/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
/// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
/// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
/// transaction.
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
- (1, resolving_txid, option),
- (2, payment_preimage, option),
-});
+// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
+// IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
+// backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
+// using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
+impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
+ let mut resolving_txid = None;
+ let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(Self {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
+ resolving_txid,
+ payment_preimage,
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
}
}
let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
- .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
true
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
source: source.clone(),
htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
- payment_preimage: None,
- });
- }
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: None,
+ });
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
payment_preimage: preimage,
});
},
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use ln::channel::EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS;
-use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
+use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
do_retry_with_no_persist(false);
}
+fn do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(use_dust: bool) {
+ // Test that an off-chain completed payment is not retryable on restart. This was previously
+ // broken for dust payments, but we test for both dust and non-dust payments.
+ //
+ // `use_dust` switches to using a dust HTLC, which results in the HTLC not having an on-chain
+ // output at all.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+
+ let mut manually_accept_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ manually_accept_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_config), None]);
+
+ let first_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let first_new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let first_nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let second_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let second_new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let second_nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let third_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let third_new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let third_nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Because we set nodes[1] to manually accept channels, just open a 0-conf channel.
+ let (funding_tx, chan_id) = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], None);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &funding_tx);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &funding_tx);
+ // Ignore the announcement_signatures messages
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
+
+ // Serialize the ChannelManager prior to sending payments
+ let mut nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ let route = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], if use_dust { 1_000 } else { 1_000_000 }).0;
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if use_dust { 1_000 } else { 1_000_000 });
+
+ // The ChannelMonitor should always be the latest version, as we're required to persist it
+ // during the `commitment_signed_dance!()`.
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+
+ let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+
+ macro_rules! reload_node {
+ ($chain_monitor: ident, $chan_manager: ident, $persister: ident) => { {
+ $persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
+ let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
+ $chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &$persister, keys_manager);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &$chain_monitor;
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+
+ let mut chan_1_monitor = None;
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
+
+ if !chan_1_monitor_serialized.0.is_empty() {
+ let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ chan_1_monitor = Some(<(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap().1);
+ assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor.as_mut().unwrap());
+ }
+
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: test_default_channel_config(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: nodes[0].logger,
+ channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ $chan_manager = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ if !chan_1_monitor_serialized.0.is_empty() {
+ let funding_txo = chan_1_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().get_funding_txo().0;
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, chan_1_monitor.unwrap()).is_ok());
+ }
+ nodes[0].node = &$chan_manager;
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], if !chan_1_monitor_serialized.0.is_empty() { 2 } else { 1 });
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ } }
+ }
+
+ reload_node!(first_new_chain_monitor, first_nodes_0_deserialized, first_persister);
+
+ // On reload, the ChannelManager should realize it is stale compared to the ChannelMonitor and
+ // force-close the channel.
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.has_pending_payments());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Now nodes[1] should send a channel reestablish, which nodes[0] will respond to with an
+ // error, as the channel has hit the chain.
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
+ let as_err = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_err.len(), 1);
+ let bs_commitment_tx;
+ match as_err[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), msg);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_string() });
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+
+ // Now fail back the payment from nodes[2] to nodes[1]. This doesn't really matter as the
+ // previous hop channel is already on-chain, but it makes nodes[2] willing to see additional
+ // incoming HTLCs with the same payment hash later.
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
+ [HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
+
+ // Connect the HTLC-Timeout transaction, timing out the HTLC on both nodes (but not confirming
+ // the HTLC-Timeout transaction beyond 1 conf). For dust HTLCs, the HTLC is considered resolved
+ // after the commitment transaction, so always connect the commitment transaction.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ if !use_dust {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1 + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32));
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1 + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32));
+ let as_htlc_timeout = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout.len(), 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout[0]);
+ // nodes[0] may rebroadcast (or RBF-bump) its HTLC-Timeout, so wipe the announced set.
+ nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout[0]);
+ }
+
+ // Create a new channel on which to retry the payment before we fail the payment via the
+ // HTLC-Timeout transaction. This avoids ChannelManager timing out the payment due to us
+ // connecting several blocks while creating the channel (implying time has passed).
+ // We do this with a zero-conf channel to avoid connecting blocks as a side-effect.
+ let (_, chan_id_3) = open_zero_conf_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], None);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // If we attempt to retry prior to the HTLC-Timeout (or commitment transaction, for dust HTLCs)
+ // confirming, we will fail as it's considered still-pending...
+ let (new_route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], if use_dust { 1_000 } else { 1_000_000 });
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.retry_payment(&new_route, payment_id).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, the HTLC should be failed and we can try the payment
+ // again. We serialize the node first as we'll then test retrying the HTLC after a restart
+ // (which should also still work).
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ // We set mpp_parts_remain to avoid having abandon_payment called
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
+
+ chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_3).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.retry_payment(&new_route, payment_id).is_ok());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ reload_node!(second_new_chain_monitor, second_nodes_0_deserialized, second_persister);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // Now resend the payment, delivering the HTLC and actually claiming it this time. This ensures
+ // the payment is not (spuriously) listed as still pending.
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.retry_payment(&new_route, payment_id).is_ok());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], if use_dust { 1_000 } else { 1_000_000 }, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.retry_payment(&new_route, payment_id).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_3).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ // Ensure that after reload we cannot retry the payment.
+ reload_node!(third_new_chain_monitor, third_nodes_0_deserialized, third_persister);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.retry_payment(&new_route, payment_id).is_err());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload() {
+ do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(true);
+ do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(false);
+}
+
+
fn do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload(persist_manager_post_event: bool, confirm_commitment_tx: bool, payment_timeout: bool) {
// When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
// dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff