//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
-//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
+//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
},
Receive {
payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
},
}
/// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
/// are part of the same payment.
payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
},
},
},
- ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
+ ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
err: msg,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
/// go to read them!
- /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
- /// arrive.
claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
/// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
- genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ genesis_hash: BlockHash,
fee_estimator: F,
monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
#[cfg(not(test))]
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
- last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
+ last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
}
}
}
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
},
- Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
+ Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
- match e {
- // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
- // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
- // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
- // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
- }
- }
let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
}
// OUR PAYMENT!
// final_expiry_too_soon
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
+ // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
+ // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
}
// final_incorrect_htlc_amount
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
+ },
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
- if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
+ // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
}
+ // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
+ // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
+ if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+
break None;
}
{
})
}
+ // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
+ pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
+
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
+ .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
+ if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
+ }
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
+ match {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
+ }
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
+ } {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
+ // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
+ // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
+ // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
+ // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
+
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ },
+ None => {},
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
/// Sends a payment along a given route.
///
/// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
/// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
/// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
/// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route:
&Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
if route.paths.len() < 1 {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
}
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
let mut results = Vec::new();
- 'path_loop: for path in route.paths.iter() {
- macro_rules! check_res_push {
- ($res: expr) => { match $res {
- Ok(r) => r,
- Err(e) => {
- results.push(Err(e));
- continue 'path_loop;
- },
- }
- }
- }
-
- log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
- let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
-
- let onion_keys = check_res_push!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
- .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}));
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = check_res_push!(onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height));
- if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
- check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}));
- }
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
-
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
-
- let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"})),
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
-
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
- match {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
- check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}));
- }
- if !chan.get().is_live() {
- check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"}));
- }
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
- } {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
- // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
- // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
- // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
- // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
- // next check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
- check_res_push!(Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed));
- }
-
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
- },
- None => {},
- }
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- results.push(Ok(()));
- continue 'path_loop;
- };
-
- match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
- Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
- Err(e) => {
- check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }));
- },
- }
+ for path in route.paths.iter() {
+ results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
}
let mut has_ok = false;
let mut has_err = false;
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
+ let (chan, msg) = {
let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(mut chan) => {
(chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
};
match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
+ (chan, funding_msg)
},
Err(_) => { return; }
}
};
- // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
- Err(_) => { return; },
- Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
- }
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
- // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
- // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
- // in fact, safe).
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- },
- }
- }
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
}
let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
+ features: NodeFeatures::known(),
timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
rgb, alias, addresses,
}
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
},
- ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
+ ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
continue;
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
prev_hop,
value: amt_to_forward,
payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
});
if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
}
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
+ &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
+ as u32,
+ ),
+ );
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
));
}
} else if total_value == data.total_msat {
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
+ ));
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
}
true
} else { false }
match &onion_error {
&HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
// TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
// process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
// next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: onion_error_data
}
);
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
ref failure_code,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref data,
.. } => {
// we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
// TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
#[cfg(test)]
error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
}
);
}
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
- let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
- let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
+ ));
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
} else {
match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
Err(Some(e)) => {
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
// lock before add_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo(), monitor_update) {
match e {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
// Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
- Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
- Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
- assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
- let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
- unreachable!();
- },
+ let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
Ok(update) => update,
+ Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
}
(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
- if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
+ data: chan_update,
+ }));
+ }
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
+ msg: funding_locked,
});
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
+ } else if let Err(e) = res {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
}
true
});
+
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
+ htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
+ // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
+ // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
+ // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
+ if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
+ data: htlc_msat_height_data
+ }));
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
+ });
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
+
+ for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
+ }
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
*self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
loop {
onion_packet.write(writer)?;
short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
},
- &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
+ &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
payment_data.write(writer)?;
+ incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
},
}
self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
},
1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
prev_hop,
value,
- payment_data
+ payment_data,
+ cltv_expiry
});
impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
{
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
+ let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
}
}
impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
- ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
}
- let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff