_ Git - ldk-java/blob - c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.cs

   1
   2 using org.ldk.impl;
   3 using org.ldk.enums;
   4 using org.ldk.util;
   5 using System;
   6
   7 namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs {
   8
   9
  10
  11 /** An implementation of EcdsaChannelSigner */
  12 public interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  13         /**Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  14          *
  15          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  16          *
  17          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  18          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  19          *
  20          * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
  21          * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
  22          * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
  23          * been removed for forwarded payments.
  24          *
  25          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  26          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  27          */
  28         Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
  29         /**Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
  30          *
  31          * This will be called
  32          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  33          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  34          *
  35          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  36          *
  37          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  38          */
  39         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  40         /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  41          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  42          *
  43          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  44          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  45          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  46          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  47          *
  48          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  49          *
  50          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
  51          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
  52          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
  53          * so).
  54          */
  55         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
  56         /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
  57          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  58          *
  59          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  60          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  61          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  62          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  63          *
  64          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
  65          * signature.
  66          *
  67          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
  68          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
  69          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
  70          * so).
  71          *
  72          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
  73          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
  74          */
  75         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
  76         /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
  77          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
  78          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
  79          *
  80          * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
  81          * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
  82          * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
  83          *
  84          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
  85          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
  86          */
  87         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
  88         /**Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
  89          * transaction, either offered or received.
  90          *
  91          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
  92          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
  93          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
  94          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  95          *
  96          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
  97          * outputs.
  98          *
  99          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 100          *
 101          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 102          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 103          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 104          * BIP 143 signature.
 105          */
 106         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 107         /**Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 108          *
 109          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 110          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 111          */
 112         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 113         /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 114          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 115          */
 116         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 117         /**Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 118          * channel participants.
 119          *
 120          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 121          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 122          *
 123          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 124          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 125          * protocol.
 126          *
 127          * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 128          */
 129         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 130 }
 131
 132 /**
 133  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
 134  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
 135  *
 136  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
 137  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
 138  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
 139  * for an example of such policies.
 140  */
 141 public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase {
 142         internal bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
 143         internal long instance_idx;
 144
 145         internal EcdsaChannelSigner(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { bindings_instance = null; }
 146         ~EcdsaChannelSigner() {
 147                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
 148         }
 149
 150         private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { internal EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 151         private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl : bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner {
 152                 internal LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; }
 153                 private EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg;
 154                 private LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder;
 155                 public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, long _inbound_htlc_preimages, long _outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 156                         org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
 157                         int _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_inbound_htlc_preimages);
 158                         byte[][] _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len][];
 159                         for (int i = 0; i < _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
 160                                 long _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_inbound_htlc_preimages, i);
 161                                 byte[] _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8);
 162                                 _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv;
 163                         }
 164                         bindings.free_buffer(_inbound_htlc_preimages);
 165                         int _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_outbound_htlc_preimages);
 166                         byte[][] _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len][];
 167                         for (int i = 0; i < _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_len; i++) {
 168                                 long _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_outbound_htlc_preimages, i);
 169                                 byte[] _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8);
 170                                 _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_conv;
 171                         }
 172                         bindings.free_buffer(_outbound_htlc_preimages);
 173                         Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr, _outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8_arr);
 174                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 175                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 176                         return result;
 177                 }
 178                 public long sign_holder_commitment(long _commitment_tx) {
 179                         org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
 180                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 181                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 182                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 183                         return result;
 184                 }
 185                 public long sign_justice_revoked_output(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key) {
 186                         byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx);
 187                         byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key);
 188                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv);
 189                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 190                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 191                         return result;
 192                 }
 193                 public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) {
 194                         byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx);
 195                         byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key);
 196                         org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
 197                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv, _htlc_hu_conv);
 198                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 199                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 200                         return result;
 201                 }
 202                 public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _htlc_descriptor) {
 203                         byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx);
 204                         org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc_descriptor < 0 || _htlc_descriptor > 4096) { _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, _htlc_descriptor); }
 205                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
 206                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 207                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 208                         return result;
 209                 }
 210                 public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) {
 211                         byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx);
 212                         byte[] _per_commitment_point_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_point);
 213                         org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
 214                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point_conv, _htlc_hu_conv);
 215                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 216                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 217                         return result;
 218                 }
 219                 public long sign_closing_transaction(long _closing_tx) {
 220                         org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction _closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_closing_tx < 0 || _closing_tx > 4096) { _closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, _closing_tx); }
 221                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv);
 222                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 223                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 224                         return result;
 225                 }
 226                 public long sign_holder_anchor_input(long _anchor_tx, long _input) {
 227                         byte[] _anchor_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_anchor_tx);
 228                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx_conv, _input);
 229                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 230                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 231                         return result;
 232                 }
 233                 public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long _msg) {
 234                         org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg_hu_conv = null; if (_msg < 0 || _msg > 4096) { _msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, _msg); }
 235                         Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(_msg_hu_conv);
 236                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 237                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 238                         return result;
 239                 }
 240         }
 241
 242         /** Creates a new instance of EcdsaChannelSigner from a given implementation */
 243         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSignerInterface channelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 244                 LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 245                 LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl impl = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(arg, impl_holder);
 246                 ChannelSigner channelSigner = ChannelSigner.new_impl(channelSigner_impl, pubkeys);
 247                 long[] ptr_idx = bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(impl, channelSigner.instance_idx, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr());
 248
 249                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(null, ptr_idx[0]);
 250                 impl_holder.held.instance_idx = ptr_idx[1];
 251                 impl_holder.held.bindings_instance = impl;
 252                 impl_holder.held.ptrs_to.AddLast(channelSigner);
 253                 return impl_holder.held;
 254         }
 255
 256         /**
 257          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 258          *
 259          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 260          *
 261          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 262          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 263          *
 264          * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
 265          * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
 266          * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
 267          * been removed for forwarded payments.
 268          *
 269          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 270          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 271          */
 272         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 273                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(inbound_htlc_preimages, inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)))), InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(outbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)))));
 274                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 275                 GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
 276                 GC.KeepAlive(inbound_htlc_preimages);
 277                 GC.KeepAlive(outbound_htlc_preimages);
 278                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 279                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 280                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
 281                 return ret_hu_conv;
 282         }
 283
 284         /**
 285          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
 286          *
 287          * This will be called
 288          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 289          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 290          *
 291          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 292          *
 293          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 294          */
 295         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 296                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 297                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 298                 GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
 299                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 300                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 301                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
 302                 return ret_hu_conv;
 303         }
 304
 305         /**
 306          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 307          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 308          *
 309          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 310          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 311          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 312          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 313          *
 314          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 315          *
 316          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 317          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 318          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 319          * so).
 320          */
 321         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 322                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)));
 323                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 324                 GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
 325                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 326                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 327                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
 328                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 329                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 330                 return ret_hu_conv;
 331         }
 332
 333         /**
 334          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 335          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 336          *
 337          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 338          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 339          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 340          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 341          *
 342          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 343          * signature.
 344          *
 345          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 346          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 347          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 348          * so).
 349          *
 350          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 351          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 352          */
 353         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 354                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 355                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 356                 GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
 357                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 358                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 359                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
 360                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
 361                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 362                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 363                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
 364                 return ret_hu_conv;
 365         }
 366
 367         /**
 368          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 369          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 370          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 371          *
 372          * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 373          * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 374          * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 375          *
 376          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
 377          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 378          */
 379         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
 380                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
 381                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 382                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
 383                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 384                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc_descriptor);
 385                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 386                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 387                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc_descriptor); };
 388                 return ret_hu_conv;
 389         }
 390
 391         /**
 392          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 393          * transaction, either offered or received.
 394          *
 395          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 396          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 397          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 398          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 399          *
 400          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 401          * outputs.
 402          *
 403          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 404          *
 405          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 406          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 407          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 408          * BIP 143 signature.
 409          */
 410         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 411                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 412                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 413                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
 414                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 415                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 416                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_point);
 417                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
 418                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 419                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 420                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
 421                 return ret_hu_conv;
 422         }
 423
 424         /**
 425          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 426          *
 427          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 428          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 429          */
 430         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 431                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 432                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 433                 GC.KeepAlive(closing_tx);
 434                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 435                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 436                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(closing_tx); };
 437                 return ret_hu_conv;
 438         }
 439
 440         /**
 441          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 442          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 443          */
 444         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 445                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(anchor_tx), input);
 446                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 447                 GC.KeepAlive(anchor_tx);
 448                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 449                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 450                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 451                 return ret_hu_conv;
 452         }
 453
 454         /**
 455          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 456          * channel participants.
 457          *
 458          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 459          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 460          *
 461          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 462          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 463          * protocol.
 464          *
 465          * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 466          */
 467         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 468                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 469                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 470                 GC.KeepAlive(msg);
 471                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 472                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 473                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(msg); };
 474                 return ret_hu_conv;
 475         }
 476
 477 }
 478 } } }