Merge pull request #106 from TheBlueMatt/main

[ldk-java] / src / main / java / org / ldk / structs / ChannelManager.java

package org.ldk.structs;

import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;


/**
 * Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 * channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 * 
 * Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 * to individual Channels.
 * 
 * Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
 * all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
 * serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
 * called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
 * 
 * Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
 * ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
 * returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
 * happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
 * the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
 * ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
 * ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
 * 
 * Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
 * tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 * the \"reorg path\" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
 * block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
 * object!
 * 
 * Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
 * ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
 * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
 * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
 * timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
 * 
 * Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
 * a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
 * essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
 * SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
 * you're using lightning-net-tokio.
 */
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
        ChannelManager(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
        @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
        protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
                super.finalize();
                if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); }
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
         * 
         * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements
         * ChannelMessageHandler.
         * 
         * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
         * 
         * Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
         * disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
         * from after `params.latest_hash`.
         */
        public static ChannelManager of(FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, ChainParameters params) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); }
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
         */
        public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); }
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
         * 
         * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
         * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
         * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
         * for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
         * `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
         * ignored.
         * 
         * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
         * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
         * 
         * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
         * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
         * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
         * 
         * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
         * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
         * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
         * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
         * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
         * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
         * 
         * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
         * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
         * 
         * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
         */
        public Result__u832APIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_channel_id, @Nullable UserConfig override_config) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result__u832APIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result__u832APIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
         * more information.
         */
        public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
                long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
                ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
                for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
                        long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
                        org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
                        ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                        ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
                }
                return ret_conv_16_arr;
        }

        /**
         * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
         * to ensure non-announced channels are used.
         * 
         * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
         * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
         * are.
         * 
         * [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
         */
        public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
                long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
                ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
                for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
                        long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
                        org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
                        ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                        ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
                }
                return ret_conv_16_arr;
        }

        /**
         * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
         * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
         * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
         * 
         * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
         * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
         * estimate.
         * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
         * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
         * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
         * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
         * 
         * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
         * 
         * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
         * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
         * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
         * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
         * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
         * 
         * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
         * the channel being closed or not:
         * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
         * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
         * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
         * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
         * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
         * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
         * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
         * 
         * May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
         * 
         * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
         * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
         * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_target_feerate(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, int target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_target_feerate(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
         * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
         * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
         * channel.
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
         * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
         * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
         * 
         * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
         * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
         * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
         */
        public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() {
                bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
        }

        /**
         * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
         * local transaction(s).
         */
        public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() {
                bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
        }

        /**
         * Sends a payment along a given route.
         * 
         * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
         * fields for more info.
         * 
         * Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
         * payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
         * next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
         * specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
         * payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent \"proof of
         * payment\") and prevent double-sends yourself.
         * 
         * May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
         * 
         * Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
         * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
         * PaymentSendFailure for more info.
         * 
         * In general, a path may raise:
         * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
         * node public key) is specified.
         * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
         * (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
         * failure).
         * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
         * relevant updates.
         * 
         * Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
         * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
         * different route unless you intend to pay twice!
         * 
         * payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
         * the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
         * newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
         * must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
         * payment_secret.
         * If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
         * bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
         * we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
         * 
         * Note that payment_secret (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
         */
        public Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, @Nullable byte[] payment_secret) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentIdPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                this.ptrs_to.add(route);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
         * 
         * Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
         * [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
         * retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
         * for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
         * further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
         * 
         * [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
         * [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
         */
        public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ retry_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_retry_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                this.ptrs_to.add(route);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
         * 
         * After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
         * will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
         * an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
         * pending HTLCs for this payment.
         * 
         * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
         * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
         * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
         * 
         * [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
         * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
         * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
         */
        public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
                bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
        }

        /**
         * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
         * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
         * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
         * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
         * never reach the recipient.
         * 
         * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
         * 
         * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
         * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
         * 
         * Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
         * 
         * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
         * 
         * Note that payment_preimage (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
         */
        public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(Route route, @Nullable byte[] payment_preimage) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentIdZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                this.ptrs_to.add(route);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
         * 
         * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
         * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
         * 
         * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
         * across the p2p network.
         * 
         * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
         * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
         * 
         * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
         * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
         * keys per-channel).
         * 
         * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
         * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
         * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
         * 
         * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
         * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
         * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
         * 
         * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
         * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
         * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
         * for more details.
         * 
         * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
         * arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
         * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
         * on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
         * announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
         * our network addresses.
         * 
         * `rgb` is a node \"color\" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
         * node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
         * 
         * `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
         * accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
         * tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
         * addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
         * 
         * Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
         * 
         * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
         */
        public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
                bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(rgb, 3), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(alias, 32), addresses != null ? Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(addresses_conv_12 -> addresses_conv_12.ptr).toArray() : null);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(rgb);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(alias);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(addresses);
        }

        /**
         * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
         * 
         * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
         * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
         * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
         * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
         * 
         * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
         * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
         * 
         * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
         * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
         * 
         * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
         * 
         * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
         * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
         * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
         * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
         * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
         * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
         * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, ChannelConfig config) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                this.ptrs_to.add(config);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
         * 
         * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
         * Will likely generate further events.
         */
        public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
                bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
        }

        /**
         * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
         * 
         * This currently includes:
         * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
         * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
         * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
         * the channel.
         * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
         * with the current `ChannelConfig`.
         * 
         * Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
         * estimate fetches.
         */
        public void timer_tick_occurred() {
                bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
        }

        /**
         * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
         * after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
         * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
         * 
         * Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
         * already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
         * second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
         * may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
         * 
         * While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
         * [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
         * [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
         * startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
         */
        public void fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
                bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
        }

        /**
         * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
         * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
         * 
         * Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
         * must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
         * provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
         * 
         * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
         * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
         * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
         * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
         * 
         * [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
         * [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
         * [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
         * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
         * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
         * [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
         */
        public void claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
                bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
        }

        /**
         * Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
         */
        public byte[] get_our_node_id() {
                byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }

        /**
         * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
         * 
         * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
         * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
         * the channel.
         * 
         * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
         * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
         * 
         * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
         * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
         * used to accept such channels.
         * 
         * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
         * it as confirmed immediately.
         * 
         * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
         * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
         * 
         * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
         * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
         * 
         * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
         * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
         * 
         * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
         * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
         * 
         * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
         * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
         */
        public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, long user_channel_id) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
         * to pay us.
         * 
         * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
         * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
         * 
         * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
         * will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
         * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
         * 
         * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
         * 
         * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
         * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
         * 
         * # Note
         * 
         * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
         * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
         * 
         * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
         * 
         * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
         * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
         * [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
         * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
         */
        public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
         * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
         * 
         * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
         * 
         * # Note
         * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
         * 
         * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
         */
        public Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_legacy(Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_legacy(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_PaymentHashPaymentSecretZAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
         * stored external to LDK.
         * 
         * A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
         * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
         * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
         * 
         * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
         * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
         * payments.
         * 
         * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
         * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
         * before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
         * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
         * 
         * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
         * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
         * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
         * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
         * invoices when no timeout is set.
         * 
         * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
         * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
         * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
         * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
         * [`PaymentReceived`].
         * 
         * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
         * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
         * 
         * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
         * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
         * 
         * # Note
         * 
         * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
         * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
         * 
         * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
         * 
         * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
         * [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
         */
        public Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
         * serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
         * 
         * May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
         * 
         * # Note
         * This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
         * 
         * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
         */
        public Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(byte[] payment_hash, Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentSecretAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
         * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
         * 
         * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
         */
        public Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PaymentPreimageAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
         * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
         * 
         * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
         */
        public long get_phantom_scid() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }

        /**
         * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
         * 
         * [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
         */
        public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public Listen as_Listen() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public Confirm as_Confirm() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
         * indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
         * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
         * up.
         * 
         * Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
         */
        public boolean await_persistable_update_timeout(long max_wait) {
                boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update_timeout(this.ptr, max_wait);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(max_wait);
                return ret;
        }

        /**
         * Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
         * `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
         * up.
         */
        public void await_persistable_update() {
                bindings.ChannelManager_await_persistable_update(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
        }

        /**
         * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
         * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
         */
        public BestBlock current_best_block() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                org.ldk.structs.BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.BestBlock(null, ret); }
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new ChannelMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned ChannelMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

        /**
         * Serialize the ChannelManager object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelManager_read
         */
        public byte[] write() {
                byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                return ret;
        }

        /**
         * Constructs a new Payer which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
         * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Payer must be freed before this_arg is
         */
        public Payer as_Payer() {
                long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Payer(this.ptr);
                Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
                if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
                Payer ret_hu_conv = new Payer(null, ret);
                ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
                return ret_hu_conv;
        }

}