use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction,TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
use std::sync::{Arc};
+use std::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
+
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
local_keys: ChanSigner,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ destination_script: Script,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
next_local_htlc_id: u64,
next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
- channel_update_count: u32,
+ update_time_counter: u32,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
+ funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
- their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+
their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
- channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+ /// Used exclusively to broadcast the latest local state, mostly a historical quirk that this
+ /// is here:
+ channel_monitor: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus,
/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
-/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
-/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
-/// it's 2^24.
-pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
#[cfg(test)]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
#[cfg(not(test))]
-pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
-pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+
+/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
+/// it's 2^24.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
Close(&'static str),
CloseDelayBroadcast {
msg: &'static str,
- update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
+ update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
},
}
cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
}
- fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
- 1000 // TODO
- }
-
// Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError> {
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
+ pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
- chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
-
Ok(Channel {
user_id: user_id,
config: config.channel_options.clone(),
channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
channel_outbound: true,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
+
local_keys: chan_keys,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
+
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
holding_cell_update_fee: None,
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 1,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
their_to_self_delay: 0,
our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
- their_funding_pubkey: None,
- their_revocation_basepoint: None,
- their_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
- their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_pubkeys: None,
their_cur_commitment_point: None,
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
- channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+ channel_monitor: None,
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
})
}
- fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
}
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> {
- let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
+ pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
+ where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+ chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
}
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
- chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
- keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
-
let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
&OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
}
} else { None };
- let mut chan = Channel {
+ let chan = Channel {
user_id: user_id,
config: local_config,
channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
channel_outbound: false,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
local_keys: chan_keys,
shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
+
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
holding_cell_update_fee: None,
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 1,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ funding_txo: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
- their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
- their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
- their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
- their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+ channel_monitor: None,
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
logger,
};
- let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
- let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
- chan.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, msg.funding_satoshis, obscure_factor);
-
Ok(chan)
}
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
+ let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
if self.channel_outbound {
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
} else {
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
witness: Vec::new(),
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
#[inline]
let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
- Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
- if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
- builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
- } else {
- builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
- }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
}
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
}
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
- /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
- /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
+ /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
+ ///
+ /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
+ /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
} else {
log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
return Ok((None, None));
},
_ => {
//
// We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
// can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
- self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
return Ok((None, None));
}
},
log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
// TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
// rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
+ return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
}
},
_ => {}
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
}
{
if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
} else {
debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
}
log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
- }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+ }), Some(monitor_update)))
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
- (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
+ let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
+ },
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
},
- (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+ (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
(None, None) => Ok((None, None))
}
}
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
- /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
- /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
+ /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
+ ///
+ /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
+ /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
return Ok(None);
},
_ => {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
},
self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
- self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
- self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
- self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
- self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
- self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
+ self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
+
self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
- let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor);
-
self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
Ok(())
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
- let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, &self.get_funding_redeemscript(), self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
}
- pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
}
// channel.
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
- let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
+ self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ self.funding_txo = None;
return Err(e);
}
};
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ macro_rules! create_monitor {
+ () => { {
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
+ self.logger.clone());
+
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()).unwrap();
+ channel_monitor
+ } }
+ }
+
+ self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
+ let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature: our_signature
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }, channel_monitor))
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitorUpdate, (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?")));
}
if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!")));
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer")));
+ }
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
- LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap()),
- local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
+ local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: Vec::new(),
+ }]
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ Ok(monitor_update)
} else {
- Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
+ Err((Some(monitor_update),
+ ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast")))
}
}
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
} else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
// Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
}
+ if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC"));
+ }
if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
}
Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
}
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
let mut update_fee = false;
let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
};
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
+ }
//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
if update_fee {
let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
}
}
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
}
let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
+ return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
+ }
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
} else {
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
}
}
+ let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
- LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap()),
- local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
+ local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
+ }]
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
// the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
// includes the right HTLCs.
- // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
- // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
- // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
// TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
// re-send the message on restoration)
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
+ return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
}
- let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
- let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- (Some(msg), monitor, None)
+ let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ (Some(msg), None)
} else if !need_our_commitment {
- (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
- } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
+ (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
+ } else { (None, None) };
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
+ updates: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
- Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
+ Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
+ if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
+ }
+ },
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
else {
} else {
None
};
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+
+ let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
+ // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+
Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs,
update_fulfill_htlcs,
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
}
}
- self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
- .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
+
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
+ // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
+ // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
+ // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
+ // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
+ // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
+ // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
+ // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
+ }
+
+ self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
+ idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
+ }],
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
// which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
// before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
- self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
- return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
+ return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
}
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
- Some(mut commitment_update) => {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+ Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
+ commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
}
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
}
- Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
+
+ // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+
+ Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
},
None => {
if require_commitment {
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+
Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
commitment_signed
}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
} else {
- Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
}
}
}
})
}
- pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
Some(update_fee) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
/// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
/// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
/// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
- pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
(raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
}
- pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
}
}
Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok(())
}
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
}
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
- return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
- });
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+ their_current_per_commitment_point: data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point
+ }]
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
+ return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast {
+ msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting",
+ update: monitor_update
+ });
}
},
OptionalField::Absent => {}
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
- Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
}
} else {
}
}
- fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
+ fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &self.get_funding_redeemscript(), &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.ok();
if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
})
}
- pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
// From here on out, we may not fail!
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
};
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+
Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
}
- pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
}
}
let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
+ let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
+
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
},
};
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
}
}
let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &funding_redeemscript, &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
}
let our_sig = self.local_keys
- .sign_closing_transaction(self.channel_value_satoshis, &funding_redeemscript, &closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
}
/// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
- pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor {
+ pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
}
- &mut self.channel_monitor
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap()
}
/// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
/// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
/// get_outbound_funding_created.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
+ self.funding_txo
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
}
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
- self.channel_update_count
+ pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.update_time_counter
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id
}
pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
+ pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
// For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
// output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
+ if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
+ let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
+ if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
+ channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ }
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
}
}
}
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
- if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
- let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
- // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
- // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
- // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
- // channel and move on.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
- });
- } else {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if input.witness.is_empty() {
- // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
- // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- }
- }
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
- }
- }
- }
- }
Ok(None)
}
self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
}
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
+ channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ }
false
}
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ pub fn get_open_channel<F: Deref>(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &F) -> msgs::OpenChannel
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
- Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, &self.get_funding_redeemscript(), self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
}
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
-
+ self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ self.funding_txo = None;
return Err(e);
}
};
let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+
+ let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ macro_rules! create_monitor {
+ () => { {
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
+ self.logger.clone());
+
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ channel_monitor
+ } }
+ }
+
+ self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
+ let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
+
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
signature: our_signature
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }, channel_monitor))
}
/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- let remote_last_secret = self.channel_monitor.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
})
} else {
- log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
+ log_info!(self, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
- my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
})
};
msgs::ChannelReestablish {
if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
}
+
+ if amount_msat == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
+ }
+
if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
}
/// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
/// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
- pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
}
self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys
- fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
// fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
// is acceptable.
let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
+ htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
(res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
},
Err(e) => return Err(e),
};
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+ unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
+ commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+ their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ }]
+ };
+ self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ Ok((res, monitor_update))
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
htlcs.push(htlc);
}
- let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.channel_value_satoshis, &self.get_funding_redeemscript(), feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
/// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
Some(update_add_htlc) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
} else {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
}
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
// Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
// our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
}
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- (self.channel_monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
}
}
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
+
self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
}
(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
+ continue; // Drop
+ }
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
match &htlc.state {
- &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
+ &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
&InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
htlc_state.write(writer)?;
}
}
- macro_rules! write_option {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match &$thing {
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- &Some(ref v) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- v.write(writer)?;
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
},
&OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ fail_reason.write(writer)?;
},
&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ fail_reason.write(writer)?;
},
&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4u8.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ fail_reason.write(writer)?;
},
}
}
fail_reason.write(writer)?;
}
- write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
- write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
+ self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
(self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
+ self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
}
- write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
- write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
+ self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
- write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
- write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
+ self.their_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
+ self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.channel_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().write_for_disk(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
+ fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
- state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
- holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
});
}
- let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
+ let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
// We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
- // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
+ // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
channel_value_satoshis,
+ latest_monitor_update_id,
+
local_keys,
shutdown_pubkey,
+ destination_script,
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
holding_cell_update_fee,
next_local_htlc_id,
next_remote_htlc_id,
- channel_update_count,
+ update_time_counter,
feerate_per_kw,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
last_sent_closing_fee,
+ funding_txo,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
short_channel_id,
last_block_connected,
their_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
- their_funding_pubkey,
- their_revocation_basepoint,
- their_payment_basepoint,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
- their_htlc_basepoint,
+ their_pubkeys,
their_cur_commitment_point,
their_prev_commitment_point,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- channel_monitor,
+ channel_monitor: Some(channel_monitor),
+ commitment_secrets,
network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::LocalCommitmentTransaction;
+ use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
+ use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
+ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use std::sync::Arc;
+ use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u64
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> InMemoryChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ self.chan_keys.clone()
+ }
fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
}
+ fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut seed = [0; 32];
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network, logger.clone() as Arc<Logger>);
+
+ // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
+
+ // Create Node A's channel
+ let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), &&feeest);
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::supported(), &open_channel_msg, 7, logger, &config).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
+ let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
+ node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::supported()).unwrap();
+
+ // Node A --> Node B: funding created
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
+ let (funding_created_msg, _) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint).unwrap();
+ let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg);
+
+ // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
+ // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
+ node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
+ let expected_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_b_chan.build_local_commitment_secret(node_b_chan.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1));
+ let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
+ match msg.data_loss_protect {
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { my_current_per_commitment_point, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(expected_commitment_point, my_current_per_commitment_point);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+
+ // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
+ // is sane.
+ node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
+ let expected_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_a_chan.build_local_commitment_secret(node_a_chan.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1));
+ let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
+ match msg.data_loss_protect {
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { my_current_per_commitment_point, .. }) => {
+ assert_eq!(expected_commitment_point, my_current_per_commitment_point);
+ },
+ _ => panic!()
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ &secp_ctx,
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
- };
+ [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
+ 10_000_000,
+ );
+
assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
+ let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, their_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
- chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
-
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
+
+ let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
+ htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
+ };
+ chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
- assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+
+ chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
+ let mut localtx;
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
unsigned_tx = {
let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
- let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
+ localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
+ chan_keys.sign_local_commitment(&mut localtx, &chan.secp_ctx);
assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],
hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
}
macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
- ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
+ ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
assert!(preimage.is_some());
}
- chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key, &keys.per_commitment_point, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key(), &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
+ let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
+ per_htlc.push((htlc.clone(), Some(remote_signature), None));
+ localtx.set_htlc_cache(keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
+ chan_keys.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut localtx, $htlc_idx, preimage, chan.their_to_self_delay, &chan.secp_ctx);
+
+ assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.htlc_with_valid_witness($htlc_idx).as_ref().unwrap())[..],
hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
};
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff