] or an [`Invoice`].
+///
+/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+pub struct InvoiceError {
+ /// The field in the [`InvoiceRequest`] or the [`Invoice`] that contained an error.
+ ///
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ /// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
+ pub erroneous_field: Option<ErroneousField>,
+
+ /// An explanation of the error.
+ pub message: UntrustedString,
+}
+
+/// The field in the [`InvoiceRequest`] or the [`Invoice`] that contained an error.
+///
+/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+pub struct ErroneousField {
+ /// The type number of the TLV field containing the error.
+ pub tlv_fieldnum: u64,
+
+ /// A value to use for the TLV field to avoid the error.
+ pub suggested_value: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
+impl core::fmt::Display for InvoiceError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
+ self.message.fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for InvoiceError {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let tlv_fieldnum = self.erroneous_field.as_ref().map(|f| f.tlv_fieldnum);
+ let suggested_value =
+ self.erroneous_field.as_ref().and_then(|f| f.suggested_value.as_ref());
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (1, tlv_fieldnum, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
+ (3, suggested_value, (option, encoding: (Vec<u8>, WithoutLength))),
+ (5, WithoutLength(&self.message), required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for InvoiceError {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (1, erroneous_field, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
+ (3, suggested_value, (option, encoding: (Vec<u8>, WithoutLength))),
+ (5, error, (option, encoding: (UntrustedString, WithoutLength))),
+ });
+
+ let erroneous_field = match (erroneous_field, suggested_value) {
+ (None, None) => None,
+ (None, Some(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ (Some(tlv_fieldnum), suggested_value) => {
+ Some(ErroneousField { tlv_fieldnum, suggested_value })
+ },
+ };
+
+ let message = match error {
+ None => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ Some(error) => error,
+ };
+
+ Ok(InvoiceError { erroneous_field, message })
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<SemanticError> for InvoiceError {
+ fn from(error: SemanticError) -> Self {
+ InvoiceError {
+ erroneous_field: None,
+ message: UntrustedString(format!("{:?}", error)),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::{ErroneousField, InvoiceError};
+
+ use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Readable, VecWriter, WithoutLength, Writeable};
+ use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn parses_invoice_error_without_erroneous_field() {
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let invoice_error = InvoiceError {
+ erroneous_field: None,
+ message: UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()),
+ };
+ invoice_error.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
+
+ let buffer = writer.0;
+ match InvoiceError::read(&mut &buffer[..]) {
+ Ok(invoice_error) => {
+ assert_eq!(invoice_error.message, UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()));
+ assert_eq!(invoice_error.erroneous_field, None);
+ }
+ Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn parses_invoice_error_with_erroneous_field() {
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let invoice_error = InvoiceError {
+ erroneous_field: Some(ErroneousField {
+ tlv_fieldnum: 42,
+ suggested_value: Some(vec![42; 32]),
+ }),
+ message: UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()),
+ };
+ invoice_error.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
+
+ let buffer = writer.0;
+ match InvoiceError::read(&mut &buffer[..]) {
+ Ok(invoice_error) => {
+ assert_eq!(invoice_error.message, UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()));
+ assert_eq!(
+ invoice_error.erroneous_field,
+ Some(ErroneousField { tlv_fieldnum: 42, suggested_value: Some(vec![42; 32]) }),
+ );
+ }
+ Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn parses_invoice_error_without_suggested_value() {
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let invoice_error = InvoiceError {
+ erroneous_field: Some(ErroneousField {
+ tlv_fieldnum: 42,
+ suggested_value: None,
+ }),
+ message: UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()),
+ };
+ invoice_error.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
+
+ let buffer = writer.0;
+ match InvoiceError::read(&mut &buffer[..]) {
+ Ok(invoice_error) => {
+ assert_eq!(invoice_error.message, UntrustedString("Invalid value".to_string()));
+ assert_eq!(
+ invoice_error.erroneous_field,
+ Some(ErroneousField { tlv_fieldnum: 42, suggested_value: None }),
+ );
+ }
+ Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn fails_parsing_invoice_error_without_message() {
+ let tlv_fieldnum: Option<u64> = None;
+ let suggested_value: Option<&Vec<u8>> = None;
+ let error: Option<&String> = None;
+
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let mut write_tlv = || -> Result<(), DecodeError> {
+ write_tlv_fields!(&mut writer, {
+ (1, tlv_fieldnum, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
+ (3, suggested_value, (option, encoding: (Vec<u8>, WithoutLength))),
+ (5, error, (option, encoding: (String, WithoutLength))),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ };
+ write_tlv().unwrap();
+
+ let buffer = writer.0;
+ match InvoiceError::read(&mut &buffer[..]) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
+ Err(e) => {
+ assert_eq!(e, DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn fails_parsing_invoice_error_without_field() {
+ let tlv_fieldnum: Option<u64> = None;
+ let suggested_value = vec![42; 32];
+ let error = "Invalid value".to_string();
+
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let mut write_tlv = || -> Result<(), DecodeError> {
+ write_tlv_fields!(&mut writer, {
+ (1, tlv_fieldnum, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
+ (3, Some(&suggested_value), (option, encoding: (Vec<u8>, WithoutLength))),
+ (5, Some(&error), (option, encoding: (String, WithoutLength))),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ };
+ write_tlv().unwrap();
+
+ let buffer = writer.0;
+ match InvoiceError::read(&mut &buffer[..]) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
+ Err(e) => {
+ assert_eq!(e, DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
/// [`Duration`]: core::time::Duration
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_with(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
///
/// [`Invoice::created_at`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice::created_at
pub fn respond_with_no_std(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn verify_and_respond_using_derived_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
///
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
pub fn verify_and_respond_using_derived_keys_no_std<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, sha256};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
use core::convert::Infallible;
use crate::offers::offer::{Amount, OfferBuilder};
use crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest;
super::root_hash(&invoice_request.bytes[..]),
sha256::Hash::from_slice(&hex::decode("608407c18ad9a94d9ea2bcdbe170b6c20c462a7833a197621c916f78cf18e624").unwrap()).unwrap(),
);
+ assert_eq!(
+ invoice_request.signature(),
+ Signature::from_slice(&hex::decode("b8f83ea3288cfd6ea510cdb481472575141e8d8744157f98562d162cc1c472526fdb24befefbdebab4dbb726bbd1b7d8aec057f8fa805187e5950d2bbe0e5642").unwrap()).unwrap(),
+ );
}
#[test]
//! Offers are a flexible protocol for Lightning payments.
pub mod invoice;
+pub mod invoice_error;
pub mod invoice_request;
mod merkle;
pub mod offer;
use bitcoin::bech32;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
- // TODO: Remove once test vectors are updated.
- #[ignore]
#[test]
fn encodes_offer_as_bech32_without_checksum() {
- let encoded_offer = "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy";
+ let encoded_offer = "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg";
let offer = dbg!(encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>().unwrap());
let reencoded_offer = offer.to_string();
dbg!(reencoded_offer.parse::<Offer>().unwrap());
assert_eq!(reencoded_offer, encoded_offer);
}
- // TODO: Remove once test vectors are updated.
- #[ignore]
#[test]
fn parses_bech32_encoded_offers() {
let offers = [
// BOLT 12 test vectors
- "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
- "l+no1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
- "l+no1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
- "lno1qcp4256ypqpq+86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn0+0fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0+sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qs+y",
- "lno1qcp4256ypqpq+ 86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn0+ 0fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0+\nsqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43l+\r\nastpwuh73k29qs+\r y",
- // Two blinded paths
- "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",
+ "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg",
+ "l+no1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg",
+ "lno1pqps7sjqpgt+yzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw3+5k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcn+ygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd+5xvxg",
+ "lno1pqps7sjqpgt+ yzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw3+ 5k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcn+\nygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd+\r\n 5xvxg",
];
for encoded_offer in &offers {
if let Err(e) = encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>() {
fn fails_parsing_bech32_encoded_offers_with_invalid_continuations() {
let offers = [
// BOLT 12 test vectors
- "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy+",
- "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy+ ",
- "+lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
- "+ lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
- "ln++o1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy",
+ "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg+",
+ "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg+ ",
+ "+lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg",
+ "+ lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg",
+ "ln++o1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg",
];
for encoded_offer in &offers {
match encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>() {
#[test]
fn fails_parsing_bech32_encoded_offer_with_invalid_hrp() {
- let encoded_offer = "lni1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsy";
+ let encoded_offer = "lni1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxg";
match encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>() {
Ok(_) => panic!("Valid offer: {}", encoded_offer),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e, ParseError::InvalidBech32Hrp),
#[test]
fn fails_parsing_bech32_encoded_offer_with_invalid_bech32_data() {
- let encoded_offer = "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qso";
+ let encoded_offer = "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxo";
match encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>() {
Ok(_) => panic!("Valid offer: {}", encoded_offer),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e, ParseError::Bech32(bech32::Error::InvalidChar('o'))),
#[test]
fn fails_parsing_bech32_encoded_offer_with_invalid_tlv_data() {
- let encoded_offer = "lno1qcp4256ypqpq86q2pucnq42ngssx2an9wfujqerp0y2pqun4wd68jtn00fkxzcnn9ehhyec6qgqsz83qfwdpl28qqmc78ymlvhmxcsywdk5wrjnj36jryg488qwlrnzyjczlqsp9nyu4phcg6dqhlhzgxagfu7zh3d9re0sqp9ts2yfugvnnm9gxkcnnnkdpa084a6t520h5zhkxsdnghvpukvd43lastpwuh73k29qsyqqqqq";
+ let encoded_offer = "lno1pqps7sjqpgtyzm3qv4uxzmtsd3jjqer9wd3hy6tsw35k7msjzfpy7nz5yqcnygrfdej82um5wf5k2uckyypwa3eyt44h6txtxquqh7lz5djge4afgfjn7k4rgrkuag0jsd5xvxgqqqqq";
match encoded_offer.parse::<Offer>() {
Ok(_) => panic!("Valid offer: {}", encoded_offer),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e, ParseError::Decode(DecodeError::InvalidValue)),
/// [`Duration`]: core::time::Duration
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_with(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
signing_pubkey: PublicKey,
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
let created_at = std::time::SystemTime::now()
///
/// [`Invoice::created_at`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice::created_at
pub fn respond_with_no_std(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
signing_pubkey: PublicKey, created_at: Duration
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, SemanticError> {
if self.features().requires_unknown_bits() {
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
pub fn respond_using_derived_keys<ES: Deref>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, entropy_source: ES
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError>
where
///
/// [`Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Invoice
pub fn respond_using_derived_keys_no_std<ES: Deref>(
- &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, payment_paths: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
created_at: core::time::Duration, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, entropy_source: ES
) -> Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, SemanticError>
where
SecretKey::from_slice(&[byte; 32]).unwrap()
}
-pub(super) fn payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPath, BlindedPayInfo)> {
+pub(super) fn payment_paths() -> Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)> {
let paths = vec![
BlindedPath {
introduction_node_id: pubkey(40),
},
];
- paths.into_iter().zip(payinfo.into_iter()).collect()
+ payinfo.into_iter().zip(paths.into_iter()).collect()
}
pub(super) fn payment_hash() -> PaymentHash {
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError, OnionMessageHandler};
-use super::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger, SendError};
+use super::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger, SendError};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1};
-use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicU16, Ordering};
use crate::io;
use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
-use crate::sync::Arc;
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
struct MessengerNode {
keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
- messenger: OnionMessenger<Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>, Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>, Arc<TestCustomMessageHandler>>,
+ messenger: OnionMessenger<
+ Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
+ Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ Arc<TestMessageRouter>,
+ Arc<TestOffersMessageHandler>,
+ Arc<TestCustomMessageHandler>
+ >,
custom_message_handler: Arc<TestCustomMessageHandler>,
- logger: Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
}
impl MessengerNode {
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
-struct TestCustomMessage {}
+struct TestMessageRouter {}
+
+impl MessageRouter for TestMessageRouter {
+ fn find_path(
+ &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination
+ ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
+ Ok(OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+struct TestOffersMessageHandler {}
+
+impl OffersMessageHandler for TestOffersMessageHandler {
+ fn handle_message(&self, _message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
+ None
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+enum TestCustomMessage {
+ Request,
+ Response,
+}
-const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4242;
-const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS: [u8; 32] = [42; 32];
+const CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4242;
+const CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4343;
+const CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_CONTENTS: [u8; 32] = [42; 32];
+const CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_CONTENTS: [u8; 32] = [43; 32];
impl CustomOnionMessageContents for TestCustomMessage {
fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
- CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE
+ match self {
+ TestCustomMessage::Request => CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+ TestCustomMessage::Response => CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+ }
}
}
impl Writeable for TestCustomMessage {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- Ok(CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS.write(w)?)
+ match self {
+ TestCustomMessage::Request => Ok(CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_CONTENTS.write(w)?),
+ TestCustomMessage::Response => Ok(CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_CONTENTS.write(w)?),
+ }
}
}
struct TestCustomMessageHandler {
- num_messages_expected: AtomicU16,
+ expected_messages: Mutex<VecDeque<TestCustomMessage>>,
}
impl TestCustomMessageHandler {
fn new() -> Self {
- Self { num_messages_expected: AtomicU16::new(0) }
+ Self { expected_messages: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()) }
+ }
+
+ fn expect_message(&self, message: TestCustomMessage) {
+ self.expected_messages.lock().unwrap().push_back(message);
}
}
return;
}
}
- assert_eq!(self.num_messages_expected.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
+ assert!(self.expected_messages.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
}
impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for TestCustomMessageHandler {
type CustomMessage = TestCustomMessage;
- fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) {
- self.num_messages_expected.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, msg: Self::CustomMessage) -> Option<Self::CustomMessage> {
+ match self.expected_messages.lock().unwrap().pop_front() {
+ Some(expected_msg) => assert_eq!(expected_msg, msg),
+ None => panic!("Unexpected message: {:?}", msg),
+ }
+
+ match msg {
+ TestCustomMessage::Request => Some(TestCustomMessage::Response),
+ TestCustomMessage::Response => None,
+ }
}
fn read_custom_message<R: io::Read>(&self, message_type: u64, buffer: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self::CustomMessage>, DecodeError> where Self: Sized {
- if message_type == CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE {
- let buf = read_to_end(buffer)?;
- assert_eq!(buf, CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS);
- return Ok(Some(TestCustomMessage {}))
+ match message_type {
+ CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_TYPE => {
+ let buf = read_to_end(buffer)?;
+ assert_eq!(buf, CUSTOM_REQUEST_MESSAGE_CONTENTS);
+ Ok(Some(TestCustomMessage::Request))
+ },
+ CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_TYPE => {
+ let buf = read_to_end(buffer)?;
+ assert_eq!(buf, CUSTOM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_CONTENTS);
+ Ok(Some(TestCustomMessage::Response))
+ },
+ _ => Ok(None),
}
- Ok(None)
}
}
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
let seed = [i as u8; 32];
let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet));
+ let message_router = Arc::new(TestMessageRouter {});
+ let offers_message_handler = Arc::new(TestOffersMessageHandler {});
let custom_message_handler = Arc::new(TestCustomMessageHandler::new());
nodes.push(MessengerNode {
keys_manager: keys_manager.clone(),
- messenger: OnionMessenger::new(keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), logger.clone(), custom_message_handler.clone()),
+ messenger: OnionMessenger::new(
+ keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager, logger.clone(), message_router,
+ offers_message_handler, custom_message_handler.clone()
+ ),
custom_message_handler,
- logger,
});
}
for idx in 0..num_messengers - 1 {
let i = idx as usize;
let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
features.set_onion_messages_optional();
- let init_msg = msgs::Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
+ let init_msg = msgs::Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
nodes[i].messenger.peer_connected(&nodes[i + 1].get_node_pk(), &init_msg.clone(), true).unwrap();
nodes[i + 1].messenger.peer_connected(&nodes[i].get_node_pk(), &init_msg.clone(), false).unwrap();
}
}
fn pass_along_path(path: &Vec<MessengerNode>) {
- path[path.len() - 1].custom_message_handler.num_messages_expected.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
let mut prev_node = &path[0];
for node in path.into_iter().skip(1) {
let events = prev_node.messenger.release_pending_msgs();
#[test]
fn one_hop() {
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
-
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage::Response);
+
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()),
+ };
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
#[test]
fn two_unblinded_hops() {
let nodes = create_nodes(3);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
-
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[2].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage::Response);
+
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![nodes[1].get_node_pk()],
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[2].get_node_pk()),
+ };
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
#[test]
fn two_unblinded_two_blinded() {
let nodes = create_nodes(5);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage::Response);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[3].get_node_pk(), nodes[4].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[4].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[4].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
#[test]
fn three_blinded_hops() {
let nodes = create_nodes(4);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage::Response);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[3].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[3].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
fn too_big_packet_error() {
// Make sure we error as expected if a packet is too big to send.
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage::Response);
let hop_node_id = nodes[1].get_node_pk();
- let hops = [hop_node_id; 400];
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&hops, Destination::Node(hop_node_id), test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
+ let hops = vec![hop_node_id; 400];
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: hops,
+ destination: Destination::Node(hop_node_id),
+ };
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooBigPacket);
}
// If we are sending straight to a blinded path and we are the introduction node, we need to
// advance the blinded path by 1 hop so the second hop is the new introduction node.
let mut nodes = create_nodes(3);
- let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Response;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[0].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[2].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
// Try with a two-hop blinded path where we are the introduction node.
let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[0].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[1].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
nodes.remove(2);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
fn invalid_blinded_path_error() {
// Make sure we error as expected if a provided blinded path has 0 or 1 hops.
let nodes = create_nodes(3);
- let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Response;
// 0 hops
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let mut blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[2].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
blinded_path.blinded_hops.clear();
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap_err();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
// 1 hop
let mut blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[2].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
blinded_path.blinded_hops.remove(0);
assert_eq!(blinded_path.blinded_hops.len(), 1);
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
}
#[test]
fn reply_path() {
- let nodes = create_nodes(4);
- let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
+ let mut nodes = create_nodes(4);
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Request;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
// Destination::Node
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()],
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[3].get_node_pk()),
+ };
let reply_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[0].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[0].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[3].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Request);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
// Make sure the last node successfully decoded the reply path.
- nodes[3].logger.assert_log_contains(
- "lightning::onion_message::messenger",
- &format!("Received an onion message with path_id None and a reply_path"), 1);
+ nodes[0].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
+ nodes.reverse();
+ pass_along_path(&nodes);
// Destination::BlindedPath
let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[3].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[3].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+ };
let reply_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&[nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[0].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[0].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Request);
+ pass_along_path(&nodes);
+
+ // Make sure the last node successfully decoded the reply path.
+ nodes[0].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
+ nodes.reverse();
pass_along_path(&nodes);
- nodes[3].logger.assert_log_contains(
- "lightning::onion_message::messenger",
- &format!("Received an onion message with path_id None and a reply_path"), 2);
}
#[test]
}
let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(InvalidCustomMessage {});
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()),
+ };
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::InvalidMessage);
}
#[test]
fn peer_buffer_full() {
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
- let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Request;
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes: vec![],
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()),
+ };
for _ in 0..188 { // Based on MAX_PER_PEER_BUFFER_SIZE in OnionMessenger
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path.clone(), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap();
}
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::BufferFull);
}
// of size [`crate::onion_message::packet::BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN`].
let num_nodes: usize = 25;
let nodes = create_nodes(num_nodes as u8);
- let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Response;
- let mut intermediates = vec![];
+ let mut intermediate_nodes = vec![];
for i in 1..(num_nodes-1) {
- intermediates.push(nodes[i].get_node_pk());
+ intermediate_nodes.push(nodes[i].get_node_pk());
}
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediates, Destination::Node(nodes[num_nodes-1].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap();
+ let path = OnionMessagePath {
+ intermediate_nodes,
+ destination: Destination::Node(nodes[num_nodes-1].get_node_pk()),
+ };
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(path, OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[num_nodes-1].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Response);
pass_along_path(&nodes);
}
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
pub use super::packet::{CustomOnionMessageContents, OnionMessageContents};
+use super::offers::OffersMessageHandler;
use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
/// # use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
/// # use lightning::sign::KeysManager;
/// # use lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
-/// # use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger};
+/// # use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger};
/// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
/// # use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
/// # use lightning::io;
/// # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
/// # fn log(&self, record: &Record) { unimplemented!() }
/// # }
+/// # struct FakeMessageRouter {}
+/// # impl MessageRouter for FakeMessageRouter {
+/// # fn find_path(&self, sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
+/// # unimplemented!()
+/// # }
+/// # }
/// # let seed = [42u8; 32];
/// # let time = Duration::from_secs(123456);
/// # let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, time.as_secs(), time.subsec_nanos());
/// # let hop_node_id1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_secret);
/// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1);
/// # let destination_node_id = hop_node_id1;
-/// # let your_custom_message_handler = IgnoringMessageHandler {};
+/// # let message_router = Arc::new(FakeMessageRouter {});
+/// # let custom_message_handler = IgnoringMessageHandler {};
+/// # let offers_message_handler = IgnoringMessageHandler {};
/// // Create the onion messenger. This must use the same `keys_manager` as is passed to your
/// // ChannelManager.
-/// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, &keys_manager, logger, &your_custom_message_handler);
+/// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(
+/// &keys_manager, &keys_manager, logger, message_router, &offers_message_handler,
+/// &custom_message_handler
+/// );
///
/// # struct YourCustomMessage {}
/// impl Writeable for YourCustomMessage {
/// }
/// }
/// // Send a custom onion message to a node id.
-/// let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
+/// let path = OnionMessagePath {
+/// intermediate_nodes: vec![hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2],
+/// destination: Destination::Node(destination_node_id),
+/// };
/// let reply_path = None;
/// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
/// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
-/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id), message, reply_path);
+/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(path, message, reply_path);
///
/// // Create a blinded path to yourself, for someone to send an onion message to.
/// # let your_node_id = hop_node_id1;
/// let blinded_path = BlindedPath::new_for_message(&hops, &keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
///
/// // Send a custom onion message to a blinded path.
-/// # let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
+/// let path = OnionMessagePath {
+/// intermediate_nodes: vec![hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2],
+/// destination: Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path),
+/// };
/// let reply_path = None;
/// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
/// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
-/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path), message, reply_path);
+/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(path, message, reply_path);
/// ```
///
/// [offers]: <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/798>
/// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::OnionMessenger
-pub struct OnionMessenger<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger,
- CMH:: Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
+pub struct OnionMessenger<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, MR: Deref, OMH: Deref, CMH: Deref>
+where
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ MR::Target: MessageRouter,
+ OMH::Target: OffersMessageHandler,
+ CMH:: Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
logger: L,
pending_messages: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>>>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ message_router: MR,
+ offers_handler: OMH,
custom_handler: CMH,
- // Coming soon:
- // invoice_handler: InvoiceHandler,
+}
+
+/// A trait defining behavior for routing an [`OnionMessage`].
+///
+/// [`OnionMessage`]: msgs::OnionMessage
+pub trait MessageRouter {
+ /// Returns a route for sending an [`OnionMessage`] to the given [`Destination`].
+ ///
+ /// [`OnionMessage`]: msgs::OnionMessage
+ fn find_path(
+ &self, sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination
+ ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()>;
+}
+
+/// A [`MessageRouter`] that always fails.
+pub struct DefaultMessageRouter;
+
+impl MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter {
+ fn find_path(
+ &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
+ ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
+ Err(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// A path for sending an [`msgs::OnionMessage`].
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct OnionMessagePath {
+ /// Nodes on the path between the sender and the destination.
+ pub intermediate_nodes: Vec<PublicKey>,
+
+ /// The recipient of the message.
+ pub destination: Destination,
}
/// The destination of an onion message.
+#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum Destination {
/// We're sending this onion message to a node.
Node(PublicKey),
/// The message known to the handler. To support multiple message types, you may want to make this
/// an enum with a variant for each supported message.
type CustomMessage: CustomOnionMessageContents;
- /// Called with the custom message that was received.
- fn handle_custom_message(&self, msg: Self::CustomMessage);
+
+ /// Called with the custom message that was received, returning a response to send, if any.
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, msg: Self::CustomMessage) -> Option<Self::CustomMessage>;
+
/// Read a custom message of type `message_type` from `buffer`, returning `Ok(None)` if the
/// message type is unknown.
fn read_custom_message<R: io::Read>(&self, message_type: u64, buffer: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self::CustomMessage>, msgs::DecodeError>;
}
-impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, CMH>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger,
- CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
+impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, MR: Deref, OMH: Deref, CMH: Deref>
+OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, MR, OMH, CMH>
+where
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ MR::Target: MessageRouter,
+ OMH::Target: OffersMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
/// Constructs a new `OnionMessenger` to send, forward, and delegate received onion messages to
/// their respective handlers.
- pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, logger: L, custom_handler: CMH) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(
+ entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, logger: L, message_router: MR, offers_handler: OMH,
+ custom_handler: CMH
+ ) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
OnionMessenger {
pending_messages: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
secp_ctx,
logger,
+ message_router,
+ offers_handler,
custom_handler,
}
}
- /// Send an onion message with contents `message` to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
+ /// Send an onion message with contents `message` to the destination of `path`.
+ ///
/// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
- pub fn send_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], mut destination: Destination, message: OnionMessageContents<T>, reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
+ pub fn send_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(
+ &self, path: OnionMessagePath, message: OnionMessageContents<T>,
+ reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
+ ) -> Result<(), SendError> {
+ let OnionMessagePath { intermediate_nodes, mut destination } = path;
if let Destination::BlindedPath(BlindedPath { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
return Err(SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
}
}
- let OnionMessageContents::Custom(ref msg) = message;
- if msg.tlv_type() < 64 { return Err(SendError::InvalidMessage) }
+
+ if message.tlv_type() < 64 { return Err(SendError::InvalidMessage) }
// If we are sending straight to a blinded path and we are the introduction node, we need to
// advance the blinded path by 1 hop so the second hop is the new introduction node.
}
};
let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
- &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
+ &self.secp_ctx, &intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
.map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
}
}
+ fn respond_with_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(
+ &self, response: OnionMessageContents<T>, path_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
+ ) {
+ let sender = match self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
+ Ok(node_id) => node_id,
+ Err(_) => {
+ log_warn!(
+ self.logger, "Unable to retrieve node id when responding to onion message with \
+ path_id {:02x?}", path_id
+ );
+ return;
+ }
+ };
+
+ let peers = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap().keys().copied().collect();
+
+ let destination = match reply_path {
+ Some(reply_path) => Destination::BlindedPath(reply_path),
+ None => {
+ log_trace!(
+ self.logger, "Missing reply path when responding to onion message with path_id \
+ {:02x?}", path_id
+ );
+ return;
+ },
+ };
+
+ let path = match self.message_router.find_path(sender, peers, destination) {
+ Ok(path) => path,
+ Err(()) => {
+ log_trace!(
+ self.logger, "Failed to find path when responding to onion message with \
+ path_id {:02x?}", path_id
+ );
+ return;
+ },
+ };
+
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Responding to onion message with path_id {:02x?}", path_id);
+
+ if let Err(e) = self.send_onion_message(path, response, None) {
+ log_trace!(
+ self.logger, "Failed responding to onion message with path_id {:02x?}: {:?}",
+ path_id, e
+ );
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>> {
let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
false
}
-impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, CMH>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger,
- CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler + Sized,
+impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, MR: Deref, OMH: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageHandler
+for OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, MR, OMH, CMH>
+where
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ MR::Target: MessageRouter,
+ OMH::Target: OffersMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
/// Handle an incoming onion message. Currently, if a message was destined for us we will log, but
/// soon we'll delegate the onion message to a handler that can generate invoices or send
}
}
};
- match onion_utils::decode_next_untagged_hop(onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..],
- msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, (control_tlvs_ss, &*self.custom_handler))
- {
+ match onion_utils::decode_next_untagged_hop(
+ onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
+ (control_tlvs_ss, &*self.custom_handler, &*self.logger)
+ ) {
Ok((Payload::Receive::<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage> {
message, control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
}, None)) => {
- log_info!(self.logger,
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
"Received an onion message with path_id {:02x?} and {} reply_path",
path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
- match message {
- OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => self.custom_handler.handle_custom_message(msg),
+
+ let response = match message {
+ OnionMessageContents::Offers(msg) => {
+ self.offers_handler.handle_message(msg)
+ .map(|msg| OnionMessageContents::Offers(msg))
+ },
+ OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => {
+ self.custom_handler.handle_custom_message(msg)
+ .map(|msg| OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg))
+ },
+ };
+
+ if let Some(response) = response {
+ self.respond_with_onion_message(response, path_id, reply_path);
}
},
Ok((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
}
}
-impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, CMH>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger,
- CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
+impl<ES: Deref, NS: Deref, L: Deref, MR: Deref, OMH: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageProvider
+for OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, MR, OMH, CMH>
+where
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ MR::Target: MessageRouter,
+ OMH::Target: OffersMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<msgs::OnionMessage> {
let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
///
/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager
/// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager
-pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
+pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<KeysManager>,
+ Arc<L>,
+ Arc<DefaultMessageRouter>,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler
+>;
+
/// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] and
/// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
///
///
/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleRefChannelManager
/// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleRefPeerManager
-pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<&'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'b L, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
+pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, 'c, L> = OnionMessenger<
+ &'a KeysManager,
+ &'a KeysManager,
+ &'b L,
+ &'c DefaultMessageRouter,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ IgnoringMessageHandler
+>;
/// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
/// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
//! [blinded paths]: crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath
mod messenger;
+mod offers;
mod packet;
#[cfg(test)]
mod functional_tests;
// Re-export structs so they can be imported with just the `onion_message::` module prefix.
-pub use self::messenger::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger, SendError, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
+pub use self::messenger::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, DefaultMessageRouter, Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger, SendError, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
+pub use self::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
pub(crate) use self::packet::{ControlTlvs, Packet};
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Message handling for BOLT 12 Offers.
+
+use core::convert::TryFrom;
+use crate::io::{self, Read};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
+use crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest;
+use crate::offers::invoice::Invoice;
+use crate::offers::parse::ParseError;
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
+// TLV record types for the `onionmsg_tlv` TLV stream as defined in BOLT 4.
+const INVOICE_REQUEST_TLV_TYPE: u64 = 64;
+const INVOICE_TLV_TYPE: u64 = 66;
+const INVOICE_ERROR_TLV_TYPE: u64 = 68;
+
+/// A handler for an [`OnionMessage`] containing a BOLT 12 Offers message as its payload.
+///
+/// [`OnionMessage`]: crate::ln::msgs::OnionMessage
+pub trait OffersMessageHandler {
+ /// Handles the given message by either responding with an [`Invoice`], sending a payment, or
+ /// replying with an error.
+ fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage>;
+}
+
+/// Possible BOLT 12 Offers messages sent and received via an [`OnionMessage`].
+///
+/// [`OnionMessage`]: crate::ln::msgs::OnionMessage
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum OffersMessage {
+ /// A request for an [`Invoice`] for a particular [`Offer`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
+ InvoiceRequest(InvoiceRequest),
+
+ /// An [`Invoice`] sent in response to an [`InvoiceRequest`] or a [`Refund`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
+ Invoice(Invoice),
+
+ /// An error from handling an [`OffersMessage`].
+ InvoiceError(InvoiceError),
+}
+
+impl OffersMessage {
+ /// Returns whether `tlv_type` corresponds to a TLV record for Offers.
+ pub fn is_known_type(tlv_type: u64) -> bool {
+ match tlv_type {
+ INVOICE_REQUEST_TLV_TYPE | INVOICE_TLV_TYPE | INVOICE_ERROR_TLV_TYPE => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// The TLV record type for the message as used in an `onionmsg_tlv` TLV stream.
+ pub fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(_) => INVOICE_REQUEST_TLV_TYPE,
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(_) => INVOICE_TLV_TYPE,
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceError(_) => INVOICE_ERROR_TLV_TYPE,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn parse(tlv_type: u64, bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, ParseError> {
+ match tlv_type {
+ INVOICE_REQUEST_TLV_TYPE => Ok(Self::InvoiceRequest(InvoiceRequest::try_from(bytes)?)),
+ INVOICE_TLV_TYPE => Ok(Self::Invoice(Invoice::try_from(bytes)?)),
+ _ => Err(ParseError::Decode(DecodeError::InvalidValue)),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OffersMessage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(message) => message.write(w),
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(message) => message.write(w),
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceError(message) => message.write(w),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<L: Logger + ?Sized> ReadableArgs<(u64, &L)> for OffersMessage {
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, read_args: (u64, &L)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let (tlv_type, logger) = read_args;
+ if tlv_type == INVOICE_ERROR_TLV_TYPE {
+ return Ok(Self::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::read(r)?));
+ }
+
+ let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+ r.read_to_end(&mut bytes).unwrap();
+
+ match Self::parse(tlv_type, bytes) {
+ Ok(message) => Ok(message),
+ Err(ParseError::Decode(e)) => Err(e),
+ Err(ParseError::InvalidSemantics(e)) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Invalid semantics for TLV type {}: {:?}", tlv_type, e);
+ Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ },
+ Err(ParseError::InvalidSignature(e)) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Invalid signature for TLV type {}: {:?}", tlv_type, e);
+ Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ },
+ Err(_) => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+}
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use super::messenger::CustomOnionMessageHandler;
+use super::offers::OffersMessage;
use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::{ChaChaPolyReadAdapter, ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter};
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, LengthRead, LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use core::cmp;
/// The contents of an onion message. In the context of offers, this would be the invoice, invoice
/// request, or invoice error.
pub enum OnionMessageContents<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> {
- // Coming soon:
- // Invoice,
- // InvoiceRequest,
- // InvoiceError,
+ /// A message related to BOLT 12 Offers.
+ Offers(OffersMessage),
/// A custom onion message specified by the user.
Custom(T),
}
/// This is not exported to bindings users as methods on non-cloneable enums are not currently exportable
pub fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
+ &OnionMessageContents::Offers(ref msg) => msg.tlv_type(),
&OnionMessageContents::Custom(ref msg) => msg.tlv_type(),
}
}
impl<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> Writeable for OnionMessageContents<T> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
match self {
+ OnionMessageContents::Offers(msg) => Ok(msg.write(w)?),
OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => Ok(msg.write(w)?),
}
}
}
// Uses the provided secret to simultaneously decode and decrypt the control TLVs and data TLV.
-impl<H: CustomOnionMessageHandler> ReadableArgs<(SharedSecret, &H)> for Payload<<H as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage> {
- fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (SharedSecret, &H)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (encrypted_tlvs_ss, handler) = args;
+impl<H: CustomOnionMessageHandler + ?Sized, L: Logger + ?Sized>
+ReadableArgs<(SharedSecret, &H, &L)> for Payload<<H as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage> {
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (SharedSecret, &H, &L)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let (encrypted_tlvs_ss, handler, logger) = args;
let v: BigSize = Readable::read(r)?;
let mut rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, v.0);
if message_type.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
message_type = Some(msg_type);
- match handler.read_custom_message(msg_type, msg_reader) {
- Ok(Some(msg)) => {
- message = Some(msg);
+ match msg_type {
+ tlv_type if OffersMessage::is_known_type(tlv_type) => {
+ let msg = OffersMessage::read(msg_reader, (tlv_type, logger))?;
+ message = Some(OnionMessageContents::Offers(msg));
Ok(true)
},
- Ok(None) => Ok(false),
- Err(e) => Err(e),
+ _ => match handler.read_custom_message(msg_type, msg_reader)? {
+ Some(msg) => {
+ message = Some(OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg));
+ Ok(true)
+ },
+ None => Ok(false),
+ },
}
});
rd.eat_remaining().map_err(|_| DecodeError::ShortRead)?;
Ok(Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs)))
},
Some(ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: ControlTlvs::Receive(tlvs)}) => {
- if message.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
Ok(Payload::Receive {
control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs),
reply_path,
- message: OnionMessageContents::Custom(message.unwrap()),
+ message: message.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
})
- }
+ },
}
}
}
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
use core::convert::TryFrom;
-use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use crate::sync::Mutex;
},
}
}
+
+ /// Gets the genesis hash for this network graph.
+ pub fn get_genesis_hash(&self) -> BlockHash {
+ self.genesis_hash
+ }
}
macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
},
- None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
+ None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
};
Self {
liquidity_msat: u64,
},
/// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
- MaximumHTLC {
+ AdvertisedMaxHTLC {
/// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
amount_msat: u64,
},
/// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
/// an invoice.
Infinite,
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
+ HintMaxHTLC {
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ },
/// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
/// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
Unknown,
pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
- EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
}
impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
- *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
- *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
+ // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
+ // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
+ let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
+ let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
+ let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
+ let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
+ let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
+ self.genesis_hash.eq(&other.genesis_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
}
}
if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
return Err(LightningError {
- err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
+ err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
});
}
// It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
{
- let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
{
let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
- let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
+ let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
-mod benches {
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
+pub mod benches {
use super::*;
-
- use test::Bencher;
use std::io::Read;
+ use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
- #[bench]
- fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
let mut v = Vec::new();
d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
- bench.iter(|| {
- let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
- });
+ bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
+ NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
+ ));
}
- #[bench]
- fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
- bench.iter(|| {
- let _ = net_graph.encode();
- });
+ bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
+ black_box(&net_graph).encode()
+ ));
}
}
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
+use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Invoice as Bolt12Invoice};
use crate::routing::gossip::{DirectedChannelInfo, EffectiveCapacity, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, LockableScore, Score};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
+use crate::sync::{Mutex};
use alloc::collections::BinaryHeap;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::ops::Deref;
+use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
/// A [`Router`] implemented using [`find_route`].
pub struct DefaultRouter<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Locked = MutexGuard<'a, Sc>>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
{
network_graph: G,
logger: L,
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Locked = MutexGuard<'a, Sc>>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
{
/// Creates a new router.
pub fn new(network_graph: G, logger: L, random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32], scorer: S, score_params: SP) -> Self {
}
}
-impl< G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> Router for DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
+impl< G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> Router for DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Locked = MutexGuard<'a, Sc>>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
{
fn find_route(
&self,
};
find_route(
payer, params, &self.network_graph, first_hops, &*self.logger,
- &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.lock(), inflight_htlcs),
+ &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.lock().deref_mut(), inflight_htlcs),
&self.score_params,
&random_seed_bytes
)
/// [`find_route`].
///
/// [`Score`]: crate::routing::scoring::Score
-pub struct ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S: Score> {
- scorer: S,
+pub struct ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> {
+ scorer: &'a mut S,
// Maps a channel's short channel id and its direction to the liquidity used up.
inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs,
}
-impl<'a, S: Score> ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S> {
+impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
/// Initialize a new `ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs`.
- pub fn new(scorer: S, inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(scorer: &'a mut S, inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs) -> Self {
ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs {
scorer,
inflight_htlcs
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, S: Score> Writeable for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S> {
+impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> Writeable for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { self.scorer.write(writer) }
}
-impl<'a, S: Score> Score for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S> {
+impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> Score for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
type ScoreParams = S::ScoreParams;
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
if let Some(used_liquidity) = self.inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
}
}
+ /// Adds a known HTLC given the public key of the HTLC source, target, and short channel
+ /// id.
+ pub fn add_inflight_htlc(&mut self, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, channel_scid: u64, used_msat: u64){
+ self.0
+ .entry((channel_scid, source < target))
+ .and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += used_msat)
+ .or_insert(used_msat);
+ }
+
/// Returns liquidity in msat given the public key of the HTLC source, target, and short channel
/// id.
pub fn used_liquidity_msat(&self, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, channel_scid: u64) -> Option<u64> {
let blinded_tails = blinded_tails.unwrap_or(Vec::new());
if blinded_tails.len() != 0 {
if blinded_tails.len() != paths.len() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
- for (mut path, blinded_tail_opt) in paths.iter_mut().zip(blinded_tails.into_iter()) {
+ for (path, blinded_tail_opt) in paths.iter_mut().zip(blinded_tails.into_iter()) {
path.blinded_tail = blinded_tail_opt;
}
}
// limits, but for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT: u8 = 10;
+const DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF: u8 = 2;
+
// The median hop CLTV expiry delta currently seen in the network.
const MEDIAN_HOP_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u32 = 40;
(2, features, (option: ReadableArgs, payee_pubkey.is_some())),
(3, max_path_count, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT)),
(4, route_hints, vec_type),
- (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, 2)),
+ (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF)),
(6, expiry_time, option),
(7, previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
(8, blinded_route_hints, optional_vec),
expiry_time: None,
max_total_cltv_expiry_delta: DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
max_path_count: DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT,
- max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: 2,
+ max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF,
previously_failed_channels: Vec::new(),
}
}
///
/// The `final_cltv_expiry_delta` should match the expected final CLTV delta the recipient has
/// provided.
- pub fn for_keysend(payee_pubkey: PublicKey, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32) -> Self {
- Self::from_node_id(payee_pubkey, final_cltv_expiry_delta).with_bolt11_features(InvoiceFeatures::for_keysend()).expect("PaymentParameters::from_node_id should always initialize the payee as unblinded")
+ ///
+ /// Note that MPP keysend is not widely supported yet. The `allow_mpp` lets you choose
+ /// whether your router will be allowed to find a multi-part route for this payment. If you
+ /// set `allow_mpp` to true, you should ensure a payment secret is set on send, likely via
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::secret_only`].
+ ///
+ /// [`RecipientOnionFields::secret_only`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::RecipientOnionFields::secret_only
+ pub fn for_keysend(payee_pubkey: PublicKey, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32, allow_mpp: bool) -> Self {
+ Self::from_node_id(payee_pubkey, final_cltv_expiry_delta)
+ .with_bolt11_features(InvoiceFeatures::for_keysend(allow_mpp))
+ .expect("PaymentParameters::from_node_id should always initialize the payee as unblinded")
+ }
+
+ /// Creates parameters for paying to a blinded payee from the provided invoice. Sets
+ /// [`Payee::Blinded::route_hints`], [`Payee::Blinded::features`], and
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::expiry_time`].
+ pub fn from_bolt12_invoice(invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Self {
+ Self::blinded(invoice.payment_paths().to_vec())
+ .with_bolt12_features(invoice.features().clone()).unwrap()
+ .with_expiry_time(invoice.created_at().as_secs().saturating_add(invoice.relative_expiry().as_secs()))
+ }
+
+ fn blinded(blinded_route_hints: Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ payee: Payee::Blinded { route_hints: blinded_route_hints, features: None },
+ expiry_time: None,
+ max_total_cltv_expiry_delta: DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ max_path_count: DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT,
+ max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF,
+ previously_failed_channels: Vec::new(),
+ }
}
- /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were initialized with blinded payment
- /// paths.
+ /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were not initialized with
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
+ pub fn with_bolt12_features(self, features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures) -> Result<Self, ()> {
+ match self.payee {
+ Payee::Clear { .. } => Err(()),
+ Payee::Blinded { route_hints, .. } =>
+ Ok(Self { payee: Payee::Blinded { route_hints, features: Some(features) }, ..self })
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Includes the payee's features. Errors if the parameters were initialized with
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_bolt11_features(self, features: InvoiceFeatures) -> Result<Self, ()> {
}
/// Includes hints for routing to the payee. Errors if the parameters were initialized with
- /// blinded payment paths.
+ /// [`PaymentParameters::from_bolt12_invoice`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_route_hints(self, route_hints: Vec<RouteHint>) -> Result<Self, ()> {
Self { max_path_count, ..self }
}
- /// Includes a limit for the maximum number of payment paths that may be used.
+ /// Includes a limit for the maximum share of a channel's total capacity that can be sent over, as
+ /// a power of 1/2. See [`PaymentParameters::max_channel_saturation_power_of_half`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users since bindings don't support move semantics
pub fn with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(self, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: u8) -> Self {
_ => None,
}
}
+ fn blinded_route_hints(&self) -> &[(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)] {
+ match self {
+ Self::Blinded { route_hints, .. } => &route_hints[..],
+ Self::Clear { .. } => &[]
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn unblinded_route_hints(&self) -> &[RouteHint] {
+ match self {
+ Self::Blinded { .. } => &[],
+ Self::Clear { route_hints, .. } => &route_hints[..]
+ }
+ }
}
enum FeaturesRef<'a> {
info: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
short_channel_id: u64,
},
- /// A hop to the payee found in the payment invoice, though not necessarily a direct channel.
+ /// A hop to the payee found in the BOLT 11 payment invoice, though not necessarily a direct
+ /// channel.
PrivateHop {
hint: &'a RouteHintHop,
- }
+ },
+ /// The payee's identity is concealed behind blinded paths provided in a BOLT 12 invoice.
+ Blinded {
+ hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ hint_idx: usize,
+ },
+ /// Similar to [`Self::Blinded`], but the path here has 1 blinded hop. `BlindedPayInfo` provided
+ /// for 1-hop blinded paths is ignored because it is meant to apply to the hops *between* the
+ /// introduction node and the destination. Useful for tracking that we need to include a blinded
+ /// path at the end of our [`Route`].
+ OneHopBlinded {
+ hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ hint_idx: usize,
+ },
}
impl<'a> CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
- fn short_channel_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ fn short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => *short_channel_id,
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.short_channel_id,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => Some(details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap()),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => Some(*short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => Some(hint.short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => None,
}
}
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.counterparty.features.to_context(),
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.channel().features.clone(),
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
}
}
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => 0,
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
}
}
fn htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => 0,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().htlc_minimum_msat,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.htlc_minimum_msat.unwrap_or(0),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
}
}
},
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().fees,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.fees,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => {
+ RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: hint.0.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: hint.0.fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
+ },
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } =>
+ RoutingFees { base_msat: 0, proportional_millionths: 0 },
}
}
liquidity_msat: details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
},
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.effective_capacity(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max), .. }} =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: *max },
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: None, .. }} =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: hint.0.htlc_maximum_msat },
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn id(&self, channel_direction: bool /* src_node_id < target_node_id */) -> CandidateHopId {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
+ _ => CandidateHopId::Clear((self.short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel_direction)),
+ }
+ }
+ fn blinded_path(&self) -> Option<&'a BlindedPath> {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ Some(&hint.1)
+ },
+ _ => None,
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd, PartialEq)]
+enum CandidateHopId {
+ /// Contains (scid, src_node_id < target_node_id)
+ Clear((u64, bool)),
+ /// Index of the blinded route hint in [`Payee::Blinded::route_hints`].
+ Blinded(usize),
+}
+
#[inline]
fn max_htlc_from_capacity(capacity: EffectiveCapacity, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: u8) -> u64 {
let saturation_shift: u32 = max_channel_saturation_power_of_half as u32;
EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => liquidity_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(),
- EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } =>
amount_msat.checked_shr(saturation_shift).unwrap_or(0),
+ // Treat htlc_maximum_msat from a route hint as an exact liquidity amount, since the invoice is
+ // expected to have been generated from up-to-date capacity information.
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => amount_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat } =>
cmp::min(capacity_msat.checked_shr(saturation_shift).unwrap_or(0), htlc_maximum_msat),
}
/// decrease as well. Thus, we have to explicitly track which nodes have been processed and
/// avoid processing them again.
was_processed: bool,
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
// In tests, we apply further sanity checks on cases where we skip nodes we already processed
// to ensure it is specifically in cases where the fee has gone down because of a decrease in
// value_contribution_msat, which requires tracking it here. See comments below where it is
.field("path_penalty_msat", &self.path_penalty_msat)
.field("path_htlc_minimum_msat", &self.path_htlc_minimum_msat)
.field("cltv_expiry_delta", &self.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta());
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
let debug_struct = debug_struct
.field("value_contribution_msat", &self.value_contribution_msat);
debug_struct.finish()
cur_hop_fees_msat = self.hops.get(i + 1).unwrap().0.hop_use_fee_msat;
}
- let mut cur_hop = &mut self.hops.get_mut(i).unwrap().0;
+ let cur_hop = &mut self.hops.get_mut(i).unwrap().0;
cur_hop.next_hops_fee_msat = total_fee_paid_msat;
// Overpay in fees if we can't save these funds due to htlc_minimum_msat.
// We try to account for htlc_minimum_msat in scoring (add_entry!), so that nodes don't
}
}
+struct LoggedCandidateHop<'a>(&'a CandidateRouteHop<'a>);
+impl<'a> fmt::Display for LoggedCandidateHop<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self.0 {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ "blinded route hint with introduction node id ".fmt(f)?;
+ hint.1.introduction_node_id.fmt(f)?;
+ " and blinding point ".fmt(f)?;
+ hint.1.blinding_point.fmt(f)
+ },
+ _ => {
+ "SCID ".fmt(f)?;
+ self.0.short_channel_id().unwrap().fmt(f)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn sort_first_hop_channels(
+ channels: &mut Vec<&ChannelDetails>, used_liquidities: &HashMap<CandidateHopId, u64>,
+ recommended_value_msat: u64, our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey
+) {
+ // Sort the first_hops channels to the same node(s) in priority order of which channel we'd
+ // most like to use.
+ //
+ // First, if channels are below `recommended_value_msat`, sort them in descending order,
+ // preferring larger channels to avoid splitting the payment into more MPP parts than is
+ // required.
+ //
+ // Second, because simply always sorting in descending order would always use our largest
+ // available outbound capacity, needlessly fragmenting our available channel capacities,
+ // sort channels above `recommended_value_msat` in ascending order, preferring channels
+ // which have enough, but not too much, capacity for the payment.
+ //
+ // Available outbound balances factor in liquidity already reserved for previously found paths.
+ channels.sort_unstable_by(|chan_a, chan_b| {
+ let chan_a_outbound_limit_msat = chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidities.get(&CandidateHopId::Clear((chan_a.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
+ our_node_pubkey < &chan_a.counterparty.node_id))).unwrap_or(&0));
+ let chan_b_outbound_limit_msat = chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidities.get(&CandidateHopId::Clear((chan_b.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
+ our_node_pubkey < &chan_b.counterparty.node_id))).unwrap_or(&0));
+ if chan_b_outbound_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat || chan_a_outbound_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat {
+ // Sort in descending order
+ chan_b_outbound_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_a_outbound_limit_msat)
+ } else {
+ // Sort in ascending order
+ chan_a_outbound_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_b_outbound_limit_msat)
+ }
+ });
+}
+
/// Finds a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee).
///
/// If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via `params.payee`.
// unblinded payee id as an option. We also need a non-optional "payee id" for path construction,
// so use a dummy id for this in the blinded case.
let payee_node_id_opt = payment_params.payee.node_id().map(|pk| NodeId::from_pubkey(&pk));
- const DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID: [u8; 33] = [42u8; 33];
+ const DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID: [u8; 33] = [2; 33];
let maybe_dummy_payee_pk = payment_params.payee.node_id().unwrap_or_else(|| PublicKey::from_slice(&DUMMY_BLINDED_PAYEE_ID).unwrap());
let maybe_dummy_payee_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&maybe_dummy_payee_pk);
let our_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&our_node_pubkey);
}
}
},
- _ => return Err(LightningError{err: "Routing to blinded paths isn't supported yet".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
-
+ Payee::Blinded { route_hints, .. } => {
+ if route_hints.iter().all(|(_, path)| &path.introduction_node_id == our_node_pubkey) {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Cannot generate a route to blinded paths if we are the introduction node to all of them".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ for (_, blinded_path) in route_hints.iter() {
+ if blinded_path.blinded_hops.len() == 0 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "0-hop blinded path provided".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ } else if &blinded_path.introduction_node_id == our_node_pubkey {
+ log_info!(logger, "Got blinded path with ourselves as the introduction node, ignoring");
+ } else if blinded_path.blinded_hops.len() == 1 &&
+ route_hints.iter().any( |(_, p)| p.blinded_hops.len() == 1
+ && p.introduction_node_id != blinded_path.introduction_node_id)
+ {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("1-hop blinded paths must all have matching introduction node ids"), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
let final_cltv_expiry_delta = payment_params.payee.final_cltv_expiry_delta().unwrap_or(0);
if payment_params.max_total_cltv_expiry_delta <= final_cltv_expiry_delta {
// drop the requirement by setting this to 0.
let mut channel_saturation_pow_half = payment_params.max_channel_saturation_power_of_half;
- // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels. Used to determine
- // if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding decisions. It is
- // aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value is used. Hence,
- // liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite direction.
- let mut used_channel_liquidities: HashMap<(u64, bool), u64> =
+ // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels or blinded paths. Used to
+ // determine if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding
+ // decisions. It is aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value
+ // is used. Hence, liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite
+ // direction.
+ let mut used_liquidities: HashMap<CandidateHopId, u64> =
HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// Keeping track of how much value we already collected across other paths. Helps to decide
let mut already_collected_value_msat = 0;
for (_, channels) in first_hop_targets.iter_mut() {
- // Sort the first_hops channels to the same node(s) in priority order of which channel we'd
- // most like to use.
- //
- // First, if channels are below `recommended_value_msat`, sort them in descending order,
- // preferring larger channels to avoid splitting the payment into more MPP parts than is
- // required.
- //
- // Second, because simply always sorting in descending order would always use our largest
- // available outbound capacity, needlessly fragmenting our available channel capacities,
- // sort channels above `recommended_value_msat` in ascending order, preferring channels
- // which have enough, but not too much, capacity for the payment.
- channels.sort_unstable_by(|chan_a, chan_b| {
- if chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat || chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < recommended_value_msat {
- // Sort in descending order
- chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)
- } else {
- // Sort in ascending order
- chan_a.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.cmp(&chan_b.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)
- }
- });
+ sort_first_hop_channels(channels, &used_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
+ our_node_pubkey);
}
log_trace!(logger, "Building path from {} to payer {} for value {} msat.",
( $candidate: expr, $src_node_id: expr, $dest_node_id: expr, $next_hops_fee_msat: expr,
$next_hops_value_contribution: expr, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: expr,
$next_hops_path_penalty_msat: expr, $next_hops_cltv_delta: expr, $next_hops_path_length: expr ) => { {
- // We "return" whether we updated the path at the end, via this:
- let mut did_add_update_path_to_src_node = false;
+ // We "return" whether we updated the path at the end, and how much we can route via
+ // this channel, via this:
+ let mut did_add_update_path_to_src_node = None;
// Channels to self should not be used. This is more of belt-and-suspenders, because in
// practice these cases should be caught earlier:
// - for regular channels at channel announcement (TODO)
// - for first and last hops early in get_route
if $src_node_id != $dest_node_id {
- let short_channel_id = $candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let scid_opt = $candidate.short_channel_id();
let effective_capacity = $candidate.effective_capacity();
let htlc_maximum_msat = max_htlc_from_capacity(effective_capacity, channel_saturation_pow_half);
// if the amount being transferred over this path is lower.
// We do this for now, but this is a subject for removal.
if let Some(mut available_value_contribution_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .get(&(short_channel_id, $src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .get(&$candidate.id($src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
.map_or(0, |used_liquidity_msat| {
available_value_contribution_msat = available_value_contribution_msat
.saturating_sub(*used_liquidity_msat);
(amount_to_transfer_over_msat < $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat &&
recommended_value_msat > $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat));
- let payment_failed_on_this_channel =
- payment_params.previously_failed_channels.contains(&short_channel_id);
+ let payment_failed_on_this_channel = scid_opt.map_or(false,
+ |scid| payment_params.previously_failed_channels.contains(&scid));
// If HTLC minimum is larger than the amount we're going to transfer, we shouldn't
// bother considering this channel. If retrying with recommended_value_msat may
path_htlc_minimum_msat,
path_penalty_msat: u64::max_value(),
was_processed: false,
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
value_contribution_msat,
}
});
#[allow(unused_mut)] // We only use the mut in cfg(test)
let mut should_process = !old_entry.was_processed;
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
{
// In test/fuzzing builds, we do extra checks to make sure the skipping
// of already-seen nodes only happens in cases we expect (see below).
inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
effective_capacity,
};
- let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
- short_channel_id, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id, channel_usage, score_params
- );
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scid_opt.map_or(0,
+ |scid| scorer.channel_penalty_msat(scid, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id,
+ channel_usage, score_params));
let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat
.saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
old_entry.fee_msat = 0; // This value will be later filled with hop_use_fee_msat of the following channel
old_entry.path_htlc_minimum_msat = path_htlc_minimum_msat;
old_entry.path_penalty_msat = path_penalty_msat;
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
{
old_entry.value_contribution_msat = value_contribution_msat;
}
- did_add_update_path_to_src_node = true;
+ did_add_update_path_to_src_node = Some(value_contribution_msat);
} else if old_entry.was_processed && new_cost < old_cost {
- #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), any(test, fuzzing)))]
{
// If we're skipping processing a node which was previously
// processed even though we found another path to it with a
// TODO: diversify by nodes (so that all paths aren't doomed if one node is offline).
'paths_collection: loop {
- // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_channel_liquidities, which
+ // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_liquidities, which
// helps to avoid reusing previously selected paths in future iterations.
targets.clear();
dist.clear();
for details in first_channels {
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
let added = add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, payee, 0, path_value_msat,
- 0, 0u64, 0, 0);
- log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via SCID {}",
- if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, candidate.short_channel_id());
+ 0, 0u64, 0, 0).is_some();
+ log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via {}",
+ if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, LoggedCandidateHop(&candidate));
}
}));
// If a caller provided us with last hops, add them to routing targets. Since this happens
// earlier than general path finding, they will be somewhat prioritized, although currently
// it matters only if the fees are exactly the same.
- let route_hints = match &payment_params.payee {
- Payee::Clear { route_hints, .. } => route_hints,
- _ => return Err(LightningError{err: "Routing to blinded paths isn't supported yet".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
- };
- for route in route_hints.iter().filter(|route| !route.0.is_empty()) {
+ for (hint_idx, hint) in payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().iter().enumerate() {
+ let intro_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hint.1.introduction_node_id);
+ let have_intro_node_in_graph =
+ // Only add the hops in this route to our candidate set if either
+ // we have a direct channel to the first hop or the first hop is
+ // in the regular network graph.
+ first_hop_targets.get(&intro_node_id).is_some() ||
+ network_nodes.get(&intro_node_id).is_some();
+ if !have_intro_node_in_graph { continue }
+ let candidate = if hint.1.blinded_hops.len() == 1 {
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, hint_idx }
+ } else { CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, hint_idx } };
+ let mut path_contribution_msat = path_value_msat;
+ if let Some(hop_used_msat) = add_entry!(candidate, intro_node_id, maybe_dummy_payee_node_id,
+ 0, path_contribution_msat, 0, 0_u64, 0, 0)
+ {
+ path_contribution_msat = hop_used_msat;
+ } else { continue }
+ if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hint.1.introduction_node_id)) {
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
+ our_node_pubkey);
+ for details in first_channels {
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
+ add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id, intro_node_id, 0, path_contribution_msat, 0,
+ 0_u64, 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for route in payment_params.payee.unblinded_route_hints().iter()
+ .filter(|route| !route.0.is_empty())
+ {
let first_hop_in_route = &(route.0)[0];
let have_hop_src_in_graph =
// Only add the hops in this route to our candidate set if either
let mut aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat: u64 = 0;
let mut aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta: u32 = 0;
let mut aggregate_next_hops_path_length: u8 = 0;
+ let mut aggregate_path_contribution_msat = path_value_msat;
for (idx, (hop, prev_hop_id)) in hop_iter.zip(prev_hop_iter).enumerate() {
let source = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id);
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: hop });
- if !add_entry!(candidate, source, target, aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
- path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
- aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
- aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta, aggregate_next_hops_path_length) {
+ if let Some(hop_used_msat) = add_entry!(candidate, source, target,
+ aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta, aggregate_next_hops_path_length)
+ {
+ aggregate_path_contribution_msat = hop_used_msat;
+ } else {
// If this hop was not used then there is no use checking the preceding
// hops in the RouteHint. We can break by just searching for a direct
// channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets.
hop_used = false;
}
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .get(&(hop.short_channel_id, source < target)).copied().unwrap_or(0);
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .get(&candidate.id(source < target)).copied()
+ .unwrap_or(0);
let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
amount_msat: final_value_msat + aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
.saturating_add(1);
// Searching for a direct channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets
- if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id)) {
+ if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id)) {
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
+ recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id),
- aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat,
- aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
- aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat, aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta,
- aggregate_next_hops_path_length);
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
+ add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id, NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id),
+ aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta, aggregate_next_hops_path_length);
}
}
// Note that we *must* check if the last hop was added as `add_entry`
// always assumes that the third argument is a node to which we have a
// path.
- if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id)) {
+ if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id)) {
+ sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
+ recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id,
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
+ add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id,
NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id),
- aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
+ aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta,
let mut features_set = false;
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
- if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
- ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
- features_set = true;
- break;
+ if let Some(scid) = ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
+ if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == scid {
+ ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
+ features_set = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
}
.chain(payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(hop, _)| &hop.node_id));
for (prev_hop, (hop, _)) in prev_hop_iter.zip(payment_path.hops.iter()) {
let spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat + hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
- let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
- .entry((hop.candidate.short_channel_id(), *prev_hop < hop.node_id))
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_liquidities
+ .entry(hop.candidate.id(*prev_hop < hop.node_id))
.and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += spent_on_hop_msat)
.or_insert(spent_on_hop_msat);
let hop_capacity = hop.candidate.effective_capacity();
// If we weren't capped by hitting a liquidity limit on a channel in the path,
// we'll probably end up picking the same path again on the next iteration.
// Decrease the available liquidity of a hop in the middle of the path.
- let victim_scid = payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let victim_candidate = &payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate;
let exhausted = u64::max_value();
- log_trace!(logger, "Disabling channel {} for future path building iterations to avoid duplicates.", victim_scid);
- *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, false)).or_default() = exhausted;
- *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, true)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Disabling route candidate {} for future path building iterations to
+ avoid duplicates.", LoggedCandidateHop(victim_candidate));
+ *used_liquidities.entry(victim_candidate.id(false)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ *used_liquidities.entry(victim_candidate.id(true)).or_default() = exhausted;
}
// Track the total amount all our collected paths allow to send so that we know
// compare both SCIDs and NodeIds as individual nodes may use random aliases causing collisions
// across nodes.
selected_route.sort_unstable_by_key(|path| {
- let mut key = [0u64; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
+ let mut key = [CandidateHopId::Clear((42, true)) ; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
debug_assert!(path.hops.len() <= key.len());
- for (scid, key) in path.hops.iter().map(|h| h.0.candidate.short_channel_id()).zip(key.iter_mut()) {
+ for (scid, key) in path.hops.iter() .map(|h| h.0.candidate.id(true)).zip(key.iter_mut()) {
*key = scid;
}
key
});
for idx in 0..(selected_route.len() - 1) {
if idx + 1 >= selected_route.len() { break; }
- if iter_equal(selected_route[idx ].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.short_channel_id(), h.0.node_id)),
- selected_route[idx + 1].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.short_channel_id(), h.0.node_id))) {
+ if iter_equal(selected_route[idx ].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.id(true), h.0.node_id)),
+ selected_route[idx + 1].hops.iter().map(|h| (h.0.candidate.id(true), h.0.node_id))) {
let new_value = selected_route[idx].get_value_msat() + selected_route[idx + 1].get_value_msat();
selected_route[idx].update_value_and_recompute_fees(new_value);
selected_route.remove(idx + 1);
}
}
- let mut selected_paths = Vec::<Vec<Result<RouteHop, LightningError>>>::new();
+ let mut paths = Vec::new();
for payment_path in selected_route {
- let mut path = payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(payment_hop, node_features)| {
- Ok(RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(payment_hop.node_id.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{err: format!("Public key {:?} is invalid", &payment_hop.node_id), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})?,
+ let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(payment_path.hops.len());
+ for (hop, node_features) in payment_path.hops.iter()
+ .filter(|(h, _)| h.candidate.short_channel_id().is_some())
+ {
+ hops.push(RouteHop {
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(hop.node_id.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{err: format!("Public key {:?} is invalid", &hop.node_id), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})?,
node_features: node_features.clone(),
- short_channel_id: payment_hop.candidate.short_channel_id(),
- channel_features: payment_hop.candidate.features(),
- fee_msat: payment_hop.fee_msat,
- cltv_expiry_delta: payment_hop.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta(),
- })
- }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ short_channel_id: hop.candidate.short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ channel_features: hop.candidate.features(),
+ fee_msat: hop.fee_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: hop.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta(),
+ });
+ }
+ let mut final_cltv_delta = final_cltv_expiry_delta;
+ let blinded_tail = payment_path.hops.last().and_then(|(h, _)| {
+ if let Some(blinded_path) = h.candidate.blinded_path() {
+ final_cltv_delta = h.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta();
+ Some(BlindedTail {
+ hops: blinded_path.blinded_hops.clone(),
+ blinding_point: blinded_path.blinding_point,
+ excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ final_value_msat: h.fee_msat,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ });
// Propagate the cltv_expiry_delta one hop backwards since the delta from the current hop is
// applicable for the previous hop.
- path.iter_mut().rev().fold(final_cltv_expiry_delta, |prev_cltv_expiry_delta, hop| {
- core::mem::replace(&mut hop.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, prev_cltv_expiry_delta)
+ hops.iter_mut().rev().fold(final_cltv_delta, |prev_cltv_expiry_delta, hop| {
+ core::mem::replace(&mut hop.cltv_expiry_delta, prev_cltv_expiry_delta)
});
- selected_paths.push(path);
+
+ paths.push(Path { hops, blinded_tail });
}
// Make sure we would never create a route with more paths than we allow.
- debug_assert!(selected_paths.len() <= payment_params.max_path_count.into());
+ debug_assert!(paths.len() <= payment_params.max_path_count.into());
if let Some(node_features) = payment_params.payee.node_features() {
- for path in selected_paths.iter_mut() {
- if let Ok(route_hop) = path.last_mut().unwrap() {
- route_hop.node_features = node_features.clone();
- }
+ for path in paths.iter_mut() {
+ path.hops.last_mut().unwrap().node_features = node_features.clone();
}
}
- let mut paths: Vec<Path> = Vec::new();
- for results_vec in selected_paths {
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(results_vec.len());
- for res in results_vec { hops.push(res?); }
- paths.push(Path { hops, blinded_tail: None });
- }
- let route = Route {
- paths,
- payment_params: Some(payment_params.clone()),
- };
+ let route = Route { paths, payment_params: Some(payment_params.clone()) };
log_info!(logger, "Got route: {}", log_route!(route));
Ok(route)
}
use crate::routing::test_utils::{add_channel, add_or_update_node, build_graph, build_line_graph, id_to_feature_flags, get_nodes, update_channel};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
- use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use crate::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, LightningError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
+ use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::test_utils as ln_test_utils;
use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
balance_msat: 0,
outbound_capacity_msat,
next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
inbound_capacity_msat: 42,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
confirmations_required: None,
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: None,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
}
}
#[test]
fn simple_mpp_route_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, _, _, _, _) = build_graph();
+ let (_, _, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let clear_payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2], 42)
+ .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(clear_payment_params);
+
+ // MPP to a 1-hop blinded path for nodes[2]
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo { // These fields are ignored for 1-hop blinded paths
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let one_hop_blinded_payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features.clone()).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(one_hop_blinded_payment_params.clone());
+
+ // MPP to 3 2-hop blinded paths
+ let mut blinded_path_node_0 = blinded_path.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_0.introduction_node_id = nodes[0];
+ blinded_path_node_0.blinded_hops.push(blinded_path.blinded_hops[0].clone());
+ let mut node_0_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_0_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 50_000;
+
+ let mut blinded_path_node_7 = blinded_path_node_0.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_7.introduction_node_id = nodes[7];
+ let mut node_7_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_7_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 60_000;
+
+ let mut blinded_path_node_1 = blinded_path_node_0.clone();
+ blinded_path_node_1.introduction_node_id = nodes[1];
+ let mut node_1_payinfo = blinded_payinfo.clone();
+ node_1_payinfo.htlc_maximum_msat = 180_000;
+
+ let two_hop_blinded_payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(
+ vec![
+ (node_0_payinfo, blinded_path_node_0),
+ (node_7_payinfo, blinded_path_node_7),
+ (node_1_payinfo, blinded_path_node_1)
+ ])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features).unwrap();
+ do_simple_mpp_route_test(two_hop_blinded_payment_params);
+ }
+
+
+ fn do_simple_mpp_route_test(payment_params: PaymentParameters) {
let (secp_ctx, network_graph, gossip_sync, _, logger) = build_graph();
let (our_privkey, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let config = UserConfig::default();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2], 42)
- .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
// We need a route consisting of 3 paths:
// From our node to node2 via node0, node7, node1 (three paths one hop each).
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 3);
let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
for path in &route.paths {
- assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len() + if bt.hops.len() == 1 { 0 } else { 1 }, 2);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
}
assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 250_000);
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 3);
let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
for path in &route.paths {
- assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().len() != 0 {
+ assert!(path.blinded_tail.is_some()) } else { assert!(path.blinded_tail.is_none()) }
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len() + if bt.hops.len() == 1 { 0 } else { 1 }, 2);
+ if bt.hops.len() > 1 {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey,
+ payment_params.payee.blinded_route_hints().iter()
+ .find(|(p, _)| p.htlc_maximum_msat == path.final_value_msat())
+ .map(|(_, p)| p.introduction_node_id).unwrap());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ }
total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
}
assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 290_000);
println!("Using seed of {}", seed);
seed
}
- #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
- use crate::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
fn generate_routes() {
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
- let mut d = match super::bench_utils::get_route_file() {
+ let logger = ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let graph = match super::bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger) {
Ok(f) => f,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("{}", e);
return;
},
};
- let logger = ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- let graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
- let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
- let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- // First, get 100 (source, destination) pairs for which route-getting actually succeeds...
- let mut seed = random_init_seed() as usize;
- let nodes = graph.read_only().nodes().clone();
- 'load_endpoints: for _ in 0..10 {
- loop {
- seed = seed.overflowing_mul(0xdeadbeef).0;
- let src = &PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- seed = seed.overflowing_mul(0xdeadbeef).0;
- let dst = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst, 42);
- let amt = seed as u64 % 200_000_000;
- let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &graph, &logger);
- if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, &logger, &scorer, ¶ms, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
- continue 'load_endpoints;
- }
- }
- }
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &graph, &logger);
+ let features = super::InvoiceFeatures::empty();
+
+ super::bench_utils::generate_test_routes(&graph, &mut scorer, ¶ms, features, random_init_seed(), 0, 2);
}
#[test]
fn generate_routes_mpp() {
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
- let mut d = match super::bench_utils::get_route_file() {
+ let logger = ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let graph = match super::bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger) {
Ok(f) => f,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("{}", e);
return;
},
};
+
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &graph, &logger);
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default());
+
+ super::bench_utils::generate_test_routes(&graph, &mut scorer, ¶ms, features, random_init_seed(), 0, 2);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ fn generate_large_mpp_routes() {
+ use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
+
let logger = ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- let graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
- let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
- let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let graph = match super::bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger) {
+ Ok(f) => f,
+ Err(e) => {
+ eprintln!("{}", e);
+ return;
+ },
+ };
- // First, get 100 (source, destination) pairs for which route-getting actually succeeds...
- let mut seed = random_init_seed() as usize;
- let nodes = graph.read_only().nodes().clone();
- 'load_endpoints: for _ in 0..10 {
- loop {
- seed = seed.overflowing_mul(0xdeadbeef).0;
- let src = &PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- seed = seed.overflowing_mul(0xdeadbeef).0;
- let dst = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst, 42).with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
- let amt = seed as u64 % 200_000_000;
- let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
- let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &graph, &logger);
- if get_route(src, &payment_params, &graph.read_only(), None, amt, &logger, &scorer, ¶ms, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok() {
- continue 'load_endpoints;
- }
- }
- }
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
+ let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &graph, &logger);
+ let features = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default());
+
+ super::bench_utils::generate_test_routes(&graph, &mut scorer, ¶ms, features, random_init_seed(), 1_000_000, 2);
}
#[test]
assert!(route.is_ok());
}
+ #[test]
+ fn abide_by_route_hint_max_htlc() {
+ // Check that we abide by any htlc_maximum_msat provided in the route hints of the payment
+ // params in the final route.
+ let (secp_ctx, network_graph, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let netgraph = network_graph.read_only();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+
+ let max_htlc_msat = 50_000;
+ let route_hint_1 = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: nodes[2],
+ short_channel_id: 42,
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 100,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 10,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max_htlc_msat),
+ }]);
+ let dest_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(42);
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dest_node_id, 42)
+ .with_route_hints(vec![route_hint_1.clone()]).unwrap()
+ .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
+
+ // Make sure we'll error if our route hints don't have enough liquidity according to their
+ // htlc_maximum_msat.
+ if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id,
+ &payment_params, &netgraph, None, max_htlc_msat + 1, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a sufficient route to the given destination");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // Make sure we'll split an MPP payment across route hints if their htlc_maximum_msat warrants.
+ let mut route_hint_2 = route_hint_1.clone();
+ route_hint_2.0[0].short_channel_id = 43;
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dest_node_id, 42)
+ .with_route_hints(vec![route_hint_1, route_hint_2]).unwrap()
+ .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &netgraph, None, max_htlc_msat + 1,
+ Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn direct_channel_to_hints_with_max_htlc() {
+ // Check that if we have a first hop channel peer that's connected to multiple provided route
+ // hints, that we properly split the payment between the route hints if needed.
+ let logger = Arc::new(ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+
+ let our_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(42);
+ let intermed_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(43);
+ let first_hop = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), intermed_node_id, InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 10_000_000)];
+
+ let amt_msat = 900_000;
+ let max_htlc_msat = 500_000;
+ let route_hint_1 = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: intermed_node_id,
+ short_channel_id: 44,
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 100,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 10,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max_htlc_msat),
+ }, RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: intermed_node_id,
+ short_channel_id: 45,
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 100,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 10,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ // Check that later route hint max htlcs don't override earlier ones
+ htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max_htlc_msat - 50),
+ }]);
+ let mut route_hint_2 = route_hint_1.clone();
+ route_hint_2.0[0].short_channel_id = 46;
+ route_hint_2.0[1].short_channel_id = 47;
+ let dest_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(44);
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dest_node_id, 42)
+ .with_route_hints(vec![route_hint_1, route_hint_2]).unwrap()
+ .with_bolt11_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config)).unwrap();
+
+ let route = get_route(&our_node_id, &payment_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&first_hop.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
+
+ // Re-run but with two first hop channels connected to the same route hint peers that must be
+ // split between.
+ let first_hops = vec![
+ get_channel_details(Some(42), intermed_node_id, InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), amt_msat - 10),
+ get_channel_details(Some(43), intermed_node_id, InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), amt_msat - 10),
+ ];
+ let route = get_route(&our_node_id, &payment_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
+
+ // Make sure this works for blinded route hints.
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: intermed_node_id,
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42), encrypted_payload: vec![] },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(43), encrypted_payload: vec![] },
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: max_htlc_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 10,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())])
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_node_id, &payment_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ assert!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert!(route.paths[1].hops.last().unwrap().fee_msat <= max_htlc_msat);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn blinded_route_ser() {
let blinded_path_1 = BlindedPath {
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].blinded_tail.as_ref().unwrap().excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, 40);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 40);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn simple_blinded_route_hints() {
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(1);
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(2);
+ do_simple_blinded_route_hints(3);
+ }
+
+ fn do_simple_blinded_route_hints(num_blinded_hops: usize) {
+ // Check that we can generate a route to a blinded path with the expected hops.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let mut blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: Vec::with_capacity(num_blinded_hops),
+ };
+ for i in 0..num_blinded_hops {
+ blinded_path.blinded_hops.push(
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 + i as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ );
+ }
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 500,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 100_000_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 15,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let final_amt_msat = 1001;
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone())]);
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, final_amt_msat , Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0].hops.len(), 2);
+
+ let tail = route.paths[0].blinded_tail.as_ref().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(tail.hops, blinded_path.blinded_hops);
+ assert_eq!(tail.excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, 0);
+ assert_eq!(tail.final_value_msat, 1001);
+
+ let final_hop = route.paths[0].hops.last().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.pubkey, blinded_path.introduction_node_id);
+ if tail.hops.len() > 1 {
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.fee_msat,
+ blinded_payinfo.fee_base_msat as u64 + blinded_payinfo.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * tail.final_value_msat / 1000000);
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, blinded_payinfo.cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.fee_msat, 0);
+ assert_eq!(final_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn blinded_path_routing_errors() {
+ // Check that we can generate a route to a blinded path with the expected hops.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let mut invalid_blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(43), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 43] },
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 100,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 500,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 100_000_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 15,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let mut invalid_blinded_path_2 = invalid_blinded_path.clone();
+ invalid_blinded_path_2.introduction_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(45);
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path_2)]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "1-hop blinded paths must all have matching introduction node ids");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+
+ invalid_blinded_path.introduction_node_id = our_id;
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), invalid_blinded_path.clone())]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot generate a route to blinded paths if we are the introduction node to all of them");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+
+ invalid_blinded_path.introduction_node_id = ln_test_utils::pubkey(46);
+ invalid_blinded_path.blinded_hops.clear();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![(blinded_payinfo, invalid_blinded_path)]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None, 1001, Arc::clone(&logger),
+ &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "0-hop blinded path provided");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected error")
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn matching_intro_node_paths_provided() {
+ // Check that if multiple blinded paths with the same intro node are provided in payment
+ // parameters, we'll return the correct paths in the resulting MPP route.
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let blinded_path_1 = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[2],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo_1 = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 30_000,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+
+ let mut blinded_path_2 = blinded_path_1.clone();
+ blinded_path_2.blinding_point = ln_test_utils::pubkey(43);
+ let mut blinded_payinfo_2 = blinded_payinfo_1.clone();
+ blinded_payinfo_2.htlc_maximum_msat = 70_000;
+
+ let blinded_hints = vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo_1.clone(), blinded_path_1.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo_2.clone(), blinded_path_2.clone()),
+ ];
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(blinded_hints.clone())
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features.clone()).unwrap();
+
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &payment_params, &network_graph, None,
+ 100_000, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
+ let mut total_amount_paid_msat = 0;
+ for path in route.paths.into_iter() {
+ assert_eq!(path.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey, nodes[2]);
+ if let Some(bt) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ assert_eq!(bt.blinding_point,
+ blinded_hints.iter().find(|(p, _)| p.htlc_maximum_msat == path.final_value_msat())
+ .map(|(_, bp)| bp.blinding_point).unwrap());
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ total_amount_paid_msat += path.final_value_msat();
+ }
+ assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 100_000);
+ }
}
-#[cfg(all(test, not(feature = "no-std")))]
+#[cfg(all(any(test, ldk_bench), not(feature = "no-std")))]
pub(crate) mod bench_utils {
+ use super::*;
use std::fs::File;
+
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+
+ use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails};
+ use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+ use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+ use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
+ use crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+
/// Tries to open a network graph file, or panics with a URL to fetch it.
pub(crate) fn get_route_file() -> Result<std::fs::File, &'static str> {
let res = File::open("net_graph-2023-01-18.bin") // By default we're run in RL/lightning
path.pop(); // target
path.push("lightning");
path.push("net_graph-2023-01-18.bin");
- eprintln!("{}", path.to_str().unwrap());
+ File::open(path)
+ })
+ .or_else(|_| { // Fall back to guessing based on the binary location for a subcrate
+ // path is likely something like .../rust-lightning/bench/target/debug/deps/bench..
+ let mut path = std::env::current_exe().unwrap();
+ path.pop(); // bench...
+ path.pop(); // deps
+ path.pop(); // debug
+ path.pop(); // target
+ path.pop(); // bench
+ path.push("lightning");
+ path.push("net_graph-2023-01-18.bin");
File::open(path)
})
.map_err(|_| "Please fetch https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-net_graph-v0.0.113-2023-01-18.bin and place it at lightning/net_graph-2023-01-18.bin");
#[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
return res;
}
-}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", not(feature = "no-std")))]
-mod benches {
- use super::*;
- use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
- use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails};
- use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
- use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
- use crate::routing::scoring::{FixedPenaltyScorer, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters};
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
- use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
- use crate::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
-
- use test::Bencher;
-
- struct DummyLogger {}
- impl Logger for DummyLogger {
- fn log(&self, _record: &Record) {}
+ pub(crate) fn read_network_graph(logger: &TestLogger) -> Result<NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, &'static str> {
+ get_route_file().map(|mut f| NetworkGraph::read(&mut f, logger).unwrap())
}
- fn read_network_graph(logger: &DummyLogger) -> NetworkGraph<&DummyLogger> {
- let mut d = bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
- NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, logger).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn payer_pubkey() -> PublicKey {
+ pub(crate) fn payer_pubkey() -> PublicKey {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap())
}
#[inline]
- fn first_hop(node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelDetails {
+ pub(crate) fn first_hop(node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelDetails {
ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
short_channel_id: Some(1),
inbound_scid_alias: None,
outbound_scid_alias: None,
- channel_value_satoshis: 10_000_000,
+ channel_value_satoshis: 10_000_000_000,
user_channel_id: 0,
- balance_msat: 10_000_000,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 10_000_000,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: 10_000_000,
+ balance_msat: 10_000_000_000,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: 10_000_000_000,
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: 10_000_000_000,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
confirmations_required: None,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
}
}
- #[bench]
- fn generate_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- let logger = DummyLogger {};
- let network_graph = read_network_graph(&logger);
+ pub(crate) fn generate_test_routes<S: Score>(graph: &NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, scorer: &mut S,
+ score_params: &S::ScoreParams, features: InvoiceFeatures, mut seed: u64,
+ starting_amount: u64, route_count: usize,
+ ) -> Vec<(ChannelDetails, PaymentParameters, u64)> {
+ let payer = payer_pubkey();
+ let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&[0u8; 32], 42, 42);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let nodes = graph.read_only().nodes().clone();
+ let mut route_endpoints = Vec::new();
+ // Fetch 1.5x more routes than we need as after we do some scorer updates we may end up
+ // with some routes we picked being un-routable.
+ for _ in 0..route_count * 3 / 2 {
+ loop {
+ seed = seed.overflowing_mul(6364136223846793005).0.overflowing_add(1).0;
+ let src = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys()
+ .skip((seed as usize) % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
+ seed = seed.overflowing_mul(6364136223846793005).0.overflowing_add(1).0;
+ let dst = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys()
+ .skip((seed as usize) % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
+ let params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst, 42)
+ .with_bolt11_features(features.clone()).unwrap();
+ let first_hop = first_hop(src);
+ let amt = starting_amount + seed % 1_000_000;
+ let path_exists =
+ get_route(&payer, ¶ms, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[&first_hop]),
+ amt, &TestLogger::new(), &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok();
+ if path_exists {
+ // ...and seed the scorer with success and failure data...
+ seed = seed.overflowing_mul(6364136223846793005).0.overflowing_add(1).0;
+ let mut score_amt = seed % 1_000_000_000;
+ loop {
+ // Generate fail/success paths for a wider range of potential amounts with
+ // MPP enabled to give us a chance to apply penalties for more potential
+ // routes.
+ let mpp_features = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default());
+ let params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst, 42)
+ .with_bolt11_features(mpp_features).unwrap();
+
+ let route_res = get_route(&payer, ¶ms, &graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&[&first_hop]), score_amt, &TestLogger::new(), &scorer,
+ score_params, &random_seed_bytes);
+ if let Ok(route) = route_res {
+ for path in route.paths {
+ if seed & 0x80 == 0 {
+ scorer.payment_path_successful(&path);
+ } else {
+ let short_channel_id = path.hops[path.hops.len() / 2].short_channel_id;
+ scorer.payment_path_failed(&path, short_channel_id);
+ }
+ seed = seed.overflowing_mul(6364136223846793005).0.overflowing_add(1).0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ // If we couldn't find a path with a higer amount, reduce and try again.
+ score_amt /= 100;
+ }
+
+ route_endpoints.push((first_hop, params, amt));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Because we've changed channel scores, it's possible we'll take different routes to the
+ // selected destinations, possibly causing us to fail because, eg, the newly-selected path
+ // requires a too-high CLTV delta.
+ route_endpoints.retain(|(first_hop, params, amt)| {
+ get_route(&payer, params, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[first_hop]), *amt,
+ &TestLogger::new(), &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok()
+ });
+ route_endpoints.truncate(route_count);
+ assert_eq!(route_endpoints.len(), route_count);
+ route_endpoints
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
+pub mod benches {
+ use super::*;
+ use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager;
+ use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+ use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+ use crate::routing::scoring::{FixedPenaltyScorer, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters};
+ use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+ use crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+
+ use criterion::Criterion;
+
+ struct DummyLogger {}
+ impl Logger for DummyLogger {
+ fn log(&self, _record: &Record) {}
+ }
+
+ pub fn generate_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger).unwrap();
let scorer = FixedPenaltyScorer::with_penalty(0);
- generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, &(), InvoiceFeatures::empty());
+ generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, &(), InvoiceFeatures::empty(), 0,
+ "generate_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer");
}
- #[bench]
- fn generate_mpp_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- let logger = DummyLogger {};
- let network_graph = read_network_graph(&logger);
+ pub fn generate_mpp_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger).unwrap();
let scorer = FixedPenaltyScorer::with_penalty(0);
- generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, &(), channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default()));
+ generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, &(),
+ channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default()), 0,
+ "generate_mpp_routes_with_zero_penalty_scorer");
}
- #[bench]
- fn generate_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- let logger = DummyLogger {};
- let network_graph = read_network_graph(&logger);
+ pub fn generate_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger).unwrap();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &network_graph, &logger);
- generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, ¶ms, InvoiceFeatures::empty());
+ generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, ¶ms, InvoiceFeatures::empty(), 0,
+ "generate_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer");
}
- #[bench]
- fn generate_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Bencher) {
- let logger = DummyLogger {};
- let network_graph = read_network_graph(&logger);
+ pub fn generate_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger).unwrap();
let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &network_graph, &logger);
- generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, ¶ms, channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default()));
+ generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, ¶ms,
+ channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default()), 0,
+ "generate_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer");
+ }
+
+ pub fn generate_large_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer(bench: &mut Criterion) {
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = bench_utils::read_network_graph(&logger).unwrap();
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::default();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &network_graph, &logger);
+ generate_routes(bench, &network_graph, scorer, ¶ms,
+ channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&UserConfig::default()), 100_000_000,
+ "generate_large_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer");
}
fn generate_routes<S: Score>(
- bench: &mut Bencher, graph: &NetworkGraph<&DummyLogger>, mut scorer: S, score_params: &S::ScoreParams,
- features: InvoiceFeatures
+ bench: &mut Criterion, graph: &NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, mut scorer: S,
+ score_params: &S::ScoreParams, features: InvoiceFeatures, starting_amount: u64,
+ bench_name: &'static str,
) {
- let nodes = graph.read_only().nodes().clone();
- let payer = payer_pubkey();
+ let payer = bench_utils::payer_pubkey();
let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&[0u8; 32], 42, 42);
let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
// First, get 100 (source, destination) pairs for which route-getting actually succeeds...
- let mut routes = Vec::new();
- let mut route_endpoints = Vec::new();
- let mut seed: usize = 0xdeadbeef;
- 'load_endpoints: for _ in 0..150 {
- loop {
- seed *= 0xdeadbeef;
- let src = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- seed *= 0xdeadbeef;
- let dst = PublicKey::from_slice(nodes.unordered_keys().skip(seed % nodes.len()).next().unwrap().as_slice()).unwrap();
- let params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dst, 42).with_bolt11_features(features.clone()).unwrap();
- let first_hop = first_hop(src);
- let amt = seed as u64 % 1_000_000;
- if let Ok(route) = get_route(&payer, ¶ms, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[&first_hop]), amt, &DummyLogger{}, &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes) {
- routes.push(route);
- route_endpoints.push((first_hop, params, amt));
- continue 'load_endpoints;
- }
- }
- }
-
- // ...and seed the scorer with success and failure data...
- for route in routes {
- let amount = route.get_total_amount();
- if amount < 250_000 {
- for path in route.paths {
- scorer.payment_path_successful(&path);
- }
- } else if amount > 750_000 {
- for path in route.paths {
- let short_channel_id = path.hops[path.hops.len() / 2].short_channel_id;
- scorer.payment_path_failed(&path, short_channel_id);
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Because we've changed channel scores, its possible we'll take different routes to the
- // selected destinations, possibly causing us to fail because, eg, the newly-selected path
- // requires a too-high CLTV delta.
- route_endpoints.retain(|(first_hop, params, amt)| {
- get_route(&payer, params, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[first_hop]), *amt, &DummyLogger{}, &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok()
- });
- route_endpoints.truncate(100);
- assert_eq!(route_endpoints.len(), 100);
+ let route_endpoints = bench_utils::generate_test_routes(graph, &mut scorer, score_params, features, 0xdeadbeef, starting_amount, 50);
// ...then benchmark finding paths between the nodes we learned.
let mut idx = 0;
- bench.iter(|| {
+ bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
let (first_hop, params, amt) = &route_endpoints[idx % route_endpoints.len()];
- assert!(get_route(&payer, params, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[first_hop]), *amt, &DummyLogger{}, &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok());
+ assert!(get_route(&payer, params, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[first_hop]), *amt,
+ &DummyLogger{}, &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok());
idx += 1;
- });
+ }));
}
}
///
/// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
pub trait LockableScore<'a> {
+ /// The [`Score`] type.
+ type Score: 'a + Score;
+
/// The locked [`Score`] type.
- type Locked: 'a + Score;
+ type Locked: DerefMut<Target = Self::Score> + Sized;
/// Returns the locked scorer.
fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked;
impl<'a, T> WriteableScore<'a> for T where T: LockableScore<'a> + Writeable {}
/// This is not exported to bindings users
impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for Mutex<T> {
+ type Score = T;
type Locked = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
- fn lock(&'a self) -> MutexGuard<'a, T> {
+ fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
Mutex::lock(self).unwrap()
}
}
impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for RefCell<T> {
+ type Score = T;
type Locked = RefMut<'a, T>;
- fn lock(&'a self) -> RefMut<'a, T> {
+ fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
self.borrow_mut()
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
/// A concrete implementation of [`LockableScore`] which supports multi-threading.
-pub struct MultiThreadedLockableScore<S: Score> {
- score: Mutex<S>,
-}
-#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-/// A locked `MultiThreadedLockableScore`.
-pub struct MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, S: Score>(MutexGuard<'a, S>);
-#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: Score + 'a> Score for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
- type ScoreParams = <T as Score>::ScoreParams;
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, scid: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
- self.0.channel_penalty_msat(scid, source, target, usage, score_params)
- }
- fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
- self.0.payment_path_failed(path, short_channel_id)
- }
- fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, path: &Path) {
- self.0.payment_path_successful(path)
- }
- fn probe_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
- self.0.probe_failed(path, short_channel_id)
- }
- fn probe_successful(&mut self, path: &Path) {
- self.0.probe_successful(path)
- }
-}
-#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: Score + 'a> Writeable for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.0.write(writer)
- }
+pub struct MultiThreadedLockableScore<T: Score> {
+ score: Mutex<T>,
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: Score + 'a> LockableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+ type Score = T;
type Locked = MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T>;
- fn lock(&'a self) -> MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
+ fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
MultiThreadedScoreLock(Mutex::lock(&self.score).unwrap())
}
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: Score + 'a> WriteableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {}
+impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> WriteableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
impl<T: Score> MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
}
}
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+/// A locked `MultiThreadedLockableScore`.
+pub struct MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T: Score>(MutexGuard<'a, T>);
+
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> Writeable for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(writer)
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> DerefMut for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
+ fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target {
+ self.0.deref_mut()
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> Deref for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
+ type Target = T;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+ self.0.deref()
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
/// This is not exported to bindings users
impl<'a, T: Writeable> Writeable for RefMut<'a, T> {
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
-type ConfiguredTime = std::time::Instant;
+type ConfiguredTime = crate::util::time::MonotonicTime;
#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
use crate::util::time::Eternity;
#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
let mut anti_probing_penalty_msat = 0;
match usage.effective_capacity {
- EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => {
- if usage.amount_msat > liquidity_msat {
+ EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat: amount_msat } |
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } =>
+ {
+ if usage.amount_msat > amount_msat {
return u64::max_value();
} else {
return base_penalty_msat;
let usage = ChannelUsage {
amount_msat: 1,
inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
- effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: 0 },
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: 0 },
};
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &target, &source, usage, ¶ms), 2048);
use crate::util::crypto::{hkdf_extract_expand_twice, sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
use crate::ln::channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI;
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, PaymentPreimage};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64,
per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment,
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- #[cfg(anchors)]
/// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
/// `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
/// must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
///
/// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as
/// a secure external signer.
+#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InMemorySigner {
/// Holder secret key in the 2-of-2 multisig script of a channel. This key also backs the
/// holder's anchor output in a commitment transaction, if one is present.
rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter,
}
+impl PartialEq for InMemorySigner {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.funding_key == other.funding_key &&
+ self.revocation_base_key == other.revocation_base_key &&
+ self.payment_key == other.payment_key &&
+ self.delayed_payment_base_key == other.delayed_payment_base_key &&
+ self.htlc_base_key == other.htlc_base_key &&
+ self.commitment_seed == other.commitment_seed &&
+ self.holder_channel_pubkeys == other.holder_channel_pubkeys &&
+ self.channel_parameters == other.channel_parameters &&
+ self.channel_value_satoshis == other.channel_value_satoshis &&
+ self.channel_keys_id == other.channel_keys_id
+ }
+}
+
impl Clone for InMemorySigner {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
pub fn get_channel_parameters(&self) -> &ChannelTransactionParameters {
self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap()
}
- /// Returns whether anchors should be used.
+ /// Returns the channel type features of the channel parameters. Should be helpful for
+ /// determining a channel's category, i. e. legacy/anchors/taproot/etc.
///
/// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before.
- pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.get_channel_parameters().opt_anchors.is_some()
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.get_channel_parameters().channel_type_features
}
/// Sign the single input of `spend_tx` at index `input_idx`, which spends the output described
/// by `descriptor`, returning the witness stack for the input.
let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.htlcs().len());
for htlc in commitment_tx.htlcs() {
let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), channel_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys);
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
let holder_htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key);
htlc_sigs.push(sign(secp_ctx, &htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
let witness_script = {
let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
let holder_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(justice_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
return Ok(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &revocation_key, &self))
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
let htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey);
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(htlc_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
Ok(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &htlc_key, &self))
let _signer: Box<dyn EcdsaChannelSigner>;
}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", not(feature = "no-std")))]
-mod benches {
+#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
+pub mod benches {
use std::sync::{Arc, mpsc};
use std::sync::mpsc::TryRecvError;
use std::thread;
use bitcoin::Network;
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
- use test::Bencher;
+ use criterion::Criterion;
- #[bench]
- fn bench_get_secure_random_bytes(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ pub fn bench_get_secure_random_bytes(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let seed = [0u8; 32];
let now = Duration::from_secs(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.time as u64);
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&seed, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_micros()));
stops.push(stop_sender);
}
- bench.iter(|| {
- for _ in 1..100 {
- keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
- }
- });
+ bench.bench_function("get_secure_random_bytes", |b| b.iter(||
+ keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()));
for stop in stops {
let _ = stop.send(());
handle.join().unwrap();
}
}
-
}
pub(crate) enum LockHeldState {
HeldByThread,
NotHeldByThread,
- #[cfg(any(feature = "_bench_unstable", not(test)))]
+ #[cfg(any(ldk_bench, not(test)))]
Unsupported,
}
fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> Self::ExclLock;
}
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), test))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(ldk_bench), test))]
mod debug_sync;
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), test))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(ldk_bench), test))]
pub use debug_sync::*;
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), test))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(ldk_bench), test))]
// Note that to make debug_sync's regex work this must not contain `debug_string` in the module name
mod test_lockorder_checks;
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(feature = "_bench_unstable", not(test))))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(ldk_bench, not(test))))]
pub(crate) mod fairrwlock;
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(feature = "_bench_unstable", not(test))))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(ldk_bench, not(test))))]
pub use {std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard}, fairrwlock::FairRwLock};
-#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(feature = "_bench_unstable", not(test))))]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(ldk_bench, not(test))))]
mod ext_impl {
use super::*;
impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
- if self.lock().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
+ if self.inner.try_borrow_mut().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
else { return LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread; }
}
type ExclLock = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for RwLock<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
- if self.write().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
+ if self.inner.try_borrow_mut().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
else { return LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread; }
}
type ExclLock = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct AtomicCounter {
// Usize needs to be at least 32 bits to avoid overflowing both low and high. If usize is 64
// bits we will never realistically count into high:
/// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
/// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
pub their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: u32,
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for outbound channels.
+ /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
+ /// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
+ /// transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
+ /// whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
+ /// channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
///
/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
- /// prior to 0.0.114, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ /// prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
///
/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
///
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
/// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
pub negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx: bool,
announced_channel: false,
commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: 10_000,
- #[cfg(anchors)]
negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx: false,
our_max_accepted_htlcs: 50,
}
}
}
+/// Options for how to set the max dust HTLC exposure allowed on a channel. See
+/// [`ChannelConfig::max_dust_htlc_exposure`] for details.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ /// This sets a fixed limit on the total dust exposure in millisatoshis. Setting this too low
+ /// may prevent the sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, however this
+ /// limit is very important to prevent stealing of large amounts of dust HTLCs by miners
+ /// through [fee griefing
+ /// attacks](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-May/002714.html).
+ ///
+ /// Note that if the feerate increases significantly, without a manual increase
+ /// to this maximum the channel may be unable to send/receive HTLCs between the maximum dust
+ /// exposure and the new minimum value for HTLCs to be economically viable to claim.
+ FixedLimitMsat(u64),
+ /// This sets a multiplier on the estimated high priority feerate (sats/KW, as obtained from
+ /// [`FeeEstimator`]) to determine the maximum allowed dust exposure. If this variant is used
+ /// then the maximum dust exposure in millisatoshis is calculated as:
+ /// `high_priority_feerate_per_kw * value`. For example, with our default value
+ /// `FeeRateMultiplier(5000)`:
+ ///
+ /// - For the minimum fee rate of 1 sat/vByte (250 sat/KW, although the minimum
+ /// defaults to 253 sats/KW for rounding, see [`FeeEstimator`]), the max dust exposure would
+ /// be 253 * 5000 = 1,265,000 msats.
+ /// - For a fee rate of 30 sat/vByte (7500 sat/KW), the max dust exposure would be
+ /// 7500 * 5000 = 37,500,000 msats.
+ ///
+ /// This allows the maximum dust exposure to automatically scale with fee rate changes.
+ ///
+ /// Note, if you're using a third-party fee estimator, this may leave you more exposed to a
+ /// fee griefing attack, where your fee estimator may purposely overestimate the fee rate,
+ /// causing you to accept more dust HTLCs than you would otherwise.
+ ///
+ /// This variant is primarily meant to serve pre-anchor channels, as HTLC fees being included
+ /// on HTLC outputs means your channel may be subject to more dust exposure in the event of
+ /// increases in fee rate.
+ ///
+ /// # Backwards Compatibility
+ /// This variant only became available in LDK 0.0.116, so if you downgrade to a prior version
+ /// by default this will be set to a [`Self::FixedLimitMsat`] of 5,000,000 msat.
+ ///
+ /// [`FeeEstimator`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator
+ FeeRateMultiplier(u64),
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(MaxDustHTLCExposure, ;
+ (1, FixedLimitMsat),
+ (3, FeeRateMultiplier),
+);
+
/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
/// with our counterparty.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
/// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
/// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
- /// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero.
+ /// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
+ /// value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
+ /// variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
///
- /// This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
- /// exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
- /// sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
- /// important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+ /// The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+ /// exposure across all three types per-channel.
///
- /// Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
- pub max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: u64,
+ /// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
+ pub max_dust_htlc_exposure: MaxDustHTLCExposure,
/// The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
/// `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
///
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
pub force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: u64,
+ /// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+ /// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+ ///
+ /// Usage:
+ /// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+ /// generated by this channel's counterparty.
+ /// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+ /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+ /// actual forward amounts is their fee.
+ // TODO: link to LSP JIT channel invoice generation spec when it's merged
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+ /// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+ /// counterparty.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+ /// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false.
+ ///
+ /// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+ /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+ /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+ /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
+ // TODO: link to bLIP when it's merged
+ pub accept_underpaying_htlcs: bool,
+}
+
+impl ChannelConfig {
+ /// Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
+ pub fn apply(&mut self, update: &ChannelConfigUpdate) {
+ if let Some(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths) = update.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths {
+ self.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ }
+ if let Some(forwarding_fee_base_msat) = update.forwarding_fee_base_msat {
+ self.forwarding_fee_base_msat = forwarding_fee_base_msat;
+ }
+ if let Some(cltv_expiry_delta) = update.cltv_expiry_delta {
+ self.cltv_expiry_delta = cltv_expiry_delta;
+ }
+ if let Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = update.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
+ self.max_dust_htlc_exposure = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat;
+ }
+ if let Some(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis) = update.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis {
+ self.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis;
+ }
+ }
}
impl Default for ChannelConfig {
forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
forwarding_fee_base_msat: 1000,
cltv_expiry_delta: 6 * 12, // 6 blocks/hour * 12 hours
- max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: 5_000_000,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure: MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5000),
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: 1000,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs: false,
}
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelConfig, {
- (0, forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
- (2, forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
- (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
- (6, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, required),
- // ChannelConfig serialized this field with a required type of 8 prior to the introduction of
- // LegacyChannelConfig. To make sure that serialization is not compatible with this one, we use
- // the next required type of 10, which if seen by the old serialization will always fail.
- (10, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis, required),
-});
+impl crate::util::ser::Writeable for ChannelConfig {
+ fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit = match self.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(_) => 5_000_000,
+ };
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
+ (1, self.accept_underpaying_htlcs, (default_value, false)),
+ (2, self.forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
+ (3, self.max_dust_htlc_exposure, required),
+ (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ (6, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit, required),
+ // ChannelConfig serialized this field with a required type of 8 prior to the introduction of
+ // LegacyChannelConfig. To make sure that serialization is not compatible with this one, we use
+ // the next required type of 10, which if seen by the old serialization will always fail.
+ (10, self.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl crate::util::ser::Readable for ChannelConfig {
+ fn read<R: crate::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
+ let mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
+ let mut accept_underpaying_htlcs = false;
+ let mut forwarding_fee_base_msat = 1000;
+ let mut cltv_expiry_delta = 6 * 12;
+ let mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = None;
+ let mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum = None;
+ let mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = 1000;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
+ (1, accept_underpaying_htlcs, (default_value, false)),
+ (2, forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
+ (3, max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum, option),
+ (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ // Has always been written, but became optionally read in 0.0.116
+ (6, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, option),
+ (10, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis, required),
+ });
+ let max_dust_htlc_fixed_limit = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.unwrap_or(5_000_000);
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum
+ .unwrap_or(MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(max_dust_htlc_fixed_limit));
+ Ok(Self {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs,
+ forwarding_fee_base_msat,
+ cltv_expiry_delta,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure: max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat,
+ force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+/// A parallel struct to [`ChannelConfig`] to define partial updates.
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+pub struct ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ pub forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Option<u32>,
+ pub forwarding_fee_base_msat: Option<u32>,
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>,
+ pub max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: Option<MaxDustHTLCExposure>,
+ pub force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+impl Default for ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ fn default() -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: None,
+ forwarding_fee_base_msat: None,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: None,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: None,
+ force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<ChannelConfig> for ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ fn from(config: ChannelConfig) -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths),
+ forwarding_fee_base_msat: Some(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat),
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Some(config.cltv_expiry_delta),
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: Some(config.max_dust_htlc_exposure),
+ force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: Some(config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis),
+ }
+ }
+}
/// Legacy version of [`ChannelConfig`] that stored the static
/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
impl crate::util::ser::Writeable for LegacyChannelConfig {
fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit = match self.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(_) => 5_000_000,
+ };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
- (1, self.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, (default_value, 5_000_000)),
+ (1, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit, required),
(2, self.options.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(3, self.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis, (default_value, 1000)),
(4, self.announced_channel, required),
+ (5, self.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure, required),
(6, self.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, required),
(8, self.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
});
impl crate::util::ser::Readable for LegacyChannelConfig {
fn read<R: crate::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
let mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
- let mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000;
+ let mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit = None;
let mut cltv_expiry_delta = 0;
let mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = 1000;
let mut announced_channel = false;
let mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = false;
let mut forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
+ let mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
- (1, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, (default_value, 5_000_000u64)),
+ // Has always been written, but became optionally read in 0.0.116
+ (1, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit, option),
(2, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(3, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis, (default_value, 1000u64)),
(4, announced_channel, required),
+ (5, max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum, option),
(6, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, required),
(8, forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
});
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit =
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit.unwrap_or(5_000_000);
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = max_dust_htlc_exposure_enum
+ .unwrap_or(MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_fixed_limit));
Ok(Self {
options: ChannelConfig {
forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths,
- max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure: max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat,
cltv_expiry_delta,
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
forwarding_fee_base_msat,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs: false,
},
announced_channel,
commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
pub accept_intercept_htlcs: bool,
+ /// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
+ /// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
+ ///
+ /// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
+ /// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
+ /// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ pub accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
}
impl Default for UserConfig {
accept_inbound_channels: true,
manually_accept_inbound_channels: false,
accept_intercept_htlcs: false,
+ accept_mpp_keysend: false,
}
}
}
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use crate::io::Error;
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
}
}
- pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool { self.inner.opt_anchors() }
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { self.inner.channel_type_features() }
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<EnforcementState> {
for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys);
- let sighash_type = if self.opt_anchors() {
+ let sighash_type = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
} else {
EcdsaSighashType::All
Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- #[cfg(anchors)]
fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
pub mod logger;
pub mod config;
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub mod test_utils;
/// impls of traits that add exra enforcement on the way they're called. Useful for detecting state
/// machine errors and used in fuzz targets and tests.
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub mod enforcing_trait_impls;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use core::marker::Sized;
use core::time::Duration;
+use crate::chain::ClaimId;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
#[cfg(taproot)]
use crate::ln::msgs::PartialSignatureWithNonce;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::util::byte_utils::{be48_to_array, slice_to_be48};
+use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
/// serialization buffer size
pub const MAX_BUF_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
fn from(s: &'a String) -> Self { Self(s) }
}
+
+impl Writeable for WithoutLength<&UntrustedString> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ WithoutLength(&self.0.0).write(w)
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for WithoutLength<UntrustedString> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let s: WithoutLength<String> = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(Self(UntrustedString(s.0)))
+ }
+}
+
impl<'a, T: Writeable> Writeable for WithoutLength<&'a Vec<T>> {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
}
impl_for_vec!(ecdsa::Signature);
+impl_for_vec!(crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate);
impl_for_vec!(crate::ln::channelmanager::MonitorUpdateCompletionAction);
impl_for_vec!((A, B), A, B);
impl_writeable_for_vec!(&crate::routing::router::BlindedTail);
}
}
+impl Writeable for ClaimId {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(writer)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for ClaimId {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self(Readable::read(reader)?))
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use core::convert::TryFrom;
($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
$crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, option);
};
+ ($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option, encoding: ($fieldty: ty, $encoding: ident))) => {
+ $crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field.map(|f| $encoding(f)), option);
+ };
($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, upgradable_required) => {
$crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, required);
};
f()
}),*
$($tuple_variant_id => {
- Ok($st::$tuple_variant_name(Readable::read(reader)?))
+ Ok($st::$tuple_variant_name($crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader)?))
}),*
_ => {
Err($crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature)
use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
use regex;
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
+use core::ops::DerefMut;
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
if let Some((find_route_query, find_route_res)) = self.next_routes.lock().unwrap().pop_front() {
assert_eq!(find_route_query, *params);
if let Ok(ref route) = find_route_res {
- let locked_scorer = self.scorer.lock().unwrap();
- let scorer = ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(locked_scorer, inflight_htlcs);
+ let mut binding = self.scorer.lock().unwrap();
+ let scorer = ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(binding.deref_mut(), inflight_htlcs);
for path in &route.paths {
let mut aggregate_msat = 0u64;
for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
return find_route_res;
}
let logger = TestLogger::new();
- let scorer = self.scorer.lock().unwrap();
find_route(
payer, params, &self.network_graph, first_hops, &logger,
- &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(scorer, &inflight_htlcs), &(),
+ &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), &inflight_htlcs), &(),
&[42; 32]
)
}
}
impl chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
- let lock_time = tx.lock_time.0;
- assert!(lock_time < 1_500_000_000);
- if bitcoin::LockTime::from(tx.lock_time).is_block_height() && lock_time > self.blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().1 {
- for inp in tx.input.iter() {
- if inp.sequence != Sequence::MAX {
- panic!("We should never broadcast a transaction before its locktime ({})!", tx.lock_time);
+ fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[&Transaction]) {
+ for tx in txs {
+ let lock_time = tx.lock_time.0;
+ assert!(lock_time < 1_500_000_000);
+ if bitcoin::LockTime::from(tx.lock_time).is_block_height() && lock_time > self.blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().1 {
+ for inp in tx.input.iter() {
+ if inp.sequence != Sequence::MAX {
+ panic!("We should never broadcast a transaction before its locktime ({})!", tx.lock_time);
+ }
}
}
}
- self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
+ let owned_txs: Vec<Transaction> = txs.iter().map(|tx| (*tx).clone()).collect();
+ self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().extend(owned_txs);
}
}
pub pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
expected_recv_msgs: Mutex<Option<Vec<wire::Message<()>>>>,
connected_peers: Mutex<HashSet<PublicKey>>,
+ pub message_fetch_counter: AtomicUsize,
+ genesis_hash: ChainHash,
}
impl TestChannelMessageHandler {
- pub fn new() -> Self {
+ pub fn new(genesis_hash: ChainHash) -> Self {
TestChannelMessageHandler {
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
expected_recv_msgs: Mutex::new(None),
connected_peers: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
+ message_fetch_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ genesis_hash,
}
}
channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default())
}
+ fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![self.genesis_hash])
+ }
+
fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
self.received_msg(wire::Message::OpenChannelV2(msg.clone()));
}
impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for TestChannelMessageHandler {
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ self.message_fetch_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
/// 1. belong to the specified module and
/// 2. match the given regex pattern.
/// Assert that the number of occurrences equals the given `count`
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn assert_log_regex(&self, module: &str, pattern: regex::Regex, count: usize) {
let log_entries = self.lines.lock().unwrap();
let l: usize = log_entries.iter().filter(|&(&(ref m, ref l), _c)| {
fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
*self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
if record.level >= self.level {
- #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ #[cfg(all(not(ldk_bench), feature = "std"))]
println!("{:<5} {} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), self.id, record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
}
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+pub struct MonotonicTime(std::time::Instant);
+
+/// The amount of time to shift `Instant` forward to prevent overflow when subtracting a `Duration`
+/// from `Instant::now` on some operating systems (e.g., iOS representing `Instance` as `u64`).
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+const SHIFT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60); // 10 years.
+
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
-impl Time for std::time::Instant {
+impl Time for MonotonicTime {
fn now() -> Self {
- std::time::Instant::now()
+ let instant = std::time::Instant::now().checked_add(SHIFT).expect("Overflow on MonotonicTime instantiation");
+ Self(instant)
}
fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
// clocks" that go backwards in practice (likely relatively ancient kernels/etc). Thus, we
// manually check for time going backwards here and return a duration of zero in that case.
let now = Self::now();
- if now > earlier { now - earlier } else { Duration::from_secs(0) }
+ if now.0 > earlier.0 { now.0 - earlier.0 } else { Duration::from_secs(0) }
}
fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
use std::time::SystemTime;
SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap()
}
+
fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- std::time::Instant::elapsed(self)
+ Self::now().0 - self.0
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+impl Sub<Duration> for MonotonicTime {
+ type Output = Self;
+
+ fn sub(self, other: Duration) -> Self {
+ let instant = self.0.checked_sub(other).expect("MonotonicTime is not supposed to go backward futher than 10 years");
+ Self(instant)
}
}
assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ fn monotonic_time_subtracts() {
+ let now = super::MonotonicTime::now();
+ assert!(now.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(10));
+
+ let ten_years = Duration::from_secs(10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+ let past = now - ten_years;
+ assert!(past.elapsed() >= ten_years);
+ }
}
--- /dev/null
+## Backwards Compat
+
+* Forwarding less than the expected amount in `ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc` may break
+ compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116
+* Setting `ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs` may break compatibility with versions of LDK
+ prior to 0.0.116, and unsetting the feature between restarts may lead to payment failures.
--- /dev/null
+ * Legacy inbound payment creation has been removed, thus there is no way to
+ create a pending inbound payment which will still be claimable on LDK
+ 0.0.103 or earlier. Support for claiming such payments is still retained,
+ however is likely to be removed in the next release (#2351).
+ * Some fields required in 0.0.103 and earlier are no longer written, thus
+ deserializing objects written in 0.0.116 with 0.0.103 may now fail (#2351).
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff