use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use util::byte_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::msgs;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Readable/Writable to serialize out a unique reference to this set of keys so
/// that you can serialize the full ChannelManager object.
///
-/// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
-/// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
-/// routine).
-/// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
-/// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
+// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
+// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
+// routine).
+// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
+// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
/// Gets the private key for the anchor tx
fn funding_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
/// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
///
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- ///
- /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
- /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
+ //
+ // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+ // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+ // making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
+ /// the same local_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
+ /// that it will not be called multiple times.
+ //
+ // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+ // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+ fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
+ /// Same as sign_local_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to local commitment
+ /// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
+ /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_local_commitment may enforce that we only ever
+ /// get called once.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a local commitment transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Unlike sign_local_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
+ /// local_commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
+ /// local_commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
+ /// local_commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
+ /// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
+ ///
+ /// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
+ /// local_commitment_tx. For those HTLCs which have transaction_output_index set to None
+ /// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated),
+ /// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the
+ /// return value must contain a signature.
+ fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
+ fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
+ let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+
+ Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
+ let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+
+ Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ local_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, local_csv, secp_ctx)
+ }
+
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
Ok(destination_key) => {
- let pubkey_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.key.serialize()[..]);
+ let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.to_bytes());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&pubkey_hash160.into_inner())
+ .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
.into_script()
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- (Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner())
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff