Remove signing local commitment transaction from ChannelMonitor

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / keysinterface.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
index 2b90188637c1535bb8ce442a1f5478c914926fcf..5f1a307bf27dc9f7bba705961b8b3646b4393b12 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use util::logger::Logger;
 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
 
 use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
 use ln::msgs;
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -215,6 +215,22 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
        /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
        fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
 
+       /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction
+       ///
+       /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+       /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+       /// TODO: Ensure test-only version doesn't enforce uniqueness of signature when it's enforced in this method
+       /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
+       fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>);
+
+       /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction without enforcing one-time signing.
+       ///
+       /// Testing revocation logic by our test framework needs to sign multiple local commitment
+       /// transactions. This unsafe test-only version doesn't enforce one-time signing security
+       /// requirement.
+       #[cfg(test)]
+       fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>);
+
        /// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
        ///
        /// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
@@ -342,6 +358,15 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
                Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
        }
 
+       fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
+               local_commitment_tx.add_local_sig(&self.funding_key, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+       }
+
+       #[cfg(test)]
+       fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
+               local_commitment_tx.add_local_sig(&self.funding_key, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+       }
+
        fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
                if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
                if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }