1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
349 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
352 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
354 err: LightningError {
356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
363 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
364 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
368 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
371 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
374 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
378 log_level: Level::Warn,
381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
385 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 shutdown_finish: None,
401 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
402 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
403 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
404 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
405 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
407 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
408 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
409 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
410 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
411 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
412 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
413 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
415 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
419 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
420 struct ClaimingPayment {
422 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
423 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
426 (0, amount_msat, required),
427 (2, payment_purpose, required),
428 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
431 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
432 struct ClaimablePayments {
433 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
434 /// failed/claimed by the user.
436 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
437 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
439 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
440 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
441 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
443 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
444 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
445 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
446 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
449 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
450 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
451 /// quite some time lag.
452 enum BackgroundEvent {
453 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
454 /// commitment transaction.
455 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
459 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
460 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
461 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
462 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
463 /// event can be generated.
464 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
465 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
466 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
470 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
471 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
474 /// State we hold per-peer.
475 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
476 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
478 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
479 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
481 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
482 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
483 latest_features: InitFeatures,
484 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
485 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
486 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
487 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
488 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
490 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
491 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
492 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
493 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
495 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
496 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
497 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
498 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
499 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
500 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
501 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
502 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
503 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
504 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
508 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
509 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
510 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
511 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
512 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
513 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
516 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
520 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
521 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
523 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
526 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
527 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
528 struct PendingInboundPayment {
529 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
530 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
531 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
532 /// this payment being removed.
534 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
535 user_payment_id: u64,
536 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
537 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
538 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
541 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
542 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
543 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
544 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
545 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
546 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
547 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
549 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
550 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
558 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
560 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
565 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
566 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
567 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
568 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
569 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
570 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
571 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
572 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
574 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
575 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
577 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
578 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
580 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
581 /// to individual Channels.
583 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
584 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
585 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
586 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
588 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
589 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
590 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
591 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
592 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
593 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
594 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
596 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
597 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
598 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
599 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
602 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
603 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
604 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
605 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
606 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
608 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
609 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
610 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
611 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
612 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
615 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
616 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
617 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
618 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
619 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
623 // `total_consistency_lock`
625 // |__`forward_htlcs`
627 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
629 // |__`per_peer_state`
631 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
633 // | |__`claimable_payments`
635 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
641 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
643 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
647 // | |__`pending_events`
649 // | |__`pending_background_events`
651 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
653 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
655 ES::Target: EntropySource,
656 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
657 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
662 default_configuration: UserConfig,
663 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
664 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
670 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
672 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
674 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
675 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
677 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
678 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
679 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
680 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
682 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
683 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
685 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
686 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
687 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
688 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
689 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
690 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
691 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
692 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
694 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
696 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
697 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
699 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
701 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
702 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
703 /// and via the classic SCID.
705 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
706 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
708 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
710 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
712 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
713 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
714 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
719 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
720 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
733 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
735 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
736 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
737 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
739 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
740 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
741 /// the handling of the events.
743 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
744 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
747 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
748 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
749 /// would break backwards compatability.
750 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
751 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
752 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
754 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
757 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
759 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
760 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
761 /// confirmation depth.
763 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
764 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
765 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
771 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
773 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
775 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
777 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
778 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
779 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
781 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
782 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
784 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
785 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
786 /// keeping additional state.
787 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
789 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
790 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
791 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
792 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
794 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
795 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
797 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
798 /// are currently open with that peer.
800 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
801 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
804 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
806 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
807 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
808 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
809 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
810 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
812 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
813 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
814 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
815 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
816 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
817 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
818 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
819 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
820 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
821 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
822 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
824 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
833 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
835 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
836 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
837 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
838 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
839 pub struct ChainParameters {
840 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
841 pub network: Network,
843 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
845 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
846 pub best_block: BestBlock,
849 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
855 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
856 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
857 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
858 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
859 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
860 /// updates are ready for persistence).
862 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
863 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
864 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
865 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
866 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
868 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
869 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
872 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
873 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
874 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
877 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
878 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
880 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
881 persistence_notifier: notifier,
882 should_persist: persist_check,
883 _read_guard: read_guard,
888 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
890 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
891 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
896 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
897 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
899 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
901 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
902 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
903 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
904 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
905 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
907 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
908 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
910 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
912 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
913 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
914 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
915 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
916 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
917 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
918 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
919 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
920 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
921 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
922 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
923 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
924 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
926 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
927 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
929 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
930 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
931 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
932 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
934 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
935 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
936 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
937 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
938 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
939 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
942 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
944 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
945 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
948 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
950 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
951 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
953 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
954 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
955 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
956 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
958 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
959 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
960 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
961 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
962 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
963 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
964 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
965 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
966 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
967 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
968 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
971 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
972 /// to better separate parameters.
973 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
974 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
975 /// The node_id of our counterparty
976 pub node_id: PublicKey,
977 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
978 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
979 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
980 pub features: InitFeatures,
981 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
982 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
983 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
985 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
987 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
988 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
989 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
990 /// payments to us through this channel.
991 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
992 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
993 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
994 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
995 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
996 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
997 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1000 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1001 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1002 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1003 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1004 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1005 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1006 /// lifetime of the channel.
1007 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1008 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1009 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1010 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1011 /// our counterparty already.
1013 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1014 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1015 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1016 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1018 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1019 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1020 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1021 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1023 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1024 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1026 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1027 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1029 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1030 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1031 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1032 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1033 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1034 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1035 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1036 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1037 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1040 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1042 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1043 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1044 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1045 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1046 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1047 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1048 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1050 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1051 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1053 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1054 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1055 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1056 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1057 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1058 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1059 /// this value on chain.
1061 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1063 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1065 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1066 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1067 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1068 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1070 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1071 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1072 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1073 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1075 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1076 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1077 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1078 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1080 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1081 pub balance_msat: u64,
1082 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1083 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1084 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1085 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1087 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1089 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1090 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1091 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1092 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1093 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1094 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1095 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1096 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1098 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1099 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1100 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1101 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1102 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1103 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1104 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1106 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1107 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1108 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1109 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1110 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1111 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1112 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1113 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1114 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1116 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1118 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1119 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1120 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1121 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1122 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1124 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1125 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1126 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1127 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1128 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1129 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1130 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1132 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1133 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1134 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1135 pub is_outbound: bool,
1136 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1137 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1138 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1139 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1140 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1142 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1143 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1144 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1145 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1147 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1148 pub is_usable: bool,
1149 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1150 pub is_public: bool,
1151 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1152 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1153 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1154 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1155 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1156 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1158 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1159 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1162 impl ChannelDetails {
1163 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1164 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1165 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1167 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1168 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1169 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1170 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1173 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1174 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1175 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1177 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1178 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1179 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1184 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1185 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1186 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1187 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1188 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1190 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1192 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1193 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1194 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1197 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1198 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1199 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1201 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1202 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1203 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1205 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1206 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1207 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1209 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1210 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1214 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1216 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1218 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1219 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1220 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1221 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1223 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1224 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1225 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1228 macro_rules! handle_error {
1229 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1232 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1233 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1234 // entering the macro.
1235 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1236 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1238 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1240 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1241 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1242 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1243 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1247 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1248 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1249 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1250 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1255 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1256 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1258 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1259 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1260 action: err.action.clone()
1264 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1265 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1266 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1267 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1268 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1272 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1279 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1280 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1281 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1282 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1283 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1284 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1286 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1287 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1288 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1289 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1290 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1292 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1293 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1295 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1299 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1300 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1301 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1303 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1304 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1306 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1307 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1309 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1310 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1312 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1313 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1314 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1320 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1321 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1325 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1327 $entry.remove_entry();
1335 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1336 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1340 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1342 $entry.remove_entry();
1350 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1351 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1353 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1354 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1360 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1361 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1363 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1364 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1365 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1366 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1367 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1370 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1371 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1372 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1373 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1374 match $action_type {
1375 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1376 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1378 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1379 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1381 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1382 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1383 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1384 if !$resend_commitment {
1385 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1388 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1390 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1391 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1393 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1398 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1399 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1401 $entry.remove_entry();
1405 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1406 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1407 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1410 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1413 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1415 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1416 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1418 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1419 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1423 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1424 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1425 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1426 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1427 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1429 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1430 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1431 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1432 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1433 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1434 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1435 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1436 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1437 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1438 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1443 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1444 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1445 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1447 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1448 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1449 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1450 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1451 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1452 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1455 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1460 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1461 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1462 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1463 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1464 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1465 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1466 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1467 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1468 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1469 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1470 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1472 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1473 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1474 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1480 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1481 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1483 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1484 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1485 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1486 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1487 updates.announcement_sigs);
1488 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1489 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1492 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1493 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1495 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1497 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1498 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1500 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1501 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1502 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1503 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1508 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1509 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1510 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1511 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1512 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1514 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1515 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1516 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1519 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1520 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1521 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1522 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1523 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1524 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1525 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1526 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1531 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1532 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1533 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1534 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1536 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
1542 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1543 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1547 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1549 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1550 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1551 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1552 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1553 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1554 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1558 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1560 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1561 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1563 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1565 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1566 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1567 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1568 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1569 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1570 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1571 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1572 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1574 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1575 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1576 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1581 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1583 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1584 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1585 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1586 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1587 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1588 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1589 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1592 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1595 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1596 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1598 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1600 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1602 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1605 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1606 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1607 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1617 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1618 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1619 &self.default_configuration
1622 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1623 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1624 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1627 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1628 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1630 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1632 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1636 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1641 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1643 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1644 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1645 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1646 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1647 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1649 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1650 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1652 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1653 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1654 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1656 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1657 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1658 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1659 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1660 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1661 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1663 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1664 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1665 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1666 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1667 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1672 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1673 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1675 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1677 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1678 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1680 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1682 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1683 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1684 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1685 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1686 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1687 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1691 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1696 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1698 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1699 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1704 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1710 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1711 node_id: their_network_key,
1714 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1717 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1718 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1719 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1720 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1721 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1722 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1723 // the same channel.
1724 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1726 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1728 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1731 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1732 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1733 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1734 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1735 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1736 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1737 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1738 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1739 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1740 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1741 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1742 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1743 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1744 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1745 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1746 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1747 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1748 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1749 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1751 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1752 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1753 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1754 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1755 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1756 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1757 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1758 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1759 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1760 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1761 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1762 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1763 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1764 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1765 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1766 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1767 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1768 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1769 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1770 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1771 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1772 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1773 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1774 config: Some(channel.config()),
1782 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1783 /// more information.
1784 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1785 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1788 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1789 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1791 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1792 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1795 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1796 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1797 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1798 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1799 // really wanted anyway.
1800 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1803 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1804 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1806 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1807 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1808 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1810 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1811 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1812 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1813 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1814 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1815 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1816 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1817 total_msat: *total_msat,
1820 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1821 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1823 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1824 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1826 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1831 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1832 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1833 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1834 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1835 Some(transaction) => {
1836 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1840 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1841 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1842 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1843 reason: closure_reason
1847 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1850 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1851 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1854 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1855 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1859 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1861 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1862 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1863 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1864 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1865 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1867 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1868 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1869 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1870 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1871 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1875 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1876 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1877 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1878 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1879 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
1882 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1883 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1884 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1885 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1897 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1898 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1903 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1907 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1908 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1909 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1911 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1912 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1914 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1915 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1916 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1917 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1919 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1921 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1922 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1923 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1924 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1925 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1928 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1929 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1930 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1932 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1933 /// the channel being closed or not:
1934 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1935 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1936 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1937 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1938 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1939 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1940 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1942 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1944 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1945 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1946 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1947 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1948 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1952 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1953 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1954 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1955 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1956 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1957 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1958 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1959 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1961 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1962 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1963 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1964 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1965 // ignore the result here.
1966 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1970 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1971 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1972 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1973 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1976 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1980 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1981 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1982 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1984 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1986 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1991 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1992 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1993 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1994 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1995 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2000 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2003 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2005 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2006 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2008 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2009 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2010 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2011 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2012 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2013 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2014 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2025 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2026 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2027 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2029 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2030 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2031 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2034 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2035 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2036 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2038 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2039 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2040 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2041 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2042 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2045 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2046 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2047 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2048 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2049 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2053 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2054 /// local transaction(s).
2055 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2056 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2057 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2061 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2062 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2064 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2065 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2067 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2069 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2072 // final_expiry_too_soon
2073 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2074 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2076 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2077 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2078 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2079 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2080 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2081 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2082 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2083 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2086 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2089 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2090 return Err(ReceiveError {
2092 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2093 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2097 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2098 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2100 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2101 err_data: Vec::new(),
2102 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2105 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2106 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2107 return Err(ReceiveError {
2108 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2109 err_data: Vec::new(),
2110 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2112 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2113 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2115 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2116 phantom_shared_secret,
2118 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2119 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2120 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2121 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2122 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2123 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2124 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2125 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2126 return Err(ReceiveError {
2127 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2128 err_data: Vec::new(),
2129 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2133 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2135 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2138 return Err(ReceiveError {
2139 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2140 err_data: Vec::new(),
2141 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2146 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2149 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2150 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2151 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2152 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2156 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2157 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2158 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2160 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2161 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2162 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2163 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2164 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2165 failure_code: $err_code,
2171 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2172 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2175 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2176 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2177 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2179 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2180 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2181 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2182 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2183 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2184 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2185 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2186 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2188 macro_rules! return_err {
2189 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2191 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2192 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2193 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2194 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2195 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2196 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2202 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2204 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2205 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2207 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2208 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2212 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2213 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2215 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2217 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2218 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2219 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2220 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2221 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2223 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2226 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2227 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2228 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2230 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2231 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2232 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2235 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2236 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2237 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2238 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2242 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2243 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2244 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2247 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2248 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2249 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2250 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2251 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2256 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2257 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2258 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2259 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2260 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2261 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2262 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2263 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2264 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2265 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2266 // phantom or an intercept.
2267 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2268 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2269 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2273 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2276 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2278 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2279 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2280 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2281 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2282 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2284 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2285 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2286 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2288 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2289 // have no consistency guarantees.
2290 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2294 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2295 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2296 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2297 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2298 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2300 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2301 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2302 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2303 // we don't have the channel here.
2304 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2306 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2308 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2309 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2310 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2311 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2312 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2313 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2314 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2316 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2317 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2319 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2320 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2324 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2325 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2326 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2327 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2329 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2336 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2337 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2338 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2339 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2340 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2341 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2343 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2344 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2346 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2347 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2348 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2349 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2350 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2351 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2352 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2353 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2354 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2355 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2361 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2362 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2363 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2364 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2366 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2367 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2369 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2370 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2371 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2373 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2374 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2375 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2376 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2377 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2378 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2379 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2383 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2388 pending_forward_info
2391 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2392 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2393 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2395 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2396 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2397 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2398 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2399 if !chan.should_announce() {
2400 return Err(LightningError {
2401 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2402 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2405 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2406 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2409 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2412 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2413 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2414 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2415 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2417 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2418 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2419 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2420 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2422 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2423 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2427 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2429 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2431 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2433 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2434 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2436 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2437 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2438 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2439 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2440 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2441 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2442 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2443 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2445 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2446 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2447 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2449 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2451 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2457 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2458 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2460 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2461 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2463 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2464 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2465 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2466 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2467 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2469 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2473 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2474 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2475 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2476 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2480 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2481 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2482 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2483 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2484 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2485 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2486 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2488 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2489 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2490 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2492 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2493 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2495 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2496 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2497 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2498 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2499 Some(monitor_update) => {
2500 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2501 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2502 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan) {
2505 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2506 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2507 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2508 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2509 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2510 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2511 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2512 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2518 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2519 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2520 // `channel_by_id` map.
2521 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2522 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2527 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2528 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2530 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2535 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2537 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2538 /// fields for more info.
2540 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2541 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2543 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2545 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2546 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2547 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2549 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2551 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2552 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2553 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2554 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2555 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2557 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2558 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2559 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2560 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2562 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2564 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2565 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2566 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2568 /// In general, a path may raise:
2569 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2570 /// node public key) is specified.
2571 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2572 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2574 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2575 /// relevant updates.
2577 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2578 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2579 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2581 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2583 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2584 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2585 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2586 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2587 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2589 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2590 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2591 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2593 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2594 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2595 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2596 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2597 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2599 self.pending_outbound_payments
2600 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2601 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2602 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2605 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2606 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2607 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2608 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2609 self.pending_outbound_payments
2610 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2611 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2612 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2613 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2614 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2618 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2619 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2620 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2621 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2622 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2626 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2628 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2632 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2633 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2634 /// retries are exhausted.
2636 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2637 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2639 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2640 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2641 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2643 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2644 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2646 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2647 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2648 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2650 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2653 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2654 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2655 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2656 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2657 /// never reach the recipient.
2659 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2660 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2662 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2663 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2665 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2667 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2668 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2670 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2671 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2673 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2674 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2677 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2678 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2680 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2683 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2684 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2685 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2686 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2687 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2688 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2690 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2691 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2694 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2695 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2696 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2697 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2698 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2699 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2700 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2701 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2704 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2707 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2708 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2711 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2712 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2713 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2714 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2715 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2718 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2720 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2721 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2726 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2728 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2729 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2730 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2731 } else { unreachable!(); })
2734 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2737 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2738 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2741 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2742 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2747 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2748 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2753 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2756 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2757 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2758 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2767 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2768 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2769 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2773 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2775 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2776 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2778 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2779 /// across the p2p network.
2781 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2782 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2784 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2785 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2786 /// keys per-channel).
2788 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2789 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2790 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2792 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2793 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2794 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2796 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2797 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2798 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2799 /// for more details.
2801 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2802 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2803 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2806 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2807 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2808 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2809 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2814 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2815 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2816 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2817 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2818 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2820 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2824 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2825 let mut output_index = None;
2826 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2827 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2828 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2829 if output_index.is_some() {
2830 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2831 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2834 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2835 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2836 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2839 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2842 if output_index.is_none() {
2843 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2844 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2847 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2851 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2853 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2854 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2855 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2856 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2858 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2859 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2861 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2862 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2864 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2866 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2867 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2868 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2869 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2870 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2871 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2872 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2873 pub fn update_channel_config(
2874 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2875 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2878 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2883 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2887 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2890 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2891 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2892 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2893 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2897 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2898 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2899 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2902 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2904 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2905 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2906 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2914 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2915 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2917 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2918 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2920 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2921 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2922 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2923 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2924 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2926 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2927 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2929 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2932 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2933 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2934 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2935 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2936 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2939 let next_hop_scid = {
2940 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2941 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2942 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2945 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2947 if !chan.is_usable() {
2948 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2949 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2952 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2954 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2955 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2960 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2961 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2962 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2965 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2966 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2967 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2969 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2971 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2972 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2975 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2976 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2977 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2978 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2979 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2981 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2985 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2986 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2988 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2991 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2992 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2995 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2996 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2997 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3000 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3001 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3002 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3003 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3004 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3005 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3006 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3009 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3010 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3012 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3017 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3019 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3020 /// Will likely generate further events.
3021 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3024 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3025 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3026 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3028 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3029 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3031 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3032 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3033 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3035 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3036 match forward_info {
3037 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3038 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3039 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3040 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3041 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3044 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3045 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3046 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3048 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3049 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3050 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3051 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3052 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3053 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3056 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3057 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3059 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3062 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3063 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3069 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3070 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3072 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3076 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3077 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3079 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3083 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3084 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3085 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3086 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3087 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3089 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3090 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3091 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3092 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3093 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3095 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3097 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3098 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3102 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3103 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3104 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3105 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3111 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3114 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3117 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3118 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3119 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3120 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3121 // problem, not ours.
3127 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3128 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3130 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3135 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3136 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3137 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3144 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3148 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3149 match forward_info {
3150 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3151 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3152 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3153 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3154 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3158 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3159 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3160 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3161 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3163 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3164 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3166 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3167 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3168 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3170 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3171 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3173 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3175 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3176 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3177 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3178 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3183 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3184 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3186 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3188 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3189 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3191 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3194 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3196 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3197 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3198 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3207 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3208 match forward_info {
3209 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3210 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3211 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3212 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3215 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3216 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3217 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3218 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3220 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3221 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3223 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3226 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3227 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3228 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3229 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3230 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3231 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3232 phantom_shared_secret,
3234 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3236 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3241 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3242 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3243 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3244 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3245 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3247 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3248 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3249 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3250 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3251 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3252 phantom_shared_secret,
3254 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3255 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3259 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3260 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3261 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3262 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3263 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3266 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3267 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3268 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3270 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3271 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3272 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3275 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3276 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3277 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3280 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3281 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3282 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3283 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3285 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3289 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3290 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3291 total_value += htlc.value;
3292 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3293 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3294 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3296 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3297 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3299 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3301 _ => unreachable!(),
3304 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3306 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3307 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3308 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3309 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3310 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3311 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3312 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3315 amount_msat: total_value,
3316 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3317 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3319 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3321 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3322 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3324 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3326 payment_claimable_generated
3330 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3331 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3332 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3333 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3334 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3335 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3336 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3337 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3339 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3340 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3341 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3342 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3343 Ok(result) => result,
3345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3350 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3351 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3352 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3354 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3355 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3359 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3361 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3362 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3363 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3364 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3367 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3369 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3370 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3371 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3372 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3373 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3375 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3377 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3378 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3389 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3390 if payment_data.is_none() {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3395 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3396 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3398 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3399 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3401 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3402 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3404 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3405 if payment_claimable_generated {
3406 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3412 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3413 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3422 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3423 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3424 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3425 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3426 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3428 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3431 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3433 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3434 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3435 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3437 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3439 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3440 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3441 events.append(&mut new_events);
3444 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3446 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3447 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3449 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3450 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3451 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3452 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3453 if background_events.is_empty() {
3457 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3459 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3460 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3461 // monitor updating completing.
3462 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3469 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3470 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3471 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3472 self.process_background_events();
3475 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3476 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3477 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3478 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3480 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3481 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3483 if !chan.is_live() {
3484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3485 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3486 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3489 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3491 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3492 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3496 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3497 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3498 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3499 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3500 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3501 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3502 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3504 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3507 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3510 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3511 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3512 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3520 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3522 /// This currently includes:
3523 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3524 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3525 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3527 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3528 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3529 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3531 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3532 /// estimate fetches.
3533 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3534 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3535 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3536 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3538 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3540 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3541 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3542 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3545 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3548 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3549 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3550 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3551 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3552 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3554 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3555 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3556 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3557 if needs_close { return false; }
3560 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3561 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3562 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3563 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3564 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3565 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3566 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3571 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3572 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3574 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3575 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3576 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3580 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3581 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3586 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3590 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3591 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3596 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3597 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3598 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3599 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3600 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3601 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3602 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3603 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3604 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3605 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3606 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3608 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3609 // have no channels to the peer.
3610 let remove_entry = {
3611 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3612 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3615 entry.remove_entry();
3618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3623 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3624 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3625 // This should be unreachable
3626 debug_assert!(false);
3629 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3630 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3631 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3632 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3634 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3635 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3636 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3638 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3645 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3646 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3647 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3648 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3652 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3653 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3656 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3658 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3659 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3660 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3661 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3662 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3669 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3670 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3671 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3673 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3674 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3675 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3676 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3678 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3679 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3680 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3681 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3682 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3686 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3687 /// reason for the failure.
3689 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3690 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3693 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3694 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3695 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3696 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3697 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3698 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3704 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3705 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3706 match failure_code {
3707 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3708 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3709 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3710 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3711 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3712 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3717 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3718 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3720 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3722 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3723 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3724 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3725 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3726 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3727 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3728 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3730 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3732 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3733 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3735 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3740 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3741 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3742 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3743 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3744 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3745 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3746 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3747 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3748 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3749 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3751 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3752 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3753 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3754 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3756 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3757 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3758 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3759 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3760 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3764 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3765 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3766 // be surfaced to the user.
3767 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3768 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3769 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3771 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3773 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3778 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3782 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3785 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3786 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3787 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3792 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3793 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3794 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3795 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3796 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3797 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3798 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3799 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3800 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3803 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3804 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3805 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3808 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3809 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3810 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3812 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3813 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3815 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3816 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3817 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3819 let mut forward_event = None;
3820 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3821 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3822 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3824 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3826 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3829 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3832 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3833 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3834 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3835 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3836 time_forwardable: time
3839 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3840 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3841 failed_next_destination: destination,
3847 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3848 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3850 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3851 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3852 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3854 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3855 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3856 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3857 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3859 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3860 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3861 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3862 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3863 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3864 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3865 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3870 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3871 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3872 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3873 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3874 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3875 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3876 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3877 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3882 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3883 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3884 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3886 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3887 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3888 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3889 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3894 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3896 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3897 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3898 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3899 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3900 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3902 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3903 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3905 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3906 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3907 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3908 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3909 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3911 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3912 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3913 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3914 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3916 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3917 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3918 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3925 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3926 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3934 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3939 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3940 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3941 debug_assert!(false);
3946 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3947 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3948 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3949 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3950 if sources.len() != 1 {
3951 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3952 debug_assert!(false);
3958 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3960 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3961 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3962 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3963 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3966 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3967 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3968 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3969 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3973 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3974 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3975 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3976 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3978 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3979 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3980 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3981 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3982 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3987 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3988 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3989 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3990 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3991 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3992 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3993 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3995 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3998 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3999 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4000 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4001 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4005 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4006 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4007 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4008 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4011 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4012 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4013 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4017 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4018 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4019 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4023 if let Some(mut peer_state_lock) = peer_state_opt.take() {
4024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4025 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4026 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4027 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4029 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4030 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4032 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4033 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4035 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4036 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4037 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4039 if let Err(e) = res {
4040 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4041 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4042 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4043 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4044 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4050 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4051 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4052 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4056 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4057 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4058 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4059 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4060 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4061 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4062 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4063 // again on restart.
4064 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4065 payment_preimage, update_res);
4067 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4068 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4069 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4070 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4071 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4072 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4076 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4077 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4080 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4082 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4083 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4086 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4087 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4088 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4089 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4090 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4091 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4094 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4095 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4097 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4099 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4105 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4106 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4107 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4113 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4114 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4115 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4118 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4119 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4121 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4122 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4123 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4124 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4125 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4129 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4130 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4136 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4137 /// update completion.
4138 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4139 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4140 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4141 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4142 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4143 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4145 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4146 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4147 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4148 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4149 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4150 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4152 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4154 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4155 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4156 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4157 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4160 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4161 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4163 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4165 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4170 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4172 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4173 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4174 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4175 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4180 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4181 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4182 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4183 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4184 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4189 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4193 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4199 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4200 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4201 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4207 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4210 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4211 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4213 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4214 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4215 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4216 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4217 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4223 let mut peer_state_lock;
4224 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4225 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4226 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4229 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4234 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4235 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4236 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4239 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4242 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4244 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4245 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4248 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4249 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4250 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4252 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4253 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4254 /// used to accept such channels.
4256 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4257 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4258 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4259 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4262 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4263 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4265 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4266 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4267 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4269 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4270 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4272 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4273 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4275 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4276 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4278 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4279 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4280 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4281 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4284 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4288 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4289 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4294 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4295 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4298 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4299 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4300 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4301 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4303 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4306 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4307 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4308 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4312 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4313 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4317 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4323 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4324 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4328 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4332 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4333 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4334 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4336 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4338 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4340 debug_assert!(false);
4341 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4345 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4346 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4347 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4350 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4355 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4357 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4361 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4362 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4367 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4370 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4371 pending_events.push(
4372 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4373 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4374 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4375 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4376 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4377 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4382 entry.insert(channel);
4388 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4389 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4393 debug_assert!(false);
4394 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4398 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4401 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4406 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4407 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4408 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4409 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4410 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4412 user_channel_id: user_id,
4417 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4418 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4419 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4421 debug_assert!(false);
4422 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4424 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4425 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4426 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4427 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4428 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4430 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4435 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4436 // lock before watch_channel
4437 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4438 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4439 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4440 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4441 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4442 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4443 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4444 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4445 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4446 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4447 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4448 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4452 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4453 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4454 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4455 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4456 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4457 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4460 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4461 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4462 // the channel above.
4463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4465 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4470 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4471 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4474 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4475 funding_msg.channel_id))
4477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4478 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4481 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4482 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4485 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4486 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4494 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4496 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4500 debug_assert!(false);
4501 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4506 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4508 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4509 Ok(update) => update,
4510 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4512 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4513 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4515 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4516 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4517 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4518 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4519 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4520 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4521 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4527 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4528 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4535 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4536 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4540 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4542 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4544 debug_assert!(false);
4545 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4551 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4552 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4553 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4555 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4556 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4557 msg: announcement_sigs,
4559 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4560 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4561 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4562 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4563 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4564 // announcement_signatures.
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4566 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4568 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4574 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4582 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4583 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4584 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4588 debug_assert!(false);
4589 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4592 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4593 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4596 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4597 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4598 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4599 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4602 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4603 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4604 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4605 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4607 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4608 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4609 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4610 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4612 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4617 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4618 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4619 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4620 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4621 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4628 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4629 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4630 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4637 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4641 debug_assert!(false);
4642 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4644 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4647 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4649 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4650 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4651 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4652 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4657 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4658 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4659 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4660 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4661 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4662 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4663 } else { (tx, None) }
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4668 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4669 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4670 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4672 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4680 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4685 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4686 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4687 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4688 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4690 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4691 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4692 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4693 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4695 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4699 debug_assert!(false);
4700 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4707 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4708 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4709 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4710 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4711 match pending_forward_info {
4712 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4713 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4714 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4715 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4717 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4718 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4719 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4720 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4721 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4724 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4726 _ => pending_forward_info
4729 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4736 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4737 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4739 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4741 debug_assert!(false);
4742 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4748 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4753 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4757 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4761 debug_assert!(false);
4762 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4768 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4775 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4779 debug_assert!(false);
4780 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4787 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4788 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4790 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4797 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4801 debug_assert!(false);
4802 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4808 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4809 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4810 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4811 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4820 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4821 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4822 let mut forward_event = None;
4823 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4824 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4825 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4826 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4827 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4828 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4829 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4830 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4832 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4833 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4835 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4836 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4837 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4839 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4840 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4843 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4844 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4846 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4847 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4848 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4850 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4851 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4852 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4853 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4854 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4857 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4858 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4861 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4862 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4863 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4864 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4865 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4866 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4867 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4870 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4871 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4872 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4877 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4878 // payments are being processed.
4879 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4880 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4882 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4883 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4890 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4891 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4894 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4895 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4896 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4899 match forward_event {
4901 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4902 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4903 time_forwardable: time
4911 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4916 debug_assert!(false);
4917 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4921 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4923 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4924 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4925 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4926 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4927 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4929 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
4931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4934 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4938 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4942 debug_assert!(false);
4943 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4947 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4956 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4960 debug_assert!(false);
4961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4967 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4971 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4972 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4973 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
4974 msg, &self.default_configuration
4976 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4977 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4978 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
4981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4986 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4987 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4988 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4989 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4991 // It's not a local channel
4992 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4996 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4997 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4998 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5002 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5004 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5005 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5006 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5007 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5008 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5009 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5011 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5013 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5014 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5015 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5016 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5018 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5019 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5024 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5027 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5029 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5032 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5034 debug_assert!(false);
5035 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5039 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5041 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5042 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5043 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5044 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5045 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5046 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5047 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5048 let mut channel_update = None;
5049 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5050 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5051 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5054 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5055 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5056 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5057 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5058 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5059 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5060 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5065 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5066 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5067 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5068 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5069 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5070 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5078 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5079 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5082 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5083 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5088 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5089 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5090 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5091 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5092 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5093 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5094 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5095 match monitor_event {
5096 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5097 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5099 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5102 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5103 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5104 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5107 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5108 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5109 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5110 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5112 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5113 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5114 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5115 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5118 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5120 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5123 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5124 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5125 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5126 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5127 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5128 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5132 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5133 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5135 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5137 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5138 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5139 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5140 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5141 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5148 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5149 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5155 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5156 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5159 has_pending_monitor_events
5162 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5163 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5164 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5166 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5167 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5170 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5171 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5172 /// update was applied.
5173 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5174 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5175 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5176 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5179 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5182 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5183 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5184 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5185 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5186 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5187 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5188 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5189 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5191 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5192 has_monitor_update = true;
5194 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5195 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5196 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5197 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5198 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5199 peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5200 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5202 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5204 continue 'chan_loop;
5211 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5212 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5213 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5216 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5217 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5223 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5224 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5225 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5226 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5227 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5228 let mut has_update = false;
5230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5232 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5235 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5236 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5237 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5238 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5239 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5242 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5245 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5246 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5247 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5248 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5254 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5256 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5257 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5258 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5264 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5265 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5273 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5274 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5280 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5281 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5283 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5284 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5285 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5286 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5287 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5288 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5289 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5290 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5291 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5292 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5293 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5294 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5295 assert!(should_broadcast);
5296 } else { unreachable!(); }
5297 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5299 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5303 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5304 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5306 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5307 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5310 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5313 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5314 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5316 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5317 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5318 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5319 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5320 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5321 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5322 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5323 // never fail a payment too early.
5324 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5326 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5334 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5337 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5338 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5340 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5341 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5342 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5343 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5345 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5347 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5348 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5352 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5353 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5355 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5357 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5358 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5360 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5361 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5362 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5363 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5364 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5365 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5366 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5367 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5368 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5369 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5370 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5373 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5374 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5376 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5379 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5381 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5383 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5384 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5385 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5386 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5387 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5390 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5391 /// stored external to LDK.
5393 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5394 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5395 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5397 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5398 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5401 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5402 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5403 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5404 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5406 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5407 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5408 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5409 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5410 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5412 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5413 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5414 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5415 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5416 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5418 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5419 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5421 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5422 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5426 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5427 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5429 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5431 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5432 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5434 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5435 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5436 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5437 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5438 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5439 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5440 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5443 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5444 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5446 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5449 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5451 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5453 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5454 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5457 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5458 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5460 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5461 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5462 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5465 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5466 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5468 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5469 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5470 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5471 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5473 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5474 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5475 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5476 Some(_) => continue,
5477 None => return scid_candidate
5482 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5484 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5485 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5487 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5488 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5489 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5493 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5494 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5495 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5497 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5498 /// times to get a unique scid.
5499 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5500 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5501 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5503 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5504 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5505 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5506 return scid_candidate
5510 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5511 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5512 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5513 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5515 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5516 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5519 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5520 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5521 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5522 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5531 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5532 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5533 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5534 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5535 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5539 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5540 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5541 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5546 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5547 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5548 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5552 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5553 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5557 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5558 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5561 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5562 /// using the given event handler.
5564 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5565 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5568 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5569 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5570 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5572 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5574 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5575 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5576 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5577 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5580 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5581 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5582 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5585 for event in pending_events {
5586 handler(event).await;
5589 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5590 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5595 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5597 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5598 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5599 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5600 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5601 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5606 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5607 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5608 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5609 /// is always placed next to each other.
5611 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5612 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5613 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5614 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5616 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5617 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5618 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5619 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5620 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5621 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5622 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5624 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5625 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5626 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5627 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5630 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5631 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5633 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5634 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5637 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5639 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5642 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5643 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5647 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5648 events.replace(pending_events);
5657 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5659 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5661 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5662 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5663 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5668 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5670 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5671 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5672 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5673 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5674 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5676 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5677 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5678 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5679 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5682 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5683 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5684 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5687 for event in pending_events {
5688 handler.handle_event(event);
5696 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5698 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5699 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5700 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5701 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5702 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5703 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5707 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5709 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5710 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5711 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5712 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5713 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5716 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5717 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5720 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let new_height = height - 1;
5724 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5725 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5726 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5727 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5728 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5729 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5732 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5736 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5738 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5739 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5740 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5741 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5742 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5747 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5748 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5749 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5750 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5752 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5753 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5756 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5757 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5759 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5760 if height < last_best_block_height {
5761 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5762 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5766 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5767 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5768 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5769 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5771 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5772 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5776 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5778 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5780 macro_rules! max_time {
5781 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5783 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5784 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5785 // having an explicit local time source.
5786 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5787 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5788 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5789 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5790 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5796 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5797 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5798 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5799 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5803 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5804 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5805 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5806 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5808 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5809 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5810 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5817 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5819 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5820 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5821 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5822 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5823 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5824 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5829 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5831 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5832 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5833 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5834 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5835 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5836 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5840 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5841 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5843 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5844 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5845 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5846 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5847 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5849 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5850 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5853 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5856 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5857 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5858 let res = f(channel);
5859 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5860 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5861 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5862 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5863 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5865 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5866 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5867 if channel.is_usable() {
5868 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5869 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5870 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5871 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5876 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5880 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5882 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5885 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5886 msg: announcement_sigs,
5888 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5889 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5890 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5892 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5893 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5894 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5899 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5900 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5901 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5902 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5903 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5904 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5905 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5906 // is always consistent.
5907 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5908 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5909 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5910 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5911 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5914 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5915 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5916 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5917 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5918 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5919 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5920 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5924 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5925 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5926 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5927 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5928 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5929 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5930 data: reason_message,
5940 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5941 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5942 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5943 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5944 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5945 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5946 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5947 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5948 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5949 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5951 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5952 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5953 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5957 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5960 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5961 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5962 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5963 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5964 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5965 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5966 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5967 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5968 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5971 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5972 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5973 _ => unreachable!(),
5975 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5976 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5977 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5984 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5986 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5991 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5992 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5993 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5994 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5996 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5998 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5999 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6000 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6001 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6002 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6003 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6006 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6007 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6008 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6010 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6011 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6012 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6013 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6016 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6017 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6018 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6019 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6020 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6023 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6024 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6025 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6028 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6029 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6030 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6031 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6034 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6035 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6036 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6037 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6040 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6041 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6043 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6044 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6045 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6046 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6047 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6050 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6051 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6052 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6053 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6056 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6057 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6058 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6059 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6062 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6063 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6064 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6065 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6069 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6070 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6072 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6074 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6075 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6076 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6077 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6081 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6083 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6086 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6088 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6091 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6093 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6096 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6098 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6101 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6103 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6106 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6107 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6108 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6111 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6112 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6113 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6116 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6118 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6121 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6123 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6126 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6128 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6131 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6133 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6136 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6138 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6141 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6143 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6146 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6151 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6156 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6157 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6158 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6161 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6166 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6171 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6174 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6176 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6177 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6178 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6181 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6182 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6183 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6184 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6185 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6186 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6191 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6195 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6196 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6197 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6198 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6199 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6200 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6201 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6202 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6205 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6206 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6207 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6208 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6209 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6216 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6217 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6218 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6222 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6224 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6226 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6227 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6231 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6232 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6233 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6237 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6242 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6243 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6245 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6246 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6247 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6248 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6249 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6254 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6255 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6256 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6257 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6264 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6267 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6268 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6269 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6270 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6271 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6272 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6273 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6277 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6278 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6279 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6284 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6285 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6286 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6287 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6288 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6297 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6301 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6304 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6305 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6307 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6308 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6311 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6313 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6314 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6315 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6319 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6321 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6322 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6325 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6326 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6327 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6328 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6336 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6337 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6341 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6342 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6345 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6346 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6350 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6351 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6352 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6353 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6356 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6357 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6359 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6360 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6361 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6362 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6363 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6366 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6368 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6369 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6372 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6373 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6374 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6375 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6378 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6379 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6380 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6381 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6382 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6383 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6384 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6385 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6386 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6387 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6388 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6389 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6390 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6391 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6392 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6393 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6394 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6395 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6397 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6398 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6399 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6405 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6406 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6408 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6409 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6410 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6411 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6414 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6415 (2, node_id, required),
6416 (4, features, required),
6417 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6418 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6419 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6420 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6423 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6424 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6425 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6426 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6427 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6428 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6429 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6430 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6431 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6432 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6433 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6434 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6435 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6436 (7, self.config, option),
6437 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6438 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6439 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6440 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6441 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6442 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6443 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6444 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6445 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6446 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6447 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6448 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6449 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6450 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6451 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6452 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6453 (32, self.is_public, required),
6454 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6455 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6456 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6462 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6463 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6464 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6465 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6466 (2, channel_id, required),
6467 (3, channel_type, option),
6468 (4, counterparty, required),
6469 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6470 (6, funding_txo, option),
6471 (7, config, option),
6472 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6473 (9, confirmations, option),
6474 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6475 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6476 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6477 (16, balance_msat, required),
6478 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6479 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6480 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6481 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6482 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6483 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6484 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6485 (26, is_outbound, required),
6486 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6487 (30, is_usable, required),
6488 (32, is_public, required),
6489 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6490 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6491 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6494 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6495 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6496 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6497 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6498 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6502 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6504 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6505 outbound_scid_alias,
6509 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6510 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6512 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6513 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6514 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6515 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6516 confirmations_required,
6518 force_close_spend_delay,
6519 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6520 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6521 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6522 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6523 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6524 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6529 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6530 (2, channels, vec_type),
6531 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6532 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6535 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6537 (0, onion_packet, required),
6538 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6541 (0, payment_data, required),
6542 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6543 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6545 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6546 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6547 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6551 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6552 (0, routing, required),
6553 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6554 (4, payment_hash, required),
6555 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6556 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6557 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6561 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6564 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6566 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6567 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6568 reason.write(writer)?;
6570 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6571 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6574 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6575 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6576 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6577 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6584 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6585 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6586 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6590 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6591 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6596 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6597 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6598 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6599 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6600 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6603 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6604 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6605 // messages contained in the variants.
6606 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6607 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6608 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6610 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6612 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6613 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6614 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6617 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6619 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6620 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6621 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6623 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6628 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6634 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6635 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6636 (2, outpoint, required),
6637 (4, htlc_id, required),
6638 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6641 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6643 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6644 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6645 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6647 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6648 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6649 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6650 (2, self.value, required),
6651 (4, payment_data, option),
6652 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6653 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6659 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6660 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6661 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6663 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6664 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6665 let mut total_msat = None;
6666 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6667 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6668 (0, prev_hop, required),
6669 (1, total_msat, option),
6670 (2, value, required),
6671 (4, payment_data, option),
6672 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6673 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6675 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6677 if payment_data.is_some() {
6678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6680 if total_msat.is_none() {
6681 total_msat = Some(value);
6683 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6686 if total_msat.is_none() {
6687 if payment_data.is_none() {
6688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6690 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6692 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6696 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6699 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6706 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6707 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6708 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6711 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6712 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6713 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6714 let mut payment_id = None;
6715 let mut payment_secret = None;
6716 let mut payment_params = None;
6717 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6718 (0, session_priv, required),
6719 (1, payment_id, option),
6720 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6721 (3, payment_secret, option),
6722 (4, path, vec_type),
6723 (5, payment_params, option),
6725 if payment_id.is_none() {
6726 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6728 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6730 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6731 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6732 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6733 path: path.unwrap(),
6734 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6739 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6740 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6745 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6748 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6750 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6751 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6752 (0, session_priv, required),
6753 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6754 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6755 (3, payment_secret, option),
6756 (4, *path, vec_type),
6757 (5, payment_params, option),
6760 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6762 field.write(writer)?;
6769 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6770 (0, forward_info, required),
6771 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6772 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6773 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6774 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6777 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6779 (0, htlc_id, required),
6780 (2, err_packet, required),
6785 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6786 (0, payment_secret, required),
6787 (2, expiry_time, required),
6788 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6789 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6790 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6793 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6795 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6797 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6799 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6804 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6805 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6807 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6809 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6811 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6812 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6813 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6816 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6819 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6820 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6821 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6824 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6825 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6827 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6828 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6829 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6830 unfunded_channels += 1;
6835 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6837 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6840 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6841 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6842 channel.write(writer)?;
6849 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6850 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6851 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6852 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6853 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6854 for forward in pending_forwards {
6855 forward.write(writer)?;
6860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6862 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6863 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6864 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6866 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6867 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6868 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6869 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6870 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6871 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6872 htlc.write(writer)?;
6874 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6877 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6878 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6879 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6880 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
6883 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6884 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6885 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6886 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6887 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6889 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6890 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6891 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6892 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6893 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
6894 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6895 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
6900 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6901 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6902 for event in events.iter() {
6903 event.write(writer)?;
6906 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6907 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6908 for event in background_events.iter() {
6910 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6912 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6913 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6918 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6919 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6920 // likely to be identical.
6921 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6922 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6924 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6925 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6926 hash.write(writer)?;
6927 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6930 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6931 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6932 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6933 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6934 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6937 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6938 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6940 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6941 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6942 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6943 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6946 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6947 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6951 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6952 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6953 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6955 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6956 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6957 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6963 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6964 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6965 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6966 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6969 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6970 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6971 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6972 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6973 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6976 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6977 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6978 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6979 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6980 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6981 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6982 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
6983 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6984 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6985 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6992 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6994 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6996 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6997 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6998 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6999 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7000 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7001 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7002 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7003 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7004 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7005 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7006 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7007 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7008 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7010 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7011 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7013 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7014 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7016 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7017 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7018 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7019 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7020 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7021 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7023 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7024 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7026 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7027 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7028 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7029 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7030 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7031 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7035 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7036 pub entropy_source: ES,
7038 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7039 pub node_signer: NS,
7041 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7042 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7044 pub signer_provider: SP,
7046 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7048 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7049 pub fee_estimator: F,
7050 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7052 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7053 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7054 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7055 pub chain_monitor: M,
7057 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7058 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7059 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7060 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7061 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7062 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7064 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7066 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7067 /// deserialization.
7069 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7070 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7071 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7073 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7074 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7076 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7077 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7078 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7079 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7081 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7084 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7085 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7088 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7089 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7100 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7101 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7102 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7103 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7104 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7106 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7107 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7112 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7113 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7114 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7115 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7117 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7118 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7119 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7120 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7121 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7122 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7126 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7127 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7128 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7132 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7133 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7135 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7137 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7138 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7139 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7144 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7145 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7147 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7153 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7155 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7156 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7157 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7158 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7159 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7160 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7161 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7163 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7164 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7165 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7166 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7167 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7168 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7169 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7170 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7171 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7172 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7173 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7174 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7175 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7176 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7177 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7178 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7179 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7180 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7181 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7182 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7183 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7184 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7185 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7186 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7187 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7188 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7189 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7190 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7191 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7192 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7193 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7194 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7196 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7197 let mut found_htlc = false;
7198 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7199 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7202 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7203 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7204 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7205 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7206 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7207 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7208 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7209 log_info!(args.logger,
7210 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7211 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7212 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7216 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7217 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7218 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7220 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7221 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7223 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7225 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7226 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7229 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7230 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7231 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7235 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7236 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7237 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7238 // safely discard the channel.
7239 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7240 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7241 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7242 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7243 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7246 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7247 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7248 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7249 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7250 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7251 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7255 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7256 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7257 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7258 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7262 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7263 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7265 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7266 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7269 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7270 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7272 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7275 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7276 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7277 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7278 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7281 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7282 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7284 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7287 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7289 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7290 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let peer_state = PeerState {
7292 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7293 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7294 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7295 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7296 is_connected: false,
7298 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7301 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7303 for _ in 0..event_count {
7304 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7305 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7310 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7312 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7313 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7314 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7315 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7319 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7320 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7324 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7325 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7326 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7330 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7332 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7333 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7334 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7336 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7338 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7339 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7343 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7344 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7345 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7346 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7347 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7348 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7349 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7350 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7351 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7352 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7353 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7354 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7355 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7356 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7357 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7358 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7359 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7360 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7361 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7362 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7364 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7365 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7368 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7369 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7372 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7373 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7374 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7375 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7376 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7377 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7379 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7381 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7382 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7383 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7384 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7385 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7386 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7387 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7389 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7390 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7391 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7392 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7393 if path.is_empty() {
7394 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7395 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7397 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7398 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7399 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7400 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7402 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7403 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7404 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7407 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7408 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7409 retry_strategy: None,
7410 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7411 payment_params: None,
7412 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7413 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7415 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7416 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7417 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7418 total_msat: path_amt,
7419 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7421 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7422 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7427 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7428 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7429 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7430 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7431 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7433 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7434 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7435 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7436 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7437 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7438 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7439 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7440 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7441 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7442 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7443 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7448 !forwards.is_empty()
7450 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7451 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7452 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7453 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7454 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7455 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7456 intercepted_id != ev_id
7468 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7469 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7470 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7471 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7472 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7473 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7474 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7475 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7479 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7480 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7482 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7483 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7484 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7485 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7487 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7488 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7491 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7492 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7493 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7494 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7495 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7497 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7498 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7499 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7500 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7501 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7502 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7503 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7504 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7506 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7511 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7513 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7515 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7516 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7518 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7522 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7523 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7525 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7526 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7529 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7531 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7533 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7534 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7535 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7536 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7540 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7541 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7542 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7543 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7544 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7545 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7546 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7548 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7549 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7550 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7552 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7553 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7554 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7555 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7556 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7559 if chan.is_usable() {
7560 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7561 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7562 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7563 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7570 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7572 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7573 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7574 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7575 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7576 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7577 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7578 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7579 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7580 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7581 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7582 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7584 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7585 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7587 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7588 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7589 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7590 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7592 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7593 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7594 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7595 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7597 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7598 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7599 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7600 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7602 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7603 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7604 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7605 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7606 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7607 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7608 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7611 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7612 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7615 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7618 purpose: payment_purpose,
7619 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7625 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7626 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7627 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7629 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7634 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7636 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7637 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7638 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7639 router: args.router,
7641 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7643 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7644 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7645 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7646 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7648 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7649 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7650 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7651 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7652 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7653 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7655 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7660 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7662 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7664 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7665 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7666 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7667 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7669 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7670 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7671 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7673 logger: args.logger,
7674 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7677 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7678 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7679 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7680 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7681 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7684 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7685 //connection or two.
7687 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7693 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7694 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7695 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7696 use core::time::Duration;
7697 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7698 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7699 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7700 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7701 use crate::ln::msgs;
7702 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7703 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7704 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7705 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7706 use crate::util::test_utils;
7707 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7708 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7711 fn test_notify_limits() {
7712 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7713 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7716 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7717 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7719 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7720 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7721 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7722 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7723 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7725 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7727 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7728 // to connect messages with new values
7729 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7730 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7731 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7732 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7734 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7735 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7736 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7737 // ... but the last node should not.
7738 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7739 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7740 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7741 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7743 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7744 // about the channel.
7745 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7746 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7747 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7749 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7751 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7752 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7753 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7754 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7755 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7756 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7758 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7759 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7760 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7762 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7763 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7764 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7765 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7766 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7767 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7769 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7770 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7771 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7772 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7773 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7774 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7775 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7776 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7778 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7779 // the channel info has updated.
7780 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7781 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7782 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7783 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7784 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7785 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7789 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7790 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7796 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7798 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7799 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7800 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7801 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7803 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7804 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7805 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7806 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7807 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7808 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7810 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7812 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7814 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7815 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7819 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7820 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7823 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7827 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7828 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7829 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7831 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7832 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7835 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7837 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7838 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7840 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7842 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7844 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7845 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7846 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7847 // lightning messages manually.
7848 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7849 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7852 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7853 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7854 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7856 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7857 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7859 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7860 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7862 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7864 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7866 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7867 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7868 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7872 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7874 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7875 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7878 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7879 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7880 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7883 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7884 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7885 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7886 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7891 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7892 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7893 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7894 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7899 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7900 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7901 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7902 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7909 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7910 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7911 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7912 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7913 // fails as expected.
7914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7918 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7919 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7920 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7922 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7923 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7924 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7926 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7927 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7928 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7929 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7930 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7932 let route = find_route(
7933 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7934 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7936 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7938 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7940 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7941 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7945 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7946 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7950 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7951 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7952 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7953 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7954 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7955 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7956 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7957 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7958 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7960 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7961 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7963 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7964 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7965 let route = find_route(
7966 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7967 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7969 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7973 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7974 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7975 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7977 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7978 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7979 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7983 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7984 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7991 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7992 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7993 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7994 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7995 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7999 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8001 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8006 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8007 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8008 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8009 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8012 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8014 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8015 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8017 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8018 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8019 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8020 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8021 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8023 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8024 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8025 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8026 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8027 let route = find_route(
8028 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8029 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8032 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8033 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8034 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8035 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8039 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8040 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8041 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8042 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8043 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8046 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8050 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8051 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8057 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8058 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8060 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8061 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8062 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8063 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8064 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8066 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8067 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8068 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8069 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8070 let route = find_route(
8071 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8072 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8075 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8076 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8077 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8078 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8079 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8083 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8084 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8085 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8086 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8087 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8090 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8094 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8098 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8101 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8102 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8103 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8105 // Marshall an MPP route.
8106 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8107 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8108 route.paths.push(path);
8109 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8110 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8111 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8112 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8113 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8114 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8116 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8117 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8118 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8119 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8124 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8130 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8132 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8133 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8135 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8136 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8138 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8141 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8142 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8143 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8144 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8145 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8146 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8149 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8152 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8153 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8158 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8159 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8165 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8166 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8168 total_msat: 100_000,
8171 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8172 // payment verification fails as expected.
8173 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8174 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8175 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8176 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8178 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8182 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8183 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8187 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8188 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8189 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8190 // the channel is successfully closed.
8191 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8193 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8194 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8196 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8197 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8198 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8199 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8200 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8202 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8203 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8205 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8206 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8207 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8208 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8211 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8213 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8214 // as it has the funding transaction.
8215 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8216 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8217 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8222 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8224 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8226 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8227 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8228 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8230 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8231 // as it has the funding transaction.
8232 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8233 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8234 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8237 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8238 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8241 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8242 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8244 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8245 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8246 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8247 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8249 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8250 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8252 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8253 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8254 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8255 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8256 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8257 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8258 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8260 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8261 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8262 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8263 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8264 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8265 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8266 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8269 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8271 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8272 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8273 // closing transaction).
8274 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8275 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8276 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8278 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8279 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8280 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8281 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8282 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8285 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8287 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8289 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8290 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8291 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8293 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8296 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8299 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8300 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8301 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8304 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8305 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8306 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8309 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8311 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8312 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8314 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8315 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8317 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8318 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8323 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8324 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8325 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8326 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8327 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8328 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8329 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8333 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8334 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8335 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8337 // Test the API functions.
8338 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8340 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8342 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8344 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8346 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8348 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8350 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8355 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8356 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8357 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8358 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8362 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8363 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8367 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8368 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8369 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8371 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8374 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8375 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8380 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8383 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8384 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8386 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8390 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8392 use crate::chain::Listen;
8393 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8394 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8395 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8396 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8397 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8398 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8399 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8400 use crate::util::test_utils;
8401 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8402 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8404 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8405 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8406 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8408 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8412 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8413 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8414 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8415 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8416 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8417 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8418 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8419 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8424 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8425 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8428 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8429 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8430 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8432 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8433 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8435 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8436 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8437 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8438 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8439 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8441 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8442 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8444 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8445 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8446 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8447 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8449 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8451 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8453 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8454 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8455 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8456 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8457 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8459 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8461 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8463 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8464 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8465 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8466 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8467 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8470 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8471 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8472 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8474 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8475 } else { panic!(); }
8477 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8478 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8480 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8483 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8486 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8487 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8489 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8490 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8491 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8492 match msg_events[0] {
8493 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8494 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8495 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8499 match msg_events[1] {
8500 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8504 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8505 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8507 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8508 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8513 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8514 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8516 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8517 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8522 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8524 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8525 macro_rules! send_payment {
8526 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8527 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8528 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8529 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8530 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8531 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8532 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8533 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8534 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8535 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8537 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8538 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8540 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8541 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8543 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8544 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8545 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8546 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8547 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8548 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8549 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8550 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8552 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8553 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8554 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8555 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8557 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8558 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8559 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8560 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8561 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8563 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8566 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8567 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8568 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8569 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8571 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8576 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8577 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);