use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
-use lightning::onion_message::OnionMessenger;
+use lightning::util::ser::{MaybeReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, OnionMessenger};
use utils::test_logger;
-use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::io::{self, Cursor};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
#[inline]
node_secret: secret,
counter: AtomicU64::new(0),
};
- let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger);
+ let custom_msg_handler = TestCustomMessageHandler {};
+ let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger, &custom_msg_handler);
let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
let peer_node_id_not_used = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
onion_messenger.handle_onion_message(&peer_node_id_not_used, &msg);
do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
}
+struct TestCustomMessage {}
+
+const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4242;
+const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS: [u8; 32] = [42; 32];
+
+impl CustomOnionMessageContents for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+ CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ Ok(CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS.write(w)?)
+ }
+}
+
+impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(buffer: &mut R, _message_type: u64,) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> where Self: Sized {
+ let mut buf = Vec::new();
+ buffer.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
+ return Ok(Some(TestCustomMessage {}))
+ }
+}
+
+struct TestCustomMessageHandler {}
+
+impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for TestCustomMessageHandler {
+ type CustomMessage = TestCustomMessage;
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) {}
+}
+
pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
impl Writer for VecWriter {
fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
#[test]
fn test_no_onion_message_breakage() {
- let one_hop_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01120410950000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let one_hop_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0136041095000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(one_hop_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Received an onion message with path_id: None and no reply_path".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
+ "Received an onion message with path_id None and no reply_path".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let two_unblinded_hops_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000039500000000000000000000000000000058000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001204105e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let two_unblinded_hops_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0135043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000029500000000000000000000000000000036000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604104b000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(two_unblinded_hops_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let two_unblinded_two_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01350433042102000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000395000000000000000000000000000000530000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000058045604210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040821020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e015e0000000000000000000000000000006b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000054b000000000000000000000000000000e800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000120410ee00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let two_unblinded_two_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01350433042102000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000295000000000000000000000000000000400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000058045604210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020821020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e014b000000000000000000000000000000b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000029500000000000000000000000000000036000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003604104b000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(two_unblinded_two_blinded_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
- let three_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e013504330421020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003950000000000000000000000000000007f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000045e0000000000000000000000000000004c000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001204104a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
+ let three_blinded_om = "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e01055600020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e013504330421020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002950000000000000000000000000000006c0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000035043304210200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000024b000000000000000000000000000000ac00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000360410d1000000000000000000000000000000fd1092202a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
let logger = TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) };
super::do_test(&::hex::decode(three_blinded_om).unwrap(), &logger);
{
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003".to_string())), Some(&1));
+ assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(), "Forwarding an onion message to peer 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002".to_string())), Some(&1));
}
}
}
const EVENT_DEADLINE: u64 = 5 * FRESHNESS_TIMER;
- #[derive(Clone, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
+ #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct TestDescriptor{}
impl SocketDescriptor for TestDescriptor {
fn send_data(&mut self, _data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
}
/// The kind of `BlockSourceError`, either persistent or transient.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum BlockSourceErrorKind {
/// Indicates an error that won't resolve when retrying a request (e.g., invalid data).
Persistent,
/// A block header and some associated data. This information should be available from most block
/// sources (and, notably, is available in Bitcoin Core's RPC and REST interfaces).
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BlockHeaderData {
/// The block header itself.
pub header: BlockHeader,
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
use std::ops::Deref;
}
/// A chain tip relative to another chain tip in terms of block hash and chainwork.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ChainTip {
/// A chain tip with the same hash as another chain's tip.
Common,
}
/// A block header with validated proof of work and corresponding block hash.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ValidatedBlockHeader {
pub(crate) block_hash: BlockHash,
inner: BlockHeaderData,
Ok(())
}
+
+ /// Returns the [`BestBlock`] corresponding to this validated block header, which can be passed
+ /// into [`ChannelManager::new`] as part of its [`ChainParameters`]. Useful for ensuring that
+ /// the [`SpvClient`] and [`ChannelManager`] are initialized to the same block during a fresh
+ /// start.
+ ///
+ /// [`SpvClient`]: crate::SpvClient
+ /// [`ChainParameters`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChainParameters
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`ChannelManager::new`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::new
+ pub fn to_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
+ BestBlock::new(self.block_hash, self.inner.height)
+ }
}
/// A block with validated data against its transaction list and corresponding block hash.
/// Errors that indicate what is wrong with the invoice. They have some granularity for debug
/// reasons, but should generally result in an "invalid BOLT11 invoice" message for the user.
#[allow(missing_docs)]
-#[derive(PartialEq, Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ParseError {
Bech32Error(bech32::Error),
ParseAmountError(ParseIntError),
/// Indicates that something went wrong while parsing or validating the invoice. Parsing errors
/// should be mostly seen as opaque and are only there for debugging reasons. Semantic errors
/// like wrong signatures, missing fields etc. could mean that someone tampered with the invoice.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ParseOrSemanticError {
/// The invoice couldn't be decoded
ParseError(ParseError),
synthetic_update.htlc_maximum_msat = htlc_maximum_msat;
}
- network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update)?;
+ match network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) => {},
+ Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(_), .. }) => {},
+ Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError, .. }) => {},
+ Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+ }
}
self.network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(latest_seen_timestamp);
assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
}
+ #[test]
+ fn update_succeeds_when_duplicate_gossip_is_applied() {
+ let initialization_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 56, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 25, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129,
+ 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash, &logger);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
+ assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
+
+ let single_direction_incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+ let update_result_1 = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&single_direction_incremental_update_input[..]);
+ // Apply duplicate update
+ let update_result_2 = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&single_direction_incremental_update_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result_1.is_ok());
+ assert!(update_result_2.is_ok());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn full_update_succeeds() {
let valid_input = vec![
L::Target: Logger,
P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
+ #[cfg(not(anchors))]
/// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
///
/// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
handler.handle_event(&event);
}
}
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
+ ///
+ /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
+ /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
+ /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
+ /// safety of funds, this method must be invoked frequently, ideally once for every chain tip
+ /// update (block connected or disconnected).
+ ///
+ /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
+ /// order to handle these events.
+ ///
+ /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: events::Event::SpendableOutputs
+ /// [`BumpTransaction`]: events::Event::BumpTransaction
+ fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
+ for monitor_state in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
+ pending_events.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events());
+ }
+ for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
+ handler.handle_event(&event);
+ }
+ }
}
#[cfg(test)]
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
use chain::Filter;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
use util::byte_utils;
use util::events::Event;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
}
/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum MonitorEvent {
/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCUpdate {
pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct HolderSignedTx {
/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Txid,
(14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
});
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+impl HolderSignedTx {
+ fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ Some(htlc.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ })
+ .collect()
+ }
+}
+
/// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
/// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
/// transaction causing it.
///
/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct OnchainEventEntry {
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
/// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
/// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
);
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
}
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
/// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
let mut ret = Ok(());
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
if *should_broadcast {
self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
+ // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
+ // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
+ // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
+ self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
+ );
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
+ let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
+ best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
+ );
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(
+ &[], vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
+ broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
+ );
+ }
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
+ match claim_event {
+ ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
+ } => {
+ let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
+ let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
+ let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
+ commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
+ ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ commitment_tx,
+ commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
+ anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: anchor_output_idx,
+ },
+ },
+ pending_htlcs,
+ }));
+ },
+ }
+ }
ret
}
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
} else {
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc.clone()))
+ htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
};
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid,
transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
- height: height,
+ height,
event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
- let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
+ let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
- // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
- // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
- let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
+ // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
+ // `transactions_confirmed`.
+ if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
+ // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
+ // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
// Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
- height: height,
+ height,
event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
};
log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable, ReadableArgs};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use ln::channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI;
use ln::{chan_utils, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
/// Information about a spendable output to a P2WSH script. See
/// SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
pub outpoint: OutPoint,
/// Information about a spendable output to our "payment key". See
/// SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
pub outpoint: OutPoint,
/// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the
/// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at
/// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
/// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface directly, either from
/// `get_destination_script()` or `get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()`, thus you should already know
/// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
+ /// input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
+ &self, anchor_tx: &mut Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
/// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
/// node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
///
witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
Ok(witness)
}
+
}
impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
Ok(closing_tx.trust().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
+ &self, anchor_tx: &mut Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(&self.holder_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let sighash = sighash::SighashCache::new(&*anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ input, &witness_script, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, EcdsaSighashType::All,
+ ).unwrap();
+ Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &hash_to_message!(&sighash[..]), &self.funding_key))
+ }
+
fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>)
-> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()> {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
pub(crate) mod package;
/// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct BestBlock {
block_hash: BlockHash,
height: u32,
}
/// An enum representing the status of a channel monitor update persistence.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
/// The update has been durably persisted and all copies of the relevant [`ChannelMonitor`]
/// have been updated.
///
/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::block_connected
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Hash)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct WatchedOutput {
/// First block where the transaction output may have been spent.
pub block_hash: Option<BlockHash>,
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::PaymentPreimage;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use chain::package::PackageSolvingData;
use chain::package::PackageTemplate;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
use core::cmp;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::mem::replace;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use core::mem::swap;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
/// transaction causing it.
///
/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct OnchainEventEntry {
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
/// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
/// bump-txn candidate buffer.
}
}
+// Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
+// claims.
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
+ /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
+ /// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
+ BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ commitment_tx: Transaction,
+ anchor_output_idx: u32,
+ },
+}
+
+/// Represents the different ways an output can be claimed (i.e., spent to an address under our
+/// control) onchain.
+pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
+ /// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
+ Tx(Transaction),
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
+ /// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
+ Event(ClaimEvent),
+}
/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
/// do RBF bumping if possible.
pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap<Txid, ClaimEvent>,
// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
// Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
locktimed_packages,
pending_claim_requests,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
secp_ctx,
})
}
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
secp_ctx,
}
self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
}
- /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
- /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
- /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
- /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
- fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<ClaimEvent> {
+ let mut ret = HashMap::new();
+ swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
+ ret.into_iter().map(|(_, event)| event).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+ }
+
+ /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize counterparty
+ /// onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock
+ /// expiration (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may get stuck
+ /// in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or
+ /// Child-Pay-For-Parent.
+ ///
+ /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
+ /// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
+ fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, OnchainClaim)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height));
if cached_request.is_malleable() {
- let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script, self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
+ let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) =
cached_request.compute_package_output(predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().to_sat(), fee_estimator, logger) {
assert!(new_feerate != 0);
- let transaction = cached_request.finalize_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
+ let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
- return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, transaction))
+ return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)))
}
} else {
- // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
- // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
- // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- if let Some(transaction) = cached_request.finalize_package(self, 0, self.destination_script.clone(), logger) {
- return Some((None, 0, transaction));
+ // Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
+ // packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
+ // which require external funding.
+ #[cfg(not(anchors))]
+ let inputs = cached_request.inputs();
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
+ debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
+ let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
+ Some(tx) => tx,
+ None => return None,
+ };
+ if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
+ return Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
}
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
+ // Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
+ // thus far that require external funding.
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => {
+ debug_assert_eq!(tx.txid(), self.holder_commitment.trust().txid(),
+ "Holder commitment transaction mismatch");
+ // We'll locate an anchor output we can spend within the commitment transaction.
+ let funding_pubkey = &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
+ match chan_utils::get_anchor_output(&tx, funding_pubkey) {
+ // An anchor output was found, so we should yield a funding event externally.
+ Some((idx, _)) => {
+ // TODO: Use a lower confirmation target when both our and the
+ // counterparty's latest commitment don't have any HTLCs present.
+ let conf_target = ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority;
+ let package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
+ .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, conf_target);
+ Some((
+ new_timer,
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
+ OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ commitment_tx: tx.clone(),
+ anchor_output_idx: idx,
+ }),
+ ))
+ },
+ // An anchor output was not found. There's nothing we can do other than
+ // attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
+ // it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
+ // transaction without anchor outputs.
+ None => Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Only HolderFundingOutput inputs should be untractable and require external funding");
+ None
+ },
+ });
}
None
}
// Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
// height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(cur_height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
req.set_timer(new_timer);
req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- let txid = tx.txid();
+ let txid = match claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ tx.txid()
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
+ let txid = match claim_event {
+ ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } => commitment_tx.txid(),
+ };
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(txid, claim_event);
+ txid
+ },
+ };
for k in req.outpoints() {
log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, conf_height));
}
self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, req);
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
}
for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim tx {}.", outpoint, claim_request);
self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ self.pending_claim_events.remove(&claim_request);
}
}
},
// Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
for (first_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(cur_height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
+ match bump_claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(*first_claim_txid, claim_event);
+ },
+ }
if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
request.set_timer(new_timer);
request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
- for (_, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
+ for (_first_claim_txid_height, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(height, &request, fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
request.set_timer(new_timer);
request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ match bump_claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(_first_claim_txid_height.0, claim_event);
+ },
+ }
}
}
for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
use io;
use prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::mem;
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
///
/// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
/// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
///
/// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
/// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
/// witnessScript.
///
/// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
preimage,
- htlc
+ htlc,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
(0, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (1, opt_anchors, option),
(2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
(6, preimage, required),
///
/// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
/// witnessScript.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc
+ htlc,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
(0, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (1, opt_anchors, option),
(2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
(6, htlc, required),
///
/// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
/// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
amount: u64,
/// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
///
/// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript: Script,
+ funding_amount: Option<u64>,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
+
impl HolderFundingOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript,
+ funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
(0, funding_redeemscript, required),
+ (1, opt_anchors, option),
+ (3, funding_amount, option),
});
/// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
///
/// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
/// finalizing an input claiming the output.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
impl PackageSolvingData {
fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
let amt = match self {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
// Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
// as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
// should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => unreachable!(),
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
+ }
};
amt
}
- fn weight(&self, opt_anchors: bool) -> usize {
+ fn weight(&self) -> usize {
let weight = match self {
PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize },
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
// Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
// as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
// should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
/// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
/// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
/// signatures.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
Malleable,
Untractable,
///
/// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
/// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PackageTemplate {
// List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
}
+ pub(crate) fn inputs(&self) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = &PackageSolvingData> {
+ self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, i)| i)
+ }
pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
match self.malleability {
PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
}
/// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
/// packages.
- fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
let mut amounts = 0;
for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
amounts += outp.amount();
self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(self.height_original))
.max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate")
}
- pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script, opt_anchors: bool) -> usize {
+ pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
let mut inputs_weight = 0;
let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
// previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
- witnesses_weight += outp.weight(opt_anchors);
+ witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
}
// version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
}
- pub(crate) fn finalize_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L) -> Option<Transaction>
- where L::Target: Logger,
- {
- match self.malleability {
- PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
- let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
- input: vec![],
- output: vec![TxOut {
- script_pubkey: destination_script,
- value,
- }],
- };
- for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
- bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: *outpoint,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
- witness: Witness::new(),
- });
- }
- for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
- if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
- }
- log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
- return Some(bumped_tx);
- },
- PackageMalleability::Untractable => {
- debug_assert_eq!(value, 0, "value is ignored for non-malleable packages, should be zero to ensure callsites are correct");
- if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
- if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
- log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
- log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
- return Some(final_tx);
- }
- return None;
- } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
- },
+ pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(
+ &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L
+ ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ debug_assert!(self.is_malleable());
+ let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![],
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: destination_script,
+ value,
+ }],
+ };
+ for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
+ bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: *outpoint,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+ if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
}
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
+ Some(bumped_tx)
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(
+ &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, logger: &L,
+ ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable());
+ if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
+ if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
+ return Some(final_tx);
+ }
+ return None;
+ } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
}
/// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
/// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
}
None
}
+
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
+ /// and the new feerate is below it, we'll use a 25% increase of the previous feerate instead of
+ /// the new one.
+ pub(crate) fn compute_package_feerate<F: Deref>(
+ &self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget,
+ ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
+ let feerate_estimate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(conf_target);
+ if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
+ // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
+ if feerate_estimate as u64 > self.feerate_previous {
+ feerate_estimate
+ } else {
+ // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
+ (self.feerate_previous + (self.feerate_previous / 4)).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
+ }
+ } else {
+ feerate_estimate
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Determines whether a package contains an input which must have additional external inputs
+ /// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
+ pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
+ self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some()
+ }
+
pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
let malleability = match input_solving_data {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
};
let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
}
macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
- ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr) => {
+ ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
{
let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc))
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
}
}
}
macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
- ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr) => {
+ ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
{
let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc))
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
}
}
}
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
fn test_package_amounts() {
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
{
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
- }
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
}
{
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
- let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
}
}
{
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
- let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
}
}
}
if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCClaim {
OfferedTimeout,
OfferedPreimage,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
}
+impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
/// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
/// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
/// pre-calculated keys.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
/// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
});
/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
res
}
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
/// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
/// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
.into_script()
}
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+/// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
+pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
+ let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
+ commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
+ .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
+}
+
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
+pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
+ let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
+ let mut funding_sig = funding_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ funding_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ Witness::from_vec(vec![funding_sig, anchor_redeem_script.to_bytes()])
+}
+
/// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
/// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
///
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
}
+impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
// We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
///
/// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
/// secret key.
-#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClosingTransaction {
to_holder_value_sat: u64,
to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
}
+impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
- // Do a really complicated dance to get an HTLC into the holding cell, with MonitorUpdateFailed
- // set but AwaitingRemoteRevoke unset. When this test was written, any attempts to send an HTLC
- // while MonitorUpdateFailed is set are immediately failed-backwards. Thus, the only way to get
- // an AddHTLC into the holding cell is to add it while AwaitingRemoteRevoke is set but
- // MonitorUpdateFailed is unset, and then swap the flags.
+ // Do a really complicated dance to get an HTLC into the holding cell, with
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress set but AwaitingRemoteRevoke unset. When this test was written, any
+ // attempts to send an HTLC while MonitorUpdateInProgress is set are immediately
+ // failed-backwards. Thus, the only way to get an AddHTLC into the holding cell is to add it
+ // while AwaitingRemoteRevoke is set but MonitorUpdateInProgress is unset, and then swap the
+ // flags.
//
// We do this by:
// a) routing a payment from node B to node A,
// e) delivering A's commitment_signed from (b) and the resulting B revoke_and_ack message,
// clearing AwaitingRemoteRevoke on node A.
//
- // Note that because, at the end, MonitorUpdateFailed is still set, the HTLC generated in (c)
- // will not be freed from the holding cell.
+ // Note that because, at the end, MonitorUpdateInProgress is still set, the HTLC generated in
+ // (c) will not be freed from the holding cell.
let (payment_preimage_0, payment_hash_0, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 100_000);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed_b2, false);
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
}
+
+fn do_test_outbound_reload_without_init_mon(use_0conf: bool) {
+ // Test that if the monitor update generated in funding_signed is stored async and we restart
+ // with the latest ChannelManager but the ChannelMonitor persistence never completed we happily
+ // drop the channel and move on.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+
+ let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ chan_config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(chan_config), Some(chan_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+ if use_0conf {
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, ..) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 43);
+
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_signed_locked = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_signed_locked.len(), if use_0conf { 2 } else { 1 });
+ match &bs_signed_locked[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { msg, .. } => {
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ if use_0conf {
+ match &bs_signed_locked[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { msg, .. } => {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // nodes[0] is now waiting on the first ChannelMonitor persistence to complete in order to
+ // broadcast the funding transaction. If nodes[0] restarts at this point with the
+ // ChannelMonitor lost, we should simply discard the channel.
+
+ // The test framework checks that watched_txn/outputs match the monitor set, which they will
+ // not, so we have to clear them here.
+ nodes[0].chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ nodes[0].chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap().clear();
+
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
+ let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
+
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ nodes_0_deserialized = {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: config,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: nodes[0].logger,
+ channel_monitors: HashMap::new(),
+ }).unwrap().1
+ };
+ nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_outbound_reload_without_init_mon() {
+ do_test_outbound_reload_without_init_mon(true);
+ do_test_outbound_reload_without_init_mon(false);
+}
+
+fn do_test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon(use_0conf: bool, lock_commitment: bool) {
+ // Test that if the monitor update generated by funding_transaction_generated is stored async
+ // and we restart with the latest ChannelManager but the ChannelMonitor persistence never
+ // completed we happily drop the channel and move on.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+
+ let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+
+ let mut chan_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ chan_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ chan_config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(chan_config), Some(chan_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+ if use_0conf {
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, ..) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 43);
+
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+
+ let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // nodes[1] happily sends its funding_signed even though its awaiting the persistence of the
+ // initial ChannelMonitor, but it will decline to send its channel_ready even if the funding
+ // transaction is confirmed.
+ let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let as_funding_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if lock_commitment {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_funding_tx[0]);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_funding_tx[0]);
+ }
+ if use_0conf || lock_commitment {
+ let as_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_ready);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ // nodes[1] is now waiting on the first ChannelMonitor persistence to complete in order to
+ // move the channel to ready (or is waiting on the funding transaction to confirm). If nodes[1]
+ // restarts at this point with the ChannelMonitor lost, we should simply discard the channel.
+
+ // The test framework checks that watched_txn/outputs match the monitor set, which they will
+ // not, so we have to clear them here.
+ nodes[1].chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ nodes[1].chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap().clear();
+
+ let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+ persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
+ let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
+
+ let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ nodes_1_deserialized = {
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: config,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: nodes[1].logger,
+ channel_monitors: HashMap::new(),
+ }).unwrap().1
+ };
+ nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
+ assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon() {
+ do_test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon(true, true);
+ do_test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon(true, false);
+ do_test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon(false, true);
+ do_test_inbound_reload_without_init_mon(false, false);
+}
/// dance.
PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
- /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
- /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
- MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
+ /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
+ /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
+ MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
/// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
/// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
/// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
ShutdownComplete = 4096,
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
-const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
where L::Target: Logger {
// Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
// (see equivalent if condition there).
- assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
+ assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
}],
};
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
// Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
// `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
// `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
}
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
}
if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
/// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
} else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
}
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
}
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
if require_commitment {
return None;
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
}
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
// If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
funding_broadcastable = None;
}
- // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
- // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
- // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
+ // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
+ // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
+ // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
// * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
// the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
// * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
- self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
}
// Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
None
} else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
} else {
let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
- // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
+ // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
self.channel_state &
(BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
- ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
+ ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
== BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
return Ok((None, None));
}
/// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
+ (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
}
/// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
}
+ /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
+ /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
+ /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
+ /// advanced state.
+ pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
+ if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
+ if self.channel_state &
+ !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
+ == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
+ // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
+ debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
+ // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
+ // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
+ // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
+ //
+ // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
+ // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
+ // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
+ //
+ // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
+ // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
+ // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
+ if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
+ assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+ false
+ }
+
/// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
(self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
};
if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
let next_per_commitment_point =
self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
/// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
/// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
/// awaiting ACK.
- /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
- /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
- /// them.
+ /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
+ /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
+ /// regenerate them.
///
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
///
}
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
}
let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
}
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
}
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
- let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
}
if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
}
} else {
events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id: payment_id,
+ payment_id,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
path: path.clone(),
short_channel_id,
if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
events::Event::ProbeFailed {
- payment_id: payment_id,
+ payment_id,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
path: path.clone(),
short_channel_id: Some(scid),
}
Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
+ first_hop_htlc_msat,
path: path.unwrap(),
payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
payment_secret,
}
by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
}
+ } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
+ // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
+ // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
+ // safely discard the channel.
+ let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
+ channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ });
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
+ SendEvent { node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
}
pub fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
/// An error in decoding a message or struct.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum DecodeError {
/// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
/// Includes unknown realm byte in an OnionHopData packet
}
/// An init message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Init {
/// The relevant features which the sender supports
pub features: InitFeatures,
}
/// An error message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ErrorMessage {
/// The channel ID involved in the error.
///
}
/// A warning message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct WarningMessage {
/// The channel ID involved in the warning.
///
}
/// A ping message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Ping {
/// The desired response length
pub ponglen: u16,
}
/// A pong message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Pong {
/// The pong packet size.
/// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
}
/// An open_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OpenChannel {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
}
/// An accept_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AcceptChannel {
/// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A funding_created message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FundingCreated {
/// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A funding_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FundingSigned {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A channel_ready message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelReady {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A shutdown message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Shutdown {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
/// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
/// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
/// to use.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
/// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
/// transaction.
}
/// A closing_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClosingSigned {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An update_add_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An onion message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OnionMessage {
/// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
}
/// An update_fulfill_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An update_fail_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An update_fail_malformed_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A commitment_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CommitmentSigned {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// A revoke_and_ack message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RevokeAndACK {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An update_fee message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFee {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
/// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
/// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
}
/// A channel_reestablish message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelReestablish {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An announcement_signatures message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
/// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
}
/// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum NetAddress {
/// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
IPv4 {
/// The unsigned part of a node_announcement
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
/// The advertised features
pub features: NodeFeatures,
pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// A node_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
/// The signature by the node key
}
/// The unsigned part of a channel_announcement
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
/// The advertised channel features
pub features: ChannelFeatures,
pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
/// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
pub node_signature_1: Signature,
}
/// The unsigned part of a channel_update
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelUpdate {
/// A signature of the channel update
pub signature: Signature,
/// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
/// effort to reply to the query using one or more reply_channel_range
/// messages.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct QueryChannelRange {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// not be a perfect view of the network. The short_channel_ids in the
/// reply are encoded. We only support encoding_type=0 uncompressed
/// serialization and do not support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// reply_short_channel_ids_end message. The short_channel_ids sent in
/// this query are encoded. We only support encoding_type=0 uncompressed
/// serialization and do not support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// query_short_channel_ids message. The query recipient makes a best
/// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
/// a perfect view of the network.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// A gossip_timestamp_filter message is used by a node to request
/// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
/// gossip_queries feature has been negotiated.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// Struct used to return values from revoke_and_ack messages, containing a bunch of commitment
/// transaction updates if they were pending.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
/// update_add_htlc messages which should be sent
pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
/// OptionalFeild simply gets Present if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
/// separate enum type for them.
/// (C-not exported) due to a free generic in T
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum OptionalField<T> {
/// Optional field is included in message
Present(T),
}
}
+impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
// This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
// (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, LightningError, NetAddress, OnionMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
use ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager};
-use util::ser::{VecWriter, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::ser::{MaybeReadableArgs, VecWriter, Writeable, Writer};
use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NextNoiseStep};
use ln::wire;
use ln::wire::Encode;
-use onion_message::{SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
+use onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
use routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync};
use util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
use util::crypto::sign;
InitFeatures::empty()
}
}
+impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for IgnoringMessageHandler {
+ type CustomMessage = Infallible;
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) {
+ // Since we always return `None` in the read the handle method should never be called.
+ unreachable!();
+ }
+}
+impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for Infallible {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(_buffer: &mut R, _msg_type: u64) -> Result<Option<Self>, msgs::DecodeError> where Self: Sized {
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+}
+
+impl CustomOnionMessageContents for Infallible {
+ fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 { unreachable!(); }
+}
+
impl Deref for IgnoringMessageHandler {
type Target = IgnoringMessageHandler;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self { self }
/// A script pubkey for shutting down a channel as defined by [BOLT #2].
///
/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ShutdownScript(ShutdownScriptImpl);
/// An error occurring when converting from [`Script`] to [`ShutdownScript`].
pub script: Script
}
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum ShutdownScriptImpl {
/// [`PublicKey`] used to form a P2WPKH script pubkey. Used to support backward-compatible
/// serialization.
use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, Recipient};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
-use ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessageHandler};
-use super::{BlindedRoute, Destination, OnionMessenger, SendError};
+use ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError, OnionMessageHandler};
+use super::{BlindedRoute, CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger, SendError};
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use util::ser::{MaybeReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1};
+use io;
use sync::Arc;
struct MessengerNode {
keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
- messenger: OnionMessenger<EnforcingSigner, Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
+ messenger: OnionMessenger<EnforcingSigner, Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>, Arc<TestCustomMessageHandler>>,
logger: Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct TestCustomMessage {}
+
+const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE: u64 = 4242;
+const CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS: [u8; 32] = [42; 32];
+
+impl CustomOnionMessageContents for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+ CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ Ok(CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS.write(w)?)
+ }
+}
+
+impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for TestCustomMessage {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(buffer: &mut R, message_type: u64) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> where Self: Sized {
+ if message_type == CUSTOM_MESSAGE_TYPE {
+ let mut buf = Vec::new();
+ buffer.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
+ assert_eq!(buf, CUSTOM_MESSAGE_CONTENTS);
+ return Ok(Some(TestCustomMessage {}))
+ }
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+}
+
+struct TestCustomMessageHandler {}
+
+impl CustomOnionMessageHandler for TestCustomMessageHandler {
+ type CustomMessage = TestCustomMessage;
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, _msg: Self::CustomMessage) {}
+}
+
fn create_nodes(num_messengers: u8) -> Vec<MessengerNode> {
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
for i in 0..num_messengers {
let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet));
nodes.push(MessengerNode {
keys_manager: keys_manager.clone(),
- messenger: OnionMessenger::new(keys_manager, logger.clone()),
+ messenger: OnionMessenger::new(keys_manager, logger.clone(), Arc::new(TestCustomMessageHandler {})),
logger,
});
}
#[test]
fn one_hop() {
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
}
#[test]
fn two_unblinded_hops() {
let nodes = create_nodes(3);
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[2].get_node_pk()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[2].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
}
#[test]
fn two_unblinded_two_blinded() {
let nodes = create_nodes(5);
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[3].get_node_pk(), nodes[4].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[4].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), test_msg, None).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
}
#[test]
fn three_blinded_hops() {
let nodes = create_nodes(4);
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[3].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[3].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), test_msg, None).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
}
fn too_big_packet_error() {
// Make sure we error as expected if a packet is too big to send.
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(TestCustomMessage {});
let hop_node_id = nodes[1].get_node_pk();
let hops = [hop_node_id; 400];
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&hops, Destination::Node(hop_node_id), None).unwrap_err();
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&hops, Destination::Node(hop_node_id), test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooBigPacket);
}
fn invalid_blinded_route_error() {
// Make sure we error as expected if a provided blinded route has 0 or 1 hops.
let nodes = create_nodes(3);
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
// 0 hops
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let mut blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[2].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
blinded_route.blinded_hops.clear();
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), None).unwrap_err();
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
// 1 hop
let mut blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[2].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
blinded_route.blinded_hops.remove(0);
assert_eq!(blinded_route.blinded_hops.len(), 1);
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), None).unwrap_err();
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
}
#[test]
fn reply_path() {
let nodes = create_nodes(4);
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
// Destination::Node
let reply_path = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[0].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[0].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[3].get_node_pk()), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk()], Destination::Node(nodes[3].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
// Make sure the last node successfully decoded the reply path.
nodes[3].logger.assert_log_contains(
"lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
- format!("Received an onion message with path_id: None and reply_path").to_string(), 1);
+ format!("Received an onion message with path_id None and a reply_path").to_string(), 1);
// Destination::BlindedRoute
let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[3].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[3].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
let reply_path = BlindedRoute::new(&[nodes[2].get_node_pk(), nodes[1].get_node_pk(), nodes[0].get_node_pk()], &*nodes[0].keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), Some(reply_path)).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes, None);
nodes[3].logger.assert_log_contains(
"lightning::onion_message::messenger".to_string(),
- format!("Received an onion message with path_id: None and reply_path").to_string(), 2);
+ format!("Received an onion message with path_id None and a reply_path").to_string(), 2);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn invalid_custom_message_type() {
+ let nodes = create_nodes(2);
+
+ struct InvalidCustomMessage{}
+ impl CustomOnionMessageContents for InvalidCustomMessage {
+ fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+ // Onion message contents must have a TLV >= 64.
+ 63
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Writeable for InvalidCustomMessage {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { unreachable!() }
+ }
+
+ impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for InvalidCustomMessage {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(_buffer: &mut R, _message_type: u64) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> where Self: Sized {
+ unreachable!()
+ }
+ }
+
+ let test_msg = OnionMessageContents::Custom(InvalidCustomMessage {});
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), test_msg, None).unwrap_err();
+ assert_eq!(err, SendError::InvalidMessage);
}
#[test]
fn peer_buffer_full() {
let nodes = create_nodes(2);
+ let test_msg = TestCustomMessage {};
for _ in 0..188 { // Based on MAX_PER_PEER_BUFFER_SIZE in OnionMessenger
- nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg.clone()), None).unwrap();
}
- let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), None).unwrap_err();
+ let err = nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(&[], Destination::Node(nodes[1].get_node_pk()), OnionMessageContents::Custom(test_msg), None).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, SendError::BufferFull);
}
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessageHandler};
use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
use super::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
+pub use super::packet::{CustomOnionMessageContents, OnionMessageContents};
use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
use super::utils;
use util::events::OnionMessageProvider;
/// A sender, receiver and forwarder of onion messages. In upcoming releases, this object will be
/// used to retrieve invoices and fulfill invoice requests from [offers]. Currently, only sending
-/// and receiving empty onion messages is supported.
+/// and receiving custom onion messages is supported.
///
/// # Example
///
/// # use bitcoin::hashes::_export::_core::time::Duration;
/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
/// # use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysManager, KeysInterface};
-/// # use lightning::onion_message::{BlindedRoute, Destination, OnionMessenger};
+/// # use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+/// # use lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
+/// # use lightning::onion_message::{BlindedRoute, CustomOnionMessageContents, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger};
/// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+/// # use lightning::util::ser::{MaybeReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+/// # use lightning::io;
/// # use std::sync::Arc;
/// # struct FakeLogger {};
/// # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
/// # let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
/// # let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
/// # let hop_node_id1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_secret);
-/// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1,
-/// hop_node_id1);
+/// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1);
/// # let destination_node_id = hop_node_id1;
-/// #
+/// # let your_custom_message_handler = IgnoringMessageHandler {};
/// // Create the onion messenger. This must use the same `keys_manager` as is passed to your
/// // ChannelManager.
-/// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger);
+/// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger, your_custom_message_handler);
///
-/// // Send an empty onion message to a node id.
+/// # struct YourCustomMessage {}
+/// impl Writeable for YourCustomMessage {
+/// fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+/// # Ok(())
+/// // Write your custom onion message to `w`
+/// }
+/// }
+/// impl CustomOnionMessageContents for YourCustomMessage {
+/// fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+/// # let your_custom_message_type = 42;
+/// your_custom_message_type
+/// }
+/// }
+/// impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for YourCustomMessage {
+/// fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R, message_type: u64) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
+/// # unreachable!()
+/// // Read your custom onion message of type `message_type` from `r`, or return `None`
+/// // if the message type is unknown
+/// }
+/// }
+/// // Send a custom onion message to a node id.
/// let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
/// let reply_path = None;
-/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id), reply_path);
+/// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
+/// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
+/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id), message, reply_path);
///
/// // Create a blinded route to yourself, for someone to send an onion message to.
/// # let your_node_id = hop_node_id1;
/// let hops = [hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4, your_node_id];
/// let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&hops, &keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
///
-/// // Send an empty onion message to a blinded route.
+/// // Send a custom onion message to a blinded route.
/// # let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
/// let reply_path = None;
-/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), reply_path);
+/// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
+/// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
+/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), message, reply_path);
/// ```
///
/// [offers]: <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/798>
/// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::OnionMessenger
-pub struct OnionMessenger<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref>
+pub struct OnionMessenger<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
L::Target: Logger,
+ CMH:: Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
keys_manager: K,
logger: L,
pending_messages: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>>>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ custom_handler: CMH,
// Coming soon:
// invoice_handler: InvoiceHandler,
- // custom_handler: CustomHandler, // handles custom onion messages
}
/// The destination of an onion message.
/// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
///
/// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SendError {
/// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
TooFewBlindedHops,
/// Our next-hop peer was offline or does not support onion message forwarding.
InvalidFirstHop,
+ /// Onion message contents must have a TLV type >= 64.
+ InvalidMessage,
/// Our next-hop peer's buffer was full or our total outbound buffer was full.
BufferFull,
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
+/// Handler for custom onion messages. If you are using [`SimpleArcOnionMessenger`],
+/// [`SimpleRefOnionMessenger`], or prefer to ignore inbound custom onion messages,
+/// [`IgnoringMessageHandler`] must be provided to [`OnionMessenger::new`]. Otherwise, a custom
+/// implementation of this trait must be provided, with [`CustomMessage`] specifying the supported
+/// message types.
+///
+/// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
+///
+/// [`IgnoringMessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler
+/// [`CustomMessage`]: Self::CustomMessage
+pub trait CustomOnionMessageHandler {
+ /// The message known to the handler. To support multiple message types, you may want to make this
+ /// an enum with a variant for each supported message.
+ type CustomMessage: CustomOnionMessageContents;
+ /// Called with the custom message that was received.
+ fn handle_custom_message(&self, msg: Self::CustomMessage);
+}
+
+impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
L::Target: Logger,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
/// Constructs a new `OnionMessenger` to send, forward, and delegate received onion messages to
/// their respective handlers.
- pub fn new(keys_manager: K, logger: L) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(keys_manager: K, logger: L, custom_handler: CMH) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
OnionMessenger {
pending_messages: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
secp_ctx,
logger,
+ custom_handler,
}
}
- /// Send an empty onion message to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
+ /// Send an onion message with contents `message` to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
/// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
- pub fn send_onion_message(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
+ pub fn send_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, message: OnionMessageContents<T>, reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
return Err(SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
}
}
+ let OnionMessageContents::Custom(ref msg) = message;
+ if msg.tlv_type() < 64 { return Err(SendError::InvalidMessage) }
+
let blinding_secret_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let (introduction_node_id, blinding_point) = if intermediate_nodes.len() != 0 {
}
};
let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
- &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
+ &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
.map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;
let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
false
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
+impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
L::Target: Logger,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
/// Handle an incoming onion message. Currently, if a message was destined for us we will log, but
/// soon we'll delegate the onion message to a handler that can generate invoices or send
match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..],
msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, control_tlvs_ss)
{
- Ok((Payload::Receive {
- control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
+ Ok((Payload::Receive::<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage> {
+ message, control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
}, None)) => {
log_info!(self.logger,
- "Received an onion message with path_id: {:02x?} and {}reply_path",
- path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "" } else { "no " });
+ "Received an onion message with path_id {:02x?} and {} reply_path",
+ path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
+ match message {
+ OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => self.custom_handler.handle_custom_message(msg),
+ }
},
Ok((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
next_node_id, next_blinding_override
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
+impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
L::Target: Logger,
+ CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<msgs::OnionMessage> {
let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
///
/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager
/// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager
-pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>>;
+pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
/// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] and
/// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
///
///
/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleRefChannelManager
/// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleRefPeerManager
-pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, &'a KeysManager, &'b L>;
+pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, &'a KeysManager, &'b L, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
/// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
/// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
-fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, mut reply_path:
- Option<BlindedRoute>, session_priv: &SecretKey
-) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), secp256k1::Error> {
+fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: CustomOnionMessageContents, S: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<S>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination,
+ message: OnionMessageContents<T>, mut reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>, session_priv: &SecretKey
+) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload<T>, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), secp256k1::Error> {
let num_hops = unblinded_path.len() + destination.num_hops();
let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
let mut onion_packet_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
let mut unblinded_path_idx = 0;
let mut blinded_path_idx = 0;
let mut prev_control_tlvs_ss = None;
+ let mut final_control_tlvs = None;
utils::construct_keys_callback(secp_ctx, unblinded_path, Some(destination), session_priv, |_, onion_packet_ss, ephemeral_pubkey, control_tlvs_ss, unblinded_pk_opt, enc_payload_opt| {
if num_unblinded_hops != 0 && unblinded_path_idx < num_unblinded_hops {
if let Some(ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
control_tlvs_ss));
blinded_path_idx += 1;
} else if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
- payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
- control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload),
- reply_path: reply_path.take(),
- }, control_tlvs_ss));
+ final_control_tlvs = Some(ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload));
+ prev_control_tlvs_ss = Some(control_tlvs_ss);
}
let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(onion_packet_ss.as_ref());
});
})?;
- if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss {
+ if let Some(control_tlvs) = final_control_tlvs {
+ payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
+ control_tlvs,
+ reply_path: reply_path.take(),
+ message,
+ }, prev_control_tlvs_ss.unwrap()));
+ } else {
payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id: None, }),
reply_path: reply_path.take(),
- }, control_tlvs_ss));
+ message,
+ }, prev_control_tlvs_ss.unwrap()));
}
Ok((payloads, onion_packet_keys))
}
/// Errors if the serialized payload size exceeds onion_message::BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
-fn construct_onion_message_packet(payloads: Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, onion_keys: Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Packet, ()> {
+fn construct_onion_message_packet<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(payloads: Vec<(Payload<T>, [u8; 32])>, onion_keys: Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Packet, ()> {
// Spec rationale:
// "`len` allows larger messages to be sent than the standard 1300 bytes allowed for an HTLC
// onion, but this should be used sparingly as it is reduces anonymity set, hence the
// Re-export structs so they can be imported with just the `onion_message::` module prefix.
pub use self::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, BlindedHop};
-pub use self::messenger::{Destination, OnionMessenger, SendError, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
+pub use self::messenger::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger, SendError, SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
pub(crate) use self::packet::Packet;
use ln::onion_utils;
use super::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::{ChaChaPolyReadAdapter, ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter};
-use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, LengthRead, LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, LengthRead, LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, MaybeReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use core::cmp;
use io::{self, Read};
pub(super) const SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN: usize = 1300;
pub(super) const BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN: usize = 32768;
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct Packet {
pub(super) version: u8,
pub(super) public_key: PublicKey,
/// Onion message payloads contain "control" TLVs and "data" TLVs. Control TLVs are used to route
/// the onion message from hop to hop and for path verification, whereas data TLVs contain the onion
/// message content itself, such as an invoice request.
-pub(super) enum Payload {
+pub(super) enum Payload<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> {
/// This payload is for an intermediate hop.
Forward(ForwardControlTlvs),
/// This payload is for the final hop.
Receive {
control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs,
reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>,
- // Coming soon:
- // message: Message,
+ message: OnionMessageContents<T>,
}
}
-// Coming soon:
-// enum Message {
-// InvoiceRequest(InvoiceRequest),
-// Invoice(Invoice),
-// InvoiceError(InvoiceError),
-// CustomMessage<T>,
-// }
+#[derive(Debug)]
+/// The contents of an onion message. In the context of offers, this would be the invoice, invoice
+/// request, or invoice error.
+pub enum OnionMessageContents<T> where T: CustomOnionMessageContents {
+ // Coming soon:
+ // Invoice,
+ // InvoiceRequest,
+ // InvoiceError,
+ /// A custom onion message specified by the user.
+ Custom(T),
+}
+
+impl<T> OnionMessageContents<T> where T: CustomOnionMessageContents {
+ /// Returns the type that was used to decode the message payload.
+ pub fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ &OnionMessageContents::Custom(ref msg) => msg.tlv_type(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> Writeable for OnionMessageContents<T> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => Ok(msg.write(w)?),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// The contents of a custom onion message. Must implement `MaybeReadableArgs<u64>` where the `u64`
+/// is the custom TLV type attempting to be read, and return `Ok(None)` if the TLV type is unknown.
+pub trait CustomOnionMessageContents: Writeable + MaybeReadableArgs<u64> {
+ /// Returns the TLV type identifying the message contents. MUST be >= 64.
+ fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64;
+}
/// Forward control TLVs in their blinded and unblinded form.
pub(super) enum ForwardControlTlvs {
}
// Uses the provided secret to simultaneously encode and encrypt the unblinded control TLVs.
-impl Writeable for (Payload, [u8; 32]) {
+impl<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> Writeable for (Payload<T>, [u8; 32]) {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
match &self.0 {
Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_bytes)) => {
})
},
Payload::Receive {
- control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_bytes), reply_path
+ control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_bytes), reply_path, message,
} => {
encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, reply_path, option),
- (4, encrypted_bytes, vec_type)
+ (4, encrypted_bytes, vec_type),
+ (message.tlv_type(), message, required)
})
},
Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(control_tlvs)) => {
})
},
Payload::Receive {
- control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(control_tlvs), reply_path,
+ control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(control_tlvs), reply_path, message,
} => {
let write_adapter = ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter::new(self.1, &control_tlvs);
encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, reply_path, option),
- (4, write_adapter, required)
+ (4, write_adapter, required),
+ (message.tlv_type(), message, required)
})
},
}
}
}
-// Uses the provided secret to simultaneously decode and decrypt the control TLVs.
-impl ReadableArgs<SharedSecret> for Payload {
+// Uses the provided secret to simultaneously decode and decrypt the control TLVs and data TLV.
+impl<T: CustomOnionMessageContents> ReadableArgs<SharedSecret> for Payload<T> {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, encrypted_tlvs_ss: SharedSecret) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let v: BigSize = Readable::read(r)?;
let mut rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, v.0);
let mut reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute> = None;
let mut read_adapter: Option<ChaChaPolyReadAdapter<ControlTlvs>> = None;
let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(&encrypted_tlvs_ss.secret_bytes());
+ let mut message_type: Option<u64> = None;
+ let mut message = None;
decode_tlv_stream!(&mut rd, {
(2, reply_path, option),
- (4, read_adapter, (option: LengthReadableArgs, rho))
+ (4, read_adapter, (option: LengthReadableArgs, rho)),
+ }, |msg_type, msg_reader| {
+ if msg_type < 64 { return Ok(false) }
+ // Don't allow reading more than one data TLV from an onion message.
+ if message_type.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+
+ message_type = Some(msg_type);
+ match T::read(msg_reader, msg_type) {
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => {
+ message = Some(msg);
+ Ok(true)
+ },
+ Ok(None) => Ok(false),
+ Err(e) => Err(e),
+ }
});
rd.eat_remaining().map_err(|_| DecodeError::ShortRead)?;
match read_adapter {
None => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
Some(ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: ControlTlvs::Forward(tlvs)}) => {
+ if message_type.is_some() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ }
Ok(Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs)))
},
Some(ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: ControlTlvs::Receive(tlvs)}) => {
- Ok(Payload::Receive { control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs), reply_path })
- },
+ if message.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
+ Ok(Payload::Receive {
+ control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs),
+ reply_path,
+ message: OnionMessageContents::Custom(message.unwrap()),
+ })
+ }
}
}
}
/// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
///
/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum NetworkUpdate {
/// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
/// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
/// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Details about a channel (both directions).
/// Received within a channel announcement.
pub struct ChannelInfo {
(2, proportional_millionths, required)
});
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
/// Protocol features the node announced support for
///
/// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
/// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
pub struct NodeInfo {
/// All valid channels a node has announced
}
}
+impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
// updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
// that it be at least the current time.
if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
} else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
// pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
// but only in the non-normative section.
if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
} else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: total_fee_msat,
lowest_fee_to_node: $next_hops_fee_msat as u64 + hop_use_fee_msat,
total_cltv_delta: hop_total_cltv_delta,
- value_contribution_msat: value_contribution_msat,
+ value_contribution_msat,
path_htlc_minimum_msat,
path_penalty_msat,
path_length_to_node,
}
}
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<T: Score> Writeable for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.lock().write(writer)
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: Score + 'a> WriteableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {}
+
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
impl<T: Score> MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
/// Creates a new [`MultiThreadedLockableScore`] given an underlying [`Score`].
use util::ser::{self, FixedLengthReader, LengthReadableArgs, Writeable};
// Used for for testing various lengths of serialization.
- #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+ #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct TestWriteable {
field1: Vec<u8>,
field2: Vec<u8>,
/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
/// with our counterparty.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelConfig {
/// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
/// over the channel.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
+use ln::channel::{ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS};
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
use ln::{chan_utils, msgs, PaymentPreimage};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, InMemorySigner, BaseSign};
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
+ &self, anchor_tx: &mut Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ debug_assert!(MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS > ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI);
+ // As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output
+ // value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1].
+ assert!(anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0 || anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1);
+ self.inner.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx)
+ }
+
fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>)
-> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()> {
self.inner.sign_channel_announcement(msg, secp_ctx)
/// Indicates an error on the client's part (usually some variant of attempting to use too-low or
/// too-high values)
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum APIError {
/// Indicates the API was wholly misused (see err for more). Cases where these can be returned
/// are documented, but generally indicates some precondition of a function was violated.
//! few other things.
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use ln::channelmanager::PaymentId;
use ln::channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS;
use ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable, Readable, VecReadWrapper, VecWriteWrapper};
use routing::router::{RouteHop, RouteParameters};
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Transaction};
+use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Transaction, OutPoint};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
(2, SpontaneousPayment)
);
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// The reason the channel was closed. See individual variants more details.
pub enum ClosureReason {
/// Closure generated from receiving a peer error message.
/// The peer disconnected prior to funding completing. In this case the spec mandates that we
/// forget the channel entirely - we can attempt again if the peer reconnects.
///
+ /// This includes cases where we restarted prior to funding completion, including prior to the
+ /// initial [`ChannelMonitor`] persistence completing.
+ ///
/// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 this could also occur if we were unable to connect to the
/// peer because of mutual incompatibility between us and our channel counterparty.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
DisconnectedPeer,
- /// Closure generated from `ChannelManager::read` if the ChannelMonitor is newer than
- /// the ChannelManager deserialized.
+ /// Closure generated from `ChannelManager::read` if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than
+ /// the [`ChannelManager`] deserialized.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
OutdatedChannelManager
}
);
/// Intended destination of a failed HTLC as indicated in [`Event::HTLCHandlingFailed`].
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum HTLCDestination {
/// We tried forwarding to a channel but failed to do so. An example of such an instance is when
/// there is insufficient capacity in our outbound channel.
}
);
+/// A descriptor used to sign for a commitment transaction's anchor output.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct AnchorDescriptor {
+ /// A unique identifier used along with `channel_value_satoshis` to re-derive the
+ /// [`InMemorySigner`] required to sign `input`.
+ ///
+ /// [`InMemorySigner`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner
+ pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The value in satoshis of the channel we're attempting to spend the anchor output of. This is
+ /// used along with `channel_keys_id` to re-derive the [`InMemorySigner`] required to sign
+ /// `input`.
+ ///
+ /// [`InMemorySigner`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner
+ pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The transaction input's outpoint corresponding to the commitment transaction's anchor
+ /// output.
+ pub outpoint: OutPoint,
+}
+
+/// Represents the different types of transactions, originating from LDK, to be bumped.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub enum BumpTransactionEvent {
+ /// Indicates that a channel featuring anchor outputs is to be closed by broadcasting the local
+ /// commitment transaction. Since commitment transactions have a static feerate pre-agreed upon,
+ /// they may need additional fees to be attached through a child transaction using the popular
+ /// [Child-Pays-For-Parent](https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/cpfp) fee bumping technique. This
+ /// child transaction must include the anchor input described within `anchor_descriptor` along
+ /// with additional inputs to meet the target feerate. Failure to meet the target feerate
+ /// decreases the confirmation odds of the transaction package (which includes the commitment
+ /// and child anchor transactions), possibly resulting in a loss of funds. Once the transaction
+ /// is constructed, it must be fully signed for and broadcasted by the consumer of the event
+ /// along with the `commitment_tx` enclosed. Note that the `commitment_tx` must always be
+ /// broadcast first, as the child anchor transaction depends on it.
+ ///
+ /// The consumer should be able to sign for any of the additional inputs included within the
+ /// child anchor transaction. To sign its anchor input, an [`InMemorySigner`] should be
+ /// re-derived through [`KeysManager::derive_channel_keys`] with the help of
+ /// [`AnchorDescriptor::channel_keys_id`] and [`AnchorDescriptor::channel_value_satoshis`].
+ ///
+ /// It is possible to receive more than one instance of this event if a valid child anchor
+ /// transaction is never broadcast or is but not with a sufficient fee to be mined. Care should
+ /// be taken by the consumer of the event to ensure any future iterations of the child anchor
+ /// transaction adhere to the [Replace-By-Fee
+ /// rules](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md)
+ /// for fee bumps to be accepted into the mempool, and eventually the chain. As the frequency of
+ /// these events is not user-controlled, users may ignore/drop the event if they are no longer
+ /// able to commit external confirmed funds to the child anchor transaction.
+ ///
+ /// The set of `pending_htlcs` on the commitment transaction to be broadcast can be inspected to
+ /// determine whether a significant portion of the channel's funds are allocated to HTLCs,
+ /// enabling users to make their own decisions regarding the importance of the commitment
+ /// transaction's confirmation. Note that this is not required, but simply exists as an option
+ /// for users to override LDK's behavior. On commitments with no HTLCs (indicated by those with
+ /// an empty `pending_htlcs`), confirmation of the commitment transaction can be considered to
+ /// be not urgent.
+ ///
+ /// [`InMemorySigner`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner
+ /// [`KeysManager::derive_channel_keys`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysManager::derive_channel_keys
+ ChannelClose {
+ /// The target feerate that the transaction package, which consists of the commitment
+ /// transaction and the to-be-crafted child anchor transaction, must meet.
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ /// The channel's commitment transaction to bump the fee of. This transaction should be
+ /// broadcast along with the anchor transaction constructed as a result of consuming this
+ /// event.
+ commitment_tx: Transaction,
+ /// The absolute fee in satoshis of the commitment transaction. This can be used along the
+ /// with weight of the commitment transaction to determine its feerate.
+ commitment_tx_fee_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The descriptor to sign the anchor input of the anchor transaction constructed as a
+ /// result of consuming this event.
+ anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor,
+ /// The set of pending HTLCs on the commitment transaction that need to be resolved once the
+ /// commitment transaction confirms.
+ pending_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
+ },
+}
+
/// An Event which you should probably take some action in response to.
///
/// Note that while Writeable and Readable are implemented for Event, you probably shouldn't use
/// Destination of the HTLC that failed to be processed.
failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination,
},
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// Indicates that a transaction originating from LDK needs to have its fee bumped. This event
+ /// requires confirmed external funds to be readily available to spend.
+ ///
+ /// LDK does not currently generate this event. It is limited to the scope of channels with
+ /// anchor outputs, which will be introduced in a future release.
+ BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent),
}
impl Writeable for Event {
(2, failed_next_destination, required),
})
},
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ &Event::BumpTransaction(ref event)=> {
+ 27u8.write(writer)?;
+ match event {
+ // We never write the ChannelClose events as they'll be replayed upon restarting
+ // anyway if the commitment transaction remains unconfirmed.
+ BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. } => {}
+ }
+ }
// Note that, going forward, all new events must only write data inside of
// `write_tlv_fields`. Versions 0.0.101+ will ignore odd-numbered events that write
// data via `write_tlv_fields`.
pub const MAX_SCID_VOUT_INDEX: u64 = 0xffff;
/// A `short_channel_id` construction error
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ShortChannelIdError {
BlockOverflow,
TxIndexOverflow,
}
}
+/// A trait that various rust-lightning types implement allowing them to (maybe) be read in from a
+/// Read, given some additional set of arguments which is required to deserialize.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as we only export serialization to/from byte arrays instead
+pub trait MaybeReadableArgs<P> {
+ /// Reads a Self in from the given Read
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R, params: P) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> where Self: Sized;
+}
+
pub(crate) struct OptionDeserWrapper<T: Readable>(pub Option<T>);
impl<T: Readable> Readable for OptionDeserWrapper<T> {
#[inline]
/// In TLV we occasionally send fields which only consist of, or potentially end with, a
/// variable-length integer which is simply truncated by skipping high zero bytes. This type
/// encapsulates such integers implementing Readable/Writeable for them.
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Debug))]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug))]
pub(crate) struct HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<T>(pub T);
macro_rules! impl_writeable_primitive {
/// The character set consists of ASCII alphanumeric characters, hyphens, and periods.
/// Its length is guaranteed to be representable by a single byte.
/// This serialization is used by BOLT 7 hostnames.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Hostname(String);
impl Hostname {
/// Returns the length of the hostname.
decode_tlv!($reader, $field, required)
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, required) => {{
- $field = ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
+ $field = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
- let f: ::util::ser::VecReadWrapper<_> = ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
+ let f: ::util::ser::VecReadWrapper<_> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
$field = Some(f.0);
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, option) => {{
- $field = Some(ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?);
+ $field = Some(::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?);
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, ignorable) => {{
- $field = ser::MaybeReadable::read(&mut $reader)?;
+ $field = ::util::ser::MaybeReadable::read(&mut $reader)?;
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
$field = Some($trait::read(&mut $reader $(, $read_arg)*)?);
}};
}
+// `$decode_custom_tlv` is a closure that may be optionally provided to handle custom message types.
+// If it is provided, it will be called with the custom type and the `FixedLengthReader` containing
+// the message contents. It should return `Ok(true)` if the custom message is successfully parsed,
+// `Ok(false)` if the message type is unknown, and `Err(DecodeError)` if parsing fails.
macro_rules! decode_tlv_stream {
- ($stream: expr, {$(($type: expr, $field: ident, $fieldty: tt)),* $(,)*}) => { {
+ ($stream: expr, {$(($type: expr, $field: ident, $fieldty: tt)),* $(,)*}
+ $(, $decode_custom_tlv: expr)?) => { {
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
let mut last_seen_type: Option<u64> = None;
let mut stream_ref = $stream;
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
},)*
- x if x % 2 == 0 => {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
- },
- _ => {},
+ t => {
+ $(
+ if $decode_custom_tlv(t, &mut s)? {
+ // If a custom TLV was successfully read (i.e. decode_custom_tlv returns true),
+ // continue to the next TLV read.
+ s.eat_remaining()?;
+ continue 'tlv_read;
+ }
+ )?
+ if t % 2 == 0 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
+ }
+ }
}
s.eat_remaining()?;
}
--- /dev/null
+disable_all_formatting = true
\ No newline at end of file