_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10 /**
  11  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  12  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  13  *
  14  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  15  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  16  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  17  * for an example of such policies.
  18  */
  19 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  20 public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
  21         final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
  22         EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
  23         private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
  24                 super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
  25                 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
  26                 this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
  27                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  28         }
  29         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  30         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  31                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
  32         }
  33         /**
  34          * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
  35          * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
  36          *
  37          * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
  38          * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
  39          * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
  40          * until the GC runs.
  41          */
  42         public void destroy() {
  43                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
  44                 ptr = 0;
  45         }
  46         public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  47                 /**
  48                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  49                  *
  50                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  51                  *
  52                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  53                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  54                  *
  55                  * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
  56                  * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
  57                  * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
  58                  * been removed for forwarded payments.
  59                  *
  60                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  61                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  62                  */
  63                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages);
  64                 /**
  65                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
  66                  *
  67                  * This will be called
  68                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  69                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  70                  *
  71                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  72                  *
  73                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  74                  */
  75                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  76                 /**
  77                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  78                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  79                  *
  80                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  81                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  82                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  83                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  84                  *
  85                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  86                  *
  87                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
  88                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
  89                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
  90                  * so).
  91                  */
  92                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
  93                 /**
  94                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
  95                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  96                  *
  97                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  98                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  99                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 100                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 101                  *
 102                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 103                  * signature.
 104                  *
 105                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 106                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 107                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 108                  * so).
 109                  *
 110                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 111                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 112                  */
 113                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 114                 /**
 115                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 116                  * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 117                  * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 118                  *
 119                  * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 120                  * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 121                  * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 122                  *
 123                  * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
 124                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 125                  */
 126                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
 127                 /**
 128                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 129                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 130                  *
 131                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 132                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 133                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 134                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 135                  *
 136                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 137                  * outputs.
 138                  *
 139                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 140                  *
 141                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 142                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 143                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 144                  * BIP 143 signature.
 145                  */
 146                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 147                 /**
 148                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 149                  *
 150                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 151                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 152                  */
 153                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 154                 /**
 155                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 156                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 157                  */
 158                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 159                 /**
 160                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 161                  * channel participants.
 162                  *
 163                  * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 164                  * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 165                  *
 166                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 167                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 168                  * protocol.
 169                  *
 170                  * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 171                  */
 172                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 173         }
 174         private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 175         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 176                 final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 177                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
 178                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 179                                 org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 180                                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages);
 181                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 182                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 183                                 return result;
 184                         }
 185                         @Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
 186                                 org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 187                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 188                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 189                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 190                                 return result;
 191                         }
 192                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 193                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
 194                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 195                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 196                                 return result;
 197                         }
 198                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
 199                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 200                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
 201                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 202                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 203                                 return result;
 204                         }
 205                         @Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
 206                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
 207                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
 208                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 209                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 210                                 return result;
 211                         }
 212                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
 213                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 214                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
 215                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 216                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 217                                 return result;
 218                         }
 219                         @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
 220                                 org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
 221                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
 222                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 223                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 224                                 return result;
 225                         }
 226                         @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 227                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
 228                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 229                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 230                                 return result;
 231                         }
 232                         @Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
 233                                 org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
 234                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
 235                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 236                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 237                                 return result;
 238                         }
 239                 }, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
 240                 return impl_holder.held;
 241         }
 242
 243         /**
 244          * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
 245          */
 246         public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
 247                 ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
 248                 res.ptrs_to.add(this);
 249                 return res;
 250         }
 251
 252         /**
 253          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 254          *
 255          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 256          *
 257          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 258          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 259          *
 260          * The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
 261          * are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
 262          * only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
 263          * been removed for forwarded payments.
 264          *
 265          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 266          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 267          */
 268         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
 269                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, inbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(inbound_htlc_preimages).map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
 270                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 271                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 272                 Reference.reachabilityFence(inbound_htlc_preimages);
 273                 Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_htlc_preimages);
 274                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 275                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 276                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 277                 return ret_hu_conv;
 278         }
 279
 280         /**
 281          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
 282          *
 283          * This will be called
 284          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 285          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 286          *
 287          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 288          *
 289          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 290          */
 291         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 292                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 293                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 294                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 295                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 296                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 297                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 298                 return ret_hu_conv;
 299         }
 300
 301         /**
 302          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 303          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 304          *
 305          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 306          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 307          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 308          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 309          *
 310          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 311          *
 312          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 313          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 314          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 315          * so).
 316          */
 317         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 318                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 319                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 320                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 321                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 322                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 323                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 324                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 325                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 326                 return ret_hu_conv;
 327         }
 328
 329         /**
 330          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 331          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 332          *
 333          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 334          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 335          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 336          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 337          *
 338          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 339          * signature.
 340          *
 341          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 342          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 343          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 344          * so).
 345          *
 346          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 347          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 348          */
 349         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 350                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 351                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 352                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 353                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 354                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 355                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 356                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 357                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 358                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 359                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 360                 return ret_hu_conv;
 361         }
 362
 363         /**
 364          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 365          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 366          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 367          *
 368          * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 369          * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 370          * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 371          *
 372          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
 373          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 374          */
 375         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
 376                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
 377                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 378                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 379                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 380                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
 381                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 382                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 383                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
 384                 return ret_hu_conv;
 385         }
 386
 387         /**
 388          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 389          * transaction, either offered or received.
 390          *
 391          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 392          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 393          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 394          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 395          *
 396          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 397          * outputs.
 398          *
 399          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 400          *
 401          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 402          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 403          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 404          * BIP 143 signature.
 405          */
 406         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 407                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 408                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 409                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 410                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 411                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 412                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 413                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 414                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 415                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 416                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 417                 return ret_hu_conv;
 418         }
 419
 420         /**
 421          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 422          *
 423          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 424          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 425          */
 426         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 427                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 428                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 429                 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
 430                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 431                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 432                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
 433                 return ret_hu_conv;
 434         }
 435
 436         /**
 437          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 438          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 439          */
 440         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 441                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 442                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 443                 Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
 444                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 445                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 446                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 447                 return ret_hu_conv;
 448         }
 449
 450         /**
 451          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 452          * channel participants.
 453          *
 454          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 455          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 456          *
 457          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 458          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 459          * protocol.
 460          *
 461          * [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
 462          */
 463         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 464                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 465                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 466                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
 467                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 468                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 469                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
 470                 return ret_hu_conv;
 471         }
 472
 473 }