use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction};
use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::io::Error;
+use prelude::*;
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use io::{self, Error};
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
/// Information about a spendable output to a P2WSH script. See
/// derive the witnessScript for this output.
pub revocation_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to
- /// `ChannelKeys::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
+ /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
/// the channel to spend the output.
pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
/// The value of the channel which this output originated from, possibly indirectly.
pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: usize = 1 + 73 + 1 + chan_utils::REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH + 1;
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, {
+ (0, outpoint, required),
+ (2, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (4, to_self_delay, required),
+ (6, output, required),
+ (8, revocation_pubkey, required),
+ (10, channel_keys_id, required),
+ (12, channel_value_satoshis, required),
+});
+
/// Information about a spendable output to our "payment key". See
/// SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
/// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
pub output: TxOut,
/// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to
- /// `ChannelKeys::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
+ /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
/// the channel to spend the output.
pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
/// The value of the channel which this transactions spends.
// redeemscript push length.
pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: usize = 1 + 73 + 34;
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, {
+ (0, outpoint, required),
+ (2, output, required),
+ (4, channel_keys_id, required),
+ (6, channel_value_satoshis, required),
+});
/// When on-chain outputs are created by rust-lightning (which our counterparty is not able to
/// claim at any point in the future) an event is generated which you must track and be able to
///
/// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the
/// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
- /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
+ /// Sign::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
/// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key
/// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
- /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().
+ /// Sign::pubkeys().
///
/// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
/// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
- /// call to ChannelKeys::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point
+ /// call to Sign::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point
/// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
///
/// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
/// chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript.
DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor),
/// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
- /// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point).
+ /// corresponds to the public key in Sign::pubkeys().payment_point).
/// The witness in the spending input, is, thus, simply:
/// <BIP 143 signature> <payment key>
///
StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor),
}
-impl Writeable for SpendableOutputDescriptor {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- output.write(writer)?;
- },
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.outpoint.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.output.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- },
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.outpoint.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.output.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl Readable for SpendableOutputDescriptor {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match Readable::read(reader)? {
- 0u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- output: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }),
- 1u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
- outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- per_commitment_point: Readable::read(reader)?,
- to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?,
- output: Readable::read(reader)?,
- revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
- channel_keys_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- channel_value_satoshis: Readable::read(reader)?,
- })),
- 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
- outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- output: Readable::read(reader)?,
- channel_keys_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
- channel_value_satoshis: Readable::read(reader)?,
- })),
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SpendableOutputDescriptor,
+ (0, StaticOutput) => {
+ (0, outpoint, required),
+ (2, output, required),
+ },
+;
+ (1, DelayedPaymentOutput),
+ (2, StaticPaymentOutput),
+);
-/// Set of lightning keys needed to operate a channel as described in BOLT 3.
+/// A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
///
/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
-/// the current ChannelKeys would be a front-end on top of a communication
+/// the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
/// channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
/// reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
/// to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
/// In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
/// to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
/// of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
-// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
+// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new Sign copy when we create
// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
-pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
+pub trait BaseSign {
/// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
///
/// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
- fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey;
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey;
/// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
///
/// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
/// Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
/// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
- /// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ /// Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
/// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
/// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
/// get called once.
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+ /// or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ ///
+ /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ ///
+ /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ ///
+ /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ /// so).
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
- /// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+ /// HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
///
- /// A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
/// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- /// It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
/// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
///
/// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
/// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
/// so).
///
- /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
- /// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
- /// signatures).
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+ /// (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
/// transaction, either offered or received.
/// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
/// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
/// BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
/// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
/// of the channel participants.
/// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
/// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
/// protocol.
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
/// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
}
+/// A cloneable signer.
+///
+/// Although we require signers to be cloneable, it may be useful for developers to be able to use
+/// signers in an un-sized way, for example as `dyn BaseSign`. Therefore we separate the Clone trait,
+/// which implies Sized, into this derived trait.
+pub trait Sign: BaseSign + Writeable + Clone {
+}
+
/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
-pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
- /// A type which implements ChannelKeys which will be returned by get_channel_keys.
- type ChanKeySigner : ChannelKeys;
+pub trait KeysInterface {
+ /// A type which implements Sign which will be returned by get_channel_signer.
+ type Signer : Sign;
/// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key).
///
/// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking
/// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user.
fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
- /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
+ /// Get a new set of Sign for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
/// restarted with some stale data!
///
/// This method must return a different value each time it is called.
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
+ fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer;
/// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting
/// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be
/// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts.
/// This method must return a different value each time it is called.
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32];
- /// Reads a `ChanKeySigner` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream.
+ /// Reads a `Signer` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream.
/// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain
- /// `ChannelKeys`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s).
- /// The bytes are exactly those which `<Self::ChanKeySigner as Writeable>::write()` writes, and
+ /// `Sign`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s).
+ /// The bytes are exactly those which `<Self::Signer as Writeable>::write()` writes, and
/// contain no versioning scheme. You may wish to include your own version prefix and ensure
/// you've read all of the provided bytes to ensure no corruption occurred.
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError>;
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError>;
+
+ /// Sign an invoice's preimage (note that this is the preimage of the invoice, not the HTLC's
+ /// preimage). By parameterizing by the preimage instead of the hash, we allow implementors of
+ /// this trait to parse the invoice and make sure they're signing what they expect, rather than
+ /// blindly signing the hash.
+ fn sign_invoice(&self, invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()>;
}
#[derive(Clone)]
-/// A simple implementation of ChannelKeys that just keeps the private keys in memory.
+/// A simple implementation of Sign that just keeps the private keys in memory.
///
/// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as
/// a secure external signer.
-pub struct InMemoryChannelKeys {
+pub struct InMemorySigner {
/// Private key of anchor tx
pub funding_key: SecretKey,
/// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
}
-impl InMemoryChannelKeys {
- /// Create a new InMemoryChannelKeys
+impl InMemorySigner {
+ /// Create a new InMemorySigner
pub fn new<C: Signing>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
funding_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
let holder_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
- InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ InMemorySigner {
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
payment_key,
}
}
-impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
- fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
}
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.channel_keys_id }
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let holder_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
- Ok(s) => s,
- Err(_) => return Err(()),
- };
+ let holder_htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
- Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
- Err(_) => return Err(())
- };
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
- Ok(revocation_pubkey) => revocation_pubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(())
+ let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let witness_script = {
+ let counterparty_delayedpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
};
- let witness_script = if let &Some(ref htlc) = htlc {
- let counterparty_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) => counterparty_htlcpubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(())
- };
- let holder_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- Ok(holder_htlcpubkey) => holder_htlcpubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(())
- };
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let witness_script = {
+ let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let holder_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
- } else {
- let counterparty_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) {
- Ok(counterparty_delayedpubkey) => counterparty_delayedpubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(())
- };
- chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
};
let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
}
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
Err(())
}
- fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); }
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
}
}
}
-impl Writeable for InMemoryChannelKeys {
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Sign for InMemorySigner {}
+
+impl Writeable for InMemorySigner {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
self.funding_key.write(writer)?;
self.revocation_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.payment_key.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
+
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for InMemoryChannelKeys {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl Readable for InMemorySigner {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let holder_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
let keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
+
+ Ok(InMemorySigner {
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
payment_key,
/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'
/// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds!
pub struct KeysManager {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
node_secret: SecretKey,
destination_script: Script,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+
rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ rand_bytes_unique_start: Sha256State,
seed: [u8; 32],
starting_time_secs: u64,
/// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
/// detailed description of the guarantee.
pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
// Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- KeysManager {
+ let mut rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
+ rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
+ rand_bytes_unique_start.input(seed);
+
+ let mut res = KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
node_secret,
+
destination_script,
shutdown_pubkey,
+
channel_master_key,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+
rand_bytes_master_key,
rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ rand_bytes_unique_start,
seed: *seed,
starting_time_secs,
starting_time_nanos,
- }
+ };
+ let secp_seed = res.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ res.secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&secp_seed);
+ res
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
}
}
- fn derive_unique_start(&self) -> Sha256State {
- let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_secs));
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos));
- unique_start.input(&self.seed);
- unique_start
- }
- /// Derive an old set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets based on a key derivation
- /// parameters.
+ /// Derive an old Sign containing per-channel secrets based on a key derivation parameters.
+ ///
/// Key derivation parameters are accessible through a per-channel secrets
- /// ChannelKeys::channel_keys_id and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of
+ /// Sign::channel_keys_id and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of
/// onchain output detection for which a corresponding delayed_payment_key must be derived.
- pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
let chan_id = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(¶ms[0..8]);
- assert!(chan_id <= std::u32::MAX as u64); // Otherwise the params field wasn't created by us
+ assert!(chan_id <= core::u32::MAX as u64); // Otherwise the params field wasn't created by us
let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
unique_start.input(params);
unique_start.input(&self.seed);
let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_key);
let htlc_base_key = key_step!(b"HTLC base key", delayed_payment_base_key);
- InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ InMemorySigner::new(
&self.secp_ctx,
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
/// We do not enforce that outputs meet the dust limit or that any output scripts are standard.
///
/// May panic if the `SpendableOutputDescriptor`s were not generated by Channels which used
- /// this KeysManager or one of the `InMemoryChannelKeys` created by this KeysManager.
- pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+ /// this KeysManager or one of the `InMemorySigner` created by this KeysManager.
+ pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
let mut input = Vec::new();
let mut input_value = 0;
let mut witness_weight = 0;
};
transaction_utils::maybe_add_change_output(&mut spend_tx, input_value, witness_weight, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, change_destination_script)?;
- let mut keys_cache: Option<(InMemoryChannelKeys, [u8; 32])> = None;
+ let mut keys_cache: Option<(InMemorySigner, [u8; 32])> = None;
let mut input_idx = 0;
for outp in descriptors {
match outp {
}
impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
- type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
+ type Signer = InMemorySigner;
fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
self.node_secret.clone()
self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner {
+ fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer {
let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- assert!(child_ix <= std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ assert!(child_ix <= core::u32::MAX as usize);
let mut id = [0; 32];
id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(child_ix as u64));
id[8..16].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos as u64));
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
+ let mut sha = self.rand_bytes_unique_start.clone();
let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError> {
- InMemoryChannelKeys::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(reader))
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
+ InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader))
}
+
+ fn sign_invoice(&self, invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&invoice_preimage)), &self.get_node_secret()))
+ }
+}
+
+// Ensure that BaseSign can have a vtable
+#[test]
+pub fn dyn_sign() {
+ let _signer: Box<dyn BaseSign>;
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff