extern crate bitcoin;
extern crate libc;
-use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+use bitcoin::{BlockHash, Txid};
+use bitcoin::hashes::hex::{FromHex, ToHex};
use crate::util::DiskWriteable;
use lightning::chain;
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
-use lightning::util::ser::Writeable;
+use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fs;
-use std::io::Error;
-use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::io::{Cursor, Error};
+use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
-#[cfg(test)]
-use {
- lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs,
- bitcoin::{BlockHash, Txid},
- bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex,
- std::collections::HashMap,
- std::io::Cursor
-};
-
/// FilesystemPersister persists channel data on disk, where each channel's
/// data is stored in a file named after its funding outpoint.
///
util::write_to_file(path, "manager".to_string(), manager)
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- fn load_channel_data<Keys: KeysInterface>(&self, keys: &Keys) ->
- Result<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<Keys::Signer>>, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- if let Err(_) = fs::create_dir_all(self.path_to_monitor_data()) {
- return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ /// Read `ChannelMonitor`s from disk.
+ pub fn read_channelmonitors<Signer: Sign, K: Deref> (
+ &self, keys_manager: K
+ ) -> Result<HashMap<OutPoint, (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>)>, std::io::Error>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer=Signer> + Sized
+ {
+ let path = self.path_to_monitor_data();
+ if !Path::new(&path).exists() {
+ return Ok(HashMap::new());
+ }
+ let mut outpoint_to_channelmonitor = HashMap::new();
+ for file_option in fs::read_dir(path).unwrap() {
+ let file = file_option.unwrap();
+ let owned_file_name = file.file_name();
+ let filename = owned_file_name.to_str();
+ if !filename.is_some() || !filename.unwrap().is_ascii() || filename.unwrap().len() < 65 {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+ std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ "Invalid ChannelMonitor file name",
+ ));
}
- let mut res = HashMap::new();
- for file_option in fs::read_dir(self.path_to_monitor_data()).unwrap() {
- let file = file_option.unwrap();
- let owned_file_name = file.file_name();
- let filename = owned_file_name.to_str();
- if !filename.is_some() || !filename.unwrap().is_ascii() || filename.unwrap().len() < 65 {
- return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- }
- let txid = Txid::from_hex(filename.unwrap().split_at(64).0);
- if txid.is_err() { return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); }
-
- let index = filename.unwrap().split_at(65).1.split('.').next().unwrap().parse();
- if index.is_err() { return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); }
+ let txid = Txid::from_hex(filename.unwrap().split_at(64).0);
+ if txid.is_err() {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+ std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ "Invalid tx ID in filename",
+ ));
+ }
- let contents = fs::read(&file.path());
- if contents.is_err() { return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); }
+ let index = filename.unwrap().split_at(65).1.parse();
+ if index.is_err() {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+ std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ "Invalid tx index in filename",
+ ));
+ }
- if let Ok((_, loaded_monitor)) =
- <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Keys::Signer>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&contents.unwrap()), keys) {
- res.insert(OutPoint { txid: txid.unwrap(), index: index.unwrap() }, loaded_monitor);
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- }
+ let contents = fs::read(&file.path())?;
+ let mut buffer = Cursor::new(&contents);
+ match <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>)>::read(&mut buffer, &*keys_manager) {
+ Ok((blockhash, channel_monitor)) => {
+ outpoint_to_channelmonitor.insert(
+ OutPoint { txid: txid.unwrap(), index: index.unwrap() },
+ (blockhash, channel_monitor),
+ );
+ }
+ Err(e) => return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+ std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+ format!("Failed to deserialize ChannelMonitor: {}", e),
+ ))
}
- Ok(res)
}
+ Ok(outpoint_to_channelmonitor)
+ }
}
-impl<ChannelSigner: Sign + Send + Sync> channelmonitor::Persist<ChannelSigner> for FilesystemPersister {
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> channelmonitor::Persist<ChannelSigner> for FilesystemPersister {
fn persist_new_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
let filename = format!("{}_{}", funding_txo.txid.to_hex(), funding_txo.index);
util::write_to_file(self.path_to_monitor_data(), filename, monitor)
// Check that the persisted channel data is empty before any channels are
// open.
- let mut persisted_chan_data_0 = persister_0.load_channel_data(nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap();
+ let mut persisted_chan_data_0 = persister_0.read_channelmonitors(nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap();
assert_eq!(persisted_chan_data_0.keys().len(), 0);
- let mut persisted_chan_data_1 = persister_1.load_channel_data(nodes[1].keys_manager).unwrap();
+ let mut persisted_chan_data_1 = persister_1.read_channelmonitors(nodes[1].keys_manager).unwrap();
assert_eq!(persisted_chan_data_1.keys().len(), 0);
// Helper to make sure the channel is on the expected update ID.
macro_rules! check_persisted_data {
($expected_update_id: expr) => {
- persisted_chan_data_0 = persister_0.load_channel_data(nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap();
+ persisted_chan_data_0 = persister_0.read_channelmonitors(nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap();
assert_eq!(persisted_chan_data_0.keys().len(), 1);
- for mon in persisted_chan_data_0.values() {
+ for (_, mon) in persisted_chan_data_0.values() {
assert_eq!(mon.get_latest_update_id(), $expected_update_id);
}
- persisted_chan_data_1 = persister_1.load_channel_data(nodes[1].keys_manager).unwrap();
+ persisted_chan_data_1 = persister_1.read_channelmonitors(nodes[1].keys_manager).unwrap();
assert_eq!(persisted_chan_data_1.keys().len(), 1);
- for mon in persisted_chan_data_1.values() {
+ for (_, mon) in persisted_chan_data_1.values() {
assert_eq!(mon.get_latest_update_id(), $expected_update_id);
}
}
/// of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new Sign copy when we create
// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
-pub trait Sign : Send+Clone + Writeable {
+pub trait BaseSign : Send {
/// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
///
/// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey;
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey;
/// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
///
/// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
/// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
/// get called once.
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
/// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
/// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
/// signatures).
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_justice_transaction(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
/// transaction, either offered or received.
/// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
/// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
/// BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
/// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
/// of the channel participants.
/// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
/// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
/// protocol.
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
/// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
}
+/// A cloneable signer.
+///
+/// Although we require signers to be cloneable, it may be useful for developers to be able to use
+/// signers in an un-sized way, for example as `dyn BaseSign`. Therefore we separate the Clone trait,
+/// which implies Sized, into this derived trait.
+pub trait Sign: BaseSign + Writeable + Clone {
+}
+
/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
/// A type which implements Sign which will be returned by get_channel_signer.
}
}
-impl Sign for InMemorySigner {
- fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
}
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.channel_keys_id }
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_justice_transaction(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Err(_) => return Err(())
return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
}
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
Err(())
}
- fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); }
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
}
}
}
+impl Sign for InMemorySigner {}
+
impl Writeable for InMemorySigner {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.funding_key.write(writer)?;
/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'
/// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds!
pub struct KeysManager {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
node_secret: SecretKey,
destination_script: Script,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
/// detailed description of the guarantee.
pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
// Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
InMemorySigner::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(reader))
}
}
+
+// Ensure that BaseSign can have a vtable
+#[test]
+pub fn dyn_sign() {
+ let _signer: Box<dyn BaseSign>;
+}
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use chain::channelmonitor;
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
}
else {
- log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
+ log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
}
} else {
// Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::{chan_utils, msgs};
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, InMemorySigner};
+use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, InMemorySigner, BaseSign};
use std::cmp;
use std::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
}
}
-impl Sign for EnforcingSigner {
- fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+impl BaseSign for EnforcingSigner {
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
}
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.inner.channel_keys_id() }
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
{
Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_justice_transaction(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_transaction(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
self.inner.sign_channel_announcement(msg, secp_ctx)
}
}
}
+impl Sign for EnforcingSigner {}
impl Writeable for EnforcingSigner {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff