_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10 /**
  11  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  12  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  13  *
  14  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  15  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  16  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  17  * for an example of such policies.
  18  */
  19 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  20 public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
  21         final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
  22         EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
  23         private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
  24                 super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
  25                 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
  26                 this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
  27                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  28         }
  29         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  30         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  31                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
  32         }
  33         /**
  34          * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
  35          * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
  36          *
  37          * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
  38          * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
  39          * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
  40          * until the GC runs.
  41          */
  42         public void destroy() {
  43                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
  44                 ptr = 0;
  45         }
  46         public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  47                 /**
  48                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  49                  *
  50                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  51                  *
  52                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  53                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  54                  *
  55                  * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
  56                  * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
  57                  * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
  58                  *
  59                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  60                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  61                  */
  62                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
  63                 /**
  64                  * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
  65                  *
  66                  * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
  67                  * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
  68                  */
  69                 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
  70                 /**
  71                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
  72                  *
  73                  * This will be called
  74                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  75                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  76                  * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
  77                  * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
  78                  * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
  79                  * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
  80                  *
  81                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  82                  *
  83                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  84                  *
  85                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
  86                  */
  87                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  88                 /**
  89                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  90                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  91                  *
  92                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  93                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  94                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  95                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  96                  *
  97                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  98                  *
  99                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 100                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 101                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 102                  * so).
 103                  */
 104                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
 105                 /**
 106                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 107                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 108                  *
 109                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 110                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 111                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 112                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 113                  *
 114                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 115                  * signature.
 116                  *
 117                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 118                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 119                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 120                  * so).
 121                  *
 122                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 123                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 124                  */
 125                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 126                 /**
 127                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 128                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 129                  *
 130                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 131                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 132                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 133                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 134                  *
 135                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 136                  * outputs.
 137                  *
 138                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 139                  *
 140                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 141                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 142                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 143                  * BIP 143 signature.
 144                  */
 145                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 146                 /**
 147                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 148                  *
 149                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 150                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 151                  */
 152                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 153                 /**
 154                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 155                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 156                  */
 157                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 158                 /**
 159                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 160                  * channel participants.
 161                  *
 162                  * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 163                  * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 164                  *
 165                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 166                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 167                  * protocol.
 168                  */
 169                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 170         }
 171         private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 172         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 173                 final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 174                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
 175                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 176                                 org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 177                                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
 178                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 179                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 180                                 return result;
 181                         }
 182                         @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 183                                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
 184                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 185                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 186                                 return result;
 187                         }
 188                         @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
 189                                 org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 190                                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 191                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 192                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 193                                 return result;
 194                         }
 195                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 196                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
 197                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 198                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 199                                 return result;
 200                         }
 201                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
 202                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 203                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
 204                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 205                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 206                                 return result;
 207                         }
 208                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
 209                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 210                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
 211                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 212                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 213                                 return result;
 214                         }
 215                         @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
 216                                 org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
 217                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
 218                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 219                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 220                                 return result;
 221                         }
 222                         @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 223                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
 224                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 225                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 226                                 return result;
 227                         }
 228                         @Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
 229                                 org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
 230                                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
 231                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 232                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 233                                 return result;
 234                         }
 235                 }, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
 236                 return impl_holder.held;
 237         }
 238
 239         /**
 240          * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
 241          */
 242         public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
 243                 ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
 244                 res.ptrs_to.add(this);
 245                 return res;
 246         }
 247
 248         /**
 249          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 250          *
 251          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 252          *
 253          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 254          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 255          *
 256          * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
 257          * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
 258          * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
 259          *
 260          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 261          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 262          */
 263         public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 264                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
 265                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 266                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 267                 Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
 268                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 269                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 270                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 271                 return ret_hu_conv;
 272         }
 273
 274         /**
 275          * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
 276          *
 277          * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
 278          * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
 279          */
 280         public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 281                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
 282                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 283                 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
 284                 Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
 285                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 286                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 287                 return ret_hu_conv;
 288         }
 289
 290         /**
 291          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
 292          *
 293          * This will be called
 294          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 295          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 296          * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
 297          * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
 298          * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 299          * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
 300          *
 301          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 302          *
 303          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 304          *
 305          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 306          */
 307         public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 308                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 309                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 310                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 311                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 312                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 313                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 314                 return ret_hu_conv;
 315         }
 316
 317         /**
 318          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 319          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 320          *
 321          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 322          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 323          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 324          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 325          *
 326          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 327          *
 328          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 329          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 330          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 331          * so).
 332          */
 333         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 334                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 335                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 336                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 337                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 338                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 339                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 340                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 341                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 342                 return ret_hu_conv;
 343         }
 344
 345         /**
 346          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 347          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 348          *
 349          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 350          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 351          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 352          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 353          *
 354          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 355          * signature.
 356          *
 357          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 358          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 359          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 360          * so).
 361          *
 362          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 363          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 364          */
 365         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 366                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 367                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 368                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 369                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 370                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 371                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 372                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 373                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 374                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 375                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 376                 return ret_hu_conv;
 377         }
 378
 379         /**
 380          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 381          * transaction, either offered or received.
 382          *
 383          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 384          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 385          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 386          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 387          *
 388          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 389          * outputs.
 390          *
 391          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 392          *
 393          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 394          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 395          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 396          * BIP 143 signature.
 397          */
 398         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 399                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 400                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 401                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 402                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 403                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 404                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 405                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 406                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 407                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 408                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 409                 return ret_hu_conv;
 410         }
 411
 412         /**
 413          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 414          *
 415          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 416          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 417          */
 418         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 419                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 420                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 421                 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
 422                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 423                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 424                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
 425                 return ret_hu_conv;
 426         }
 427
 428         /**
 429          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 430          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 431          */
 432         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 433                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 434                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 435                 Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
 436                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 437                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 438                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 439                 return ret_hu_conv;
 440         }
 441
 442         /**
 443          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 444          * channel participants.
 445          *
 446          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 447          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 448          *
 449          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 450          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 451          * protocol.
 452          */
 453         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 454                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 455                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 456                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
 457                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 458                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 459                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
 460                 return ret_hu_conv;
 461         }
 462
 463 }