//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
-//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
+//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
},
},
},
- ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
+ ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
err: msg,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
- genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ genesis_hash: BlockHash,
fee_estimator: F,
monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
#[cfg(not(test))]
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
- last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
+ last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
}
}
}
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
},
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
- match e {
- // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
- // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
- // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
- // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
- }
- }
let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
}
// OUR PAYMENT!
// final_expiry_too_soon
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
+ // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
+ // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
}
// final_incorrect_htlc_amount
break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
+ // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
}
+ // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
+ // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
+ if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+
break None;
}
{
}
let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
+ features: NodeFeatures::known(),
timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
rgb, alias, addresses,
}
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
},
- ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
+ ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
continue;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
- if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
+ data: chan_update,
+ }));
+ }
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
+ msg: funding_locked,
});
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
+ } else if let Err(e) = res {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
}
for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // Call it incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details as the issue, ultimately, is that the
- // user failed to provide us a preimage within the cltv_expiry time window.
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
}
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
+ let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
}
}
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
}
- let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff