_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2
   3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   5 import org.ldk.util.*;
   6 import java.util.Arrays;
   7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   9
  10 /**
  11  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  12  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  13  *
  14  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  15  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  16  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  17  * for an example of such policies.
  18  */
  19 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
  20 public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
  21         final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
  22         EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
  23         private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
  24                 super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
  25                 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
  26                 this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
  27                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  28         }
  29         @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
  30         protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
  31                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
  32         }
  33         /**
  34          * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
  35          * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
  36          *
  37          * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
  38          * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
  39          * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
  40          * until the GC runs.
  41          */
  42         public void destroy() {
  43                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
  44                 ptr = 0;
  45         }
  46         public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
  47                 /**
  48                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  49                  *
  50                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  51                  *
  52                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  53                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  54                  *
  55                  * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
  56                  * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
  57                  * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
  58                  *
  59                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  60                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  61                  */
  62                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
  63                 /**
  64                  * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
  65                  *
  66                  * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
  67                  * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
  68                  */
  69                 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
  70                 /**
  71                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
  72                  *
  73                  * This will be called
  74                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  75                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  76                  *
  77                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
  78                  *
  79                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
  80                  */
  81                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
  82                 /**
  83                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
  84                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
  85                  *
  86                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
  87                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
  88                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
  89                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
  90                  *
  91                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
  92                  *
  93                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
  94                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
  95                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
  96                  * so).
  97                  */
  98                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
  99                 /**
 100                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 101                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 102                  *
 103                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 104                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 105                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 106                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 107                  *
 108                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 109                  * signature.
 110                  *
 111                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 112                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 113                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 114                  * so).
 115                  *
 116                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 117                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 118                  */
 119                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 120                 /**
 121                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 122                  * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 123                  * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 124                  *
 125                  * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 126                  * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 127                  * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 128                  *
 129                  * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
 130                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 131                  */
 132                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
 133                 /**
 134                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 135                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 136                  *
 137                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 138                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 139                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 140                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 141                  *
 142                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 143                  * outputs.
 144                  *
 145                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 146                  *
 147                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 148                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 149                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 150                  * BIP 143 signature.
 151                  */
 152                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
 153                 /**
 154                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 155                  *
 156                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 157                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 158                  */
 159                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
 160                 /**
 161                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 162                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 163                  */
 164                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
 165                 /**
 166                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 167                  * channel participants.
 168                  *
 169                  * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 170                  * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 171                  *
 172                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 173                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 174                  * protocol.
 175                  */
 176                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
 177         }
 178         private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
 179         public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 180                 final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
 181                 impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
 182                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 183                                 org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 184                                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
 185                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 186                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 187                                 return result;
 188                         }
 189                         @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 190                                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
 191                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 192                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 193                                 return result;
 194                         }
 195                         @Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
 196                                 org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
 197                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 198                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 199                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 200                                 return result;
 201                         }
 202                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 203                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
 204                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 205                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 206                                 return result;
 207                         }
 208                         @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
 209                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 210                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
 211                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 212                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 213                                 return result;
 214                         }
 215                         @Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
 216                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
 217                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
 218                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 219                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 220                                 return result;
 221                         }
 222                         @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
 223                                 org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
 224                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
 225                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 226                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 227                                 return result;
 228                         }
 229                         @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
 230                                 org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
 231                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
 232                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 233                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 234                                 return result;
 235                         }
 236                         @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 237                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
 238                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 239                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 240                                 return result;
 241                         }
 242                         @Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
 243                                 org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
 244                                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
 245                                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 246                                 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 247                                 return result;
 248                         }
 249                 }, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
 250                 return impl_holder.held;
 251         }
 252
 253         /**
 254          * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
 255          */
 256         public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
 257                 ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
 258                 res.ptrs_to.add(this);
 259                 return res;
 260         }
 261
 262         /**
 263          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 264          *
 265          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 266          *
 267          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 268          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 269          *
 270          * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
 271          * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
 272          * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
 273          *
 274          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 275          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 276          */
 277         public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 278                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
 279                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 280                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 281                 Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
 282                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 283                 Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 284                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 285                 return ret_hu_conv;
 286         }
 287
 288         /**
 289          * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
 290          *
 291          * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
 292          * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
 293          */
 294         public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 295                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
 296                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 297                 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
 298                 Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
 299                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 300                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 301                 return ret_hu_conv;
 302         }
 303
 304         /**
 305          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
 306          *
 307          * This will be called
 308          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 309          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 310          *
 311          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 312          *
 313          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 314          */
 315         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 316                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 317                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 318                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
 319                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 320                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 321                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
 322                 return ret_hu_conv;
 323         }
 324
 325         /**
 326          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 327          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 328          *
 329          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 330          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 331          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 332          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 333          *
 334          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 335          *
 336          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 337          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 338          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 339          * so).
 340          */
 341         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 342                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 343                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 344                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 345                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 346                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 347                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 348                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 349                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 350                 return ret_hu_conv;
 351         }
 352
 353         /**
 354          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 355          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 356          *
 357          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 358          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 359          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 360          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 361          *
 362          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 363          * signature.
 364          *
 365          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 366          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 367          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 368          * so).
 369          *
 370          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 371          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 372          */
 373         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 374                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 375                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 376                 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
 377                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 378                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 379                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
 380                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 381                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 382                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 383                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 384                 return ret_hu_conv;
 385         }
 386
 387         /**
 388          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
 389          * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
 390          * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
 391          *
 392          * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
 393          * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 394          * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
 395          *
 396          * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
 397          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 398          */
 399         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
 400                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
 401                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 402                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 403                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 404                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
 405                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 406                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 407                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
 408                 return ret_hu_conv;
 409         }
 410
 411         /**
 412          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 413          * transaction, either offered or received.
 414          *
 415          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 416          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 417          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 418          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 419          *
 420          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 421          * outputs.
 422          *
 423          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 424          *
 425          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 426          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 427          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 428          * BIP 143 signature.
 429          */
 430         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 431                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 432                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 433                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
 434                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 435                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
 436                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 437                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 438                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 439                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 440                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
 441                 return ret_hu_conv;
 442         }
 443
 444         /**
 445          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 446          *
 447          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 448          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 449          */
 450         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 451                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 452                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 453                 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
 454                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 455                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 456                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
 457                 return ret_hu_conv;
 458         }
 459
 460         /**
 461          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 462          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 463          */
 464         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 465                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 466                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 467                 Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
 468                 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
 469                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 470                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 471                 return ret_hu_conv;
 472         }
 473
 474         /**
 475          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
 476          * channel participants.
 477          *
 478          * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
 479          * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
 480          *
 481          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 482          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 483          * protocol.
 484          */
 485         public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 486                 long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 487                 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 488                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
 489                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 490                 Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 491                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
 492                 return ret_hu_conv;
 493         }
 494
 495 }