_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
   2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
   3 //! by hand.
   4
   5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
   6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
   7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
   8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
   9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  10
  11 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  12 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  13 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  14 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  15
  16 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  17 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  18 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  19 use util::byte_utils;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use std::{cmp, mem};
  26
  27 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  28
  29 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  30 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  31
  32 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  33 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  34         AcceptedHTLC,
  35         OfferedHTLC
  36 }
  37
  38 impl HTLCType {
  39         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  40         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  41                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  42                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  43                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  44                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  45                 } else {
  46                         None
  47                 }
  48         }
  49 }
  50
  51 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  52 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  53
  54 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  55         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  56         for i in 0..48 {
  57                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  58                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  59                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  60                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  61                 }
  62         }
  63         res
  64 }
  65
  66 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  67 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  68 ///
  69 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  70 /// or so.
  71 #[derive(Clone)]
  72 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  73         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  74 }
  75
  76 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  77         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  78                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  79                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  80                                 return false
  81                         }
  82                 }
  83                 true
  84         }
  85 }
  86
  87 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  88         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
  89                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
  90         }
  91
  92         #[inline]
  93         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
  94                 for i in 0..48 {
  95                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
  96                                 return i
  97                         }
  98                 }
  99                 48
 100         }
 101
 102         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 103                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 104                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 105                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 106                         if idx < min {
 107                                 min = idx;
 108                         }
 109                 }
 110                 min
 111         }
 112
 113         #[inline]
 114         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 115                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 116                 for i in 0..bits {
 117                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 118                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 119                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 120                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 121                         }
 122                 }
 123                 res
 124         }
 125
 126         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 127                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 128                 for i in 0..pos {
 129                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 130                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 131                                 return Err(());
 132                         }
 133                 }
 134                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 135                         return Ok(());
 136                 }
 137                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 138                 Ok(())
 139         }
 140
 141         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 142         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 143                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 144                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 145                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 146                         }
 147                 }
 148                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 149                 None
 150         }
 151 }
 152
 153 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 154         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 155                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 156                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 157                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 158                 }
 159                 Ok(())
 160         }
 161 }
 162 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 163         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 164                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 165                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 166                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 167                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 168                 }
 169
 170                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 171         }
 172 }
 173
 174 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
 175 /// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
 176 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 177         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 178         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 179         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 180         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 181
 182         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 183         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 184         Ok(key)
 185 }
 186
 187 pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 188         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 189         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 190         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 191         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 192
 193         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 194         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 195 }
 196
 197 /// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
 198 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 199 /// generated (ie our own).
 200 pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 201         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 202         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 203
 204         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 205                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 206                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 207                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 208
 209                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 210         };
 211         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 212                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 213                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 214                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 215
 216                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 217         };
 218
 219         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 220         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 221         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 222         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 223         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 224         Ok(part_a)
 225 }
 226
 227 pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 228         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 229                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 230                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 231                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 232
 233                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 234         };
 235         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 236                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 237                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 238                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 239
 240                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 241         };
 242
 243         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 244         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 245         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 246         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 247         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 248 }
 249
 250 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 251 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 252 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 253 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 254         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 255         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 256         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 257         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 258         pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
 259         /// A's HTLC Key
 260         pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 261         /// B's HTLC Key
 262         pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 263         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 264         pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 265 }
 266 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 267         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 268
 269 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 271 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 272         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 273         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 274         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 275         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 276         /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
 277         /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
 278         /// broadcast an old state.
 279         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 280         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 281         /// public key which receives immediately-spendable non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
 282         pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 283         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 284         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 285         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 286         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 287         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 288         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 289         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 290 }
 291
 292 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 293         funding_pubkey,
 294         revocation_basepoint,
 295         payment_basepoint,
 296         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 297         htlc_basepoint
 298 });
 299
 300
 301 impl TxCreationKeys {
 302         pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
 303                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 304                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 305                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 306                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 307                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 308                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 309                 })
 310         }
 311 }
 312
 313 /// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
 314 /// the revocation key
 315 pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 316         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 317                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 318                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 319                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 320                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 321                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 322                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 323                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 324                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 325                       .into_script()
 326 }
 327
 328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 329 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 330 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 331         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 332         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 333         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 334         /// the remote party or our own.
 335         pub offered: bool,
 336         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 337         /// this divided by 1000.
 338         pub amount_msat: u64,
 339         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 340         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 341         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 342         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 343         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 344         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 345         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 346         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 347 }
 348
 349 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 350         offered,
 351         amount_msat,
 352         cltv_expiry,
 353         payment_hash,
 354         transaction_output_index
 355 });
 356
 357 #[inline]
 358 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 359         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 360         if htlc.offered {
 361                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 362                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 363                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 364                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 365                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 366                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 367                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 368                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 369                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 370                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 371                               .push_int(32)
 372                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 373                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 374                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 375                               .push_int(2)
 376                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 377                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 378                               .push_int(2)
 379                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 380                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 381                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 382                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 383                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 384                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 385                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 386                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 387                               .into_script()
 388         } else {
 389                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 390                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 391                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 392                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 393                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 394                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 395                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 396                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 397                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 398                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 399                               .push_int(32)
 400                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 401                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 402                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 403                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 404                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 405                               .push_int(2)
 406                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 407                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 408                               .push_int(2)
 409                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 410                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 411                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 412                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 413                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 414                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 415                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 416                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 417                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 418                               .into_script()
 419         }
 420 }
 421
 422 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 423 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 424 #[inline]
 425 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 426         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 427 }
 428
 429 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 430 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 431 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 432         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 433         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 434
 435         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 436         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 437                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 438                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 439         } else {
 440                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 441                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 442         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 443 }
 444
 445 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 446 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 447         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 448         txins.push(TxIn {
 449                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 450                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 451                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 452                 },
 453                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 454                 sequence: 0,
 455                 witness: Vec::new(),
 456         });
 457
 458         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 459                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 460                 } else {
 461                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 462                 };
 463
 464         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 465         txouts.push(TxOut {
 466                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 467                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 468         });
 469
 470         Transaction {
 471                 version: 2,
 472                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 473                 input: txins,
 474                 output: txouts,
 475         }
 476 }
 477
 478 #[derive(Clone)]
 479 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 480 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
 481 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
 482 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 483         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 484         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 485         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 486         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 487         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 488         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 489         pub their_sig: Signature,
 490         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 491         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 492         our_sig_first: bool,
 493         /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
 494         pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 495         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 496         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 497         pub feerate_per_kw: u64,
 498         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 499         ///
 500         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 501         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 502         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 503         ///
 504         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 505         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 506         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 507 }
 508 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 509         #[cfg(test)]
 510         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 511                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 512                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 513                                 txid: Default::default(),
 514                                 vout: 0,
 515                         },
 516                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 517                         sequence: 0,
 518                         witness: vec![]
 519                 };
 520                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 521                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 522                 Self {
 523                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 524                                 version: 2,
 525                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 526                                 output: Vec::new(),
 527                                 lock_time: 0,
 528                         },
 529                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 530                         our_sig_first: false,
 531                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 532                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 533                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 534                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 535                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 536                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 537                                 },
 538                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 539                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 540                 }
 541         }
 542
 543         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 544         /// remote signature and both parties keys
 545         pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 546                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 547                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 548
 549                 Self {
 550                         unsigned_tx,
 551                         their_sig,
 552                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 553                         local_keys,
 554                         feerate_per_kw,
 555                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 556                 }
 557         }
 558
 559         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 560         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 561         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 562                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 563         }
 564
 565         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 566         ///
 567         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 568         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 569         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 570         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 571         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 572         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 573         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 574                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 575                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 576                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 577         }
 578
 579         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 580                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 581                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 582                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 583
 584                 if self.our_sig_first {
 585                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 586                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 587                 } else {
 588                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 589                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 590                 }
 591                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 592                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 593
 594                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 595                 tx
 596         }
 597
 598         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 599         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 600         ///
 601         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 602         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 603         /// included.
 604         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 605                 let txid = self.txid();
 606                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 607                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 608
 609                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 610                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 611                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 612
 613                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 614
 615                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 616                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 617                         } else {
 618                                 ret.push(None);
 619                         }
 620                 }
 621                 Ok(ret)
 622         }
 623
 624         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 625         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 626                 let txid = self.txid();
 627                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 628                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 629                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 630                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 631                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 632                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 633
 634                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 635                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 636                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 637                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 638
 639                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 640
 641                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 642                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 643
 644                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 645                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 646                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 647                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 648
 649                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 650                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 651                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 652                 } else {
 653                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 654                 }
 655
 656                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 657                 htlc_tx
 658         }
 659 }
 660 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 661         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 662         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 663                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 664         }
 665 }
 666 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 667         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 668                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 669                         match e {
 670                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 671                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 672                         }
 673                 }
 674                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 675                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 676                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 677                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 678                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 679                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 680                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 681                         sig.write(writer)?;
 682                 }
 683                 Ok(())
 684         }
 685 }
 686 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 687         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 688                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 689                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 690                         Err(e) => match e {
 691                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 692                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 693                         },
 694                 };
 695                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 696                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 697                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 698                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 699                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 700                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 701                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 702                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 703                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 704                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 705                 }
 706
 707                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 708                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 709                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 710                 }
 711                 Ok(Self {
 712                         unsigned_tx,
 713                         their_sig,
 714                         our_sig_first,
 715                         local_keys,
 716                         feerate_per_kw,
 717                         per_htlc,
 718                 })
 719         }
 720 }
 721
 722 #[cfg(test)]
 723 mod tests {
 724         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 725         use hex;
 726
 727         #[test]
 728         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 729                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 730                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 731                 let mut monitor;
 732
 733                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 734                         () => {
 735                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 736                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 737                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 738                                         idx -= 1;
 739                                 }
 740                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 741                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 742                         };
 743                 }
 744
 745                 {
 746                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 747                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 748                         secrets.clear();
 749
 750                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 751                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 752                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 753                         test_secrets!();
 754
 755                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 756                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 757                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 758                         test_secrets!();
 759
 760                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 761                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 762                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 763                         test_secrets!();
 764
 765                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 766                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 767                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 768                         test_secrets!();
 769
 770                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 771                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 772                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 773                         test_secrets!();
 774
 775                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 776                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 777                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 778                         test_secrets!();
 779
 780                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 781                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 782                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 783                         test_secrets!();
 784
 785                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 786                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 787                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 788                         test_secrets!();
 789                 }
 790
 791                 {
 792                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 793                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 794                         secrets.clear();
 795
 796                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 797                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 798                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 799                         test_secrets!();
 800
 801                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 802                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 803                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 804                 }
 805
 806                 {
 807                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 808                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 809                         secrets.clear();
 810
 811                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 812                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 813                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 814                         test_secrets!();
 815
 816                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 817                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 818                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 819                         test_secrets!();
 820
 821                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 822                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 823                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 824                         test_secrets!();
 825
 826                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 827                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 828                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 829                 }
 830
 831                 {
 832                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 833                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 834                         secrets.clear();
 835
 836                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 837                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 838                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 839                         test_secrets!();
 840
 841                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 842                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 843                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 844                         test_secrets!();
 845
 846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 848                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 849                         test_secrets!();
 850
 851                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 852                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 853                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 854                 }
 855
 856                 {
 857                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 858                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 859                         secrets.clear();
 860
 861                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 862                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 863                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 864                         test_secrets!();
 865
 866                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 867                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 868                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 869                         test_secrets!();
 870
 871                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 872                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 873                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 874                         test_secrets!();
 875
 876                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 877                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 878                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 879                         test_secrets!();
 880
 881                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 882                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 883                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 884                         test_secrets!();
 885
 886                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 887                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 888                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 889                         test_secrets!();
 890
 891                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 892                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 893                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 894                         test_secrets!();
 895
 896                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 897                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 898                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 899                 }
 900
 901                 {
 902                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 903                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 904                         secrets.clear();
 905
 906                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 907                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 908                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 909                         test_secrets!();
 910
 911                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 912                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 913                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 914                         test_secrets!();
 915
 916                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 917                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 918                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 919                         test_secrets!();
 920
 921                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 922                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 923                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 924                         test_secrets!();
 925
 926                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 927                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 928                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 929                         test_secrets!();
 930
 931                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 932                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 933                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 934                 }
 935
 936                 {
 937                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 938                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 939                         secrets.clear();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 948                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 949                         test_secrets!();
 950
 951                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 952                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 953                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 954                         test_secrets!();
 955
 956                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 957                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 958                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 959                         test_secrets!();
 960
 961                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 962                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 963                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 964                         test_secrets!();
 965
 966                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 967                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 968                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 969                         test_secrets!();
 970
 971                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 972                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 973                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 974                         test_secrets!();
 975
 976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 978                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 979                 }
 980
 981                 {
 982                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
 983                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 984                         secrets.clear();
 985
 986                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 987                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 988                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 989                         test_secrets!();
 990
 991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 994                         test_secrets!();
 995
 996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 998                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 999                         test_secrets!();
1000
1001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1004                         test_secrets!();
1005
1006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1009                         test_secrets!();
1010
1011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1013                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1014                         test_secrets!();
1015
1016                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1018                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1019                         test_secrets!();
1020
1021                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1023                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1024                 }
1025
1026                 {
1027                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1028                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1029                         secrets.clear();
1030
1031                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1033                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1034                         test_secrets!();
1035
1036                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1038                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1039                         test_secrets!();
1040
1041                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1043                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1044                         test_secrets!();
1045
1046                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1048                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1049                         test_secrets!();
1050
1051                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1053                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1054                         test_secrets!();
1055
1056                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1058                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1059                         test_secrets!();
1060
1061                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1063                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1064                         test_secrets!();
1065
1066                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1068                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1069                 }
1070         }
1071 }