1 package org.ldk.structs;
3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
6 import java.util.Arrays;
7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
12 * Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
13 * with our counterparty.
15 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
16 public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase {
17 ChannelConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
18 @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
19 protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
21 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); }
25 * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
27 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
28 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
32 public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
33 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
34 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
39 * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
41 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
42 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
46 public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
47 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
48 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
49 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
53 * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
54 * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
55 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
56 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
58 * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
59 * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
62 * Default value: 1000.
64 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
66 public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
67 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
68 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
73 * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
74 * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
75 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
76 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
78 * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
79 * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
82 * Default value: 1000.
84 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
86 public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
87 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
88 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
89 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
93 * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
94 * the channel this config applies to.
96 * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
97 * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
98 * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
99 * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
101 * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
102 * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
103 * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
104 * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
105 * the spending transaction).
107 * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
108 * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
109 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
111 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
113 public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
114 short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
115 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
120 * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
121 * the channel this config applies to.
123 * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
124 * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
125 * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
126 * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
128 * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
129 * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
130 * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
131 * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
132 * the spending transaction).
134 * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
135 * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
136 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
138 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
140 public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
141 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
142 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
143 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
147 * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
148 * small to claim on-chain.
150 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
151 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
152 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
153 * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
154 * channel is force-closed.
156 * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
157 * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
158 * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
159 * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
160 * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
161 * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
162 * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
164 * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
165 * exposure across all three types per-channel.
167 * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
169 public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
170 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr);
171 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
172 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
173 org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret);
174 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
179 * Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
180 * small to claim on-chain.
182 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
183 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
184 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
185 * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
186 * channel is force-closed.
188 * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
189 * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
190 * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
191 * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
192 * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
193 * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
194 * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
196 * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
197 * exposure across all three types per-channel.
199 * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
201 public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) {
202 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr);
203 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
204 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
205 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); };
209 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
210 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
212 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
213 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
216 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
217 * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
218 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
219 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
220 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
223 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
224 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
225 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
227 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
229 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
230 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
232 public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
233 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
234 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
239 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
240 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
242 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
243 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
246 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
247 * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
248 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
249 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
250 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
253 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
254 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
255 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
257 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
259 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
260 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
262 public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
263 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
264 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
265 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
269 * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
270 * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
273 * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
274 * generated by this channel's counterparty.
275 * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
276 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
277 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
278 * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
279 * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
280 * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
283 * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
284 * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
285 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
289 * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
290 * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
292 * Default value: false.
294 * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
295 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
296 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
297 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
298 * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
299 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
301 public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() {
302 boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr);
303 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
308 * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
309 * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
312 * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
313 * generated by this channel's counterparty.
314 * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
315 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
316 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
317 * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
318 * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
319 * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
322 * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
323 * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
324 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
328 * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
329 * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
331 * Default value: false.
333 * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
334 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
335 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
336 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
337 * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
338 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
340 public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) {
341 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
342 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
343 Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
347 * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
349 public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) {
350 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
351 Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
352 Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
353 Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
354 Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg);
355 Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
356 Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
357 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
358 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
359 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
360 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); };
365 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
366 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
371 * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
373 public ChannelConfig clone() {
374 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
375 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
376 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
377 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
378 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
383 * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
384 * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
385 * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
387 public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) {
388 boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
389 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
390 Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
391 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
395 @Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
396 if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false;
397 return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
400 * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
402 public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) {
403 bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
404 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
405 Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
406 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
410 * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
412 public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
413 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
414 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
415 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
416 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
421 * Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
423 public byte[] write() {
424 byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
425 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
430 * Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
432 public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
433 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser);
434 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
435 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
436 Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);