[*]
indent_style = tab
insert_final_newline = true
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
run: |
cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning-invoice
+ cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning-rapid-gossip-sync
cargo build --verbose --color always -p lightning-persister
cargo build --verbose --color always -p lightning-background-processor
- name: Test C Bindings Modifications on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
- name: Fetch routing graph snapshot
if: steps.cache-graph.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: |
- wget -O lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-net_graph-v0.0.15-2021-05-31.bin
- if [ "$(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "05a5361278f68ee2afd086cc04a1f927a63924be451f3221d380533acfacc303" ]; then
+ curl --verbose -L -o lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-net_graph-v0.0.15-2021-05-31.bin
+ echo "Sha sum: $(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')"
+ if [ "$(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "${EXPECTED_ROUTING_GRAPH_SNAPSHOT_SHASUM}" ]; then
echo "Bad hash"
exit 1
fi
+ env:
+ EXPECTED_ROUTING_GRAPH_SNAPSHOT_SHASUM: 05a5361278f68ee2afd086cc04a1f927a63924be451f3221d380533acfacc303
+ - name: Fetch rapid graph sync reference input
+ run: |
+ curl --verbose -L -o lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin
+ echo "Sha sum: $(sha256sum lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip | awk '{ print $1 }')"
+ if [ "$(sha256sum lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "${EXPECTED_RAPID_GOSSIP_SHASUM}" ]; then
+ echo "Bad hash"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ env:
+ EXPECTED_RAPID_GOSSIP_SHASUM: 9637b91cea9d64320cf48fc0787c70fe69fc062f90d3512e207044110cadfd7b
- name: Test with Network Graph on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
run: |
cd lightning
"lightning-net-tokio",
"lightning-persister",
"lightning-background-processor",
+ "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync"
]
exclude = [
[dependencies]
afl = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
lightning = { path = "../lightning", features = ["regex"] }
+lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync" }
bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", features = ["secp-lowmemory"] }
hex = "0.3"
honggfuzz = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
GEN_TEST chanmon_consistency
GEN_TEST full_stack
GEN_TEST peer_crypt
+GEN_TEST process_network_graph
GEN_TEST router
GEN_TEST zbase32
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+#![cfg_attr(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz", no_main)]
+
+#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+compile_error!("Fuzz targets need cfg=fuzzing");
+
+extern crate lightning_fuzz;
+use lightning_fuzz::process_network_graph::*;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+});
+
+#[cfg(feature = "stdin_fuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ use std::io::Read;
+
+ let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(8192);
+ std::io::stdin().read_to_end(&mut data).unwrap();
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn run_test_cases() {
+ use std::fs;
+ use std::io::Read;
+ use lightning_fuzz::utils::test_logger::StringBuffer;
+
+ use std::sync::{atomic, Arc};
+ {
+ let data: Vec<u8> = vec![0];
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ }
+ let mut threads = Vec::new();
+ let threads_running = Arc::new(atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
+ if let Ok(tests) = fs::read_dir("test_cases/process_network_graph") {
+ for test in tests {
+ let mut data: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+ let path = test.unwrap().path();
+ fs::File::open(&path).unwrap().read_to_end(&mut data).unwrap();
+ threads_running.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel);
+
+ let thread_count_ref = Arc::clone(&threads_running);
+ let main_thread_ref = std::thread::current();
+ threads.push((path.file_name().unwrap().to_str().unwrap().to_string(),
+ std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ let string_logger = StringBuffer::new();
+
+ let panic_logger = string_logger.clone();
+ let res = if ::std::panic::catch_unwind(move || {
+ process_network_graph_test(&data, panic_logger);
+ }).is_err() {
+ Some(string_logger.into_string())
+ } else { None };
+ thread_count_ref.fetch_sub(1, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel);
+ main_thread_ref.unpark();
+ res
+ })
+ ));
+ while threads_running.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) > 32 {
+ std::thread::park();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut failed_outputs = Vec::new();
+ for (test, thread) in threads.drain(..) {
+ if let Some(output) = thread.join().unwrap() {
+ println!("\nOutput of {}:\n{}\n", test, output);
+ failed_outputs.push(test);
+ }
+ }
+ if !failed_outputs.is_empty() {
+ println!("Test cases which failed: ");
+ for case in failed_outputs {
+ println!("{}", case);
+ }
+ panic!();
+ }
+}
extern crate bitcoin;
extern crate lightning;
+extern crate lightning_rapid_gossip_sync;
extern crate hex;
pub mod utils;
pub mod chanmon_consistency;
pub mod full_stack;
pub mod peer_crypt;
+pub mod process_network_graph;
pub mod router;
pub mod zbase32;
--- /dev/null
+// Import that needs to be added manually
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+/// Actual fuzz test, method signature and name are fixed
+fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let block_hash = bitcoin::BlockHash::default();
+ let network_graph = lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+ lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::processing::update_network_graph(&network_graph, data);
+}
+
+/// Method that needs to be added manually, {name}_test
+pub fn process_network_graph_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], _out: Out) {
+ do_test(data);
+}
+
+/// Method that needs to be added manually, {name}_run
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn process_network_graph_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
+ do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) });
+}
channel_type: None,
short_channel_id: Some(scid),
inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias: None,
channel_value_satoshis: capacity,
user_channel_id: 0, inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
void chanmon_consistency_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void full_stack_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void peer_crypt_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
+void process_network_graph_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void router_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void zbase32_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void msg_accept_channel_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
#![cfg_attr(all(not(feature = "std"), not(test)), no_std)]
//! This crate provides data structures to represent
-//! [lightning BOLT11](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md)
+//! [lightning BOLT11](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md)
//! invoices and functions to create, encode and decode these. If you just want to use the standard
//! en-/decoding functionality this should get you started:
//!
/// variant. If no element was found `None` gets returned.
///
/// The following example would extract the first B.
-/// ```
-/// use Enum::*
///
/// enum Enum {
/// A(u8),
/// B(u16)
/// }
///
-/// let elements = vec![A(1), A(2), B(3), A(4)]
+/// let elements = vec![Enum::A(1), Enum::A(2), Enum::B(3), Enum::A(4)];
///
-/// assert_eq!(find_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::B(ref x), x), Some(3u16))
-/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(find_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::B(x), x), Some(3u16));
macro_rules! find_extract {
($iter:expr, $enm:pat, $enm_var:ident) => {
find_all_extract!($iter, $enm, $enm_var).next()
/// variant through an iterator.
///
/// The following example would extract all A.
-/// ```
-/// use Enum::*
///
/// enum Enum {
/// A(u8),
/// B(u16)
/// }
///
-/// let elements = vec![A(1), A(2), B(3), A(4)]
+/// let elements = vec![Enum::A(1), Enum::A(2), Enum::B(3), Enum::A(4)];
///
/// assert_eq!(
-/// find_all_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::A(ref x), x).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
-/// vec![1u8, 2u8, 4u8])
-/// ```
+/// find_all_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::A(x), x).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
+/// vec![1u8, 2u8, 4u8]
+/// );
macro_rules! find_all_extract {
($iter:expr, $enm:pat, $enm_var:ident) => {
$iter.filter_map(|tf| match *tf {
//! # use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
//! # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
//! # use lightning::ln::msgs::LightningError;
-//! # use lightning::routing::scoring::Score;
//! # use lightning::routing::network_graph::NodeId;
//! # use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
+//! # use lightning::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
//! # use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
//! # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
//! # use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
//! # }
//! # impl Score for FakeScorer {
//! # fn channel_penalty_msat(
-//! # &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _chan_amt: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+//! # &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, _usage: ChannelUsage
//! # ) -> u64 { 0 }
//! # fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
//! # fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
use lightning::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, LightningError};
use lightning::routing::network_graph::NodeId;
use lightning::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop};
+ use lightning::routing::scoring::ChannelUsage;
use lightning::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
impl Score for TestScorer {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _chan_amt: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+ &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, _usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 { 0 }
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, actual_path: &[&RouteHop], actual_short_channel_id: u64) {
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync"
+version = "0.0.106"
+authors = ["Arik Sosman <git@arik.io>"]
+license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
+edition = "2018"
+description = """
+Utility to process gossip routing data from Rapid Gossip Sync Server.
+"""
+
+[features]
+_bench_unstable = []
+
+[dependencies]
+lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning" }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", default-features = false }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
--- /dev/null
+# lightning-rapid-gossip-sync
+
+This crate exposes functionality for rapid gossip graph syncing, aimed primarily at mobile clients.
+Its server counterpart is the
+[rapid-gossip-sync-server](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rapid-gossip-sync-server) repository.
+
+## Mechanism
+
+The (presumed) server sends a compressed gossip response containing gossip data. The gossip data is
+formatted compactly, omitting signatures and opportunistically incremental where previous channel
+updates are known.
+
+Essentially, the serialization structure is as follows:
+
+1. Fixed prefix bytes `76, 68, 75, 1` (the first three bytes are ASCII for `LDK`)
+ - The purpose of this prefix is to identify the serialization format, should other rapid gossip
+ sync formats arise in the future
+ - The fourth byte is the protocol version in case our format gets updated
+2. Chain hash (32 bytes)
+3. Latest seen timestamp (`u32`)
+4. An unsigned int indicating the number of node IDs to follow
+5. An array of compressed node ID pubkeys (all pubkeys are presumed to be standard
+ compressed 33-byte-serializations)
+6. An unsigned int indicating the number of channel announcement messages to follow
+7. An array of significantly stripped down customized channel announcements
+8. An unsigned int indicating the number of channel update messages to follow
+9. A series of default values used for non-incremental channel updates
+ - The values are defined as follows:
+ 1. `default_cltv_expiry_delta`
+ 2. `default_htlc_minimum_msat`
+ 3. `default_fee_base_msat`
+ 4. `default_fee_proportional_millionths`
+ 5. `default_htlc_maximum_msat` (`u64`, and if the default is no maximum, `u64::MAX`)
+ - The defaults are calculated by the server based on the frequency among non-incremental
+ updates within a given delta set
+10. An array of customized channel updates
+
+You will also notice that `NodeAnnouncement` messages are omitted altogether as the node IDs are
+implicitly extracted from the channel announcements and updates.
+
+The data is then applied to the current network graph, artificially dated to the timestamp of the
+latest seen message less one week, be it an announcement or an update, from the server's
+perspective. The network graph should not be pruned until the graph sync completes.
+
+### Custom Channel Announcement
+
+To achieve compactness and avoid data repetition, we're sending a significantly stripped down
+version of the channel announcement message, which contains only the following data:
+
+1. `channel_features`: `u16` + `n`, where `n` is the number of bytes indicated by the first `u16`
+2. `short_channel_id`: `CompactSize` (incremental `CompactSize` deltas starting from 0)
+3. `node_id_1_index`: `CompactSize` (index of node id within the previously sent sequence)
+4. `node_id_2_index`: `CompactSize` (index of node id within the previously sent sequence)
+
+### Custom Channel Update
+
+For the purpose of rapid syncing, we have deviated from the channel update format specified in
+BOLT 7 significantly. Our custom channel updates are structured as follows:
+
+1. `short_channel_id`: `CompactSize` (incremental `CompactSize` deltas starting at 0)
+2. `custom_channel_flags`: `u8`
+3. `update_data`
+
+Specifically, our custom channel flags break down like this:
+
+| 128 | 64 | 32 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
+|---------------------|----|----|----|---|---|------------------|-----------|
+| Incremental update? | | | | | | Disable channel? | Direction |
+
+If the most significant bit is set to `1`, indicating an incremental update, the intermediate bit
+flags assume the following meaning:
+
+| 64 | 32 | 16 | 8 | 4 |
+|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
+| `cltv_expiry_delta` has changed | `htlc_minimum_msat` has changed | `fee_base_msat` has changed | `fee_proportional_millionths` has changed | `htlc_maximum_msat` has changed |
+
+If the most significant bit is set to `0`, the meaning is almost identical, except instead of a
+change, the flags now represent a deviation from the defaults sent at the beginning of the update
+sequence.
+
+In both cases, `update_data` only contains the fields that are indicated by the channel flags to be
+non-default or to have mutated.
+
+## Delta Calculation
+
+The way a server is meant to calculate this rapid gossip sync data is by taking the latest time
+any change, be it either an announcement or an update, was seen. That timestamp is included in each
+rapid sync message, so all the client needs to do is cache one variable.
+
+If a particular channel update had never occurred before, the full update is sent. If a channel has
+had updates prior to the provided timestamp, the latest update prior to the timestamp is taken as a
+reference, and the delta is calculated against it.
+
+Depending on whether the rapid sync message is calculated on the fly or a snapshotted version is
+returned, intermediate changes between the latest update seen by the client and the latest update
+broadcast on the network may be taken into account when calculating the delta.
+
+## Performance
+
+Given the primary purpose of this utility is a faster graph sync, we thought it might be helpful to
+provide some examples of various delta sets. These examples were calculated as of May 19th 2022
+with a network graph comprised of 80,000 channel announcements and 160,000 directed channel updates.
+
+| Full sync | |
+|-----------------------------|--------|
+| Message Length | 4.7 MB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 2.0 MB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 1.4 s |
+
+| Week-old sync | |
+|-----------------------------|--------|
+| Message Length | 2.7 MB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 862 kB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 907 ms |
+
+| Day-old sync | |
+|-----------------------------|---------|
+| Message Length | 191 kB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 92.8 kB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 196 ms |
--- /dev/null
+*
+!.gitignore
--- /dev/null
+use core::fmt::Debug;
+use std::fmt::Formatter;
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, LightningError};
+
+/// All-encompassing standard error type that processing can return
+pub enum GraphSyncError {
+ /// Error trying to read the update data, typically due to an erroneous data length indication
+ /// that is greater than the actual amount of data provided
+ DecodeError(DecodeError),
+ /// Error applying the patch to the network graph, usually the result of updates that are too
+ /// old or missing prerequisite data to the application of updates out of order
+ LightningError(LightningError),
+}
+
+impl From<std::io::Error> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: std::io::Error) -> Self {
+ Self::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(error.kind()))
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<DecodeError> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: DecodeError) -> Self {
+ Self::DecodeError(error)
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<LightningError> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: LightningError) -> Self {
+ Self::LightningError(error)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Debug for GraphSyncError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ GraphSyncError::DecodeError(e) => f.write_fmt(format_args!("DecodeError: {:?}", e)),
+ GraphSyncError::LightningError(e) => f.write_fmt(format_args!("LightningError: {:?}", e))
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(unsafe_code)]
+#![deny(broken_intra_doc_links)]
+#![deny(non_upper_case_globals)]
+#![deny(non_camel_case_types)]
+#![deny(non_snake_case)]
+#![deny(unused_mut)]
+#![deny(unused_variables)]
+#![deny(unused_imports)]
+//! This crate exposes functionality to rapidly sync gossip data, aimed primarily at mobile
+//! devices.
+//!
+//! The server sends a compressed response containing differential gossip data. The gossip data is
+//! formatted compactly, omitting signatures and opportunistically incremental where previous
+//! channel updates are known (a mechanism that is enabled when the timestamp of the last known
+//! channel update is communicated). A reference server implementation can be found
+//! [here](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rapid-gossip-sync-server).
+//!
+//! An example server request could look as simple as the following. Note that the first ever rapid
+//! sync should use `0` for `last_sync_timestamp`:
+//!
+//! ```shell
+//! curl -o rapid_sync.lngossip https://rapidsync.lightningdevkit.org/snapshot/<last_sync_timestamp>
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Then, call the network processing function. In this example, we process the update by reading
+//! its contents from disk, which we do by calling the `sync_network_graph_with_file_path` method:
+//!
+//! ```
+//! use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+//! use bitcoin::Network;
+//! use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+//!
+//! let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
+//! let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+//! let new_last_sync_timestamp_result = lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, "./rapid_sync.lngossip");
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The primary benefit this syncing mechanism provides is that given a trusted server, a
+//! low-powered client can offload the validation of gossip signatures. This enables a client to
+//! privately calculate routes for payments, and do so much faster and earlier than requiring a full
+//! peer-to-peer gossip sync to complete.
+//!
+//! The reason the rapid sync server requires trust is that it could provide bogus data, though at
+//! worst, all that would result in is a fake network topology, which wouldn't enable the server to
+//! steal or siphon off funds. It could, however, reduce the client's privacy by forcing all
+//! payments to be routed via channels the server controls.
+//!
+//! The way a server is meant to calculate this rapid gossip sync data is by using a `latest_seen`
+//! timestamp provided by the client. It's not included in either channel announcement or update,
+//! (not least due to announcements not including any timestamps at all, but only a block height)
+//! but rather, it's a timestamp of when the server saw a particular message.
+
+// Allow and import test features for benching
+#![cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature(test))]
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+extern crate test;
+
+use std::fs::File;
+
+use lightning::routing::network_graph;
+
+use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+
+/// Error types that these functions can return
+pub mod error;
+
+/// Core functionality of this crate
+pub mod processing;
+
+/// Sync gossip data from a file
+/// Returns the last sync timestamp to be used the next time rapid sync data is queried.
+///
+/// `network_graph`: The network graph to apply the updates to
+///
+/// `sync_path`: Path to the file where the gossip update data is located
+///
+pub fn sync_network_graph_with_file_path(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ sync_path: &str,
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut file = File::open(sync_path)?;
+ processing::update_network_graph_from_byte_stream(&network_graph, &mut file)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use std::fs;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::sync_network_graph_with_file_path;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sync_from_file() {
+ struct FileSyncTest {
+ directory: String,
+ }
+
+ impl FileSyncTest {
+ fn new(tmp_directory: &str, valid_response: &[u8]) -> FileSyncTest {
+ let test = FileSyncTest { directory: tmp_directory.to_owned() };
+
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = test.get_test_directory();
+ fs::create_dir_all(graph_sync_test_directory).unwrap();
+
+ let graph_sync_test_file = test.get_test_file_path();
+ fs::write(&graph_sync_test_file, valid_response).unwrap();
+
+ test
+ }
+ fn get_test_directory(&self) -> String {
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = self.directory.clone() + "/graph-sync-tests";
+ graph_sync_test_directory
+ }
+ fn get_test_file_path(&self) -> String {
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = self.get_test_directory();
+ let graph_sync_test_file = graph_sync_test_directory.to_owned() + "/test_data.lngossip";
+ graph_sync_test_file
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Drop for FileSyncTest {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ fs::remove_dir_all(self.directory.clone()).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+
+ // same as incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_same_direction_updates
+ let valid_response = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 25, 0, 0,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let tmp_directory = "./rapid-gossip-sync-tests-tmp";
+ let sync_test = FileSyncTest::new(tmp_directory, &valid_response);
+ let graph_sync_test_file = sync_test.get_test_file_path();
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let sync_result = sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, &graph_sync_test_file);
+
+ if sync_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected sync result: {:?}", sync_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn measure_native_read_from_file() {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let start = std::time::Instant::now();
+ let sync_result =
+ sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, "./res/full_graph.lngossip");
+ if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
+ let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-graph-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
+ #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
+ {
+ println!("{}", error_string);
+ return;
+ }
+ #[cfg(require_route_graph_test)]
+ panic!("{}", error_string);
+ }
+ let elapsed = start.elapsed();
+ println!("initialization duration: {:?}", elapsed);
+ if sync_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected sync result: {:?}", sync_result)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+pub mod bench {
+ use test::Bencher;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::sync_network_graph_with_file_path;
+
+ #[bench]
+ fn bench_reading_full_graph_from_file(b: &mut Bencher) {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ b.iter(|| {
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+ let sync_result = sync_network_graph_with_file_path(
+ &network_graph,
+ "./res/full_graph.lngossip",
+ );
+ if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
+ let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-graph-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
+ #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
+ {
+ println!("{}", error_string);
+ return;
+ }
+ panic!("{}", error_string);
+ }
+ assert!(sync_result.is_ok())
+ });
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use std::cmp::max;
+use std::io;
+use std::io::Read;
+
+use bitcoin::BlockHash;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{
+ DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate,
+};
+use lightning::routing::network_graph;
+use lightning::util::ser::{BigSize, Readable};
+
+use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+
+/// The purpose of this prefix is to identify the serialization format, should other rapid gossip
+/// sync formats arise in the future.
+///
+/// The fourth byte is the protocol version in case our format gets updated.
+const GOSSIP_PREFIX: [u8; 4] = [76, 68, 75, 1];
+
+/// Maximum vector allocation capacity for distinct node IDs. This constraint is necessary to
+/// avoid malicious updates being able to trigger excessive memory allocation.
+const MAX_INITIAL_NODE_ID_VECTOR_CAPACITY: u32 = 50_000;
+
+/// Update network graph from binary data.
+/// Returns the last sync timestamp to be used the next time rapid sync data is queried.
+///
+/// `network_graph`: network graph to be updated
+///
+/// `update_data`: `&[u8]` binary stream that comprises the update data
+pub fn update_network_graph(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ update_data: &[u8],
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut read_cursor = io::Cursor::new(update_data);
+ update_network_graph_from_byte_stream(&network_graph, &mut read_cursor)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn update_network_graph_from_byte_stream<R: Read>(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ mut read_cursor: &mut R,
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut prefix = [0u8; 4];
+ read_cursor.read_exact(&mut prefix)?;
+
+ match prefix {
+ GOSSIP_PREFIX => {},
+ _ => {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion.into());
+ }
+ };
+
+ let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let latest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ // backdate the applied timestamp by a week
+ let backdated_timestamp = latest_seen_timestamp.saturating_sub(24 * 3600 * 7);
+
+ let node_id_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let mut node_ids: Vec<PublicKey> = Vec::with_capacity(std::cmp::min(
+ node_id_count,
+ MAX_INITIAL_NODE_ID_VECTOR_CAPACITY,
+ ) as usize);
+ for _ in 0..node_id_count {
+ let current_node_id = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ node_ids.push(current_node_id);
+ }
+
+ let mut previous_scid: u64 = 0;
+ let announcement_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ for _ in 0..announcement_count {
+ let features = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+
+ // handle SCID
+ let scid_delta: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let short_channel_id = previous_scid
+ .checked_add(scid_delta.0)
+ .ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ previous_scid = short_channel_id;
+
+ let node_id_1_index: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let node_id_2_index: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ if max(node_id_1_index.0, node_id_2_index.0) >= node_id_count as u64 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue.into());
+ };
+ let node_id_1 = node_ids[node_id_1_index.0 as usize];
+ let node_id_2 = node_ids[node_id_2_index.0 as usize];
+
+ let announcement_result = network_graph.add_channel_from_partial_announcement(
+ short_channel_id,
+ backdated_timestamp as u64,
+ features,
+ node_id_1,
+ node_id_2,
+ );
+ if let Err(lightning_error) = announcement_result {
+ if let ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip = lightning_error.action {
+ // everything is fine, just a duplicate channel announcement
+ } else {
+ return Err(lightning_error.into());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ previous_scid = 0; // updates start at a new scid
+
+ let update_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ if update_count == 0 {
+ return Ok(latest_seen_timestamp);
+ }
+
+ // obtain default values for non-incremental updates
+ let default_cltv_expiry_delta: u16 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_htlc_minimum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_fee_base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_htlc_maximum_msat = if tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat == u64::max_value() {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Present(tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat)
+ };
+
+ for _ in 0..update_count {
+ let scid_delta: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let short_channel_id = previous_scid
+ .checked_add(scid_delta.0)
+ .ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ previous_scid = short_channel_id;
+
+ let channel_flags: u8 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+
+ // flags are always sent in full, and hence always need updating
+ let standard_channel_flags = channel_flags & 0b_0000_0011;
+
+ let mut synthetic_update = if channel_flags & 0b_1000_0000 == 0 {
+ // full update, field flags will indicate deviations from the default
+ UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: backdated_timestamp,
+ flags: standard_channel_flags,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: default_cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: default_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: default_htlc_maximum_msat.clone(),
+ fee_base_msat: default_fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: default_fee_proportional_millionths,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ } else {
+ // incremental update, field flags will indicate mutated values
+ let read_only_network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
+ let channel = read_only_network_graph
+ .channels()
+ .get(&short_channel_id)
+ .ok_or(LightningError {
+ err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })?;
+
+ let directional_info = channel
+ .get_directional_info(channel_flags)
+ .ok_or(LightningError {
+ err: "Couldn't find previous directional data for update".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })?;
+
+ let htlc_maximum_msat =
+ if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = directional_info.htlc_maximum_msat {
+ OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat)
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ };
+
+ UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: backdated_timestamp,
+ flags: standard_channel_flags,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat,
+ fee_base_msat: directional_info.fees.base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: directional_info.fees.proportional_millionths,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ };
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0100_0000 > 0 {
+ let cltv_expiry_delta: u16 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.cltv_expiry_delta = cltv_expiry_delta;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0010_0000 > 0 {
+ let htlc_minimum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.htlc_minimum_msat = htlc_minimum_msat;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0001_0000 > 0 {
+ let fee_base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.fee_base_msat = fee_base_msat;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0000_1000 > 0 {
+ let fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.fee_proportional_millionths = fee_proportional_millionths;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0000_0100 > 0 {
+ let tentative_htlc_maximum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.htlc_maximum_msat = if tentative_htlc_maximum_msat == u64::max_value()
+ {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Present(tentative_htlc_maximum_msat)
+ };
+ }
+
+ network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update)?;
+ }
+
+ Ok(latest_seen_timestamp)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+ use crate::processing::update_network_graph;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn network_graph_fails_to_update_from_clipped_input() {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ let example_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0, 100,
+ 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 36, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 24, 0,
+ 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &example_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::ShortRead)) = update_result {
+ // this is the expected error type
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_announcements() {
+ let incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &incremental_update_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(lightning_error.err, "Couldn't find channel for update");
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_updates() {
+ let announced_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255,
+ 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &announced_update_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(
+ lightning_error.err,
+ "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
+ );
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_same_direction_updates() {
+ let initialization_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 25, 0, 0,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let initialization_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &initialization_input[..]);
+ if initialization_result.is_err() {
+ panic!(
+ "Unexpected initialization result: {:?}",
+ initialization_result
+ )
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let initialized = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61"));
+ assert!(initialized.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(initialized.contains("783241506229452801"));
+
+ let opposite_direction_incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(
+ &network_graph,
+ &opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..],
+ );
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(
+ lightning_error.err,
+ "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
+ );
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_update_succeeds_with_prior_announcements_and_full_updates() {
+ let initialization_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 56, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 25, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129,
+ 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let initialization_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &initialization_input[..]);
+ assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
+
+ let single_direction_incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(
+ &network_graph,
+ &single_direction_incremental_update_input[..],
+ );
+ if update_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn full_update_succeeds() {
+ let valid_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 60, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 0, 29, 0,
+ 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1,
+ 0, 0, 1,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &valid_input[..]);
+ if update_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+}
pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
- pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, source, required),
(4, payment_preimage, option),
});
HTLCUpdate {
source: HTLCSource,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
- input_idx: Option<u32>,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
(0, source, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
- (3, input_idx, option),
+ (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
},
(1, MaturingOutput) => {
(0, descriptor, required),
(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
},
(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, preimage, option),
(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
},
commitment_txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
},
PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
(2, commitment_number, required),
- (4, their_revocation_point, required),
+ (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
});
counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_
revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+ their_cur_
per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
logger: &L,
) where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
- txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+ txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
}
#[cfg(test)]
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for htlc in $htlc_iter {
- if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
- if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
} else { None }
}) {
debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
});
- } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+ } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
} else { None }
});
if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
} else { None }
} else { None }
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
- } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+ } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
// the preimage.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
} else { false }
});
if !htlc_update_confd {
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: None,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
},
};
log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
Ok(())
}
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some(old_points) => {
if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
},
None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
}
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
ret = Err(());
}
}
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
+ if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ let per_commitment_point_option =
// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
// per-commitment point
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
payment_hash,
payment_preimage: None,
source: source.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis,
+ htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+ if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
}
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
},
- OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
},
OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(), height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else {
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
},
};
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
if first_idx == 0 {
None
counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points,
on_holder_tx_csv,
/// Returns an error if `genesis_hash` is for a different chain or if such a transaction output
/// is unknown.
///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#definition-of-short_channel_id
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#definition-of-short_channel_id
fn get_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: &BlockHash, short_channel_id: u64) -> Result<TxOut, AccessError>;
}
//! figure out how best to make networking happen/timers fire/things get written to disk/keys get
//! generated/etc. This makes it a good candidate for tight integration into an existing wallet
//! instead of having a rather-separate lightning appendage to a wallet.
+//!
+//! `default` features are:
+//!
+//! * `std` - enables functionalities which require `std`, including `std::io` trait implementations and things which utilize time
+//! * `grind_signatures` - enables generation of [low-r bitcoin signatures](https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/111660/what-is-signature-grinding),
+//! which saves 1 byte per signature in 50% of the cases (see [bitcoin PR #13666](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13666))
+//!
+//! Available features are:
+//!
+//! * `std`
+//! * `grind_signatures`
+//! * `no-std ` - exposes write trait implementations from the `core2` crate (at least one of `no-std` or `std` are required)
+//! * Skip logging of messages at levels below the given log level:
+//! * `max_level_off`
+//! * `max_level_error`
+//! * `max_level_warn`
+//! * `max_level_info`
+//! * `max_level_debug`
+//! * `max_level_trace`
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), deny(missing_docs))]
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub use debug_sync::*;
#[cfg(not(test))]
- pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+ pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub use crate::util::fairrwlock::FairRwLock;
}
}
/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
-/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
+/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
///
/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
// Because we will connect a block at height 200 below, we need the TestBroadcaster to know
// that we are at height 200 so that it doesn't think we're violating the time lock
// requirements of transactions broadcasted at that point.
- blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header, 200); 200])),
+ blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet), 200); 200])),
};
let chain_mon = {
let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
/// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
///
- /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+ /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
/// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
// Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
// outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
// the channel's funding UTXO.
+ //
+ // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
+ // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
+ // associated channel mapping.
+ //
// We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
// to store all of them.
latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
/// standard.
-/// See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905 for more details.
+/// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
+ minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
}
- if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
- // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
- // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
- // channel.
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
- }
if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
if *ty != self.channel_type {
self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
- self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+
+ if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
+ self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+ } else {
+ self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
+ }
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
&self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature
- }, channel_monitor))
+ }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_funding_locked(0)))
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
+ Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_funding_locked(0)))
}
/// Handles a funding_locked message from our peer. If we've already sent our funding_locked
/// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
/// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
- mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+ resend_funding_locked: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
) {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked |= resend_funding_locked;
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
- self.funding_transaction.take()
- } else { None };
+ // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
+ // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
+ // first received the funding_signed.
+ let mut funding_broadcastable =
+ if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.funding_transaction.take()
+ } else { None };
+ // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
+ // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
+ if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ funding_broadcastable = None;
+ }
// We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
// we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
- // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
- // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
- // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
+ // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're
+ // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
+ // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
+ // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the funding_locked before any broadcast at all.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
+ "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
}
+ /// Returns true if our funding_locked has been sent
+ pub fn is_our_funding_locked(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
+ }
+
/// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
(self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
}
fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
return None;
}
pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
-> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
- // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
- // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
+ // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
// close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
// the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
//
- // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf channel,
- // but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map being
- // inconsistent, so we currently have to.
+ // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
+ // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map
+ // being inconsistent, so we currently have to.
if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
self.inbound_awaiting_accept
}
+ /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
+ pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
+ assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
+ self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
+ }
+
/// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
/// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
///
commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
}]
};
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
(0, FailRelay),
self.user_id.write(writer)?;
- // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
- // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
- self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
- self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
- self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
- self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
+ // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
+ // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
- let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
Forward {
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
+ /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
},
Receive {
// `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
// `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
// HTLCs.
+ //
+ // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
prev_short_channel_id: u64,
prev_htlc_id: u64,
prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
/// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
/// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
///
+ /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
+ /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
+ ///
/// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
+ /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
/// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
+ /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
+ /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
+ /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
+ /// `Some(0)`).
+ ///
+ /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
+ pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
/// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
/// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
/// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
}
+
+ /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
+ /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
+ /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
+ pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
+ }
}
/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
if !$resend_raa {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
}
- $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
+ $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
} };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
} };
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_funding_locked: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_funding_locked, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
};
}
let res = loop {
let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
if !forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
+ htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
$channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
}
// `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
(chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
});
}
+ if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// May be called with channel_state already locked!
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
};
}
}
- /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
- /// triggered.
+ /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
///
/// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
/// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
/// the channel.
///
- /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
- /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
+ /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
+ }
+
+ /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
+ /// it as confirmed immediately.
+ ///
+ /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+ ///
+ /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
+ /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
+ ///
+ /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
+ /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
+ ///
+ /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
+ /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
+ }
+
+ fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
}
+ if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); }
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
}
fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
+ let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut funding_locked), mut chan) = {
let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
// until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, funding_locked.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ funding_locked = None; // Don't send the funding_locked now
},
}
}
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: funding_msg,
});
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ }
e.insert(chan);
}
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
+ let (monitor, funding_tx, funding_locked) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
Ok(update) => update,
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, funding_locked.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
// it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
}
return res
}
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+ }
funding_tx
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
} else {
if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
- raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
break Err(e);
break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
- .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
+ .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
}
}
+ if channel.is_our_funding_locked() {
+ if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ // If we sent a 0conf funding_locked, and now have an SCID, we add it
+ // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
+ // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
+ // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
+ // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
+ let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
+ fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+ }
+ }
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
(2, channel_id, required),
(3, channel_type, option),
(4, counterparty, required),
+ (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
(6, funding_txo, option),
(8, short_channel_id, option),
(10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
//! supports a feature if it advertises the feature (as either required or optional) to its peers.
//! And the implementation can interpret a feature if the feature is known to it.
//!
-//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/09-features.md
+//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
//! [messages]: crate::ln::msgs
use {io, io_extras};
///
/// See [BOLT #9] for details.
///
- /// [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/09-features.md
+ /// [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
pub trait $feature: Context {
/// The bit used to signify that the feature is required.
const EVEN_BIT: usize = $odd_bit - 1;
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use util::scid_utils;
use util::test_utils;
use util::test_utils::{panicking, TestChainMonitor};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
/// Mine the given transaction in the next block and then mine CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1 blocks on
/// top, giving the given transaction CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH confirmations.
-pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
- confirm_transaction_at(node, tx, node.best_block_info().1 + 1);
+///
+/// Returns the SCID a channel confirmed in the given transaction will have, assuming the funding
+/// output is the 1st output in the transaction.
+pub fn confirm_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) -> u64 {
+ let scid = confirm_transaction_at(node, tx, node.best_block_info().1 + 1);
connect_blocks(node, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+ scid
}
/// Mine a signle block containing the given transaction
pub fn mine_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) {
}
/// Mine the given transaction at the given height, mining blocks as required to build to that
/// height
-pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction, conf_height: u32) {
+///
+/// Returns the SCID a channel confirmed in the given transaction will have, assuming the funding
+/// output is the 1st output in the transaction.
+pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction, conf_height: u32) -> u64 {
let first_connect_height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
assert!(first_connect_height <= conf_height);
if conf_height > first_connect_height {
}
block.txdata.push(tx.clone());
connect_block(node, &block);
+ scid_utils::scid_from_parts(conf_height as u64, block.txdata.len() as u64 - 1, 0).unwrap()
}
/// The possible ways we may notify a ChannelManager of a new block
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum ConnectStyle {
- /// Calls best_block_updated first, detecting transactions in the block only after receiving the
- /// header and height information.
+ /// Calls `best_block_updated` first, detecting transactions in the block only after receiving
+ /// the header and height information.
BestBlockFirst,
- /// The same as BestBlockFirst, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
- /// make a single best_block_updated call.
+ /// The same as `BestBlockFirst`, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
+ /// make a single `best_block_updated` call.
BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks,
- /// Calls transactions_confirmed first, detecting transactions in the block before updating the
- /// header and height information.
+ /// The same as `BestBlockFirst` when connecting blocks. During disconnection only
+ /// `transaction_unconfirmed` is called.
+ BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip,
+ /// Calls `transactions_confirmed` first, detecting transactions in the block before updating
+ /// the header and height information.
TransactionsFirst,
- /// The same as TransactionsFirst, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
- /// make a single best_block_updated call.
+ /// The same as `TransactionsFirst`, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
+ /// make a single `best_block_updated` call.
TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks,
- /// Provides the full block via the chain::Listen interface. In the current code this is
- /// equivalent to TransactionsFirst with some additional assertions.
+ /// The same as `TransactionsFirst` when connecting blocks. During disconnection only
+ /// `transaction_unconfirmed` is called.
+ TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip,
+ /// Provides the full block via the `chain::Listen` interface. In the current code this is
+ /// equivalent to `TransactionsFirst` with some additional assertions.
FullBlockViaListen,
}
+impl ConnectStyle {
+ fn random_style() -> ConnectStyle {
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")] {
+ use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
+ // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
+ let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
+ let res = match rand_val % 7 {
+ 0 => ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst,
+ 1 => ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks,
+ 2 => ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip,
+ 3 => ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst,
+ 4 => ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks,
+ 5 => ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip,
+ 6 => ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen,
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+ eprintln!("Using Block Connection Style: {:?}", res);
+ res
+ }
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
+ ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen
+ }
+ }
+}
+
pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, depth: u32) -> BlockHash {
let skip_intermediaries = match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
- ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks|
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip => true,
_ => false,
};
};
assert!(depth >= 1);
for i in 1..depth {
- do_connect_block(node, &block, skip_intermediaries);
+ let prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
+ do_connect_block(node, block, skip_intermediaries);
block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: height + i, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: height + i, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: vec![],
};
}
- connect_block(node, &block);
- block.header.block_hash()
+ let hash = block.header.block_hash();
+ do_connect_block(node, block, false);
+ hash
}
pub fn connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block) {
- do_connect_block(node, block, false);
+ do_connect_block(node, block.clone(), false);
}
fn call_claimable_balances<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>) {
}
}
-fn do_connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block, skip_intermediaries: bool) {
+fn do_connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: Block, skip_intermediaries: bool) {
call_claimable_balances(node);
let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")] {
+ eprintln!("Connecting block using Block Connection Style: {:?}", *node.connect_style.borrow());
+ }
if !skip_intermediaries {
let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
- ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip => {
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
call_claimable_balances(node);
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
node.node.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
node.node.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
},
- ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip => {
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
call_claimable_balances(node);
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
}
call_claimable_balances(node);
node.node.test_process_background_events();
- node.blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block.header, height));
+ node.blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block, height));
}
pub fn disconnect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, count: u32) {
call_claimable_balances(node);
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")] {
+ eprintln!("Disconnecting {} blocks using Block Connection Style: {:?}", count, *node.connect_style.borrow());
+ }
for i in 0..count {
- let orig_header = node.blocks.lock().unwrap().pop().unwrap();
- assert!(orig_header.1 > 0); // Cannot disconnect genesis
- let prev_header = node.blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().clone();
+ let orig = node.blocks.lock().unwrap().pop().unwrap();
+ assert!(orig.1 > 0); // Cannot disconnect genesis
+ let prev = node.blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().clone();
match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen => {
- node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_disconnected(&orig_header.0, orig_header.1);
- Listen::block_disconnected(node.node, &orig_header.0, orig_header.1);
+ node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_disconnected(&orig.0.header, orig.1);
+ Listen::block_disconnected(node.node, &orig.0.header, orig.1);
},
ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => {
if i == count - 1 {
- node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
- node.node.best_block_updated(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
+ node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&prev.0.header, prev.1);
+ node.node.best_block_updated(&prev.0.header, prev.1);
+ }
+ },
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip => {
+ for tx in orig.0.txdata {
+ node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transaction_unconfirmed(&tx.txid());
+ node.node.transaction_unconfirmed(&tx.txid());
}
},
_ => {
- node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
- node.node.best_block_updated(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
+ node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&prev.0.header, prev.1);
+ node.node.best_block_updated(&prev.0.header, prev.1);
},
}
call_claimable_balances(node);
pub network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
pub network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
pub logger: &'c test_utils::TestLogger,
- pub blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(BlockHeader, u32)>>>,
+ pub blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(Block, u32)>>>,
pub connect_style: Rc<RefCell<ConnectStyle>>,
}
impl<'a, 'b, 'c> Node<'a, 'b, 'c> {
self.blocks.lock().unwrap().last().map(|(a, b)| (a.block_hash(), *b)).unwrap()
}
pub fn get_block_header(&self, height: u32) -> BlockHeader {
- self.blocks.lock().unwrap()[height as usize].0
+ self.blocks.lock().unwrap()[height as usize].0.header
}
}
for i in 0..node_count {
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster {
txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header, 0)])),
+ blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet), 0)])),
};
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
- let connect_style = Rc::new(RefCell::new(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen));
+ let connect_style = Rc::new(RefCell::new(ConnectStyle::random_style()));
for i in 0..node_count {
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(cfgs[i].network_graph, None, cfgs[i].logger);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
- // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
- check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
- check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
+
+ let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
+ &claim_txn[3]
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
+
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
+
+ &claim_txn[7]
+ };
assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
- check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
+
assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
// Create some new channels:
let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
- // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
- // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
- // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
- // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
+ assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
// Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let htlc_timeout_tx;
{ // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
+ assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
+
+ if node_txn.len() > 3 {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
+ }
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ if node_txn.len() > 3 {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ }
htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
}
assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
- preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
+
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
+ preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
+ } else {
+ preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
+ check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
+ }
timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
watchtower
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
// Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
// transaction lock time requirements here.
- chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
- watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
+ watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
// Try to update ChannelMonitor
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
watchtower
};
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
// Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
// transaction lock time requirements here.
- chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
- watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
+ watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
{
let funding_created = {
let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
+ // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
+ // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
+ // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
+ // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
+ let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
};
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::Transaction;
use prelude::*;
expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
+fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
+ let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+}
+
#[test]
fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
-
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
// only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
// have only one HTLC output left spendable.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
// `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
}
pub fee_base_msat: u32,
/// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+ /// to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
+ /// lightning gossip
+ pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
let (_, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Serialize the ChannelManager prior to sending payments
if confirm_before_reload {
let best_block = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().clone();
- nodes[0].node.best_block_updated(&best_block.0, best_block.1);
+ nodes[0].node.best_block_updated(&best_block.0.header, best_block.1);
}
// Create a new channel on which to retry the payment before we fail the payment via the
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV*4 + 20);
let as_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_txn[2], funding_tx);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_txn[0], as_commitment_tx);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_txn[1], as_commitment_tx);
assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 3);
- if as_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_txn[1]);
+ let (first_htlc_timeout_tx, second_htlc_timeout_tx) = if as_htlc_timeout_txn[0] == as_commitment_tx {
+ (&as_htlc_timeout_txn[1], &as_htlc_timeout_txn[2])
} else {
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_txn[2], as_commitment_tx);
+ (&as_htlc_timeout_txn[0], &as_htlc_timeout_txn[1])
+ };
+ check_spends!(first_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
+ check_spends!(second_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
+ if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &second_htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &first_htlc_timeout_tx);
}
nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
let mon_updates: Vec<_> = chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap()
.get_mut(&funding_txo).unwrap().drain().collect();
- assert_eq!(mon_updates.len(), 1);
+ // If we are using chain::Confirm instead of chain::Listen, we will get the same update twice
+ assert!(mon_updates.len() == 1 || mon_updates.len() == 2);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(funding_txo, mon_updates[0]).unwrap();
+ for update in mon_updates {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(funding_txo, update).unwrap();
+ }
if payment_timeout {
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
} else {
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
/// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
-/// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
-/// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
+/// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
+/// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
// Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
//! other behavior that exists only on private channels or with a semi-trusted counterparty (eg
//! LSP).
-use chain::Watch;
+use chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch};
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use chain::keysinterface::{Recipient, KeysInterface};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ChannelUpdate};
use ln::wire::Encode;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
-use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::events::{ClosureReason, Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use util::test_utils;
PaymentFailedConditions::new().blamed_scid(last_hop[0].inbound_scid_alias.unwrap())
.blamed_chan_closed(false).expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000|12, &err_data));
}
+
+// Receiver must have been initialized with manually_accept_inbound_channels set to true.
+fn open_zero_conf_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(initiator: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, receiver: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, initiator_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> bitcoin::Transaction {
+ initiator.node.create_channel(receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_001, 42, initiator_config).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ receiver.node.handle_open_channel(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ let events = receiver.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+ receiver.node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(receiver, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(accept_channel.minimum_depth, 0);
+ initiator.node.handle_accept_channel(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&initiator, &receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+ initiator.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ let funding_created = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ receiver.node.handle_funding_created(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
+ check_added_monitors!(receiver, 1);
+ let bs_signed_locked = receiver.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_signed_locked.len(), 2);
+ let as_funding_locked;
+ match &bs_signed_locked[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+ initiator.node.handle_funding_signed(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(initiator, 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(initiator.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(initiator.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)[0], tx);
+
+ as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match &bs_signed_locked[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+ initiator.node.handle_funding_locked(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ receiver.node.handle_funding_locked(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
+
+ let as_channel_update = get_event_msg!(initiator, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, receiver.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(receiver, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, initiator.node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ initiator.node.handle_channel_update(&receiver.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_update);
+ receiver.node.handle_channel_update(&initiator.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_update);
+
+ assert_eq!(initiator.node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(receiver.node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ tx
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_0conf_channel() {
+ // If our peer tells us they will accept our channel with 0 confs, and we funded the channel,
+ // we should trust the funding won't be double-spent (assuming `trust_own_funding_0conf` is
+ // set)!
+ // Further, if we `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`, funding locked messages
+ // should fly immediately and the channel should be available for use as soon as they are
+ // received.
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], None);
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_channel_with_async_monitor() {
+ // Test that we properly send out funding_locked in (both inbound- and outbound-) zero-conf
+ // channels if ChannelMonitor updates return a `TemporaryFailure` during the initial channel
+ // negotiation.
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config), None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(chan_config)).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(accept_channel.minimum_depth, 0);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ let channel_id = funding_output.to_channel_id();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&channel_id);
+
+ let bs_signed_locked = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_signed_locked.len(), 2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+
+ match &bs_signed_locked[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match &bs_signed_locked[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&channel_id);
+ let as_locked_update = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ // Note that the funding transaction is actually released when
+ // get_and_clear_pending_msg_events, above, checks for monitor events.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)[0], tx);
+
+ match &as_locked_update[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let as_channel_update = match &as_locked_update[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_update);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_update);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+ // Now that we have useful channels, try sending a payment where the we hit a temporary monitor
+ // failure before we've ever confirmed the funding transaction. This previously caused a panic.
+ let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_send.msgs[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_send.commitment_msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let (bs_raa, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+ let (outpoint, _, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&bs_raa.channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_send.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], bs_send.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash, payment_secret, 1_000_000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_close_no_early_chan_update() {
+ // Tests that even with a public channel 0conf channel, we don't generate a channel_update on
+ // closing.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // This is the default but we force it on anyway
+ chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+ // We can use the channel immediately, but won't generate a channel_update until we get confs
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_all_channels();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ let _ = get_err_msg!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_public_0conf_channel() {
+ // Tests that we will announce a public channel (after confirmation) even if its 0conf.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // This is the default but we force it on anyway
+ chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ let tx = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+ // We can use the channel immediately, but we can't announce it until we get 6+ confirmations
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+ let scid = confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+ let as_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx), scid);
+ let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
+
+ let bs_announcement = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_announcement.len(), 1);
+ let announcement;
+ let bs_update;
+ match bs_announcement[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ announcement = msg.clone();
+ bs_update = update_msg.clone();
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ let as_announcement = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_announcement.len(), 1);
+ match as_announcement[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
+ assert!(announcement == *msg);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, scid);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_0conf_channel_reorg() {
+ // If we accept a 0conf channel, which is then confirmed, but then changes SCID in a reorg, we
+ // have to make sure we handle this correctly (or, currently, just force-close the channel).
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(chan_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // This is the default but we force it on anyway
+ chan_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ let tx = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], Some(chan_config));
+
+ // We can use the channel immediately, but we can't announce it until we get 6+ confirmations
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+
+ // Send a payment using the channel's real SCID, which will be public in a few blocks once we
+ // can generate a channel_announcement.
+ let real_scid = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), real_scid);
+
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, real_scid);
+ send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1]]], 10_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // At this point the channel no longer has an SCID again. In the future we should likely
+ // support simply un-setting the SCID and waiting until the channel gets re-confirmed, but for
+ // now we force-close the channel here.
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
+ });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 0 confs, now have 0 confs.".to_owned()
+ });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+}
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
+
+ do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
}
#[test]
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+ do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
+
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
fn test_to_remote_after_local_detection() {
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
+ do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
+ do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
/// A script pubkey for shutting down a channel as defined by [BOLT #2].
///
-/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ShutdownScript(ShutdownScriptImpl);
pub struct InvalidShutdownScript {
/// The script that did not meet the requirements from [BOLT #2].
///
- /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+ /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
pub script: Script
}
//! Wire encoding/decoding for Lightning messages according to [BOLT #1], and for
//! custom message through the [`CustomMessageReader`] trait.
//!
-//! [BOLT #1]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/01-messaging.md
+//! [BOLT #1]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md
use io;
use ln::msgs;
pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
}
-
+
/// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.0
/// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
/// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
///
-/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
+/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum NetworkUpdate {
/// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
return None;
}
};
- Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
}
/// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
return None;
}
};
- Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
+ pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
+ let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
+ if direction == 0 {
+ self.one_to_two.as_ref()
+ } else {
+ self.two_to_one.as_ref()
+ }
}
}
pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
}
impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
+ let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
+
+ let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
+ (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
+ (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
+ },
+ (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
+ (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
+ },
+ (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
+ (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
+ },
+ (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
+ };
+
+ Self {
+ channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
+ }
+ }
+
/// Returns information for the channel.
pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
/// Returns information for the direction.
pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
+ /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
+ pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.htlc_maximum_msat
+ }
+
/// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
///
/// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
/// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
- /// whichever is smaller.
+ /// otherwise.
pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
- let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
- self.direction
- .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
- .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
- let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
- if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
- EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
- } else {
- EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
- }
- })
- .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
- EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
- .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
+ self.effective_capacity
}
/// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
/// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
#[inline]
pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
+
+ /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
}
impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
///
/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
/// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
/// direct hop.
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
}
+ /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
+ ///
+ /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
+ /// rapid gossip sync server)
+ ///
+ /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
+ pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ };
+
+ let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
+ let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
+ let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
+ features,
+ node_one: node_1.clone(),
+ one_to_two: None,
+ node_two: node_2.clone(),
+ two_to_one: None,
+ capacity_sats: None,
+ announcement_message: None,
+ announcement_received_time: timestamp,
+ };
+
+ self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
+ }
+
+ fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+
+ let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
+ let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
+
+ match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
+ //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
+ //exactly how...
+ if utxo_value.is_some() {
+ // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
+ // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
+ // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
+ // do that because
+ // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
+ // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
+ // get reorg'd out.
+ // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
+ *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
+ } else {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
+ }
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(channel_info);
+ }
+ };
+
+ for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
+ match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
+ announcement_info: None,
+ });
+ }
+ };
+ };
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
}
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.features.clone(),
- node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
- one_to_two: None,
- node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
- two_to_one: None,
- capacity_sats: utxo_value,
- announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
- { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
- announcement_received_time,
- };
-
- let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
- let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
- match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
- //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
- //exactly how...
- if utxo_value.is_some() {
- // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
- // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
- // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
- // do that because
- // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
- // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
- // get reorg'd out.
- // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
- *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
- } else {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
- }
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(chan_info);
- }
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
+ one_to_two: None,
+ node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
+ two_to_one: None,
+ capacity_sats: utxo_value,
+ announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
+ { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
+ announcement_received_time,
};
- macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
- ( $node_id: expr ) => {
- match nodes.entry($node_id) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
- announcement_info: None,
- });
- }
- }
- };
- }
-
- add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
- add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
-
- Ok(())
+ self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
}
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
- UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
+ UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use routing::scoring::Score;
+use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
use routing::network_graph::{DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate, EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
-use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
/// Parameters needed to find a [`Route`].
///
-/// Passed to [`find_route`] and also provided in [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] for retrying a failed
-/// payment path.
+/// Passed to [`find_route`] and [`build_route_from_hops`], but also provided in
+/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] for retrying a failed payment path.
///
/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
impl<'a> CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
fn short_channel_id(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.short_channel_id.unwrap(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap(),
CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => *short_channel_id,
CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => hint.short_channel_id,
}
}
}
+ fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => {
+ hint.htlc_maximum_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value())
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
fn fees(&self) -> RoutingFees {
match self {
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => RoutingFees {
impl<'a> core::fmt::Debug for PathBuildingHop<'a> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
- f.debug_struct("PathBuildingHop")
+ let mut debug_struct = f.debug_struct("PathBuildingHop");
+ debug_struct
.field("node_id", &self.node_id)
.field("short_channel_id", &self.candidate.short_channel_id())
.field("total_fee_msat", &self.total_fee_msat)
.field("total_fee_msat - (next_hops_fee_msat + hop_use_fee_msat)", &(&self.total_fee_msat - (&self.next_hops_fee_msat + &self.hop_use_fee_msat)))
.field("path_penalty_msat", &self.path_penalty_msat)
.field("path_htlc_minimum_msat", &self.path_htlc_minimum_msat)
- .field("cltv_expiry_delta", &self.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta())
- .finish()
+ .field("cltv_expiry_delta", &self.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta());
+ #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ let debug_struct = debug_struct
+ .field("value_contribution_msat", &self.value_contribution_msat);
+ debug_struct.finish()
}
}
) -> Result<Route, LightningError>
where L::Target: Logger {
let network_graph = network.read_only();
- match get_route(
- our_node_pubkey, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, first_hops, route_params.final_value_msat,
- route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, scorer, random_seed_bytes
- ) {
- Ok(mut route) => {
- add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
- Ok(route)
- },
- Err(err) => Err(err),
- }
+ let mut route = get_route(our_node_pubkey, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, first_hops,
+ route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, scorer,
+ random_seed_bytes)?;
+ add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
+ Ok(route)
}
pub(crate) fn get_route<L: Deref, S: Score>(
HashMap::with_capacity(if first_hops.is_some() { first_hops.as_ref().unwrap().len() } else { 0 });
if let Some(hops) = first_hops {
for chan in hops {
- if chan.short_channel_id.is_none() {
+ if chan.get_outbound_payment_scid().is_none() {
panic!("first_hops should be filled in with usable channels, not pending ones");
}
if chan.counterparty.node_id == *our_node_pubkey {
let recommended_value_msat = final_value_msat * ROUTE_CAPACITY_PROVISION_FACTOR as u64;
let mut path_value_msat = final_value_msat;
- // We don't want multiple paths (as per MPP) share liquidity of the same channels.
- // This map allows paths to be aware of the channel use by other paths in the same call.
- // This would help to make a better path finding decisions and not "overbook" channels.
- // It is unaware of the directions (except for `next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat` in
- // `first_hops`).
- let mut bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat = HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
+ // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels. Used to determine
+ // if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding decisions. It is
+ // aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value is used. Hence,
+ // liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite direction.
+ let mut used_channel_liquidities: HashMap<(u64, bool), u64> =
+ HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// Keeping track of how much value we already collected across other paths. Helps to decide:
// - how much a new path should be transferring (upper bound);
// - for first and last hops early in get_route
if $src_node_id != $dest_node_id {
let short_channel_id = $candidate.short_channel_id();
- let available_liquidity_msat = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat
- .entry(short_channel_id)
- .or_insert_with(|| $candidate.effective_capacity().as_msat());
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = $candidate.htlc_maximum_msat();
// It is tricky to subtract $next_hops_fee_msat from available liquidity here.
// It may be misleading because we might later choose to reduce the value transferred
// fees caused by one expensive channel, but then this channel could have been used
// if the amount being transferred over this path is lower.
// We do this for now, but this is a subject for removal.
- if let Some(available_value_contribution_msat) = available_liquidity_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
+ if let Some(mut available_value_contribution_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .get(&(short_channel_id, $src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
+ .map_or(0, |used_liquidity_msat| {
+ available_value_contribution_msat = available_value_contribution_msat
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidity_msat);
+ *used_liquidity_msat
+ });
// Routing Fragmentation Mitigation heuristic:
//
}
}
- let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat.saturating_add(
- scorer.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, amount_to_transfer_over_msat,
- *available_liquidity_msat, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id));
+ let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: amount_to_transfer_over_msat,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
+ effective_capacity: $candidate.effective_capacity(),
+ };
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
+ short_channel_id, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id, channel_usage
+ );
+ let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat
+ .saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
node_id: $src_node_id,
lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: total_fee_msat,
// TODO: diversify by nodes (so that all paths aren't doomed if one node is offline).
'paths_collection: loop {
- // For every new path, start from scratch, except
- // bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat, which will improve
- // the further iterations of path finding. Also don't erase first_hop_targets.
+ // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_channel_liquidities, which
+ // helps to avoid reusing previously selected paths in future iterations.
targets.clear();
dist.clear();
hit_minimum_limit = false;
short_channel_id: hop.short_channel_id,
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: hop });
- let capacity_msat = candidate.effective_capacity().as_msat();
- aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat = aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat
- .saturating_add(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(hop.short_channel_id,
- final_value_msat, capacity_msat, &source, &target));
-
- aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta = aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta
- .saturating_add(hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
-
- aggregate_next_hops_path_length = aggregate_next_hops_path_length
- .saturating_add(1);
if !add_entry!(candidate, source, target, aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
hop_used = false;
}
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .get(&(hop.short_channel_id, source < target)).copied().unwrap_or(0);
+ let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: final_value_msat + aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
+ effective_capacity: candidate.effective_capacity(),
+ };
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
+ hop.short_channel_id, &source, &target, channel_usage
+ );
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat = aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat
+ .saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
+
+ aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta = aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta
+ .saturating_add(hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
+
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_length = aggregate_next_hops_path_length
+ .saturating_add(1);
+
// Searching for a direct channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id)) {
for details in first_channels {
let mut features_set = false;
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
- if details.short_channel_id.unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
+ if details.get_outbound_payment_scid().unwrap() == ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.short_channel_id() {
ordered_hops.last_mut().unwrap().1 = details.counterparty.features.to_context();
features_set = true;
break;
// Remember that we used these channels so that we don't rely
// on the same liquidity in future paths.
let mut prevented_redundant_path_selection = false;
- for (payment_hop, _) in payment_path.hops.iter() {
- let channel_liquidity_available_msat = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat.get_mut(&payment_hop.candidate.short_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat;
- let next_hops_fee_msat = payment_hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
- spent_on_hop_msat += next_hops_fee_msat;
- if spent_on_hop_msat == *channel_liquidity_available_msat {
+ let prev_hop_iter = core::iter::once(&our_node_id)
+ .chain(payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(hop, _)| &hop.node_id));
+ for (prev_hop, (hop, _)) in prev_hop_iter.zip(payment_path.hops.iter()) {
+ let spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat + hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .entry((hop.candidate.short_channel_id(), *prev_hop < hop.node_id))
+ .and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += spent_on_hop_msat)
+ .or_insert(spent_on_hop_msat);
+ if *used_liquidity_msat == hop.candidate.htlc_maximum_msat() {
// If this path used all of this channel's available liquidity, we know
// this path will not be selected again in the next loop iteration.
prevented_redundant_path_selection = true;
}
- *channel_liquidity_available_msat -= spent_on_hop_msat;
+ debug_assert!(*used_liquidity_msat <= hop.candidate.htlc_maximum_msat());
}
if !prevented_redundant_path_selection {
// If we weren't capped by hitting a liquidity limit on a channel in the path,
// we'll probably end up picking the same path again on the next iteration.
// Decrease the available liquidity of a hop in the middle of the path.
let victim_scid = payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let exhausted = u64::max_value();
log_trace!(logger, "Disabling channel {} for future path building iterations to avoid duplicates.", victim_scid);
- let victim_liquidity = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat.get_mut(&victim_scid).unwrap();
- *victim_liquidity = 0;
+ *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, false)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, true)).or_default() = exhausted;
}
// Track the total amount all our collected paths allow to send so that we:
// destination, if the remaining CLTV expiry delta exactly matches a feasible path in the network
// graph. In order to improve privacy, this method obfuscates the CLTV expiry deltas along the
// payment path by adding a randomized 'shadow route' offset to the final hop.
-fn add_random_cltv_offset(route: &mut Route, payment_params: &PaymentParameters, network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]) {
+fn add_random_cltv_offset(route: &mut Route, payment_params: &PaymentParameters,
+ network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) {
let network_channels = network_graph.channels();
let network_nodes = network_graph.nodes();
}
}
+/// Construct a route from us (payer) to the target node (payee) via the given hops (which should
+/// exclude the payer, but include the payee). This may be useful, e.g., for probing the chosen path.
+///
+/// Re-uses logic from `find_route`, so the restrictions described there also apply here.
+pub fn build_route_from_hops<L: Deref>(
+ our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, hops: &[PublicKey], route_params: &RouteParameters, network: &NetworkGraph,
+ logger: L, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) -> Result<Route, LightningError>
+where L::Target: Logger {
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+ let mut route = build_route_from_hops_internal(
+ our_node_pubkey, hops, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph,
+ route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, random_seed_bytes)?;
+ add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
+ Ok(route)
+}
+
+fn build_route_from_hops_internal<L: Deref>(
+ our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, hops: &[PublicKey], payment_params: &PaymentParameters,
+ network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, final_value_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+ logger: L, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) -> Result<Route, LightningError> where L::Target: Logger {
+
+ struct HopScorer {
+ our_node_id: NodeId,
+ hop_ids: [Option<NodeId>; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize],
+ }
+
+ impl Score for HopScorer {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId,
+ _usage: ChannelUsage) -> u64
+ {
+ let mut cur_id = self.our_node_id;
+ for i in 0..self.hop_ids.len() {
+ if let Some(next_id) = self.hop_ids[i] {
+ if cur_id == *source && next_id == *target {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cur_id = next_id;
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ u64::max_value()
+ }
+
+ fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
+
+ fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
+ }
+
+ impl<'a> Writeable for HopScorer {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ unreachable!();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if hops.len() > MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE.into() {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Cannot build a route exceeding the maximum path length.".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+
+ let our_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(our_node_pubkey);
+ let mut hop_ids = [None; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
+ for i in 0..hops.len() {
+ hop_ids[i] = Some(NodeId::from_pubkey(&hops[i]));
+ }
+
+ let scorer = HopScorer { our_node_id, hop_ids };
+
+ get_route(our_node_pubkey, payment_params, network_graph, None, final_value_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, &scorer, random_seed_bytes)
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NetGraphMsgHandler, NodeId};
- use routing::router::{get_route, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features,
+ use routing::router::{get_route, build_route_from_hops_internal, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features,
PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RoutingFees,
DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE};
- use routing::scoring::Score;
+ use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
channel_type: None,
short_channel_id,
+ outbound_scid_alias: None,
inbound_scid_alias: None,
channel_value_satoshis: 0,
user_channel_id: 0,
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> { unimplemented!() }
}
impl Score for BadChannelScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
if short_channel_id == self.short_channel_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
}
impl Score for BadNodeScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
if *target == self.node_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
assert!(path_plausibility.iter().all(|x| *x));
}
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_correct_path_from_hops() {
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3]);
+ let hops = [nodes[1], nodes[2], nodes[4], nodes[3]];
+ let route = build_route_from_hops_internal(&our_id, &hops, &payment_params,
+ &network_graph, 100, 0, Arc::clone(&logger), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route_hop_pubkeys = route.paths[0].iter().map(|hop| hop.pubkey).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(hops.len(), route.paths[0].len());
+ for (idx, hop_pubkey) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
+ assert!(*hop_pubkey == route_hop_pubkeys[idx]);
+ }
+ }
+
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
pub(super) fn random_init_seed() -> u64 {
// Because the default HashMap in std pulls OS randomness, we can use it as a (bad) RNG.
channel_type: None,
short_channel_id: Some(1),
inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias: None,
channel_value_satoshis: 10_000_000,
user_channel_id: 0,
balance_msat: 10_000_000,
//! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
+use routing::network_graph::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use util::logger::Logger;
/// such as a chain data, network gossip, or invoice hints. For invoice hints, a capacity near
/// [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
/// Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64;
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
+ ) -> u64;
/// Handles updating channel penalties after failing to route through a channel.
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop], short_channel_id: u64);
}
impl<S: Score, T: DerefMut<Target=S> $(+ $supertrait)*> Score for T {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
- self.deref().channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source, target)
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
+ ) -> u64 {
+ self.deref().channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, source, target, usage)
}
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop], short_channel_id: u64) {
}
}
+/// Proposed use of a channel passed as a parameter to [`Score::channel_penalty_msat`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct ChannelUsage {
+ /// The amount to send through the channel, denominated in millisatoshis.
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+
+ /// Total amount, denominated in millisatoshis, already allocated to send through the channel
+ /// as part of a multi-path payment.
+ pub inflight_htlc_msat: u64,
+
+ /// The effective capacity of the channel.
+ pub effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
+}
+
#[derive(Clone)]
/// [`Score`] implementation that uses a fixed penalty.
pub struct FixedPenaltyScorer {
}
impl Score for FixedPenaltyScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: u64, _: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
self.penalty_msat
}
impl<T: Time> Score for ScorerUsingTime<T> {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 {
let failure_penalty_msat = self.channel_failures
.get(&short_channel_id)
.map_or(0, |value| value.decayed_penalty_msat(self.params.failure_penalty_half_life));
let mut penalty_msat = self.params.base_penalty_msat + failure_penalty_msat;
+ let send_amt_msat = usage.amount_msat;
+ let capacity_msat = usage.effective_capacity.as_msat()
+ .saturating_sub(usage.inflight_htlc_msat);
let send_1024ths = send_amt_msat.checked_mul(1024).unwrap_or(u64::max_value()) / capacity_msat;
if send_1024ths > self.params.overuse_penalty_start_1024th as u64 {
penalty_msat = penalty_msat.checked_add(
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> Score for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, short_channel_id: u64, amount_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId,
- target: &NodeId
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 {
+ if let EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } = usage.effective_capacity {
+ if usage.amount_msat > liquidity_msat {
+ return u64::max_value();
+ } else {
+ return self.params.base_penalty_msat;
+ };
+ }
+
let liquidity_offset_half_life = self.params.liquidity_offset_half_life;
+ let amount_msat = usage.amount_msat;
+ let capacity_msat = usage.effective_capacity.as_msat()
+ .saturating_sub(usage.inflight_htlc_msat);
self.channel_liquidities
.get(&short_channel_id)
.unwrap_or(&ChannelLiquidity::new())
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
- use routing::scoring::Score;
- use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
+ use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
+ use routing::network_graph::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_064);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_064);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_192);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_192);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(9));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 8));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_001);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_001);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
// An unchecked right shift 64 bits or more in ChannelFailure::decayed_penalty_msat would
// cause an overflow.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 64));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_768);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_768);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_384);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_384);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
let hop = RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(target.as_slice()).unwrap(),
cltv_expiry_delta: 18,
};
scorer.payment_path_successful(&[&hop]);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_064);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_064);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let deserialized_scorer = <Scorer>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
let deserialized_scorer = <Scorer>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256_999, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 257_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 100);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 258_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 200);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 256 * 100);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256_999, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 257_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 100);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 258_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 200);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 512_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 256 * 100);
}
// `ProbabilisticScorer` tests
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 10_240, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 102_400, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 47);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 2_000);
-
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 58);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 374, 1_024, &source, &target), 198);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 640, 1_024, &source, &target), 425);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 602);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), 902);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1_024,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 10_240, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 102_400, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 47);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 128,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 58);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 374, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 198);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 512, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 640, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 425);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 902);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 39, 100, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 50, 100, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 50, 100, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 61, 100, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 39,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 100 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 50, ..usage };
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 61, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let sender = sender_node_id();
let source = source_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
let failed_path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
let successful_path = payment_path_for_amount(200);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&failed_path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 41);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
scorer.payment_path_successful(&successful_path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
}
#[test]
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 301);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 301);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 250, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 301);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 301);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 250, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let recipient = recipient_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 250, 1_000, &sender, &source), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 250, 1_000, &target, &recipient), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &target, &recipient, usage), 128);
scorer.payment_path_successful(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 250, 1_000, &sender, &source), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 250, 1_000, &target, &recipient), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &target, &recipient, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(768).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(128).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 93);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_479);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 93);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_479);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(9));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 93);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_479);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 93);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_479);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 64, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 34);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_970);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 960, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 64, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 34);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_970);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 960, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
// Fully decay liquidity lower bound.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 7));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_023, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_023, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
// Fully decay liquidity upper bound.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 256,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(512).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 281);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 281);
// An unchecked right shift 64 bits or more in DirectedChannelLiquidity::decayed_offset_msat
// would cause an overflow.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 64));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 512,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
// More knowledge gives higher confidence (256, 768), meaning a lower penalty.
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(768).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(256).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 281);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 281);
// Decaying knowledge gives less confidence (128, 896), meaning a higher penalty.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 291);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 291);
// Reducing the upper bound gives more confidence (128, 832) that the payment amount (512)
// is closer to the upper bound, meaning a higher penalty.
scorer.payment_path_successful(&payment_path_for_amount(64).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 331);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 331);
// Increasing the lower bound gives more confidence (256, 832) that the payment amount (512)
// is closer to the lower bound, meaning a lower penalty.
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(256).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 245);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 245);
// Further decaying affects the lower bound more than the upper bound (128, 928).
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 280);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 280);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 473);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 473);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(250).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
<ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
<ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 473);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 473);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(250).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 365);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 365);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 950_000_000, &source, &target), 3613);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 1_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1977);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 2_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1474);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 3_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1223);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 4_950_000_000, &source, &target), 877);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 5_950_000_000, &source, &target), 845);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 6_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 7_450_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 7_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 8_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 9_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 100_000_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 950_000_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 3613);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1977);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 2_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1474);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 3_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1223);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 4_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 877);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 5_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 845);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 6_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 7_450_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 7_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 8_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 9_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 128,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 58);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 58);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
base_penalty_msat: 500, liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000, ..Default::default()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 558);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 558);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 512_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 337);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 337);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: u64::max_value(),
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 40_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(
- scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, u64::max_value(), u64::max_value(), &source, &target),
- 80_000,
- );
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 80_000);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn accounts_for_inflight_htlc_usage() {
+ let network_graph = network_graph();
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
+ let source = source_node_id();
+ let target = target_node_id();
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 750,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { inflight_htlc_msat: 251, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn removes_uncertainity_when_exact_liquidity_known() {
+ let network_graph = network_graph();
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
+ let source = source_node_id();
+ let target = target_node_id();
+
+ let base_penalty_msat = params.base_penalty_msat;
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 750,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), base_penalty_msat);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), base_penalty_msat);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_001, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
}
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
+ /// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+ /// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+ ///
/// Default value: 6.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
pub minimum_depth: u32,
/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
///
/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
+ /// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+ /// channels to not be double-spent.
+ ///
+ /// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+ /// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+ /// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+ /// control of the signing keys).
+ ///
+ /// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+ /// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+ ///
+ /// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+ /// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+ /// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+ /// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+ ///
+ /// Default value: true
+ pub trust_own_funding_0conf: bool,
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
///
min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ trust_own_funding_0conf: true,
max_minimum_depth: 144,
force_announced_channel_preference: true,
their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
path: Vec<RouteHop>,
/// The channel responsible for the failed payment path.
///
+ /// Note that for route hints or for the first hop in a path this may be an SCID alias and
+ /// may not refer to a channel in the public network graph. These aliases may also collide
+ /// with channels in the public network graph.
+ ///
/// If this is `Some`, then the corresponding channel should be avoided when the payment is
/// retried. May be `None` for older [`Event`] serializations.
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
const MAX_NAMESPACES: u8 = 8; // We allocate 3 bits for the namespace identifier.
const NAMESPACE_ID_BITMASK: u8 = 0b111;
+ const BLOCKS_PER_MONTH: u32 = 144 /* blocks per day */ * 30 /* days per month */;
+ pub(crate) const MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW: u32 = BLOCKS_PER_MONTH;
+
+
/// Fake scids are divided into namespaces, with each namespace having its own identifier between
/// [0..7]. This allows us to identify what namespace a fake scid corresponds to upon HTLC
/// receipt, and handle the HTLC accordingly. The namespace identifier is encrypted when encoded
// Ensure we haven't created a namespace that doesn't fit into the 3 bits we've allocated for
// namespaces.
assert!((*self as u8) < MAX_NAMESPACES);
- const BLOCKS_PER_MONTH: u32 = 144 /* blocks per day */ * 30 /* days per month */;
let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let segwit_activation_height = segwit_activation_height(genesis_hash);
// We want to ensure that this fake channel won't conflict with any transactions we haven't
// seen yet, in case `highest_seen_blockheight` is updated before we get full information
// about transactions confirmed in the given block.
- blocks_since_segwit_activation = blocks_since_segwit_activation.saturating_sub(BLOCKS_PER_MONTH);
+ blocks_since_segwit_activation = blocks_since_segwit_activation.saturating_sub(MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
let rand_for_height = u32::from_be_bytes(rand_bytes[..4].try_into().unwrap());
let fake_scid_height = segwit_activation_height + rand_for_height % (blocks_since_segwit_activation + 1);
/// encoded in several different ways, which we must check for at deserialization-time. Thus, if
/// you're looking for an example of a variable-length integer to use for your own project, move
/// along, this is a rather poor design.
-pub(crate) struct BigSize(pub u64);
+pub struct BigSize(pub u64);
impl Writeable for BigSize {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
expect_channel_force_closed: Mutex::new(None),
}
}
+
+ pub fn complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+ let (outpoint, _, latest_update) = self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(channel_id).unwrap().clone();
+ self.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update).unwrap();
+ }
}
impl<'a> chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> Result<(), chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
pub struct TestBroadcaster {
pub txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
- pub blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(BlockHeader, u32)>>>,
+ pub blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(Block, u32)>>>,
}
impl TestBroadcaster {
- pub fn new(blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(BlockHeader, u32)>>>) -> TestBroadcaster {
+ pub fn new(blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(Block, u32)>>>) -> TestBroadcaster {
TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks }
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff