Ok(TaggedField::PrivateRoute(PrivateRoute::from_base32(field_data)?)),
constants::TAG_PAYMENT_SECRET =>
Ok(TaggedField::PaymentSecret(PaymentSecret::from_base32(field_data)?)),
+ constants::TAG_PAYMENT_METADATA =>
+ Ok(TaggedField::PaymentMetadata(Vec::<u8>::from_base32(field_data)?)),
constants::TAG_FEATURES =>
Ok(TaggedField::Features(InvoiceFeatures::from_base32(field_data)?)),
_ => {
/// * `D`: exactly one [`TaggedField::Description`] or [`TaggedField::DescriptionHash`]
/// * `H`: exactly one [`TaggedField::PaymentHash`]
/// * `T`: the timestamp is set
+/// * `C`: the CLTV expiry is set
+/// * `S`: the payment secret is set
+/// * `M`: payment metadata is set
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we likely need to manually select one set of boolean type parameters.
#[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct InvoiceBuilder<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> {
+pub struct InvoiceBuilder<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> {
currency: Currency,
amount: Option<u64>,
si_prefix: Option<SiPrefix>,
phantom_t: core::marker::PhantomData<T>,
phantom_c: core::marker::PhantomData<C>,
phantom_s: core::marker::PhantomData<S>,
+ phantom_m: core::marker::PhantomData<M>,
}
/// Represents a syntactically and semantically correct lightning BOLT11 invoice.
Fallback(Fallback),
PrivateRoute(PrivateRoute),
PaymentSecret(PaymentSecret),
+ PaymentMetadata(Vec<u8>),
Features(InvoiceFeatures),
}
pub const TAG_FALLBACK: u8 = 9;
pub const TAG_PRIVATE_ROUTE: u8 = 3;
pub const TAG_PAYMENT_SECRET: u8 = 16;
+ pub const TAG_PAYMENT_METADATA: u8 = 27;
pub const TAG_FEATURES: u8 = 5;
}
-impl InvoiceBuilder<tb::False, tb::False, tb::False, tb::False, tb::False> {
+impl InvoiceBuilder<tb::False, tb::False, tb::False, tb::False, tb::False, tb::False> {
/// Construct new, empty `InvoiceBuilder`. All necessary fields have to be filled first before
/// `InvoiceBuilder::build(self)` becomes available.
- pub fn new(currrency: Currency) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(currency: Currency) -> Self {
InvoiceBuilder {
- currency: currrency,
+ currency,
amount: None,
si_prefix: None,
timestamp: None,
phantom_t: core::marker::PhantomData,
phantom_c: core::marker::PhantomData,
phantom_s: core::marker::PhantomData,
+ phantom_m: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S, M> {
/// Helper function to set the completeness flags.
- fn set_flags<DN: tb::Bool, HN: tb::Bool, TN: tb::Bool, CN: tb::Bool, SN: tb::Bool>(self) -> InvoiceBuilder<DN, HN, TN, CN, SN> {
- InvoiceBuilder::<DN, HN, TN, CN, SN> {
+ fn set_flags<DN: tb::Bool, HN: tb::Bool, TN: tb::Bool, CN: tb::Bool, SN: tb::Bool, MN: tb::Bool>(self) -> InvoiceBuilder<DN, HN, TN, CN, SN, MN> {
+ InvoiceBuilder::<DN, HN, TN, CN, SN, MN> {
currency: self.currency,
amount: self.amount,
si_prefix: self.si_prefix,
phantom_t: core::marker::PhantomData,
phantom_c: core::marker::PhantomData,
phantom_s: core::marker::PhantomData,
+ phantom_m: core::marker::PhantomData,
}
}
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S, M> {
/// Builds a [`RawInvoice`] if no [`CreationError`] occurred while construction any of the
/// fields.
pub fn build_raw(self) -> Result<RawInvoice, CreationError> {
}
}
-impl<H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<tb::False, H, T, C, S> {
+impl<H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<tb::False, H, T, C, S, M> {
/// Set the description. This function is only available if no description (hash) was set.
- pub fn description(mut self, description: String) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S> {
+ pub fn description(mut self, description: String) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S, M> {
match Description::new(description) {
Ok(d) => self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::Description(d)),
Err(e) => self.error = Some(e),
}
/// Set the description hash. This function is only available if no description (hash) was set.
- pub fn description_hash(mut self, description_hash: sha256::Hash) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S> {
+ pub fn description_hash(mut self, description_hash: sha256::Hash) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S, M> {
self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::DescriptionHash(Sha256(description_hash)));
self.set_flags()
}
/// Set the description or description hash. This function is only available if no description (hash) was set.
- pub fn invoice_description(self, description: InvoiceDescription) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S> {
+ pub fn invoice_description(self, description: InvoiceDescription) -> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, H, T, C, S, M> {
match description {
InvoiceDescription::Direct(desc) => {
self.description(desc.clone().into_inner())
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, tb::False, T, C, S> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, tb::False, T, C, S, M> {
/// Set the payment hash. This function is only available if no payment hash was set.
- pub fn payment_hash(mut self, hash: sha256::Hash) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, tb::True, T, C, S> {
+ pub fn payment_hash(mut self, hash: sha256::Hash) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, tb::True, T, C, S, M> {
self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::PaymentHash(Sha256(hash)));
self.set_flags()
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::False, C, S> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::False, C, S, M> {
/// Sets the timestamp to a specific [`SystemTime`].
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
- pub fn timestamp(mut self, time: SystemTime) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S> {
+ pub fn timestamp(mut self, time: SystemTime) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S, M> {
match PositiveTimestamp::from_system_time(time) {
Ok(t) => self.timestamp = Some(t),
Err(e) => self.error = Some(e),
/// Sets the timestamp to a duration since the Unix epoch, dropping the subsecond part (which
/// is not representable in BOLT 11 invoices).
- pub fn duration_since_epoch(mut self, time: Duration) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S> {
+ pub fn duration_since_epoch(mut self, time: Duration) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S, M> {
match PositiveTimestamp::from_duration_since_epoch(time) {
Ok(t) => self.timestamp = Some(t),
Err(e) => self.error = Some(e),
/// Sets the timestamp to the current system time.
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
- pub fn current_timestamp(mut self) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S> {
+ pub fn current_timestamp(mut self) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, tb::True, C, S, M> {
let now = PositiveTimestamp::from_system_time(SystemTime::now());
self.timestamp = Some(now.expect("for the foreseeable future this shouldn't happen"));
self.set_flags()
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, tb::False, S> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, tb::False, S, M> {
/// Sets `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`.
- pub fn min_final_cltv_expiry_delta(mut self, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: u64) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, tb::True, S> {
+ pub fn min_final_cltv_expiry_delta(mut self, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: u64) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, tb::True, S, M> {
self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::MinFinalCltvExpiryDelta(MinFinalCltvExpiryDelta(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)));
self.set_flags()
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::False> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::False, M> {
/// Sets the payment secret and relevant features.
- pub fn payment_secret(mut self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::True> {
- let mut features = InvoiceFeatures::empty();
- features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
- features.set_payment_secret_required();
+ pub fn payment_secret(mut self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::True, M> {
+ let mut found_features = false;
+ for field in self.tagged_fields.iter_mut() {
+ if let TaggedField::Features(f) = field {
+ found_features = true;
+ f.set_variable_length_onion_required();
+ f.set_payment_secret_required();
+ }
+ }
self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::PaymentSecret(payment_secret));
- self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::Features(features));
+ if !found_features {
+ let mut features = InvoiceFeatures::empty();
+ features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
+ features.set_payment_secret_required();
+ self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::Features(features));
+ }
self.set_flags()
}
}
-impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::True> {
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S, tb::False> {
+ /// Sets the payment metadata.
+ ///
+ /// By default features are set to *optionally* allow the sender to include the payment metadata.
+ /// If you wish to require that the sender include the metadata (and fail to parse the invoice if
+ /// they don't support payment metadata fields), you need to call
+ /// [`InvoiceBuilder::require_payment_metadata`] after this.
+ pub fn payment_metadata(mut self, payment_metadata: Vec<u8>) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S, tb::True> {
+ self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::PaymentMetadata(payment_metadata));
+ let mut found_features = false;
+ for field in self.tagged_fields.iter_mut() {
+ if let TaggedField::Features(f) = field {
+ found_features = true;
+ f.set_payment_metadata_optional();
+ }
+ }
+ if !found_features {
+ let mut features = InvoiceFeatures::empty();
+ features.set_payment_metadata_optional();
+ self.tagged_fields.push(TaggedField::Features(features));
+ }
+ self.set_flags()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, S: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S, tb::True> {
+ /// Sets forwarding of payment metadata as required. A reader of the invoice which does not
+ /// support sending payment metadata will fail to read the invoice.
+ pub fn require_payment_metadata(mut self) -> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, S, tb::True> {
+ for field in self.tagged_fields.iter_mut() {
+ if let TaggedField::Features(f) = field {
+ f.set_payment_metadata_required();
+ }
+ }
+ self
+ }
+}
+
+impl<D: tb::Bool, H: tb::Bool, T: tb::Bool, C: tb::Bool, M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<D, H, T, C, tb::True, M> {
/// Sets the `basic_mpp` feature as optional.
pub fn basic_mpp(mut self) -> Self {
for field in self.tagged_fields.iter_mut() {
}
}
-impl InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, tb::True, tb::True, tb::True, tb::True> {
+impl<M: tb::Bool> InvoiceBuilder<tb::True, tb::True, tb::True, tb::True, tb::True, M> {
/// Builds and signs an invoice using the supplied `sign_function`. This function MAY NOT fail
/// and MUST produce a recoverable signature valid for the given hash and if applicable also for
/// the included payee public key.
find_extract!(self.known_tagged_fields(), TaggedField::PaymentSecret(ref x), x)
}
+ pub fn payment_metadata(&self) -> Option<&Vec<u8>> {
+ find_extract!(self.known_tagged_fields(), TaggedField::PaymentMetadata(ref x), x)
+ }
+
pub fn features(&self) -> Option<&InvoiceFeatures> {
find_extract!(self.known_tagged_fields(), TaggedField::Features(ref x), x)
}
self.signed_invoice.payment_secret().expect("was checked by constructor")
}
+ /// Get the payment metadata blob if one was included in the invoice
+ pub fn payment_metadata(&self) -> Option<&Vec<u8>> {
+ self.signed_invoice.payment_metadata()
+ }
+
/// Get the invoice features if they were included in the invoice
pub fn features(&self) -> Option<&InvoiceFeatures> {
self.signed_invoice.features()
TaggedField::Fallback(_) => constants::TAG_FALLBACK,
TaggedField::PrivateRoute(_) => constants::TAG_PRIVATE_ROUTE,
TaggedField::PaymentSecret(_) => constants::TAG_PAYMENT_SECRET,
+ TaggedField::PaymentMetadata(_) => constants::TAG_PAYMENT_METADATA,
TaggedField::Features(_) => constants::TAG_FEATURES,
};
payer: P
) -> Result<(), PaymentError> where P::Target: Payer {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash((*invoice.payment_hash()).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = Some(*invoice.payment_secret());
- let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret };
+ let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields {
+ payment_secret: Some(*invoice.payment_secret()),
+ payment_metadata: invoice.payment_metadata().map(|v| v.clone()),
+ };
let mut payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(invoice.recover_payee_pub_key(),
invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry_delta() as u32)
.with_expiry_time(expiry_time_from_unix_epoch(invoice).as_secs())
use super::*;
use crate::{InvoiceBuilder, Currency};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use lightning::events::Event;
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use lightning::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use secp256k1::{SecretKey, Secp256k1};
_ => panic!()
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ fn payment_metadata_end_to_end() {
+ // Test that a payment metadata read from an invoice passed to `pay_invoice` makes it all
+ // the way out through the `PaymentClaimable` event.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let payment_metadata = vec![42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 42];
+
+ let (payment_hash, payment_secret) =
+ nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(None, 7200, None).unwrap();
+
+ let invoice = InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
+ .description("test".into())
+ .payment_hash(Sha256::from_slice(&payment_hash.0).unwrap())
+ .payment_secret(payment_secret)
+ .current_timestamp()
+ .min_final_cltv_expiry_delta(144)
+ .amount_milli_satoshis(50_000)
+ .payment_metadata(payment_metadata.clone())
+ .build_signed(|hash| {
+ Secp256k1::new().sign_ecdsa_recoverable(hash,
+ &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.get_node_secret_key())
+ })
+ .unwrap();
+
+ pay_invoice(&invoice, Retry::Attempts(0), nodes[0].node).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &send_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events.pop().unwrap() {
+ Event::PaymentClaimable { onion_fields, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(Some(payment_metadata), onion_fields.unwrap().payment_metadata);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
+ }
+ }
}
TaggedField::PaymentSecret(ref payment_secret) => {
write_tagged_field(writer, constants::TAG_PAYMENT_SECRET, payment_secret)
},
+ TaggedField::PaymentMetadata(ref payment_metadata) => {
+ write_tagged_field(writer, constants::TAG_PAYMENT_METADATA, payment_metadata)
+ },
TaggedField::Features(ref features) => {
write_tagged_field(writer, constants::TAG_FEATURES, features)
},
true, // Different features than set in InvoiceBuilder
true, // Some unknown fields
),
+ ( // Older version of the payment metadata test with a payment_pubkey set
+ "lnbc10m1pvjluezpp5qqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqypqdp9wpshjmt9de6zqmt9w3skgct5vysxjmnnd9jx2mq8q8a04uqnp4q0n326hr8v9zprg8gsvezcch06gfaqqhde2aj730yg0durunfhv66sp5zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zygs9q2gqqqqqqsgqy9gw6ymamd20jumvdgpfphkhp8fzhhdhycw36egcmla5vlrtrmhs9t7psfy3hkkdqzm9eq64fjg558znccds5nhsfmxveha5xe0dykgpspdha0".to_owned(),
+ InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
+ .amount_milli_satoshis(1_000_000_000)
+ .duration_since_epoch(Duration::from_secs(1496314658))
+ .payment_hash(sha256::Hash::from_hex(
+ "0001020304050607080900010203040506070809000102030405060708090102"
+ ).unwrap())
+ .description("payment metadata inside".to_owned())
+ .payment_metadata(hex::decode("01fafaf0").unwrap())
+ .require_payment_metadata()
+ .payee_pub_key(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(
+ "03e7156ae33b0a208d0744199163177e909e80176e55d97a2f221ede0f934dd9ad"
+ ).unwrap()).unwrap())
+ .payment_secret(PaymentSecret([0x11; 32]))
+ .build_raw()
+ .unwrap()
+ .sign(|_| {
+ RecoverableSignature::from_compact(
+ &hex::decode("2150ed137ddb54f9736c6a0290ded709d22bddb7261d1d6518dffb467c6b1eef02afc182491bdacd00b65c83554c914a1c53c61b0a4ef04eccccdfb4365ed259").unwrap(),
+ RecoveryId::from_i32(1).unwrap()
+ )
+ }).unwrap(),
+ false, // Different features than set in InvoiceBuilder
+ true, // Some unknown fields
+ ),
+ (
+ "lnbc10m1pvjluezpp5qqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqqqsyqcyq5rqwzqfqypqdp9wpshjmt9de6zqmt9w3skgct5vysxjmnnd9jx2mq8q8a04uqsp5zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zyg3zygs9q2gqqqqqqsgq7hf8he7ecf7n4ffphs6awl9t6676rrclv9ckg3d3ncn7fct63p6s365duk5wrk202cfy3aj5xnnp5gs3vrdvruverwwq7yzhkf5a3xqpd05wjc".to_owned(),
+ InvoiceBuilder::new(Currency::Bitcoin)
+ .amount_milli_satoshis(1_000_000_000)
+ .duration_since_epoch(Duration::from_secs(1496314658))
+ .payment_hash(sha256::Hash::from_hex(
+ "0001020304050607080900010203040506070809000102030405060708090102"
+ ).unwrap())
+ .description("payment metadata inside".to_owned())
+ .payment_metadata(hex::decode("01fafaf0").unwrap())
+ .require_payment_metadata()
+ .payment_secret(PaymentSecret([0x11; 32]))
+ .build_raw()
+ .unwrap()
+ .sign(|_| {
+ RecoverableSignature::from_compact(
+ &hex::decode("f5d27be7d9c27d3aa521bc35d77cabd6bda18f1f61716445b19e27e4e17a887508ea8de5a8e1d94f561248f65434e61a221160dac1f1991b9c0f1057b269d898").unwrap(),
+ RecoveryId::from_i32(1).unwrap()
+ )
+ }).unwrap(),
+ false, // Different features than set in InvoiceBuilder
+ true, // Some unknown fields
+ ),
+
]
}
///
/// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
/// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
- fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, OnchainClaim)>
+ fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u32, u64, OnchainClaim)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
// Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
- let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height));
+ let new_timer = cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height);
if cached_request.is_malleable() {
#[cfg(anchors)]
{ // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package(
cur_height, self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger
).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
+ log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer, new_feerate);
assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)));
}
None => return None,
};
if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
- return Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
+ return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
}
#[cfg(anchors)]
return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
// attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
// it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
// transaction without anchor outputs.
- None => Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
+ None => Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
}
},
_ => {
// Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
for (package_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
- if let Some(h) = request.timer() {
- if cur_height >= h {
- bump_candidates.insert(*package_id, request.clone());
- }
+ if cur_height >= request.timer() {
+ bump_candidates.insert(*package_id, request.clone());
}
}
feerate_previous: u64,
// Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
// the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
- height_timer: Option<u32>,
+ height_timer: u32,
// Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
// it, we wipe out and forget the package.
height_original: u32,
pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
}
- pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
- if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
- return Some(*timer);
- }
- None
+ pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.height_timer
}
- pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
+ pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: u32) {
self.height_timer = new_timer;
}
pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
soonest_conf_deadline,
aggregable,
feerate_previous: 0,
- height_timer: None,
+ height_timer: height_original,
height_original,
}
}
(0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
(2, self.feerate_previous, required),
(4, self.height_original, required),
- (6, self.height_timer, option)
+ (6, self.height_timer, required)
});
Ok(())
}
(4, height_original, required),
(6, height_timer, option),
});
+ if height_timer.is_none() {
+ height_timer = Some(height_original);
+ }
Ok(PackageTemplate {
inputs,
malleability,
soonest_conf_deadline,
aggregable,
feerate_previous,
- height_timer,
+ height_timer: height_timer.unwrap(),
height_original,
})
}
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
- let timer_none = package.timer();
- assert!(timer_none.is_none());
- package.set_timer(Some(100));
- if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
- assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
- } else { panic!() }
+ assert_eq!(package.timer(), 100);
+ package.set_timer(101);
+ assert_eq!(package.timer(), 101);
}
#[test]
pub use bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
use crate::chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{InterceptId, PaymentId};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{InterceptId, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs;
///
/// Some of the reasons may include:
/// * HTLC Timeouts
- /// * Expected MPP amount has already been reached
- /// * Claimable amount does not match expected amount
+ /// * Excess HTLCs for a payment that we have already fully received, over-paying for the
+ /// payment,
+ /// * The counterparty node modified the HTLC in transit,
+ /// * A probing attack where an intermediary node is trying to detect if we are the ultimate
+ /// recipient for a payment.
FailedPayment {
/// The payment hash of the payment we attempted to process.
payment_hash: PaymentHash
/// The hash for which the preimage should be handed to the ChannelManager. Note that LDK will
/// not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound payments.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The fields in the onion which were received with each HTLC. Only fields which were
+ /// identical in each HTLC involved in the payment will be included here.
+ ///
+ /// Payments received on LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 will have this field unset.
+ onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
/// The value, in thousandths of a satoshi, that this payment is for.
amount_msat: u64,
/// Information for claiming this received payment, based on whether the purpose of the
// We never write out FundingGenerationReady events as, upon disconnection, peers
// drop any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_signed.
},
- &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, ref purpose, ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id, ref claim_deadline } => {
+ &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref amount_msat, ref purpose,
+ ref receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
+ ref claim_deadline, ref onion_fields
+ } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
let mut payment_secret = None;
let payment_preimage;
(6, 0u64, required), // user_payment_id required for compatibility with 0.0.103 and earlier
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
+ (9, onion_fields, option),
});
},
&Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_id, ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, ref fee_paid_msat } => {
let mut via_channel_id = None;
let mut claim_deadline = None;
let mut via_user_channel_id = None;
+ let mut onion_fields = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
(1, receiver_node_id, option),
(6, _user_payment_id, option),
(7, claim_deadline, option),
(8, payment_preimage, option),
+ (9, onion_fields, option),
});
let purpose = match payment_secret {
Some(secret) => PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
via_channel_id,
via_user_channel_id,
claim_deadline,
+ onion_fields,
}))
};
f()
},
Receive {
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
},
}
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
});
+struct ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
+ onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
+ htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
+}
+
/// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
struct ClaimablePayments {
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
///
/// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
/// we don't get a duplicate payment.
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
+ claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
/// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
});
},
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
return Err(ReceiveError {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
} else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
phantom_shared_secret,
}
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
}
} else {
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
}
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
+ }
+
/// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
/// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
}
}
} else {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
}
}) => {
- let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
+ let onion_fields =
+ RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
+ Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
+ },
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
+ None, None, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
onion_payload,
};
+ let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
+
macro_rules! fail_htlc {
($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
));
+ continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
}
}
let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
- let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
- .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
+ let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
+ .entry(payment_hash)
+ // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
+ .or_insert_with(|| {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
+ }
+ });
+ if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
+ if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
+ }
+ } else {
+ claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
+ }
+ let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
if htlcs.len() == 1 {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
}
let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ }
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
+ onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
});
payment_claimable_generated = true;
} else {
// payment value yet, wait until we receive more
// MPP parts.
htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
+ committed_to_claimable = true;
+ }
}
payment_claimable_generated
}}
Err(()) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
};
if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue;
}
}
check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
}
- match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
+ match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
- e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
+ e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose: purpose.clone(),
+ onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
+ htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
+ });
let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
claim_deadline,
+ onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
});
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
- continue
};
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
}
}
- self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
- if htlcs.is_empty() {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
+ if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
// This should be unreachable
debug_assert!(false);
return false;
}
- if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
// Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
// In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
// This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
// exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
- if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
+ if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
+ .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
+ {
return true;
- } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
+ } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
}) {
- timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
+ timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
+ .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
return false;
}
}
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
- if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
+ if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
let mut sources = {
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
+ if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
- for htlc in sources.iter() {
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
}
let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
- ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
});
if dup_purpose.is_some() {
debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
- sources
+ payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
}
if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
- htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
+ payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
// If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
// our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
// number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
false
} else { true }
});
- !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
+ !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
});
let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
(0, payment_data, required),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
+ (3, payment_metadata, option),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
+ (3, payment_metadata, option),
},
;);
let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
- (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
+ let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
+ (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
+ (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
htlc.write(writer)?;
}
- htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
+ htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
+ htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
}
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
+ (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
Ok(())
let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
+ let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
+ (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
});
if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
- let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
- if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
+ let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
+ if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
- claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
+ if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
+ if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
+ purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
+ {
+ let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
+ });
+ if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
+ let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
+ });
+ if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ }
}
} else {
// LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
// include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
- for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
- if previous_hops.is_empty() {
+ for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
+ if htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
+ let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
};
- claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
+ claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
+ purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
+ });
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
- if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
+ if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
- let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
+ let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
}
- for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
+ for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
// Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
receiver_node_id,
payment_hash,
- purpose: payment_purpose,
+ purpose: payment.purpose,
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
});
}
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
- claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
+ claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
//! (see [BOLT-2](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md) for more information).
//! - `OnionMessages` - requires/supports forwarding onion messages
//! (see [BOLT-7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/759/files) for more information).
-//! TODO: update link
+// TODO: update link
//! - `ChannelType` - node supports the channel_type field in open/accept
//! (see [BOLT-2](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md) for more information).
//! - `SCIDPrivacy` - supply channel aliases for routing
//! (see [BOLT-2](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md) for more information).
+//! - `PaymentMetadata` - include additional data in invoices which is passed to recipients in the
+//! onion.
+//! (see [BOLT-11](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md) for
+//! more).
+//! - `ZeroConf` - supports accepting HTLCs and using channels prior to funding confirmation
+//! (see
+//! [BOLT-2](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message)
+//! for more info).
//! - `Keysend` - send funds to a node without an invoice
//! (see the [`Keysend` feature assignment proposal](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/605#issuecomment-606679798) for more information).
//! - `AnchorsZeroFeeHtlcTx` - requires/supports that commitment transactions include anchor outputs
-//! and HTLC transactions are pre-signed with zero fee (see
-//! [BOLT-3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md) for more
-//! information).
+//! and HTLC transactions are pre-signed with zero fee (see
+//! [BOLT-3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md) for more
+//! information).
//!
//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
//! [messages]: crate::ln::msgs
VariableLengthOnion | PaymentSecret,
// Byte 2
BasicMPP,
+ // Byte 3
+ ,
+ // Byte 4
+ ,
+ // Byte 5
+ ,
+ // Byte 6
+ PaymentMetadata,
]);
define_context!(OfferContext, []);
define_context!(InvoiceRequestContext, []);
}
flags[Self::BYTE_OFFSET] |= Self::REQUIRED_MASK;
+ flags[Self::BYTE_OFFSET] &= !Self::OPTIONAL_MASK;
}
/// Sets the feature's optional (odd) bit in the given flags.
define_feature!(47, SCIDPrivacy, [InitContext, NodeContext, ChannelTypeContext],
"Feature flags for only forwarding with SCID aliasing. Called `option_scid_alias` in the BOLTs",
set_scid_privacy_optional, set_scid_privacy_required, supports_scid_privacy, requires_scid_privacy);
+ define_feature!(49, PaymentMetadata, [InvoiceContext],
+ "Feature flags for payment metadata in invoices.", set_payment_metadata_optional,
+ set_payment_metadata_required, supports_payment_metadata, requires_payment_metadata);
define_feature!(51, ZeroConf, [InitContext, NodeContext, ChannelTypeContext],
"Feature flags for accepting channels with zero confirmations. Called `option_zeroconf` in the BOLTs",
set_zero_conf_optional, set_zero_conf_required, supports_zero_conf, requires_zero_conf);
define_feature!(55, Keysend, [NodeContext],
"Feature flags for keysend payments.", set_keysend_optional, set_keysend_required,
supports_keysend, requires_keysend);
+ // Note: update the module-level docs when a new feature bit is added!
#[cfg(test)]
define_feature!(123456789, UnknownFeature,
#[test]
fn convert_to_context_with_unknown_flags() {
// Ensure the `from` context has fewer known feature bytes than the `to` context.
- assert!(<sealed::InvoiceContext as sealed::Context>::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len() <
- <sealed::NodeContext as sealed::Context>::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len());
- let mut invoice_features = InvoiceFeatures::empty();
- invoice_features.set_unknown_feature_optional();
- assert!(invoice_features.supports_unknown_bits());
- let node_features: NodeFeatures = invoice_features.to_context();
- assert!(!node_features.supports_unknown_bits());
+ assert!(<sealed::ChannelContext as sealed::Context>::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len() <
+ <sealed::InvoiceContext as sealed::Context>::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len());
+ let mut channel_features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
+ channel_features.set_unknown_feature_optional();
+ assert!(channel_features.supports_unknown_bits());
+ let invoice_features: InvoiceFeatures = channel_features.to_context_internal();
+ assert!(!invoice_features.supports_unknown_bits());
}
#[test]
}
impl ConnectStyle {
+ pub fn skips_blocks(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst => false,
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip => true,
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst => false,
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsDuplicativelyFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip => true,
+ ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen => false,
+ }
+ }
+
fn random_style() -> ConnectStyle {
#[cfg(feature = "std")] {
use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
}
pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, depth: u32) -> BlockHash {
- let skip_intermediaries = match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
- ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks|
- ConnectStyle::TransactionsDuplicativelyFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks|
- ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip => true,
- _ => false,
- };
+ let skip_intermediaries = node.connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks();
let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
let mut block = Block {
let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
if payment_claimable_expected {
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id, claim_deadline } => {
+ match &events_2[0] {
+ Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat,
+ receiver_node_id, ref via_channel_id, ref via_user_channel_id,
+ claim_deadline, onion_fields,
+ } => {
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
+ assert!(onion_fields.is_some());
match &purpose {
PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert_eq!(expected_preimage, *payment_preimage);
assert_eq!(our_payment_secret.unwrap(), *payment_secret);
+ assert_eq!(Some(*payment_secret), onion_fields.as_ref().unwrap().payment_secret);
},
PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
assert_eq!(expected_preimage.unwrap(), *payment_preimage);
assert!(our_payment_secret.is_none());
},
}
- assert_eq!(amount_msat, recv_value);
+ assert_eq!(*amount_msat, recv_value);
assert!(node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|details| details.channel_id == via_channel_id.unwrap()));
assert!(node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|details| details.user_channel_id == via_user_channel_id.unwrap()));
assert!(claim_deadline.unwrap() > node.best_block_info().1);
/// also fail.
pub fn test_txn_broadcast<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut txn_seen = HashSet::new();
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| txn_seen.insert(tx.txid()));
assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
pub fn check_preimage_claim<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut txn_seen = HashSet::new();
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| txn_seen.insert(tx.txid()));
- assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let mut found_prev = false;
-
- for tx in prev_txn {
- if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
- let mut iter = node_txn[0].input[0].witness.iter();
- iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
- iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
- assert!(iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items").len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
- assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
-
- found_prev = true;
- break;
+ for prev_tx in prev_txn {
+ for tx in &*node_txn {
+ if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == prev_tx.txid() {
+ check_spends!(tx, prev_tx);
+ let mut iter = tx.input[0].witness.iter();
+ iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
+ iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items");
+ assert!(iter.next().expect("expected 3 witness items").len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
+
+ found_prev = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
assert!(found_prev);
}
#[test]
-fn test_justice_tx() {
- // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
+fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
+ // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
// Create some new channels:
let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
-
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
node_txn.swap_remove(0);
}
test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+}
- // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
+#[test]
+fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
+ // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
+ let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create some new channels:
let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- node_txn.clear();
- }
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
// Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
- // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
+ // Filter out any non justice transactions.
+ node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
+ assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
// Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
}
// Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
- let timeout_tx;
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
-
- timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
- node_txn.clear();
- }
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
+ let timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); // Extra rebroadcast of timeout transaction
+ }
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ txn.remove(0)
+ };
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
- let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ txn
+ };
// Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
- {
- let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let alice_state = {
+ let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- txn.clear();
- }
+ txn.remove(0)
+ };
// Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
// Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
let bob_state_y;
{
- let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
- txn.clear();
+ bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
};
// We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
{
- let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
+ // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
+ // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
+ check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
}
}
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::crypto::sign;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
-#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::test_utils;
#[cfg(anchors)]
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
- let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ let revoked_htlc_success = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
- let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
- assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+ let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
+ txn.remove(1)
+ } else {
+ txn.remove(0)
+ }
+ };
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
// A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(as_balances,
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
// outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
- 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
+ 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
// As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}
+fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
+ // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_deserialized;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
+ // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
+ // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
+ 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+ ).unwrap();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ }
+
+ // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
+ } else {
+ assert!(txn.len() < 6);
+ }
+ for tx in txn {
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
+}
+
#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
use crate::util::logger;
-use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
+use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
},
FinalNode {
payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
},
}
(6, short_channel_id, required)
});
},
- OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
+ OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage } => {
_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
(4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
(8, payment_data, option),
+ (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option),
(5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
});
},
let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
+ let mut payment_metadata: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(r, {
(2, amt, required),
(4, cltv_value, required),
(6, short_id, option),
(8, payment_data, option),
+ (16, payment_metadata, option),
// See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
(5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
});
let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ if payment_metadata.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
short_channel_id,
}
} else {
- if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
+ if let Some(data) = &payment_data {
if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
payment_data,
+ payment_metadata: payment_metadata.map(|w| w.0),
keysend_preimage,
}
};
let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
payment_data: None,
+ payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
},
amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
total_msat: 0x1badca1f
}),
+ payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
},
amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
payment_secret,
total_msat: 0x1badca1f
}),
+ payment_metadata: None,
keysend_preimage: None,
} = msg.format {
assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
total_msat,
})
} else { None },
+ payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(),
keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
}
} else {
session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
+ payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pending_amt_msat: u64,
/// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
///
/// This should generally be constructed with data communicated to us from the recipient (via a
/// BOLT11 or BOLT12 invoice).
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RecipientOnionFields {
/// The [`PaymentSecret`] is an arbitrary 32 bytes provided by the recipient for us to repeat
/// in the onion. It is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
/// receives, thus you should generally never be providing a secret here for spontaneous
/// payments.
pub payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
+ /// The payment metadata serves a similar purpose as [`Self::payment_secret`] but is of
+ /// arbitrary length. This gives recipients substantially more flexibility to receive
+ /// additional data.
+ ///
+ /// In LDK, while the [`Self::payment_secret`] is fixed based on an internal authentication
+ /// scheme to authenticate received payments against expected payments and invoices, this field
+ /// is not used in LDK for received payments, and can be used to store arbitrary data in
+ /// invoices which will be received with the payment.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this field was added to the lightning specification more recently than
+ /// [`Self::payment_secret`] and while nearly all lightning senders support secrets, metadata
+ /// may not be supported as universally.
+ pub payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RecipientOnionFields, {
+ (0, payment_secret, option),
+ (2, payment_metadata, option),
+});
+
impl RecipientOnionFields {
/// Creates a [`RecipientOnionFields`] from only a [`PaymentSecret`]. This is the most common
/// set of onion fields for today's BOLT11 invoices - most nodes require a [`PaymentSecret`]
/// but do not require or provide any further data.
pub fn secret_only(payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Self {
- Self { payment_secret: Some(payment_secret) }
+ Self { payment_secret: Some(payment_secret), payment_metadata: None }
}
/// Creates a new [`RecipientOnionFields`] with no fields. This generally does not create
///
/// [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment
pub fn spontaneous_empty() -> Self {
- Self { payment_secret: None }
+ Self { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata: None }
+ }
+
+ /// When we have received some HTLC(s) towards an MPP payment, as we receive further HTLC(s) we
+ /// have to make sure that some fields match exactly across the parts. For those that aren't
+ /// required to match, if they don't match we should remove them so as to not expose data
+ /// that's dependent on the HTLC receive order to users.
+ ///
+ /// Here we implement this, first checking compatibility then mutating two objects and then
+ /// dropping any remaining non-matching fields from both.
+ pub(super) fn check_merge(&mut self, further_htlc_fields: &mut Self) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ if self.payment_secret != further_htlc_fields.payment_secret { return Err(()); }
+ if self.payment_metadata != further_htlc_fields.payment_metadata { return Err(()); }
+ // For custom TLVs we should just drop non-matching ones, but not reject the payment.
+ Ok(())
}
}
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) => {
let res = match payment.get() {
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
- total_msat, keysend_preimage, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
+ total_msat, keysend_preimage, payment_secret, payment_metadata, pending_amt_msat, ..
} => {
let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
}
(*total_msat, RecipientOnionFields {
payment_secret: *payment_secret,
+ payment_metadata: payment_metadata.clone(),
}, *keysend_preimage)
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
}
}
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) fn test_set_payment_metadata(
+ &self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>
+ ) {
+ match self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get_mut(&payment_id).unwrap() {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_metadata, .. } => {
+ *payment_metadata = new_payment_metadata;
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Need a retryable payment to update metadata on"),
+ }
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_add_new_pending_payment<ES: Deref>(
&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId,
pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
payment_hash,
payment_secret: recipient_onion.payment_secret,
+ payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata,
keysend_preimage,
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
(4, payment_secret, option),
(5, keysend_preimage, option),
(6, total_msat, required),
+ (7, payment_metadata, option),
(8, pending_amt_msat, required),
(10, starting_block_height, required),
(not_written, retry_strategy, (static_value, None)),
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV*4 + 20);
- let as_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 2);
- let (first_htlc_timeout_tx, second_htlc_timeout_tx) = (&as_htlc_timeout_txn[0], &as_htlc_timeout_txn[1]);
+ let (first_htlc_timeout_tx, second_htlc_timeout_tx) = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ (txn.remove(0), txn.remove(0))
+ };
check_spends!(first_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
check_spends!(second_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
do_claim_from_closed_chan(true);
do_claim_from_closed_chan(false);
}
+
+fn do_test_payment_metadata_consistency(do_reload: bool, do_modify: bool) {
+ // Check that a payment metadata received on one HTLC that doesn't match the one received on
+ // another results in the HTLC being rejected.
+ //
+ // We first set up a diamond shaped network, allowing us to split a payment into two HTLCs, the
+ // first of which we'll deliver and the second of which we'll fail and then re-send with
+ // modified payment metadata, which will in turn result in it being failed by the recipient.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]);
+
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
+ let chan_id_bd = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 1_000_000, 0).2;
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1_000_000, 0);
+ let chan_id_cd = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 1_000_000, 0).2;
+
+ // Pay more than half of each channel's max, requiring MPP
+ let amt_msat = 750_000_000;
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[3], Some(amt_msat));
+ let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash.0);
+ let payment_metadata = vec![44, 49, 52, 142];
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
+ .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
+ let mut route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params,
+ final_value_msat: amt_msat,
+ };
+
+ // Send the MPP payment, delivering the updated commitment state to nodes[1].
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields {
+ payment_secret: Some(payment_secret), payment_metadata: Some(payment_metadata),
+ }, payment_id, route_params.clone(), Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
+
+ let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
+ let first_send = SendEvent::from_event(send_events.pop().unwrap());
+ let second_send = SendEvent::from_event(send_events.pop().unwrap());
+
+ let (b_recv_ev, c_recv_ev) = if first_send.node_id == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ (&first_send, &second_send)
+ } else {
+ (&second_send, &first_send)
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_recv_ev.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], b_recv_ev.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let b_forward_ev = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_forward_ev.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[1], b_forward_ev.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+
+ // Before delivering the second MPP HTLC to nodes[2], disconnect nodes[2] and nodes[3], which
+ // will result in nodes[2] failing the HTLC back.
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &c_recv_ev.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], c_recv_ev.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let cs_fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_fail.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let payment_fail_retryable_evs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(payment_fail_retryable_evs.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = payment_fail_retryable_evs[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = payment_fail_retryable_evs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+
+ // Before we allow the HTLC to be retried, optionally change the payment_metadata we have
+ // stored for our payment.
+ if do_modify {
+ nodes[0].node.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, Some(Vec::new()));
+ }
+
+ // Optionally reload nodes[3] to check that the payment_metadata is properly serialized with
+ // the payment state.
+ if do_reload {
+ let mon_bd = get_monitor!(nodes[3], chan_id_bd).encode();
+ let mon_cd = get_monitor!(nodes[3], chan_id_cd).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[3], config, &nodes[3].node.encode(), &[&mon_bd, &mon_cd],
+ persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // Create a new channel between C and D as A will refuse to retry on the existing one because
+ // it just failed.
+ let chan_id_cd_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 1_000_000, 0).2;
+
+ // Now retry the failed HTLC.
+ nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_resend = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resend.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], as_resend.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
+ let cs_forward = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[2]);
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_forward.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], cs_forward.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ // Finally, check that nodes[3] does the correct thing - either accepting the payment or, if
+ // the payment metadata was modified, failing only the one modified HTLC and retaining the
+ // other.
+ if do_modify {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(),
+ &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment {payment_hash}]);
+ nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[3], 1);
+ let ds_fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[3], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &ds_fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], ds_fail.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(),
+ &[HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_cd_2 }]);
+ } else {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+ expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, amt_msat);
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_payment_metadata_consistency() {
+ do_test_payment_metadata_consistency(true, true);
+ do_test_payment_metadata_consistency(true, false);
+ do_test_payment_metadata_consistency(false, true);
+ do_test_payment_metadata_consistency(false, false);
+}
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::Confirm;
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
}
// Connect blocks on node B
- connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 135);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
let partial_claim_tx = {
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- node_txn[1].clone()
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
+ node_txn.remove(1)
};
// Broadcast partial claim on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
pub fn new(blocks: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(Block, u32)>>>) -> TestBroadcaster {
TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks }
}
+
+ pub fn txn_broadcast(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)
+ }
+
+ pub fn unique_txn_broadcast(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ let mut txn = self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ let mut seen = HashSet::new();
+ txn.retain(|tx| seen.insert(tx.txid()));
+ txn
+ }
}
impl chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {