_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10 /**
  11  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  12  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  13  *
  14  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  15  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  16  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  17  * for an example of such policies.
  18  */
  19 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  20 public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
  21         final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
  22         EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
  23         private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
  24                 super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
  25                 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
  26                 this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
  27                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  28         }
  29         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  30         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  31                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
  32         }
  33         /**
  34          * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
  35          * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
  36          *
  37          * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
  38          * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
  39          * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
  40          * until the GC runs.
  41          */
  42         public void destroy() {
  43                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
  44                 ptr = 0;
  45         }
  46         public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  47                 /**
  48                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  49                  *
  50                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  51                  *
  52                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  53                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  54                  *
  55                  * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
  56                  * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
  57                  * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
  58                  *
  59                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  60                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  61                  */
  62                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
  63                 /**
  64                  * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
  65                  *
  66                  * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
  67                  * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
  68                  */
  69                 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
  70                 /**
  71                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
  72                  *
  73                  * This will be called
  74                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  75                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  76                  * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
  77                  * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
  78                  * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
  79                  * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
  80                  *
  81                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  82                  *
  83                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  84                  *
  85                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
  86                  */
  87                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  88                 /**
  89                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  90                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  91                  *
  92                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  93                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  94                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  95                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  96                  *
  97                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  98                  *
  99                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 100                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 101                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 102                  * so).
 103                  */
 104                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
 105                 /**
 106                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 107                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 108                  *
 109                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 110                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 111                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 112                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 113                  *
 114                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 115                  * signature.
 116                  *
 117                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 118                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 119                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 120                  * so).
 121                  *
 122                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 123                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 124                  */
 125                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 126                 /**
 127                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 128                  * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 129                  * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
 130                  * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
 131                  * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
 132                  *
 133                  * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
 134                  */
 135                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
 136                 /**
 137                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 138                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 139                  *
 140                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 141                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 142                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 143                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 144                  *
 145                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 146                  * outputs.
 147                  *
 148                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 149                  *
 150                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 151                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 152                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 153                  * BIP 143 signature.
 154                  */
 155                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 156                 /**
 157                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 158                  *
 159                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 160                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 161                  */
 162                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 163                 /**
 164                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 165                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 166                  */
 167                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 168                 /**
 169                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 170                  * channel participants.
 171                  *
 172                  * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 173                  * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 174                  *
 175                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 176                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 177                  * protocol.
 178                  */
 179                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 180         }
 181         private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 182         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 183                 final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 184                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
 185                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 186                                 org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 187                                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
 188                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 189                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 190                                 return result;
 191                         }
 192                         @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 193                                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
 194                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 195                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 196                                 return result;
 197                         }
 198                         @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
 199                                 org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 200                                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 201                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 202                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 203                                 return result;
 204                         }
 205                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 206                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
 207                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 208                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 209                                 return result;
 210                         }
 211                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
 212                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 213                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
 214                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 215                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 216                                 return result;
 217                         }
 218                         @Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
 219                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
 220                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
 221                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 222                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 223                                 return result;
 224                         }
 225                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
 226                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 227                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
 228                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 229                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 230                                 return result;
 231                         }
 232                         @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
 233                                 org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
 234                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
 235                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 236                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 237                                 return result;
 238                         }
 239                         @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 240                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
 241                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 242                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 243                                 return result;
 244                         }
 245                         @Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
 246                                 org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
 247                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
 248                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 249                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 250                                 return result;
 251                         }
 252                 }, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
 253                 return impl_holder.held;
 254         }
 255
 256         /**
 257          * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
 258          */
 259         public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
 260                 ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
 261                 res.ptrs_to.add(this);
 262                 return res;
 263         }
 264
 265         /**
 266          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 267          *
 268          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 269          *
 270          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 271          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 272          *
 273          * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
 274          * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
 275          * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
 276          *
 277          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 278          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 279          */
 280         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 281                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
 282                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 283                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 284                 Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
 285                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 286                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 287                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 288                 return ret_hu_conv;
 289         }
 290
 291         /**
 292          * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
 293          *
 294          * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
 295          * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
 296          */
 297         public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 298                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
 299                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 300                 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
 301                 Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
 302                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 303                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 304                 return ret_hu_conv;
 305         }
 306
 307         /**
 308          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
 309          *
 310          * This will be called
 311          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 312          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 313          * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
 314          * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
 315          * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 316          * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
 317          *
 318          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 319          *
 320          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 321          *
 322          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 323          */
 324         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 325                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 326                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 327                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 328                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 329                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 330                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 331                 return ret_hu_conv;
 332         }
 333
 334         /**
 335          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 336          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 337          *
 338          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 339          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 340          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 341          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 342          *
 343          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 344          *
 345          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 346          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 347          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 348          * so).
 349          */
 350         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 351                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 352                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 353                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 354                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 355                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 356                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 357                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 358                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 359                 return ret_hu_conv;
 360         }
 361
 362         /**
 363          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 364          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 365          *
 366          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 367          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 368          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 369          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 370          *
 371          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 372          * signature.
 373          *
 374          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 375          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 376          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 377          * so).
 378          *
 379          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 380          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 381          */
 382         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 383                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 384                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 385                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 386                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 387                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 388                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 389                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 390                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 391                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 392                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 393                 return ret_hu_conv;
 394         }
 395
 396         /**
 397          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 398          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 399          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
 400          * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
 401          * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
 402          *
 403          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
 404          */
 405         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
 406                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
 407                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 408                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 409                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 410                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
 411                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 412                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 413                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
 414                 return ret_hu_conv;
 415         }
 416
 417         /**
 418          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 419          * transaction, either offered or received.
 420          *
 421          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 422          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 423          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 424          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 425          *
 426          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 427          * outputs.
 428          *
 429          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 430          *
 431          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 432          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 433          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 434          * BIP 143 signature.
 435          */
 436         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 437                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 438                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 439                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 440                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 441                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 442                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 443                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 444                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 445                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 446                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 447                 return ret_hu_conv;
 448         }
 449
 450         /**
 451          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 452          *
 453          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 454          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 455          */
 456         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 457                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 458                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 459                 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
 460                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 461                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 462                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
 463                 return ret_hu_conv;
 464         }
 465
 466         /**
 467          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 468          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 469          */
 470         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 471                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 472                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 473                 Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
 474                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 475                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 476                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 477                 return ret_hu_conv;
 478         }
 479
 480         /**
 481          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 482          * channel participants.
 483          *
 484          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 485          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 486          *
 487          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 488          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 489          * protocol.
 490          */
 491         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 492                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 493                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 494                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
 495                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 496                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 497                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
 498                 return ret_hu_conv;
 499         }
 500
 501 }