1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
11 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
12 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
14 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
16 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
17 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
18 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
29 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
33 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
39 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
40 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
41 if witness_script_len == 133 {
42 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
43 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
44 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
51 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
52 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
54 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
55 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
58 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
59 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
60 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
66 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
67 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
69 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
72 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
73 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
76 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
77 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
78 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
79 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
87 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
88 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
89 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
93 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
95 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
102 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
103 //TODO This can be optimized?
104 let mut min = 1 << 48;
105 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
114 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
115 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
117 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
118 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
119 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
120 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
126 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
127 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
129 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
130 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
134 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
137 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
141 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
142 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
143 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
144 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
145 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
148 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
153 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
154 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
155 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
156 writer.write_all(secret)?;
157 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
162 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
163 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
164 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
165 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
166 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
167 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
170 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
174 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
175 /// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
176 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
177 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
178 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
179 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
180 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
182 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
183 key.add_assign(&res)?;
187 pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
188 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
189 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
190 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
191 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
193 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
194 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
197 /// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
198 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
199 /// generated (ie our own).
200 pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
201 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
202 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
204 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
205 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
206 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
207 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
209 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
211 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
212 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
213 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
214 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
216 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
219 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
220 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
221 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
222 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
223 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
227 pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
228 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
229 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
230 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
231 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
233 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
235 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
236 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
237 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
238 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
240 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
243 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
244 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
245 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
246 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
247 part_a.combine(&part_b)
250 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
251 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
252 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
253 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
254 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
255 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
256 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
257 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
258 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
260 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
262 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
263 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
264 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
266 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
267 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
269 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
271 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
272 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
273 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
274 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
275 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
276 /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
277 /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
278 /// broadcast an old state.
279 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
280 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
281 /// public key which receives immediately-spendable non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
282 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
283 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
284 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
285 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
286 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
287 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
288 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
289 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
292 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
294 revocation_basepoint,
296 delayed_payment_basepoint,
301 impl TxCreationKeys {
302 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
304 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
305 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
306 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
307 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
308 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
313 /// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
314 /// the revocation key
315 pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
316 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
317 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
318 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
319 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
320 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
321 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
322 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
323 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
324 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
329 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
330 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
331 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
332 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
333 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
334 /// the remote party or our own.
336 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
337 /// this divided by 1000.
338 pub amount_msat: u64,
339 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
340 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
341 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
342 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
343 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
344 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
345 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
346 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
349 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
354 transaction_output_index
358 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
359 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
361 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
362 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
363 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
364 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
365 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
366 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
367 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
368 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
369 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
370 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
372 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
373 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
374 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
376 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
377 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
379 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
380 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
381 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
382 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
383 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
386 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
389 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
390 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
391 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
392 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
394 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
395 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
396 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
397 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
400 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
401 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
402 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
403 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
406 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
407 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
409 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
411 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
412 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
413 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
416 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
422 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
423 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
425 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
426 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
429 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
430 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
431 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
432 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
433 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
435 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
436 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
437 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
438 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
440 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
441 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
442 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
445 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
446 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
447 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
449 previous_output: OutPoint {
450 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
451 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
453 script_sig: Script::new(),
458 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
459 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
461 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
464 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
466 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
467 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
472 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
479 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
480 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
481 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
482 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
483 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
484 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
485 // so we're probably most of the way there.
486 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
487 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
488 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
489 pub their_sig: Signature,
490 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
491 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
493 /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
494 pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
495 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
496 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
497 pub feerate_per_kw: u64,
498 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
500 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
501 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
502 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
504 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
505 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
506 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
508 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
510 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
511 let dummy_input = TxIn {
512 previous_output: OutPoint {
513 txid: Default::default(),
516 script_sig: Default::default(),
520 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
521 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
523 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
525 input: vec![dummy_input],
529 their_sig: dummy_sig,
530 our_sig_first: false,
531 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
532 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
533 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
534 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
535 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
536 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
543 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
544 /// remote signature and both parties keys
545 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
546 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
547 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
552 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
559 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
560 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
561 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
562 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
565 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
567 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
568 /// by your ChannelKeys.
569 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
570 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
571 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
572 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
573 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
574 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
575 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
576 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
579 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
580 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
581 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
582 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
584 if self.our_sig_first {
585 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
586 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
588 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
589 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
591 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
592 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
594 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
598 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
599 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
601 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
602 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
604 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
605 let txid = self.txid();
606 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
607 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
609 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
610 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
611 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
613 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
615 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
616 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
624 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
625 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
626 let txid = self.txid();
627 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
628 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
629 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
630 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
631 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
632 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
634 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
635 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
636 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
637 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
639 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
641 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
642 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
644 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
645 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
646 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
647 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
649 if this_htlc.0.offered {
650 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
651 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
653 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
656 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
660 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
661 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
662 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
663 self.txid() == o.txid()
666 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
667 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
668 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
670 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
671 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
674 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
675 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
676 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
677 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
678 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
679 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
686 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
687 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
688 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
691 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
692 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
695 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
696 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
697 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
698 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
699 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
700 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
701 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
702 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
703 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
704 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
707 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
708 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
709 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
724 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
728 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
729 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
730 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
733 macro_rules! test_secrets {
735 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
736 for secret in secrets.iter() {
737 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
740 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
741 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
746 // insert_secret correct sequence
747 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
750 secrets.push([0; 32]);
751 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
752 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
755 secrets.push([0; 32]);
756 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
757 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
760 secrets.push([0; 32]);
761 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
762 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
765 secrets.push([0; 32]);
766 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
767 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
770 secrets.push([0; 32]);
771 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
772 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
777 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
792 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
793 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
796 secrets.push([0; 32]);
797 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
803 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
807 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
808 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
811 secrets.push([0; 32]);
812 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
813 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
816 secrets.push([0; 32]);
817 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
818 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
821 secrets.push([0; 32]);
822 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
823 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
826 secrets.push([0; 32]);
827 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
828 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
832 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
833 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
836 secrets.push([0; 32]);
837 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
838 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
841 secrets.push([0; 32]);
842 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
843 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
846 secrets.push([0; 32]);
847 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
848 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
851 secrets.push([0; 32]);
852 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
853 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
857 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
858 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
898 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
902 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
903 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
933 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
937 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
938 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
978 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
982 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
983 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
986 secrets.push([0; 32]);
987 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1023 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1027 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1028 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1043 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1046 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1048 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1053 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1068 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());