_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10
  11 /**
  12  * Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
  13  * with our counterparty.
  14  */
  15 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  16 public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase {
  17         ChannelConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
  18         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  19         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  20                 super.finalize();
  21                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); }
  22         }
  23
  24         /**
  25          * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
  26          * over the channel.
  27          * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
  28          * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
  29          *
  30          * Default value: 0.
  31          */
  32         public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
  33                 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
  34                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
  35                 return ret;
  36         }
  37
  38         /**
  39          * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
  40          * over the channel.
  41          * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
  42          * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
  43          *
  44          * Default value: 0.
  45          */
  46         public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
  47                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
  48                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
  49                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
  50         }
  51
  52         /**
  53          * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
  54          * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
  55          * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
  56          * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
  57          *
  58          * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
  59          * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
  60          * this node.
  61          *
  62          * Default value: 1000.
  63          *
  64          * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
  65          */
  66         public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
  67                 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
  68                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
  69                 return ret;
  70         }
  71
  72         /**
  73          * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
  74          * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
  75          * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
  76          * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
  77          *
  78          * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
  79          * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
  80          * this node.
  81          *
  82          * Default value: 1000.
  83          *
  84          * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
  85          */
  86         public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
  87                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
  88                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
  89                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
  90         }
  91
  92         /**
  93          * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
  94          * the channel this config applies to.
  95          *
  96          * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
  97          * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
  98          * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
  99          * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
 100          *
 101          * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
 102          * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
 103          * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
 104          * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
 105          * the spending transaction).
 106          *
 107          * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
 108          * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
 109          * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
 110          *
 111          * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
 112          */
 113         public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
 114                 short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
 115                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 116                 return ret;
 117         }
 118
 119         /**
 120          * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
 121          * the channel this config applies to.
 122          *
 123          * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
 124          * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
 125          * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
 126          * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
 127          *
 128          * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
 129          * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
 130          * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
 131          * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
 132          * the spending transaction).
 133          *
 134          * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
 135          * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
 136          * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
 137          *
 138          * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
 139          */
 140         public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
 141                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
 142                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 143                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 144         }
 145
 146         /**
 147          * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
 148          * small to claim on-chain.
 149          *
 150          * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
 151          * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
 152          * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
 153          * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
 154          * channel is force-closed.
 155          *
 156          * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
 157          * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
 158          * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
 159          * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
 160          * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
 161          * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
 162          * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
 163          *
 164          * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
 165          * exposure across all three types per-channel.
 166          *
 167          * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
 168          */
 169         public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
 170                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr);
 171                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 172                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 173                 org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 174                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
 175                 return ret_hu_conv;
 176         }
 177
 178         /**
 179          * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
 180          * small to claim on-chain.
 181          *
 182          * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
 183          * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
 184          * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
 185          * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
 186          * channel is force-closed.
 187          *
 188          * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
 189          * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
 190          * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
 191          * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
 192          * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
 193          * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
 194          * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
 195          *
 196          * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
 197          * exposure across all three types per-channel.
 198          *
 199          * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
 200          */
 201         public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) {
 202                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr);
 203                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 204                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 205                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); };
 206         }
 207
 208         /**
 209          * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
 210          * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
 211          *
 212          * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
 213          * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
 214          * funder/initiator.
 215          *
 216          * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
 217          * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
 218          * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
 219          * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
 220          * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
 221          * funds.
 222          *
 223          * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
 224          * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
 225          * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
 226          *
 227          * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
 228          *
 229          * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
 230          * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
 231          */
 232         public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
 233                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
 234                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 235                 return ret;
 236         }
 237
 238         /**
 239          * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
 240          * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
 241          *
 242          * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
 243          * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
 244          * funder/initiator.
 245          *
 246          * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
 247          * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
 248          * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
 249          * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
 250          * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
 251          * funds.
 252          *
 253          * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
 254          * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
 255          * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
 256          *
 257          * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
 258          *
 259          * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
 260          * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
 261          */
 262         public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
 263                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
 264                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 265                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 266         }
 267
 268         /**
 269          * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
 270          * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
 271          *
 272          * Usage:
 273          * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
 274          * generated by this channel's counterparty.
 275          * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
 276          * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
 277          * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
 278          * actual forward amounts is their fee.
 279          *
 280          * # Note
 281          * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
 282          * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
 283          * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
 284          * counterparty.
 285          *
 286          * # Note
 287          * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
 288          * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
 289          *
 290          * Default value: false.
 291          *
 292          * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
 293          * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
 294          * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
 295          * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
 296          * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
 297          * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
 298          */
 299         public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() {
 300                 boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr);
 301                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 302                 return ret;
 303         }
 304
 305         /**
 306          * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
 307          * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
 308          *
 309          * Usage:
 310          * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
 311          * generated by this channel's counterparty.
 312          * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
 313          * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
 314          * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
 315          * actual forward amounts is their fee.
 316          *
 317          * # Note
 318          * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
 319          * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
 320          * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
 321          * counterparty.
 322          *
 323          * # Note
 324          * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
 325          * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
 326          *
 327          * Default value: false.
 328          *
 329          * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
 330          * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
 331          * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
 332          * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
 333          * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
 334          * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
 335          */
 336         public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) {
 337                 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
 338                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 339                 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 340         }
 341
 342         /**
 343          * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
 344          */
 345         public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) {
 346                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
 347                 Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
 348                 Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
 349                 Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
 350                 Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg);
 351                 Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
 352                 Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
 353                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 354                 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
 355                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
 356                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); };
 357                 return ret_hu_conv;
 358         }
 359
 360         long clone_ptr() {
 361                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
 362                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 363                 return ret;
 364         }
 365
 366         /**
 367          * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
 368          */
 369         public ChannelConfig clone() {
 370                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
 371                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 372                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 373                 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
 374                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
 375                 return ret_hu_conv;
 376         }
 377
 378         /**
 379          * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
 380          * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
 381          * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
 382          */
 383         public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) {
 384                 boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
 385                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 386                 Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
 387                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
 388                 return ret;
 389         }
 390
 391         @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
 392                 if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false;
 393                 return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
 394         }
 395         /**
 396          * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
 397          */
 398         public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) {
 399                 bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
 400                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 401                 Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
 402                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
 403         }
 404
 405         /**
 406          * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
 407          */
 408         public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
 409                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
 410                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 411                 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
 412                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
 413                 return ret_hu_conv;
 414         }
 415
 416         /**
 417          * Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
 418          */
 419         public byte[] write() {
 420                 byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
 421                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 422                 return ret;
 423         }
 424
 425         /**
 426          * Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
 427          */
 428         public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
 429                 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser);
 430                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
 431                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 432                 Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 433                 return ret_hu_conv;
 434         }
 435
 436 }