use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ConfirmationTarget,ChainListener,FeeEstimator,ChainWatchInterfaceUtil,ChainWatchInterface};
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLCUpdate};
+use lightning::ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated();
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
- /// Used exclusively to broadcast the latest local state, mostly a historical quirk that this
- /// is here:
- channel_monitor: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
- channel_monitor: None,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- channel_monitor: None,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
}],
};
- self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
} }
}
- self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
} }
}
- self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
}]
};
- self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
}],
};
- self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
self.user_id
}
- /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
- pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
- }
- self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap()
- }
-
/// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
/// is_usable() returns true).
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
- if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
- channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
- }
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
}
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
- channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
- }
false
}
their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
}]
};
- self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
Ok((res, monitor_update))
}
self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
-
- self.channel_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().write_for_disk(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
- // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
- if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
-
Ok(Channel {
user_id,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- channel_monitor: Some(channel_monitor),
commitment_secrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
}
}
+
+ /// Process pending events from the ManyChannelMonitor.
+ fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ {
+ for monitor_event in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() {
+ match monitor_event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
+ let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
+ let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ }
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
- // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
- // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
- // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
- {
- //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- }
- }
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
+ // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
let mut ret = Vec::new();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
- // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
- // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
- // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
- {
- //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- }
- }
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
+ // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
let mut ret = Vec::new();
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
}
}
}
- if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height, &self.logger) {
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
- // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
- // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- return false;
- }
true
});
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub enum MonitorEvent {
+ /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
+ HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
+
+ /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
+ CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
+}
+
/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
}
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
+ pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
}
- pending_htlcs_updated
+ pending_monitor_events
}
}
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
///
/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
-/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
+/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
- pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
// the full block_connected).
- pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ last_block_hash: BlockHash,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
/// with success or failure.
///
/// You should probably just call through to
- /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
+ /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() for each ChannelMonitor and return
/// the full list.
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
+ self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
- for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
- data.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
+ for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
+ match event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ upd.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
+ }
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- }
-
- /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
- pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
- match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
- if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
- }
- }
- self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
}
/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
- /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events().
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
ret
}
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
}
if should_broadcast {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
+ self.local_tx_signed = true;
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
match ev {
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
payment_preimage: None,
source: htlc_update.0,
- });
+ }));
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
}
}
}
+
self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
}
- pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
// * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
if accepted_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash
- });
+ }));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
+ if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
+ |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
+ upd.source == source
+ } else { false }) {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash
- });
+ }));
}
} else {
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
}
}
- let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
- for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
- pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
+ for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
+ pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
}
let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
current_local_commitment_number,
payment_preimages,
- pending_htlcs_updated,
+ pending_monitor_events,
pending_events,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
// CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
// buffer space).
- {
+ let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
+ let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
// Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
-
+ let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
nodes[4].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
+ (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
+ };
+ nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
+ nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}
/// An error message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ErrorMessage {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) data: String,
+ /// The channel ID involved in the error
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// A possibly human-readable error description.
+ /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs
+ /// or printed to stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security
+ /// vulnerability in the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
+ pub data: String,
}
/// A ping message to be sent or received from a peer
pub struct Ping {
- pub(crate) ponglen: u16,
- pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
+ /// The desired response length
+ pub ponglen: u16,
+ /// The ping packet size.
+ /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
+ pub byteslen: u16,
}
/// A pong message to be sent or received from a peer
pub struct Pong {
- pub(crate) byteslen: u16,
+ /// The pong packet size.
+ /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
+ pub byteslen: u16,
}
/// An open_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct OpenChannel {
- pub(crate) chain_hash: BlockHash,
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) funding_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) push_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
- pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
- pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) payment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) channel_flags: u8,
- pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
+ /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
+ pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
+ /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
+ pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The channel value
+ pub funding_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
+ pub push_msat: u64,
+ /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
+ pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
+ pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by update_fee
+ pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
+ pub to_self_delay: u16,
+ /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
+ pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
+ pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
+ pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
+ pub payment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
+ pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
+ pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
+ pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// Channel flags
+ pub channel_flags: u8,
+ /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
+ pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
}
/// An accept_channel message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AcceptChannel {
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) minimum_depth: u32,
- pub(crate) to_self_delay: u16,
- pub(crate) max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- pub(crate) funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) payment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>
+ /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
+ pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
+ pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
+ pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
+ pub minimum_depth: u32,
+ /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
+ pub to_self_delay: u16,
+ /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
+ pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
+ pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
+ pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
+ pub payment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
+ pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
+ pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
+ pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
+ pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
}
/// A funding_created message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct FundingCreated {
- pub(crate) temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) funding_txid: Txid,
- pub(crate) funding_output_index: u16,
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
+ pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The funding transaction ID
+ pub funding_txid: Txid,
+ /// The specific output index funding this channel
+ pub funding_output_index: u16,
+ /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the funding transaction
+ pub signature: Signature,
}
/// A funding_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct FundingSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the funding transaction
+ pub signature: Signature,
}
/// A funding_locked message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-#[allow(missing_docs)]
pub struct FundingLocked {
+ /// The channel ID
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
}
/// A shutdown message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct Shutdown {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) scriptpubkey: Script,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
+ /// Must be in one of these forms: p2pkh, p2sh, p2wpkh, p2wsh.
+ pub scriptpubkey: Script,
}
/// A closing_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ClosingSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) fee_satoshis: u64,
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
+ pub fee_satoshis: u64,
+ /// A signature on the closing transaction
+ pub signature: Signature,
}
/// An update_add_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) amount_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(crate) cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The HTLC ID
+ pub htlc_id: u64,
+ /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
+ pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The expiry height of the HTLC
+ pub cltv_expiry: u32,
pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
}
/// An update_fulfill_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(crate) payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The HTLC ID
+ pub htlc_id: u64,
+ /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
+ pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
}
/// An update_fail_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The HTLC ID
+ pub htlc_id: u64,
pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
}
/// An update_fail_malformed_htlc message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) htlc_id: u64,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The HTLC ID
+ pub htlc_id: u64,
pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) failure_code: u16,
+ /// The failure code
+ pub failure_code: u16,
}
/// A commitment_signed message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct CommitmentSigned {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// A signature on the commitment transaction
+ pub signature: Signature,
+ /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
+ pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
}
/// A revoke_and_ack message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct RevokeAndACK {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
+ pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
+ /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
+ pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
}
/// An update_fee message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
pub struct UpdateFee {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
+ pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
}
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct DataLossProtect {
- pub(crate) your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+/// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
+/// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
+/// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
+/// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
+pub struct DataLossProtect {
+ /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
+ /// belonging to the recipient
+ pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
+ /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
+ pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
}
/// A channel_reestablish message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
pub struct ChannelReestablish {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) next_local_commitment_number: u64,
- pub(crate) next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
- pub(crate) data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The next commitment number for the sender
+ pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// The next commitment number for the recipient
+ pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
+ pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
}
/// An announcement_signatures message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
- pub(crate) channel_id: [u8; 32],
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(crate) node_signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature: Signature,
+ /// The channel ID
+ pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The short channel ID
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// A signature by the node key
+ pub node_signature: Signature,
+ /// A signature by the funding key
+ pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
}
/// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer
}
}
-// Only exposed as broadcast of node_announcement should be filtered by node_id
/// The unsigned part of a node_announcement
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) features: NodeFeatures,
- pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
+ /// The advertised features
+ pub features: NodeFeatures,
+ /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
+ pub timestamp: u32,
/// The node_id this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the node_announcement back
/// to this node).
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) rgb: [u8; 3],
- pub(crate) alias: [u8; 32],
- /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable. Note that you may only have up to one
- /// address of each type, if you have more, they may be silently discarded or we may panic!
- pub(crate) addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
+ pub node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// An RGB color for UI purposes
+ pub rgb: [u8; 3],
+ /// An alias, for UI purposes. This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee
+ /// of uniqueness.
+ pub alias: [u8; 32],
+ /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
+ pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
/// A node_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
+ /// The signature by the node key
+ pub signature: Signature,
+ /// The actual content of the announcement
+ pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
}
-// Only exposed as broadcast of channel_announcement should be filtered by node_id
/// The unsigned part of a channel_announcement
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) features: ChannelFeatures,
- pub(crate) chain_hash: BlockHash,
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// The advertised channel features
+ pub features: ChannelFeatures,
+ /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
+ pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
+ /// The short channel ID
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
/// One of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
- pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
+ pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
/// The other of the two node_ids which are endpoints of this channel
- pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
+ pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
+ /// The funding key for the first node
+ pub bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
+ /// The funding key for the second node
+ pub bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_announcement message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
- pub(crate) node_signature_1: Signature,
- pub(crate) node_signature_2: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
- pub(crate) bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
-}
-
+ /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
+ pub node_signature_1: Signature,
+ /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
+ pub node_signature_2: Signature,
+ /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
+ pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
+ /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
+ pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
+ /// The actual announcement
+ pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
+}
+
+/// The unsigned part of a channel_update
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
-pub(crate) struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- pub(crate) chain_hash: BlockHash,
- pub(crate) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(crate) timestamp: u32,
- pub(crate) flags: u8,
- pub(crate) cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
- pub(crate) htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- pub(crate) htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField<u64>,
- pub(crate) fee_base_msat: u32,
- pub(crate) fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
+ pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
+ /// The short channel ID
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
+ pub timestamp: u32,
+ /// Channel flags
+ pub flags: u8,
+ /// The number of blocks to subtract from incoming HTLC cltv_expiry values
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+ /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// Optionally, the maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField<u64>,
+ /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(PartialEq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelUpdate {
- pub(crate) signature: Signature,
- pub(crate) contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
+ /// A signature of the channel update
+ pub signature: Signature,
+ /// The actual channel update
+ pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
}
/// Used to put an error message in a LightningError
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: claim_txn }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1);
- // ChannelManager only polls ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated when we
+ // ChannelManager only polls ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events when we
// probe it for events, so we probe non-message events here (which should still end up empty):
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
} else {
};
}
- #[test]
- fn route_test() {
+ fn get_nodes(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> (SecretKey, PublicKey, Vec<SecretKey>, Vec<PublicKey>) {
+ let privkeys: Vec<SecretKey> = (2..10).map(|i| {
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(format!("{:02}", i).repeat(32)).unwrap()[..]).unwrap()
+ }).collect();
+
+ let pubkeys = privkeys.iter().map(|secret| PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, secret)).collect();
+
+ let our_privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("01".repeat(32)).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_privkey);
+
+ (our_privkey, our_id, privkeys, pubkeys)
+ }
+
+ fn id_to_feature_flags(id: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
+ // Set the feature flags to the id'th odd (ie non-required) feature bit so that we can
+ // test for it later.
+ let idx = (id - 1) * 2 + 1;
+ if idx > 8*3 {
+ vec![1 << (idx - 8*3), 0, 0, 0]
+ } else if idx > 8*2 {
+ vec![1 << (idx - 8*2), 0, 0]
+ } else if idx > 8*1 {
+ vec![1 << (idx - 8*1), 0]
+ } else {
+ vec![1 << idx]
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn build_graph() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<std::sync::Arc<crate::chain::chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, std::sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>, std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_privkey);
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
- // Build network from our_id to node8:
+ // Build network from our_id to node7:
//
- // -1(1)2- node1 -1(3)2-
+ // -1(1)2- node0 -1(3)2-
// / \
- // our_id -1(12)2- node8 -1(13)2--- node3
+ // our_id -1(12)2- node7 -1(13)2--- node2
// \ /
- // -1(2)2- node2 -1(4)2-
+ // -1(2)2- node1 -1(4)2-
//
//
// chan1 1-to-2: disabled
// chan13 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
//
//
- // -1(5)2- node4 -1(8)2--
+ // -1(5)2- node3 -1(8)2--
// | 2 |
// | (11) |
// / 1 \
- // node3--1(6)2- node5 -1(9)2--- node7 (not in global route map)
+ // node2--1(6)2- node4 -1(9)2--- node6 (not in global route map)
// \ /
- // -1(7)2- node6 -1(10)2-
+ // -1(7)2- node5 -1(10)2-
//
// chan5 1-to-2: enabled, 100 msat fee
// chan5 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
// chan11 1-to-2: enabled, 0 fee
// chan11 2-to-1: enabled, 0 fee
- let node1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node3_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node4_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node5_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node6_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node7_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808080808").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let node8_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
-
- let node1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node1_privkey);
- let node2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node2_privkey);
- let node3 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node3_privkey);
- let node4 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node4_privkey);
- let node5 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node5_privkey);
- let node6 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node6_privkey);
- let node7 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node7_privkey);
- let node8 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node8_privkey);
-
- macro_rules! id_to_feature_flags {
- // Set the feature flags to the id'th odd (ie non-required) feature bit so that we can
- // test for it later.
- ($id: expr) => { {
- let idx = ($id - 1) * 2 + 1;
- if idx > 8*3 {
- vec![1 << (idx - 8*3), 0, 0, 0]
- } else if idx > 8*2 {
- vec![1 << (idx - 8*2), 0, 0]
- } else if idx > 8*1 {
- vec![1 << (idx - 8*1), 0]
- } else {
- vec![1 << idx]
- }
- } }
- }
+ let (our_privkey, _, privkeys, _) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, node1_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(1)), 1);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, &privkeys[0], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(1)), 1);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 1,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(1)), 0);
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, node2_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(2)), 2);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(1)), 0);
+
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, &privkeys[1], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(2)), 2);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 2,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 2,
timestamp: 1,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(2)), 0);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(2)), 0);
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, node8_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(12)), 12);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, &privkeys[7], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(12)), 12);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 12,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 12,
timestamp: 1,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(8)), 0);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(8)), 0);
-
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, node3_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(3)), 3);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], &privkeys[2], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(3)), 3);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 3,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 3,
timestamp: 1,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
-
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, node3_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(4)), 4);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], &privkeys[2], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(4)), 4);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 4,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 4,
timestamp: 1,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, node3_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(13)), 13);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], &privkeys[2], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(13)), 13);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 13,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 2000000,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 13,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(3)), 0);
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, node5_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(6)), 6);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(3)), 0);
+
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], &privkeys[4], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(6)), 6);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 6,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node5_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[4], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 6,
timestamp: 1,
htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
fee_base_msat: 0,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
});
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node5_privkey, node4_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(11)), 11);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node5_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[4], &privkeys[3], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(11)), 11);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[4], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 11,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node4_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[3], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 11,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node5_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(5)), 0);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node4_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(4)), 0);
- add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, node6_privkey, ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(7)), 7);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[4], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(5)), 0);
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node3_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[3], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(4)), 0);
+
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], &privkeys[5], ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(7)), 7);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[2], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 7,
timestamp: 1,
fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node6_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[5], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 7,
timestamp: 1,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node6_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(6)), 0);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[5], NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(6)), 0);
+
+ (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger)
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn simple_route_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Simple route to 3 via 2
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node3, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 4);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn disable_channels_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (our_privkey, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// // Disable channels 4 and 12 by flags=2
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 4,
timestamp: 2,
fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
excess_data: Vec::new()
});
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
short_channel_id: 12,
timestamp: 2,
});
// If all the channels require some features we don't understand, route should fail
- if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node3, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)) {
+ if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)) {
assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a path to the given destination");
} else { panic!(); }
- // If we specify a channel to node8, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
+ // If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node8.clone(),
+ remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
channel_value_satoshis: 0,
user_id: 0,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
is_live: true,
}];
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node3, Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node8);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[7]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 200);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (13 << 8) | 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &vec![0b11]); // it should also override our view of their features
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // No feature flags will meet the relevant-to-channel conversion
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 13);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(13));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(13));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn disable_node_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
- // Re-enable channels 4 and 12
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 4,
- timestamp: 3,
- flags: 0, // to enable
- cltv_expiry_delta: (4 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 1000000,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- });
- update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, our_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 12,
- timestamp: 3,
- flags: 0, // to enable
- cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(),
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(),
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(),
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- });
// Disable nodes 1, 2, and 8 by requiring unknown feature bits
let mut unknown_features = NodeFeatures::known();
unknown_features.set_required_unknown_bits();
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, unknown_features.clone(), 1);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, unknown_features.clone(), 1);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, unknown_features.clone(), 1);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
- // // If all nodes require some features we don't understand, route should fail
- // if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler, &node3, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)) {
- // assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a path to the given destination");
- // } else { panic!(); }
+ // If all nodes require some features we don't understand, route should fail
+ if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a path to the given destination");
+ } else { panic!(); }
- // If we specify a channel to node8, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
+ // If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node8.clone(),
+ remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
channel_value_satoshis: 0,
user_id: 0,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
is_live: true,
}];
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node3, Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node8);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[7]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 200);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (13 << 8) | 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &vec![0b11]); // it should also override our view of their features
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // No feature flags will meet the relevant-to-channel conversion
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 13);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(13));
-
- // Re-enable nodes 1, 2, and 8
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node1_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(1)), 2);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node2_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(2)), 2);
- add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, node8_privkey, NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags!(8)), 2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(13));
// Note that we don't test disabling node 3 and failing to route to it, as we (somewhat
// naively) assume that the user checked the feature bits on the invoice, which override
// the node_announcement.
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn our_chans_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Route to 1 via 2 and 3 because our channel to 1 is disabled
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node1, None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[0], None, &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 200);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 4);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, (3 << 8) | 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, node1);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].short_channel_id, 3);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(1));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(1));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
- // If we specify a channel to node8, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
+ // If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node8.clone(),
+ remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
channel_value_satoshis: 0,
user_id: 0,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
is_live: true,
}];
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node3, Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], Some(&our_chans), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node8);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[7]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 200);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (13 << 8) | 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &vec![0b11]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // No feature flags will meet the relevant-to-channel conversion
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 13);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(13));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(13));
+ }
+ fn last_hops(nodes: &Vec<PublicKey>) -> Vec<RouteHint> {
let zero_fees = RoutingFees {
base_msat: 0,
proportional_millionths: 0,
};
- let mut last_hops = vec!(RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node4.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 8,
- fees: zero_fees,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (8 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- }, RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node5.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 9,
- fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: 1001,
- proportional_millionths: 0,
- },
- cltv_expiry_delta: (9 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- }, RouteHint {
- src_node_id: node6.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 10,
- fees: zero_fees,
- cltv_expiry_delta: (10 << 8) | 1,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- });
+ vec!(RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: nodes[3].clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 8,
+ fees: zero_fees,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (8 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ }, RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: nodes[4].clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 9,
+ fees: RoutingFees {
+ base_msat: 1001,
+ proportional_millionths: 0,
+ },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (9 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ }, RouteHint {
+ src_node_id: nodes[5].clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 10,
+ fees: zero_fees,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: (10 << 8) | 1,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ })
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn last_hops_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Simple test across 2, 3, 5, and 4 via a last_hop channel
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[6], None, &last_hops(&nodes), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 4);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, node5);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, nodes[4]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].short_channel_id, 6);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(5));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(6));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(5));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(6));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, nodes[3]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].short_channel_id, 11);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
// If we have a peer in the node map, we'll use their features here since we don't have
// a way of figuring out their features from the invoice:
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(11));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(11));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].pubkey, nodes[6]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].short_channel_id, 8);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].node_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // We dont pass flags in from invoices yet
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // We can't learn any flags from invoices, sadly
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn our_chans_last_hop_connect_test() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Simple test with outbound channel to 4 to test that last_hops and first_hops connect
let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: node4.clone(),
+ remote_network_id: nodes[3].clone(),
counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
channel_value_satoshis: 0,
user_id: 0,
inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
is_live: true,
}];
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node7, Some(&our_chans), &last_hops, 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let mut last_hops = last_hops(&nodes);
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[6], Some(&our_chans), &last_hops, 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[3]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &vec![0b11]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // No feature flags will meet the relevant-to-channel conversion
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[6]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 8);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
last_hops[0].fees.base_msat = 1000;
// Revert to via 6 as the fee on 8 goes up
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node7, None, &last_hops, 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[6], None, &last_hops, 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 200); // fee increased as its % of value transferred across node
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 4);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, (7 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, node6);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, nodes[5]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].short_channel_id, 7);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].cltv_expiry_delta, (10 << 8) | 1);
// If we have a peer in the node map, we'll use their features here since we don't have
// a way of figuring out their features from the invoice:
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(6));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(7));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(6));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(7));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, nodes[6]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].short_channel_id, 10);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].fee_msat, 100);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].channel_features.le_flags(), &Vec::<u8>::new()); // We can't learn any flags from invoices, sadly
// ...but still use 8 for larger payments as 6 has a variable feerate
- let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &node7, None, &last_hops, 2000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[6], None, &last_hops, 2000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, node2);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].pubkey, nodes[1]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id, 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].fee_msat, 3000);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].cltv_expiry_delta, (4 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][0].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(2));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, node3);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].pubkey, nodes[2]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id, 4);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta, (6 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(3));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][1].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, node5);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].pubkey, nodes[4]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].short_channel_id, 6);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].fee_msat, 0);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].cltv_expiry_delta, (11 << 8) | 1);
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(5));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(6));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(5));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(6));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, node4);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].pubkey, nodes[3]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].short_channel_id, 11);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].fee_msat, 1000);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].cltv_expiry_delta, (8 << 8) | 1);
// If we have a peer in the node map, we'll use their features here since we don't have
// a way of figuring out their features from the invoice:
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(4));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags!(11));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].node_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(4));
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][3].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(11));
- assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].pubkey, node7);
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].pubkey, nodes[6]);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].short_channel_id, 8);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].fee_msat, 2000);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][4].cltv_expiry_delta, 42);
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::OptionalField;
-use ln::channelmonitor::HTLCUpdate;
+use ln::channelmonitor::MonitorEvent;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
use util::events;
use util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
ret
}
- fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated();
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ return self.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff