}
}
- /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
- /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
- /// height than once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure than we safely claim outputs before
- /// than our counterparty can do it too. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scale down in consequence to increase
- /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
- fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
- if timelock_expiration <= current_height + 3 {
- return current_height + 1
- } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
- return current_height + 3
- }
- current_height + 15
- }
-
/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
/// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
/// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
// Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
- let new_timer = Some(Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_request.timelock()));
+ let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(height));
let amt = cached_request.package_amount();
if cached_request.is_malleable() {
let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
+const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
+const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
+const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
+
/// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
/// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
///
},
}
}
+ /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
+ /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
+ /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
+ /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
+ /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
+ pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
+ if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
+ return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+ } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
+ return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+ }
+ current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+ }
pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
let malleability = match input_solving_data {
PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
}
None
}
+