/// HTLC-Success transaction.
/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
- pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+ pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
L::Target: Logger,
{
for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
- /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+ /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
///
/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
///
// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
- pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
+ pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
/// this value.
- pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+ // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
+ // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
+ // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
+ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
- // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+ // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
/// only Tor Onion addresses.
///
/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
- pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
+ pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
if addresses.len() > 500 {
panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
}
+ // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
+ // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
+ addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
+
let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
},
}
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
Ok(())
}
}
};
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff