use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
use crate::io::Read;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
+ pub(super) amt_incoming: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
-pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
- AddHTLC {
- forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
+pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
- // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
- // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
- // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
- // HTLCs.
- //
- // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
- prev_short_channel_id: u64,
- prev_htlc_id: u64,
- prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
- },
+ // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
+ // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
+ // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
+ // HTLCs.
+ //
+ // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
+ prev_short_channel_id: u64,
+ prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
+}
+
+pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
+ AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
FailHTLC {
htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
- /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
- ///
- /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
- /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
- /// confirmation depth.
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
/// failed/claimed by the user.
///
// | |
// | |__`id_to_peer`
// | |
+// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
+// | |
// | |__`per_peer_state`
// | |
// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
+ ///
+ /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
+ /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
+ /// confirmation depth.
+ ///
+ /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
+ /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
- ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
+ $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
} else {
// If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
// outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
debug_assert!(alias_removed);
}
- $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
- $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
- }
+ short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ }}
}
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
macro_rules! remove_channel {
- ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
channel
}
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
// TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
// chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
// will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
res
} };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
} };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
- handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
- handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
};
}
macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
- ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
$pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: $channel_ready_msg,
});
// Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
// we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
- let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
+ let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
}
- }
+ }}
}
macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
- send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
}
if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
if $raa.is_none() {
order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
}
- break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
+ break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
}
}
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
by_id: HashMap::new(),
- short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
});
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: channel_update
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
+ remove_channel!(self, chan)
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_incoming: Some(amt_msat),
amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
},
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_incoming: Some(msg.amount_msat),
amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
// phantom.
- if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
+ if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
None
} else {
break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
};
let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ None => {
+ // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
+ // no consistency guarantees.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(chan) => chan
+ };
if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
// Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
// should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
};
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
match {
payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
}, onion_packet, &self.logger),
- channel_state, chan)
+ chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
match (update_err,
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, channel_state, chan,
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
{
(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
},
None => { },
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ } else {
+ // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
+ // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
+ // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
+ }
return Ok(());
};
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if short_chan_id != 0 {
- let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
+ macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
+ () => {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- macro_rules! failure_handler {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
-
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
- });
-
- let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
- HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
- } else {
- HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
- };
-
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
- reason
- ));
- continue;
- }
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value, amt_incoming: _
+ }
+ }) => {
+ macro_rules! failure_handler {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ });
+
+ let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
+ HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
+ } else {
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
+ };
+
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
+ reason
+ ));
+ continue;
}
- macro_rules! fail_forward {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
- {
- failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
- }
+ }
+ macro_rules! fail_forward {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
}
}
- macro_rules! failed_payment {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
- {
- failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
- }
+ }
+ macro_rules! failed_payment {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
}
}
- if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
- let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
- if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
- let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
- // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
- // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
- // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
- // of the onion.
- failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
- },
- Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
- failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
- },
- };
- match next_hop {
- onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
- match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
- Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
- }
- },
- _ => panic!(),
- }
- } else {
- fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
+ let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
+ if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
+ let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
+ // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
+ // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
+ // of the onion.
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
+ },
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
+ },
+ };
+ match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
}
} else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
- },
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ },
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
}
}
}
+ }
+ }
+ let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
+ Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
}
};
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet, ..
- }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
- phantom_shared_secret: None,
- });
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ continue;
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, amt_incoming: _,
},
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ });
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(update_add) => {
+ match update_add {
+ Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ None => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
+ // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
+ // commitment_signed messages when we can.
+ // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
+ // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
+ // this channel currently :/.
+ }
}
}
}
- }
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
- Err(e) => {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ Ok(None) => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
+ // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
+ // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
+ // messages when we can.
+ // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
+ // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
+ // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
}
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
- },
- Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- Ok(None) => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
- // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
- // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
- // messages when we can.
- // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
- // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
- // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
}
- }
- },
+ },
+ }
}
- }
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
- // close channel and then send error message to peer.
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
- },
- };
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
- continue;
- }
- };
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
- continue;
+ if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
+ let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
+ // close channel and then send error message to peer.
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
+ }
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
+ let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
+ },
+ };
+ handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
+ e => {
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
+ continue;
+ }
}
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
+ add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
+ });
}
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
- add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
}
- } else {
- unreachable!();
}
} else {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, ..
+ }
+ }) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
Ok(res) => Ok(res),
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
Err(res)
}
Ok(())
},
e => {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
res
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push(err);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
if err.is_err() {
handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
if !retain_channel { return false; }
if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
if needs_close { return false; }
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
for htlc in sources.iter() {
- if let None = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ };
+
+ if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
valid_mpp = false;
break;
}
+
if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
debug_assert!(false);
fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
payment_preimage, e);
return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
Some(htlc_value_msat)
);
}
},
}
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
if drop {
chan.remove_entry();
}
return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
},
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
}
};
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
+ let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
(chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
msg: funding_msg,
});
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
}
e.insert(chan);
}
}
let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
Ok(update) => update,
- Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
};
match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
e => {
- let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
// it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
},
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
- send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
}
funding_tx
},
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
- let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
+ handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
// fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
// watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
} else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
}
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
- Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
Err((Some(update), e)) => {
assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
unreachable!();
},
Ok(res) => res
};
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
return Err(e);
}
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
}) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
}
}
}
}
let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
if was_paused_for_mon_update {
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
}
if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan,
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
- self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
+ self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
// so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
/// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
};
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
}
Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
}
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
- &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
+ &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
let mut channel_update = None;
if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
},
e => {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
if close_channel { return false; }
},
true
},
Err(e) => {
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
// ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
!close_channel
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
false
} else { true }
},
Err(e) => {
has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
!close_channel
}
///
/// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
- match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
+ match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
+ Some(_) => continue,
+ None => return scid_candidate
}
}
}
fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let res = f(channel);
}, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
}
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.is_usable() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
// enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
// un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
// is always consistent.
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
"SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
}
}
} else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
} else {
(2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
(4, payment_hash, required),
(6, amt_to_forward, required),
- (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
+ (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
+ (9, amt_incoming, option),
});
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
(3, payment_secret, option),
- (4, path, vec_type),
+ (4, *path, vec_type),
(5, payment_params, option),
});
}
},
;);
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
+ (0, forward_info, required),
+ (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
+ (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
+ (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
+});
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
- (0, AddHTLC) => {
- (0, forward_info, required),
- (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
- (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
- (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
- },
(1, FailHTLC) => {
(0, htlc_id, required),
(2, err_packet, required),
- },
-;);
+ };
+ (0, AddHTLC)
+);
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
(0, payment_secret, required),
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
by_id,
- short_to_chan_info,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Data structures and encoding for `offer` messages.
+//!
+//! An [`Offer`] represents an "offer to be paid." It is typically constructed by a merchant and
+//! published as a QR code to be scanned by a customer. The customer uses the offer to request an
+//! invoice from the merchant to be paid.
+//!
+//! ```ignore
+//! extern crate bitcoin;
+//! extern crate core;
+//! extern crate lightning;
+//!
+//! use core::num::NonZeroU64;
+//! use core::time::Duration;
+//!
+//! use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+//! use lightning::offers::offer::{OfferBuilder, Quantity};
+//!
+//! # use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+//! # use lightning::onion_message::BlindedPath;
+//! # #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+//! # use std::time::SystemTime;
+//! #
+//! # fn create_blinded_path() -> BlindedPath { unimplemented!() }
+//! # fn create_another_blinded_path() -> BlindedPath { unimplemented!() }
+//! #
+//! # #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+//! # fn build() -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
+//! let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+//! let keys = KeyPair::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32])?);
+//! let pubkey = PublicKey::from(keys);
+//!
+//! let expiration = SystemTime::now() + Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60);
+//! let offer = OfferBuilder::new("coffee, large".to_string(), pubkey)
+//! .amount_msats(20_000)
+//! .supported_quantity(Quantity::Unbounded)
+//! .absolute_expiry(expiration.duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap())
+//! .issuer("Foo Bar".to_string())
+//! .path(create_blinded_path())
+//! .path(create_another_blinded_path())
+//! .build()
+//! .unwrap();
+//! # Ok(())
+//! # }
+//! ```
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+use core::num::NonZeroU64;
+use core::time::Duration;
+use crate::io;
+use crate::ln::features::OfferFeatures;
+use crate::ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+use crate::onion_message::BlindedPath;
+use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use std::time::SystemTime;
+
+/// Builds an [`Offer`] for the "offer to be paid" flow.
+///
+/// See [module-level documentation] for usage.
+///
+/// [module-level documentation]: self
+pub struct OfferBuilder {
+ offer: OfferContents,
+}
+
+impl OfferBuilder {
+ /// Creates a new builder for an offer setting the [`Offer::description`] and using the
+ /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`] for signing invoices. The associated secret key must be remembered
+ /// while the offer is valid.
+ ///
+ /// Use a different pubkey per offer to avoid correlating offers.
+ pub fn new(description: String, signing_pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
+ let offer = OfferContents {
+ chains: None, metadata: None, amount: None, description,
+ features: OfferFeatures::empty(), absolute_expiry: None, issuer: None, paths: None,
+ supported_quantity: Quantity::one(), signing_pubkey: Some(signing_pubkey),
+ };
+ OfferBuilder { offer }
+ }
+
+ /// Adds the chain hash of the given [`Network`] to [`Offer::chains`]. If not called,
+ /// the chain hash of [`Network::Bitcoin`] is assumed to be the only one supported.
+ ///
+ /// See [`Offer::chains`] on how this relates to the payment currency.
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will add another chain hash.
+ pub fn chain(mut self, network: Network) -> Self {
+ let chains = self.offer.chains.get_or_insert_with(Vec::new);
+ let chain = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
+ if !chains.contains(&chain) {
+ chains.push(chain);
+ }
+
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::metadata`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ pub fn metadata(mut self, metadata: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+ self.offer.metadata = Some(metadata);
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::amount`] as an [`Amount::Bitcoin`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ pub fn amount_msats(mut self, amount_msats: u64) -> Self {
+ self.amount(Amount::Bitcoin { amount_msats })
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::amount`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ fn amount(mut self, amount: Amount) -> Self {
+ self.offer.amount = Some(amount);
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::features`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn features(mut self, features: OfferFeatures) -> Self {
+ self.offer.features = features;
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::absolute_expiry`] as seconds since the Unix epoch. Any expiry that has
+ /// already passed is valid and can be checked for using [`Offer::is_expired`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ pub fn absolute_expiry(mut self, absolute_expiry: Duration) -> Self {
+ self.offer.absolute_expiry = Some(absolute_expiry);
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the [`Offer::issuer`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ pub fn issuer(mut self, issuer: String) -> Self {
+ self.offer.issuer = Some(issuer);
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a blinded path to [`Offer::paths`]. Must include at least one path if only connected by
+ /// private channels or if [`Offer::signing_pubkey`] is not a public node id.
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will add another blinded path. Caller is responsible for not
+ /// adding duplicate paths.
+ pub fn path(mut self, path: BlindedPath) -> Self {
+ self.offer.paths.get_or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(path);
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Sets the quantity of items for [`Offer::supported_quantity`].
+ ///
+ /// Successive calls to this method will override the previous setting.
+ pub fn supported_quantity(mut self, quantity: Quantity) -> Self {
+ self.offer.supported_quantity = quantity;
+ self
+ }
+
+ /// Builds an [`Offer`] from the builder's settings.
+ pub fn build(mut self) -> Result<Offer, ()> {
+ match self.offer.amount {
+ Some(Amount::Bitcoin { amount_msats }) => {
+ if amount_msats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ },
+ Some(Amount::Currency { .. }) => unreachable!(),
+ None => {},
+ }
+
+ if let Some(chains) = &self.offer.chains {
+ if chains.len() == 1 && chains[0] == self.offer.implied_chain() {
+ self.offer.chains = None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+ self.offer.write(&mut bytes).unwrap();
+
+ Ok(Offer {
+ bytes,
+ contents: self.offer,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+/// An `Offer` is a potentially long-lived proposal for payment of a good or service.
+///
+/// An offer is a precursor to an `InvoiceRequest`. A merchant publishes an offer from which a
+/// customer may request an `Invoice` for a specific quantity and using an amount sufficient to
+/// cover that quantity (i.e., at least `quantity * amount`). See [`Offer::amount`].
+///
+/// Offers may be denominated in currency other than bitcoin but are ultimately paid using the
+/// latter.
+///
+/// Through the use of [`BlindedPath`]s, offers provide recipient privacy.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct Offer {
+ // The serialized offer. Needed when creating an `InvoiceRequest` if the offer contains unknown
+ // fields.
+ bytes: Vec<u8>,
+ contents: OfferContents,
+}
+
+/// The contents of an [`Offer`], which may be shared with an `InvoiceRequest` or an `Invoice`.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct OfferContents {
+ chains: Option<Vec<ChainHash>>,
+ metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+ amount: Option<Amount>,
+ description: String,
+ features: OfferFeatures,
+ absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>,
+ issuer: Option<String>,
+ paths: Option<Vec<BlindedPath>>,
+ supported_quantity: Quantity,
+ signing_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+}
+
+impl Offer {
+ // TODO: Return a slice once ChainHash has constants.
+ // - https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/1283
+ // - https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/1286
+ /// The chains that may be used when paying a requested invoice (e.g., bitcoin mainnet).
+ /// Payments must be denominated in units of the minimal lightning-payable unit (e.g., msats)
+ /// for the selected chain.
+ pub fn chains(&self) -> Vec<ChainHash> {
+ self.contents.chains
+ .as_ref()
+ .cloned()
+ .unwrap_or_else(|| vec![self.contents.implied_chain()])
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Link to corresponding method in `InvoiceRequest`.
+ /// Opaque bytes set by the originator. Useful for authentication and validating fields since it
+ /// is reflected in `invoice_request` messages along with all the other fields from the `offer`.
+ pub fn metadata(&self) -> Option<&Vec<u8>> {
+ self.contents.metadata.as_ref()
+ }
+
+ /// The minimum amount required for a successful payment of a single item.
+ pub fn amount(&self) -> Option<&Amount> {
+ self.contents.amount.as_ref()
+ }
+
+ /// A complete description of the purpose of the payment. Intended to be displayed to the user
+ /// but with the caveat that it has not been verified in any way.
+ pub fn description(&self) -> PrintableString {
+ PrintableString(&self.contents.description)
+ }
+
+ /// Features pertaining to the offer.
+ pub fn features(&self) -> &OfferFeatures {
+ &self.contents.features
+ }
+
+ /// Duration since the Unix epoch when an invoice should no longer be requested.
+ ///
+ /// If `None`, the offer does not expire.
+ pub fn absolute_expiry(&self) -> Option<Duration> {
+ self.contents.absolute_expiry
+ }
+
+ /// Whether the offer has expired.
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
+ match self.absolute_expiry() {
+ Some(seconds_from_epoch) => match SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH.elapsed() {
+ Ok(elapsed) => elapsed > seconds_from_epoch,
+ Err(_) => false,
+ },
+ None => false,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// The issuer of the offer, possibly beginning with `user@domain` or `domain`. Intended to be
+ /// displayed to the user but with the caveat that it has not been verified in any way.
+ pub fn issuer(&self) -> Option<PrintableString> {
+ self.contents.issuer.as_ref().map(|issuer| PrintableString(issuer.as_str()))
+ }
+
+ /// Paths to the recipient originating from publicly reachable nodes. Blinded paths provide
+ /// recipient privacy by obfuscating its node id.
+ pub fn paths(&self) -> &[BlindedPath] {
+ self.contents.paths.as_ref().map(|paths| paths.as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[])
+ }
+
+ /// The quantity of items supported.
+ pub fn supported_quantity(&self) -> Quantity {
+ self.contents.supported_quantity()
+ }
+
+ /// The public key used by the recipient to sign invoices.
+ pub fn signing_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.contents.signing_pubkey.unwrap()
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ fn as_tlv_stream(&self) -> OfferTlvStreamRef {
+ self.contents.as_tlv_stream()
+ }
+}
+
+impl OfferContents {
+ pub fn implied_chain(&self) -> ChainHash {
+ ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin)
+ }
+
+ pub fn supported_quantity(&self) -> Quantity {
+ self.supported_quantity
+ }
+
+ fn as_tlv_stream(&self) -> OfferTlvStreamRef {
+ let (currency, amount) = match &self.amount {
+ None => (None, None),
+ Some(Amount::Bitcoin { amount_msats }) => (None, Some(*amount_msats)),
+ Some(Amount::Currency { iso4217_code, amount }) => (
+ Some(iso4217_code), Some(*amount)
+ ),
+ };
+
+ let features = {
+ if self.features == OfferFeatures::empty() { None } else { Some(&self.features) }
+ };
+
+ OfferTlvStreamRef {
+ chains: self.chains.as_ref(),
+ metadata: self.metadata.as_ref(),
+ currency,
+ amount,
+ description: Some(&self.description),
+ features,
+ absolute_expiry: self.absolute_expiry.map(|duration| duration.as_secs()),
+ paths: self.paths.as_ref(),
+ issuer: self.issuer.as_ref(),
+ quantity_max: self.supported_quantity.to_tlv_record(),
+ node_id: self.signing_pubkey.as_ref(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OfferContents {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.as_tlv_stream().write(writer)
+ }
+}
+
+/// The minimum amount required for an item in an [`Offer`], denominated in either bitcoin or
+/// another currency.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Amount {
+ /// An amount of bitcoin.
+ Bitcoin {
+ /// The amount in millisatoshi.
+ amount_msats: u64,
+ },
+ /// An amount of currency specified using ISO 4712.
+ Currency {
+ /// The currency that the amount is denominated in.
+ iso4217_code: CurrencyCode,
+ /// The amount in the currency unit adjusted by the ISO 4712 exponent (e.g., USD cents).
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+}
+
+/// An ISO 4712 three-letter currency code (e.g., USD).
+pub type CurrencyCode = [u8; 3];
+
+/// Quantity of items supported by an [`Offer`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Quantity {
+ /// Up to a specific number of items (inclusive).
+ Bounded(NonZeroU64),
+ /// One or more items.
+ Unbounded,
+}
+
+impl Quantity {
+ fn one() -> Self {
+ Quantity::Bounded(NonZeroU64::new(1).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn to_tlv_record(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ match self {
+ Quantity::Bounded(n) => {
+ let n = n.get();
+ if n == 1 { None } else { Some(n) }
+ },
+ Quantity::Unbounded => Some(0),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+tlv_stream!(OfferTlvStream, OfferTlvStreamRef, {
+ (2, chains: (Vec<ChainHash>, WithoutLength)),
+ (4, metadata: (Vec<u8>, WithoutLength)),
+ (6, currency: CurrencyCode),
+ (8, amount: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize)),
+ (10, description: (String, WithoutLength)),
+ (12, features: OfferFeatures),
+ (14, absolute_expiry: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize)),
+ (16, paths: (Vec<BlindedPath>, WithoutLength)),
+ (18, issuer: (String, WithoutLength)),
+ (20, quantity_max: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize)),
+ (22, node_id: PublicKey),
+});
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::{Amount, OfferBuilder, Quantity};
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
+ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+ use core::num::NonZeroU64;
+ use core::time::Duration;
+ use crate::ln::features::OfferFeatures;
+ use crate::ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ use crate::onion_message::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
+ use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+ use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
+
+ fn pubkey(byte: u8) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey(byte))
+ }
+
+ fn privkey(byte: u8) -> SecretKey {
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[byte; 32]).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_defaults() {
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42)).build().unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ let mut buffer = Vec::new();
+ offer.contents.write(&mut buffer).unwrap();
+
+ assert_eq!(offer.bytes, buffer.as_slice());
+ assert_eq!(offer.chains(), vec![ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin)]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.metadata(), None);
+ assert_eq!(offer.amount(), None);
+ assert_eq!(offer.description(), PrintableString("foo"));
+ assert_eq!(offer.features(), &OfferFeatures::empty());
+ assert_eq!(offer.absolute_expiry(), None);
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ assert!(!offer.is_expired());
+ assert_eq!(offer.paths(), &[]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.issuer(), None);
+ assert_eq!(offer.supported_quantity(), Quantity::one());
+ assert_eq!(offer.signing_pubkey(), pubkey(42));
+
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.chains, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.metadata, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.currency, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.amount, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.description, Some(&String::from("foo")));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.features, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.absolute_expiry, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.paths, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.issuer, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.quantity_max, None);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.node_id, Some(&pubkey(42)));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_chains() {
+ let mainnet = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
+ let testnet = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .chain(Network::Bitcoin)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.chains(), vec![mainnet]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().chains, None);
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .chain(Network::Testnet)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.chains(), vec![testnet]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().chains, Some(&vec![testnet]));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .chain(Network::Testnet)
+ .chain(Network::Testnet)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.chains(), vec![testnet]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().chains, Some(&vec![testnet]));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .chain(Network::Bitcoin)
+ .chain(Network::Testnet)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.chains(), vec![mainnet, testnet]);
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().chains, Some(&vec![mainnet, testnet]));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_metadata() {
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .metadata(vec![42; 32])
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.metadata(), Some(&vec![42; 32]));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().metadata, Some(&vec![42; 32]));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .metadata(vec![42; 32])
+ .metadata(vec![43; 32])
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.metadata(), Some(&vec![43; 32]));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().metadata, Some(&vec![43; 32]));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_amount() {
+ let bitcoin_amount = Amount::Bitcoin { amount_msats: 1000 };
+ let currency_amount = Amount::Currency { iso4217_code: *b"USD", amount: 10 };
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .amount_msats(1000)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.amount(), Some(&bitcoin_amount));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.amount, Some(1000));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.currency, None);
+
+ let builder = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .amount(currency_amount.clone());
+ let tlv_stream = builder.offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(builder.offer.amount, Some(currency_amount.clone()));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.amount, Some(10));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.currency, Some(b"USD"));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .amount(currency_amount.clone())
+ .amount(bitcoin_amount.clone())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.amount, Some(1000));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.currency, None);
+
+ let invalid_amount = Amount::Bitcoin { amount_msats: MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1 };
+ match OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42)).amount(invalid_amount).build() {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("expected error"),
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e, ()),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_features() {
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .features(OfferFeatures::unknown())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.features(), &OfferFeatures::unknown());
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().features, Some(&OfferFeatures::unknown()));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .features(OfferFeatures::unknown())
+ .features(OfferFeatures::empty())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.features(), &OfferFeatures::empty());
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().features, None);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_absolute_expiry() {
+ let future_expiry = Duration::from_secs(u64::max_value());
+ let past_expiry = Duration::from_secs(0);
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .absolute_expiry(future_expiry)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ assert!(!offer.is_expired());
+ assert_eq!(offer.absolute_expiry(), Some(future_expiry));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().absolute_expiry, Some(future_expiry.as_secs()));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .absolute_expiry(future_expiry)
+ .absolute_expiry(past_expiry)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ assert!(offer.is_expired());
+ assert_eq!(offer.absolute_expiry(), Some(past_expiry));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().absolute_expiry, Some(past_expiry.as_secs()));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_paths() {
+ let paths = vec![
+ BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: pubkey(40),
+ blinding_point: pubkey(41),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: pubkey(43), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 43] },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: pubkey(44), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 44] },
+ ],
+ },
+ BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: pubkey(40),
+ blinding_point: pubkey(41),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: pubkey(45), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 45] },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: pubkey(46), encrypted_payload: vec![0; 46] },
+ ],
+ },
+ ];
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .path(paths[0].clone())
+ .path(paths[1].clone())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.paths(), paths.as_slice());
+ assert_eq!(offer.signing_pubkey(), pubkey(42));
+ assert_ne!(pubkey(42), pubkey(44));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.paths, Some(&paths));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.node_id, Some(&pubkey(42)));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_issuer() {
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .issuer("bar".into())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.issuer(), Some(PrintableString("bar")));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().issuer, Some(&String::from("bar")));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .issuer("bar".into())
+ .issuer("baz".into())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(offer.issuer(), Some(PrintableString("baz")));
+ assert_eq!(offer.as_tlv_stream().issuer, Some(&String::from("baz")));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_offer_with_supported_quantity() {
+ let ten = NonZeroU64::new(10).unwrap();
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .supported_quantity(Quantity::one())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.supported_quantity(), Quantity::one());
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.quantity_max, None);
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .supported_quantity(Quantity::Unbounded)
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.supported_quantity(), Quantity::Unbounded);
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.quantity_max, Some(0));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .supported_quantity(Quantity::Bounded(ten))
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.supported_quantity(), Quantity::Bounded(ten));
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.quantity_max, Some(10));
+
+ let offer = OfferBuilder::new("foo".into(), pubkey(42))
+ .supported_quantity(Quantity::Bounded(ten))
+ .supported_quantity(Quantity::one())
+ .build()
+ .unwrap();
+ let tlv_stream = offer.as_tlv_stream();
+ assert_eq!(offer.supported_quantity(), Quantity::one());
+ assert_eq!(tlv_stream.quantity_max, None);
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff