run: |
sudo apt-get -y install shellcheck
shellcheck ci/ci-tests.sh
+ - name: Set RUSTFLAGS to deny warnings
+ if: "matrix.toolchain == '1.63.0'"
+ run: echo "RUSTFLAGS=-D warnings" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Run CI script
shell: bash # Default on Winblows is powershell
run: CI_MINIMIZE_DISK_USAGE=1 ./ci/ci-tests.sh
pass
elif feature == "electrum":
pass
+ elif feature == "time":
+ pass
elif feature == "_test_utils":
pass
elif feature == "_test_vectors":
DOWNLOAD_ELECTRS_AND_BITCOIND
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-blocking
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-blocking
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-async
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-async
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-async-https
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-async-https
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features electrum
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features electrum
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-blocking
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-blocking
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-async
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-async
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-async-https
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features esplora-async-https
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo test --verbose --color always --features electrum
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg no_download" cargo check --verbose --color always --features electrum
popd
fi
echo -e "\n\nBuilding with all Log-Limiting features"
pushd lightning
grep '^max_level_' Cargo.toml | awk '{ print $1 }'| while read -r FEATURE; do
- cargo check --verbose --color always --features "$FEATURE"
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS -A unused_variables -A unused_macros -A unused_imports -A dead_code" cargo check --verbose --color always --features "$FEATURE"
done
popd
for DIR in lightning lightning-invoice lightning-rapid-gossip-sync; do
# check if there is a conflict between no-std and the c_bindings cfg
- RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=c_bindings" cargo test -p $DIR --verbose --color always --no-default-features --features=no-std
+ RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=c_bindings" cargo test -p $DIR --verbose --color always --no-default-features --features=no-std
done
-RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=c_bindings" cargo test --verbose --color always
+RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=c_bindings" cargo test --verbose --color always
# Note that outbound_commitment_test only runs in this mode because of hardcoded signature values
pushd lightning
fi
echo -e "\n\nTest cfg-flag builds"
-RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=taproot" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
-RUSTFLAGS="$RUSTFLAGS --cfg=async_signing" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
+RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=taproot" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
+RUSTFLAGS="--cfg=async_signing" cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
use lightning::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
use lightning::events::{Event, PathFailure};
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
-use lightning::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider};
+use lightning::events::EventHandler;
+#[cfg(any(feature = "std", feature = "futures"))]
+use lightning::events::EventsProvider;
+
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
use lightning::ln::msgs::OnionMessageHandler;
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::APeerManager;
where
PM::Target: APeerManager + Send + Sync,
{
- use lightning::events::EventsProvider;
-
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
peer_manager.onion_message_handler().process_pending_events(&|e| events.borrow_mut().push(e));
/// The REST `getutxos` endpoint retuns a whole pile of data we don't care about and one bit we do
/// - whether the `hit bitmap` field had any entries. Thus we condense the result down into only
/// that.
+#[cfg(feature = "rest-client")]
pub(crate) struct GetUtxosResponse {
pub(crate) hit_bitmap_nonempty: bool
}
+#[cfg(feature = "rest-client")]
impl TryInto<GetUtxosResponse> for JsonResponse {
type Error = std::io::Error;
mod ser;
mod tb;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
mod prelude {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
extern crate hashbrown;
use crate::prelude::*;
-/// Sync compat for std/no_std
-#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
-mod sync;
-
/// Errors that indicate what is wrong with the invoice. They have some granularity for debug
/// reasons, but should generally result in an "invalid BOLT11 invoice" message for the user.
#[allow(missing_docs)]
use lightning::routing::router::RouteHintHop;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
- use std::time::{UNIX_EPOCH, Duration};
+ use std::time::Duration;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
assert_eq!(invoice.currency(), Currency::BitcoinTestnet);
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
assert_eq!(
- invoice.timestamp().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap().as_secs(),
+ invoice.timestamp().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap().as_secs(),
1234567
);
assert_eq!(invoice.payee_pub_key(), Some(&public_key));
use super::*;
use crate::{InvoiceBuilder, Currency};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use lightning::events::Event;
- use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{Retry, PaymentId};
- use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use lightning::ln::PaymentSecret;
- use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use lightning::routing::router::Payee;
use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Secp256k1};
- use std::time::{SystemTime, Duration};
+ use core::time::Duration;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ use std::time::SystemTime;
fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn payment_metadata_end_to_end() {
+ use lightning::events::Event;
+ use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{Retry, PaymentId};
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
// Test that a payment metadata read from an invoice passed to `pay_invoice` makes it all
// the way out through the `PaymentClaimable` event.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+++ /dev/null
-use core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut};
-use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
-
-pub type LockResult<Guard> = Result<Guard, ()>;
-
-pub struct Mutex<T: ?Sized> {
- inner: RefCell<T>
-}
-
-#[must_use = "if unused the Mutex will immediately unlock"]
-pub struct MutexGuard<'a, T: ?Sized + 'a> {
- lock: RefMut<'a, T>,
-}
-
-impl<T: ?Sized> Deref for MutexGuard<'_, T> {
- type Target = T;
-
- fn deref(&self) -> &T {
- &self.lock.deref()
- }
-}
-
-impl<T: ?Sized> DerefMut for MutexGuard<'_, T> {
- fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T {
- self.lock.deref_mut()
- }
-}
-
-impl<T> Mutex<T> {
- pub fn new(inner: T) -> Mutex<T> {
- Mutex { inner: RefCell::new(inner) }
- }
-
- pub fn lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
- Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
- }
-}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
- use core::cell::RefCell;
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::{Currency, Description, Bolt11InvoiceDescription, SignOrCreationError, CreationError};
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, sha256};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use lightning::sign::PhantomKeysManager;
- use lightning::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, Event, EventsProvider};
- use lightning::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use lightning::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ use lightning::ln::PaymentPreimage;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{PhantomRouteHints, MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn do_test_multi_node_receive(user_generated_pmt_hash: bool) {
+ use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+ use core::cell::RefCell;
+
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let seed_1 = [42u8; 32];
let seed_2 = [43u8; 32];
use lightning::util::persist::read_channel_monitors;
use std::fs;
use std::str::FromStr;
- #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
- use {
- lightning::get_event_msg,
- lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler,
- };
impl Drop for FilesystemStore {
fn drop(&mut self) {
rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"]
[features]
-default = []
+default = ["time"]
+time = []
esplora-async = ["async-interface", "esplora-client/async", "futures"]
esplora-async-https = ["esplora-async", "esplora-client/async-https-rustls"]
esplora-blocking = ["esplora-client/blocking"]
let mut sync_state = self.sync_state.lock().unwrap();
log_trace!(self.logger, "Starting transaction sync.");
+ #[cfg(feature = "time")]
let start_time = Instant::now();
let mut num_confirmed = 0;
let mut num_unconfirmed = 0;
sync_state.pending_sync = false;
}
}
+ #[cfg(feature = "time")]
log_debug!(self.logger,
"Finished transaction sync at tip {} in {}ms: {} confirmed, {} unconfirmed.",
tip_header.block_hash(), start_time.elapsed().as_millis(), num_confirmed,
num_unconfirmed);
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "time"))]
+ log_debug!(self.logger,
+ "Finished transaction sync at tip {}: {} confirmed, {} unconfirmed.",
+ tip_header.block_hash(), num_confirmed, num_unconfirmed);
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "async-interface"))]
use esplora_client::blocking::BlockingClient;
-use std::time::Instant;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use core::ops::Deref;
let mut sync_state = self.sync_state.lock().await;
log_trace!(self.logger, "Starting transaction sync.");
- let start_time = Instant::now();
+ #[cfg(feature = "time")]
+ let start_time = std::time::Instant::now();
let mut num_confirmed = 0;
let mut num_unconfirmed = 0;
sync_state.pending_sync = false;
}
}
+ #[cfg(feature = "time")]
log_debug!(self.logger, "Finished transaction sync at tip {} in {}ms: {} confirmed, {} unconfirmed.",
tip_hash, start_time.elapsed().as_millis(), num_confirmed, num_unconfirmed);
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "time"))]
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Finished transaction sync at tip {}: {} confirmed, {} unconfirmed.",
+ tip_hash, num_confirmed, num_unconfirmed);
Ok(())
}
}
/// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
-// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
-// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
-pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
+// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 3 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
+// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push). Generally, pushes are only 2 bytes (for values below 0x7fff, i.e.
+// around 7 months), however, a 7 month contest delay shouldn't result in being unable to reclaim
+// on-chain funds.
+pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 4 + 34*2;
/// A script either spendable by the revocation
/// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
- local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
- remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
+ local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
+ remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
}
}
}
- let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
// Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
// AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
// "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
// everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
- let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
- // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
- value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
- value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
-
CommitmentStats {
tx,
feerate_per_kw,
/// will sign and send to our counterparty.
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
- //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
- //may see payments to it!
let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
}
- cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
+ let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
+ cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
}
/// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
}
+/// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
+pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
+ msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
+) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
+ if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
+ // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
+ // `static_remote_key`.
+ if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
+ }
+ // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
+ if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
+ }
+ let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ Ok(channel_type.clone())
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ Ok(channel_type)
+ }
+}
+
impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
// First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
// support this channel type.
- let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
- if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
- }
-
- // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
- // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
- // `static_remote_key`.
- if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
- }
- // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
- if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type.clone()
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type
- };
+ let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
macro_rules! doc_comment {
- ($x:expr, $($tt:tt)*) => {
- #[doc = $x]
- $($tt)*
- };
+ ($x:expr, $($tt:tt)*) => {
+ #[doc = $x]
+ $($tt)*
+ };
}
macro_rules! basepoint_impl {
- ($BasepointT:ty) => {
- impl $BasepointT {
- /// Get inner Public Key
- pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.0
- }
- }
-
- impl From<PublicKey> for $BasepointT {
- fn from(value: PublicKey) -> Self {
- Self(value)
- }
- }
-
- }
+ ($BasepointT:ty) => {
+ impl $BasepointT {
+ /// Get inner Public Key
+ pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.0
+ }
+ }
+
+
impl From<PublicKey> for $BasepointT {
+ fn from(value: PublicKey) -> Self {
+ Self(value)
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
}
macro_rules! key_impl {
- ($BasepointT:ty, $KeyName:expr) => {
- doc_comment! {
- concat!("Generate ", $KeyName, " using per_commitment_point"),
- pub fn from_basepoint<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
- basepoint: &$BasepointT,
- per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
- ) -> Self {
- Self(derive_public_key(secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, &basepoint.0))
- }
- }
-
- doc_comment! {
- concat!("Generate ", $KeyName, " from privkey"),
- pub fn from_secret_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, sk: &SecretKey) -> Self {
- Self(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &sk))
- }
- }
-
- /// Get inner Public Key
- pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.0
- }
- }
+ ($BasepointT:ty, $KeyName:expr) => {
+ doc_comment! {
+ concat!("Derive a public ", $KeyName, " using one node's `per_commitment_point` and its countersignatory's `basepoint`"),
+ pub fn from_basepoint<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ countersignatory_basepoint: &$BasepointT,
+ per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
+ ) -> Self {
+ Self(derive_public_key(secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_basepoint.0))
+ }
+ }
+
+ doc_comment! {
+ concat!("Build a ", $KeyName, " directly from an already-derived private key"),
+ pub fn from_secret_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, sk: &SecretKey) -> Self {
+ Self(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &sk))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Get inner Public Key
+ pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.0
+ }
+ }
}
macro_rules! key_read_write {
- ($SelfT:ty) => {
- impl Writeable for $SelfT {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.0.serialize().write(w)
- }
- }
-
- impl Readable for $SelfT {
- fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let key: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
- Ok(Self(key))
- }
- }
- }
+ ($SelfT:ty) => {
+ impl Writeable for $SelfT {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.serialize().write(w)
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Readable for $SelfT {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let key: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(Self(key))
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
-/// Master key used in conjunction with per_commitment_point to generate [`local_delayedpubkey`](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#key-derivation) for the latest state of a channel.
-/// A watcher can be given a [DelayedPaymentBasepoint] to generate per commitment [DelayedPaymentKey] to create justice transactions.
+/// Base key used in conjunction with a `per_commitment_point` to generate a [`DelayedPaymentKey`].
+///
+/// The delayed payment key is used to pay the commitment state broadcaster their
+/// non-HTLC-encumbered funds after a delay to give their counterparty a chance to punish if the
+/// state broadcasted was previously revoked.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct DelayedPaymentBasepoint(pub PublicKey);
basepoint_impl!(DelayedPaymentBasepoint);
key_read_write!(DelayedPaymentBasepoint);
-/// [delayedpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation)
-/// To allow a counterparty to contest a channel state published by a node, Lightning protocol sets delays for some of the outputs, before can be spend.
-/// For example a commitment transaction has to_local output encumbered by a delay, negotiated at the channel establishment flow.
-/// To spend from such output a node has to generate a script using, among others, a local delayed payment key.
+
+/// A derived key built from a [`DelayedPaymentBasepoint`] and `per_commitment_point`.
+///
+/// The delayed payment key is used to pay the commitment state broadcaster their
+/// non-HTLC-encumbered funds after a delay. This delay gives their counterparty a chance to
+/// punish and claim all the channel funds if the state broadcasted was previously revoked.
+///
+/// [See the BOLT specs]
+/// (https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation)
+/// for more information on key derivation details.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug)]
pub struct DelayedPaymentKey(pub PublicKey);
impl DelayedPaymentKey {
- key_impl!(DelayedPaymentBasepoint, "delayedpubkey");
+ key_impl!(DelayedPaymentBasepoint, "delayedpubkey");
}
key_read_write!(DelayedPaymentKey);
-/// Master key used in conjunction with per_commitment_point to generate a [localpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#key-derivation) for the latest state of a channel.
-/// Also used to generate a commitment number in a commitment transaction or as a Payment Key for a remote node (not us) in an anchor output if `option_static_remotekey` is enabled.
-/// Shared by both nodes in a channel establishment message flow.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash)]
-pub struct PaymentBasepoint(pub PublicKey);
-basepoint_impl!(PaymentBasepoint);
-key_read_write!(PaymentBasepoint);
-
-
-/// [localpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation) is a child key of a payment basepoint,
-/// that enables a secure hash-lock for off-chain payments without risk of funds getting stuck or stolen. A payment key is normally shared with a counterparty so that it can generate
-/// a commitment transaction's to_remote ouput, which our node can claim in case the counterparty force closes the channel.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentKey(pub PublicKey);
-
-impl PaymentKey {
- key_impl!(PaymentBasepoint, "localpubkey");
-}
-key_read_write!(PaymentKey);
-
-/// Master key used in conjunction with per_commitment_point to generate [htlcpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#key-derivation) for the latest state of a channel.
+/// Base key used in conjunction with a `per_commitment_point` to generate an [`HtlcKey`].
+///
+/// HTLC keys are used to ensure only the recipient of an HTLC can claim it on-chain with the HTLC
+/// preimage and that only the sender of an HTLC can claim it on-chain after it has timed out.
+/// Thus, both channel counterparties' HTLC keys will appears in each HTLC output's script.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct HtlcBasepoint(pub PublicKey);
basepoint_impl!(HtlcBasepoint);
key_read_write!(HtlcBasepoint);
-
-/// [htlcpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation) is a child key of an htlc basepoint,
-/// that enables secure routing of payments in onion scheme without a risk of them getting stuck or diverted. It is used to claim the funds in successful or timed out htlc outputs.
+/// A derived key built from a [`HtlcBasepoint`] and `per_commitment_point`.
+///
+/// HTLC keys are used to ensure only the recipient of an HTLC can claim it on-chain with the HTLC
+/// preimage and that only the sender of an HTLC can claim it on-chain after it has timed out.
+/// Thus, both channel counterparties' HTLC keys will appears in each HTLC output's script.
+///
+/// [See the BOLT specs]
+/// (https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation)
+/// for more information on key derivation details.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug)]
pub struct HtlcKey(pub PublicKey);
impl HtlcKey {
- key_impl!(HtlcBasepoint, "htlcpubkey");
+ key_impl!(HtlcBasepoint, "htlcpubkey");
}
key_read_write!(HtlcKey);
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
-
let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
&SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
key_read_write!(RevocationBasepoint);
-/// [htlcpubkey](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#localpubkey-local_htlcpubkey-remote_htlcpubkey-local_delayedpubkey-and-remote_delayedpubkey-derivation) is a child key of a revocation basepoint,
-/// that enables a node to create a justice transaction punishing a counterparty for an attempt to steal funds. Used to in generation of commitment and htlc outputs.
+/// The revocation key is used to allow a channel party to revoke their state - giving their
+/// counterparty the required material to claim all of their funds if they broadcast that state.
+///
+/// Each commitment transaction has a revocation key based on the basepoint and
+/// per_commitment_point which is used in both commitment and HTLC transactions.
+///
+/// See [the BOLT spec for derivation details]
+/// (https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#revocationpubkey-derivation)
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct RevocationKey(pub PublicKey);
impl RevocationKey {
- /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
- /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
- /// public key instead of private keys.
- ///
- /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
- /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
- /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
- /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
- ///
- /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
- /// generated (ie our own).
- pub fn from_basepoint<T: secp256k1::Verification>(
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
- basepoint: &RevocationBasepoint,
- per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
- ) -> Self {
- let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&basepoint.to_public_key().serialize());
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
- };
- let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&basepoint.to_public_key().serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
- };
-
- let countersignatory_contrib = basepoint.to_public_key().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
- .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
- let broadcaster_contrib = (&per_commitment_point).mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
- .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
- let pk = countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
- .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.");
- Self(pk)
- }
-
- /// Get inner Public Key
- pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.0
- }
+ /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from one party's per-commitment
+ /// point and the other party's [`RevocationBasepoint`]. This is the public equivalent of
+ /// [`chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key`] - using only public keys to derive a public
+ /// key instead of private keys.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+ /// generated (ie our own).
+ ///
+ /// [`chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key`]: crate::ln::chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key
+ pub fn from_basepoint<T: secp256k1::Verification>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ countersignatory_basepoint: &RevocationBasepoint,
+ per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
+ ) -> Self {
+ let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize());
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
+ };
+ let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize());
+
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
+ };
+
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_basepoint.to_public_key().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = (&per_commitment_point).mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let pk = countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.");
+ Self(pk)
+ }
+
+ /// Get inner Public Key
+ pub fn to_public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.0
+ }
}
key_read_write!(RevocationKey);
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use super::derive_public_key;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use super::derive_public_key;
- #[test]
+ #[test]
fn test_key_derivation() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
}
}
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
+use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
-use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
-use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
-use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
+ crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
+ crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
+ crate::sign::KeysManager,
+};
use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
}
fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+
+ let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
- .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+ .ok_or_else(|| {
+ let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
+ })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
&unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
+ let err_str = e.to_string();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
+ })
+ }
+ _ => {
+ let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
}
- _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
}?;
if accept_0conf {
}
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
} else {
// If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
// with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
}
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
+ log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
+
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
}
}
// If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
+ &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
+ ).map_err(|e|
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
+ )?;
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ channel_type,
}, None));
peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
- if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
- // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
- // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
- // worry about closing and removing them.
- debug_assert!(false);
- None
- }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
).for_each(|chan| {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
}
impl<T: sealed::Context> Hash for Features<T> {
fn hash<H: Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
- self.flags.hash(hasher);
+ let mut nonzero_flags = &self.flags[..];
+ while nonzero_flags.last() == Some(&0) {
+ nonzero_flags = &nonzero_flags[..nonzero_flags.len() - 1];
+ }
+ nonzero_flags.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl<T: sealed::Context> PartialEq for Features<T> {
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
- self.flags.eq(&o.flags)
+ let mut o_iter = o.flags.iter();
+ let mut self_iter = self.flags.iter();
+ loop {
+ match (o_iter.next(), self_iter.next()) {
+ (Some(o), Some(us)) => if o != us { return false },
+ (Some(b), None) | (None, Some(b)) => if *b != 0 { return false },
+ (None, None) => return true,
+ }
+ }
}
}
impl<T: sealed::Context> PartialOrd for Features<T> {
assert!(!converted_features.supports_any_optional_bits());
assert!(converted_features.requires_static_remote_key());
}
+
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ fn test_excess_zero_bytes_ignored() {
+ // Checks that `Hash` and `PartialEq` ignore excess zero bytes, which may appear due to
+ // feature conversion or because a peer serialized their feature poorly.
+ use std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher;
+ use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
+
+ let mut zerod_features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ zerod_features.flags = vec![0];
+ let empty_features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ assert!(empty_features.flags.is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(zerod_features, empty_features);
+
+ let mut zerod_hash = DefaultHasher::new();
+ zerod_features.hash(&mut zerod_hash);
+ let mut empty_hash = DefaultHasher::new();
+ empty_features.hash(&mut empty_hash);
+ assert_eq!(zerod_hash.finish(), empty_hash.finish());
+ }
}
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
-use {
- crate::util::time::tests::SinceEpoch,
- std::time::{SystemTime, Instant, Duration}
-};
+use std::time::{SystemTime, Instant, Duration};
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+use crate::util::time::tests::SinceEpoch;
#[test]
fn mpp_failure() {
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use crate::sign::{KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
use crate::onion_message::{SimpleArcOnionMessenger, SimpleRefOnionMessenger};
use crate::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageHandler, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, OnionMessageContents, PendingOnionMessage};
-use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync, NodeId, NodeAlias};
+use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeId, NodeAlias};
use crate::util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
use crate::util::logger::{Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::io;
use alloc::collections::VecDeque;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, FairRwLock};
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, FairRwLock};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, AtomicI32, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, hash, fmt, mem};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::convert::Infallible;
-#[cfg(feature = "std")] use std::error;
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use std::error;
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync},
+ crate::sign::KeysManager,
+ crate::sync::Arc,
+};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256Engine;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, Retry, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
-use crate::routing::router::{RouteParameters, PaymentParameters};
use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
-use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool, substantially_old: bool, not_stale: bool) {
+ use crate::routing::router::{RouteParameters, PaymentParameters};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::Retry;
+ use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
// When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
// chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
// panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
use crate::blinded_path::message::{advance_path_by_one, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::blinded_path::utils;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient};
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager};
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessage, OnionMessageHandler, SocketAddress};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
-use crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
pub use super::packet::OnionMessageContents;
use super::packet::ParsedOnionMessageContents;
use core::fmt;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::io;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use crate::sync::Mutex;
use crate::prelude::*;
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ crate::sign::KeysManager,
+ crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ crate::sync::Arc,
+};
+
pub(super) const MAX_TIMER_TICKS: usize = 2;
/// A sender, receiver and forwarder of [`OnionMessage`]s.
///
/// These are obtained when released from [`OnionMessenger`]'s handlers after which they are
/// enqueued for sending.
-pub type PendingOnionMessage<T: OnionMessageContents> = (T, Destination, Option<BlindedPath>);
+pub type PendingOnionMessage<T> = (T, Destination, Option<BlindedPath>);
pub(crate) fn new_pending_onion_message<T: OnionMessageContents>(
contents: T, destination: Destination, reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
use crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice;
use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12ParseError;
use crate::onion_message::OnionMessageContents;
-use crate::onion_message::messenger::PendingOnionMessage;
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use crate::onion_message::messenger::PendingOnionMessage;
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(any(ldk_bench, not(any(test, fuzzing))))]
const _GRAPH_NODE_FIXED_SIZE: usize = core::mem::size_of::<RouteGraphNode>() - 64;
+/// A [`CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop`] entry.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct FirstHopCandidate<'a> {
+ /// Channel details of the first hop
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::get_outbound_payment_scid`] MUST be `Some` (indicating the channel
+ /// has been funded and is able to pay), and accessor methods may panic otherwise.
+ ///
+ /// [`find_route`] validates this prior to constructing a [`CandidateRouteHop`].
+ pub details: &'a ChannelDetails,
+ /// The node id of the payer, which is also the source side of this candidate route hop.
+ pub payer_node_id: &'a NodeId,
+}
+
+/// A [`CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop`] entry.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct PublicHopCandidate<'a> {
+ /// Information about the channel, including potentially its capacity and
+ /// direction-specific information.
+ pub info: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
+ /// The short channel ID of the channel, i.e. the identifier by which we refer to this
+ /// channel.
+ pub short_channel_id: u64,
+}
+
+/// A [`CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop`] entry.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct PrivateHopCandidate<'a> {
+ /// Information about the private hop communicated via BOLT 11.
+ pub hint: &'a RouteHintHop,
+ /// Node id of the next hop in BOLT 11 route hint.
+ pub target_node_id: &'a NodeId
+}
+
+/// A [`CandidateRouteHop::Blinded`] entry.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct BlindedPathCandidate<'a> {
+ /// Information about the blinded path including the fee, HTLC amount limits, and
+ /// cryptographic material required to build an HTLC through the given path.
+ pub hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ /// Index of the hint in the original list of blinded hints.
+ ///
+ /// This is used to cheaply uniquely identify this blinded path, even though we don't have
+ /// a short channel ID for this hop.
+ hint_idx: usize,
+}
+
+/// A [`CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded`] entry.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct OneHopBlindedPathCandidate<'a> {
+ /// Information about the blinded path including the fee, HTLC amount limits, and
+ /// cryptographic material required to build an HTLC terminating with the given path.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the [`BlindedPayInfo`] is ignored here.
+ pub hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
+ /// Index of the hint in the original list of blinded hints.
+ ///
+ /// This is used to cheaply uniquely identify this blinded path, even though we don't have
+ /// a short channel ID for this hop.
+ hint_idx: usize,
+}
+
/// A wrapper around the various hop representations.
///
/// Can be used to examine the properties of a hop,
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
/// A hop from the payer, where the outbound liquidity is known.
- FirstHop {
- /// Channel details of the first hop
- ///
- /// [`ChannelDetails::get_outbound_payment_scid`] MUST be `Some` (indicating the channel
- /// has been funded and is able to pay), and accessor methods may panic otherwise.
- ///
- /// [`find_route`] validates this prior to constructing a [`CandidateRouteHop`].
- details: &'a ChannelDetails,
- /// The node id of the payer, which is also the source side of this candidate route hop.
- payer_node_id: &'a NodeId,
- },
+ FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate<'a>),
/// A hop found in the [`ReadOnlyNetworkGraph`].
- PublicHop {
- /// Information about the channel, including potentially its capacity and
- /// direction-specific information.
- info: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
- /// The short channel ID of the channel, i.e. the identifier by which we refer to this
- /// channel.
- short_channel_id: u64,
- },
+ PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate<'a>),
/// A private hop communicated by the payee, generally via a BOLT 11 invoice.
///
/// Because BOLT 11 route hints can take multiple hops to get to the destination, this may not
/// terminate at the payee.
- PrivateHop {
- /// Information about the private hop communicated via BOLT 11.
- hint: &'a RouteHintHop,
- /// Node id of the next hop in BOLT 11 route hint.
- target_node_id: &'a NodeId
- },
+ PrivateHop(PrivateHopCandidate<'a>),
/// A blinded path which starts with an introduction point and ultimately terminates with the
/// payee.
///
///
/// Because blinded paths are "all or nothing", and we cannot use just one part of a blinded
/// path, the full path is treated as a single [`CandidateRouteHop`].
- Blinded {
- /// Information about the blinded path including the fee, HTLC amount limits, and
- /// cryptographic material required to build an HTLC through the given path.
- hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
- /// Index of the hint in the original list of blinded hints.
- ///
- /// This is used to cheaply uniquely identify this blinded path, even though we don't have
- /// a short channel ID for this hop.
- hint_idx: usize,
- },
+ Blinded(BlindedPathCandidate<'a>),
/// Similar to [`Self::Blinded`], but the path here only has one hop.
///
/// While we treat this similarly to [`CandidateRouteHop::Blinded`] in many respects (e.g.
///
/// This primarily exists to track that we need to included a blinded path at the end of our
/// [`Route`], even though it doesn't actually add an additional hop in the payment.
- OneHopBlinded {
- /// Information about the blinded path including the fee, HTLC amount limits, and
- /// cryptographic material required to build an HTLC terminating with the given path.
- ///
- /// Note that the [`BlindedPayInfo`] is ignored here.
- hint: &'a (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath),
- /// Index of the hint in the original list of blinded hints.
- ///
- /// This is used to cheaply uniquely identify this blinded path, even though we don't have
- /// a short channel ID for this hop.
- hint_idx: usize,
- },
+ OneHopBlinded(OneHopBlindedPathCandidate<'a>),
}
impl<'a> CandidateRouteHop<'a> {
#[inline]
fn short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => details.get_outbound_payment_scid(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => Some(*short_channel_id),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint, .. } => Some(hint.short_channel_id),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => None,
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => hop.details.get_outbound_payment_scid(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => Some(hop.short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => Some(hop.hint.short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(_) => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => None,
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn globally_unique_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => if details.is_public { details.short_channel_id } else { None },
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { short_channel_id, .. } => Some(*short_channel_id),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => None,
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => None,
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => if hop.details.is_public { hop.details.short_channel_id } else { None },
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => Some(hop.short_channel_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(_) => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(_) => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => None,
}
}
// NOTE: This may alloc memory so avoid calling it in a hot code path.
fn features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => details.counterparty.features.to_context(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.channel().features.clone(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => hop.details.counterparty.features.to_context(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => hop.info.channel().features.clone(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(_) => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(_) => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => ChannelFeatures::empty(),
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u32 {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => 0,
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint, .. } => hint.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(_) => 0,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => hop.info.direction().cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => hop.hint.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) => hop.hint.0.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => 0,
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => details.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().htlc_minimum_msat,
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint, .. } => hint.htlc_minimum_msat.unwrap_or(0),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.0.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => hop.details.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => hop.info.direction().htlc_minimum_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => hop.hint.htlc_minimum_msat.unwrap_or(0),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) => hop.hint.0.htlc_minimum_msat,
CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => 0,
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn fees(&self) -> RoutingFees {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => RoutingFees {
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(_) => RoutingFees {
base_msat: 0, proportional_millionths: 0,
},
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.direction().fees,
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint, .. } => hint.fees,
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => hop.info.direction().fees,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => hop.hint.fees,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) => {
RoutingFees {
- base_msat: hint.0.fee_base_msat,
- proportional_millionths: hint.0.fee_proportional_millionths
+ base_msat: hop.hint.0.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: hop.hint.0.fee_proportional_millionths
}
},
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } =>
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) =>
RoutingFees { base_msat: 0, proportional_millionths: 0 },
}
}
/// cached!
fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity {
- liquidity_msat: details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity {
+ liquidity_msat: hop.details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
},
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.effective_capacity(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max), .. }, .. } =>
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => hop.info.effective_capacity(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(PrivateHopCandidate { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: Some(max), .. }, .. }) =>
EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: *max },
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: None, .. }, .. } =>
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(PrivateHopCandidate { hint: RouteHintHop { htlc_maximum_msat: None, .. }, .. }) =>
EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } =>
- EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: hint.0.htlc_maximum_msat },
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) =>
+ EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat: hop.hint.0.htlc_maximum_msat },
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
}
}
#[inline]
fn id(&self) -> CandidateHopId {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint_idx, .. } => CandidateHopId::Blinded(*hint_idx),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) => CandidateHopId::Blinded(hop.hint_idx),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(hop) => CandidateHopId::Blinded(hop.hint_idx),
_ => CandidateHopId::Clear((self.short_channel_id().unwrap(), self.source() < self.target().unwrap())),
}
}
fn blinded_path(&self) -> Option<&'a BlindedPath> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(BlindedPathCandidate { hint, .. }) | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(OneHopBlindedPathCandidate { hint, .. }) => {
Some(&hint.1)
},
_ => None,
#[inline]
pub fn source(&self) -> NodeId {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { payer_node_id, .. } => **payer_node_id,
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => *info.source(),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint, .. } => hint.src_node_id.into(),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } => hint.1.introduction_node_id.into(),
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => hint.1.introduction_node_id.into(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => *hop.payer_node_id,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => *hop.info.source(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => hop.hint.src_node_id.into(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(hop) => hop.hint.1.introduction_node_id.into(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(hop) => hop.hint.1.introduction_node_id.into(),
}
}
/// Returns the target node id of this hop, if known.
#[inline]
pub fn target(&self) -> Option<NodeId> {
match self {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => Some(details.counterparty.node_id.into()),
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => Some(*info.target()),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { target_node_id, .. } => Some(**target_node_id),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => None,
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => Some(hop.details.counterparty.node_id.into()),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(hop) => Some(*hop.info.target()),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(hop) => Some(*hop.target_node_id),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(_) => None,
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => None,
}
}
}
impl<'a> fmt::Display for LoggedCandidateHop<'a> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
match self.0 {
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, .. } | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, .. } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(BlindedPathCandidate { hint, .. }) | CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(OneHopBlindedPathCandidate { hint, .. }) => {
"blinded route hint with introduction node id ".fmt(f)?;
hint.1.introduction_node_id.fmt(f)?;
" and blinding point ".fmt(f)?;
hint.1.blinding_point.fmt(f)
},
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(_) => {
"first hop with SCID ".fmt(f)?;
self.0.short_channel_id().unwrap().fmt(f)
},
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(_) => {
"route hint with SCID ".fmt(f)?;
self.0.short_channel_id().unwrap().fmt(f)
},
|scid| payment_params.previously_failed_channels.contains(&scid));
let (should_log_candidate, first_hop_details) = match $candidate {
- CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } => (true, Some(details)),
- CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { .. } => (true, None),
- CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { .. } => (true, None),
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { .. } => (true, None),
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(hop) => (true, Some(hop.details)),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(_) => (true, None),
+ CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(_) => (true, None),
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(_) => (true, None),
_ => (false, None),
};
if !skip_node {
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&$node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details, payer_node_id: &our_node_id,
- };
+ });
add_entry!(&candidate, fee_to_target_msat,
$next_hops_value_contribution,
next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
if let Some((directed_channel, source)) = chan.as_directed_to(&$node_id) {
if first_hops.is_none() || *source != our_node_id {
if directed_channel.direction().enabled {
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info: directed_channel,
short_channel_id: *chan_id,
- };
+ });
add_entry!(&candidate,
fee_to_target_msat,
$next_hops_value_contribution,
// place where it could be added.
payee_node_id_opt.map(|payee| first_hop_targets.get(&payee).map(|first_channels| {
for details in first_channels {
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details, payer_node_id: &our_node_id,
- };
+ });
let added = add_entry!(&candidate, 0, path_value_msat,
0, 0u64, 0, 0).is_some();
log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via {}",
network_nodes.get(&intro_node_id).is_some();
if !have_intro_node_in_graph || our_node_id == intro_node_id { continue }
let candidate = if hint.1.blinded_hops.len() == 1 {
- CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded { hint, hint_idx }
- } else { CandidateRouteHop::Blinded { hint, hint_idx } };
+ CandidateRouteHop::OneHopBlinded(OneHopBlindedPathCandidate { hint, hint_idx })
+ } else { CandidateRouteHop::Blinded(BlindedPathCandidate { hint, hint_idx }) };
let mut path_contribution_msat = path_value_msat;
if let Some(hop_used_msat) = add_entry!(&candidate,
0, path_contribution_msat, 0, 0_u64, 0, 0)
sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities, recommended_value_msat,
our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
- let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details, payer_node_id: &our_node_id,
- };
+ });
let blinded_path_fee = match compute_fees(path_contribution_msat, candidate.fees()) {
Some(fee) => fee,
None => continue
let candidate = network_channels
.get(&hop.short_channel_id)
.and_then(|channel| channel.as_directed_to(&target))
- .map(|(info, _)| CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ .map(|(info, _)| CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: hop.short_channel_id,
- })
- .unwrap_or_else(|| CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: hop, target_node_id: target });
+ }))
+ .unwrap_or_else(|| CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(PrivateHopCandidate { hint: hop, target_node_id: target }));
if let Some(hop_used_msat) = add_entry!(&candidate,
aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
- let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details, payer_node_id: &our_node_id,
- };
+ });
add_entry!(&first_hop_candidate,
aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
sort_first_hop_channels(first_channels, &used_liquidities,
recommended_value_msat, our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
- let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details, payer_node_id: &our_node_id,
- };
+ });
add_entry!(&first_hop_candidate,
aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
aggregate_path_contribution_msat,
let target = ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate.target().unwrap_or(maybe_dummy_payee_node_id);
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&target) {
for details in first_channels {
- if let CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details: last_hop_details, .. }
+ if let CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate { details: last_hop_details, .. })
= ordered_hops.last().unwrap().0.candidate
{
if details.get_outbound_payment_scid() == last_hop_details.get_outbound_payment_scid() {
.filter(|(h, _)| h.candidate.short_channel_id().is_some())
{
let target = hop.candidate.target().expect("target is defined when short_channel_id is defined");
- let maybe_announced_channel = if let CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { .. } = hop.candidate {
+ let maybe_announced_channel = if let CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(_) = hop.candidate {
// If we sourced the hop from the graph we're sure the target node is announced.
true
- } else if let CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details, .. } = hop.candidate {
+ } else if let CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(first_hop) = &hop.candidate {
// If this is a first hop we also know if it's announced.
- details.is_public
+ first_hop.details.is_public
} else {
// If we sourced it any other way, we double-check the network graph to see if
// there are announced channels between the endpoints. If so, the hop might be
use crate::routing::utxo::UtxoResult;
use crate::routing::router::{get_route, build_route_from_hops_internal, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features,
BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RoutingFees,
- DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE, RouteParameters, CandidateRouteHop};
+ DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE, RouteParameters, CandidateRouteHop, PublicHopCandidate};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, FixedPenaltyScorer, ScoreLookUp, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters};
use crate::routing::test_utils::{add_channel, add_or_update_node, build_graph, build_line_graph, id_to_feature_flags, get_nodes, update_channel};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
let channels = network_graph.channels();
let channel = channels.get(&5).unwrap();
let info = channel.as_directed_from(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[3])).unwrap();
- let candidate: CandidateRouteHop = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate: CandidateRouteHop = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info: info.0,
short_channel_id: 5,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, &scorer_params), 456);
// Then check we can get a normal route
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
-use crate::routing::router::{Path, CandidateRouteHop};
+use crate::routing::router::{Path, CandidateRouteHop, PublicHopCandidate};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut, Ref};
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::io::{self, Read};
-use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
+use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut, Ref},
+ crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard},
+};
/// We define Score ever-so-slightly differently based on whether we are being built for C bindings
/// or not. For users, `LockableScore` must somehow be writeable to disk. For Rust users, this is
&self, candidate: &CandidateRouteHop, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters
) -> u64 {
let (scid, target) = match candidate {
- CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, short_channel_id } => {
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate { info, short_channel_id }) => {
(short_channel_id, info.target())
},
_ => return 0,
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
- use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop, CandidateRouteHop};
+ use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop, CandidateRouteHop, PublicHopCandidate};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, ScoreLookUp, ScoreUpdate};
use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, TestLogger};
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 10_240, ..usage };
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 50, ..usage };
assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
let successful_path = payment_path_for_amount(200);
let channel = &network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 41,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 301);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 301);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 301);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_a).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
// Note that a default liquidity bound is used for B -> C as no channel exists
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_b).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 43,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(44).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_c).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 44,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&Path { hops: path, blinded_tail: None }, 43, Duration::ZERO);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_a).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 80);
// Note that a default liquidity bound is used for B -> C as no channel exists
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_b).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 43,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(44).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&node_c).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 44,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 128);
}
let channel_42 = network_graph.get(&42).unwrap();
let channel_43 = network_graph.get(&43).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel_42.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate_41 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate_41 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 41,
- };
+ });
let (info, target) = channel_42.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate_42 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate_42 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
let (info, _) = channel_43.as_directed_from(&target).unwrap();
- let candidate_43 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate_43 = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 43,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate_41, usage, ¶ms), 128);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate_42, usage, ¶ms), 128);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate_43, usage, ¶ms), 128);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_023, ..usage };
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 2_000);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 300);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500), 42, Duration::ZERO);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), u64::max_value());
scorer.time_passed(Duration::from_secs(10));
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500), 42, Duration::ZERO);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), u64::max_value());
if decay_before_reload {
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 11497);
let usage = ChannelUsage {
effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_950_000_000, htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000 }, ..usage
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &network_graph, &logger);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 58);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters {
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::default(), &network_graph, &logger);
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 300);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters {
let decay_params = ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters::zero_penalty();
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(decay_params, &network_graph, &logger);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 80_000);
}
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), u64::max_value());
let usage = ChannelUsage { inflight_htlc_msat: 251, ..usage };
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), base_penalty_msat);
let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_000, ..usage };
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
// With no historical data the normal liquidity penalty calculation is used.
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 168);
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 2048);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage_1, ¶ms), 249);
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 105);
}
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 168);
}
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 2050);
let network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
let channel = network_graph.channel(42).unwrap();
let (info, _) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 0);
// Check we receive anti-probing penalty for htlc_maximum_msat == channel_capacity.
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, target) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 300);
let mut path = payment_path_for_amount(768);
};
let channel = network_graph.read_only().channel(42).unwrap().to_owned();
let (info, target) = channel.as_directed_from(&source).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info,
short_channel_id: 42,
- };
+ });
// With no historical data the normal liquidity penalty calculation is used, which results
// in a success probability of ~75%.
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, ¶ms), 1269);
Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
}
- pub fn try_lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
- Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
- }
-
pub fn into_inner(self) -> LockResult<T> {
Ok(self.inner.into_inner())
}
}
#[inline]
+#[allow(unused_variables)]
pub fn sign_with_aux_rand<C: Signing, ES: Deref>(
ctx: &Secp256k1<C>, msg: &Message, sk: &SecretKey, entropy_source: &ES
) -> Signature where ES::Target: EntropySource {
use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::MonitorEvent;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::routing::router::CandidateRouteHop;
+use crate::routing::router::{CandidateRouteHop, FirstHopCandidate, PublicHopCandidate, PrivateHopCandidate};
use crate::sign;
use crate::events;
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{WalletSource, Utxo};
if let Some(first_hops) = first_hops {
if let Some(idx) = first_hops.iter().position(|h| h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(hop.short_channel_id)) {
let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(payer);
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop(FirstHopCandidate {
details: first_hops[idx],
payer_node_id: &node_id,
- };
+ });
scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, &());
continue;
}
let network_graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
if let Some(channel) = network_graph.channel(hop.short_channel_id) {
let (directed, _) = channel.as_directed_to(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.pubkey)).unwrap();
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop(PublicHopCandidate {
info: directed,
short_channel_id: hop.short_channel_id,
- };
+ });
scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, &());
} else {
let target_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.pubkey);
htlc_minimum_msat: None,
htlc_maximum_msat: None,
};
- let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop {
+ let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop(PrivateHopCandidate {
hint: &route_hint,
target_node_id: &target_node_id,
- };
+ });
scorer.channel_penalty_msat(&candidate, usage, &());
}
prev_hop_node = &hop.pubkey;
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff