]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/commitdiff
Drop now-unused Vec of outpoints in remote-commitment-tx-tracking 2020-09-broken-fn
authorMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Sun, 27 Sep 2020 22:05:28 +0000 (18:05 -0400)
committerMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Mon, 5 Oct 2020 16:19:41 +0000 (12:19 -0400)
This nearly fully reverts 6f08779b0439e7e4367a75f4ee88de093dfb68cb,
removing the extra data storage that it added.

lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

index 3adf3e0e70528d64985005d217730a4fd44a456e..0a9cf6997c99b9bda1e5e6217782f7813b79de63 100644 (file)
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
        /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
        /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
        /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
-       counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
+       counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
        /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
        /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
        /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
@@ -824,13 +824,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                }
 
                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
-               for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+               for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
                        writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
-                       writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
-                       (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
-                       for script in txouts.iter() {
-                               script.write(writer)?;
-                       }
+                       writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
                }
 
                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
@@ -1217,12 +1213,8 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
                // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
                // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
-               for (txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
-                       let watched_outputs = self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
-                       assert_eq!(watched_outputs.len(), outputs.len());
-                       for (watched, output) in watched_outputs.iter().zip(outputs.iter()) {
-                               assert_eq!(watched, output);
-                       }
+               for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+                       self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
                }
                &self.outputs_to_watch
        }
@@ -1328,7 +1320,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                                // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
                                log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
                                watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
-                               self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+                               self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
                                macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
                                        ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
@@ -1375,7 +1367,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                        // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
                        // insert it here.
                        watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
-                       self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+                       self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
                        log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
 
@@ -1713,7 +1705,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                                                claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                                        }
                                } else {
-                                       if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+                                       if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
                                                let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
                                                claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                                                if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
@@ -2205,12 +2197,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor
                for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
                        let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-                       let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
-                       let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
-                       for _ in 0..outputs_count {
-                               outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
-                       }
-                       if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
+                       if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }