Adopting (W)PubkeyHash types

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / keysinterface.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
index 44f347abc12e133ec8d735daf1e9de6a3ce15f87..ce865107abc3ee831b25263a7281b08921547155 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
 
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 
 use util::byte_utils;
 use util::logger::Logger;
@@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
 /// Readable/Writable to serialize out a unique reference to this set of keys so
 /// that you can serialize the full ChannelManager object.
 ///
-/// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
-/// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
-/// routine).
-/// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
-/// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
+// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
+// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
+// routine).
+// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
+// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
 pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
        /// Gets the private key for the anchor tx
        fn funding_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
@@ -209,18 +209,18 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
        /// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
        ///
        /// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
-       ///
-       /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
-       /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
-       /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
+       //
+       // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+       // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+       // making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
        fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
 
        /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
        /// the same local_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
        /// that it will not be called multiple times.
-       ///
-       /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
-       /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+       //
+       // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+       // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
        fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
 
        /// Same as sign_local_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to local commitment
@@ -513,9 +513,9 @@ impl KeysManager {
                                let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
                                let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
                                        Ok(destination_key) => {
-                                               let pubkey_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.key.serialize()[..]);
+                                               let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.to_bytes());
                                                Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
-                                                             .push_slice(&pubkey_hash160.into_inner())
+                                                             .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
                                                              .into_script()
                                        },
                                        Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),