Merge pull request #1055 from lightning-signer/2021-08-anchor-tx

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index b7eb6c006f4baddbdc0b71c18d3f19704cc0c457..06cc80cc18b0a5b770be83ce25cbb82535d932ba 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -1301,6 +1301,9 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
                let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
+               // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
+               chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
+
                let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
                (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
                 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
@@ -7984,7 +7987,7 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
        // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
        // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
        // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
-       // EnforcingSigner would have paniced as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+       // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
        // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
        // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
        // implement that).
@@ -7995,11 +7998,19 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
        let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
 
        let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-       let keys = &guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
+       let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
+
        const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
+       // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
+       keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
        let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+
        // Must revoke without gaps
+       keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
        keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
+
+       keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
        let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
                &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());