use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
-use ln::router::Route;
-use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
+use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
-use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
-use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use std::{cmp, mem};
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
-use std::io::Cursor;
+use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::time::Duration;
use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
use std::ops::Deref;
-const SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS: [u8; 65] = [0; 65];
-
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
//
-// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
-// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
-// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
-// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
+// Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
+// Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
+// with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
+// before we forward it.
+//
+// We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
+// relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
+// to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
-/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
+
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+enum PendingHTLCRouting {
+ Forward {
+ onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
+ },
+ Receive {
+ payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ },
+}
+
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
+pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- short_channel_id: u64,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
/// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
- Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
+ Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
+pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
+ AddHTLC {
+ prev_short_channel_id: u64,
+ prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+}
+
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
}
+struct ClaimableHTLC {
+ prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
+ value: u64,
+ /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
+ /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
+ /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
+ /// are part of the same payment.
+ payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+}
+
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
- route: Route,
+ path: Vec<RouteHop>,
session_priv: SecretKey,
/// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
/// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
impl HTLCSource {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
+ path: Vec::new(),
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
}
/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
+/// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
-type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
+type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
-pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
- AddHTLC {
- prev_short_channel_id: u64,
- prev_htlc_id: u64,
- forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
- },
- FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: u64,
- err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
-}
-
/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
/// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
- /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
+ /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
- /// can be failed/claimed by the user
+ /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
+ /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
/// go to read them!
- pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
+ claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
/// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
-/// issues such as overly long function definitions.
-pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
+/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
+/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
+/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
/// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
-/// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
-pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
+/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
+/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
+/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
///
/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
-pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
- fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
+ fee_estimator: F,
monitor: M,
- tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ tx_broadcaster: T,
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
+ /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
+ last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
+
/// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
/// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
/// are currently open with that peer.
/// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
- keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
+ keys_manager: K,
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
-macro_rules! secp_call {
- ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return Err($err),
- }
- };
-}
-
/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
pub is_live: bool,
}
+/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
+/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
+/// states for more.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
+ /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
+ /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
+ /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
+ ParameterError(APIError),
+ /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
+ /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
+ /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
+ /// payment in full.
+ ///
+ /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
+ /// send_payment.
+ PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
+ /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
+ /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
+ /// paths than the ones selected).
+ AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
+ /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
+ /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
+ /// in over-/re-payment.
+ ///
+ /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
+ /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
+ /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
+ ///
+ /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
+ /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
+ /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
+ /// with the latest update_id.
+ PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
+}
+
macro_rules! handle_error {
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
+ // entering the macro.
+ assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ }
+
+ let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
$self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
if let Some(update) = update_option {
- $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
+
log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
- } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
+ } else {
+ msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: $their_node_id,
+ action: err.action.clone()
+ });
+ }
+
+ if !msg_events.is_empty() {
+ $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
+ }
+
// Return error in case higher-API need one
Err(err)
},
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
- },
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
}
}
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
},
Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- if let Some(update) = update {
- if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
- match e {
- // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
- // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
- // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
- // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
- }
+ if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
+ match e {
+ // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
+ // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
+ // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
+ // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
}
}
- let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
- if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
- log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
- }
- shutdown_res.0.clear();
+ let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
}
}
// splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
res
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
} else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
else { "nothing" },
- (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
+ (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
(&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
if !$resend_commitment {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
/// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
/// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
/// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
/// go.
- pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let res = ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
+ fee_estimator: fee_est,
monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
}),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+ last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
///
/// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
/// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
}
- let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
- let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
+ let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
+ let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
+ let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
Ok(())
}
- fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
let mut res = Vec::new();
{
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
#[inline]
fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
- let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
- log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
+ let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
- for tx in local_txn {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
+ // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
+ // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
+ // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
+ // ignore the result here.
+ let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
}
}
}
};
log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
}
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- let next_hop_data = {
- let mut decoded = [0; 65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
- match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
+ let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
+ let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
+ match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
Err(err) => {
let error_code = match err {
msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
+ msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
+ msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
_ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
};
return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
},
- Ok(msg) => msg
+ Ok(msg) => {
+ let mut hmac = [0; 32];
+ if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
+ return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
+ }
+ (msg, hmac)
+ },
}
};
- let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
+ let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
#[cfg(test)]
{
// In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
// as-is (and were originally 0s).
// Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
// algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
- let mut new_packet_data = [0; 19*65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- assert_ne!(new_packet_data[0..65], [0; 65][..]);
- assert_ne!(new_packet_data[..], [0; 19*65][..]);
+ let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
+ chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
+ chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
}
// OUR PAYMENT!
return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
}
// final_incorrect_htlc_amount
- if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
+ if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
}
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
+ if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
}
+ let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
+ };
+
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
// message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
// instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: None,
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
+ },
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
} else {
let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- chacha.process(&SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
+ let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // Check two things:
+ // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
+ // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
+ // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
+ let mut t = [0; 1];
+ debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
+ }
+ // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
+ // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
+ chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
version: 0,
public_key,
hop_data: new_packet_data,
- hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
+ hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
+ };
+
+ let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
+ return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
+ },
};
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
+ },
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
};
channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
- if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
+ if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
+ // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
+ // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
+ // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
+ if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let forwarding_id = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
}
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
- timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
+ timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
- fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
+ fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
})
}
- /// Sends a payment along a given route.
- ///
- /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
- /// fields for more info.
- ///
- /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
- /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
- /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
- /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
- /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
- /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
- ///
- /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
- ///
- /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
- /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
- /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
- /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
- /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
- /// relevant updates.
- ///
- /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
- /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
- /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
- /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
- /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
- }
- let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
- if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
- }
- }
-
+ // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
+ pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
- let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
-
- let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
- APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
+ .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
+ if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
+ }
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
-
- let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
Some(id) => id.clone(),
};
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
match {
- if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
}
if !chan.get().is_live() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
}
break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: route.clone(),
+ path: path.clone(),
session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
}, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
} {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
// Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
- // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
- // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
- // something else in case we will resend later!
+ // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
+ // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
+ // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
+ // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
return Ok(());
};
- match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
+ match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
- Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
+ Err(e) => {
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Sends a payment along a given route.
+ ///
+ /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
+ /// fields for more info.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
+ /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
+ /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
+ /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
+ /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
+ /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
+ ///
+ /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
+ /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
+ /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
+ ///
+ /// In general, a path may raise:
+ /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+ /// node public key) is specified.
+ /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
+ /// failure).
+ /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// relevant updates.
+ ///
+ /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
+ /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
+ /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+ ///
+ /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
+ /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
+ /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
+ /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
+ /// payment_secret.
+ /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
+ /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
+ /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ if route.paths.len() < 1 {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
+ }
+ if route.paths.len() > 10 {
+ // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
+ // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
+ // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
+ }
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
+ 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
+ if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
+ path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
+ continue 'path_check;
+ }
+ for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
+ if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
+ path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
+ continue 'path_check;
+ }
+ }
+ total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ path_errs.push(Ok(()));
+ }
+ if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
+ }
+
+ let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let mut results = Vec::new();
+ for path in route.paths.iter() {
+ results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
+ }
+ let mut has_ok = false;
+ let mut has_err = false;
+ for res in results.iter() {
+ if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
+ if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
+ if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
+ // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
+ // PartialFailure.
+ has_err = true;
+ has_ok = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if has_err && has_ok {
+ Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
+ } else if has_err {
+ Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
+ } else {
+ Ok(())
}
}
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ let (chan, msg) = {
+ let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(mut chan) => {
(chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
.map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
} else { unreachable!(); })
, chan)
},
None => return
};
- match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
+ match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
+ (chan, funding_msg)
},
Err(_) => { return; }
}
};
- // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_update_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
- Err(_) => { return; },
- Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
- // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
- // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
- // in fact, safe).
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- },
- }
- }
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
}
fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
- if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
+ if !chan.should_announce() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
+ return None
+ }
let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
Ok(res) => res,
})
}
+ #[allow(dead_code)]
+ // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
+ // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
+ // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
+ // message...
+ const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
+ #[deny(const_err)]
+ #[allow(dead_code)]
+ // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
+ // smaller than 500:
+ const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
+
+ /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
+ /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
+ /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
+ ///
+ /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
+ /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
+ ///
+ /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
+ /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
+ /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
+ /// only Tor Onion addresses.
+ ///
+ /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
+ pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ if addresses.len() > 500 {
+ panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
+ }
+
+ let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
+ features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
+ timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
+ node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
+ rgb, alias, addresses,
+ excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
+ msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
+ signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
+ contents: announcement
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
/// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
///
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
});
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
+ ));
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet, ..
+ }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
+ log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
+ ));
continue;
},
Ok(update_add) => {
}
}
},
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
}
if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
+ let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
// We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
- match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
- Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
- Err(_) => { continue; },
- }
+ handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
+ continue;
}
};
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
continue;
}
} else {
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
- let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
+ let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- };
- match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
};
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
- amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
+
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let payment_secret_opt =
+ if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
+ let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
+ .or_insert(Vec::new());
+ htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
+ prev_hop,
+ value: amt_to_forward,
+ payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
});
+ if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ total_value += htlc.value;
+ if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
+ &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
+ as u32,
+ ),
+ );
+ failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
+ }), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
+ ));
+ }
+ } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
+ amt: total_value,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ payment_secret: None,
+ amt: amt_to_forward,
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
}
}
- for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
- match update {
- None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
- Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
- };
+ for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
}
- if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
}
if new_events.is_empty() { return }
/// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
/// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
/// HTLC backwards has been started.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
+ ));
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
}
true
} else { false }
//between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
//timer handling.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
match &onion_error {
&HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
// TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
// process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
// next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: onion_error_data
}
);
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
ref failure_code,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref data,
.. } => {
// we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
// TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
events::Event::PaymentFailed {
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
+ rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
#[cfg(test)]
error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
}
);
}
/// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
/// motivated attackers.
///
+ /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
+ /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
+ ///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
- let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
+ let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
+ assert!(!sources.is_empty());
+
+ // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
+ // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
+ // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
+ // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
+ //
+ // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
+ // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
+ // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
+ // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
+ // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
+ // it.
+
+ let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
+ assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
+ (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
+ } else {
+ assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
+ (false, false)
+ };
+
+ for htlc in sources.iter() {
+ if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
+ if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ valid_mpp = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut errs = Vec::new();
+ let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
+ for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
- let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
- let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
- htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
+ if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
+ self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
+ ));
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
} else {
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
+ match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
+ Err(Some(e)) => {
+ if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
+ // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
+ // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
+ log_error!(self, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
+ claimed_any_htlcs = true;
+ } else { errs.push(e); }
+ },
+ Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
+ Err(None) => {
+ log_warn!(self, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
+ },
+ Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
+ }
}
}
- true
+
+ // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
+ // which were generated.
+ channel_state.take();
+
+ for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
+ }
+
+ claimed_any_htlcs
} else { false }
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
- let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
- match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
- },
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
- //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
- Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => {
- // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
- // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
- // why it's missing.
- return
- }
- };
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
+ //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
+ let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
+ Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
+ None => {
+ return Err(None)
+ }
+ };
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
- Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
- if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(msgs.is_none());
- } else {
- break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- }
- });
- }
- },
- Err(_e) => {
- // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
- // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
- //TODO: Do something with e?
- return
- },
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
+ Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ if was_frozen_for_monitor {
+ assert!(msgs.is_none());
+ } else {
+ return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
+ }
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ }
+ if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ return Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ // TODO: Do something with e?
+ // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
+ // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
+ // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
+ // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
+ // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
+ // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
+ debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
+ return Err(None)
},
}
- return;
- };
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ }
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_preimage
+ });
+ },
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
+ if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
+ Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+ Err(None) => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
+ // why it's missing.
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
+ } {
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
+ }
+ },
+ }
}
/// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
}
- /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
+ /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
/// operation.
- pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
+ ///
+ /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
+ /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
+ ///
+ /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
+ /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
+ /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
+ /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
+ /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
+ /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
+ /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
+ /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
+ /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
+ /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
+ /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
+ pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
let mut close_results = Vec::new();
let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
- let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- match e {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
- // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
- // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
- // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
- // on-chain confirmations.
- // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
- // should be written.
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- false
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
- }
- } else {
- let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
- if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
- }
- htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
+ let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ Some(chan) => chan,
+ None => return,
+ };
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ return;
+ }
- macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
- if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- updates: update,
- });
- }
- } }
- macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
- if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: revoke_and_ack,
- });
- }
- } }
- match order {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
- handle_cs!();
- handle_raa!();
- },
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
- handle_raa!();
- handle_cs!();
- },
- }
- if needs_broadcast_safe {
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- });
- }
- if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- }
- true
- }
- } else { true }
- });
+ let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
+ if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
+ htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
+ }
+ htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
+
+ macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
+ if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: update,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
+ if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ handle_cs!();
+ handle_raa!();
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ handle_raa!();
+ handle_cs!();
+ },
+ }
+ if needs_broadcast_safe {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
+ funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
+ }
}
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
.map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
}
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
- // lock before add_update_monitor
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ // lock before add_monitor
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo(), monitor_update) {
match e {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
// Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
// channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
// spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
// any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
// There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
+ Ok(update) => update,
+ Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ };
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
}
(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
}
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
// If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
// announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
// funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
+ let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
}
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
Ok(())
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
+ match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
+ Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
+ Err((Some(update), e)) => {
+ assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
+ let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
+ unreachable!();
+ },
+ Ok(res) => res
+ };
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
//TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
}
}
#[inline]
- fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
+ fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
let mut forward_event = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
}
for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
+ match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
+ }) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
},
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
if was_frozen_for_monitor {
assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
+ let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
}
let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
+ let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
- if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
// for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
// re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
#[doc(hidden)]
pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_node_id;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
}
their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
- if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
+ if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
{
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
unimplemented!();
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
return Ok(())
};
- match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
+ match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
}
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
// TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
// user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
// restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
{
//TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
// TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
// user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
// restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
{
//TODO: This behavior should be documented.
- for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
+ ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
- if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
+ data: chan_update,
+ }));
+ }
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
+ msg: funding_locked,
});
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ }
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
- } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
+ } else if let Err(e) = res {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
// broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
// some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
// If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
// the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
// hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
- failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
}
true
});
+
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
+ htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
+ // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
+ // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
+ // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
+ if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
+ let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
+ htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
+ data: htlc_msat_height_data
+ }));
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
+ });
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
+
+ for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
+ }
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
*self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
+ loop {
+ // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
+ // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
+ // having an explicit local time source.
+ // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
+ // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
+ let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
+ if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
/// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
+ failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
+ ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
- if res.is_err() {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
- }
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ match &self.routing {
+ &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ payment_data.write(writer)?;
+ incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
- Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
+ 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
- short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
})
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn read
<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
incoming_packet_shared_secret
});
+impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
+ prev_hop,
+ value,
+ payment_data,
+ cltv_expiry
+});
+
impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
match self {
0u8.write(writer)?;
hop_data.write(writer)?;
},
- &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
+ &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
- route.write(writer)?;
+ path.write(writer)?;
session_priv.write(writer)?;
first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for HTLCSource {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ path: Readable::read(reader)?,
session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
}),
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
(previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
- recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
- previous_hop.write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
}
}
peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
}
+ (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
+
Ok(())
}
}
/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
-pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
+pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
+
/// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
/// deserialization.
- pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
+ pub keys_manager: K,
/// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
///
/// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
- pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
+ pub fee_estimator: F,
/// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
///
/// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
/// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
/// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
/// force-closed during deserialization.
- pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ pub tx_broadcaster: T,
/// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
/// deserialization.
pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
///
/// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
/// this struct.
- pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
+ pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
}
-impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
+// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
+impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
+ Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
+ ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
+ where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+{
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
for _ in 0..channel_count {
let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
- if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
+ if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
- if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
- channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
- channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
- let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
- force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
- closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
+ if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
+ channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
+ channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
+ let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
+ failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
+ monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
} else {
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
- closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
+ monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
}
}
let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
- previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
}
claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
}
per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
}
+ let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
}),
our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+ last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
+
per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
default_configuration: args.default_config,
};
- for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
- channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
- //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
- //connection or two.
+ for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
+ //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
+ //connection or two.
+
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff