1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
406 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
407 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
411 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
412 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
413 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
414 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
415 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
420 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
421 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
424 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
425 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
426 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
431 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
434 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
435 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
436 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
437 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
438 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
439 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
440 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
441 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
442 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
443 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
444 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
445 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
446 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
447 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
448 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
451 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
452 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
453 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
455 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
456 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
457 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
458 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
460 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
461 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
462 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
463 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
464 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
466 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
467 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
468 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
469 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
471 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
472 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
473 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
475 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
476 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
477 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
478 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
479 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
481 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
482 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
483 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
486 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
487 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
488 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
489 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
491 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
492 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
493 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
494 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
496 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
500 channel_id: [u8; 32],
503 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
504 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
506 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
507 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
508 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
511 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
512 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
513 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
515 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
516 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
518 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
520 holder_signer: Signer,
521 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
522 destination_script: Script,
524 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
525 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
526 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
528 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
529 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
531 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
532 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
533 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
535 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
536 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
537 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
538 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
539 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
540 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
542 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
544 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
545 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
546 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
548 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
549 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
550 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
551 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
552 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
553 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
554 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
556 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
558 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
559 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
560 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
561 // HTLCs with similar state.
562 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
563 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
564 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
565 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
566 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
567 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
568 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
569 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
570 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
573 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
574 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
575 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
577 update_time_counter: u32,
579 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
580 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
581 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
583 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
584 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
586 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
587 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
589 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
590 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
591 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
592 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
594 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
595 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
597 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
599 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
602 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
603 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
604 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
605 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
606 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
608 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
609 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
610 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
611 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
612 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
614 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
615 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
616 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
617 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
618 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
619 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
620 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
621 channel_creation_height: u32,
623 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
626 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
631 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
633 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
636 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
641 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
644 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
646 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
649 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
653 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
657 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
659 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
660 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
662 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
663 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
666 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
668 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
670 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
671 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
672 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
673 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
675 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
676 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
677 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
679 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
680 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
681 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
683 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
684 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
685 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
686 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
692 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
693 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
694 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
695 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
696 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
698 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
699 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
702 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
703 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
704 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
705 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
706 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
707 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
708 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
710 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
711 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
713 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
714 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
715 // the channel's funding UTXO.
717 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
718 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
719 // associated channel mapping.
721 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
722 // to store all of them.
723 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
725 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
726 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
727 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
728 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
729 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
731 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
732 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
734 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
735 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
736 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
738 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
739 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
740 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
741 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
742 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
746 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
748 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
749 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
750 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
754 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
756 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
759 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
765 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
769 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
770 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
771 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
772 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
773 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
775 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
776 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
778 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
780 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
781 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
783 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
784 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
785 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
786 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
787 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
788 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
790 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
791 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
793 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
794 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
795 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
796 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
797 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
799 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
800 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
802 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
803 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
805 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
806 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
807 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
808 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
814 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
815 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
817 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
824 macro_rules! secp_check {
825 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
828 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
833 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
834 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
835 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
838 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
840 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
841 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
842 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
844 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
847 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
849 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
852 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
853 /// required by us according to the configured or default
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
856 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
858 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
859 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
860 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
861 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
862 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
865 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
866 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
867 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
868 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
869 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
870 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
871 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
874 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
875 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
878 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
879 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
880 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
881 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
882 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
883 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
884 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
885 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
886 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
890 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
891 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
892 // `only_static_remotekey`.
894 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
895 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
896 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
897 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
904 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
905 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
906 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
907 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
908 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
909 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
910 // We've exhausted our options
913 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
914 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
917 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
918 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
919 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
920 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
922 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
923 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
924 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
925 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
926 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
927 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
929 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
931 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
935 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
936 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
937 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
938 outbound_scid_alias: u64
939 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
940 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
941 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
945 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
946 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
947 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
949 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
952 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
955 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
956 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
959 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
962 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
963 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
964 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
965 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
969 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
970 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
972 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
974 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
975 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
976 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
980 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
981 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
983 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
984 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
987 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
988 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
989 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
996 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
997 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
998 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
999 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1004 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1006 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1007 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1008 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1010 channel_value_satoshis,
1012 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1015 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1016 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1018 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1019 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1022 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1023 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1025 pending_update_fee: None,
1026 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1027 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1028 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1029 update_time_counter: 1,
1031 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1033 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1034 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1035 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1036 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1037 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1040 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1041 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1043 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1045 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1046 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1047 closing_fee_limits: None,
1048 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1050 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1052 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1053 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1054 short_channel_id: None,
1055 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1057 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1058 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1059 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1060 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1061 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1062 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1063 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1064 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1065 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1066 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1067 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1069 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1071 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1072 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1073 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1074 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1075 counterparty_parameters: None,
1076 funding_outpoint: None,
1077 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1078 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1080 funding_transaction: None,
1082 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1083 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_node_id,
1086 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1088 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1090 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1091 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1093 announcement_sigs: None,
1095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1096 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1098 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1100 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1102 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1103 outbound_scid_alias,
1105 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1108 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1113 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1117 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1118 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1119 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1121 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1122 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1123 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1124 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1125 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1126 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1127 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1130 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1131 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1132 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1133 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1134 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1135 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1136 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1137 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1139 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1140 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1149 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1150 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1151 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1153 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1154 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1155 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1156 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1157 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1164 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1165 // support this channel type.
1166 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1167 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1171 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1172 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1173 // `static_remote_key`.
1174 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1177 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1178 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1181 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1184 channel_type.clone()
1186 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1187 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1192 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1205 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1209 // Check sanity of message fields:
1210 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1213 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1219 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1220 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1229 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1231 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1232 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1235 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1238 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1242 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1249 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1252 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1261 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1265 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1267 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1268 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1273 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1274 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1275 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1276 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1283 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1284 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1291 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1292 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1294 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1298 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1299 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1300 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1301 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1305 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1306 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1307 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1308 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1309 if script.len() == 0 {
1312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1315 Some(script.clone())
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1319 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1326 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1329 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1335 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1338 let chan = Channel {
1341 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1342 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1344 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1349 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1351 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1352 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1353 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1356 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1359 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1360 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1362 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1363 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1366 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1369 pending_update_fee: None,
1370 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1371 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1373 update_time_counter: 1,
1375 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1377 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1378 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1379 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1380 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1381 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1385 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1387 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1389 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1390 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1391 closing_fee_limits: None,
1392 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1394 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1396 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1397 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1398 short_channel_id: None,
1399 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1401 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1402 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1404 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1405 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1406 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1407 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1408 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1409 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1411 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1424 funding_outpoint: None,
1425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1428 funding_transaction: None,
1430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1432 counterparty_node_id,
1434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1441 announcement_sigs: None,
1443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1450 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1451 outbound_scid_alias,
1453 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1461 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1467 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1468 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1469 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1470 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1471 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1473 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1474 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1475 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1476 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1477 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1478 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1479 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1481 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1482 where L::Target: Logger
1484 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1485 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1486 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1488 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1489 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1490 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1493 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1494 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1495 if match update_state {
1496 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1497 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1498 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1499 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1502 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1506 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1507 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1508 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1509 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1511 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1512 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1513 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1515 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1516 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1517 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1518 transaction_output_index: None
1523 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1524 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1525 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1526 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1527 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1530 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1532 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1533 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1534 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1536 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1537 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1540 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1541 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1544 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1546 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1550 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1551 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1557 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1559 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1567 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1568 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1572 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1573 if generated_by_local {
1574 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1586 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1588 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1595 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1596 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1597 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1602 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1603 preimages.push(preimage);
1607 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1608 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1610 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1612 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1613 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1615 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1616 if !generated_by_local {
1617 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1625 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1626 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1627 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1628 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1629 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1630 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1631 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1632 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1636 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1637 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1638 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1639 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1641 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1643 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1644 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1645 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1646 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1649 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1650 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1651 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1652 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1654 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1657 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1658 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1659 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1660 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1662 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1665 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1666 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1671 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1672 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1677 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1679 let channel_parameters =
1680 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1681 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1682 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1685 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1690 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1693 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1694 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1695 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1696 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1698 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1699 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1700 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1708 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1709 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1715 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1716 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1717 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1718 // outside of those situations will fail.
1719 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1723 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1728 1 + // script length (0)
1732 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1733 2 + // witness marker and flag
1734 1 + // witness element count
1735 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1736 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1737 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1738 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1739 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1740 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1742 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1743 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1744 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1750 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1751 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1752 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1755 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1756 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1757 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1759 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1760 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1761 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1762 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1763 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1764 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1767 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1768 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1771 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1772 value_to_holder = 0;
1775 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1776 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1777 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1778 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1780 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1781 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1784 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1785 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1789 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1790 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1791 /// our counterparty!)
1792 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1793 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1794 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1795 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1796 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1797 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1798 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1800 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1804 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1805 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1806 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1807 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1808 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1809 //may see payments to it!
1810 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1811 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1812 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1814 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1817 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1818 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1819 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1820 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1821 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1824 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1827 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1828 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1830 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1832 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1833 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1834 where L::Target: Logger {
1835 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1836 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1837 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1838 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1839 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1840 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1841 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1842 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1846 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1847 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1848 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1849 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1851 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1852 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1854 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1856 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1858 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1859 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1860 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1862 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1863 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1864 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1865 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1866 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1868 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1869 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1870 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1872 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1873 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1875 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1878 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1879 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1883 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1887 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1889 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1890 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1891 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1892 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1895 // Now update local state:
1897 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1898 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1899 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1900 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1901 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1902 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1903 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1907 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1908 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1909 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1911 // do not not get into this branch.
1912 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1913 match pending_update {
1914 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1915 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1916 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1917 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1919 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1923 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1924 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1925 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1926 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1927 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1928 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1929 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1935 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1936 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1937 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1939 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1940 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1941 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1947 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1948 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1950 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1951 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1953 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1954 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1957 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1960 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1961 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1962 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1963 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1968 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1969 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1970 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1971 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1972 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1974 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1976 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1977 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1978 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1979 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1983 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1984 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1985 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1986 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1987 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1991 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1995 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1996 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1997 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1998 /// before we fail backwards.
2000 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2001 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2002 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2003 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2004 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2005 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2006 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2009 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2010 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2011 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2012 /// before we fail backwards.
2014 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2015 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2016 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2017 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2019 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2020 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2022 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2024 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2025 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2026 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2028 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2029 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2030 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2032 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2033 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2034 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2036 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2041 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2048 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2050 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2051 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2052 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2056 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2057 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2058 force_holding_cell = true;
2061 // Now update local state:
2062 if force_holding_cell {
2063 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2064 match pending_update {
2065 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2066 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2068 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2072 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2073 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2074 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2081 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2082 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2083 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2089 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2091 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2092 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2095 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2097 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2102 // Message handlers:
2104 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2105 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2107 // Check sanity of message fields:
2108 if !self.is_outbound() {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2111 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2117 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2120 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2123 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2125 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2127 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2128 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2131 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2132 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2135 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2138 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2142 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2143 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2146 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2149 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2152 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2155 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2158 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2161 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2165 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2166 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2169 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2170 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2172 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2173 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2176 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2179 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2180 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2181 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2182 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2183 if script.len() == 0 {
2186 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2189 Some(script.clone())
2192 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2193 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2199 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2200 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2201 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2202 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2203 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2205 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2206 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2208 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2211 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2212 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2213 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2214 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2215 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2216 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2219 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2220 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2221 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2224 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2225 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2227 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2228 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2233 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2234 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2236 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2237 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2239 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2240 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2241 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2242 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2243 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2244 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2245 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2247 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2250 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2251 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2253 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2254 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2255 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2256 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2258 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2261 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2262 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2265 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2266 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2269 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2270 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2271 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2273 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2276 if self.is_outbound() {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2279 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2280 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2281 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2285 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2288 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2289 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2290 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2291 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2294 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2295 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2296 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2297 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2298 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2300 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2302 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2303 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2307 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2308 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2309 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2313 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2314 initial_commitment_tx,
2317 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2318 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2321 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2322 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2324 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2326 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2327 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2328 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2329 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2330 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2331 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2332 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2333 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2334 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2335 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2336 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2338 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2340 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2342 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2343 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2344 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2345 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2347 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2349 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2350 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2352 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2355 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2356 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2357 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2358 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2359 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2361 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2364 if !self.is_outbound() {
2365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2367 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2370 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2371 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2372 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2373 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2376 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2378 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2379 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2380 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2381 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2383 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2384 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2386 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2387 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2389 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2390 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2391 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2392 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2393 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2398 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2399 initial_commitment_tx,
2402 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2403 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2406 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2407 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2410 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2411 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2412 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2413 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2414 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2415 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2416 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2417 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2418 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2419 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2420 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2421 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2423 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2425 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2427 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2428 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2429 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2430 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2432 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2434 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2437 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2438 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2440 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2441 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2442 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2443 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2445 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2448 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2449 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2450 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2453 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2454 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2455 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2456 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2457 // when routing outbound payments.
2458 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2462 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2464 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2465 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2466 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2467 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2468 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2469 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2470 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2471 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2472 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2474 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2475 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2476 let expected_point =
2477 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2478 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2480 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2482 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2483 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2484 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2485 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2486 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2488 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2493 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2496 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2497 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2499 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2501 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2504 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2505 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2506 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2507 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2513 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2514 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2515 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2516 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2517 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2518 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2519 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2520 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2521 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2524 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2527 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2528 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2529 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2531 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2532 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2533 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2534 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2535 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2536 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2538 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2539 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2545 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2546 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2547 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2548 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2549 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2550 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2551 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2552 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2553 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2556 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2559 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2560 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2561 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2563 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2564 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2565 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2566 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2567 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2568 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2570 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2571 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2575 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2576 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2577 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2578 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2579 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2580 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2581 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2583 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2584 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2586 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2593 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2594 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2595 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2596 /// corner case properly.
2597 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2598 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2599 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2601 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2602 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2603 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2604 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2607 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2609 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2610 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2611 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2614 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2615 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2616 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2617 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2619 outbound_capacity_msat,
2620 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2621 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2622 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2628 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2629 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2632 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2633 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2634 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2635 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2636 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2637 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2640 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2641 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2643 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2644 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2647 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2648 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2649 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2651 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2652 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2654 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2657 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2658 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2660 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2661 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2663 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2664 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2666 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2667 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2671 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2678 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2679 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2680 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2683 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2684 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2685 included_htlcs += 1;
2688 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2693 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2694 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2695 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2697 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2698 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2703 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2705 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2706 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2711 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2712 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2716 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2717 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2721 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2722 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2724 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2725 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2726 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2728 total_pending_htlcs,
2729 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2730 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2731 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2733 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2734 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2735 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2737 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2739 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2744 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2745 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2746 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2748 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2749 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2751 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2754 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2755 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2757 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2758 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2760 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2761 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2763 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2768 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2775 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2776 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2777 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2778 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2779 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2780 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2783 included_htlcs += 1;
2786 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2787 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2790 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2791 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2793 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2794 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2795 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2800 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2801 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2805 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2806 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2808 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2809 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2811 total_pending_htlcs,
2812 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2813 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2814 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2816 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2817 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2818 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2820 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2822 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2827 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2828 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2829 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2830 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2831 if local_sent_shutdown {
2832 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2834 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2835 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2836 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2839 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2842 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2845 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2848 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2852 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2853 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2854 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2857 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2860 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2861 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2862 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2863 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2864 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2865 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2866 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2867 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2868 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2869 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2870 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2872 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2873 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2874 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2875 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2876 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2877 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2881 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2884 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2885 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2886 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2888 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2889 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2890 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2891 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2892 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2894 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2898 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2899 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2900 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2901 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2902 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2903 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2904 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2908 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2909 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2910 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2911 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2912 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2916 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2917 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2918 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2919 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2920 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2922 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2926 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2930 if !self.is_outbound() {
2931 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2932 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2933 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2934 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2935 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2936 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2937 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2938 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2939 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2940 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2941 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2942 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2943 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2944 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2945 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2948 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2949 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2950 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2951 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2955 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2958 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2962 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2963 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2964 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2968 // Now update local state:
2969 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2970 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2971 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2972 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2973 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2974 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2975 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2980 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2982 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2983 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2984 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2985 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2986 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2987 None => fail_reason.into(),
2988 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2989 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2990 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2993 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2997 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2999 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3000 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3002 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3008 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3011 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3012 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3015 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3019 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3022 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3023 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3026 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3030 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3034 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3035 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3038 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3042 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3046 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3047 where L::Target: Logger
3049 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3052 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3055 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3059 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3061 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3063 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3064 let commitment_txid = {
3065 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3066 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3067 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3069 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3070 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3071 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3072 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3073 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3078 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3080 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3081 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3082 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3083 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3086 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3087 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3088 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3094 if self.is_outbound() {
3095 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3096 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3097 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3098 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3099 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3100 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3101 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3102 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3103 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3104 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3110 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3114 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3115 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3116 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3117 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3118 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3119 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3120 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3122 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3123 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3124 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3125 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3126 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3127 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3128 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3131 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3133 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3137 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3138 commitment_stats.tx,
3140 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3141 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3142 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3145 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3146 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3148 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3149 let mut need_commitment = false;
3150 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3151 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3152 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3153 need_commitment = true;
3157 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3158 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3159 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3160 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3161 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3162 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3166 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3167 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3168 Some(forward_info.clone())
3170 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3171 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3172 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3173 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3174 need_commitment = true;
3177 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3178 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3179 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3180 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3181 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3182 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3183 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3184 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3185 need_commitment = true;
3189 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3190 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3191 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3192 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3194 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3195 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3196 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3197 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3198 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3199 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3200 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3201 // includes the right HTLCs.
3202 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3203 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3204 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3205 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3206 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3207 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3209 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3210 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3211 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3212 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3215 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3216 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3217 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3218 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3219 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3220 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3221 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3222 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3223 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3227 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3228 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3229 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3230 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3231 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3234 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3235 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3236 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3237 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3238 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3239 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3240 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3241 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3244 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3245 /// for our counterparty.
3246 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3247 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3248 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3249 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3250 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3252 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3253 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3254 updates: Vec::new(),
3257 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3258 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3259 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3260 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3261 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3262 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3263 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3264 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3265 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3266 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3267 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3268 // to rebalance channels.
3269 match &htlc_update {
3270 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3271 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3272 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3275 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3276 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3277 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3278 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3279 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3280 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3281 // into the holding cell without ever being
3282 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3283 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3284 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3287 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3293 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3294 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3295 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3296 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3297 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3298 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3299 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3300 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3301 (msg, monitor_update)
3302 } else { unreachable!() };
3303 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3304 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3306 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3307 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3308 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3309 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3310 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3311 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3312 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3313 // for a full revocation before failing.
3314 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3317 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3319 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3326 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3327 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3329 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3330 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3335 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3336 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3337 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3338 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3339 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3341 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3342 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3343 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3345 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3346 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3347 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3353 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3354 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3355 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3356 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3357 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3358 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3359 where L::Target: Logger,
3361 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3364 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3367 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3371 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3373 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3374 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3379 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3380 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3381 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3382 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3383 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3384 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3385 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3386 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3392 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3393 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3396 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3397 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3399 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3401 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3402 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3403 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3404 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3405 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3406 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3407 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3408 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3412 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3413 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3414 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3415 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3416 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3417 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3418 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3419 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3421 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3422 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3425 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3426 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3427 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3428 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3429 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3430 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3431 let mut require_commitment = false;
3432 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3435 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3436 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3437 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3439 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3440 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3441 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3442 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3443 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3444 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3449 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3450 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3451 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3452 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3453 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3455 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3456 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3457 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3462 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3463 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3465 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3469 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3470 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3472 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3474 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3475 require_commitment = true;
3476 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3477 match forward_info {
3478 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3479 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3480 require_commitment = true;
3482 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3483 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3484 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3486 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3487 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3488 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3492 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3493 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3494 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3495 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3501 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3502 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3503 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3504 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3506 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3507 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3508 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3509 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3510 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3511 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3512 require_commitment = true;
3516 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3518 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3519 match update_state {
3520 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3521 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3522 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3523 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3524 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3526 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3527 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3528 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3530 require_commitment = true;
3531 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3532 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3537 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3538 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3539 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3540 if require_commitment {
3541 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3542 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3543 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3544 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3545 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3546 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3547 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3548 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3549 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3551 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3552 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3553 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3555 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3556 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3559 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3560 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3561 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3562 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3563 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3564 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3565 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3567 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3568 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3569 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3571 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3572 if require_commitment {
3573 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3575 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3576 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3577 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3578 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3580 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3581 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3582 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3583 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3584 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3586 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3587 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3588 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3589 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3595 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3596 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3597 /// commitment update.
3598 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3599 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3600 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3603 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3604 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3605 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3606 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3608 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3609 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3610 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3611 if !self.is_outbound() {
3612 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3614 if !self.is_usable() {
3615 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3617 if !self.is_live() {
3618 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3621 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3622 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3623 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3624 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3625 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3626 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3627 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3628 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3629 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3634 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3635 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3636 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3637 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3638 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3641 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3642 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3646 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3647 force_holding_cell = true;
3650 if force_holding_cell {
3651 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3655 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3656 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3658 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3659 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3664 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3665 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3667 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3669 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3670 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3671 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3672 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3676 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3677 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3678 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3682 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3683 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3686 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3687 // will be retransmitted.
3688 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3689 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3690 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3692 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3693 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3695 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3696 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3697 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3698 // this HTLC accordingly
3699 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3702 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3703 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3704 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3705 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3708 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3709 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3710 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3711 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3712 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3713 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3718 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3720 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3721 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3722 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3723 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3727 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3728 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3729 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3730 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3731 // the update upon reconnection.
3732 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3736 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3737 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3740 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3741 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3742 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3743 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3744 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3745 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3747 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3748 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3749 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3750 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3751 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3752 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3754 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3755 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3756 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3757 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3758 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3759 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3760 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3763 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3764 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3765 /// to the remote side.
3766 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3767 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3768 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3769 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3772 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3774 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3775 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3776 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3778 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3779 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3780 // first received the funding_signed.
3781 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3782 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3783 self.funding_transaction.take()
3785 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3786 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3787 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3788 funding_broadcastable = None;
3791 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3792 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3793 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3794 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3795 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3796 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3797 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3798 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3799 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3800 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3801 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3802 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3803 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3804 next_per_commitment_point,
3805 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3809 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3811 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3812 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3813 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3814 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3815 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3816 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3818 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3819 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3820 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3821 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3822 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3823 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3827 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3828 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3830 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3831 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3834 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3835 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3836 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3837 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3838 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3839 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3840 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3841 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3842 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3846 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3847 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3849 if self.is_outbound() {
3850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3855 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3856 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3858 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3859 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3860 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3861 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3862 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3863 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3864 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3865 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3866 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3867 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3868 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3870 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3872 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3874 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3880 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3881 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3882 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3883 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3884 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3885 per_commitment_secret,
3886 next_per_commitment_point,
3890 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3891 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3892 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3893 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3894 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3896 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3897 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3898 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3899 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3900 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3901 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3902 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3903 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3904 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3909 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3910 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3912 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3913 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3914 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3915 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3916 reason: err_packet.clone()
3919 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3920 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3921 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3922 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3923 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3924 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3927 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3928 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3929 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3930 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3931 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3938 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3939 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3940 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3941 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3945 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3946 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3947 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3948 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3949 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3950 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3954 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3955 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3957 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3958 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3959 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3960 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3961 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3962 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3963 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3964 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3967 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3969 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3970 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3971 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3972 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3976 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3977 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3981 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3982 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3983 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3984 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3985 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3986 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3987 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3990 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3991 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3992 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3993 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3994 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3997 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3998 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3999 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4000 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4001 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4002 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4003 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4004 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4007 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4011 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4012 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4013 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4014 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4016 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4020 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4021 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4022 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4024 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4025 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4026 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4027 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4028 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4032 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4034 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4035 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4036 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4037 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4038 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4041 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4042 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4043 channel_ready: None,
4044 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4045 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4046 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4050 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4051 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4052 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4053 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4054 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4055 next_per_commitment_point,
4056 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4058 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4059 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4060 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4064 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4065 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4066 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4068 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4069 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4070 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4073 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4079 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4080 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4081 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4082 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4083 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4085 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4086 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4087 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4088 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4089 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4090 next_per_commitment_point,
4091 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4095 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4096 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4097 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4099 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4102 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4103 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4104 raa: required_revoke,
4105 commitment_update: None,
4106 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4108 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4109 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4110 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4115 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4116 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4117 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4118 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4119 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4120 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4123 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4124 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4125 raa: required_revoke,
4126 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4127 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4131 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4135 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4136 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4137 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4138 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4140 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4142 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4144 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4145 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4146 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4147 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4148 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4149 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4151 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4152 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4153 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4154 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4155 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4157 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4158 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4159 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4160 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4163 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4164 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4165 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4166 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4167 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4168 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4169 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4170 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4171 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4172 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4173 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4174 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4175 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4176 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4177 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4179 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4182 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4183 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4186 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4187 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4188 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4189 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4190 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4191 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4192 self.channel_state &
4193 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4194 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4195 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4196 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4199 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4200 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4201 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4202 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4203 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4204 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4207 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4213 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4214 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4215 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4216 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4218 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4219 return Ok((None, None));
4222 if !self.is_outbound() {
4223 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4224 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4226 return Ok((None, None));
4229 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4231 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4232 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4233 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4234 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4236 let sig = self.holder_signer
4237 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4238 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4240 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4241 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4242 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4243 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4245 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4246 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4247 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4252 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4253 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4254 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4255 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4257 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4260 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4261 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4262 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4263 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4266 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4267 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4271 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4273 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4277 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4278 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4282 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4285 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4286 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4287 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4288 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4290 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4293 assert!(send_shutdown);
4294 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4295 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4298 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4303 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4305 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4306 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4308 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4309 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4310 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4311 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4312 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4313 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4316 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4317 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4318 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4320 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4321 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4322 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4323 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4327 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4328 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4329 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4330 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4331 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4332 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4334 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4335 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4342 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4343 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4345 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4348 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4349 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4351 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4353 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4354 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4355 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4356 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4357 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4358 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4359 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4360 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4361 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4363 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4364 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4367 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4371 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4372 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4373 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4374 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4376 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4379 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4382 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4385 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4389 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4393 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4394 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4395 return Ok((None, None));
4398 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4399 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4400 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4403 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4405 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4408 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4409 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4410 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4411 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4412 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4416 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4417 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4422 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4423 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4424 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4425 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4426 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4427 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4428 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4432 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4434 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4435 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4436 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4437 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4439 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4442 let sig = self.holder_signer
4443 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4444 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4446 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4447 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4448 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4449 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4453 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4454 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4455 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4456 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4458 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4459 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4460 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4466 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4467 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4468 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4470 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4471 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4473 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4477 if !self.is_outbound() {
4478 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4479 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4480 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4481 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4483 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4485 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4487 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4488 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4491 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4492 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4493 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4494 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4495 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4496 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4497 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4498 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4503 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4504 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4505 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4506 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4512 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4513 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4514 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4515 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4517 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 // Public utilities:
4525 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4529 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4533 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4534 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4535 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4539 /// Gets the channel's type
4540 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4544 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4545 /// is_usable() returns true).
4546 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4547 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4548 self.short_channel_id
4551 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4552 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4553 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4556 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4557 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4558 self.outbound_scid_alias
4560 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4561 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4562 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4563 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4564 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4567 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4568 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4569 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4570 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4573 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4574 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4575 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4578 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4579 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4580 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4581 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4585 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4588 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4589 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4592 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4593 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4596 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4597 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4598 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4601 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4602 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4605 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4606 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4607 self.counterparty_node_id
4610 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4611 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4612 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4615 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4616 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4617 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4620 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4621 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4623 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4624 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4625 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4626 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4628 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4632 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4633 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4634 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4637 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4638 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4639 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4642 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4643 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4644 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4646 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4647 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4652 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4653 self.channel_value_satoshis
4656 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4657 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4660 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4661 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4664 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4665 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4668 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4669 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4670 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4673 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4674 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4675 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4678 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4679 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4680 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4683 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4684 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4685 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4686 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4687 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4690 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4692 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4693 self.prev_config = None;
4697 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4698 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4702 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4703 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4704 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4705 let did_channel_update =
4706 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4707 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4708 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4709 if did_channel_update {
4710 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4711 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4712 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4713 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4715 self.config.options = *config;
4719 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4720 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4721 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4722 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4723 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4724 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4725 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4727 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4728 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4731 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4733 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4734 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4740 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4741 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4742 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4743 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4744 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4745 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4746 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4748 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4749 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4756 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4760 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4761 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4762 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4763 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4764 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4765 // which are near the dust limit.
4766 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4767 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4768 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4769 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4770 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4772 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4773 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4775 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4778 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4779 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4782 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4783 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4786 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4787 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4791 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4796 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4798 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4799 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4800 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4801 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4802 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4803 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4805 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4815 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4816 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4820 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4821 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4822 self.update_time_counter
4825 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4826 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4829 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4830 self.config.announced_channel
4833 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4834 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4837 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4838 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4839 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4840 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4843 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4844 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4845 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4848 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4849 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4850 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4851 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4852 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4855 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4856 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4857 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4858 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4859 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4862 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4863 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4864 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4865 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4868 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4869 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4872 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4873 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4874 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4877 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4878 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4879 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4881 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4882 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4883 if self.channel_state &
4884 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4885 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4886 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4887 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4888 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4891 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4892 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4893 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4894 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4895 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4896 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4898 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4899 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4900 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4902 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4903 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4904 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4905 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4906 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4907 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4913 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4914 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4915 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4918 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4919 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4920 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4923 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4924 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4925 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4928 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4929 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4930 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4931 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4932 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4933 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4938 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4939 self.channel_update_status
4942 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4943 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4944 self.channel_update_status = status;
4947 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4949 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4950 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4951 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4955 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4956 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4957 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4960 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4964 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4965 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4966 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4968 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4969 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4970 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4972 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4973 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4976 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4977 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4978 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4979 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4980 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4981 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4982 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4983 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4984 self.channel_state);
4986 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4990 if need_commitment_update {
4991 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4992 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4993 let next_per_commitment_point =
4994 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4995 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4996 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4997 next_per_commitment_point,
4998 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5002 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5008 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5009 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5010 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5011 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5012 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5013 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5014 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5016 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5019 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5020 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5021 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5022 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5023 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5024 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5025 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5026 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5027 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5028 if self.is_outbound() {
5029 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5030 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5031 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5032 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5033 // channel and move on.
5034 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5035 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5037 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5038 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5039 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5041 if self.is_outbound() {
5042 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5043 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5044 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5045 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5046 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5047 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5051 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5052 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5053 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5054 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5055 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5059 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5060 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5061 // may have already happened for this block).
5062 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5063 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5064 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5065 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5068 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5069 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5070 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5071 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5079 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5080 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5081 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5082 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5084 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5085 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5088 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5090 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5091 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5092 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5093 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5095 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5098 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5101 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5102 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5103 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5104 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5109 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5110 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5111 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5113 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5114 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5116 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5117 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5118 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5126 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5128 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5129 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5130 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5132 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5133 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5136 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5137 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5138 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5139 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5140 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5141 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5142 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5143 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5144 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5147 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5148 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5149 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5150 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5152 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5153 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5154 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5156 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5157 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5158 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5159 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5161 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5162 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5163 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5164 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5165 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5166 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5167 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5170 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5171 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5173 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5176 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5177 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5178 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5179 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5180 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5181 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5182 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5183 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5184 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5185 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5186 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5187 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5188 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5189 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5190 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5191 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5192 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5198 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5203 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5204 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5206 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5207 if !self.is_outbound() {
5208 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5210 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5211 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5214 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5215 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5218 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5219 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5223 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5224 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5225 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5226 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5227 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5228 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5229 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5230 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5231 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5232 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5233 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5234 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5235 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5236 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5237 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5238 first_per_commitment_point,
5239 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5240 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5241 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5242 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5244 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5248 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5249 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5252 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5253 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5254 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5255 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5258 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5259 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5261 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5262 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5263 if self.is_outbound() {
5264 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5266 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5267 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5269 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5270 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5272 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5273 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5276 self.user_id = user_id;
5277 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5279 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5282 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5283 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5284 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5286 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5287 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5288 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5289 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5291 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5292 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5293 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5294 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5295 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5296 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5297 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5298 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5299 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5300 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5301 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5302 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5303 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5304 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5305 first_per_commitment_point,
5306 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5307 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5308 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5310 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5314 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5315 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5317 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5319 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5320 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5323 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5324 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5325 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5326 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5327 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5328 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5331 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5332 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5333 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5334 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5335 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5336 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5337 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5338 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5339 if !self.is_outbound() {
5340 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5342 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5343 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5345 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5346 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5347 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5348 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5351 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5352 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5354 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5357 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5358 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5363 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5365 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5367 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5368 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5369 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5371 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5372 temporary_channel_id,
5373 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5374 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5379 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5380 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5381 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5382 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5384 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5387 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5388 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5389 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5390 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5391 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5392 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5394 if !self.is_usable() {
5395 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5398 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5399 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5400 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5401 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5403 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5404 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5406 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5407 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5408 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5409 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5410 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5411 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5417 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5418 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5419 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5420 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5422 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5425 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5429 if !self.is_usable() {
5433 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5434 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5438 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5442 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5443 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5446 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5450 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5452 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5457 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5459 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5464 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5466 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5467 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5468 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5469 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5470 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5474 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5476 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5477 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5478 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5479 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5480 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5481 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5482 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5484 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5485 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5486 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5487 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5488 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5489 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5490 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5491 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5492 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5493 contents: announcement,
5496 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5500 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5501 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5502 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5503 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5504 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5505 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5506 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5507 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5509 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5511 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5513 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5514 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5516 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5518 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5519 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5522 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5523 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5525 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5528 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5531 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5532 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5533 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5534 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5535 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5536 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5539 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5541 Err(_) => return None,
5543 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5544 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5549 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5550 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5551 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5552 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5553 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5554 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5555 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5556 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5557 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5558 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5559 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5560 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5561 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5562 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5563 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5564 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5565 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5566 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5567 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5570 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5571 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5572 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5573 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5576 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5577 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5578 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5579 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5580 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5581 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5582 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5583 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5585 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5586 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5587 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5588 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5589 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5590 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5591 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5592 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5593 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5595 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5601 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5603 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5604 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5605 /// commitment update.
5607 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5608 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5609 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5610 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5612 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5613 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5615 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5616 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5621 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5622 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5624 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5626 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5627 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5629 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5630 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5631 /// regenerate them.
5633 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5634 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5636 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5637 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5638 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5639 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5640 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5643 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5644 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5645 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5648 if amount_msat == 0 {
5649 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5652 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5653 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5656 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5657 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5658 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5659 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5660 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5661 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5662 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5663 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5666 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5667 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5668 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5669 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5671 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5672 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5676 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5677 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5678 if !self.is_outbound() {
5679 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5680 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5681 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5682 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5683 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5684 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5688 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5691 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5692 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5693 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5695 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5696 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5697 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5698 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5699 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5700 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5704 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5705 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5706 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5707 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5708 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5709 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5713 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5714 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5718 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5719 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5720 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5721 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5723 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5724 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5727 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5728 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5729 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5730 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5734 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5735 force_holding_cell = true;
5738 // Now update local state:
5739 if force_holding_cell {
5740 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5745 onion_routing_packet,
5750 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5751 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5753 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5755 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5759 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5760 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5761 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5765 onion_routing_packet,
5767 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5772 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5773 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5774 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5775 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5777 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5778 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5779 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5781 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5782 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5786 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5787 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5788 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5789 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5790 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5791 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5792 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5795 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5796 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5797 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5798 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5799 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5800 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5803 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5805 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5806 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5807 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5809 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5810 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5813 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5814 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5815 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5816 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5817 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5818 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5819 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5820 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5823 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5827 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5828 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5829 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5830 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5834 if !self.is_outbound() {
5835 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5836 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5837 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5838 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5839 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5840 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5841 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5842 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5843 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5844 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5850 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5853 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5854 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5855 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5856 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5858 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5860 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5861 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5862 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5863 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5866 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5867 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5871 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5872 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5874 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5876 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5877 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5878 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5879 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5881 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5882 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5883 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5884 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5885 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5886 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5890 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5891 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5894 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5897 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5898 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5900 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5901 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5902 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5903 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5904 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5907 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5908 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5909 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5910 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5916 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5917 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5918 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5921 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5922 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5925 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5926 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5927 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5928 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5934 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5935 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5937 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5938 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5939 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5940 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5941 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5942 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5943 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5944 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5948 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5949 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5952 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5953 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5956 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5957 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5958 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5961 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5964 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5965 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5966 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5968 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5973 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5974 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5975 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5976 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5978 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5980 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5982 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5983 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5984 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5985 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5986 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5987 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5990 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5991 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5992 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
5994 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5995 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5996 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5999 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6000 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6001 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6002 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6003 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6005 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6006 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6013 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6014 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6016 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6019 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6020 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6021 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6022 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6023 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6024 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6025 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6026 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6027 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6028 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6029 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6031 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6032 // return them to fail the payment.
6033 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6034 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6035 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6037 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6038 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6043 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6044 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6045 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6046 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6047 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6048 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6049 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6050 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6052 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6053 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6054 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6055 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6060 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6061 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6062 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6065 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6066 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6067 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6069 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6070 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6074 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6078 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6079 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6081 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6087 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6088 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6089 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6090 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6091 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6093 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6094 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6095 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6096 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6102 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6103 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6104 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6105 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6106 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6107 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6112 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6113 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6114 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6115 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6117 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6118 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6119 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6120 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6125 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6126 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6127 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6128 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6129 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6130 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6135 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6136 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6137 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6140 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6142 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6143 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6144 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6145 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6146 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6148 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6149 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6150 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6151 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6153 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6154 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6155 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6157 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6159 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6160 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6161 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6162 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6163 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6164 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6166 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6167 // deserialized from that format.
6168 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6169 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6170 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6172 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6174 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6175 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6176 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6178 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6179 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6180 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6181 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6184 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6185 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6186 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6189 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6190 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6191 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6192 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6194 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6195 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6197 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6199 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6201 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6203 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6206 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6208 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6213 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6215 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6216 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6217 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6218 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6219 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6220 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6221 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6223 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6225 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6227 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6230 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6231 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6232 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6235 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6237 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6238 preimages.push(preimage);
6240 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6241 reason.write(writer)?;
6243 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6245 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6246 preimages.push(preimage);
6248 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6249 reason.write(writer)?;
6254 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6255 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6257 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6259 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6260 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6261 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6262 source.write(writer)?;
6263 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6265 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6267 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6268 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6270 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6272 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6273 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6278 match self.resend_order {
6279 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6280 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6283 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6284 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6285 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6287 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6288 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6289 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6290 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6293 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6294 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6295 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6296 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6297 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6300 if self.is_outbound() {
6301 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6302 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6303 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6305 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6306 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6307 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6309 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6311 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6312 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6313 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6314 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6316 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6317 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6318 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6319 // consider the stale state on reload.
6322 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6323 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6324 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6326 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6327 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6328 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6330 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6331 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6333 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6334 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6335 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6337 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6338 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6340 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6343 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6344 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6345 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6347 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6350 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6351 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6353 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6354 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6355 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6357 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6359 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6361 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6364 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6366 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6367 htlc.write(writer)?;
6370 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6371 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6372 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6374 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6375 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6377 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6378 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6379 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6380 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6381 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6382 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6383 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6385 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6386 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6387 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6388 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6389 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6391 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6393 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6394 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6395 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6396 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6398 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6399 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6400 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6401 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6402 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6403 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6404 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6406 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6407 (2, chan_type, option),
6408 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6409 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6410 (5, self.config, required),
6411 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6412 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6413 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6414 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6415 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6416 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6417 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6418 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6419 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6420 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6421 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6422 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6429 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6430 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6432 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6433 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6435 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6436 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6437 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6439 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6440 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6441 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6442 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6446 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6447 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6453 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let mut keys_data = None;
6464 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6465 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6466 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6468 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6469 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6470 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6471 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6472 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6473 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6477 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6478 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6479 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6482 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6490 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6491 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6492 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6493 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6494 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6497 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6498 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6499 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6500 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6501 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6506 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6508 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6509 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6510 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6512 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6513 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6515 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6516 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6517 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6519 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6523 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6527 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6530 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6535 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6537 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6538 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6539 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6540 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6541 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6543 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6547 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6548 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6550 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6551 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6552 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6554 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6558 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6559 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6560 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6561 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6564 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6566 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6569 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6570 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6571 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6574 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6575 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6576 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6577 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6580 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6582 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6585 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6590 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6591 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6592 // consider the stale state on reload.
6593 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6596 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6598 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6603 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6612 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6613 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6615 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6616 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6624 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6625 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6627 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6628 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6633 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6634 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6635 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6636 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6638 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6641 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6655 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6656 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6658 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6660 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6664 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6665 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6666 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6668 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6674 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6675 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6676 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6677 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6678 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6679 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6680 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6681 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6682 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6683 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6685 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6686 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6687 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6688 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6689 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6690 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6692 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6693 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6695 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6696 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6697 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6698 (2, channel_type, option),
6699 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6700 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6701 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6702 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6703 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6704 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6705 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6706 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6707 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6708 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6709 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6710 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6711 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6712 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6713 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6716 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6717 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6718 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6719 // required channel parameters.
6720 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6721 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6722 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6724 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6726 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6727 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6728 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6729 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6732 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6733 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6734 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6736 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6737 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6739 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6740 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6745 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6746 if iter.next().is_some() {
6747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6751 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6752 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6753 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6754 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6755 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6758 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6759 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6761 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6762 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6763 // separate u64 values.
6764 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6769 config: config.unwrap(),
6773 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6774 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6775 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6779 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6781 channel_value_satoshis,
6783 latest_monitor_update_id,
6786 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6789 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6790 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6793 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6794 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6795 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6799 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6800 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6801 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6802 monitor_pending_forwards,
6803 monitor_pending_failures,
6804 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6807 holding_cell_update_fee,
6808 next_holder_htlc_id,
6809 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6810 update_time_counter,
6813 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6814 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6816 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6818 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6819 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6820 closing_fee_limits: None,
6821 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6823 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6825 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6826 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6828 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6830 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6831 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6832 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6833 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6834 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6835 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6836 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6837 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6838 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6841 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6843 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6844 funding_transaction,
6846 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6847 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6848 counterparty_node_id,
6850 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6854 channel_update_status,
6855 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6860 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6861 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6862 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6864 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6866 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6867 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6868 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6870 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6873 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6875 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6878 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6886 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6887 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6888 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6889 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6890 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6892 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6893 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6895 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6896 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6897 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6898 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6899 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6900 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6901 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6902 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6903 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6904 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6905 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6906 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6907 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6908 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6909 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6910 use crate::util::test_utils;
6911 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6912 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6914 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6915 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6916 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6917 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6918 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6919 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6920 use crate::prelude::*;
6922 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6925 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6926 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6932 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6933 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6934 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6935 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6939 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6940 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6941 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6942 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6943 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6944 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6945 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6949 signer: InMemorySigner,
6952 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6953 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6956 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6957 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6959 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6960 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6963 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6967 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6969 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6970 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6971 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6972 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6973 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6976 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6977 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6978 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6979 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6983 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6984 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6985 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6989 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6990 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6991 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6992 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6994 let seed = [42; 32];
6995 let network = Network::Testnet;
6996 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6997 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6998 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7001 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7002 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7003 let config = UserConfig::default();
7004 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7005 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7006 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7008 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7009 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7013 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7014 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7016 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7017 let original_fee = 253;
7018 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7019 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7021 let seed = [42; 32];
7022 let network = Network::Testnet;
7023 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7025 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7026 let config = UserConfig::default();
7027 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7029 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7030 // same as the old fee.
7031 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7032 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7033 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7037 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7038 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7039 // dust limits are used.
7040 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7041 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7042 let seed = [42; 32];
7043 let network = Network::Testnet;
7044 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7045 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7047 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7048 // they have different dust limits.
7050 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7051 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7052 let config = UserConfig::default();
7053 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7055 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7056 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7057 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7058 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7059 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7061 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7062 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7063 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7064 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7065 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7067 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7068 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7069 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7071 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7072 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7073 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7074 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7077 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7079 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7080 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7081 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7082 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7083 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7085 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7086 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7087 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7088 payment_secret: None,
7089 payment_params: None,
7093 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7094 // the dust limit check.
7095 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7096 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7097 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7098 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7100 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7101 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7102 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7103 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7104 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7105 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7106 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7110 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7111 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7112 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7113 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7114 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7115 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7116 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7117 let seed = [42; 32];
7118 let network = Network::Testnet;
7119 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7121 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7122 let config = UserConfig::default();
7123 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7125 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7126 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7128 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7129 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7130 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7131 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7132 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7133 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7135 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7136 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7137 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7138 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7139 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7141 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7143 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7144 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7145 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7146 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7147 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7149 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7150 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7151 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7152 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7153 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7157 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7158 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7159 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7161 let seed = [42; 32];
7162 let network = Network::Testnet;
7163 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7164 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7165 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7167 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7169 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7170 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7171 let config = UserConfig::default();
7172 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7174 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7175 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7176 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7177 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7179 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7180 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7181 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7183 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7184 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7185 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7186 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7188 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7189 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7190 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7192 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7193 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7195 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7196 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7197 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7198 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7199 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7200 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7201 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7202 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7203 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7208 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7210 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7211 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7212 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7213 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7214 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7215 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7216 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7223 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7224 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7225 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7226 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7227 let seed = [42; 32];
7228 let network = Network::Testnet;
7229 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7230 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7231 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7233 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7234 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7235 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7236 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7237 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7238 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7239 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7240 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7242 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7243 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7244 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7245 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7246 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7247 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7249 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7250 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7251 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7252 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7254 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7256 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7257 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7258 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7259 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7260 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7261 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7263 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7264 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7265 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7266 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7268 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7269 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7270 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7271 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7272 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7274 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7275 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7277 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7278 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7279 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7281 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7282 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7283 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7284 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7285 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7287 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7288 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7290 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7291 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7292 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7296 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7298 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7299 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7300 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7302 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7303 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7304 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7305 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7307 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7308 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7309 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7311 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7313 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7314 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7317 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7318 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7319 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7321 let seed = [42; 32];
7322 let network = Network::Testnet;
7323 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7324 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7325 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7328 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7329 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7330 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7332 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7333 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7335 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7336 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7337 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7339 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7340 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7342 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7344 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7345 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7347 // Channel Negotiations failed
7348 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7349 assert!(result.is_err());
7354 fn channel_update() {
7355 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7357 let seed = [42; 32];
7358 let network = Network::Testnet;
7359 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7360 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7362 // Create a channel.
7363 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7364 let config = UserConfig::default();
7365 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7366 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7367 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7368 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7370 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7371 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7372 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7374 short_channel_id: 0,
7377 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7378 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7379 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7381 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7382 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7384 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7386 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7388 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7389 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7390 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7391 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7393 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7394 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7395 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7397 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7401 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7403 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7404 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7405 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7406 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7407 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7408 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7409 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7410 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7411 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7412 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7413 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7414 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7415 use crate::sync::Arc;
7417 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7418 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7419 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7422 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7424 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7425 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7426 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7428 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7430 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7431 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7436 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7437 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7438 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7440 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7441 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7442 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7443 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7444 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7445 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7447 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7449 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7450 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7451 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7452 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7453 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7454 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7456 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7457 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7458 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7459 selected_contest_delay: 144
7461 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7462 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7464 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7465 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7467 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7468 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7470 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7471 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7473 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7474 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7475 // build_commitment_transaction.
7476 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7477 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7478 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7479 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7480 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7482 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7483 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7484 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7485 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7489 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7490 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7491 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7492 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7496 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7497 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7498 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7500 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7501 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7503 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7504 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7506 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7508 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7509 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7510 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7511 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7512 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7513 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7514 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7516 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7517 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7518 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7519 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7521 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7522 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7523 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7525 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7527 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7528 commitment_tx.clone(),
7529 counterparty_signature,
7530 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7531 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7532 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7534 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7535 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7537 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7538 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7539 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7541 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7542 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7545 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7546 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7548 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7549 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7550 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7551 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7552 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7553 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7554 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7555 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7557 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7560 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7561 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7562 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7566 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7569 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7570 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7571 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7573 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7574 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7575 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7576 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7577 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7578 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7579 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7580 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7582 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7586 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7587 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7589 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7590 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7591 "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", {});
7593 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7594 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7595 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7596 "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", {});
7598 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7599 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7601 amount_msat: 1000000,
7603 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7604 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7606 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7609 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7610 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7612 amount_msat: 2000000,
7614 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7615 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7617 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7620 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7621 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7623 amount_msat: 2000000,
7625 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7626 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7627 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7629 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7632 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7633 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7635 amount_msat: 3000000,
7637 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7638 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7639 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7641 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7644 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7645 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7647 amount_msat: 4000000,
7649 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7650 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7652 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7656 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7657 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7658 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7660 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7661 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7662 "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", {
7665 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7666 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7667 "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" },
7670 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7671 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7672 "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" },
7675 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7676 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7677 "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" },
7680 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7681 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7682 "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" },
7685 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7686 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7687 "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" }
7690 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7691 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7692 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7694 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7695 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7696 "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", {
7699 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7700 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7701 "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" },
7704 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7705 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7706 "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" },
7709 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7710 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7711 "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" },
7714 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7715 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7716 "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" },
7719 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7720 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7721 "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" }
7724 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7725 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7726 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7728 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7729 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7730 "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", {
7733 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7734 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7735 "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" },
7738 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7739 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7740 "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" },
7743 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7744 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7745 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7748 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7749 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7750 "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" }
7753 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7754 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7755 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7756 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7758 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7759 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7760 "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", {
7763 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7764 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7765 "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" },
7768 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7769 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7770 "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" },
7773 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7774 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7775 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7778 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7779 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7780 "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" }
7783 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7784 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7785 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7786 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7788 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7789 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7790 "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", {
7793 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7794 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7795 "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" },
7798 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7799 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7800 "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" },
7803 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7804 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7805 "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" },
7808 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7809 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7810 "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" }
7813 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7814 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7815 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7817 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7818 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7819 "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", {
7822 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7823 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7824 "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" },
7827 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7828 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7829 "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" },
7832 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7833 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7834 "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" }
7837 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7838 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7839 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7841 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7842 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7843 "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", {
7846 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7847 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7848 "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" },
7851 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7852 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7853 "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" },
7856 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7857 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7858 "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" }
7861 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7863 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7865 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7866 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7867 "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", {
7870 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7871 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7872 "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" },
7875 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7876 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7877 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7880 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7881 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7882 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7883 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7885 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7886 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7887 "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", {
7890 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7891 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7892 "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" },
7895 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7896 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7897 "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" }
7900 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7901 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7902 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7903 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7905 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7906 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7907 "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", {
7910 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7911 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7912 "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" },
7915 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7916 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7917 "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" }
7920 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7921 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7922 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7924 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7925 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7926 "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", {
7929 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7930 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7931 "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" }
7934 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7935 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7936 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7937 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7939 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7940 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7941 "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", {
7944 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7945 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7946 "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" }
7949 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7950 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7951 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7952 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7954 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7955 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7956 "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", {
7959 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7960 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7961 "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" }
7964 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7965 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7966 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7967 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7969 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7970 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7971 "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", {});
7973 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7974 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7975 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7976 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7978 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7979 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7980 "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", {});
7982 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7983 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7984 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7985 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7987 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7988 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7989 "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", {});
7991 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7992 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7993 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7995 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7996 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7997 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7999 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8000 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8001 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8002 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8004 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8005 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8006 "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", {});
8008 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8009 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8010 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8011 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8013 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8014 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8015 "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", {});
8017 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8018 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8019 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8020 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8021 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8022 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8024 amount_msat: 2000000,
8026 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8027 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8029 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8032 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8033 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8034 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8036 amount_msat: 5000000,
8038 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8039 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8040 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8042 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8045 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8046 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8048 amount_msat: 5000000,
8050 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8051 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8052 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8054 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8058 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8059 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8060 "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", {
8063 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8064 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8065 "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" },
8067 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8068 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8069 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8071 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8072 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8073 "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" }
8076 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8077 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8078 "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", {
8081 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8082 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8083 "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" },
8085 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8086 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8087 "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" },
8089 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8090 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8091 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e83473044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced401008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8096 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8097 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8099 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8100 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8101 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8102 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8104 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8105 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8106 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8108 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8109 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8111 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8112 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8114 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8115 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8116 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8120 fn test_key_derivation() {
8121 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8122 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8124 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8125 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8127 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8128 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8130 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8131 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8133 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8134 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8136 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8137 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8139 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8140 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8142 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8143 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8147 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8148 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8149 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8150 let seed = [42; 32];
8151 let network = Network::Testnet;
8152 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8153 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8155 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8156 let config = UserConfig::default();
8157 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8158 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8160 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8161 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8163 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8164 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8165 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8166 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8167 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8168 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8169 assert!(res.is_ok());
8174 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8175 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8176 // resulting `channel_type`.
8177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8178 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8179 let network = Network::Testnet;
8180 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8183 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8184 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8186 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8187 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8189 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8190 // need to signal it.
8191 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8192 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8193 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8196 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8198 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8199 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8200 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8202 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8203 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8204 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8207 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8208 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8209 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8210 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8211 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8214 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8215 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8220 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8221 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8222 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8223 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8224 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8225 let network = Network::Testnet;
8226 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8227 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8229 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8230 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8232 let config = UserConfig::default();
8234 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8235 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8236 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8237 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8238 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8240 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8241 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8242 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8245 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8246 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8247 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8249 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8250 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8251 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8252 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8253 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8254 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8256 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8261 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8262 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8264 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8265 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8266 let network = Network::Testnet;
8267 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8268 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8270 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8271 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8273 let config = UserConfig::default();
8275 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8276 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8277 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8278 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8279 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8280 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8281 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8282 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8284 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8285 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8286 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8287 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8288 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8289 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8292 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8293 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8295 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8296 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8297 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8298 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8300 assert!(res.is_err());
8302 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8303 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8304 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8306 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8307 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8308 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8311 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8313 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8314 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8315 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8316 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8319 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8320 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8322 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8323 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8325 assert!(res.is_err());