_ Git - ldk-java/blob - src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/UtilMethods.java

   1 package org.ldk.structs;
   2 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
   3 import org.ldk.enums.*;
   4 import org.ldk.util.*;
   5 import java.util.Arrays;
   6 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
   7 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
   8
   9 public class UtilMethods {
  10         /**
  11          * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing a
  12          */
  13         public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_some() {
  14                 COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_some();
  15                 return ret;
  16         }
  17
  18         /**
  19          * Constructs a new COption_NoneZ containing nothing
  20          */
  21         public static COption_NoneZ COption_NoneZ_none() {
  22                 COption_NoneZ ret = bindings.COption_NoneZ_none();
  23                 return ret;
  24         }
  25
  26         /**
  27          * Read a ClosureReason from a byte array, created by ClosureReason_write
  28          */
  29         public static Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ClosureReason_read(byte[] ser) {
  30                 long ret = bindings.ClosureReason_read(ser);
  31                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
  32                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
  33                 Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_ClosureReasonZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
  34                 return ret_hu_conv;
  35         }
  36
  37         /**
  38          * Read a Event from a byte array, created by Event_write
  39          */
  40         public static Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ Event_read(byte[] ser) {
  41                 long ret = bindings.Event_read(ser);
  42                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
  43                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
  44                 Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_EventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
  45                 return ret_hu_conv;
  46         }
  47
  48         /**
  49          * Creates a digital signature of a message given a SecretKey, like the node's secret.
  50          * A receiver knowing the PublicKey (e.g. the node's id) and the message can be sure that the signature was generated by the caller.
  51          * Signatures are EC recoverable, meaning that given the message and the signature the PublicKey of the signer can be extracted.
  52          */
  53         public static Result_StringErrorZ sign(byte[] msg, byte[] sk) {
  54                 long ret = bindings.sign(msg, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(sk, 32));
  55                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
  56                 Reference.reachabilityFence(sk);
  57                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
  58                 Result_StringErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_StringErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
  59                 return ret_hu_conv;
  60         }
  61
  62         /**
  63          * Recovers the PublicKey of the signer of the message given the message and the signature.
  64          */
  65         public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ recover_pk(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig) {
  66                 long ret = bindings.recover_pk(msg, sig);
  67                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
  68                 Reference.reachabilityFence(sig);
  69                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
  70                 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
  71                 return ret_hu_conv;
  72         }
  73
  74         /**
  75          * Verifies a message was signed by a PrivateKey that derives to a given PublicKey, given a message, a signature,
  76          * and the PublicKey.
  77          */
  78         public static boolean verify(byte[] msg, java.lang.String sig, byte[] pk) {
  79                 boolean ret = bindings.verify(msg, sig, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(pk, 33));
  80                 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
  81                 Reference.reachabilityFence(sig);
  82                 Reference.reachabilityFence(pk);
  83                 return ret;
  84         }
  85
  86         /**
  87          * Read a MonitorEvent from a byte array, created by MonitorEvent_write
  88          */
  89         public static Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ MonitorEvent_read(byte[] ser) {
  90                 long ret = bindings.MonitorEvent_read(ser);
  91                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
  92                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
  93                 Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_MonitorEventZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
  94                 return ret_hu_conv;
  95         }
  96
  97         /**
  98          * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_write
  99          */
 100         public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg) {
 101                 long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZ_read(ser, arg == null ? 0 : arg.ptr);
 102                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
 103                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
 104                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 105                 Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelMonitorZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 106                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg);
 107                 return ret_hu_conv;
 108         }
 109
 110         /**
 111          * Read a C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ from a byte array, created by C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_write
 112          */
 113         public static Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(byte[] ser, KeysInterface arg_keys_manager, FeeEstimator arg_fee_estimator, Watch arg_chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface arg_tx_broadcaster, Logger arg_logger, UserConfig arg_default_config, ChannelMonitor[] arg_channel_monitors) {
 114                 long ret = bindings.C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZ_read(ser, bindings.ChannelManagerReadArgs_new(arg_keys_manager == null ? 0 : arg_keys_manager.ptr, arg_fee_estimator == null ? 0 : arg_fee_estimator.ptr, arg_chain_monitor == null ? 0 : arg_chain_monitor.ptr, arg_tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : arg_tx_broadcaster.ptr, arg_logger == null ? 0 : arg_logger.ptr, arg_default_config == null ? 0 : arg_default_config.ptr & ~1, arg_channel_monitors != null ? Arrays.stream(arg_channel_monitors).mapToLong(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 -> arg_channel_monitors_conv_16 == null ? 0 : arg_channel_monitors_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null));
 115                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
 116                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_keys_manager);
 117                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_fee_estimator);
 118                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_chain_monitor);
 119                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_tx_broadcaster);
 120                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_logger);
 121                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_default_config);
 122                 Reference.reachabilityFence(arg_channel_monitors);
 123                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 124                 Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_BlockHashChannelManagerZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 125                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_keys_manager);
 126                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_fee_estimator);
 127                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_chain_monitor);
 128                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_tx_broadcaster);
 129                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_logger);
 130                 ;
 131                 for (ChannelMonitor arg_channel_monitors_conv_16: arg_channel_monitors) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(arg_channel_monitors_conv_16); };
 132                 return ret_hu_conv;
 133         }
 134
 135         /**
 136          * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
 137          */
 138         public static long htlc_success_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) {
 139                 long ret = bindings.htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors);
 140                 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
 141                 return ret;
 142         }
 143
 144         /**
 145          * Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 146          */
 147         public static long htlc_timeout_tx_weight(boolean opt_anchors) {
 148                 long ret = bindings.htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors);
 149                 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
 150                 return ret;
 151         }
 152
 153         /**
 154          * Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
 155          */
 156         public static byte[] build_commitment_secret(byte[] commitment_seed, long idx) {
 157                 byte[] ret = bindings.build_commitment_secret(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_seed, 32), idx);
 158                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_seed);
 159                 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
 160                 return ret;
 161         }
 162
 163         /**
 164          * Build a closing transaction
 165          */
 166         public static byte[] build_closing_transaction(long to_holder_value_sat, long to_counterparty_value_sat, byte[] to_holder_script, byte[] to_counterparty_script, OutPoint funding_outpoint) {
 167                 byte[] ret = bindings.build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, to_holder_script, to_counterparty_script, funding_outpoint == null ? 0 : funding_outpoint.ptr & ~1);
 168                 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_value_sat);
 169                 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_value_sat);
 170                 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_holder_script);
 171                 Reference.reachabilityFence(to_counterparty_script);
 172                 Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_outpoint);
 173                 return ret;
 174         }
 175
 176         /**
 177          * Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 178          * from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 179          *
 180          * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 181          * generated (ie our own).
 182          */
 183         public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_secret) {
 184                 long ret = bindings.derive_private_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_secret, 32));
 185                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 186                 Reference.reachabilityFence(base_secret);
 187                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 188                 Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 189                 return ret_hu_conv;
 190         }
 191
 192         /**
 193          * Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 194          * from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 195          * derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 196          *
 197          * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 198          * generated (ie our own).
 199          */
 200         public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] base_point) {
 201                 long ret = bindings.derive_public_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(base_point, 33));
 202                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 203                 Reference.reachabilityFence(base_point);
 204                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 205                 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 206                 return ret_hu_conv;
 207         }
 208
 209         /**
 210          * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 211          *
 212          * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 213          * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
 214          * and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 215          * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 216          *
 217          * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 218          * generated (ie our own).
 219          */
 220         public static Result_SecretKeyErrorZ derive_private_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_secret, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_secret) {
 221                 long ret = bindings.derive_private_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_secret, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret, 32));
 222                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_secret);
 223                 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
 224                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 225                 Result_SecretKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SecretKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 226                 return ret_hu_conv;
 227         }
 228
 229         /**
 230          * Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 231          * the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 232          * public key instead of private keys.
 233          *
 234          * Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 235          * commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
 236          * and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 237          * of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 238          *
 239          * Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 240          * generated (ie our own).
