res
}
+ /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
+ /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
+ /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
+ ///
+ /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
+ /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
+ pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ let mut res = HashMap::new();
+ // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
+ // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
+ let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
+ ($txid: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
/// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
/// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
- let mut res = HashMap::new();
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
+ // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
+ // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
+ let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
+ us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ Some(event.txid)
+ } else { None }
+ })
+ });
+
+ if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
+ // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
+ // closed), just get the full set.
+ mem::drop(us);
+ return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
+ }
+ let mut res = HashMap::new();
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
}
}
- // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
- // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
- // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
- let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
- us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
- Some(event.txid)
+ let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = b {
+ Some((a, &**source))
} else { None }
- })
- });
- if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
- if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
- if let &Some(ref source) = b {
- Some((a, &**source))
- } else { None }
- }));
- } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ }));
+ } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
+ }));
+ } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
}));
- } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
- if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
- }));
- }
- }
- } else {
- // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
- // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
- // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
- macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
- ($txid: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
}
}
let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
- for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
+ for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
}
events.into_inner()
}
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
+ let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
!self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
});
+ for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
+ let mut found_htlc = false;
+ for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
+ }
+ if !found_htlc {
+ // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
+ // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
+ // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
+ // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
+ // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
+ // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
+ // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
+ log_info!(args.logger,
+ "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
+ log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ }
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
None => continue,
}
}
- if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
- // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
- // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
- // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
- // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
- // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
- pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
- });
- }
let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
}
}
}
+ for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
+ // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
+ // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
+ // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
+ // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
+ // the payment.
+ forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
+ forwards.retain(|forward| {
+ if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
+ if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
+ htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
+ {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ !forwards.is_empty()
+ })
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
+ if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
+ // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
+ // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
+ // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
+ // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
+ pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
+ });
+ }
+
let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
//! Functional tests which test for correct behavior across node restarts.
use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch};
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils;
-use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
+use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
}
+
+fn do_forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence(use_cs_commitment: bool, claim_htlc: bool) {
+ if !use_cs_commitment { assert!(!claim_htlc); }
+ // If we go to forward a payment, and the ChannelMonitor persistence completes, but the
+ // ChannelManager does not, we shouldn't try to forward the payment again, nor should we fail
+ // it back until the ChannelMonitor decides the fate of the HTLC.
+ // This was never an issue, but it may be easy to regress here going forward.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let nodes_1_deserialized;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
+ let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
+
+ let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
+ let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV;
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), payment_id).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ let node_encoded = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ if claim_htlc {
+ get_monitor!(nodes[2], chan_id_2).provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage,
+ &nodes[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[2].fee_estimator), &nodes[2].logger);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+
+ let _ = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id_2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let cs_commitment_tx = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(cs_commitment_tx.len(), if claim_htlc { 2 } else { 1 });
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).encode();
+ let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], node_encoded, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized);
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+
+ let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_commitment_tx.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ if use_cs_commitment {
+ // If we confirm a commitment transaction that has the HTLC on-chain, nodes[1] should wait
+ // for an HTLC-spending transaction before it does anything with the HTLC upstream.
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &cs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ if claim_htlc {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &cs_commitment_tx[1]);
+ } else {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_expiry - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+ let bs_htlc_timeout_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_tx.len(), 1);
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_tx[0]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ }
+
+ if !claim_htlc {
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], [HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
+ } else {
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, true);
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ if claim_htlc {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ }
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if claim_htlc {
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ } else {
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence() {
+ do_forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence(true, true);
+ do_forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence(true, false);
+ do_forwarded_payment_no_manager_persistence(false, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn removed_payment_no_manager_persistence() {
+ // If an HTLC is failed to us on a channel, and the ChannelMonitor persistence completes, but
+ // the corresponding ChannelManager persistence does not, we need to ensure that the HTLC is
+ // still failed back to the previous hop even though the ChannelMonitor now no longer is aware
+ // of the HTLC. This was previously broken as no attempt was made to figure out which HTLCs
+ // were left dangling when a channel was force-closed due to a stale ChannelManager.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let nodes_1_deserialized;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
+ let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
+
+ let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+
+ let node_encoded = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], commitment_signed, false);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).encode();
+ let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], node_encoded, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized);
+
+ match nodes[1].node.pop_pending_event().unwrap() {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { ref reason, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*reason, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Now that the ChannelManager has force-closed the channel which had the HTLC removed, it is
+ // now forgotten everywhere. The ChannelManager should have, as a side-effect of reload,
+ // learned that the HTLC is gone from the ChannelMonitor and added it to the to-fail-back set.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], [HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff