}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in outpoints.iter() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
- // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
- // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
}
}
-fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
+fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
// Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
// pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
// commitment transaction anymore.
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
// Revoke the old state
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
- let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
- let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
- let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let value = if use_dust {
+ // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
+ // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
+ nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
+ } else { 3000000 };
+
+ let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
+ let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
if deliver_bs_raa {
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
- // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
- // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
+ // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
+ // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
-fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
- do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
+fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
}
#[test]