 241          */
 242         public static Result_PublicKeyErrorZ derive_public_revocation_key(byte[] per_commitment_point, byte[] countersignatory_revocation_base_point) {
 243                 long ret = bindings.derive_public_revocation_key(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_revocation_base_point, 33));
 244                 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
 245                 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_revocation_base_point);
 246                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 247                 Result_PublicKeyErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_PublicKeyErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 248                 return ret_hu_conv;
 249         }
 250
 251         /**
 252          * A script either spendable by the revocation
 253          * key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 254          * Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 255          */
 256         public static byte[] get_revokeable_redeemscript(byte[] revocation_key, short contest_delay, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key) {
 257                 byte[] ret = bindings.get_revokeable_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33), contest_delay, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33));
 258                 Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key);
 259                 Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay);
 260                 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
 261                 return ret;
 262         }
 263
 264         /**
 265          * Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
 266          * does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 267          */
 268         public static byte[] get_htlc_redeemscript(HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, TxCreationKeys keys) {
 269                 byte[] ret = bindings.get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, keys == null ? 0 : keys.ptr & ~1);
 270                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 271                 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
 272                 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys);
 273                 return ret;
 274         }
 275
 276         /**
 277          * Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 278          * Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 279          */
 280         public static byte[] make_funding_redeemscript(byte[] broadcaster, byte[] countersignatory) {
 281                 byte[] ret = bindings.make_funding_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory, 33));
 282                 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster);
 283                 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory);
 284                 return ret;
 285         }
 286
 287         /**
 288          * Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
 289          * parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
 290          * transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
 291          * broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
 292          *
 293          * Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
 294          * commitment transaction).
 295          */
 296         public static byte[] build_htlc_transaction(byte[] commitment_txid, int feerate_per_kw, short contest_delay, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc, boolean opt_anchors, byte[] broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, byte[] revocation_key) {
 297                 byte[] ret = bindings.build_htlc_transaction(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(commitment_txid, 32), feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1, opt_anchors, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(revocation_key, 33));
 298                 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_txid);
 299                 Reference.reachabilityFence(feerate_per_kw);
 300                 Reference.reachabilityFence(contest_delay);
 301                 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
 302                 Reference.reachabilityFence(opt_anchors);
 303                 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
 304                 Reference.reachabilityFence(revocation_key);
 305                 return ret;
 306         }
 307
 308         /**
 309          * Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
 310          * The witness in the spending input must be:
 311          * <BIP 143 funding_signature>
 312          * After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
 313          * <>
 314          * (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
 315          */
 316         public static byte[] get_anchor_redeemscript(byte[] funding_pubkey) {
 317                 byte[] ret = bindings.get_anchor_redeemscript(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(funding_pubkey, 33));
 318                 Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_pubkey);
 319                 return ret;
 320         }
 321
 322         /**
 323          * Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
 324          * shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
 325          * transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
 326          *
 327          * This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
 328          * \"decrypt\" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
 329          */
 330         public static long get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(byte[] broadcaster_payment_basepoint, byte[] countersignatory_payment_basepoint, boolean outbound_from_broadcaster) {
 331                 long ret = bindings.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(broadcaster_payment_basepoint, 33), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(countersignatory_payment_basepoint, 33), outbound_from_broadcaster);
 332                 Reference.reachabilityFence(broadcaster_payment_basepoint);
 333                 Reference.reachabilityFence(countersignatory_payment_basepoint);
 334                 Reference.reachabilityFence(outbound_from_broadcaster);
 335                 return ret;
 336         }
 337
 338         /**
 339          * Read a NetworkUpdate from a byte array, created by NetworkUpdate_write
 340          */
 341         public static Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ NetworkUpdate_read(byte[] ser) {
 342                 long ret = bindings.NetworkUpdate_read(ser);
 343                 Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
 344                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 345                 Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_COption_NetworkUpdateZDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 346                 return ret_hu_conv;
 347         }
 348
 349         /**
 350          * Finds a route from us (payer) to the given target node (payee).
 351          *
 352          * If the payee provided features in their invoice, they should be provided via `params.payee`.
 353          * Without this, MPP will only be used if the payee's features are available in the network graph.
 354          *
 355          * Private routing paths between a public node and the target may be included in `params.payee`.
 356          *
 357          * If some channels aren't announced, it may be useful to fill in `first_hops` with the results
 358          * from [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]. If it is filled in, the view of our local
 359          * channels from [`NetworkGraph`] will be ignored, and only those in `first_hops` will be used.
 360          *
 361          * The fees on channels from us to the next hop are ignored as they are assumed to all be equal.
 362          * However, the enabled/disabled bit on such channels as well as the `htlc_minimum_msat` /
 363          * `htlc_maximum_msat` *are* checked as they may change based on the receiving node.
 364          *
 365          * # Note
 366          *
 367          * May be used to re-compute a [`Route`] when handling a [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]. Any
 368          * adjustments to the [`NetworkGraph`] and channel scores should be made prior to calling this
 369          * function.
 370          *
 371          * # Panics
 372          *
 373          * Panics if first_hops contains channels without short_channel_ids;
 374          * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] will never include such channels.
 375          *
 376          * [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 377          * [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
 378          *
 379          * Note that first_hops (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
 380          */
 381         public static Result_RouteLightningErrorZ find_route(byte[] our_node_pubkey, RouteParameters params, NetworkGraph network, @Nullable ChannelDetails[] first_hops, Logger logger, Score scorer) {
 382                 long ret = bindings.find_route(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(our_node_pubkey, 33), params == null ? 0 : params.ptr & ~1, network == null ? 0 : network.ptr & ~1, first_hops != null ? Arrays.stream(first_hops).mapToLong(first_hops_conv_16 -> first_hops_conv_16 == null ? 0 : first_hops_conv_16.ptr & ~1).toArray() : null, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, scorer == null ? 0 : scorer.ptr);
 383                 Reference.reachabilityFence(our_node_pubkey);
 384                 Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
 385                 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
 386                 Reference.reachabilityFence(first_hops);
 387                 Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
 388                 Reference.reachabilityFence(scorer);
 389                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 390                 Result_RouteLightningErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_RouteLightningErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 391                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params);
 392                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(network);
 393                 for (ChannelDetails first_hops_conv_16: first_hops) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(first_hops_conv_16); };
 394                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
 395                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(scorer);
 396                 return ret_hu_conv;
 397         }
 398
 399         /**
 400          * Writes the provided `ChannelManager` to the path provided at `FilesystemPersister`
 401          * initialization, within a file called \"manager\".
 402          */
 403         public static Result_NoneErrorZ FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(java.lang.String data_dir, ChannelManager manager) {
 404                 long ret = bindings.FilesystemPersister_persist_manager(data_dir, manager == null ? 0 : manager.ptr & ~1);
 405                 Reference.reachabilityFence(data_dir);
 406                 Reference.reachabilityFence(manager);
 407                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 408                 Result_NoneErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 409                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(manager);
 410                 return ret_hu_conv;
 411         }
 412
 413         /**
 414          * Utility to construct an invoice. Generally, unless you want to do something like a custom
 415          * cltv_expiry, this is what you should be using to create an invoice. The reason being, this
 416          * method stores the invoice's payment secret and preimage in `ChannelManager`, so (a) the user
 417          * doesn't have to store preimage/payment secret information and (b) `ChannelManager` can verify
 418          * that the payment secret is valid when the invoice is paid.
 419          */
 420         public static Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ create_invoice_from_channelmanager(ChannelManager channelmanager, KeysInterface keys_manager, org.ldk.enums.Currency network, Option_u64Z amt_msat, java.lang.String description) {
 421                 long ret = bindings.create_invoice_from_channelmanager(channelmanager == null ? 0 : channelmanager.ptr & ~1, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, network, amt_msat.ptr, description);
 422                 Reference.reachabilityFence(channelmanager);
 423                 Reference.reachabilityFence(keys_manager);
 424                 Reference.reachabilityFence(network);
 425                 Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_msat);
 426                 Reference.reachabilityFence(description);
 427                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 428                 Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_InvoiceSignOrCreationErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 429                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(channelmanager);
 430                 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
 431                 return ret_hu_conv;
 432         }
 433
 434 }