use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use crate::util::byte_utils;
-use crate::events::Event;
+use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
use crate::prelude::*;
(8, delayed_payment_key, required),
(10, per_commitment_point, required),
(12, feerate_per_kw, required),
- (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
+ (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
});
impl HolderSignedTx {
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_tx, required),
- (1, claimed_htlcs, vec_type),
- (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
+ (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
+ (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
(4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
},
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
(2, commitment_number, required),
(4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
- (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
+ (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
},
(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
///
-/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
-/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
-/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
-/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
-///
/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
+ pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
// we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
- pending_events: Vec<Event>,
+ pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
+ pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
// Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
// which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
- (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
- (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+ (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
+ (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
- (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
(15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
});
}
}
+macro_rules! _process_events_body {
+ ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
+ loop {
+ let (pending_events, repeated_events);
+ if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
+ let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
+ break;
+ }
+ inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
+
+ pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
+ repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
+ } else { break; }
+ let num_events = pending_events.len();
+
+ for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
+ $event_to_handle = event;
+ $handle_event;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
+ let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
+ inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
+ if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
+ // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
+
impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
/// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
+ is_processing_pending_events: false,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
outputs_to_watch,
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
}
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
+ /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
+ ///
+ /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
+ /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
+ /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
+ /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
+ /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
///
- /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for
- /// [`ChainMonitor`].
+ /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
+ /// order to handle these events.
+ ///
+ /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
+ /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
+ pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
+ let mut ev;
+ process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
+ }
+
+ /// Processes any events asynchronously.
///
- /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events
- /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
+ /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
+ pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
+ &self, handler: &H
+ ) {
+ let mut ev;
+ process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
+ ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
+ ret
}
pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
ret
}
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
- for (claim_id, claim_event) in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
+ /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
+ /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
+ /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
+ pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
+ let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
+ let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
+ for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
match claim_event {
ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
- (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
- (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+ (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
+ (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
- (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
(15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
});
payment_preimages,
pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
pending_events,
+ is_processing_pending_events: false,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
outputs_to_watch,
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
-use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
+use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use crate::io;
}
/// The return type of `force_shutdown`
+///
+/// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
+/// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
+/// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
(self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
}
+ /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
+ pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
+ }
+ return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
+ }
+
+ fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
+ self.channel_state &
+ (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
+ ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
+ ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
+ ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
+ }
+
/// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
}
- pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
+ pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
+ let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
+ ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
+ },
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
+ }
}
/// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
/// Doesn't bother handling the
/// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
/// corner case properly.
- pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
+ pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
+ -> AvailableBalances
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
let context = &self;
// Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
// send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
(context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
- Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
+ Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
}
let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
- context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
}
Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
- where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
+ create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
+ FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
+ {
// We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
if local_sent_shutdown {
}
}
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
(0, 0)
} else {
let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
- on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
+ on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
/// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
/// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
/// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
- pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
- self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
+ self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
} else { (None, Vec::new()) }
}
/// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
/// for our counterparty.
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
skimmed_fee_msat, ..
} => {
match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
- onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
+ onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
{
Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
}
let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
- self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
+ self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
} else {
None
};
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
- where L::Target: Logger,
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
}
- match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
(Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
// free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
/// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
/// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
/// commitment update.
- pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
+ pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
}
///
/// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
/// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
- fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
// Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
/// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
/// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
- self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
- self.context.channel_state &
- (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
- ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
- == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
- self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
+ self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
}
/// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
/// commitment update.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
self
.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
- skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
+ skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
.map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
.map_err(|err| {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
/// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
///
/// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
- skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
}
- let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
+ let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
///
/// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
/// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
- &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
+ source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
+ {
let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
- onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
+ onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
match send_res? {
Some(_) => {
(5, self.context.config, required),
(6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
(7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
- (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
(9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
- (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
+ (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
(13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
- (15, preimages, vec_type),
+ (15, preimages, required_vec),
(17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
(19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
(21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
(5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
(6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
(7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
- (8, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
(9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
- (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
+ (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
(13, channel_creation_height, option),
- (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
+ (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
(17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
(19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
(21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
- use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
+ use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
enum BackgroundEvent {
- /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
- /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
- /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
- /// need the counterparty node_id.
+ /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
+ /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
+ /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
+ /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
///
/// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
/// are regenerated on startup.
- ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
+ ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
/// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
/// channel to continue normal operation.
///
/// In general this should be used rather than
- /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
+ /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
/// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
/// error the other variant is acceptable.
///
/// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
persistence_notifier: Notifier,
///
/// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
///
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
- best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
-
- let balance = context.get_available_balances();
+ fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
+ ) -> Self
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
ChannelDetails {
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
}
}
}
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
+
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
// update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
// any case so that it won't deadlock.
debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
- debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
- }
+ debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.drain(..num_events);
processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
+ // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
+ // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
$self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone());
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
}
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
.map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
.collect();
}
vec![]
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
Some(monitor_update) => {
match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
/// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
/// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
///
+ /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
/// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
/// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
});
if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
{
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
match event {
- BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
// The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
// monitor updating completing.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
+ chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
+ // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
+ // `BackgroundEvent`s.
+ let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = res {
- // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
- // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
- // update over and over again until morale improves.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ if !during_init {
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = res {
+ // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
+ // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
+ // update over and over again until morale improves.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
+ // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
+ // monitor update as a background event.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
+ update: monitor_update.clone(),
+ });
}
}
return Ok(());
payment_preimage,
}],
};
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
+
+ if !during_init {
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
+ // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
+ // event.
+ // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
+ // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
+ // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
+ // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
+ // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
+ // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
+ // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
+ prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
+ )));
}
// Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
// duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
+ debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
+ "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
_ => pending_forward_info
}
};
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
}
- // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
- .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
- .is_some();
- if !forward_ev_exists {
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable:
- Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
+ let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
+ if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
+ ).count();
+ // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
+ // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
+ // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
+ // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
+ // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
+ // real by taking more time.
+ if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
+ pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
}, None));
}
}
/// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
- /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
+ /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
/// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
/// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
}
/// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
/// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
/// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
- /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
+ /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
let mut errors = Vec::new();
loop {
(35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
Ok(())
}
(35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
(37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
(39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
+ (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
});
// `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ channel_shutdown_state,
})
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
- (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (2, channels, required_vec),
(4, phantom_scid, required),
(6, real_node_pubkey, required),
});
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
let mut payment_id = None;
let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (4, path_hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path_hops, required_vec),
(5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
(6, blinded_tail, option),
});
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
- let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
+ let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
if path.hops.len() == 0 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
(1, payment_id_opt, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
// 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
- (4, path.hops, vec_type),
+ (4, path.hops, required_vec),
(5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
(6, path.blinded_tail, option),
});
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
(8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
- (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
}
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
+ (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
+ (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
+ (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
+ (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
+ (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
+);
+
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
};
- close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+ close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
}
}
(6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
(7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
(8, events_override, option),
- (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
+ (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
// Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
+ // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
+ // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
+ // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
+ let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
+
{
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
- if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
+ if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.hops.is_empty() {
}
}
}
+
+ // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
+ // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
+ // payments.
+ let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
+ .into_iter()
+ .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
+ Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
+ // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
+ // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
+ // channel_id -> peer map entry).
+ counterparty_opt.is_none(),
+ monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
+ } else { None }
+ } else {
+ // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
+ // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
+ // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
+ // channel still live case here.
+ None
+ }
+ });
+ for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
+ pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
+ }
}
}
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
+ for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
+ // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
+ // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
+ // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
+ channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
+ downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
+ }
+
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
//connection or two.
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
use crate::util::test_utils;
- use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
+ use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
//! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
}
}
+/// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
+///
+/// Returns an error if it is invalid.
+pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
+
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
+///
+/// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
+pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
+
+ Ok(())
+}
+
impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
{
(4, self.rgb, required),
(6, self.alias, required),
(8, self.announcement_message, option),
- (10, empty_addresses, vec_type), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
+ (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
});
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
_init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, features, required),
(2, last_update, required),
(4, rgb, required),
(6, alias, required),
(8, announcement_message, option),
- (10, _addresses, vec_type), // deprecated, not used anymore
+ (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
});
let _: Option<Vec<NetAddress>> = _addresses;
Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
- }
+ }
}
/// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
// Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
(2, self.announcement_info, option),
- (4, self.channels, vec_type),
+ (4, self.channels, required_vec),
});
Ok(())
}
// with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
// requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
// performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
- let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
- let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
- _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
-
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
(2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
- (4, channels, vec_type),
+ (4, channels, required_vec),
});
+ let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
+ let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
Ok(NodeInfo {
announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
- channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
+ channels,
})
}
}
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
+ verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
}
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
{
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
- secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
+ verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
}
}
}
+ /// Adds a known HTLC given the public key of the HTLC source, target, and short channel
+ /// id.
+ pub fn add_inflight_htlc(&mut self, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, channel_scid: u64, used_msat: u64){
+ self.0
+ .entry((channel_scid, source < target))
+ .and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += used_msat)
+ .or_insert(used_msat);
+ }
+
/// Returns liquidity in msat given the public key of the HTLC source, target, and short channel
/// id.
pub fn used_liquidity_msat(&self, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, channel_scid: u64) -> Option<u64> {
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedTail, {
- (0, hops, vec_type),
+ (0, hops, required_vec),
(2, blinding_point, required),
(4, excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(6, final_value_msat, required),
(1, self.max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(2, self.payee.features(), option),
(3, self.max_path_count, required),
- (4, *clear_hints, vec_type),
+ (4, *clear_hints, required_vec),
(5, self.max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, required),
(6, self.expiry_time, option),
- (7, self.previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
+ (7, self.previously_failed_channels, required_vec),
(8, *blinded_hints, optional_vec),
(9, self.payee.final_cltv_expiry_delta(), option),
});
(1, max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)),
(2, features, (option: ReadableArgs, payee_pubkey.is_some())),
(3, max_path_count, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT)),
- (4, route_hints, vec_type),
+ (4, clear_route_hints, required_vec),
(5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_CHANNEL_SATURATION_POW_HALF)),
(6, expiry_time, option),
- (7, previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
+ (7, previously_failed_channels, optional_vec),
(8, blinded_route_hints, optional_vec),
(9, final_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, default_final_cltv_expiry_delta)),
});
- let clear_route_hints = route_hints.unwrap_or(vec![]);
let blinded_route_hints = blinded_route_hints.unwrap_or(vec![]);
let payee = if blinded_route_hints.len() != 0 {
if clear_route_hints.len() != 0 || payee_pubkey.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: None,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
}
}
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
}
}
//! [`Readable`]: crate::util::ser::Readable
//! [`Writeable`]: crate::util::ser::Writeable
+ // There are quite a few TLV serialization "types" which behave differently. We currently only
+ // publicly document the `optional` and `required` types, not supporting anything else publicly and
+ // changing them at will.
+ //
+ // Some of the other types include:
+ // * (default_value, $default) - reads optionally, reading $default if no TLV is present
+ // * (static_value, $value) - ignores any TLVs, always using $value
+ // * required_vec - reads into a Vec without a length prefix, failing if no TLV is present.
+ // * optional_vec - reads into an Option<Vec> without a length prefix, continuing if no TLV is
+ // present. Writes from a Vec directly, only if any elements are present. Note
+ // that the struct deserialization macros return a Vec, not an Option.
+ // * upgradable_option - reads via MaybeReadable.
+ // * upgradable_required - reads via MaybeReadable, requiring a TLV be present but may return None
+ // if MaybeReadable::read() returns None.
+
/// Implements serialization for a single TLV record.
/// This is exported for use by other exported macros, do not use directly.
#[doc(hidden)]
BigSize($field.serialized_length() as u64).write($stream)?;
$field.write($stream)?;
};
- ($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, vec_type) => {
+ ($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, required_vec) => {
$crate::_encode_tlv!($stream, $type, $crate::util::ser::WithoutLength(&$field), required);
};
($stream: expr, $optional_type: expr, $optional_field: expr, option) => {
};
($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, optional_vec) => {
if !$field.is_empty() {
- $crate::_encode_tlv!($stream, $type, $field, vec_type);
+ $crate::_encode_tlv!($stream, $type, $field, required_vec);
}
};
($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, upgradable_required) => {
BigSize(field_len as u64).write(&mut $len).expect("No in-memory data may fail to serialize");
$len.0 += field_len;
};
- ($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, vec_type) => {
+ ($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, required_vec) => {
$crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $crate::util::ser::WithoutLength(&$field), required);
};
($len: expr, $optional_type: expr, $optional_field: expr, option) => {
};
($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, optional_vec) => {
if !$field.is_empty() {
- $crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, vec_type);
+ $crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, required_vec);
}
};
($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, option) => {{
// no-op
}};
- ($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
- // no-op
+ ($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, required_vec) => {{
+ $crate::_check_decoded_tlv_order!($last_seen_type, $typ, $type, $field, required);
}};
($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, optional_vec) => {{
// no-op
($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
$crate::_check_missing_tlv!($last_seen_type, $type, $field, required);
}};
- ($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
- // no-op
+ ($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, required_vec) => {{
+ $crate::_check_missing_tlv!($last_seen_type, $type, $field, required);
}};
($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, option) => {{
// no-op
($reader: expr, $field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
$field = $trait::read(&mut $reader $(, $read_arg)*)?;
}};
- ($reader: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
+ ($reader: expr, $field: ident, required_vec) => {{
let f: $crate::util::ser::WithoutLength<Vec<_>> = $crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
- $field = Some(f.0);
+ $field = f.0;
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, option) => {{
$field = Some($crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?);
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, optional_vec) => {{
- $crate::_decode_tlv!($reader, $field, vec_type);
+ let f: $crate::util::ser::WithoutLength<Vec<_>> = $crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
+ $field = Some(f.0);
}};
// `upgradable_required` indicates we're reading a required TLV that may have been upgraded
// without backwards compat. We'll error if the field is missing, and return `Ok(None)` if the
($field: ident, required) => {
$field.0.unwrap()
};
- ($field: ident, vec_type) => {
- $field.unwrap()
+ ($field: ident, required_vec) => {
+ $field
};
($field: ident, optional_vec) => {
$field.unwrap()
($field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
$crate::_init_tlv_field_var!($field, required);
};
- ($field: ident, vec_type) => {
- let mut $field = Some(Vec::new());
+ ($field: ident, required_vec) => {
+ let mut $field = Vec::new();
};
($field: ident, option) => {
let mut $field = None;
f()
}),*
$($tuple_variant_id => {
- Ok($st::$tuple_variant_name(Readable::read(reader)?))
+ Ok($st::$tuple_variant_name($crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader)?))
}),*
_ => {
Err($crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature)
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff