// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
+use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
-use std;
-use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
-use std::ops::Deref;
+use prelude::*;
+use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use core::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
use std::sync::Mutex;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
/// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
/// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ ///
/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
- /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
- /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+ /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
+ /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
/// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}
pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
-/// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
-/// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
-/// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
-/// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum UpdateStatus {
- /// Status has been gossiped.
- Fresh,
- /// Status has been changed.
- DisabledMarked,
- /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
+/// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
+/// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
+/// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
+/// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
+/// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
+ /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
+ Enabled,
+ /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
DisabledStaged,
+ /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
+ EnabledStaged,
+ /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
+ Disabled,
}
/// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
}
}
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+ /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
+ /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+}
+
// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
- /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
- /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
- /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
- /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
+ /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
minimum_depth: u32,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
+
pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
+ funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
-
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
- network_sync: UpdateStatus,
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
+
+ /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
+ /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
+ announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
// We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
// `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
+
+ /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
+ /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
+ /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
+ /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
+ /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
+ ///
+ /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
+ pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
}
pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
-/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
-/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
-/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
-const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
-const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
#[cfg(not(test))]
const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
/// it's 2^24.
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
+/// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
+/// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
+/// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
+/// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
+/// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
+/// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
+/// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
+/// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
+pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
+
+/// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
+/// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
+/// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
+/// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
+pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
+
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
}
- fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
- cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
- }
-
// Constructors:
pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
}
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
- return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
}
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: feerate,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
counterparty_parameters: None,
funding_outpoint: None
},
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+
+ announcement_sigs: None,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
})
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
}),
funding_outpoint: None
},
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+
+ announcement_sigs: None,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
};
Ok(chan)
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
- log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
+ commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
+ get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
break;
}
}
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
}
_ => {}
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
}
///
/// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
/// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
match htlc.state {
pending_idx = idx;
}
}
- if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
}
_ => {}
}
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
err_packet,
return Ok(None);
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
{
let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
- }
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
}
+ if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
+ // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
+ // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
+ // channel.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
+ }
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
// They sign the holder commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
}
let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
&self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(channel_monitor)
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
+ Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
}
- pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
+ self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
}
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+
Ok(())
}
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
} else {
let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
+ log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
}
Some(forward_info.clone())
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
need_commitment = true;
}
if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
Some(fail_reason.take())
} else { None } {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
need_commitment = true;
}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
// TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
// re-send the message on restoration)
return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
(None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
} else { (None, None) };
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
}, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
}
+ /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
+ /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
+ /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
+ pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
+ }
+
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+ log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
+ if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
Err(e) => {
match e {
ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
- log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
// If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
// be failed backwards. Failing to send here
// indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
- match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
+ update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
+
Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs,
update_fulfill_htlcs,
self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
});
for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
true
} else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
true
} else { false };
if swap {
mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
require_commitment = true;
} else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
match forward_info {
PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
require_commitment = true;
match fail_msg {
HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
}
},
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
}
}
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
}
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
commitment_signed
}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
} else {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
}
}
}
}
- /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
- /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
- /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
- /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+ /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
+ /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
+ /// resent.
/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
/// completed.
- pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
-
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- return outbound_drops;
+ return;
}
// Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
// will be retransmitted.
}
}
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
- // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
- // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
- // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
- // logic.
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
- }
- });
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- outbound_drops
+ log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
+ let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
+ self.funding_transaction.take()
+ } else { None };
- // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
- // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
- // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
- // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
- // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
- // monitor was persisted.
+ // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
+ // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
+ // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
+ // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
+ // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
}
let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
let order = self.resend_order.clone();
- log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
- if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
- if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
+ log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
- (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
}
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
update_fee: None,
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
}
// Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
- return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
// We have OurFundingLocked set!
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
- // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
- for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
- debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
- }
- }
-
// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
- // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
},
Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
- // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
- // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
},
}
} else {
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
}
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
}
self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
}
+ pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
+ cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
+ }
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
self.feerate_per_kw
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
}
/// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
} else { false }
}
- pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
+ pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
+ self.channel_update_status
}
- pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
+ pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
+ self.channel_update_status = status;
}
- pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
- self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
- }
+ fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ return None;
+ }
- pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
- self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
+ }
+
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ };
+
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ });
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ }
+ }
+ None
}
- pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
- self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
+ /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
+ /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
+ /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
+ pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
+ // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
+ let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
+ self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+ Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
+ Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
+ // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
+ // may have already happened for this block).
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
+ }
+ }
+ for inp in tx.input.iter() {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(None)
}
- /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
- /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
- /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
- /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
- /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
+ /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
+ /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
+ /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
/// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
///
/// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
/// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
/// post-shutdown.
- /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
- if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
+ if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
false
} else { true }
}
});
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
+
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
}
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
- let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
- let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
- // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
- // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
- // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
- // channel and move on.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
- });
- } else {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if input.witness.is_empty() {
- // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
- // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- }
- }
- if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
- panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
- }
- assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
- }
- }
+ if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
+ (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
+ let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
+ // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
+ // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
+ funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
}
- }
- self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash());
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- }), timed_out_htlcs));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
- }
- }
+ // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
+ // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
+ // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
+ // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
+ });
}
}
+
Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
}
- /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
- /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
- /// unconfirmation/reorg.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
- return true;
+ /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
+ /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
+ /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
+ pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
+ // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
+ // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
+ let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
+ // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
+ // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
+ // time we saw and it will be ignored.
+ let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
+ match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
+ Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
+ assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
+ assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(e) => Err(e)
}
+ } else {
+ // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
+ Ok(())
}
- if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
- }
- false
}
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
temporary_channel_id,
/// closing).
/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
+ ///
+ /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
if !self.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
Ok((msg, sig))
}
+ /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
+ /// available.
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
+ if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
+ let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
+
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
+ Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
+ node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: announcement,
+ })
+ } else {
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
+ /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
+ /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
+ pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
+
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
+ &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
+ }
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
+ "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
+ &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
+ }
+
+ self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
+
+ self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
+ /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
+ pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return None,
+ };
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
+ Ok(res) => Some(res),
+ Err(_) => None,
+ }
+ }
+
/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
})
} else {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
/// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
- /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
- /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
- /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
- /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ ///
+ /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
+ /// the wire:
+ /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
+ /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
+ /// awaiting ACK.
+ /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
+ /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
+ /// them.
+ ///
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
+ ///
/// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
// Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
// incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
// the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
// disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
// end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
// IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
}
let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
}
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat,
payment_hash,
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
- &counterparty_commitment_txid,
- encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
- log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
+ log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
- log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
+ log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
}
}
}
+ /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
+ pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
+ }
+
+ pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ }
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
+ (0, FailRelay),
+ (1, FailMalformed),
+ (2, Fulfill),
+);
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
+ // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
+ // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
match self {
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- error_packet.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- onion_hash.write(writer)?;
- err_code.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
- },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
}
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
})
}
impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
- // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
+ // called.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.user_id.write(writer)?;
self.config.write(writer)?;
let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
(key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
&OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
- 2u8.write(writer)?;
- fail_reason.write(writer)?;
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
+ // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
+ // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
},
&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
}
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
+ match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
+ Some(info) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
+ info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
+ info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ None => 0u8.write(writer)?
+ }
+
self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {(0, self.announcement_sigs, option)});
+
Ok(())
}
}
impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
+ let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
};
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut announcement_sigs = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {(0, announcement_sigs, option)});
+
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
last_sent_closing_fee,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height,
short_channel_id,
- funding_tx_confirmations,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
+ counterparty_forwarding_info,
+
channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
+ funding_transaction,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
counterparty_node_id,
commitment_secrets,
- network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
+ channel_update_status,
+
+ announcement_sigs,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
})
}
}
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
+ use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
use std::sync::Arc;
+ use prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u32
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
+ fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
}
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
+ node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
// Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
- let last_block_hash = chain_hash;
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
+ let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
- let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger);
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn channel_update() {
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+
+ // Create a channel.
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+ let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
+ assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
+
+ // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
+ let update = ChannelUpdate {
+ contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 110,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ },
+ signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
+ };
+ node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
+
+ // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
+ // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
+ Some(info) => {
+ assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
+ assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
+ assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
+ },
+ None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff