use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
- use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use crate::util::events::{Event, ClosureReason, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
#[test]
fn test_async_ooo_offchain_updates() {
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
let persistences = chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.offchain_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(persistences.len(), 1);
.find(|(txo, _)| txo == funding_txo).unwrap().1.contains(&next_update));
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*funding_txo, update_iter.next().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ let claim_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(claim_events.len(), 2);
+ match claim_events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentClaimed { ref payment_hash, amount_msat: 1_000_000, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match claim_events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentClaimed { ref payment_hash, amount_msat: 1_000_000, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
// Now manually walk the commitment signed dance - because we claimed two payments
// back-to-back it doesn't fit into the neat walk commitment_signed_dance does.
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan.2);
- if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
+ if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
// Check that even though the persister is returning a InProgress,
// because the update is bogus, ultimately the error that's returned
// should be a PermanentFailure.
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
let (_, payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[2].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
let channel_id = chan_1.2;
let (outpoint, latest_update, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
let bs_fulfill_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
// Get the payment forwards, note that they were batched into one commitment update.
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let bs_forward_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_forward_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
let (outpoint, latest_update, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
- if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } = events[0] {
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } = events[1] {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
} else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[2] {
+ match events[0] {
Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
let (outpoint, latest_update, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_0, 100_000);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.msgs[0]);
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.commitment_msg);
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
let (funding_txo, mon_id, _) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id).unwrap().clone();
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(funding_txo, mon_id);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_0, 100_000);
// New outbound messages should be generated immediately upon a call to
// get_and_clear_pending_msg_events (but not before).
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_ok());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+
+ // We always send the `shutdown` response when initiating a shutdown, even if we immediately
+ // close the channel thereafter.
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } = msg_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } = msg_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
+
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
}
assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_ok());
let shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+
+ // We always send the `shutdown` response when receiving a shutdown, even if we immediately
+ // close the channel thereafter.
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } = msg_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } = msg_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
+
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
}
// `claim_funds` results in a ChannelMonitorUpdate.
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
let (funding_tx, latest_update_1, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
// which had some asserts that prevented it from being called twice.
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
let (_, latest_update_2, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(funding_tx, latest_update_2);
- // Complete the first HTLC.
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ // Complete the first HTLC. Note that as a side-effect we handle the monitor update completions
+ // and get both PaymentClaimed events at once.
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentClaimed { amount_msat: 1_000_000, payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected Event: {:?}", events[0]),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentClaimed { amount_msat: 1_000_000, payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected Event: {:?}", events[1]),
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
let (update_fulfill_1, commitment_signed_b1, node_id) = {
- match &events[0] {
+ match &msg_events[0] {
&MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
}
/// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
-pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
+pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
/// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
/// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
/// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
NewClaim {
/// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
- monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
+ monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
/// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
htlc_value_msat: u64,
- /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
- /// in the holding cell).
- msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
},
/// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
/// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
DuplicateClaim {},
}
-/// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
-/// state.
-pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
- pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
- pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
- pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
- pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
- pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
- pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
-}
-
/// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
}
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
- let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
- Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
- Ok(res) => res
- };
- // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
- Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
+ monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
+ htlc_value_msat,
+ }
},
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
- Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
- UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
+ monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
+ htlc_value_msat,
+ }
+ }
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
}
}
Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
+ pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger
{
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
bitcoin_tx.txid
};
debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
}
}
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
}
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
}
// TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
- return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
} else {
self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
- .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
- let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let mut need_commitment = false;
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
- // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
// the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
// includes the right HTLCs.
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
- // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
- return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
}
- let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
- let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
- // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
- Some(msg)
- } else { None };
+ true
+ } else { false };
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
-
- Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
+ log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
}
/// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
/// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
/// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
- pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
- } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
+ } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
}
/// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
/// for our counterparty.
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
}
}
if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
- return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
+ return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
}
let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
None
};
- let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
- // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
// but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
- Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs,
- update_fail_htlcs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee,
- commitment_signed,
- }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
} else {
- Ok((None, Vec::new()))
+ (None, Vec::new())
}
}
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger,
{
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
// When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
// which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
// before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
- let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
- // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- return Ok(RAAUpdates {
- commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- monitor_update,
- holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
- });
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
}
- match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
- (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
- commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
- for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
- }
- commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
- for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
- }
-
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
+ (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
+ let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
// free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
- Ok(RAAUpdates {
- commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
- finalized_claimed_htlcs,
- accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
- failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
- monitor_update,
- holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
- })
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
},
(None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
if require_commitment {
- let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
- Ok(RAAUpdates {
- commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs,
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed
- }),
- finalized_claimed_htlcs,
- accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
- monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
- })
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
} else {
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- Ok(RAAUpdates {
- commitment_update: None,
- finalized_claimed_htlcs,
- accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
- monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
- })
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
}
}
}
{
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
// If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
- ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
+ ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
where SP::Target: SignerProvider
{
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
- })
+ };
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
} else { None };
let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
Ok(Some(res))
}
- /// Only fails in case of signer rejection.
- fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
- Ok((commitment_signed, _)) => Ok((commitment_signed, monitor_update)),
- Err(e) => Err(e),
- }
- }
-
fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
}, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
}
- /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
- /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
+ /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
///
/// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
- /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
- Some(update_add_htlc) => {
- let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
- Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
+ if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
+ match send_res? {
+ Some(_) => {
+ let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
},
None => Ok(None)
}
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
- -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
+ ///
+ /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
+ pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
+ -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
- })
+ };
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
+ Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
} else { None };
let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
}
});
+ debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
+ "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
+
Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
}
}
#[inline]
- fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: LightningError {
- err,
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
- },
- chan_id: None,
- shutdown_finish: None,
- }
- }
- #[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
}
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
+ .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
failed_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
- }
-
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg
+ msg: shutdown_msg,
});
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
+ }
+
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
if !chan.get().is_live() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
}
- match {
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
- htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- payment_id,
- payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
- payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
- chan)
- } {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
- let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
- let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
- match (update_err,
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
- {
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
- (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
- // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
- // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
- // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
- // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
- // which we do in the send_payment check for
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
+ htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_id,
+ payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
+ payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
+ }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
+ match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
+ Some(monitor_update) => {
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
+ if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan) {
+ break Err(e);
+ }
+ if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
}
-
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- },
- });
},
None => { },
}
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
-
let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
None => None
)
).unwrap_or(None);
- if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
- {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
- match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
- Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
- let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
- mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
- }
- }
- if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
- log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
- }
- });
- }
- mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
- Ok(())
- } else {
- Ok(())
- }
- },
- Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
- e => {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
- // again on restart.
- log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
- "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, e);
- },
+ if let Some(mut peer_state_lock) = peer_state_opt.take() {
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+
+ if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
+ if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
+ peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
- if drop {
- chan.remove_entry();
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = res {
+ // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
+ // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
+ // update over and over again until morale improves.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
+ return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
}
- mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
- Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
- },
- }
- } else {
- let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage,
- }],
- };
- // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
- // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
- // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
- // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
- // again on restart.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
- payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ return Ok(());
}
- mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
- mem::drop(per_peer_state);
- // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
- // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
- // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
- // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
- // `PaymentForwarded`).
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
- Ok(())
}
+ let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage,
+ }],
+ };
+ // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
+ // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
+ if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
+ // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
+ // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
+ // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
+ // again on restart.
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
+ payment_preimage, update_res);
+ }
+ // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
+ // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
+ // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
+ // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
+ // `PaymentForwarded`).
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ Ok(())
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
- let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
- let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
- if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- break result;
- }
- }
-
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
}
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
+ }
break Ok(());
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
- Ok(())
+ result
}
fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
- match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
- Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
- Err((Some(update), e)) => {
- assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
- let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
- unreachable!();
- },
- Ok(res) => res
- };
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
- return Err(e);
- }
-
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: revoke_and_ack,
- });
- if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: msg,
- },
- });
- }
- Ok(())
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, chan)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
- let res = loop {
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
- htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
- if was_paused_for_mon_update {
- assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
- assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
- assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
- break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
- }
- if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
- raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
- raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
- break Err(e);
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- }
- if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- updates,
- });
- }
- break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
- raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
- chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
- .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
- chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- chan.get().get_user_id()))
+ let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, chan);
+ (htlcs_to_fail, res)
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
- match res {
- Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
- short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
- {
- for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
- let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
- }
- self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
- self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
- Ok(())
- },
- Err(e) => Err(e)
- }
+ res
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
- {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ 'chan_loop: loop {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
- match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
- Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
- if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
- failed_htlcs.push((
- holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
- *channel_id,
- chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
- ));
- }
- if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
- match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- updates: commitment_update,
- });
- },
- e => {
- has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
- if close_channel { return false; }
- },
- }
- }
- true
- },
- Err(e) => {
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
- // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
- !close_channel
+ let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
+ let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
+ }
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
+ has_monitor_update = true;
+
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
+ funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
+ if res.is_err() {
+ handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
}
+ continue 'chan_loop;
}
- });
+ }
+ break 'chan_loop;
}
}
// LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
// map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
pending_claiming_payments = None;
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
}
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[2] {
Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[2] {
+ match events[3] {
Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[3] {
- Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
}
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
- if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
+ if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
} else { assert!(false); }
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
- if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
+ if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
// Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff